Due to a lapse in federal funding, this website is not being actively updated or monitored. See OPM status.

July 19, 2024

The Other Arctic: Competition, Cooperation, or Coexistence?

In 1959, 12 countries signed the Antarctic Treaty to ensure scientific freedom and equal access for all nations of the world to the continent. Since then, the number of states acceding to the treaty has grown to 56 from all parts of the globe, with just over half—29 states—now granted “consultative” status to make decisions regarding the future protection and use of Antarctica through the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM). For over 60 years, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has provided the world with a peaceful and stable environment to conduct scientific inquiry, protect unique biodiversity, and promote regional tourism.

July 16, 2024

DOD’s Need for a Transportable Energy Solution: The Promise of Nuclear Power

In the 42 days following Hurricane Maria in September 2017, the Federal Government deployed 366 generators with a combined 122-megawatt electric (MWe) capacity to Puerto Rico. This supported one-third of critical infrastructure on the island but fell far short of the ~2,400 MWe normally needed just in San Juan. This disaster highlights a profound Department of Defense (DOD) capability gap in providing large-scale transportable electrical power generation to the Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) mission. This disaster should stand as a stark warning to planners as DOD refocuses on peer competition, fields ever more energy-intensive technologies, invests in forward synthetic fuel production, transitions to an all-electric ground, and addresses climate change.

July 16, 2024

Implementing the Chairman’s Guidance on Experiential Learning in PME Classrooms

Major powers are active across all strategic domains—including space and cyberspace—and possess multiple tools of national power to realize their leadership’s core objectives. In turn, the present geopolitical competition among the United States, China, and Russia includes diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dimensions. As stated in Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, Strategy, military strategy requires employment of “the instruments of national power across a broad spectrum of competition and conflict in pursuit of objectives, in a transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional environment.” Given this present and future reality, the education of contemporary strategists should include experiential learning opportunities where participants develop multipronged national strategies within a competitive exercise environment. This type of activity could provide a stimulating, hands-on educational experience that promotes critical thinking on how to balance competing national priorities while yielding important insights into how potential adversaries seek to do the same.

July 16, 2024

Getting the Best Out of Joint Warfighter Development

Is the Department of Defense (DOD) producing the best joint warfighters possible? During strategic competition that increasingly ebbs toward conflict, joint warfighting and joint warfighter development are more important than ever. Joint warfighter development is the catalyst necessary for the U.S. military to conduct joint operations.

July 16, 2024

"Study, Not Doctrine": Prioritizing History in JPME

War is inherently unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable. The insights are timeless, and Carl von Clausewitz suffuses On War with these understandings, but we struggle to come to terms with the implications of those observations. The need to make predictions is seemingly irresistible, but approaches rooted in process or in generalizing about behavior fail in practice. Generic concepts of war facilitate discussion in the abstract but face challenges in accounting for variables such as ambiguity, leadership, personalities, politics, fear, confusion, violence, and friction. The commercial and budgetary attractions of characterizing techniques, technologies, weapons, or approaches to war as seeming to guarantee results can create powerful, if perverse, incentives that frequently lead to disappointing results. Ongoing military operations are understandably closely held or even deceptive.

July 15, 2024

2040 Vision: Designing UK Defence for Advantage in a Competitive Age

Some readers will have a close affinity for Scottish whisky and heroes (rebels?) such as William Wallace. We wonder if the request for us to write an article for Joint Force Quarterly was inspired by another Scottish icon, the poet Robert Burns, who wrote, “Oh, would some Power the gift give us / To see ourselves as others see us!” We are sure that we shall fall short of the literary genius of Burns, but we hope our observations will provide some of the value he describes of being seen through the eyes of others.

July 15, 2024

Breaking the Shield: Countering Drone Defenses

Unmanned systems will help save Taiwan. At least, that is what some recent war games suggest.

July 15, 2024

Accelerating Transition of Biotechnology Products for Military Supply Chains

Biomanufacturing, a process in which organisms and their biological systems are used to produce chemicals and biomaterials, has been a part of the military industrial base since World War I.

July 12, 2024

Taking Cues From Complexity: How Complex Adaptive Systems Prepare for All-Domain Operations

Because of potential increased adversary military expenditures and technological advances, the U.S. military technological advantage that has benefited American interests since the end of World War II is dwindling. To adjust to the increasingly technical global competitive arena, the joint force continues to develop the joint all-domain operations (JADO) concept, mainly adapted from the U.S.

July 12, 2024

Executive Summary

JFQ is certainly the Chairman’s journal, but it exists solely to give voice to you and your ideas on the joint force, jointness in general, and how best to fight and win our Nation’s wars and secure the peace. For over 30 years, the best and brightest among us have sustained the dialogue within these pages, whether physical or virtual. Help us continue this great tradition by sending us your articles and adding to the growing body of knowledge that is Joint Force Quarterly.

June 28, 2024

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 4 (June 2024)

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 4 is now online.

June 28, 2024

Joint Force Quarterly 113 (2nd Quarter 2024)

JFQ is certainly the Chairman’s journal, but it exists solely to give voice to you and your ideas on the joint force, jointness in general, and how best to fight and win our Nation’s wars and secure the peace. For over 30 years, the best and brightest among us have sustained the dialogue within these pages, whether physical or virtual. Help us continue this great tradition by sending us your articles and adding to the growing body of knowledge that is Joint Force Quarterly.

