Oct. 22, 2020

PRISM Vol. 9, No. 1 (October 2020)

Though Great Power Competition (or GPC) dominates the current national security discourse, the United States is a global power with global interests. In addition to GPC, PRISM V.9,N.1 offers insight on the future of NATO, on U.S. engagement in Africa, and on emerging technology domains of competition such as quantum computing, 5G technology, and influence operations. Read American and South East Asian perspectives on competition with China, as well as Huawei’s rejoinder to "The Worst Possible Day: U.S. Telecommunications and Huawei," from PRISM V.8,N.3.

Oct. 21, 2020

China’s Strategic Objectives in a Post-COVID-19 World

On 1 October 2019, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) celebrated its 70th birthday, thus marking another important landmark of modern China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In commemorating the event, the Chinese government held a grand military parade with some 15,000 troops, more than 160 aircraft, and 580 active weapon systems during the event, including the latest generation nuclear missile systems such as the Dongfeng-41 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. As the South China Morning Post reported, citing one insider, “the parade, which aims to showcase President Xi’s achievement in military modernization and reforms in both hardware and software will carry a lot of political meaning.” Given ongoing social protests in Hong Kong and problems in western societies at that time (such as Brexit talks in the UK and political opposition to President Trump in the United States) the contrast could not have been more stark: A powerful and prosperous China celebrates its international success while many western societies fail and flounder amidst their own domestic problems.

Oct. 21, 2020

The Essence of the Strategic Competition with China

U.S. national security strategy and defense policy have come to focus on China as the primary emphasis in the “strategic competition” outlined by recent U.S. strategy documents. Outside government, an avalanche of recent reports and essays lays out the China challenge in sometimes fervent terms, depicting an ideologically threatening revisionist state with malign intentions. As the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf put it recently, “Across-the-board rivalry with China is becoming an organizing principle of U.S. economic, foreign and security policies.

Oct. 21, 2020

Rediscovering a Strategic Purpose for NATO

Watford is at first sight an unlikely place for a gathering of world leaders. This nondescript suburb to the north of London found itself briefly in the media spotlight one chilly afternoon in December 2019. Boris Johnson had taken time out from his election campaign just before polling day to host a meeting of NATO leaders. It was intended to be a signal of allied unity in the 70th anniversary year of the 1949 Washington Treaty.

Oct. 21, 2020

The Evolution of Authoritarian Digital Influence: Grappling with the New Normal

As the world contends with the wide-ranging ramifications of the global COVID-19 pandemic, it has been simultaneously beset by the global information crisis, which mimics the shape of the pandemic itself in its viral effects across huge segments of the global population.

Oct. 21, 2020

Quantum Computing’s Cyber-Threat to National Security

Quantum computing has the potential to bring tremendous advancements to science, including biology, chemistry, physics, and many other disciplines. The practical application will empower a stronger defense against future pandemics similar to COVID-19, not only in the acceleration of the development of vaccines and treatments, but also in optimizing currently unsolvable logistics problems such as how to deliver and route vaccines. In computer science, the “traveling salesman problem” shows it is impractical to find the optimal shortest path to visit cities once the list grows to even a few dozen. This same challenge in delivering vaccines to rural areas during a pandemic is exactly the type of problem that quantum computing will be well suited to solve.

Oct. 21, 2020

No Competition Without Presence: Should the U.S. Leave Africa?

American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United States military is not the world’s police force, and where others can share the burden, the United States should add only its unique capabilities. But defending U.S. interests extends even into faraway lands, including Africa. While Africa may never be a top national security concern for the United States, a convergence of gains by state and nonstate actors alike there affect U.S. security and economic interests globally. Yet the Pentagon’s recent effort to rebalance its resources against great power competitors—especially China and Russia—after almost two decades of counterterrorism dominance places the commitment of U.S. military resources to Africa in question. Drawing down too far militarily in Africa risks losing influence on the continent to those very same state actors, erasing hard–fought counterterrorism gains, and compromising U.S. global interests.

Oct. 21, 2020

International Competition to Provide Security Force Assistance in Africa: Civil-Military Relations Matter

Western states increasingly tackle the problem of state fragility in Africa through the delivery of security force assistance (SFA). What is SFA and why does it matter?  Broadly speaking, SFA is a term used to describe the provision of military aid, advisors, and resources to a fragile state, so that the armed forces of that state can provide security in support of stability. SFA typically consists of the deployment of small numbers of military advisors and resources to a fragile or weak state to build effective armed forces. However, such efforts are often overly technical and rarely address the political and institutional problems that create insecurity and the fragmented security organizations of that state (e.g. police, military, intelligence, etc.). Worse, in some cases, such SFA has only created the veneer of military effectiveness, known as the Fabergé Egg army problem; an expensively built military, but easily broken by insurgents.

Oct. 21, 2020

Don’t Trust Anyone: The ABCs of Building Resilient Telecommunications Networks

The January issue of Prism carried an article titled “The Worst Possible Day”1 that included a discussion of the implications for the United States of banning Chinese company Huawei from networks that the United States and its allies rely on for national security-related communications. A supporter of the ban, the author, Thomas Donahue, emphasized the critical importance of using equipment from trusted sources in U.S. telecom infrastructure and that of its allies. He argued that the consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic when the United States needs to project power, or convincingly threaten the use of force, such as during a military conflict. The article concluded that the United States needs to seriously consider how to assure the use of trusted alternatives to Huawei equipment, whether by supporting the development of a U.S.-based manufacturer or consortium, or spending tens of billions of dollars to acquire either or both the manufacturers Nokia and Ericsson, or investing significantly in the two Nordic firms.

Oct. 21, 2020

Is China Expansionist?

The Chinese soldier who pushed the Indian Colonel Santosh Babu (who tragically died) and thereby triggered the violent clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers in mid-June 2020 should be court-martialed. Both sides suffered casualties, the worst since 1975. This one push by one Chinese soldier has set back China-India relations severely, undermining all the good work that had been done over several years by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao, as well as by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. Equally importantly, it has reinforced a growing belief, especially in the western world, that as China’s economy becomes stronger and stronger, China will abandon its “peaceful rise” and behave as a militarily expansionist power. This could well happen. It would be naive to believe otherwise. However, a deep study of Chinese history and culture would also show that the continuation of a peaceful rise is equally plausible.

