July 11, 2018

Enhancing Global Security Through Security Force Assistance

This commentary advocates for renewed emphasis on activities that support the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions, also known as Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA creates a framework for improved partnerships and stronger alliances, and encourages our global partners to carry a greater share of the security burden. The author calls for improvements to interoperability between current and future coalition forces and additional training of senior-level ministerial advisors among other initiatives. With continued focus and determination, SFA can help build more capable partners and facilitate peace, security and stability.

July 5, 2018

Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion

In this feature article, the author compares the experiences of ancient Greek philosopher Demosthenes and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Though separated by two thousand years, both advocated for rearmament, both were called warmongers, and both were sidelined as a result. Far from provoking conflict, Demosthenes and Churchill sought to avoid war by strengthening military readiness and reinforcing support for their allies to make war less appealing to their adversaries. The lessons of Demosthenes and Churchill are still relevant as the Joint Force struggles with its own challenges in the midst of growing threats from actors across multiple domains.

July 5, 2018

Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols: China’s Joint Force Reforms

This feature article examines the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, particularly its operational capability within the People’s Republic of China and recent efforts to develop its capability as an expeditionary force. While the U.S. military has been reorganizing since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, China has paid close attention and taken significant steps, for example, in the creation of new joint warfighting commands, reorganization of its department system, and creation of new military services. These reform efforts have not been entirely successful, however, due to entrenched bureaucratic interests and the lack of recent combat operations.

July 5, 2018

Bombs, Not Broadcasts: U.S. Preference for Kinetic Strategy in Asymmetric Conflict

In this feature article, the author explores reasons why U.S. strategy in asymmetric conflict has focused so heavily on kinetic operations while conceding the information domain to weaker adversaries. This scenario is a consistent feature of every asymmetric conflict the U.S. has been involved in over the past several decades. In order for the U.S. military to be more successful in asymmetric wars, it needs to give company and battalion commanders authority to conduct information operations, move away from the mentality of treating messages like munitions, and create an organizational culture that fully appreciates the importance of information operations.

July 5, 2018

Defense of the West (Book Review)

In this timely book, one of the most seasoned observers of Atlantic security affairs, Stanley Sloan, offers insights about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These insights are linked to a detailed examination of the Alliance’s origins and development. Sloan pinpoints three key alliance drivers—national interests, common values, and political leadership—and offers a carefully circumscribed optimistic conclusion: common national interests and values are strong, but political leadership is volatile and in need of constructive and effective management.

July 5, 2018

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Book Review)

Famously, Henry Kissinger once wondered out loud, “What in the name of God is strategic superiority? . . . What do you do with it?” Over 40 years later, the questions still resonate, and Georgetown University professor Matthew Kroenig aims to tackle Kissinger’s quandary. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy begins with a puzzle: if the basic premise of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy is supposed to be that the United States can survive a massive nuclear attack and retaliate with great force (so-called assured destruction), why have successive Presidents maintained nuclear capabilities that go well beyond what is required for this goal?

July 5, 2018

The Forgotten Front (Book Review)

This is an important book for theorists and practitioners of counterinsurgency alike. Ladwig, who teaches at King’s College London, begins by pointing out that most U.S. counterinsurgency thinking errs in assuming that the United States will share common goals, interests, and priorities with the local government that it is supporting. As recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan indicate, that assumption should not be taken for granted. In fact, many U.S. elements of strategy applied in counterinsurgency—ending political and military corruption, bolstering political legitimacy by addressing the public’s concerns, engaging in economic reform—may appear just as threatening to the local government’s interests as the insurgency itself. Some local governments’ political and other interests simply do not coincide with those of the United States, and that can lead to tremendous difficulty in convincing them to adopt U.S.-backed reforms. Indeed, Ladwig’s central argument is that the “forgotten front” in these conflicts—the relationship between the United States and local government it is trying to aid—is just as important.

July 5, 2018

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

July 5, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security

This article discusses the importance of economic security, which is the ability to protect and advance U.S. economic interests, shape international interests to suit U.S. policy, and deter non-economic challenges. Because of our increasing dependence on the flow of goods, services, people, capital, information and technology across borders, economic security is vital to U.S. national security. The author argues that combatant commanders and the Joint Force must support whole-of-government efforts by integrating economic security into planning, preparation and training to influence adversarial behavior, maintain order, prepare for relief, and relieve economic insecurity in potential operational areas.

July 5, 2018

Defending the AEF: Combat Adaptation and Jointness in the Skies over France

This article recalls how an untrained cadre of men modified existing French equipment and doctrine to build a small but effective anti-aircraft force during WWI. This history of the A.E.F. Antiaircraft Service highlights how the U.S. military responded to a threat that did not exist a mere decade earlier. In many respects, this type of challenge is familiar to contemporary observers who have watched the Joint Force struggle with intra-service parochialism and the unwillingness to learn from others. Nevertheless, this case history shows what can happen when leaders encourage innovation and adaptation at all levels, top-down, middle-out and bottom-up.

July 3, 2018

Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget

This commentary explains how the effects of globalization and rapid advancements in technology have changed the geopolitical power balance. Advances in military technology and the introduction of hybrid threat capabilities have obscured traditional categories of warfare and increased the difficulty of matching capabilities to meet contemporary challenges. For the U.S. to maintain preeminence, says the author, it must develop innovative technological solutions without neglecting other aspects of innovation. For example, the U.S. should invest widely in technology and science, but also create more flexible and adaptive organizations and cultivate leaders prepared to innovate and accept the inherent risk.

