Feb. 3, 2020

3. The Ethics of Nationalism

We are observing the 100th anniversary of the ending of World War I, a war that has been blamed to a large degree on the passions of nationalism. Today we see a debate over the virtues of nationalism vis-à-vis a growth in the importance of supranational institutions and more global governance that is strikingly similar in many ways to that which occurred in the aftermath of the war. The Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump, and the surge of what has been referred to in a pejorative manner as “populist” and “nationalist” movements throughout the West are only the opening salvos of what I am convinced will be a mammoth struggle over ideas regarding national identity versus cosmopolitanism, more local national governments versus transnational governmental institutions, and so forth, and the impact that these ideas will have on the shape of the future international order.

Feb. 3, 2020

2. Grim Virtue: Decisiveness as an Implication of the Just War Tradition

So proclaims J.R.R. Tolkien’s Faramir, second son of Denethor, brother of Boromir, captain of the rangers of Ithilien, and later captain of the white tower when his brother falls. Faramir makes this assertion in a moment of great peril, in the midst of conflict, when he is given an opportunity to do a terrible thing in order to bring about a great good. He does not do it, and his proclamation, above, as to why he does not provides a tidy summary of the core of the just war framework, which could be rendered thus: Wars may be justly fought only in the last resort and for the aim of peace, when a sovereign authority—over whom there is no one greater charged with the care of the political community—determines that nothing else will properly retribute a sufficiently grave evil, take back what has been wrongly taken, or protect the innocent. In such cases, and only such, force may be rightly deployed to restore justice, order, and peace.

Feb. 3, 2020

1. What Should Military Ethics Learn from World War I? A Christian Assessment

The Somme has become a byword for disproportionate military slaughter, caused by criminally stupid and callous generals in the prosecution of a senseless, futile war. This narrative began to take root in Great Britain when I was a teenager in the 1960s and against the background of widespread opposition to America’s war in Vietnam. Although now under challenge from professional historians, it remains a common view and received something of a boost 5 years ago with the publication of Christopher Clark’s widely celebrated The Sleepwalkers. Clark concludes his account of the outbreak and escalation of World War I thus: “There is no smoking gun in this story; or, rather, there is one in the hand of every major character. . . . The outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime.” “The crisis that brought war in 1914,” he tells us, “was the fruit of a shared political culture,” which rendered Europe’s leaders “sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world.”

Feb. 3, 2020

Introduction

The profession of arms in the 21st century is at significant risk of losing its status as a profession due to several salient factors. Because of the rapid development of technology in relation to warfare, for instance, there are growing questions as to how much control human beings will retain of future combat, particularly given the speed of decisionmaking required for victory on the modern battlefield. As well, with the rise of new geopolitical and military coalitions, many are concerned as to how much war will remain an act of and in accordance with the political interests, values, and histories of individual nation-states, especially considering the thornier problem of developing the same for coalitions or allied forces. Furthermore, amid an increase in value-neutral societies (and the concomitant lack of personal moral formation of individual citizens), it may rightly be asked whether values-based institutions such as professional militaries can be adequately shaped to reflect any coherent national ethical consensus.

Feb. 3, 2020

Acknowledgments

The completion of this work stands on the efforts of many tireless professionals, all of whom are deserving of tremendous thanks. First, the staff officers and noncommissioned officers of both the U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Chaplains and Royal Army Chaplains Department deserve mention, including Chaplain (Major General) Paul K. Hurley, USA, and Rev. Dr. (Chaplain General) David C. Coulter (co-hosts of the International Military Ethics Symposium 2018); Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Grace Hollis, USA; Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) “Bogie” Augustyn, USA; Rev. Father (Lieutenant Colonel) Pascal Hanrahan, Royal Army Chaplains’ Department (British Army); Sergeant First Class Jason Gaulke, USA (action officer); and from NCI, Inc., Ms. Alana Gates and Ms. Tina Mincks (logistical organizers).

Feb. 3, 2020

Preface

The Army’s professional ethic is built on the trust granted to our profession and the legal authorization to use violence in order to compel an adversary and to assert the Nation’s will. The military remains among the most trusted professions in America. Our continued ethical conduct is paramount to maintaining the respect that generations of Soldiers have forged.

Feb. 3, 2020

17. Toward a Resilient Military Ethic

As this volume of reflections on military ethics in light of World War I comes to a close, a framing of diverse insights is both necessary and beneficial. This evaluation may be accomplished, I suggest, by relating military ethics more broadly to the overall purpose of military action, as well as of human life. Within this schema, war may be understood as an attempt at resilience—a striving after societal flourishing that was as evident in the Great War as it is today. By situating discussion about military ethics in this way, we may achieve greater clarity regarding the purpose and nature of war as well as insight into possible present and future expressions of warfare and the place of ethics in them.

Feb. 3, 2020

16. The Proper Marking of Medical Personnel and Equipment: Lessons from the Great War

In April 1917, after repeated attempts at diplomacy aimed at keeping itself out of the conflict raging in Europe, the United States declared war against Imperial Germany and later its allies. The 65th Congress authorized and directed that the President “employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and . . . bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged.”1 Thus, the United States entered into the first world conflict in which Allied nations truly attempted to undertake a whole-of-government approach, with the aim of achieving unity of effort between its joint military forces, interagency communities, and intergovernmental entities. In addition, the Allied nations attempted to extend this coordination not only within their own governments but also among their Allies as well.

Feb. 3, 2020

A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms

The profession of arms in the 21st century is at significant risk of losing its status as a profession due to several salient factors. Because of the rapid development of technology in relation to warfare, for instance, there are growing questions as to how much control human beings will retain of future combat, particularly given the speed of decisionmaking required for victory on the modern battlefield. As well, with the rise of new geopolitical and military coalitions, many are concerned as to how much war will remain an act of and in accordance with the political interests, values, and histories of individual nation-states, especially considering the thornier problem of developing the same for coalitions or allied forces. Furthermore, amid an increase in value-neutral societies (and the concomitant lack of personal moral formation of individual citizens), it may rightly be asked whether values-based institutions such as professional militaries can be adequately shaped to reflect any coherent national ethical consensus.

Feb. 3, 2020

15. Soldier Enhancement Ethics and the Lessons of World War I

World War I is sometimes described as either the last of the Napoleonic wars or the first of the modern ones. In truth, it was both. While it was largely fought by the kinds of mass formations perfected by Napoleon Bonaparte 100 years earlier, it was also characterized by innovations such as the tank, airplane, flamethrowers, poison gas, and hydrophones, to name only a few, that gave rise to what we now call “modern warfare.”