Oct. 21, 2020

An Interview with General Joseph Votel, USA (Ret)

First and foremost, we have largely blunted the platform that was used to attack our country on 9/11, and our military operations there have ensured that the area cannot be used as a location from which to attack our citizens or our homeland. We certainly have accomplished that. I think we have also provided the opportunity for the Afghan people to move forward in their own way; to exercise self-rule, for example. It has certainly been a very difficult path and it will continue to be as we move forward. It is not an easy situation, but I think we have provided the opportunity for them to become a more stable part of the Central Asian scene, and hopefully not be a platform from which terrorist organizations or other elements of instability can continue to impact the people of Afghanistan or others in the region.

Oct. 21, 2020

Exercise of Power

I first met Secretary Gates in the summer of 2006, when he was President of Texas A&M and had been invited to the Pentagon to meet with my boss, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. I was a newly selected 3-star Vice Admiral, and knew all about him, of course, as a career CIA officer who went on to lead the Agency before retiring and heading into academe, first as Dean of the Bush School and then as President at Texas A&M. When he came into my small office outside the vast Secretary of Defense office, I started to usher him in immediately, but he spent several minutes asking me about myself, how long I had been with Secretary Rumsfeld, where I had been before my current job. It was friendly and engaging conversation, but you could feel that spymaster’s gaze sizing you up and filing the conversation away. I thought to myself, I would like to work for him someday—never considering it would happen. I sure wasn’t going to get out of the Navy and move to Texas.

Oct. 21, 2020

The Return of the Russian Leviathan

Sergei Medvedev, Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, is a fox; a thoroughly modern, or perhaps I should say, post-modern fox. Isaiah Berlin would understand. The British historian of ideas wrote a paradigmatic essay on Russian literature, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” in which he contrasted Tolstoy the fox, with Dostoevsky the hedgehog. As Berlin explained, the hedgehog knows one big thing, but the fox knows many things.

Oct. 21, 2020

The Dragons and the Snakes

Every few years David Kilcullen publishes an insightful book that inspires new thinking in the U.S. armed forces and becomes a standard reference for all manner of strategies, operational plans, and concepts. The Australian anthropologist, former army officer, and conflict zone observer has a unique talent for capturing global dynamics in warfare and explaining them to a wide audience. In 2009, it was The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. In 2013, it was Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. His newest, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, repeats the feat in a timely book for the re-emerging multipolar world.

Oct. 15, 2020

America and the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

The US Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program hosted a conversation on October 15, 2020 as a part of its SMA INSS/PRISM Speaker Series, featuring Honorable Robert Zoellick and moderator General (Ret.) David Petraeus.

Sept. 23, 2020

Geoeconomics and the Emerging World Order: The Power of the U.S. Dollar

The US Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program hosted a speaker session on September 23, 2020 as a part of its SMA INSS/PRISM Speaker Series, entitled “Geoeconomics and the Emerging World Order: The Power of the U.S. Dollar.” This brief was presented by the Honorable Jack Lew (Former United States Secretary of the Treasury, White House Chief of Staff, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget).

Sept. 10, 2020

Joint Force Quarterly 98 (3rd Quarter, July 2020)

As I write this column from my table far away from my NDU Press office during the pandemic, I am wondering about the scope of it all, as I am sure many of you are. Was COVID-19 unexpected? Unprecedented? Did we all think it would not happen? One thing I am certain about—such times bring out the need for capability and teamwork in the harshest of conditions. While not a typical environment for the military, often when we see the need to team up in ways that might not be traditional to work out a “wicked problem” like this one, I wonder if this situation is exactly what jointness is for.

Sept. 10, 2020

Surrogate Warfare

What do you get when two Middle Eastern subject matter experts decide to update the age-old concept of proxy warfare and explore the potential of machines to serve as surrogates that substitute or supplement a nation’s formal military forces? The answer is an ambitious and useful examination of how war is changing in light of emerging technologies, such as autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) and cyber weapons able to leverage artificial intelligence (AI). Members of the joint force willing to brave the occasional academese passages on Clausewitzian theory will find gems of insight throughout Surrogate Warfare.

Sept. 10, 2020

The New Rules of War and The Dragons and the Snakes

It is said that generals always want to refight the last war. Often scholars are willing to do the same. Martin Van Creveld’s Transformation of War (Free Press, 1991) was heavily influenced by the painful intifadas in his native Israel. Mary Kaldor’s New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Stanford University Press, 1999) was based on the criminal warlords of the ethnic Balkan clashes. In his The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Knopf, 2007), British general Rupert Smith declared that war, as he was taught, no longer existed and drew heavily on the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and his tour in Bosnia. Conventional warfare was thrown into history’s dustbin and “wars amongst the people” presented as a novel paradigm shift.

Sept. 10, 2020

The Duke of Marlborough and the Paradox of Campaigning in Long Wars

The Duke of Marlborough was a commander for the ages. For 10 campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession, stretching from 1702 to 1711, he was never defeated on the field of battle. However, the war ended in the failure of the Grand Alliance’s war aim to prevent Louis XIV’s Bourbon dynasty from taking the throne of Spain. Marlborough’s campaign in 1711 provides a potent source of understanding for joint military commanders and practitioners on the complexities of campaigning.

Sept. 10, 2020

Leveraging Return on Investment: A Model for Joint Force Campaign Plan Assessments

On August 2, 2019, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper informed the military Services of a department-wide fiscal program review to better align the future joint force toward a near-peer threat environment, a process similar to the “night court” proceedings he held during his tenure as the Secretary of the Army. The directive memo states, “No reform is too small, too bold, or too controversial to be considered.”

Sept. 10, 2020

The Psychology of Jointness

No military in the world can employ the forces of different services in such an integrated and interdependent manner as the U.S. military, and we can attribute this hard-won level of competence, accumulated over decades, to reforms stemming from the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA). These changes led the U.S. military to become the most powerful force in the world by compelling it to become the most joint force in the world.

Joint Force Quarterly 98 Sept. 10, 2020

The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance

In 1955 a book titled The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 was published; it would soon become a landmark study of civil-military relations. Gordon Craig’s unassuming tome became widely influential within and outside the civil-military relations field and spurred the publication of what has become a wide literature on the politics of armies (particularly those of the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, and France) that takes a different approach to our conventional understanding of civil-military relations.