March 4, 2024

Lessons and Legacies of the War in Ukraine: Conference Report

The international conference titled “Lessons and Legacies of the War in Ukraine” took place on November 17, 2023, at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Hosted by the University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, the conference brought together perspectives from practitioners in the U.S. Government and uniformed military, along with experts from academia and the think tank community in the United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Taiwan, to discuss the lessons that the United States and its allies should take from the first year and a half of the effort to repel Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Feb. 16, 2024

Joint Force Quarterly 112 (1st Quarter 2024)

And as you work through some of the pressing issues facing the joint force, we are here to help your ideas get a complete and full airing out. The only way we can change is to help each other to see the need to do so and then suggest a proper path to that new future. We need you to help be a good wingman and show us how to succeed.

Feb. 16, 2024

No Limits: The Inside Story of China’s War With the West

No Limits: The Inside Story of China’s War With the West is a valuable book. It is simultaneously analytical and personal. No Limits is an incisive, selective history about how the promise of China’s integration into Western economic systems and global institutions gave way to acrimony and rivalry. It also is author Andrew Small’s memoir about how his quarter-century-long iterative interactions with China evolved from hope and cautious optimism about Sino-global integration into resigned fatalism that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can never tolerate such a happy ending. The CCP must instead view itself as perpetual victim and implacable rival of the West.

Feb. 16, 2024

Airpower in the War Against ISIS

In Airpower in the War Against ISIS, Benjamin Lambeth not only weaves an account that celebrates the decisive role he insists airpower played in the defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS) but also depicts tragically missed opportunities and almost incomprehensibly poor judgment on the part of U.S. civilian and military leaders that unnecessarily delayed that defeat.

Feb. 16, 2024

The Genesis Machine: Our Quest to Rewrite Life in the Age of Synthetic Biology

Emerging biotechnologies have captured the imagination, interest, and concerns of the world. Scenarios once relegated to science fiction movies and novels are now potentially within the grasp of bioengineering. The purposeful design of biology can enable novel ways to meet a variety of societal needs—from the biomanufacturing of commodities to gene therapies and the recreation of once-extinct organisms. This biological revolution, or “bioeconomy,” has the potential to address important issues such as climate change, sustainable energy, and food production, as well as improved medicines and quality of life for all. But with this capability comes dual use (that is, not only for commercial/military use but also by good actors/bad actors) as well as profound ethical concerns, making The Genesis Machine a timely volume.

Feb. 16, 2024

Applying Three Decisionmaking Models to the Lakota Sioux Wars

Examining the factors leading to the decisions made by Crazy Horse, Custer, and Reno through the lenses of expected utility, cybernetic, and poliheuristic decision strategies enables objectivity in analysis and hindsight. It also offers an example of how to study three different leaders, each of whom resolved uncertainty with their decisions, even if such decisions proved disastrous. Modern leaders can utilize these same tools to make sense of complexity and to apply a framework to analyze an opponent’s past decisions, compare the findings to the present situation, and then predict future courses of action.

Feb. 16, 2024

Converting a Political- to a Military-Strategic Objective

Political objectives are usually achieved by using one’s military power. Converting political objectives into achievable military-strategic objectives is the primary responsibility of military-strategic leadership. This process is largely an art rather than a science. There are many potential pitfalls because much depends on the knowledge, understanding, experience, and judgment of military-strategic leaders. Most often, mistakes made are only recognized after setbacks or defeats suffered during the hostilities. Despite its critical importance, there is no consensus on the steps and methods in converting political- into military-strategic objectives. There is scant writing on the subject in either doctrinal documents or professional journals.

Feb. 16, 2024

The “Survival Chain”: Medical Support to Military Operations on the Future Battlefield

The Department of Defense Joint Trauma System (JTS) was created to provide optimal care to the wounded on a battlefield. The current National Defense Strategy anticipates future threats of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer adversaries that may limit overall freedom of maneuver for medical evacuation, increase survivability risk of medical units, and limit timeliness and robustness of critical medical logistics. Thus, the JTS must continue to evolve and embrace the concept of Medical Performance Optimization (MPO) to adapt to this new operational reality.

Feb. 16, 2024

From “Made in China” to “Created in China”: Intellectual Property Rights in the People’s Republic of China

Friction between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on technology captures the headlines regularly. While there continue to be intellectual property rights (IPR) violations in China, China analysts need to be more mindful of China’s rising influence in generating intellectual property. The reality is that China’s growing influence in patent applications and innovation is the real threat.

Feb. 15, 2024

Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates

This article proposes an approach to nuclear force sizing debates based on a framework built on four analytic dimensions: overarching risk management approaches; deterrence and assurance objectives; strategic force employment guidance; and operational constraints. The answers to key questions across these dimensions provide a structure to inform debates about the appropriate size and characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces. Only after clarifying U.S. objectives across these dimensions and focusing on key considerations therein should policymakers enter nuclear force sizing debates. The resulting analysis does not advocate for any policy position or hypothesize the “correct” number of nuclear forces. Instead, the purpose of the framework is to focus nuclear force sizing debates on more fundamental assumptions regarding the role of nuclear weapons in achieving U.S. national security objectives.

Feb. 15, 2024

Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation

Today, most people do not remember a time when the United States was not allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. As these alliances span over seven decades, it is easy to take for granted that the relationships will continue as they always have into the future. The changing security landscape and the emergence of the two-peer nuclear environment will challenge extended deterrence in ways not yet well understood. This requires reexamining deterrence strategies and potentially acquiring new capabilities to effectively assure allies and close the growing “assurance gap.”

Feb. 15, 2024

New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges

Decades of fighting militarily inferior adversaries with little to no concern of strategic escalation have atrophied the intellectual frameworks required to deter and, if necessary, fight today’s potential adversaries. Paths to nuclear use, strategies that simultaneously account for prevailing conventionally while deterring strategic attacks, and concepts to restore deterrence should an adversary choose strategic escalation are among the most important considerations the United States must contend with in an era of intensifying Great Power competition.