Feb. 3, 2020

14. Twin Children of the Great War: Assessing the Effects of Moral and Spiritual Injury Today

If World War I demonstrated anything, it was the sheer brutality, wastage, and immensity of industrial-age combat. Against this tide, the warrior in the trench or the line, in the sky or on the waves appeared to have little or no hope of coming out unscathed either in body or in soul. Indeed, the postwar social pathos for the plight of the warrior seemed to be a type of hope-filled social exercise in revaluing human life and straining against the goads of this new scale of war.1 Postwar Western societies yearned to reclaim an optimism about war—that somehow it would never again reach the scale of carnage the world had just witnessed, though this was not to be. Metaphorically, war from 1914 to 1919 crossed the Rubicon, never to return to its former land.

Feb. 3, 2020

13. Growth After Trauma: Moral Injury, PTSD, and PTG

Combat deployments affect people, and veterans return changed. Some come back worse than others, but no one comes back the same. Many have experienced various forms of trauma, and whether directly from combat operations or not, trauma can be a significant part of one’s experience in war. Trauma can cause severe physical, emotional, and psychological reactions, often displaying symptoms referred to as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trauma may manifest symptoms of PTSD, but the injury to the psyche, or soul, is much more than just symptoms of a disorder, reparable through medication and therapy. There is a deeply spiritual aspect to combat that is much more than merely psychological or physiological, yet they are interrelated. Therefore, the treatment of combat veterans’ symptoms needs to address the moral aspects of the combat experience.1 Hence, some behavioral health and religious professionals have begun to talk more about moral injury in the last few years.

Feb. 3, 2020

11. Anglo-American Army Chaplaincy in World War I: A Centenary Perspective

The history of Anglo-American chaplaincy cooperation is curiously neglected. Since 1900, British and American forces have served together in the Boxer Rebellion, two world wars, the Korean War, Gulf War, and the war on terror, to say nothing of their routine collaboration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although histories of 20th-century British and American chaplaincy have multiplied in recent decades, almost all focus on a single national context, an individual service, a specific conflict, and/or a certain religious tradition. However useful in other respects, such selectivity has served to obscure the fundamental connection between British and U.S. Army chaplaincy, especially that which occurred in World War I. If mentioned at all, this collaboration usually receives only a nod of acknowledgment, although Richard Budd has rightly emphasized its formative role in shaping the organization of American chaplaincy.

Feb. 3, 2020

About the Contributors

Contributors to A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms.

Jan. 31, 2020

Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications for the Baltic Sea Region

Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.

Jan. 22, 2020

The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region

China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017 was an important “first” for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had never operated a base on foreign territory. It was also a milestone in a gradually expanding PLA presence in the Red Sea region. Over the previous decade, China deployed peacekeepers to conflicts in the oil-producing states of Sudan and South Sudan, conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and increased its military diplomacy throughout the area. By the time the Djibouti base opened, the PLA was already maintaining a presence of more than 2,000 personnel in the region—far more than in any other area outside the Indo-Pacific. While PLA capabilities have remained largely concentrated in Asia, its Red Sea presence showcased an increasing ability to project power to other regions and suggested that additional deployments may occur as China seeks to defend its overseas interests. The PLA role in the region has also entered the Chinese popular imagination: the navy’s evacuation of Chinese and foreign citizens from Yemen in 2015 was the basis of Operation Red Sea, one of China’s top grossing films of 2018.

Jan. 22, 2020

The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation: Implications for Transatlantic Security

In November of 2017, the European Union (EU) officially launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, its latest attempt to deepen defense cooperation among EU members. Earlier that same year, the EU approved two other important initiatives designed to strengthen defense cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Shortly after the launch of PESCO, many U.S. defense officials expressed skepticism about its value. This is not surprising; U.S. officials have reflexively opposed European defense initiatives such as PESCO since the end of the Cold War. U.S. opposition to these initiatives reflects its fear that they could lead the EU to become a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues and resources, and in so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security.

Jan. 10, 2020

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 3 (January 2020)

Emerging disruptive technologies, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, and neuroscience will dramatically alter the global security environment. PRISM V.8,N.3 “Singularity” maps this evolving challenge and propose solutions. 

Jan. 10, 2020

The Future of Leadership: Rise of Automation, Robotics, and Artificial Intelligence

It seems like we are continuously bombarded with prophecies about how Artificial Intelligence (AI) and all of its permutations—from quantum computing and machine learning to RPA and Skynet—will radically change just about everything we do.1 However, much of its potential (whether as promise or pariah) remains prospective, more speculative than real.

Jan. 10, 2020

“Thinking About What Could Be” An Interview with General John M. Murray, Commanding General, Army Futures Command

Army Futures Command is an adaptation to the on-going change in the international order we have seen since the end of World War Two. The rules of the road for international order have changed; Russian destabilization of Ukraine, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, and the inevitable shift from an Atlantic-based global economy to a Pacific-based economy.

Jan. 10, 2020

A Small State Perspective on the Evolving Nature of Cyber Conflict: Lessons from Singapore

Cyber conflicts among states are still largely driven by geopolitical and political considerations and should not be seen as separate from other kinds of conflict or political objectives. Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness observe that modern cyber strategies are neither new nor revolutionary and that actions in cyberspace fall into “a domain of limited coercive actions designed to alter the balance of information as well as manage escalation risks in long-term competitive interactions.” Cyber operations may offer new ways to test the robustness of networks, control messaging, or degrade a network, but they do not fundamentally change great power competition or the hierarchy of states in the international system.

Jan. 10, 2020

The Challenges Facing 21st Century Military Modernization

When a military organization undertakes a modernization program, it is intuitive to expect that existing capabilities are going to be replaced by superior capabilities. There is an implied suggestion that a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of this superiority is enhanced lethality; lethality surely constitutes a necessary condition of the strategic effectiveness of the military organization in question. At the risk of stating the obvious, military organizations around the world exist to protect the security of their respective countries: in peacetime, by deterring the adversaries of the country from waging war, and in wartime, by defeating these adversaries should they choose the war option. These two missions are not mutually exclusive: “The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” Nevertheless, it is possible to question the extent to which lethality subsequently connects to strategic effectiveness, which is understood here as the ability to win wars. In other words, while modernization ought to result in a military organization that is more lethal than before, this enhanced lethality does not guarantee strategic effectiveness.