Sept. 10, 2020

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Sept. 10, 2020

Preparing Senior Officers and Their Counterparts for Interagency National Security Decisionmaking

America will be better off if uniformed officers know more about interagency decisionmaking and their civilian colleagues understand more about the military and how it is schooled. The answer to the problems at hand is education writ large, but the critical part will be in determining how, when, and where this education takes place.

Sept. 10, 2020

Evaluating Strategies: Six Criteria for National Security Professionals

It is relatively easy to examine past strategies and evaluate whether they were successful; it is much more difficult to evaluate current and proposed strategies to determine whether they are likely to be effective. This article briefly discusses some of the proposals in business literature for evaluating corporate strategies and incorporates many of these ideas into six criteria for evaluating security strategies.

Sept. 10, 2020

Disinformation and Disease: Operating in the Information Environment During Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions

Previous disease outbreaks involving narrative exploitation by the former Soviet Union, Russia, and Iran highlight the consequences of failing to identify and counter misinformation and disinformation. The expected rise in disease- and disaster-related FHA missions demands interagency community and Department of Defense (DOD) coordination to mitigate risks. This analysis illustrates the threat posed by adversaries and the necessity of building expertise to synchronize information-related capabilities for counternarrative planning.

Sept. 10, 2020

Accelerating Military Innovation: Lessons from China and Israel

The U.S. military’s technological advantage is under threat. Since the end of the Cold War, the military has been largely occupied with relatively low-tech counterterrorism and counterinsurgency conflicts against non-peer adversaries. Much U.S. defense research and development (R&D) during that time focused on delivering incremental innovations to address capability gaps in existing systems and warfighting concepts. As a result, many of today’s frontline systems are upgraded versions of those used in the Gulf War almost 30 years ago.

Sept. 10, 2020

Structuring for Competition: Rethinking the Area of Responsibility Concept for Great Power Competition

Even if we can create and master new tools capable of dominating today’s battlespace, just having the best technology will not be enough: Winning conflicts today requires changes to the ways DOD organizes and employs forces. Ultimately, if the United States fails to take a comprehensive approach toward adapting to the challenges of the information age and adversarial competition, then we will cede our national security advantage.

Sept. 10, 2020

Executive Summary

As I write this column from my table far away from my NDU Press office during the pandemic, I am wondering about the scope of it all, as I am sure many of you are. Was COVID-19 unexpected? Unprecedented? Did we all think it would not happen? One thing I am certain about—such times bring out the need for capability and teamwork in the harshest of conditions. While not a typical environment for the military, often when we see the need to team up in ways that might not be traditional to work out a “wicked problem” like this one, I wonder if this situation is exactly what jointness is for.

Aug. 19, 2020

GeoEconomics and the Emerging World Order

Held on August 19, 2020, this lecture and discussion featured Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, University Professor at Columbia University. Dr. Stiglitz is winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics (2001) and in 2011 was named by Time magazine as one of the 100 most influential people in the world. The session was chaired by PRISM Editor, Michael Miklaucic.

Aug. 12, 2020

The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations

This paper argues that leaders, historians, and pundits have grossly exaggerated civilian micromanagement of the U.S. military, resulting in less effective civilian and military oversight of military operations and a reduced likelihood that military operations will achieve strategic results.

July 28, 2020

Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations

China’s latest round of military reforms is driven primarily by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes.

July 7, 2020

Latin America 2020: Challenges to U.S. National Security Interests

U.S. national security interests in Latin America are undermined by three key threats: transnational criminal organizations, which exploit weak levels of governance across the majority of countries in the region; extra-regional actors, which fill the vacuum created by U.S. distraction and inattention to its neighborhood; and finally, a number of regional political actors embracing ideological positions opposed to open political systems and free markets, which undermine progress toward democratic governance and stability.

July 2, 2020

Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (1st Edition)

This edition has been revised and updated. See the 2nd Edition for the most recent version.

June 25, 2020

System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War over Taiwan?

In his 2019 New Year’s Day address, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping issued a stern warning to Taiwan: “We make no promise to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures.” At the same time, he warned that force could also be used to forestall “intervention by external forces,” referring to the United States. While designed to intimidate recalcitrant Taiwan and U.S. leaders—and appeal to domestic nationalists—rather than to signal an imminent confrontation, Xi’s comments underscored the very real military threats that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to Taiwan. As the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency notes, Taiwan has been the “primary driver” of PLA modernization for decades, spurring the development of short- and long-range ballistic missiles, amphibious and airborne units, and other capabilities targeted at Taiwan and intervening U.S. forces. Those threats have become more worrisome as the PLA conducts large-scale exercises and provocative bomber flights around the island. The PLA’s improved warfighting capabilities have contributed to China’s near-term cross–Taiwan Strait objective—deterring Taiwan independence. Understanding the costs that a war would impose on the island, few but the most die-hard Taiwan independence activists have supported overt moves toward de jure independence.

June 12, 2020

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 4 (June 2020)

As the National Security and National Defense Strategies state, the world has entered a phase of great power competition in which the United States is confronted by a rising China and a resurgent Russia. PRISM V.8,N.4 offers perspective on this competition with articles by Sir Lawrence Freedman, the Honorable Joseph Nye, and the Honorable Andrew Natsios.

June 11, 2020

Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror

One might assume that a history of America’s 21st century turn to irregular warfare would have little to offer policymakers grappling with the challenge of great power competition. In Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror however, Maria Ryan offers a meticulous account not of how the United States might organize itself for futuristic high-tech warfare or geopolitical competition, but, rather, how it came to elevate a form of warfare that many U.S. defense planners and practitioners would prefer to view through the rear-view mirror. And yet, the lessons implied by Ryan’s impressive piece of scholarship should serve as a cautionary tale not just for practitioners seeking to ensure irregular warfare remains a “core competency” of the U.S. military, but also for those managing the tradeoffs and dilemmas of the contemporary strategic environment.

June 11, 2020

Foreign Aid in an Era of Great Power Competition

Over the past decade the international political system has evolved into a state of great power rivalry in which the United States is challenged for international leadership by a rising China and a rapidly re-arming, revanchist Russia. A new militant nationalism is spreading across the globe; democracy appears to be in retreat as aggrieved populations turn to populist authoritarianism as a remedy. This rising political and strategic competition has now crossed over into the international development space.