July 3, 2018

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design

This commentary introduces a new approach to problem-solving developed by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The USSOCOM Design Way is a fusion of design thinking and military planning, which promotes creativity, critical thinking and innovation, and emphasizes divergent perspectives across the Joint Force. The USSOCOM Design Way goes beyond operations planning and has proven successful dealing with the complexities of resourcing, policy, acquisitions, as well as joint planning and programming. As the authors suggest, this approach has demonstrated appeal across the Joint Force, from the commander to the action officer, in response to a wide range of complex challenges.

July 3, 2018

The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform

This article calls attention to the flaws in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) which promote competition rather than cooperation. The authors argue that the Services are motivated by parochial incentives which do not align with the combatant command structure despite the jointness imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In order to empower Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff with early and direct influence over materiel development, the DAS must be reformed. The Services must act as agents working in alignment with the combatant command structure, and Service procurement budgets must allow for greater flexibility to promote Joint Force development.

July 3, 2018

Transregional Capstone Exercise: Training for Tomorrow’s Fight

This article proposes a Transregional Capstone Exercise to address shortfalls in Joint Force training against potential challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others. This article proposes four training objectives and a concise framework for regular exercises to help fulfill the Chairman’s vision for the Joint Force, and satisfy the need for all combatant commanders to anticipate transregional, multifunctional, and multi-domain conflict in a global scenario. Despite the logistical challenges and lack of transregional doctrine, these exercises would set the Joint Force on a trajectory to defend the U.S. against the transregional threats of tomorrow.

July 3, 2018

568 Balls in the Air: Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities

This article explores the integration of space capabilities and explains the strategic, operational and tactical risks the U.S. military has assumed as a result. The authors recommend that joint warfighters of the future begin to prepare now, with continuity plans when space is denied, degraded or disrupted. Failure to consider such risk factors could lead to severe degradation of U.S. military capability with disastrous results. Measured in terms of lives lost, such a failure would be reminiscent of wars fought in the pre-digital age. However, losses on this scale are simply unacceptable, especially when this risk can be mitigated.

July 3, 2018

The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing

What is the future of the aircraft carrier for the U.S. Navy? Based on a variety of threats ranging from computer systems vulnerable to hacking, China’s latest ballistic missiles, the proliferation of quiet attack submarines and the spread of nuclear weapons, you could argue the carrier may someday become obsolete. Others predict that carriers will continue to perform many of the same missions as they’ve always done. In any case, the U.S. Navy should rethink joint warfighting concepts in strategic as well as technological terms and figure out what this means for the carrier fleet and associated carrier wings.

July 3, 2018

Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive Space

This article presents a new concept called Strategic Shaping, an integrated whole-of-government approach which targets an adversary’s strategic intentions, disrupts their political calculus, and thus deters them from military action. The idea is to present multiple, complex dilemmas to an adversary’s leadership and remove their sense of control over the situation. Strategic Shaping will help the U.S. defense establishment maintain military advantage prior to or during a crisis with major competitors such as China and Russia, both of whom have recently exploited advantages below the threshold of armed conflict to accomplish their strategic objectives.

July 3, 2018

Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age

In this article, the authors explore alternative methods to create long-term competitive advantage by increasing collaboration between the intelligence community and machines, with an emphasis on artificial intelligence and machine learning. The intelligence community is battle-trained if overworked as a result of continuous operations since 2001, and its technological advantage may be at risk because intelligence systems are collecting data in too many disconnected and diverse formats, and relying on systems that are disconnected, non-standard or inaccessible. Nonetheless, artificial intelligence and machine learning will be instrumental to increase the effectiveness of future intelligence analysts and to sustain our competitive advantage.

July 3, 2018

Executive Summary

How well does the U.S. military transform? When are the best time and circumstances to change how the joint force does business? In search of some answers, I came across a short but powerful article written a few years ago by two consultants to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, David Chinn and John Dowdy. They conducted a survey in December 2014 of “almost 1,000 leaders and senior employees in more than 30 U.S. Government agencies and found that only 40 percent believed that their transformation programs succeeded.” Even though these results do not seem heartening to those “change agents” among us, their research suggests how to change one’s military even in a period of budgetary pressure, as was recently experienced in Europe and the United States. In fact, as of this writing, the Budgetary Control Act (or so-called sequestration) is still in force, but the Department of Defense budgetary outlook is fairly bright. So, if we needed to do some thinking when money was tight, should these suggestions not be applied as the situation improves? Let’s take a minute to see if this is the case.

May 18, 2018

Improving Our CWMD Capabilities: Who Will Lead?

The current DOD CWMD strategy positions the Department to meet national policy objectives for which it is not resourced, reflecting a failure at the national level to scope the challenge as something other than a technical issue and to oversee the execution of WMD-related tasks throughout the whole-of-government. In part, this is because the term “WMD,” which once had specificity in the arms control community, has been reduced to a political buzzword. This further reflects the need to define what DOD sees as important CWMD activities.

May 15, 2018

An Interview with Congressman James R. Langevin

When I first came into Congress, we were still in that transition phase of going from a relatively calm and stable, bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union as chief adversaries. We were just entering the multi-polar world in which we live and the world became much more paradoxically unstable and the threats became more involved and grew. I came in around 2000—before 9/11—and none of us could have anticipated how the world would change so dramatically, on that date in particular, and later morph into other threats and challenges.