Jan. 10, 2020

The Ethics of Acquiring Disruptive Technologies: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weapons, and Decision Support Systems

Reluctance to develop AI applications for military purposes is not going to go away as the development, acquisition, and employment of these systems challenge the traditional norms associated with not just war­fighting but morality in general. Meanwhile, as the debate rages, adversaries of the United States who do not have these ethical concerns continue with their development. China, for example, has vowed to be the leader in AI by 2030. No one should have any illusions that the Chinese will not use this dominance for military as well as civilian purposes. So, to maintain parity, if not advantage, DOD has little choice but to proceed with the development and employment of artificially intelligent systems. As it does so, ethical concerns will continue to arise, potentially excluding important expertise for their development. To include this expertise, DOD needs to confront these concerns upfront.

Jan. 10, 2020

Killing Me Softly: Competition in Artificial Intelligence and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The conduct of war is being fundamentally altered by the revolutionary impact of artificial intelligence (AI). The competition in AI and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) marks the onset of the “7th Military Revolution” and the states that integrate these advances first will have a prodigious military advantage.” China has seized this moment, increasingly posing a risk to the historical technological advantage of the United States and destabilizing the foundations of modern warfare.

Jan. 9, 2020

Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage through Cognitive Science and Biotechnology

The United States is starting to confront unprecedented challenges to the military and technological superiority that it has enjoyed in recent history. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a powerhouse across a range of emerging technologies, and Chinese leaders recognize today’s technological revolution as a critical, even historic, opportunity to achieve strategic advantage. As Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Commander-in-Chief of the CMC Joint Operations Center, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has highlighted the importance of military innovation to “keep pace with the times” (与时俱进) and adapt to the global revolution in military affairs.

Jan. 9, 2020

Strategic Competition for Emerging Military Technologies: Comparative Paths and Patterns

One of the most pressing issues in contemporary international relations is the expectation of a new era of intensifying strategic competition, characterized by the confluence of political, economic, and military-technological competitions in the context of major shifts in the global security environment.1 At the forefront of this growing strategic rivalry is the contest for future supremacy over global security and economic institutional grids between the world’s major military powers—the United States, China, and to a lesser degree, Russia.

Jan. 9, 2020

Redefining Neuroweapons: Emerging Capabilities in Neuroscience and Neurotechnology

While many types of weaponizable neuroscience and technology (neuroS/T) have been addressed in and by extant forums, treaties, conventions, and laws, other newer techniques and technologies have not. Thus, particular advances in neuroS/T have an increased potential for dual use and direct use in warfare, intelligence, and national security (WINS). In this light, this article (1) presents the WINS utility and possible applicability of gene editing methods, nanoparticles, and other tools that can modify the central nervous system; (2) discusses the value and vulnerabilities of big data and bio-cybersecurity in WINS; (3) posits how such developments bring into stark relief existing gaps in international biological and chemical weapons conventions; and (4) proposes steps toward rectification of current and future oversight and governance.

Jan. 9, 2020

Directed Energy Weapons Are Real . . . And Disruptive

What exactly is a directed energy weapon? Are these weapons still science fiction, lab experiments, or are they real? How can they be used and how disruptive can they be? What are the challenges and next steps? This article will examine answers to these questions.

Jan. 9, 2020

The Worst Possible Day: U.S. Telecommunications and Huawei

As a global power, the United States must be able to sustain military forces and project power anywhere in the world, even in the face of resistance from a sophisticated adversary with the ability to infiltrate or disrupt telecommunications and other critical infrastructure within the United States, in space, under the ocean, and in other regions of the world. Policy must consider the worst possible day, not the routine day.

Jan. 9, 2020

Cyber Physical Systems: The Coming Singularity

At this moment, a subtle but fundamental technological shift is occurring that is uniting our digital and physical worlds at the deepest architectural and operational levels. This technological shift will alter the global business, government, military and intelligence ecosystems. It is nothing less than a technological singularity and this technology will forever change our world—it is called Cyber Physical Systems (CPS).

Dec. 4, 2019

Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today

Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight. Those who assume they are cheap imitations of national armed forces invite disaster because for-profit warriors are a wholly different genus and species of fighter. Private military companies such as the Wagner Group are more like heavily armed multinational corporations than the Marine Corps. Their employees are recruited from different countries, and profitability is everything. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries do not fight conventionally, and traditional war strategies used against them may backfire.

Dec. 4, 2019

Fentanyl as a Chemical Weapon

Fentanyl is a major topic in the news these days because of its significant contribution to the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States. It clearly is a major counternarcotic challenge. But there also has been some reporting, including about congressional interest, as to whether fentanyl additionally should be considered a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and whether U.S. Government chemical defense efforts should place greater emphasis on it. This paper provides some perspective on fentanyl as a chemical weapon.

Nov. 22, 2019

Joint Force Quarterly 95 (4th Quarter, October 2019)

Our world is in constant motion, and as a result change is what we must always seek to adjust and improve our situations. If you have a setback, a delay, or a loss, you do as the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Marine Corps suggests—you improvise, adapt, and overcome. I would add that we need to be constantly learning both from what we see and from what others experienced. As former Secretary James Mattis asked our professional military education (PME) institutions to do, developing our critical thinking skills and testing our intellectual limits in new and engaging ways are no longer options for a select few. To that end for the joint force, Joint Force Quarterly continues to offer discussions about past conflicts and current issues and to frame future concepts and issues in ways that hopefully help each of us better use our minds. With that as a goal, we offer a wide range of ideas to help you keep your intellectual edge. Hopefully, you will read them and send us your best ideas on how to keep improving the joint force.

Nov. 18, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

Nov. 18, 2019

Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence

This article examines the potential of artificial intelligence to improve joint electromagnetic spectrum operations along three lines of discussion. First, current doctrine and process limitations may impact a Joint Force commander’s ability to visualize and understand how Joint Forces are operating within the spectrum. Second, artificial intelligence and specific learning models can help understand how the electromagnetic spectrum connects military forces. And finally, the role of data can fuel machine learning despite the associated risks. Artificial intelligence can improve Joint Force understanding and visualization, say the authors, and help commanders make more accurate and timely decisions.