June 11, 2020

Perspectives for a China Strategy

When the Munich Security Conference met in February 2020, China was the most frequently mentioned country, while there was an exaggerated mood of Western decline. Yet as the recent COVID-19 pandemic has shown, China has both strengths and weaknesses. Its initial censorship, suppression of feedback and curtailment of international information allowed the pandemic to develop and fester. Draconian quarantine of Wuhan curtailed its spread somewhat; followed by a government propaganda campaign to attract others to the theme that China’s behavior had been benign. When the pandemic eventually subsides, however, China will be faced with the political and economic costs resulting from the exposure of both a failed public health system and an overly rigid party control system.

June 11, 2020

COVID-19: The Pandemic and its Impact on Security Policy

The world is caught up in an existential struggle. The opponent is intangible; it spares neither state nor social group and does not stop at any border. For many of us, this struggle feels like war. Indeed, with the growing use of war-like language in the fight against COVID-19, also called coronavirus, a rapidly rising number of victims, and last but not least the economic consequences which are becoming increasingly clear, we seem to be experiencing a war-like situation.

June 11, 2020

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner: The Challenges of “By, With, and Through”

Taking a peacebuilding approach to working with local militaries and armed groups means using assistance to fragmented security sectors to increase cooperation between various formal and informal elites in a weak state. This approach places less emphasis on developing conventional military power and more emphasis on facilitating and improving relations between the different factions within the security sector and between the security sector and the civilian population. If international providers help local partners perform better at military tasks without ensuring that the forces have local legitimacy and strong accountability, progress is likely to be fleeting and could actually exacerbate civilian harm and the underlying drivers of violent conflict.

June 11, 2020

China’s Private Military and Security Companies: “Chinese Muscle” and the Reasons for U.S. Engagement

On 7 February 2019, General Thomas Waldhauser, then-Commander of United States Africa Command, stated the following during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee: “The Chinese bring the money and the Russians bring the muscle.” “Chinese money” is evident in the fact that since 2009, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner.

June 11, 2020

AI Singularity and the Growing Risk of Surprise: Lessons from the IDF’s Strategic and Operational Learning Processes, 2014-2019

For decades, scholars have pondered the likelihood and effect of computers surpassing human intelligence, often referred to as the singularity. For militaries, artificial intelligence (AI) singularity will be a double-edged sword. We should seek to achieve and employ it, while denying our adversaries the opportunity to do so. When AI singularity does emerge, it will likely have profound implications for tactical capabilities, as well as strategic and operational decisionmaking.

June 11, 2020

ROC(K) Solid Preparedness: Resistance Operations Concept in the Shadow of Russia

Resistance is a form of warfare. It can be planned. The Resistance Operations Concept is simply a resistance primer. It contains guidance and advice toward establishing a nationally authorized resistance capability. It advises the establishment of a pre-crisis organization for nations under greater threat, for the purpose of having a unified resistance effort against an occupier, and renders specific organizational guidance.

June 11, 2020

Who Wants to Be a Great Power?

Strategic competition is back in vogue. After years of worrying about ethnic conflict and humanitarian intervention, civil wars and counterinsurgency, there is a renewed focus among policymakers, think-tankers, and academics on traditional strategic concerns and in particular great power confrontation. For many students of international relations this appears as no more than recognizing a feature of the system that never went away.

June 3, 2020

Just Another Paper Tiger? Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

In March 2018, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi responded to a question about the Donald Trump administration’s new “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy by comparing it to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean” that might get some attention, “but soon will dissipate.” Wang’s remarks raise an important question for U.S. policymakers: Is Beijing so confident in its own influence, and doubtful of U.S. commitments in the region, that it perceives a green light to continue or expand the kinds of behavior Washington is trying to discourage, such as coercion of China’s territorial rivals and “predatory” lending?

May 6, 2020

The Geo-Economic Dimension of Great Power Competition

This faculty seminar was held on Wednesday, May 6, 2020 and focused on the fundamentals of geo-economics and the drivers or dimensions of geo-economic competition. This seminar features two distinguished subject matter experts on China and geo-economics, and is part of a series that looks at modern great power competition and how to prepare national security leaders for the associated challenges. The discussion was led by Carolyn Bartholomew and William Overholt, and moderated by PRISM Editor Michael Miklaucic.

April 1, 2020

Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2nd Quarter, April 2020)

This issue of JFQ shows the way ahead for the Joint Force. In our Forum and JPME Today sections, we discuss emerging battlespace technologies. In Commentary, authors propose the development of a new global engagement cycle. In our Features section are articles about the need to adapt the Joint Force command and control structure, about dealing with Iran as a rival nation-state, and addressing A2/AD threats in the Indo-Pacific region. In Recall, we see how General Ulysses Grant learned the art of joint operations in the Civil War. Finally, we review Andrew Marble’s biography of former CJCS General John Shalikashvilli.

April 1, 2020

Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power

When developing strategy, the US military considers all instruments of power (IOP) in planning activities that require a whole-of-government approach. Recently, newer IOPs such as financial, intelligence and law enforcement have emerged. The National Defense Strategy and a doctrine note on strategy mention the new IOPs, but there is no guidance on how they could be applied in a competitive environment. A better understanding of these new IOPs could mitigate the gap in doctrine and joint planning, say the authors, by defining the terms, identifying key mission partners, and detecting potential applications for each new instrument.

April 1, 2020

Airbase Defense Falls Between the Cracks

Locating US overseas airbases far from the enemy used to be sufficient to protect the airbases. Now that our enemies are better organized and technologically equipped, distance is unlikely to provide refuge from the reach of these increasingly capable adversaries. This paper considers two types of threats to overseas airbases. The first is direct and indirect attacks by special operators, and the second is attacks by theater ballistic and cruise missiles. To improve the protection of airbases against enemy forces, say the authors, the concept of a base security zone should be incorporated in joint doctrine.