May 15, 2018

The Darkest Sides of Politics, II: State Terrorism, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," Religious Extremism, and Organized Crime (Book Review)

In this companion to his first volume on Postwar Facism, Covert Operations, and Terrorism, Jeffrey Bale explores the influence of some of the world’s most pressing security concerns through a review of global case studies on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), violent extremism, and organized crime. Bale is thorough in his selection and treatment of the cases, using primary sources whenever available and delivering an “intentionally robust” text to provide an alternative to what he describes in the volume’s preface as often unqualified opinions taking the guise of academic works. Based on decades of research in violent extremism, Bale reviews select works and either updates their findings, or acknowledges their currency. State Terrorism, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," Religious Extremism, and Organized Crime is dense with explanations and structured expositions, but the volume offers a good model for how to convey conclusions that are framed by evidence.

May 15, 2018

The Politics of Weapons Inspections: Assessing WMD Monitoring and Verification Regimes (Book Review)

Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat in their book The Politics of Weapons Inspections: Assessing WMD Monitoring and Verification Regimes draw attention to the important role that politics can play within weapons of mass destruction (WMD) verification, but the title promises more than the authors deliver. The authors analyze three cases of disarmament using inspections (South Africa, Iraq, and Libya); examine how the verification of global nuclear disarmament might or might not work; and apply the book’s lessons to what they term difficult cases, which may be subject to future inspections (North Korea, Iran, and Syria). The studies provide a useful survey and side-by-side comparison of the successes, pitfalls, and likely future challenges of efforts to verify individual state compliance with WMD agreements. The authors on occasion fail to place the case studies within a broader geopolitical context, leaving important gaps in their analysis, which makes for an uneven read. As an example, the authors point to shortfalls in multilateral verification regimes without fully assessing how these regimes are limited and sometimes hamstrung by the external and internal politics of sovereign states.

May 15, 2018

The CWMD Strategy Gap

During the past 15 years, countering–WMD (CWMD) has been a top priority as expressed throughout multiple national and department-level strategy and policy documents, to include the National Security Strategy (NSS); the National Military Strategy (NMS); the National Defense Strategy (NDS); the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG); and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While a prevention strategy is laudable and important, the disparity between strategy and the required operational capabilities and capacities needed for securing, interdicting, and eliminating WMD reveals potential gaps that must be recognized and accounted for to ensure a credible deterrent posture. Future threats, especially biological, are likely to be more complicated than current or past conceptions.

May 15, 2018

North Korea's CBW Program: How to Contend with Imperfectly Understood Capabilities

Biological weapons programs tend to be among the most closely guarded weapons programs in a country’s arsenal. By contrast, extensive documentation and histories of nuclear weapons programs exist for virtually all the known weapons states as well as those that abandoned such programs. In recent years, while North Korea (formally the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has gone to great lengths to demonstrate to the world its nuclear and missile programs, the country has hidden whatever CBW it may possess. As the international community grapples with how to reduce tension on the Peninsula, re-assessing what is known about North Korea’s CBW program and considering options to minimize their role in the regime’s security calculous is an important addition to the complex set of issues that U.S. civilian and military leaders must consider. This article attempts to put in context what little is known about North Korea’s capabilities and offer some measures that might be taken to help curtail those capabilities.

May 15, 2018

"The Irreducible Minimum" An Evaluation of Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq

Surprise is a constant in war. But the surprise experienced by TF–714 in Iraq proved to be a major challenge even for an organization comprised of units that excelled at tactical adaptation. Consequently, TF–714’s initial response was to do more of what it already did extremely well. “The initial response,” explained General McChrystal in a 2014 interview, was that “we will just do more of what we are already very good at and then we would have done our part.” What became evident to the task force leadership, however, was that a “more of the same” response was not going to have a meaningful impact on AQI. To be sure, those operations that TF–714 executed were highly successful. The problem was there were not enough of them. They had, at best, only a limited impact on AQI’s operational tempo. The Task Force was facing an enemy it had never envisaged and could not degrade through its existing ways of operating.

May 15, 2018

The State of the Art in Contemporary CWMD Thinking

To effectively counter-WMD networks, the USG must bring to bear its full arsenal of capabilities, authorities, and permissions in a coordinated manner. As A.Q. Khan's story and September 11 demonstrate, exclusive use of the old tools—analysis, planning, functionally-organized sector-based agencies—in a complex environment has proven not only inadequate, but dangerous.

May 15, 2018

The Forensic Challenge

The suspected use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons or materials adds complexity to any international or internal conflict. It is critical that responses to such use are based on good information. The relatively new field of CBRN forensics, which is emerging out of domestic terrorism investigations, seeks to establish scientific facts through analysis of rigorously collected evidence. CBRN forensics are important to establishing actual facts, but are inherently difficult for a variety of reasons. The question of whether military forces, particularly Special Operations Forces (SOF), can conduct CBRN forensics in an adequate fashion is debatable; however, there are numerous pathways to improve the status quo.

May 15, 2018

WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat

The specter of terrorists and other violent non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is perhaps an even greater concern than acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by states. This over-magnification, however, ignores the hurdles inherent in such malignant enterprises. Despite clear interest on the part of some non-state adversaries, a true WMD is at present likely out of their reach in all but a select set of scenarios. Changes in technology, however, could augur a dramatic shift in the WMD terrorism threat picture.

May 15, 2018

Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?

Preventive actions taken since 2004, both in counterterrorism and in counterproliferation, have been extraordinary. From the decimation of al-Qaeda to the Iran Deal and the Nuclear Security Summits, difficult actions taken by courageous and hard-working Americans and others have prevented the future we feared. For all of these successes, however, there have been a matching number of failures and structural shifts that are increasing the risk of successful mega-terrorist attacks. To put it metaphorically, while there can be no doubt that we have been running faster, we have also been falling further behind. I still believe that the chance of an attack during the next decade is slightly greater than even. But there is a lengthy agenda of actions that the United States and other nations could take today to reduce this risk and even reverse trend lines moving in the wrong direction.