Feb. 15, 2024

Wicked Deterrence Challenge: The Changing Strategic Landscape

The National Security Strategy of the United States laid out that the Nation is entering a decisive decade—not only for itself but also for the world. The current era of strategic competition is characterized by the reemergence of a geopolitical contest between powerful states over the shape of the future global order.

Feb. 15, 2024

An Interview with Anthony J. Cotton

Our threats are not isolated to one command or nation. These global challenges require a concerted effort to strengthen not only deterrence but also partnerships with our allies and partners. For the first time, the United States faces two major nuclear powers that could operate at any level or domain of conflict to meet their national objectives. We are now in a multipolar world with potential adversaries that could threaten the United States, our allies, and our partners with nuclear weapons and nonnuclear capabilities that could have devastating impacts.

Feb. 15, 2024

Accelerating Cyber Leader Development: A Call to Action for Service War Colleges

Cyber leaders find their organizations under constant cyber attack from millions of daily intrusions disrupting everything from our electoral system to our social media feeds. Today, cyberspace provides both technological opportunity and vulnerability. The frightening reality is that the Nation is adrift in a dangerous cyberspace domain, a warfighting domain that stores, processes, and analyzes data under the uncertain eye of ill-prepared senior cyber leaders. This article is squarely focused on a recommendation to deliberately develop senior cyber leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD) to win in this dangerous battlespace.

Feb. 15, 2024

A New Form of Accountability in JPME: The Shift to Outcomes-Based Military Education

The programs responsible for teaching joint professional military education (JPME) Phases I and II are undergoing a significant transformation in demonstrating their mission fulfillment. Governed by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), particularly OPMEP-F, implemented on May 15, 2020, these institutions are moving towards outcomes-based military education (OBME).

Feb. 15, 2024

Microgrids for the 21st Century: The Case for a Defense Energy Architecture

The Department of Defense (DOD) needs a new approach to electrical grid infrastructure to maintain security and access to operational energy.

Feb. 15, 2024

Position, Navigation, and Timing Weaponization in the Maritime Domain: Orientation in the Era of Great Systems Conflict

The jamming and spoofing of Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) information has escalated in the last half-dozen years from simple demonstrations of capability to truly dangerous situations where misperceptions could ignite a major conflict.

Feb. 15, 2024

When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis

The gray zone remains one of the most fashionable strategic concepts of the past few years in the United States, it encapsulates a particular subset of international relations, in the process affecting the ideational distinction between war and peace. While the gray zone concept may have negligible strategic-analytical merit, its high social utility persists and should be recognized.

Feb. 15, 2024

Executive Summary

And as you work through some of the pressing issues facing the joint force, we are here to help your ideas get a complete and full airing out. The only way we can change is to help each other to see the need to do so and then suggest a proper path to that new future. We need you to help be a good wingman and show us how to succeed. 

Dec. 14, 2023

Solarium at 70: Project Solarium’s Influence on Eisenhower Historiography and National Security Strategy

Project Solarium was a national security exercise that took place in 1953 during the first months of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency, taking its name from the White House solarium, where Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, conceived it. According to many scholars, Project Solarium highly influenced Eisenhower’s strategy, and it has come to be regarded as an outstanding example of strategic planning and foresight—indeed as a standard for other American Presidential administrations.

Oct. 30, 2023

Joint Force Quarterly 111 (4th Quarter, 2023)

Your voice in how best to move the joint force forward can only help achieve both the mission of this journal and the goals of the new Joint Warfighting Concept. Every successful leader at every level knows the wisdom of how to bring diverse talents together to achieve the mission. The Chairman and JFQ are looking for your ideas on how to achieve success together as we deal with the world today and in the future.

Oct. 30, 2023

Friction Points in the Sino-Russian Arctic Partnership

This article is an overview of Sino-Russian friction and points of vulnerability in their Arctic relationship. In this article, we highlight three main areas of friction—navigation, resource exploitation, and infrastructure—that we see as exploitable gaps in the relationship. Western observers and commentators should not be neutral in observing this relationship; rather, we might benefit from shining a light on these issues that Beijing and Moscow have so assiduously sought to sidestep.

Oct. 30, 2023

Risky Business: Using the Joint Force’s Framework for Managing Risk

This article provides the analytical basis for the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM), the framework for appraising and managing risk. It explains how risk informs national security decisionmaking. The JRAM is useful and flexible, within limits, to facilitate commanders’ decisionmaking regardless of level. Beyond education, the purpose is to illustrate key risk considerations, including impacts of mitigation measures to other regions and across time in a multipolar environment.

Oct. 30, 2023

Training With Industry: Integrating the Commercial Defense Industrial Base

This article examines Training With Industry (TWI)’s impact on the joint force, and it assesses and reviews the perspective of the World War II–era historical TWI program and contrasts it with today’s version. Recommendations are made to incorporate TWI training objectives into the Joint Learning Continuum, ensure individual TWI lessons are captured in the Joint Lessons Learned Program, and modernize the TWI program as a fellowship to address strategic level gaps.

Oct. 30, 2023

Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology

Miller delivers an insightful discussion of several conflicts associated with the rise of semiconductors and provides a detailed history of the industry, the tycoons who shaped it, and the strategic importance of Taiwan’s role in the current geopolitical environment. He omits the typical arguments that revolve around the defense of democracy and liberalist ideology, instead offering a coherent realist rationale for the defense of Taiwan. Miller’s compelling thesis is that the semiconductor industry shapes international politics, the world economy, and the global balance of power. Even though it is unstated, Miller uses the framework of strategic competition between the United States and China to address the criticality of high-end semiconductors.