March 31, 2020

Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific: A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force

Amphibious training is unusually significant in the Indo-Pacific region due to the nature of troop dispositions and geography. Seventy years ago, this was the assessment of General Douglas MacArthur. Today, the Joint Force’s ability to deploy and maneuver ground forces in a contested maritime-centric region is limited to transit through the land and air domains. Redeveloping the Army’s forcible-entry amphibious capability would give the Joint Force flexibility to deploy ground forces through maritime corridors controlled by the Navy. This, says the author, would increase the cross-domain synergy of US forces in a potential anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) campaign in the Indo-Pacific.

March 31, 2020

Disciplined Lethality: Expanding Competition with Iran in an Age of Nation-State Rivalries

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies Iran as a long-standing threat to US strategic interests and a source of instability in the Middle East. This article examines the prospects of expanding strategic competition with Iran, and argues the US could outcompete Iran without resorting to the US’s traditional overmatch strengths. The best way to defeat Iran’s attempts to undermine American power and influence is by defining acceptable behavior, setting expectations, and laying ground rules for competition. This disciplined lethality, says the author, would allow for success in the gray zone while keeping competition beneath large-scale combat.

March 31, 2020

Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain Command and Control

Advances in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems offer enhanced military capabilities to nations who adopt and operationalize these technologies. How might the Joint Force change policy and leadership structures to maximize the benefits of such technologies? In this article, data science concepts are applied to the historical example of the Department of Defense (DOD) 2003 data strategy to yield insights into the changes the Joint Force should make to improve the agility of command and control structures. Making these changes would enable the Joint Force to make better decisions, says the author, and conduct more effective multi-domain operations.

March 31, 2020

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

March 31, 2020

The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace

Mariya Omelicheva reviews The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace by Oscar Jonsson. This book helps the reader understand an adversary that has embraced a form of conflict at odds with Western notions of war and peace. It is a must read for Russia-watchers and all national security analysts and strategists in the Joint Force.

March 31, 2020

To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth

Walter Hudson reviews To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. Zelikow and Rice write not only as scholars but also as actors who played parts in history. This book is valuable to policymakers, warfighters, and students of strategy throughout the Joint Force.

March 31, 2020

Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvili’s American Success

Bryon Greenwald reviews Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvilli’s American Success by Andrew Marble. This fine biography of former CJCS (1993-1997) General John Shalikashvilli offers much to the military reader. He was a competent leader who rose from humble origins to become the most senior officer in the US military.

March 31, 2020

Learning the Art of Joint Operations: Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Navy

General Ulysses Grant learned the art of joint operations during the Civil War by working with Andrew Hull Foote, his Navy counterpart who shared Grant’s commitment to winning the war. There was no Joint Force Commander in the 1860s because there was no formal principle of unity of command. Today, this principle mitigates the confusion and complexity of joint operations, as per JP 3-0 Joint Operations which assigns a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Grant’s partnership with Foote exemplifies how to make joint operations work.

March 31, 2020

Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration

The US military continues to make mistakes in detainee operations, which has reduced its ability to achieve national objectives. If we do not place significant emphasis on this critical aspect of planning, says the author, more mistakes will be made and the US military will lose credibility. Moreover, if we do not fix these mistakes, the nation may fail in other aspects of combat operations. This article conveys historical examples of insufficient and ineffective planning for detainee operations, and offers a new paradigm to future planners and specific recommendations to minimize errors and help achieve national and military objectives.

March 31, 2020

The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle

Step into any joint or coalition operations center and you will find planners, intelligence analysts, and operators synchronizing joint fires. The Joint Force commonly conflates the joint information and joint fires functions, limiting its ability to influence the thinking and behavior of audiences not associated with a US adversary. This article argues for establishing a Joint Staff Global Engagement Division to lead the global integration of the joint information function. Adopting this concept, says the author, would address current inadequacies with how the Joint Force integrates the information function into all military operations.

March 31, 2020

The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success

Grand strategy is more art than science, but the practice has always required creativity to translate the Big Idea into a specific plan which uses every instrument of national power to advance the national interest. How do policymakers develop grand strategy? Is it captured in a single concept like containment? Or is it a series of strategic activities orchestrated like a campaign plan? This article explores the “theory of success”, a methodology to formulate grand strategy with an emphasis on strategic logic, the continuous line of thinking which integrates and aligns desired outcomes with existing conditions and constraints.

March 31, 2020

Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education for Rising U.S. National Security Leaders

This article proposes a new mandatory semester-long course in atrocity prevention at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC. In the last century, tens of millions of civilians were killed in atrocities and genocide (mass killings of targeted, unarmed populations). Today, such atrocities and genocide are responsible for three times as many deaths as war. And there is a persistent threat of atrocities in the contemporary security environment. The proposed course would teach practical “upstream-prevention” skills and reinforce moral conduct among senior officers, says the author, and thus influence who holds the high moral ground in great-power competition.

March 31, 2020

Strategic Leader Research: Answering the Call

One goal for senior service colleges and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools is to transform senior officers into warrior-scholars. This requires taking a new approach to the role of research and writing in the preparation of senior officers for strategic responsibility. Greater emphasis on research and writing would meet the needs of strategic leadership, but also transform the culture of JPME. By making students and faculty active participants in problem-solving and idea generation, schools could inspire a culture of articulate leadership at the cutting edge of strategic progress, which would permeate the Joint Force and the larger strategic community.

March 31, 2020

Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap: Facing the Russian “Accompli Attack”

The Joint Operating Environment 2035 predicts the US will face challenges from both persistent disorders and states contesting international norms. One plausible scenario could be a surprise “accompli” attack with little or no warning, which would exploit disorder, challenge international norms, and establish a fait accompli with a limited resistance. The attacker’s gains could be used as leverage to force a settlement because the risks of escalation and the costs to reverse the attacker’s gains are equally unacceptable. The authors propose a five-point plan to strengthen the Joint Force communication infrastructure and improve information resiliency in the future fight.

March 31, 2020

Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations: Implications for National Security

The development of new space technologies and the falling costs of space launch have enabled the proliferation of low orbiting satellites. Commercial actors are pursuing opportunities in space, which will disrupt traditional business models for commercial satellite communications. However, the success of these endeavors will not be confined to the commercial sector. The proliferation of satellites will change future military operations in space. In order to deny space superiority to our adversaries, the US should take a whole-of-government approach to identify strategic technologies (and other systems with military value) and prevent foreign companies and governments from acquiring these technologies.