Nov. 18, 2019

Subordinating Intelligence

Long interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations have resulted in increased scrutiny of civil-military relations and the interagency intelligence community. Subordinating Intelligence analyzes the evolution of civil-military relationships with an emphasis on the post–Cold War era. This book identifies the barriers to cooperation, but also identifies the factors that made a difference where integration was achieved. Given that interagency alignment is a prerequisite for success, both military and intelligence professionals would be well served to read Oakley’s excellent book to find examples of what can go wrong, but also what can go right.

Nov. 18, 2019

Sailing True North

While the emphasis is on naval leaders, Sailing True North provides insights relevant to the entire Joint Force and beyond. This book is for anyone who wants to understand the essential questions of character and leadership under stress. The author is supremely well read, and provides an invaluable distillation over a vast span of history. This book encourages self-examination as the author challenges you, and asks you to identify your heroes and the qualities you admire. Given the author’s leadership experience at the most consequential levels of command, his scholarship on this topic is recommended reading.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Lessons of Tragedy

Colonel Joseph Collins, USA (Ret.), PhD reviews The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order by Hal Brands and Charles Edel. In this excellent book, the focus is on great power politics. And the centrality of survival and security supports this approach. However, the international order has a number of important aspects beyond interstate security politics. The issues of international political economy, trade, globalization and regional/global organizations are a big part of the story. If you can read only one book on world order, says Collins, you would do well to read Lessons of Tragedy. Aristotle would salute your prudence.

Nov. 18, 2019

Wolfe, Montcalm, and the Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign of 1759

Analysis of the 1759 French and Indian War Quebec Campaign demonstrates that Britain achieved victory because it adhered to the principles of joint operations better than the French did. This historical case study examines the commanders’ uneven application of joint operating principles given contemporary technology and the physical environment. While the British lacked formal doctrine listing the principles of joint operations, the thought process and underlying concepts of current doctrinal principles shaped their military decisions. It is important that our joint leaders can do likewise, to learn from history and use their creativity to apply joint operating principles in combat.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System: A Case Study in Defense Innovation

The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System played an important role in Great Britain’s defense during the 1940 Battle of Britain. The system’s ability to warn the Royal Air Force about incoming Luftwaffe attacks helped restore a measure of Britain’s protection from continental states, contributing to the resistance and eventual defeat of Nazi Germany. Today, creation of the Chain Home System serves as a case study in military innovation, which shows the importance of strategic planning in the acquisition process, the importance of wartime adaptation, and the need to have the right team to manage development and implementation.

Nov. 18, 2019

3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations

Additive manufacturing (AM), also known as 3D printing, can enable the production of replacement parts when and where they are needed, which is required to enable future agile operations. As such, AM development in the DOD represents a critical enabler of forward basing and denied area operations. However, creating reliable and trusted repair parts to the correct specification is challenging, especially in an austere environment. In order to overcome AM employment challenges and leverage this technology effectively and efficiently, unity of effort for development and implementation is required across the joint enterprise.

Nov. 18, 2019

Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System: An Overview

The Joint Qualification System’s narrow focus on officers working at the strategic level is insufficient to build the joint-ready force needed to meet our nation’s warfighting demands. Given that the Joint Qualification System was introduced ten years ago, it is time to assess how well the current system is meeting current needs. The Air Force is developing a talent management system to complement the Joint Qualification System. This initiative can inform similar efforts in other services to ensure that leaders are prepared for the challenges they will confront in increasingly sophisticated complex joint operations of the future.

Nov. 18, 2019

Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win: Competition Below Armed Conflict with Revisionist Powers

The current geopolitical environment is complex, dynamic and dangerous. Since the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has battled an assortment of rogue regimes and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). While these actors remain a security threat to the US and its allies, the 2018 National Defense Strategy directs the DOD to focus on long-term, strategic competition with two revisionist powers: Russia and China. The regional and global ambitions of these two nuclear powers, along with the emergent threats posed by rogue regimes and VEOs, presents the Joint Force with a unique security challenge.

Nov. 18, 2019

Attacking Fielded Forces: An Airman's Perspective from Kosovo

The ability of air forces to attack ground forces has been disputed since airplanes first strafed enemy trenches in World War I. The controversy that arose over NATO’s Battle Damage Assessment after the joint air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 is a case study in the effectiveness of air forces directly attacking ground forces. This article takes the experience of an A-10 pilot who flew numerous combat missions over Kosovo and visited his strike sites eleven years later. The author highlights lessons learned for joint military leaders on the conduct of joint air operations against conventional ground forces.

Nov. 18, 2019

Why Normandy Still Matters: Seventy-Five Years On, Operation Overlord Inspires, Instructs, and Invites Us to Be Better Joint Warfighters

Operation Overlord took place seventy-five years ago. Operation Overlord was strategically audacious and required an amazing amount of intellectual capacity and organizational acumen to have any chance of success. Today it teaches valuable lessons concerning the difficulty of planning and conducting integrated, all-domain, joint and combined forced-entry operations against a lethal enemy whose anti-access and area denial preparations were immense. Though much has changed since June 1944, this article highlights the operational approach, all-domain planning, and synchronized integration of Operation Overlord and asks if today’s Joint Force is intellectually prepared to plan such an operation.

Nov. 18, 2019

America First ≠ America Alone: Morocco as Exemplar for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On October 4, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the release of the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and the role of international partnerships. The first page of this strategy includes the statement “America First does not mean America alone,” indicating the essential role of key international partners. The US should highlight Morocco as an example for other countries in the region and capitalize on Morocco’s status as a net security exporter. Encouraging the success of countries like Morocco would reduce the threat of terrorism and give meaning to the America First concept.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Second Island Cloud: A Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands

In the early 20th century, visionary Marine officer Pete Ellis compiled remarkable studies of islands in the Western Pacific and studied the practical means for the seizure or defense of advanced bases. Ellis’s description of an island cloud (as opposed to an island chain) aptly captures the complexity and diversity of this geography and provides a framework for lasting and dispersed strength. A century after Ellis’s work, China presents new strategic and operational challenges to the US in Asia. Now is the time to develop a coherent strategy that will last another hundred years.

Nov. 18, 2019

Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field: Diligent Deterrence or De-Escalation Debacle

Having fought three wars and numerous border clashes, the potential for future conflict between Pakistan and India remains high. This includes the future potential of a nuclear exchange. While the nuclear evolution of both countries trace back to the 1960s, this article focuses on developments since the formal declaration of nuclear weapons in 1998. The nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India has produced several close calls though neither state has resorted to using nuclear weapons. While there is cause for concern, encouraging Pakistan and India to comply with international norms may defuse tensions and give us reason for hope.