May 14, 2018

Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare 1975-1980 (Book Review)

Glenn Cross’s Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare 1975–1980 is a welcome addition to the small, but growing scholarly literature on the history of chemical and biological warfare. In 1965, the minority white community in the British territory of Rhodesia (officially Southern Rhodesia) rejected demands that it transfer political power to the majority black population. By the mid-1970s, white Rhodesians found it increasingly difficult to counter the growing power of native African nationalists fighting the government. As with many insurgencies, the guerrillas lacked the resources to defeat government security forces in direct combat, but Rhodesian forces were stretched too thin to suppress the insurgents, especially once they had established base camps in neighboring countries. Amidst the conflict, Rhodesian military and intelligence services employed what would now be considered chemical and biological agents against the guerillas with unknown results.

May 14, 2018

The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism (Book Review)

The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism by Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij provides the national security professional with an exceptional overview and appreciation of this growing problem facing the United States and its partners. Detailed in their compilation of the 123 incidents of lone wolf terrorism from 1940–2016, the authors examine the incidents against 20 variables to help identify trends in backgrounds, modus operandi, and motivations. Hamm and Spaaij, a professor of criminology and a sociologist respectfully, then devise a radicalization model that provides an evidence-based explanation for select case studies of lone wolf terror incidents.

May 9, 2018

Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained

There is a world war under way, waged in hot, cold, and cool modes. The aggressors see no gray zone “between war and peace.” They see all as war. So must we.

April 25, 2018

Read the Latest Issue of Joint Force Quarterly From NDU Press

The newest issue of Joint Force Quarterly is now online. This edition brings a range of important articles from the Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).

April 19, 2018

Paradigm Change: Operational Art and the Information Joint Function

The need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges. During a recent effort by the Joint Staff to update Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, leaders recognized that the joint force was already attempting to use information as a function and that the time to institutionalize information as a function was therefore overdue.

April 19, 2018

Globally Integrated Exercises: Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure

The limitations in the Globally Integrated Exercise construct should not dissuade its utilization. Like any new concept, it requires the necessary time, space, and iterations to meet the Chairman’s intent. There is no shortage of recommendations for tackling the globally integrated operations challenges.

April 17, 2018

Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight: Joint Concepts and Future Readiness

Military forces that quickly adapt to change usually prevail. It is difficult to adapt in the near term, more so when there is an extended time horizon, but not adapting can exact a heavy toll in blood and treasure. The high cost of not adjusting to new situations underlies the stereotypical conservatism of military organizations, and it is borne in their propensity to lean heavily on the lessons of the last war and eschew radical change. But those who do not try to anticipate change risk surrendering the initiative on the future battlefield.

April 17, 2018

A New Approach to Joint Concepts

The future operating environment will feature broad changes in the character of warfare. Driven by the rise of competent and competitive states; economic, social, and environmental challenges; and rapidly evolving technologies, these changes will necessitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DOD). Innovation must develop and employ new capabilities, organizational constructs, and approaches to warfighting to maintain competitive advantage over a broad range of potential adversaries.

April 13, 2018

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

April 13, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: Focus on Campaign Activities

This article continues the discussion on human security’s1 seven relevant dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.2 Complementing previous Joint Force Quarterly installments on health and food security,3 the following describes the U.S. Government’s approach to environmental security with a focus on combatant commander campaign activities.

April 13, 2018

Exploring the Future Operating Environment

As we move past the plan of the day, proceed outside of the budget cycle, and venture beyond the 10-year horizon of strategic planning efforts, significant ongoing changes in the security environment will alter the character of warfare beyond recognition.

April 13, 2018

America’s First General Staff (Book Review)

This trim book explains the full course of the U.S. Navy’s General Board, its institutional forum for innovation, during the period from 1900 to 1950. To remedy challenges identified during the Spanish-American War, Navy Secretary John D. Long established the board as an experiment. The Secretary realized he needed military advice, so he chose a mix of up-and-coming Navy officers, the head of the Bureau of Navigation that managed careers, and one Marine officer, all led by the redoubtable Admiral George Dewey, to offer it.

April 13, 2018

Anatomy of a Campaign (Book Review)

John Kiszely had an outstanding career in the British army. As a major, he won the Military Cross while leading his company of Scots Guards in the attack on Tumbledown Mountain in the last days of the Falklands War. During his career, he served in the bureaucracy in Whitehall as the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff and served stints in British operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Iraq, finally retiring as a lieutenant general. He has seen war at both ends: the hard, sharp end of combat and the making and coordinating of policy and operations.

April 13, 2018

Illusions of Victory (Book Review)

In Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (Columbia University Press, 2006), Kimberly Zisk Marten recounts the dismal record of Western military interventions that could achieve temporary stability but not foster any lasting political change. Her solution is to lower expectations while extending presence; outsiders cannot shape the course of internal political change but can maintain security for the lengthy period required for equilibrium to be restored after a society is disrupted.

April 12, 2018

Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate: Enabling Senior Leader Decisionmaking

In the coming years, each Service will likely pursue a human capital data analytics solution set that best meets its needs. Regardless of each Service’s chosen path, the paramount requirement before us all is to create systems that balance the data analytic needs of leaders while strengthening the bond of trust with our Servicemembers.