March 31, 2020

The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone: How Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Balance Back to the Defense

American adversaries are building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones to keep the US military out of key regions. The Chinese set up A2/AD zones to deny US access to Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Russians have A2/AD zones in Kaliningrad, Crimea, the Kola Peninsula, and the Kuril Islands to block maritime lanes. For the Joint Force, the challenge is to penetrate and degrade these A2/AD zones. Disintegration of an adversary’s A2/AD zone is possible, says the author, but we should not underestimate the resilience of enemy networks and their ability to recover from damage inflicted by US fire power.

March 31, 2020

The Imperative for the U.S. Military to Develop a Counter-UAS Strategy

Years of sustained combat has constrained military readiness and thus impacted the US military's ability to respond to emerging global security challenges. For the first time in decades, US ground forces have found themselves under aerial attack and are generally unable to counter the threat. This risk results in an imperative for the Joint Force to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more commonly referred to as drones. This type of strategy will provide a framework for the Joint Force to leverage emerging technologies, develop a comprehensive training program, and regain the warfighting initiative.

March 31, 2020

Executive Summary

This issue of JFQ shows the way ahead for the Joint Force. In our Forum and JPME Today sections, we discuss emerging battlespace technologies. In Commentary, authors propose the development of a new global engagement cycle. In our Features section are articles about the need to adapt the Joint Force command and control structure, about dealing with Iran as a rival nation-state, and addressing A2/AD threats in the Indo-Pacific region. In Recall, we see how General Ulysses Grant learned the art of joint operations in the Civil War. Finally, we review Andrew Marble’s biography of former CJCS General John Shalikashvilli.

March 1, 2020

Foreword

I commend this book and, more importantly, the professional reflection on the ethical lessons of World War I that continue to shape the profession of arms today. While serving to remind us of the timeless and sacred nature of sacrifice, and how we are called to honor those who have fought and fallen in conflicts near and far while in service to the Nation, the writings in this volume will cause readers to develop their own understanding of ethical judgment. This is a long overdue and needed resource for today’s warriors as we carry on the proud tradition of fighting our nation’s wars.

Feb. 10, 2020

Joint Force Quarterly 96 (1st Quarter, January 2020)

This issue of JFQ covers many topics about the decade ahead. In our Forum section there’s an article about the Australian Army’s efforts to advance intellectual development. In JPME Today, we cover the JPME experience and the nature of war. In Commentary, authors write about climate change and great power competition. In our Features section are articles about the role of chaplains in humanitarian assistance and aerial combat during the Vietnam War. Finally, we review Andrew Marble’s biography of former CJCS General John Shalikashvilli. As usual, good thinking leads to good writing on many issues facing the Joint Force.

Feb. 10, 2020

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Feb. 10, 2020

The Future of Interagency Doctrine

Interagency synchronization continues to challenge whole-of-government approaches to national security. The Joint Staff has been brainstorming ideas to improve workforce interoperability within the context of joint doctrine. In addition, the Joint Staff created a pathway for non-DOD entities to become more involved in the development process of joint doctrine. Subjects of interest included inter-organizational cooperation, protection of civilians, defense support to civil authorities, joint planning and intelligence activities, special operations, counterdrug operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and combating terrorism. CJCS General Mark Milley indicated that listening to non-DOD contributors is important to building an adaptive and agile force.

Feb. 10, 2020

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions

The Joint Force is not well positioned to share best practices in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems (AI/AS). To address this shortcoming, Joint Manning Documents should add an AI/AS cell made up of officers and NCOs in order to incorporate best practices across the seven joint functions. The Army took a similar approach in 2003 with the creation of knowledge management as a distinct discipline and staff function. In order to avoid fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons, the Joint Force should change the way it organizes and employs forces, and embrace a new approach to technological innovation.

Feb. 10, 2020

Failed Megacities and the Joint Force

The greatest international challenge of the 21st century may be the advent the megacity, an urban environment with a population of 10 million people or more. The problems the Joint Force could face when operating in a megacity would stretch the limits of US military capacity. Although joint doctrine addresses traditional urban terrain, it neglects to address the challenges associated with megacities, especially failed megacities. Given the high probability of a failed megacity and the need for military support, the DOD must develop joint doctrine that adequately addresses the challenges posed by operations in a failed megacity.

Feb. 10, 2020

White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War

Edward Salo reviews White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War by John Gans. This book enlightens readers about the foreign policy and national security decision-making process, and demonstrates the importance of experts with bureaucratic, functional and area expertise to maintain a strong national security policy.

Feb. 10, 2020

Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power

Nathaniel L. Moir reviews Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power by Sheila Smith. For national security professionals and those in the Joint Force focused on the Asia-Pacific region, this book is an authoritative account on the Japanese Self Defense Force and a good reminder of the importance of US-Japan relations.

Feb. 10, 2020

Small Arms: Children and Terrorism

Kira McFadden reviews Small Arms: Children and Terrorism by Mia Bloom and John Horgan. This book is a deep dive into an under-examined issue, the long term challenges of children in terrorist organizations. It is a must read for policymakers and planners working to end generational cycles of violent extremism.

Feb. 10, 2020

Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era: Lessons from the Battle of the Bismarck Sea

As China and Russia continue to acquire and integrate precision-guided long-range missiles into their weapons systems, Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is one of the toughest challenges to American maritime dominance. Strategists often look to history to solve current defense problems, and WWII may teach lessons applicable to today’s context. The author uses the 1943 Battle of the Bismarck Sea as a case study to highlight the role of land-based airpower in maritime interdiction. By looking through a counter-A2/AD lens, this battle offers an interesting perspective on attaining maritime dominance in this era of global integration and great power competition.

Feb. 10, 2020

Frustrated Cargo: The U.S. Army’s Limitations in Projecting Force from Ship to Shore in an A2/AD Environment

The Korean peninsula, Taiwan and numerous other contested islands and landmasses in the Pacific highlight the need for a revised Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. The current joint concept relies on a relatively small initial entry force of Marines to establish a lodgment with the preponderance of the Army combat power flowing as follow-on forces through established ports. However, using historical examples the author argues that the Army needs to develop new training and doctrine to support over-the-shore maneuver. This would provide complementary capabilities to the Marine Corps and make better use of Army assets to support the Joint Force.