Nov. 18, 2019

Winners of the 2019 Essay Competitions

NDU Press congratulates the winners of the 2019 Essay Competitions.

Nov. 18, 2019

Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats: Critical Gaps and Opportunities for Progress

The Department of Defense (DOD) 2012 Mission Assurance Strategy does not account for the risk that cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could degrade mission execution. Adversaries are rapidly improving their ability to attack such infrastructure by accessing industrial control systems and exploiting other cyber vulnerabilities. At the same time, US infrastructure systems are becoming increasingly interdependent, heightening the risk of cascading failures across multiple sectors on which the Department depends. The department must strengthen the culture of mission assurance, say the authors, by bringing cybersecurity into the heart of mission assurance and extending such initiatives to all overseas defense installations.

Nov. 18, 2019

Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight

Strategic Foresight is an interdisciplinary skillset concerned with identifying signals of change in uncertain environments. This article argues first that national security professionals need this skillset in this era of ambiguity and unpredictability. In addition, the author identifies several areas where Strategic Foresight can be improved. First, shift analytic focus from technology-focused futures to a more integrated vision of future environments. Second, use lessons from systems thinking to evaluate more accurately the global system. Third, provide more instruction on complexity thinking. Fourth, introduce foresight thinking early in professional development. Fifth, create a unified lexicon of the concepts and terms.

Nov. 18, 2019

Strategic Army: Developing Trust in the Shifting Landscape

Warfare in the information age is a new battleground. The disinformation campaigns of our adversaries undermine trust across the Joint Force and degrade the legitimacy of liberal democracies. The Australian Army serves as a case study of building trust domestically, regionally and globally in order to strengthen the entire rules-based global order. Trust is a strategic asset, say the authors, which strengthens our defense capabilities and can diminish the power of our adversaries. In order to realize a truly strategic army, force design and force structure should complement high quality combat capability.

Nov. 18, 2019

Executive Summary

Our world is in constant motion. If you have a setback or loss, you would be wise to do as the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Marine Corps suggests: improvise, adapt and overcome. Former Secretary James Mattis asked our professional military education (PME) institutions to develop their critical thinking skills and push their intellectual limits. To that end, in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly, we examine past and present conflicts to help you become a better leader. And we offer new ideas to help you maintain your intellectual advantage and keep the Joint Force moving forward.

Nov. 7, 2019

Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence

This paper is the first in a sequence of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by Baltic states in close proximity to a resurgent Russia that the U.S. National Security Strategy describes as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to begin exploration of the most significant Baltic states security challenges through focused strategic research and a series of multinational, interactive theater wargames sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University and Swedish Defence University. This first paper highlights early research and wargaming insights indicating the importance of denial-based deterrence for protection of the Baltic states from potential Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and the Baltic states can best improve their ground, maritime, and air forces to generate credible denial-based deterrence.

Oct. 17, 2019

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 (October 2019)

“Taking Responsibility in a Dangerous World”—the aptly titled feature by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—sets the tone for our latest edition of PRISM.  A non-themed edition, PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 explores the business of terrorism; lessons learned from 18 years of war; the emergence of hybrid warfare; the potential militarization of robotic automated systems and artificial intelligence; Russia’s resurgence, and Sweden’s strategy of Total Defense in response to Russia’s resurgent assertiveness; as well as the rapid growth of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and a comparative analysis of international approaches to diplomatic security. The edition features the perspectives of warfighters, scholars, practitioners, and diplomats from Israel, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Distinguished perspectives include those of a Defense Minister, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, former Commander Joint Special Operations Command, and former UN Under Secretary General for Safety and Security. Irrespective of the rank or specialty, each of our newest authors are thought leaders. 

Oct. 4, 2019

Diplomatic Security: A Comparative Analysis

This book's stark litany of attacks against diplomats from other nations—as well as the information presented regarding the steps their individual nations have taken in the name of diplomatic security—reveals that too often, the attention of the public and members of national governments may have been momentarily seized by attacks on their diplomatic outposts. But discussions about anemic budgets and other higher priority matters quickly diluted the collective anger about the deaths of yet another diplomat serving their country, and little changes.

Oct. 4, 2019

"Total Defense"—an Interview with Swedish Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist

"Total Defense" is the total mobilization of a society in a war situation—what you can mobilize on the civilian side and on the military side together, and what you can do on the civilian side to support the military effort. It includes what you can do in private companies, as well as in the public sector and authorities. Sweden had a huge civil defense organization during the Cold War, but since then it has atrophied, and now we are starting the complicated process of rebuilding that capacity. If the military organization is to work in reality, you need this support from the civilian side, such as infrastructure, healthcare, and all these things that are required for effective military operations.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Digital Maginot Line: Autonomous Warfare and Strategic Incoherence

Just as the Maginot Line created an illusion of security, guaranteed standoff, and physical protection that made its shattering during the blitzkrieg of 1940 all the more shocking to the French polity, the pursuit of militarized robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) has led many to believe that the key to a more efficient and secure future lay within these technologies. The United States Armed Forces owe themselves and their civilian leaders honesty regarding a prudent approach to integrating AI and a pragmatic vision of the threats and risks associated with relying on these systems to achieve future policy goals.

Oct. 4, 2019

Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield: Implications for Deterrence and Surprise

Predicting the future of technology is a risky business. We know with certainty that AI is being incorporated into an array of military missions with the intent of improving our knowledge of the operational environment, adversary capabilities, and the speed and precision of offensive and defensive weapons. We can usefully speculate about how these developments are poised to change the face of modern warfare and how those changes might affect regional and strategic deterrence stability, based on our understanding of established political and military realities. More elusive, however, is a clear picture of how AI might converge with other technologies to produce unexpected outcomes, or “unknown unknowns.” Nevertheless, there are a few possibilities that could have major strategic consequences and alter the underlying realities on which regional and strategic stability are founded.

Oct. 4, 2019

Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 — Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part of an intense revisionist campaign or during war. For example, the current conflict in eastern Ukraine might be viewed as an example of hybrid warfare that is taking place within a wider Russian campaign of regional revisionism and global influence. Likewise, Iranian proxy militia fighting hybrid wars in Syria and Iraq, and against Israel, are part of a wider regional revisionist challenge. Alternatively, any future large-scale war is likely to involve hybrid warfare operations, in parallel with hybrid threats to the homeland. The challenge will be to fight both in parallel.