April 12, 2018

Structuring Airpower to Win in 2030: Designing a Joint Division of Labor Between Land- and Sea-Based Combat Aviation

The lessons learned during nearly a decade of concept development must be translated into a joint force structure capable of defeating antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and preserving America’s power projection advantage. However, such a force structure will only be effective if it is pursued through a joint approach to acquisitions.

April 12, 2018

Climate Change and Urbanization: Challenges to Global Security and Stability

Two global trends that present monumental new challenges for civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises are urbanization—the growth of cities across the world—and climate change. The following article explains how these two trends and their interactive effects will increasingly complicate and test civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises.

April 12, 2018

The Importance of Lessons Learned in Joint Force Development

The importance of gathering, developing, and disseminating joint lessons learned cannot be overemphasized. Today, we need real-world lessons learned by the deployed young officer who is experiencing what works, what does not, and what could—if certain changes were made. This is mission of the Joint Staff Joint Force Development Directorate’s Joint Lessons Learned Division (JLLD).

April 12, 2018

A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving

Despite George Santayana’s warning—“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it”—we continue to forget what we have learned and fall into bad habits. Although we have already determined better ways to make decisions and solve problems, we tend to forget them.

April 12, 2018

Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command?

The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 provides that the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will depend substantially on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries. Consistent with the law, implementation guidance over the years has been clear, and increasingly more urgent.

April 12, 2018

Laying the Foundation for a Strategic By-With-Through Approach

Logistics interoperability is critical to the future success of global operations responding to transregional threats, but it requires dedicated efforts in logistics security cooperation to build the foundation for a strategic BWT approach.

April 12, 2018

Sacrifice, Ownership, Legitimacy: Winning Wars By, With, and Through Host-Nation Security Forces

Speed and tactical efficiency do not win civil conflict; host-nation legitimacy combined with eventual tactical victory does. These facts necessitate a conditions-based approach.

April 12, 2018

Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through: How Mattered as Much as What

In January 2017, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, deployed to bolster the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the campaign to annihilate the so-called Islamic State. How we advised ISF commanders was as important as what we advised them to do in order to win.

April 12, 2018

The By-With-Through Approach: An Army Component Perspective

Land forces in U.S. Central Command have adopted an operational approach of “by, with, and through” (BWT) to achieve this endstate. This article provides the USARCENT perspective on how it accomplishes its mission with BWT as the operational approach and demonstrates the need for the joint force to come to a common understanding of what executing operations within a BWT operational approach, and all associated terms, means.

April 12, 2018

The By-With-Through Operational Approach

The U.S. military must organize, resource, and train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments requires common understanding and the development of joint force doctrine.

April 12, 2018

From the Chairman: The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed

Over the past two decades, the strategic landscape has changed dramatically. While the fundamental nature of war has not changed, the pace of change and modern technology, coupled with shifts in the nature of geopolitical competition, have altered the character of war in the 21st century. To keep pace with the changing character of war, we must globally integrate the way we plan, employ the force, and design the force of the future.

April 12, 2018

Outmatched Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks

Understanding how adversaries use threat networks globally to compete with us below the threshold of traditional armed conflict is a critical first step to identifying opportunities to exploit, disrupt, or degrade threat networks. However, the increasing convergence of legitimate and illicit networks complicates our ability to gain the level of understanding required to do this effectively.

April 12, 2018

Moore’s Law and the Challenge of Counter-sUAS Doctrine

In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of the Intel Corporation, made his now famous prediction that the “number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately double every 24 months.” More than 50 years later, his prediction has not only held true, but also the implications of what is now called Moore’s Law define the combat environment for the joint force. The continual miniaturization, mass production, proliferation, and improvement of integrated circuits and microprocessors have introduced powerful computing technology into every aspect of modern life.

April 11, 2018

The Practical Implications of Information as a Joint Function

The integration of the Information as a Joint Function (IJF) with the other six joint functions offers new opportunities for developing and conducting operational art and design. IJF will result in the development of executable plans to deal with future conflicts that are TMM in nature. The ultimate result will be that joint force commanders are able to dominate the informational aspect of their operating environment (the IE) the same way they dominate land, sea, air space, and cyberspace.

April 11, 2018

Introducing Information as a Joint Function

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a change to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, introducing information as a new and seventh joint function. This issuance portends significant changes in how the joint force will plan and execute transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional operations. As such, it represents an opportunity to reimagine what “combined arms” means in 21st-century warfare.

April 11, 2018

Executive Summary

What kind of force does the United States need in order to meet its mission of protecting the Nation? How do we preserve our working relationships with allies and partners? What about the ongoing issue of readiness needs versus force modernization? No matter how the future turns out, the United States and the joint force will continue to be central elements of how the world is shaped.

March 1, 2018

Technology and National Security: The United States at a Critical Crossroads

Globalization of science and technology, emerging and unpredictable threats (both manmade and natural), conventional and emerging weapons of mass destruction, and an inversion of technology flow from the private to public sectors all present challenges to our national security.

Feb. 1, 2018

Low-Cost Access to Space: Military Opportunities and Challenges

Space activity is critical to the American way of war. The commercialization of space has potentially radical implications for U.S. national security through its impact on a range of military and intelligence functions and on the ability of the nation to effectively project power around the globe.

Jan. 10, 2018

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Update.

Jan. 10, 2018

Born Multinational: Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations

U.S. military operations are conducted in a multinational environment. Given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s emphasis on working with allies and other international partners, there are many advantages to certain capabilities being born multinational. A multinational development team offers the benefits of both inherent interoperability and a broad set of perspectives, insights, and knowledge sources.