Feb. 10, 2020

The Revival of Al Qaeda

Al-Qaida has taken advantage of the attention focused on the Islamic State to develop safe havens and exercise control over large swaths of territory. In addition, Al-Qaida has taken security precautions such as diffusing its leadership to a variety of geographic locations, creating cohesion among its global affiliates, and gaining inroads with vulnerable populations in fragile states. It is imperative, therefore, to understand how Al-Qaeda and other such groups employ inconspicuous methods such as exploiting socio-political and ethnic grievances and, exercising strategic patience in order to prevent Al-Qaida from staging a comeback.

Feb. 10, 2020

Adapting to Disruption: Aerial Combat over North Vietnam

During aerial combat in the Vietnam War, both the US Navy and the US Air Force experienced unexpectedly high losses. A comparison of the Navy’s and the Air Force’s different approaches to aerial combat yields four insights regarding military adaptation. First, adaptation depends on senior leadership. Second, taking a broader approach results in more successful adaptation. Third, the not-invented-here syndrome results in less successful adaptation. And fourth, one key component of military effectiveness is the capacity to adapt to disruption. Realistic testing and training, and recent battlefield experience may enable military forces to adapt more quickly to future disruptions.

Feb. 7, 2020

Peacemakers: Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain

In regions where the US military operates, commanders should consider employing DOD chaplains to serve as the commander’s representative and coordinate humanitarian assistance. Military commanders must deal with a network of intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international foreign humanitarian entities. This complex network requires ongoing coordination, which a DOD chaplain can accomplish in a way that is consistent with joint doctrine. Although critics may say this blurs the lines between the military and humanitarian actors, DOD chaplains bring expertise as potential liaisons to religious leaders and can facilitate civilian-military relations to achieve national objectives.

Feb. 7, 2020

The Bering Strait: An Arena for Great Power Competition

The rapidly changing environmental conditions in the Arctic Region have increased the potential for great power competition between Russia, China and the US. Because of Russia’s and China’s interest in the region, the Bering Strait more than ever is vital to US economic and national security interests. Since 2014, the US has mostly focused on deterring Russian aggression in Europe. As a result, the US is now in a position of weakness in the Arctic. If steps are not taken, the status of the Arctic as a place of peaceful cooperation and exploration will be jeopardized.

Feb. 7, 2020

A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis: A Special Operations Case Study

For many military commanders, the word assessment induces bouts of eye-rolling, daytime drowsiness and nausea. This condition results from years of overly complicated briefings which are unintelligible to everyone but the presenter. This manuscript offers a remedy: a set of guiding principles to help make better decisions built on better data. Breaking from traditional assessment approaches, the authors focus on building collaborative teams to pursue questions of primary concern to the commander. This article can help every commander and their staff learn to ask questions that matter, conduct useful, hard-nosed analysis, and enhance decision-making across the organization.

Feb. 7, 2020

Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity: The Nature of War as a Complex Adaptive System

Clausewitz described war as a paradoxical trinity comprised of the tendencies of the people, the commander and his army, and the government. The three elements of the Clausewitz trinity interact within and among the other elements to create a pattern of behavior that is understandable yet unpredictable. Within this trinity, Clausewitz captured the social dynamics in war that characterize a complex adaptive system. This article provides an overview of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, and illustrates how complexity theory can be applied as a framework to examine Clausewitz’s observations of the interactions between chance, politics and passion.

Feb. 7, 2020

Asking Strategic Questions: A Primer for National Security Professionals

Asking good strategic questions is not just a useful leadership habit. In the national security profession, it can save lives and change history. Because leaders have so much power over which questions organizations ask, it is essential that leaders understand the basic characteristics of good strategic questions. Leaders cannot be expected to be experts in all things, but guiding or assessing a strategic question is one area in which they must be active and involved. Strategic questions drive organizational attention, energy, and resources, say the authors, and can make the difference between success and failure.

Feb. 7, 2020

Beyond Auftragstaktik: The Case Against Hyper-Decentralized Command

The Prussian concept of mission command emphasizes hyper-decentralization, commander’s intent and low-level initiative. This article argues that such decentralization is no guarantee of command effectiveness. While there is a need to resolve the inherent tension between centralization and decentralization, the author recommends taking a balanced approach, which would empower subordinates to take the initiative while retaining the commander’s ability to coordinate mutual support and mass combat power. While the Prussian approach has some qualities worth emulating, it is less than ideal. An iterative approach based on a continual cycle of synchronization, dissemination and initiative offers the most promising way ahead.

Feb. 7, 2020

Adapting for Victory: DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century

The US’s technological advantage is now under threat. In the era of Great Power competition, the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation are approaching parity in many areas. Their stated intent is to reach full parity and then technological dominance, a situation which would be unacceptable to the US and its allies. The authors call upon the DOD and other government agencies, as well as key partners in industry and academia, to join in a new venture which would reimagine how the US conducts research in fields such as directed energy, artificial intelligence, synthetic biology and other emergent technologies.

Feb. 7, 2020

Reconceiving Modern Warfare: A Unified Model

Joint warfighting requires integrated thinking across many different capabilities, technologies and functions. This article proposes a new model of joint warfare, which brings together several existing paradigms and facilitates strategic discussion, tactical planning and operational design. First, the author presents and defines the new model, and then applies it to the Joint Planning Process. Tailored for modern technologies and emerging concepts, this unified model serves an example of enhanced thinking that goes into the development of warfighting plans and operations, and enables military strategists, planners, and operators to execute modern warfare.

Feb. 7, 2020

The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition

The changing nature of work, demographics and greater integration of national security endeavors will have a major impact on future military personnel. Only by thinking better and building an intellectual edge will military organizations have sufficient capacity to accomplish future national security objectives. Attaining this intellectual edge will require an enterprise wide approach that embraces strategic vision and engagement, and increases investment in joint professional military education. Because the global security environment has changed fundamentally, military organizations must take a more sophisticated approach to academic technology in order to create a culture of continuous learning.

Feb. 7, 2020

Executive Summary

This issue of JFQ covers many topics about the decade ahead. In our Forum section there’s an article about the Australian Army’s efforts to advance intellectual development. In JPME Today, we cover the JPME experience and the nature of war. In Commentary, authors write about climate change and great power competition. In our Features section are articles about the role of chaplains in humanitarian assistance and aerial combat during the Vietnam War. As usual, good thinking leads to good writing on many issues facing the Joint Force.