Oct. 4, 2019

On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch

Punching above its weight is a sign of strong leadership in the Russian cultural-political-military context. As the past two decades show, the Kremlin has been quite consistent in delivering its promises, especially in the political-military sphere. The West has also been very consistent in dismissing Moscow’s promises, finding itself surprised time after time. Unfortunately, in analyzing how Gerasimov’s latest promise was discussed in the West, it is likely to follow the same path, and we all will be “surprised” in a few years when Russia will deploy an intervention force to “protect” its interests abroad.

Oct. 4, 2019

Pathologies of Centralized State-Building

The international community, led by the United States, has invested trillions of dollars in state-building efforts during the past two decades. Yet despite this commitment of substantial resources, conflict and violence remain a challenge in fragile states. It therefore seems especially important to consider the reasons why state-building has not lived up to its expectations. One plausible explanation for the failure of state-building in Afghanistan is that the government remains extremely centralized in all critical dimensions, including the power of the executive, subnational governance, judicial institutions, public budgeting and finance, and the national security forces. Of these, only the Afghan National Army has implemented meaningful reforms. In the other areas, almost no reform has occurred compared to the institutional status quo before 2001. A consequence is that most Afghans continue to experience the same type of centralized, predatory state that they endured prior to 2001. Paradoxically, by resurrecting the centralized, predatory state, the stabilization effort continues to give rise to an antigovernment insurgency across the country.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Meaning of Setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan

From 2011 to 2017, similar processes played out in Iraq and Afghanistan that are deeply significant yet understudied. Between 2011 and 2014, after much effort and some success, the United States drew down its military forces in both countries. Hopes were high that the Iraqi and the Afghan government could take over. Their armies and police were vastly superior in numbers, equipment, and training to those of their adversaries. Nevertheless, the Iraqi and Afghan states both came to the brink of collapse. Gains that had come at high cost and sacrifice for the United States unraveled. Terrorist threats re-emerged. The United States re-entered the conflicts. So far, it has not fully withdrawn. Why these events came to pass has not yet been fully studied. This article explores what happened and the implications for U.S. strategy.

Oct. 4, 2019

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons from the Long War

Considering that more than 2,200 Americans have died in Afghanistan, it would be a dereliction of duty not to extract lessons from nearly 18 years of engagement there. It not only makes sense but also is a statutory obligation for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Our legislative mandate requires us to provide recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and leadership on preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse. As an independent inspector general, my job is to evaluate the effectiveness of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, not to make policy. Nonetheless, I have been asked many times whether the United States and its coalition partners will be in Afghanistan in another 18 years. Although I cannot answer that question directly, I know that we may well be if we fail to learn the lessons from the first 18 years of our nation’s experience in Afghanistan.

Oct. 4, 2019

Taking Responsibility in a Dangerous World

The NATO partnership is indeed evolving, and some analysts describe a growing rift across the ocean. Yet transatlantic cooperation today is more important than ever. Beyond any disagreement we might have, European and American interests very often coincide. On most foreign policy issues—from Ukraine to Syria, from Africa’s security to North Korea—transatlantic cooperation is in great shape. During the five-year term of the current EU leadership, the European Union and NATO have signed two historic Joint Declarations, which have opened a whole new phase in our partnership. Our two organizations share 22 Members and the same set of values: our mandates are different but—most importantly—they are complementary. While NATO remains the pillar of Europe’s collective defense, there are tasks that can only be performed by an organization of a different nature, such as the European Union (EU). The EU contribution to our common security is unique and increasingly relevant in our dangerous world.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Business Case for Terrorism

Two of the deadliest and most notorious terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), have boasted many of the same structures and utilized tactics common to organizations in the business world. While AQ (having existed and thrived longer) has gradually built a global network of operatives, IS has focused on rapid expansion. Circumstances have forced the two organizations to compete for influence, resources, and success. In this, article we will reconceptualize terrorist groups as business organizations and explore how such organizations can best be countered, based on insights from the business world.

Oct. 4, 2019

Temperature Rising: Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Wars in the Middle East

The academic literature on the IRGC, Iran’s elite force, has been rapidly growing. Nader Uskowi’s book differs from other offerings in the sense that the author does not claim objectivity. On the first page, the author dedicates the book to his father, a former major general in the Iranian Imperial Army—the military arm of the Pahlavi regime, toppled by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. There is nothing wrong or unusual about taking one side in a political debate. The Islamic Revolution created a large number of both loyalists and opponents. Certainly, both sides have the right to make their case.

July 31, 2019

Five Conundrums: The United States and the Conflict in Syria

For the past 8 years, two U.S. administrations, the United Nations (UN), and numerous foreign governments have sought to end the catastrophic war in Syria and reach a negotiated political settlement to the conflict. Their efforts have repeatedly been complicated, even thwarted, by the highly contested and violent politics underlying the conflict, the sheer number of conflict actors inside and outside of Syria, and those actors’ diverse and often irreconcilable objectives.

July 29, 2019

Joint Force Quarterly 94 (3rd Quarter, July 2019)

What have you learned from the past? What future do you see? Why not write about it and share it with us?  Our Forum section in this issue opens with an interview of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. With arguably some of the most important responsibilities in the joint force, he discusses how his commands work to protect the homeland, defend the airspace above the United States and Canada, and how the joint force is working to achieve the Chairman’s Globally Integrated Operations challenge.

July 25, 2019

Can the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Avoid the Fate of the F-22 Raptor?

Has the US made the right choices in our defense industrial base for advanced combat aircraft? The author analyzes two major weapons systems—the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II—looking for ways to save money, improve interoperability, and enhance military-industrial cooperation between the US and its allies. The author’s analysis of the F-22 program raises questions that might be common to both programs. Why, for example, was the single purpose non-joint aircraft (the F-22) program cancelled after only 25% of the intended aircraft had been procured? Does the F-22’s fate offer any lessons for multipurpose joint aircraft?

July 25, 2019

Getting the Joint Functions Right

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a special out-of-cycle revision to joint doctrine, adding Information to the joint functions. The significance of this policy change was highlighted by endorsement from the Secretary of Defense in September 2017, where he stressed that inclusion in the joint functions signaled an elevation of information throughout Department of Defense thinking and practice. This article is an historical overview of the joint functions, intended to overcome the long-standing reluctance to place the soft power elements of the modern battlefield on the same footing as hard power elements.