Jan. 10, 2018

Department of Defense Terminology Program

The Department of Defense (DOD) Terminology Program was formalized in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and falls under the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).1 The program is overseen by the director of Joint Force Development (DJ7) to improve communications and mutual understanding through the standardization of military and associated terminology within DOD, with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and between the United States and international partners. It includes U.S. participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology development as well as other terminology forums.

Jan. 10, 2018

A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles

While current U.S. doctrine makes the center of gravity (COG) concept the centerpiece in operational planning, there is a broad call for either revising or killing the concept. However, if the COG concept is to remain the centerpiece in military planning, it must not only help link actions, effects, and objectives but also link the JFC level of command with the national strategic level of command.

Jan. 10, 2018

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan

The gap between academia and the military has existed at least since the early 1960s, when Project Camelot crystallized political opposition to the American military/security apparatus by activist academicians. As a result, the military/security community established its own think tanks, designed to replicate social and hard science capabilities, reducing the political noise and fallout inherent in the engagement with a potentially hostile academic community. On the other side of the divide, many academics reacted with anger to social scientists engaged in military activity, political beliefs fusing with concerns of academic freedom and fanned with the flames of opposition to the Vietnam War in what they saw as colonialism and rampant militarization of American society.

Jan. 10, 2018

Elite Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the World

Special operations forces (SOF) have existed in some form and played roles in warfare since the advent of conventional military operations. For example, in biblical times, King David had a special forces platoon. World War II brought growth, greater recognition, and prestige for special forces like the British Commandos, Special Air Service, and the American Office of Strategic Services. The last two decades have witnessed explosive growth in various forms of unconventional or SOF.

Jan. 10, 2018

Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014

For years, the British enjoyed a reputation of counterinsurgency excellence. Their campaigns—Malaya, Kenya, Oman, Northern Ireland—were hailed as successes in this difficult form of war. Afghanistan, however, turned out to be painful for the British. They committed a peak of over 9,500 troops, eventually drawing down to a few hundred by the end of 2014. They faced numerous battlefield reverses. Eventual successes were overshadowed by the arrival of 20,000 U.S. Marines. Britain’s counterinsurgency reputation came out of the campaign tarnished.

Jan. 10, 2018

Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation: Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. Africa Command’s Efforts

U.S. Africa Command’s lack of operationalization of its security cooperation processes, combined with the sheer size of its area of responsibility and the significant changes with the new NDAA, create unique challenges. This article outlines four main areas where USAFRICOM can improve its efforts to operationalize and synchronize its security cooperation efforts.

Jan. 10, 2018

Achieving Secrecy and Surprise in a Ubiquitous ISR Environment

As foreign and commercial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities proliferate, our ability to leverage secrecy and surprise for battlefield advantage is in danger of being severely degraded or lost altogether. We must take prudent near-term steps to address this concern.

Jan. 10, 2018

Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Simplifying an Increasingly Complex Problem

As the complexity of air, cruise, and ballistic missile threats quickly evolves over the next 10 to 20 years, DOD must find a less complicated way to rapidly develop and integrate the Services’ integrated air and missile defense capabilities and employ them across the combatant commands boundaries.

Jan. 10, 2018

Geographic Component Network Analysis: A Methodology for Deliberately Targeting a Hybrid Adversary

As the nature of the adversaries the U.S. military engages on the battlefield changes, so must our thinking on how to systematically analyze and degrade their centers of gravity. Geographic component network analysis (GCNA) enables more rapid analysis of a hybrid enemy in a focused, systematic manner to degrade the adversary’s capability to effectively govern and project combat power from defined territorial strongholds.

Jan. 10, 2018

Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War: Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis

Scipio Africanus’s European and African campaigns during the Second Punic War serve as timeless lessons for joint force planners on how to conduct center of gravity (COG) analysis in support of theater and national military planning.

Jan. 10, 2018

The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure

There has never been a greater historical need and better opportunity to create a strategic joint influence organization and subsequent total joint influence force structure. A unified joint influence force would be able to support and defend the Nation’s strategic interests against all propaganda efforts coming from the likes of adversarial states and nonstate actors well into the foreseeable future.

Jan. 10, 2018

Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts Toward a Joint Solution

As advancements in cyber continue to accelerate and proliferate across multiple domains, and as our potential adversaries adjust their strategies by utilizing these advancements asymmetrically in order to counter our strengths, we can no longer develop domain-specific solutions that require time and effort to synchronize and federate.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process

Is risk management overemphasized in the decisionmaking process? Is caution more valued than boldness in action?

Jan. 9, 2018

Surfing the Chaos: Warfighting in a Contested Cyberspace Environment

To win in the new cyber-contested battles of the future, a combatant must still command, but let go of control and surf the chaos.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Power of Partnership: Security Cooperation and Globally Integrated Logistics

Logistics ought to be substantially integrated into security cooperation efforts, and security cooperation ought to be thoughtfully integrated into the discipline of logistics. While this premise may seem obvious, it is too often overlooked or misunderstood.

Jan. 9, 2018

Multidomain Battle: Time for a Campaign of Joint Experimentation

Concepts on the scale of multidomain battle (MDB) require a campaign of experimentation that provides compelling evidence for the concept by fleshing out its operational and institutional contexts.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Future Is Plural: Multiple Futures for Tomorrow's Joint Force

Multidimensional challenges cannot rely on dartboards or algorithms fed by Big Data. The central question for senior leaders in defense is improving their assessment of risk in ambiguous contexts.