Feb. 7, 2020

Letter to the Editor

The article “Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea” by Dion Moten, Bryan Teff, Michael Pyle, Gerald Delk, and Randel Clark (JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019) is an insightful piece that brings to light many issues that the Department of the Navy has been diligently pursuing over the past 2 years. In May 2018, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of Navy Medicine’s ability to support the concepts of Distributed Maritime Operations and Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations with the underlying concept of Fleet Design. This review was not conducted solely under the auspices of medical operational requirements in a distributed maritime environment. Rather, it was developed by leveraging capabilities across surface platforms and the combat logistics force in order to enable a comprehensive approach for medical capabilities across warfighting domains.

Feb. 3, 2020

10. The Moral Status of Chemical Weapons: Arguments from World War I

While the human condition affords countless examples of what Pope had in mind, perhaps no more striking wartime example can be found than that of the employment of chemical weapons in World War I. Chemical weapons—regarded as vicious and hated by all self-identified “civilized peoples”—were first endured, then pitied, then embraced by both sides, even as both sides held their noses, both literally and figuratively, for having chosen to employ weapons condemned throughout history. Then, in a turn so quick as to make the head of the body politic spin, the international community roundly condemned these weapons, even as individual states muttered under their breath—in the form of treaty reservations—their willingness to employ them again if an enemy did. At least some in Germany took all of this in stride, as evidenced in a now famous diary entry by army officer and author Rudolf Binding, written in the immediate aftermath of the gas attacks at Ypres, Belgium: “I am not pleased with the idea of poisoning men. Of course, the entire world will rage about it at first and then imitate us.” Imitation did, indeed, follow, both in the attacks employing progressively more lethal weapons and the amassing, over the course of the 20th century, of huge stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Feb. 3, 2020

9. The Ethical Challenge of Information Warfare: Nothing New

This chapter considers the ethical challenge of a problem that was not new in 1914, had not been resolved by 1918, and continues to exist: the strategic weaponization of information as an instrument of war. It describes how Great Britain used its global cable and high-powered network in conjunction with its cryptographic expertise and military assets to conduct a highly successful information war campaign against Germany and its allies. The interception of the now famous Zimmermann Telegram, which many historians and analysts see as critical to the U.S. entry into the conflict in 1917, is the focal event.1 Drawing on the experiences of Britain’s 1914–1918 information war, this chapter next draws out five challenges that states continue to face in the increasingly ubiquitous domain of cyberspace.

Feb. 3, 2020

8. The Ethics of Care for Civilians, Internally Displaced Persons, and Enemy Prisoners of War

On the Web site of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is a film titled The Path to Nazi Genocide, which gives a 38-minute overview of the history of Nazi Germany, World War II, and the genocide of the European Jews.1 The film begins not with the 1933 ascent of the Nazis to power in Berlin or the German invasion of Poland in 1939, but with the events in Sarajevo in 1914—because so much of what occurred during the years of National Socialism, World War II, and the Holocaust itself can be traced back to the events of World War I and its turbulent aftermath.

Feb. 3, 2020

7. A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education

The profession of arms is viewed in one of two ways by those who put on a military uniform. Holders of one perspective see what they do as an occupation—the principal means of making a living. From an occupational point of view, the profession of arms is a collection of technical skills, or what I call a more quantitative view, that encompasses performing the duties that are expected of them, but such performance may not necessarily be a part of their self-identity. The evaluation of their job is associated with some end result: increasing profit margin, meeting quotas, completing a mission or report, and the like. In the military, extensive training hones skills in a particular context to reach outcomes desired by higher authorities.

Feb. 3, 2020

6. Society and Intensive Conflict

On a well-known Internet auction site, it is quite easy to find the commemorative medals that Great Britain and the United States issued to veterans of the Great War. Both nations used the identical phrase on the reverse of the medal—The Great War for Civilisation. However odd such an inscription might seem a century later, it clearly had a contemporary resonance. Moving to the next war, the resonance continues. In his thoughtful account of the closing days of World War II, Max Hastings argues that the character of the conflict in Western Europe was determined by the character of the Western democracies themselves. The armies of Great Britain, the United States, and their associates, he suggests, may have lacked the ruthless military prowess and determination of the German and Soviet forces, but they “fought as bravely and well as any democracy could ask, if the values of civilization were to be retained in their ranks.”1 When Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt invoked “Christian civilization” in public pronouncements as the grand cause worthy of sacrifice, they were not so much making a religious statement as appealing to a shared sense of identity, one that they expected their listeners to understand and relate to.2 Eighty years later, it is by no means obvious that this shared identity still holds.

Feb. 3, 2020

5. The Law of the Great War as an Ethical Paradigm, 1918–2038

The law of war as recognizable to modern military leaders comes from World War I in both its form and practice. Though the basic rules guiding care for the wounded and sick and the protection of captured enemy combatants and civilians long predate the Great War, no historical inevitability dictated the makeup of the law of war as it has formed over the past hundred years.

Feb. 3, 2020

4. Incompetence, Technology, and Justice: Today’s Lessons from World War I

This chapter looks at leadership issues from the Great War and draws lessons regarding accountability, the philosophy of technology, and postwar justice. Each of these areas tracks with one of the three basic components of just war thinking: the ethics of going to war (jus ad bellum), of how war is fought (jus in bello), and of ending war well (jus post bellum). When thinking about World War I, one has to consider whether the grotesque body counts were the result of incompetent leadership, and, if so, why were these incompetent leaders not fired? Second, World War I was characterized by the pell-mell introduction of new armaments and technologies, including tanks, machine guns, submarines, and chemical agents. What is the appropriate philosophical framework for establishing protocols for use and restraint of the tools of modern warfare? Third, each of the principal victors—Georges Clemenceau (France), David Lloyd George (the United Kingdom), and Woodrow Wilson (the United States)—took a different approach to postwar justice, ranging from vengeance to restoration. What was at stake, and which was the most appropriate? Operating from the just war framework, this chapter argues that these questions have currency today, whether in the consideration of how to measure the success of battlefield commanders, defining the norms and limits of cyber warfare, or advancing postconflict stability and justice.