July 25, 2019

Global Risks and Opportunities: The Great Power Competition Paradigm

The great power competition paradigm outlined in the National Defense Strategy provides a way to think strategically about inter-state competition in a multipolar world. Both history and a survey of current events indicate we should expect great power competition throughout the 21st century between the US, China and Russia in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Although information operations, economic diplomacy and espionage will be the primary weapons of statecraft, say the authors, military cooperation can catalyze greater regional integration, reassure our partners and allies, and support our whole-of-government efforts.

July 25, 2019

Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

America must maintain credible nuclear deterrent capabilities to convince potential adversaries and allies alike that the US will defend its vital interests and will employ those capabilities, all while hedging against an uncertain future. Despite the changing environment, America continues to view nuclear deterrence largely in Cold War terms. The continued reliance on obsolete deterrence concepts exposes a gap between policy and practice. The US must eliminate this gap, say the authors, by developing a tailored and flexible deterrence posture, which will give the Joint Force a broad spectrum of nuclear deterrence capabilities.

July 24, 2019

Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea

US maritime forces currently conduct theater security operations through rotating carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific. Although current engagements and interactions with our competitors in the region fall short of open military conflict, a war at sea may be unavoidable. Some of the most significant deficiencies within the current combat casualty care system occur within this contentious maritime environment. To improve readiness, the authors recommend joint integration of medical capabilities such as incorporating forward resuscitative and surgical platforms, enhancing our medical airlift and sealift evacuation capabilities, supplementing Mercy-class hospital ships, and implementing a medical command and control system.

July 24, 2019

LikeWar

Brett Swaney reviews LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking. The authors examine the role of social media in reshaping the character of war and politics. The result is an insightful overview of the new information battlespace for national security professionals.

July 24, 2019

Strategy, Evolution, and War

Ryan Shaffer reviews Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence by Kenneth Payne. Payne studies the origins of human strategy in evolutionary history, examines the relationship between culture, war and technology, and considers the potential of artificial intelligence to influence military strategy.

July 24, 2019

America vs. the West

Brittany Bounds reviews America vs. the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved? By Kori Schake. Schake gives an efficient summation of the great power competition with China and Russia, says Bounds, and offers several possible scenarios for an alternative to the liberal international order if the US continues to disengage.

July 24, 2019

Flanking the Crater

The Battle of the Crater, fought in 1864 during the US Civil War, is a successful example of tactical innovation except that it did not succeed. The idea was to alter the battlespace by tunneling under the enemy’s fortifications. The local commander made a quick feasibility study, and decided to utilize his soldiers’ skills as civilian miners. The authors use these events as a case study in innovation, particularly the role of mid-level leaders and propose a Joint Innovation Framework. Among their recommendations is appointment of a lead integrator who would help translate tactical opportunities into operational and strategic victories.

July 24, 2019

Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral

Atmospheric littoral operations—in the air between the buildings—exemplify how the inherent capabilities of unmanned systems and autonomy could enable overmatch, particularly for close combat in the land domain where many future conflicts are likely to be decided. A doctrine of exploiting control of the atmospheric littoral offers tactical advantages that provide a driving force for integrating robotic systems into ground combat. By pursuing a low-cost program of prototyping and experimentation, the US can lead the emerging combat capabilities offered by unmanned systems, avoid technological surprise, and lead the fight in three dimensions.

July 24, 2019

The Mayaguez Incident: A Model Case Study for PME

The seizure and rescue of the SS Mayaguez in 1975 serves as a case study in this fascinating article. Considered by many to be the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Mayaguez incident took place just two weeks before the final withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. The author highlights the challenges created by a poor understanding of history, lack of awareness of the strategic situation, numerous communication failures and an inability to overcome groupthink. Although the Mayaguez operation was flawed, says the author, this case is a valuable teaching tool at every level of professional military education.

July 24, 2019

A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education

Perceiving military service as an occupation rather than a profession creates a problem for professional military education (PME). From an occupational point of view, military service is a collection of technical skills. From a professional point of view, the profession of arms is rooted in internal trust shared with other members of the profession, and external trust demanded by society. The trust of one’s government is required for members of this profession, who in turn are granted relative autonomy. One goal of PME, therefore, should be to produce military professionals who are trustworthy in both their professional and private lives.

July 24, 2019

A Framework to Understand and Improve Defense All-Source Intelligence Analysis

This article proposes a framework to optimize the employment and career development of military and civilian intelligence analysts. The author’s framework identifies training gaps and interoperability issues within joint and strategic intelligence organizations. Military intelligence analysts are initially trained to operate at the tactical level, says the author, whereas civilian analysts are trained to operate predominately at the strategic level. In addition, there is a significant convergence of military and civilian personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commands and service intelligence centers. The author’s framework facilitates discussion of professional development for analysts across the Department of Defense.

July 24, 2019

An Interview with Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy

General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, Commander of US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command is interviewed by JFQ Editor-in-Chief Bill Eliason. Objective number one is defending the homeland, which means communicating and cooperating with every other combatant command, with the Department of Homeland Security, as well as global partners and non-traditional partners in the civilian and commercial sectors. When it comes to countering the threat from unmanned aerial systems, protecting critical infrastructure, or engaging adversaries in the cyber domain, says O’Shaughnessy, homeland defense and homeland security are inseparable.

July 24, 2019

Executive Summary

This June, the world observed the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings, which marked the beginning of the end of Nazi control in Europe. In what was probably the last time veterans of that combined campaign could meet in company strength, victorious and liberated nations alike honored their service and sacrifice. We all were reminded of the terrible costs of war as well as our collective responsibility to remember such experiences in hopes they will not be repeated. The awesome power of those young warriors, many of them civilians fresh out of school just months before, shows how well-trained and well-led troops, draftees, and long-serving veterans can achieve strategic ends. A friend sent me a link to a CBS Reports video from 1964 that featured Walter Cronkite interviewing President Dwight D. Eisenhower in England, and later Normandy, about the operation.

July 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

July 17, 2019

The Enduring Relevance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

For over six decades, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan and the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in Japan have served as the foundation of stability, prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is the basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and is a central pillar of its global strategy. The ability to project power halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then homeported in Japan. The deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

June 4, 2019

Thucydides’ Other “Traps”: The United States, China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War

The notion of a “Thucydides Trap” that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict—much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war “inevitable” between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE—has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino-American war.