Jan. 9, 2018

Executive Summary

War exacts a toll over time unlike any other human experience. And meeting the demands of combat takes more than one individual’s effort, budget, and ideas to succeed. The joint force has to adapt, adjust, acquire, repurpose, retrain, recruit, and perform a whole range of other functions to continue to meet the mission of protecting our Nation, allies, and partners around the world.

Dec. 21, 2017

Battlefield Geometry in our Digital Age: From Flash to Bang in 22 Milliseconds

This year has been tough for cybersecurity programs. Every month in the first six months of 2017, the world experienced a major cyber event. Open-source attacks included attacks on critical infrastructure, banks, intelligence services, and significant commercial and government entities. Indeed, reflecting on the scope and depth of most publically acknowledged compromises, uncovers the reality of the tremendous and growing risks the country faces nearly two decades into the 21st century. Everything seems to have changed. Virtually every organization within the Department of Defense (DOD) has, sometimes reluctantly, come to embrace digital age technology, to the point that they are completely dependent on it. The result is a shocking degree of paralysis when our access to the services we now rely upon is disrupted.

Dec. 21, 2017

How is NATO Meeting the Challenge of Cyberspace

Historians of international relations are familiar with the hinge-year concept when trends that previously had been largely subterranean suddenly crystallize into a clear and immediate danger, forcing policymakers to wake up and take action. When it comes to cyberspace, the past year has certainly smashed any complacency about our ability to anticipate and counter the growing sophistication of cyberattacks. As fast as we have tried to catch up, the speed and global impact of these attacks continue to outrun us. 2016 witnessed the first major attack via the Internet of Things when a DynCorp server in the United States was hacked through video surveillance cameras. We also saw the first attacks driven by artificial intelligence, and increasing evidence of collusion between state intelligence services and organized crime networks.

Dec. 21, 2017

Power Projection in the Digital Age

Logistics is the lifeblood of the Joint Force. It requires an effective distribution network as its heart, moving and sustaining the force at the right place and at the right time—all the time. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) delivers that decisive force, projecting American power globally through the robust Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) and leveraging the expertise of more than 140,000 professionals. No other nation in the world can compete with the United States in conventional warfare because we plan, secure, and distribute combat capability so well. As a result, many military planners are now value-programmed to believe that a soldier or bullet will always be where it needs to be, when it needs to be there—on demand.

Dec. 21, 2017

A National Security Enterprise Response - Digital Dimension Disruption

The digital dimension is simultaneously enhancing and disrupting the fabric of life in every society where modern, informatized technology is present. The slow-motion collapse of parts of the 20th century’s legacy is now accelerating in ways that likely will usher in a monumental realignment of societal institutions, methods of business, and fundamental ideas about national security. This realignment will, of necessity, change the frameworks within which America provides for its security, including how it acquires the goods and services it uses in that effort.

Dec. 21, 2017

A Cyber Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Achieving Enhanced National Security

Of the emerging man-made risks affecting U.S. national security, cyber threats have enjoyed the most attention and resources from national security leaders and policymakers. And yet, cyber threats remain one of the most complex risks to address given their amorphous, highly fluid, and extra-territorial nature. This makes it difficult if not impossible to quantify the national state of readiness and, in these fiscally constrained times, the return on investment from the billions spent each year on cybersecurity. Five gaps conspire to make achieving a state of enhanced cyber resilience complex if not impossible. These include a yawning talent gap to the tune of millions of people; a technological gap predicated on managing a risk that evolves according to Moore’s law; a financial and economic gap leaving trillions in value at risk with no generally accepted way to measure this value; an alignment gap in terms of policy harmonization and cooperation inside the United States and around the world; and, finally, a gap in patience and the speed of markets. This article delves into the evolving cyber threat landscape and outlines ways of understanding and bridging these critical gaps.

Dec. 21, 2017

Bridging the Cyberspace Gap - Washington and Silicon Valley

One of the defining characteristics of the cyber domain is the dominance of the private sector. The majority of critical networks are privately owned and operated; more than 90 percent of American military and intelligence communications travel over privately owned backbone telecommunications networks. Many of the most talented hackers are in the private sector, and private security firms such as CrowdStrike, FireEye, and Cylance have taken an increasingly large public role in tracing cyberattacks to nation-states and other perpetrators. In addition, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, IBM, Intel, and other companies drive innovation and the deployment of new technologies, especially in cutting-edge areas like artificial intelligence. For these reasons, strong ties to the technology sector are central to the U.S. Government’s (USG) pursuit of its economic, diplomatic, and military strategic interests in cyberspace.

Dec. 21, 2017

Cyber Gray Space Deterrence

During the past few years, adversaries of the United States have begun to use their militaries to test U.S. resolve through innovative methods designed to bypass deterrent threats and avoid direct challenges. These “gray space campaigns” are specifically designed to allow adversaries to achieve their goals without triggering escalation by making retaliation difficult. China demonstrated this with its attempt to seize control of the South China Sea through its island building program, as did Russia with its effort to foment insurgency in eastern Ukraine through the use of “little green men.”

Dec. 21, 2017

Cyberdeterrence by Engagement and Surprise

The conventional deterrence strategies of denial and punishment do not factor in the unique characteristics of the man-made cyber domain. This domain needs a new and holistic deterrence strategy that involves prompt and direct cyber responses that are sudden, dynamic, stealthy, and random so that adversaries can be defeated mentally and virtually. This article offers such an approach that I refer to as “deterrence by engagement and surprise.”