Oct. 30, 2023

The American War in Afghanistan: A History

Carter Malkasian provides a magisterial and balanced account of the American intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 until the early months of 2021. His writing, analysis, and credibility are buttressed by his multiple deployments to the country at both the provincial and district levels as well as by his fluency in Pashto. Since the topic can be approached from a myriad of perspectives, Malkasian’s book is likely the first in a long series of historical examinations over the next several decades. His book can serve as the flagship for those who follow, given its comprehensiveness and lucidity.

Oct. 30, 2023

The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace

Timely, relevant, and provocative, Michael J. Boyle’s The Drone Age makes the point better than any other on the subject: the sky is full of drones, and policymakers, especially those in defense agencies, need to come to terms with this technology.

Oct. 30, 2023

Winners of the 2023 Essay Competitions

NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 11–12, 2023, during which 29 faculty judges from 17 participating professional military education (PME) institutions selected the best entries in each category. There were 95 submissions in this year’s three categories. First Place winners in each of the three categories appear in the following pages.

Oct. 30, 2023

A Symphony of Capabilities: How the Joint Warfighting Concept Guides Service Force Design and Development

The United States today faces complex global challenges, including long-term strategic competition with major powers such as China and Russia. Rapidly evolving technologies are changing the character of warfare, and we are only just beginning to understand the implications of these changes. History shows that in times like this, nations that best capitalize on these changes create the greatest advantages in battle. Adapting to this evolving landscape requires the joint force to integrate capabilities and synchronize effects fluidly across domains.

Oct. 30, 2023

Sharpening Our Competitive Edge: Honing Our Warfighting Capabilities Through the Joint Warfighting Concept

The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) challenges the joint force to rethink competition, deterrence, and conflict. This necessitates a shift in how we utilize our current capabilities and a leap toward new ones. To truly sharpen our competitive edge, we must outpace our adversaries in adaptability and innovation. While the Pentagon has made strides in recent years, there is more to be done.

Oct. 30, 2023

Embracing Change: A Sense of Urgency

At the dawn of an ever-evolving geopolitical era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the world’s most powerful political and military alliance, faces a new reality. This article examines the issues facing NATO and suggests ways to modernize and adapt the Alliance to meet current and future security challenges.

Oct. 30, 2023

Weaponizing Wheat: How Strategic Competition With Russia Could Threaten American Food Security

In the history of warfare, belligerents have often targeted food supplies to force opponents into submission. In America’s wars over the last century, threats to domestic food security have been minimal. We are now in an era of increased globalization, where food supply chains span the oceans. America faces the renewed rise of strategic competition as China and Russia seek to replace U.S. power across the globe. Given these new realities, timely evaluation of potential vulnerabilities to American food production is necessary.

Oct. 30, 2023

Space Denial: A Deterrence Strategy

Space assets are strategic and crucial to U.S. national security in maintaining military superiority across the land, maritime, air, and cyber domains. U.S. adversaries recognize this advantage and intend to challenge American interests in space. As the leading space powers continue to enhance their direct-ascent capabilities, the United States must adopt a deterrence strategy through building robust constellations, optimizing satellite placement, and integrating U.S. Government–owned sensors on allies, strategic partners, and commercial satellites.

Oct. 30, 2023

An Interview with Michael E. Langley

It is an honor to convey the USAFRICOM message in this publication; Joint Force Quarterly is an important forum for strategic discussion. Africa is both key strategic and geopolitical terrain due to its physical geography, wealth of resources, and fast-growing populations. These attributes make Africa an increasingly contested environment as strategic competitors, violent extremist organizations [VEOs], and transnational criminal organizations collectively seek to exploit African nations for their gain.

Oct. 30, 2023

Guardian of the Seams: U.S. Africa Command at the Intersection of Diplomacy, Development, and Defense

By its constitution, programs, and ethos, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is committed to the idea that knowledge should unify rather than fragment actions, concepts, and relationships. The commander of USAFRICOM, General Michael E. Langley, USMC, charged us in this article and the two that follow to explore the concept of seams and challenged us to identify and address the disparities that potentially undermine the effectiveness of U.S. engagements with African partner forces—whether these differences are interagency relationships, resources, rules and authorities, priorities, objectives, data, or something yet unidentified.

Oct. 30, 2023

Defense Diplomacy: Professionalizing the Purple to Gold Pipeline

The joint force prioritizes joint experience as a requirement for senior military leaders through joint qualification accreditation but currently has no formal requirement or incentive for interagency experience, the importance of which has been repeatedly discussed and advocated for in professional journals over the last two decades. The introduction of an interagency qualification requirement for career advancement would expand acculturation across development, diplomacy, and defense agencies.

Oct. 30, 2023

Beating Drumbeat: Lessons Learned in Unified Action from the German U-Boat Offensive Against the United States, January–July 1942

In the first 7 months after the United States entered World War II, a handful of German U-boats almost brought the Allied war effort to a standstill in a shockingly effective campaign against merchant shipping. Examining this case study from a joint perspective provides timeless lessons for contemporary planners.

Oct. 30, 2023

Executive Summary

As the outline of the Joint Warfighting Concept begins to become clearer to the joint force and beyond, we hope to hear from you about how it relates to your vision of the future, AI, geopolitical issues, and more. While this world may seem increasingly complex and complicated, sharing your thoughts on how to deal with it is always of value to our nation’s leadership and your battle buddies alike. JFQ is always ready to air them out.

Sept. 7, 2023

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2023)

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 3 is now online.