May 20, 2019

Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces

Current national-level strategic documents exhort the need for creativity and innovation as a precondition of America’s continued competitive edge in the international arena. But what does that really mean in terms of personnel, processes, and culture? This paper argues that an overlooked aspect of talent management, that of cognitive diversity, must be considered when retooling military talent management systems. Going one step further, talent management models must incorporate diversity of both skill set and mindset into their calculus. Specifically, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to recruit, retain, and utilize Servicemembers and civilians with higher than average levels of creativity and a propensity for innovative thinking. It needs “enders.”

May 14, 2019

Diplomatic Security: A Comparative Analysis

In In this new book, two adept editors, Eugenio Cusumano and Christopher Kinsey, combine and edit the work of eleven authors’ different looks at diplomatic security as practiced in nine countries—China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as some overall themes on the subject. The result is perhaps the most comprehensive public study of the topic released to date, and the work stands as a reminder of the high price nations have paid in pursuit of diplomacy, as well as the difficulties and tradeoffs of balancing diplomatic efforts and the security operations meant to protect them.

May 14, 2019

The Cold War and The Cold War’s Killing Fields

Two new books revisit the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad’s The Cold War: A World History and Paul Chamberlin’s The Cold War’s Killing Fields. Westad does not use the standard bracket of 1945-89, but takes the long view back to nineteenth century economic turmoil and turn-of-the-century anti-colonialist sentiment. Chamberlain also emphasizes this same point, that the Cold War was much more than a bipolar ideological struggle. According to reviewer Walter Hudson, neither book is perfect, particularly the Chamberlin book in which American policies and policymakers do not receive fair treatment. Nonetheless, the merits of both books outweigh their flaws.

May 14, 2019

Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, was revised and signed by the Director of Joint Force Development, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, is in the final stages of its revision, tentatively scheduled for release in fall 2019. While both of these documents are commendable, says Mark Berwanger, some will claim that joint doctrine falls short in providing sufficient doctrine to integrate and synchronize all capabilities needed to accomplish the commander’s intent. Until the definition, utilization, and cultural understanding of “fires” is updated to include all offensive capabilities regardless of the weapon system, problems of integration and synchronization will remain.

May 14, 2019

The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine

As the U.S. enters a new era of near-peer competition, Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is insufficient to counter adversary employment of irregular strategies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Violent Extremist Organizations are using irregular methods to include information, cyber, economic, and unconventional warfare to offset conventional military advantages. The doctrinal terms IW and Unconventional Warfare (UW) provide a common point of departure for the doctrinal discussion, but are incomplete, generally not well understood and often misused. According to Pelleriti and co-authors, U.S. planners must reassess and update IW terminology, concepts and authorities to be successful in this new era.

May 14, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

May 14, 2019

Gallipoli: Lessons from the Great War on the Projection of Power and Joint Forcible Entry

The Gallipoli Campaign in April 1915 is one of the few events in WWI that incorporated land, sea, subsurface, air and multinational operations. Today we recognize this as a truly joint operation. This campaign offers the Joint Force important lessons on the projection of power and forcible entries for large scale combat operations within the all-domain operational concept. These include unity of command, joint fires, multiple dilemmas, logistics, the consolidation of gains and medical support services. The Gallipoli Campaign is a case study and a valuable learning tool for modern day planners which should not go to waste.

May 14, 2019

Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border

Realistic training for military can often be illusive. Factors such as urban growth, pollution, competition for frequencies and airspace, and protected habitats, continually challenge the Department of Defense in carrying out realistic training at installations. However, a small task force in the southwest has developed a solution to keep units training as they fight. At Fort Bliss in Texas, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) has developed innovative training opportunities for units that otherwise may not get the chance. While the benefits are easy to see, JTF-N is always looking for new ways to save money and enhance unit readiness.

May 14, 2019

U.S. Africa Command and Its Changing Strategic Environment

U.S. Africa Command has been training governments to combat terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime while instilling the principles of professionalism and good governance. However, major changes in the strategic environment call for a new approach. Based on changing trade patterns, China’s rising influence, and the U.S.’s new focus on great power competition, say the authors, USAFRICOM must now help African leaders safeguard national independence and root out foreign corruption. A whole-of-government approach is needed to prevent dark money from subverting local governments and turning would-be allies against the United States.

May 14, 2019

Unity of Command: Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice

Military justice has been undergoing constant change recently, as a stream of legislation continues to modify the procedures through which we achieve justice in the military. This period of flux is now coming to an end, as the most sweeping reforms in thirty years passed Congress in 2016. Perhaps the most important outcome is not what has changed, but what stayed the same: the role of the commander in the military justice process. This article examines the commander’s historical role in the military justice process, and the challenges of maintaining authority and responsibility.

May 14, 2019

A Model for Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) are often viewed as burdens and distractions. However, if managed correctly TSCPs can significantly increase unit readiness. This article provides a model based on the authors’ experience in Operation Garuda Shield 17, which placed tactical leaders at strategic points of friction to communicate up and down the chain of command. TSCPs should be viewed as readiness opportunities rather than burdens because they provide opportunity for increased resources, unique experiences, as well as deployment and training readiness. Exercise planners and their partner-nation equivalents are the key audience, say the authors, to influence and ensure success.

May 14, 2019

The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement: An Old Tool for the Modern Military

This article builds on a recent contribution from General Votel and Colonel Keravuori (in JFQ 89) who showed how the BWT approach promotes sustainable multi-national, regional and local defense institutions. Using a simple exchange of supplies and materials by via Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement transactions, the Joint Force can simultaneously build partner capacity and increase logistical interoperability. This simple but effective tool, says the author, allows service members to function in ambiguous, complex and volatile environments. Given the demands of future operations, the Joint Force must utilize all resources available to be leaner, faster and more mobile.

May 7, 2019

Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain

Bloom’s Taxonomy (named for educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom) is a system to classify learning objectives according to their level of complexity. In Professional Military Education (PME) Bloom’s Taxonomy is used to differentiate learning levels and create sequential learning objectives. This approach makes sense for most PME students but not everyone. Thus, the authors propose a stratified systems theory as a complementary framework that can be used to meet the contextual need across all PME educational systems. Implementing this recommendation, say the authors, will enhance PME and better prepare graduates to face the challenges associated with a dynamic, uncertain future.