Dec. 21, 2017

A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty

The cybercrime and cyber terrorism raging today are the most visible symptoms of a more pervasive problem concerning cyber security. How to establish a fair and just governance regime in cyberspace and establish international rules spark a storm of controversy. The controversy reflects the competing interests and demands of three distinct cyberspace actors: the state, the citizen, and the international community. By focusing only on one’s own interests, each actor ignores the interests of the other two, resulting in the current situation in which each sticks to its own argument and refuses to reconcile. The establishment of a new order in cyberspace requires a comprehensive review from the perspective of all three major actors. This article proposes a “three-perspectives” theory based on the three actors. It divides cyberspace into three levels; the base level, the application level, and the core level. Treating each level differently, it seeks to identify the largest common ground, and transcends the single perspective vulnerability of interpreting everything in terms of binary opposition. Three-perspective thinking makes it possible to deal with the binary opposition of exclusivity and transferability with respect to state sovereignty.

Dec. 21, 2017

An Interview with Marina Kaljurand, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia

Those were the first explicitly political cyberattacks against an independent, sovereign state in history. If put into today’s context, the attacks were not very sophisticated—even primitive. But back then, they were very disturbing. By that time, Estonia already had widely established internet and e-services, and an e-lifestyle; when those services were interrupted—mainly in the banking sector—it was highly disruptive. As to the effects of the attacks? They did not kill anybody, they were not destructive. They were highly disruptive to our lives though.

Dec. 21, 2017

Warnings Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes

Every day we hear warnings—from parents concerned about the personal safety and good health of their children, to government officials worried about protecting the citizenry from external adversaries and the forces of nature. Distinguishing serious warnings of impending catastrophe from those that are frivolous may mean the difference between life and death, success and failure, freedom and oppression.

Dec. 21, 2017

International Conflict and Cyberspace Superiority: Theory and Practice

Cyberspace Superiority is a compelling mix of advanced technological know-how and easy-to-understand writing. Bryant, a Lieutenant Colonel who is a career fighter pilot and earned his Ph.D. in military strategy, first examines whether cyberspace is a “global common”—i.e. a shared resource like the oceans, atmosphere, space, and Antarctica. The answer may well determine the future nature of cyber hostilities but, with the issue as yet unsettled, Bryant posits a far more pressing question—is superiority in cyberspace “a useful construct for thinking about and planning for nation-state conflict in cyberspace?”

Dec. 21, 2017

Cyberspace in Peace and War

Martin Libicki has been a prolific writer in the field of information warfare since the mid-1990s. In this newer work, published by the Naval Institute Press, he aggregates his thinking during the past several decades into a single book. Cyberspace in Peace and War draws from work performed at RAND, both solely and with colleagues, and from lecture interactions with his students at various universities, to present a streamlined and consolidated overview of activities within and enabled by information technologies.

Dec. 21, 2017

Prologue

Nearly a half century ago in October 1969, computer programmers at the University of California, Los Angeles used a primitive Department of Defense computer network called ARPANET to send the first messages to computers at Stanford Research Institute. This quiet event, considered by some to be the birth of the internet, ignited a technological movement within the computer and information industries that eventually transformed the world into a globally connected society utterly dependent on instant access to information, yet increasingly vulnerable to network intrusions by those who seek to steal sensitive data or disrupt cyber infrastructure.

Oct. 1, 2017

Toxic Culture: Enabling Incivility in the U.S. Military and What to Do About It

Core values are the heart and soul of U.S. military Services and their cultures. Military organizational, strategic, operational, and tactical strength lies in the degree to which the Services’ systems, processes, and behaviors of personnel align with their stated core values, the collective practice of which creates organizational culture. Yet even with the emphasis on core values such as respect and selfless service, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to experience toxic and counterproductive behaviors that sabotage culture and values, as well as performance, productivity, force protection, health, readiness, and actions of personnel.1 Although DOD has not conducted comprehensive research on toxic behavior, there is extensive private-sector research regarding the impact, cost, tolerance, enabling, and reduction of toxicity. This article applies private-sector research to assess DOD policies and practices and to recommend courses of action. Although the implications and cost of toxicity are beyond the scope of this article, a brief discussion is relevant for demonstrating its significance. Private-sector research has identified relationships between toxic behaviors and adverse effects on mental and physical health (including suicide, stress-related illness, and post-traumatic stress), increasing demands on an already overburdened healthcare system; job satisfaction and commitment; individual and collective performance (cognition and collaboration); employee turnover; and the creation of an organizational culture that tolerates other inappropriate behaviors including sexual harassment and discrimination.2 In addition to the impact on direct targets of toxicity, research has identified the transmission of adverse effects to bystanders and family members.3

Oct. 1, 2017

Increasing Partner-Nation Capacity Through Global Health Engagement

Why the Department of Defense (DOD) and international military sector writ large engage in global health is well documented.1 How DOD conducts global health engagement (GHE) in a systematic way is not. While pundits representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, Service components, and other organizations codify DOD policy for GHE, individuals and units implementing this broad guidance from 2013 to today continue to do so in a patchwork manner.2 Using the Indo-Asia Pacific region as a case study, this article presents the background regarding the current state of GHE in the region, develops a standardized GHE approach for engagement, and informs a partner-nation 5-year strategy.

Oct. 1, 2017

Human Terrain at the Crossroads

The U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS) was created in 2007 amid fears of defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Responding to clear needs expressed by military leadership, HTS was offered as an experimental effort to embed academic social scientists with Army and Marine Corps units to dramatically increase local sociocultural knowledge on the battlefield.1