Sept. 7, 2023

The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan

Elliot Ackerman’s The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan reads like one of his award-winning novels. It is fast-paced and thrilling. It also is full of flashbacks, similar to movies and extended television murder mysteries. But this latest Ackerman volume is not a novel. It is the very real story of how the author, together with many others, worked to rescue as many Afghans as they could during the chaotic days of Kabul’s downfall to the Taliban. And it contrasts not only the fate of these people with the author’s current peaceful life but with the anguish that characterized his own service in Afghanistan both as a Marine and as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer a decade into what became America’s endless war.

Sept. 7, 2023

War Transformed and White Sun War:

Every military strategist is cautioned against the temptation of fighting the last war. This pair of books by retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan makes clear that, whatever criticisms might be addressed against his predictions, he has not succumbed to that temptation. Instead, he has decided to try his hand not just at envisaging the next war but fleshing it out in a novel.

Sept. 7, 2023

Interview with the Honorable Arvydas Anušauskas: Minister of National Defence of Lithuania

Lithuania’s defense policy is based on three pillars. These are the strengthening of the armed forces, a resilient society, and reliance on collective defense. In order to achieve these three, we are increasing our spending on defense.

Sept. 7, 2023

Interview with the Honorable Hanno Pevkur: Minister of Defense of Estonia

We are quite like Finland in the sense that we have a clear understanding that everyone must be involved in protecting the country. We have a conscript service for the reserve army. This is mandatory for all men and voluntary for women. What we have changed since the full-scale war in Ukraine is that we have increased the number of wartime structures. We had 31,000 fighters before, but now we have almost 44,000. Most of those come from the Volunteer Defense League. The Estonian army is based on the regular army, the reserve army, and the Volunteer Defense League which at the moment has 30,000 people of which 10,000 are combatants. This will be increased this year to 20,000, which brings us to 44,000 combatants in our wartime structure.

Sept. 7, 2023

NATO’s New Center of Gravity

“Russia considers the Baltic states to be the most vulnerable part of NATO….” This is the conclusion of a recent report by Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.1 The three small Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have a 1,360-kilometer border with Russia and its client state Belarus. With a joint population of just over 6 million and 47,000 active-duty armed forces the Baltic states are on the frontline of any confrontation with Russia. Their vulnerability is keenly felt having all been under brutally oppressive Soviet occupation until quite recently; many still living recall that oppression that lasted until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reminded Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians of the horrors of occupation, and rekindled fears of what until recently was considered unimaginable—a land war of territorial aggression in Europe—a contingency for which the Baltic states are urgently preparing.

Sept. 7, 2023

Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

Sept. 7, 2023

Challenges and Opportunities in Global Supply Chains: The Role of Critical Minerals

The strength and security of global supply chains are vital for the stability and growth of the global economy as well as for national security. However, supply chains, which form the foundations for a number of industries and products in the defense and non-defense markets. are highly dependent on a variety of factors and countries to provide key critical minerals as inputs.

Sept. 7, 2023

Neutrality After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: The Example of Switzerland and Some Lessons for Ukraine

In 1956, former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that “neutrality has increasingly become an obsolete conception.” Dulles’s statement seemed to be vindicated after the end of the Cold War as only a handful of countries in Europe identified themselves as neutral. Whereas in the past Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden adopted neutrality, only two countries in Europe—Austria and Switzerland—are considered permanent neutral states under international law after the Cold War. Together with Sweden and Finland, Austria although maintaining a constitutional basis for its neutrality, became a non-allied state when it joined the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1995.

Sept. 7, 2023

Russia, Ukraine, and the Future Use of Strategic Intelligence

Before Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook an aggressive public and private information campaign to attempt to achieve two concurrent objectives. The primary goal was to convince their allies of the threat of Russia’s pending offensive (and to smooth the mobilization of support to Ukraine after the fact) and to a lesser degree a secondary goal was to attempt to deter Moscow from acting. Central to this campaign was the very visible and highly publicized use of intelligence. Indeed, as Dan Drezner wrote in the Washington Post, “The U.S. intelligence community sure has been chatty as of late about what it thinks Russia is doing.”1 The use of intelligence to support policy or diplomatic efforts and to achieve a strategic effect is, in and of itself, not novel. Intelligence is meant to inform policymakers and their decisions.

Sept. 7, 2023

Innovation and National Security: Ash Carter’s Legacy

I had the great privilege of working very closely with Secretary Ash Carter on many occasions over the years. He was a great patriot and a great American. In October 2022 this country, each and every one of us in this country, lost a transformational leader, a friend, and a champion of selfless service. Ash Carter’s decisionmaking was always motivated by the care and safety of the men and women in uniform. He was incredibly talented at cutting red tape and speeding up the bureaucracy in order to improve the lives of our soldiers, our sailors, airmen, and marines.

July 26, 2023

Discerning the Drivers of China’s Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data

For decades following its first test in 1964, China maintained a small nuclear force and a doctrine emphasizing deterrence and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China has recently embarked on an unprecedented campaign of expansion and modernization, which is changing the size, structure, and operational posture of its nuclear forces. The growing discrepancy between China’s restrained declaratory policy and advancing nuclear capabilities raises important questions about the status and future trajectory of China’s nuclear forces, with major implications for the United States.

July 7, 2023

Mission Assurance: Decisionmaking at the Speed of Relevance

The outdated mission assurance myopia focuses on vulnerabilities related to Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) but neglects timely decisions that impact how we fight. The Department of Defense (DOD) is facing challenges in prioritizing and delivering constrained resources in time, space, and domain due to the inflexible nature of the existing DCI-focused MA construct. This approach overlooks key areas and stakeholders, hindering the identification of critical weaknesses affecting mission performance. The 2022 DOD Mission Assurance instruction relies on outdated off-the-shelf plans, limiting its effectiveness. To address evolving threats, DOD Global Security efforts must unite proactive approaches and enable senior leaders to make risk-informed decisions at the speed of relevance.

July 7, 2023

Alpha

Alpha is a fast-paced, brilliantly written, and ultimately disturbing book about the health of the Navy SEAL community. Using the infamous Eddie Gallagher case for its core narrative, Alpha weaves together Gallagher’s actions and the larger developments in Naval Special Warfare during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The SEALs emerge from this era as a troubled organization, full of first-rate special operators willing to take on the toughest direct-action missions but largely devoid of a higher moral code to guide their actions and dismissive of any oversight beyond that of the insular world of special operations.

July 7, 2023

America’s Great-Power Opportunity

America’s Great-Power Opportunity is a lucid, thoughtful assessment of the problems and the possibilities with the geostrategic formulation of Great Power competition (GPC). Ali Wyne frames a narrative that captures well the major debates from 2017 through 2022 surrounding whether GPC is a proper framework for understanding America’s evolving geostrategic posture and how Washington’s global strategy should respond. Wyne adds value to the prolific number of publications on GPC during 2021 and 2022 by recommending that Washington accept the new norm of competitive geopolitics with a positivist rather than a reactive strategic agenda.

July 7, 2023

Four Battlegrounds and I, Warbot

The rollout of Chat GPT-3 by OpenAI in late 2022 caused a storm of controversy. The new software created seemingly authentic and detailed answers to queries, generated passable drafts of student essays, and even managed to pass a college exam at the Wharton Business School. But some of the chatbot’s responses were also inaccurate, inappropriate, and deeply flawed. The updated version GPT-4, released in March 2023, did little to alleviate concerns about how far and how fast this technology could take us.

July 7, 2023

China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

George Schultz, the U.S. Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989, equated diplomacy to gardening: long-term cultivation and maintenance of a healthy relationship that slowly but reliably bears fruit. Peter Martin’s China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy depicts a Chinese diplomatic corps that has intermittently subscribed to this philosophy. This clear and engaging book is an enlightening blend of domestic People’s Republic of China (PRC) politics, foreign policy practice, and diplomatic history with a fair amount of Zhou Enlai biography thrown in. Zhou was China’s first foreign minister (FM) from its founding in 1949 to when he stepped down as FM in 1958.

July 7, 2023

The Civil War and Revolutions in Naval Affairs: Lessons for Today

At certain times, the character of naval warfare and the course of naval history undergo rapid, profound, and lasting change. The American Civil War was such a time, and its lessons still resound.

July 7, 2023

The Exceptional Family Member Program: Noble Cause, Flawed System

"We recruit individuals, but we retain families.” This insightful statement recognizes the importance of familial bonds in the military profession and the challenge of maintaining them while in the actively defending the Nation. The responsibility lies with the Department of Defense (DOD), and the mindset of “retain families” underscores the level of accountability. DOD's Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) is the primary program dedicated to serving and supporting the special needs of eligible families of Servicemembers. In execution, however, EFMP has foundational issues.

July 7, 2023

Analyzing a Country’s Strategic Posture: Suggestions for Practitioners

Diplomats and defense attachés are expected to give a fresh assessment of a country’s strategic posture. The utility of this exercise is that, if done prudently and with an eye for nuance, it has some predictive value. Even the world’s only superpower has an interest in judging what positions other governments may take in a dispute. Beyond predictions one can identify some potentialities, that is, possible future developments that may or may not come to pass.

July 7, 2023

Special Operations Forces Institution-Building: From Strategic Approach to Security Force Assistance

SOF institution-building (SOFIB) takes on significant importance for the future because as irregular and hybrid warfare becomes more prevalent, the relevance of SOF increases. Allied and partner nation SOF can be sustainable and operationally effective in a near-peer environment only if they exist within a proper institutional framework.

July 7, 2023

The Purpose and Impact of the U.S. Military HIV Research Program

HIV has been a recognized issue since the mid-1980s when it was linked to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Prevalence of HIV varies among militaries, often exceeding civilian rates in high-prevalence areas. Military screening typically excludes HIV-positive individuals from enlistment, indicating that infections occur after enlistment, suggesting that military personnel are often at substantially increased risk for acquiring and then possibly transmitting HIV. The Military HIV Research Program (MHRP) at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) was established in 1986 to research and develop preventive and treatment measures, evaluate the impact on U.S. Servicemembers, and protect military personnel while addressing the global burden of HIV.

July 7, 2023

Improving Analytic Tradecraft: The Benefit of a Multilateral Foundational Training Model for Military Intelligence

The foundational training of our military intelligence professionals is paramount for our national security. This training could be improved by soliciting the individual military Services by means of a multilateral approach. The Services should work together multilaterally through their lead commands for intelligence, versus unilaterally or even jointly, ensuring synchronized instruction at a foundational level. Regardless of their specific roles within the profession, all Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and Guardians in the intelligence profession should have a solid understanding of the core analytic tradecraft standards that should apply to their daily work.

July 7, 2023

Why Military Space Matters

Over the past two-plus decades of military operations, our nation’s ability to use outer space has not been consequentially challenged or contested. An unintended byproduct of that circumstance is we have unintentionally conditioned strategists and national security professionals to assume the space advantage is our birthright. In our past wars our adversaries didn’t need to leverage space to fight and certainly had more important military objectives than attacking U.S. space capabilities. But if the next war is against a near-peer competitor, that will not be the case.

July 7, 2023

An AI-Ready Military Workforce

The military's successful integration of new technologies, such as AI, is crucial in a revolution in military affairs. The advantages of AI will be realized by the military that can best employ it. To realize the groundbreaking potential of AI, military organizations should prioritize creating an AI-enabled workforce based on the nature of AI in the military. This means moving away from solely focusing on creating costly AI experts and instead adopting an AI skills-in-depth model. Training AI experts alone is insufficient for achieving revolutionary effects on the battlefield.

July 7, 2023

Quantum Computing: A New Competitive Factor with China

The winner in the race to develop quantum-based technology will have the potential to shape the world in ways that are hard to imagine today—for better or worse. The application of quantum technologies not only has the potential to reshape the national security landscape but also to determine which nation will become the foremost superpower of the 21st century.

July 7, 2023

Cutting the Chaff: Overlooked Lessons of Military UAP Sightings for Joint Force and Interagency Coordination

The Mantell incident and other military UAP sightings make it clear that misidentification remains a common problem in complex operating environments. They demonstrate how distinguishing one’s joint force and interagency partners (or their assets) from an enemy force, from civilians and other noncombatants, or even from environmental phenomena can be a challenge in the best of circumstances. Misidentification of friendly (or nonhostile) airborne assets can lead to expensive or even fatal accidents in the field.

July 7, 2023

A Framework for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Deterrence

As nations around the world continue to pursue lethal autonomous platforms for use on the battlefield, the lack of a commonly understood framework for their employment increases the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation due to miscommunication or misinterpretation of deterrent signals in competition and crisis.

July 7, 2023

Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty

Geostrategic competition and rapidly advancing technology are driving fundamental changes to the character of war. Our opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is fleeting. We must modernize the Joint Force to deter our adversaries, defend the United States, ensure future military advantage, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.

July 7, 2023

Letter to the Editor

The April 2023 issue of Joint Force Quarterly features a positive review of our book, "Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace" by Stafford Ward, alongside an article on cyber and deterrence by James Van de Velde. Both pieces present discordant views on U.S. Cyber Command's approach to persistent engagement and how it fits with a strategy of deterrence and the more recent concept of integrated deterrence. As theorists and a practitioner in persistent engagement, we offer some clarification.

May 15, 2023

Integrated Deterrence and Cyberspace

This edited volume represents an important contribution to our thinking on cyberspace and national security. It also serves as one example of an enduring and fruitful relationship between the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the College of Information and Cyberspace (CIC) at the National Defense University (NDU).

May 5, 2023

Joint Force Quarterly 109 (2nd Quarter, 2023)

The latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly features articles on black soldiers and the promise of America, integrating the private sector into U.S. cyber strategy, and when dragons watch bears.

May 4, 2023

When Dragons Watch Bears: Information Warfare Trends and Implications for the Joint Force

Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has watched Russia’s employment of information warfare (IW) with great interest. The parallels between these two Great Powers and their associated aggression toward breakaway republics present an opportunity for the United States and the joint force to map the contours of an evolving Chinese information warfare strategy to build a more comprehensive U.S. response prior to a future conflict in the region. Thwarting Chinese information confrontation tactics during crisis and conflict will require a comprehensive approach, one that boldly marshals increased unity of effort from across the whole of government. To compete and win in the 21st-century information environment, the Department of Defense (DOD), in partnership with the interagency community, should endeavor to lead three initiatives across upcoming joint force time horizons.

May 4, 2023

Mind the Gap: Space Resiliency Advantages of High-Altitude Capabilities

This article argues that the joint force must develop high-altitude capabilities and integrate them into joint operations to improve space mission resiliency. High-altitude capabilities ensure that warfighting mission requirements are met and will enable the joint force to achieve its objectives in a conflict when adversaries attempt to heavily contest both air and space. The following section recommends a joint definition for the high-altitude region, continues with a historical review of the development and importance of high-altitude capabilities, describes how their use will improve space mission resiliency, and concludes with recommendations for ways the joint force should develop and budget for these important high-altitude capabilities as it prepares for the next conflict.

May 4, 2023

Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific Region

This article is organized into three parts. First, a historical narrative of the Burma campaign highlights the struggles of 1942–1943, then details the second Arakan operation, the second Chindit operation, the battle of Imphal-Kohima, and the final Allied operation to retake Burma. Second, inferences are drawn from the historical narrative applied to modern warfare. Finally, implications for future joint force operational design in the Indo-Pacific derive from these inferences, indicating lessons contemporary joint force commanders and staffs can learn from the Burma campaign.

May 4, 2023

Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations

Leadership decapitation has become increasingly popular as an efficient, economical, and effective counterterrorism option for advancing U.S. interests when dealing with organizations willing to kill civilians in pursuit of political ends. But does the removal of violent nonstate leaders actually yield demonstrably favorable results beyond the obvious: execution or apprehension of a target? Does it, in fact, weaken or bring about the demise of terrorist organizations? In Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations, Jenna Jordan addresses such questions by offering a complex and nuanced discussion of the ways that leadership decapitation affects terrorist organizations and insurgencies that kill civilians.

May 4, 2023

Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ends and Means of U.S. National Security

Books on strategy are often aspirational or theoretical, considering high-level questions, first principles, and general trends without delving deeply into the mechanics of implementation. Similarly, a parallel vein of literature focuses on a narrow range of tactical platforms or concepts in the implicit hope that someone somewhere will use these clever tools to build a future force from the bottom up. Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ends and Means of U.S. National Security fits squarely between these two attractive yet unsatisfying poles; it is a practitioner’s guide to programming and budgeting that aims to demystify the “invisible but very real web of processes and authorities [that] constitute the ‘rules of the game’ for the bureaucracy”—“rules which often forestall the ‘obvious solution’” to government workers’ problems.

May 4, 2023

Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace

Few books have been written in the recent past whose stated intent has been to influence and shape the perceptions of foreign and defense policymakers. In the spirit of the famed Stanford University political scientist Alexander George, who wrote Bridging the Gap: Theory and Policy in Foreign Policy, the authors of Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace have successfully bridged the gap with a thought-provoking, accessible academic analysis. Cyber Persistence Theory holistically examines the current cyberspace environment in a way that is sure to be useful to U.S. cyberspace policymakers and operators.

May 4, 2023

A Framework for Mission Analysis in the Space Planning Process

The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has a joint integration problem. It provides capabilities that give the military and its partners decisive advantages in combat. In this way, many USSF missions are inherently “joint.” However, the Space Force is unprepared to contribute to planning for true joint operations—operations with a significant space nexus where the main effort could easily transition between space and other domains. In such an environment, adversary space systems will be high-value targets that drive action, and friendly space systems will be critical assets that require protection. Although the Space Force has made significant progress toward establishing Service components at the combatant commands, putting Guardians in a position to support joint force commanders (JFCs), the Service has not yet armed those Guardians with a process to bring space system considerations into joint planning.

May 4, 2023

Intermediate Force Capabilities: Nonlethal Weapons and Related Military Capabilities

The U.S. military has a history of fighting wars and winning battles through the overwhelming use of force. In today’s strategic environment, the battle is often one of competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Our adversaries are gaining the advantage by exploiting the predictable joint force responses, either showing force through military presence or employing lethal force. Both of these extremes are often ineffective against adversary competition. Yet neither doctrine nor training prepares the joint force to employ force between these extremes. To protect current and future national political and military interests, the U.S. military must modify its mindset and tactics to gain the necessary tools for strategic competition, or the Nation risks losing its competitive advantage.

May 4, 2023

The New “Cyber” Space Race: Integrating the Private Sector Into U.S. Cyber Strategy

The impact of Russia’s rise as a cyberpower and the Kremlin’s use of cyber warfare as an instrument of power have not gone unnoticed by U.S. Government and military leaders. The questions remain, however: What can the United States learn from Russia, and how has the United States adapted its national strategy for cyberpower to this integrated, whole-of-society approach to international competition and conflict?

May 4, 2023

General George Washington: First in War, First in Peace, First in National Security Strategy

On July 4, 1776, American leaders at the Second Continental Congress terminated the strategy they had been executing against Great Britain for over a year. They wanted political, military, and economic independence for the 13 colonies. To achieve that end, they relied on all four instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. But while many of the founders understood one or perhaps two of these instruments, General George Washington was the first American to execute a strategy using all four to achieve his ends—all while operating in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment, as complicated in its time as ours is today.

May 4, 2023

Cyber Deterrence Is Dead! Long Live “Integrated Deterrence”!

The demands that Congress, some strategists, and many academics make of cyberspace deterrence are unrealistic in the extreme.1 Many want the Department of Defense (DOD) to freeze adversary military or influence operations or the theft of American intellectual property (IP) entirely through the simple threat of interfering with adversary computer code, presumably imperiling the function of either adversary military systems or civilian infrastructure. Such strategic thinking is hopelessly naïve because such threats are insufficiently credible to deter malicious cyberspace activities, which generally fall below the level of armed conflict.2

May 4, 2023

A Mission Assurance Assessment of Threats to Missions and Force Protection Planning

After the Cold War, the United States enjoyed such an uncontested or dominant superiority in every domain that the Department of Defense (DOD) could deploy forces when it wanted, assemble them where it wanted, and operate them as it wanted. Perhaps because of this history, combined with the objectives in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), DOD components have focused on the development of new offensive and lethal capabilities and concepts with the unstated assumption that, once developed, these capabilities would be available. The following scenario describes how these assumptions can adversely affect DOD force projection capabilities.

May 4, 2023

Napoleon Revisited

Since Napoleon Bonaparte’s death, in 1821, he has continued to command the fervent interest of many admirers. Military thinkers persist in the search for the secrets of his success. Countless books and articles have been written in an attempt to unlock his astonishing abilities.

May 4, 2023

Executive Summary

I offer these thoughts to stimulate your thinking on where the joint force needs to be in the years ahead. Technology is important, but it is not the answer to issues of human nature or culture. Effective leadership must be achieved through training, education, enforcement of standards, effective and appropriate promotion policies, and focusing on respect for everyone who serves. As you experience success in your own lives, be sure to lead with enough humility to help those around you share in that success.

March 17, 2023

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 2 (March 2023)

PRISM Vol. 10, No. 2 is now online.

March 10, 2023

Denmark's Security Starts in the Baltic States

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and resulting war has caused a significant change in the perception of the European security environment. Consequently, Denmark made the choice to abolish its opt-out from EU cooperation on security and defense matters, increased defense spending, committed to reach the 2 percent target in 2033, and increased its contributions to NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. In 2023, the Denmark’s major political parties will negotiate the country’s new defense agreement. It was already determined that the agreement will reach over a 10-year period, in contrast to the more usual 5 years of the past defense agreements. A substantial increase in budget and capabilities is expected, but its extent and the prioritization of tasks and capabilities remains to be seen.

March 10, 2023

Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

The security of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has gained importance for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Germany in the past decade, even prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since 2014, the Russian Federation has waged continuous political warfare against its neighbors. Actions include the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass region, as well as ongoing disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and violations of air and maritime spaces. The BSR is a preferred target of these attacks and provocations, and as attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the German Bundestag in 2015 and the infamous “Lisa” disinformation campaign in 2016 have shown, neither Germany’s size nor its comparatively good relations with Russia guarantees Berlin’s security from Russian political warfare.