Nov. 18, 2019

America First ≠ America Alone: Morocco as Exemplar for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On October 4, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the release of the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and the role of international partnerships. The first page of this strategy includes the statement “America First does not mean America alone,” indicating the essential role of key international partners. The US should highlight Morocco as an example for other countries in the region and capitalize on Morocco’s status as a net security exporter. Encouraging the success of countries like Morocco would reduce the threat of terrorism and give meaning to the America First concept.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Second Island Cloud: A Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands

In the early 20th century, visionary Marine officer Pete Ellis compiled remarkable studies of islands in the Western Pacific and studied the practical means for the seizure or defense of advanced bases. Ellis’s description of an island cloud (as opposed to an island chain) aptly captures the complexity and diversity of this geography and provides a framework for lasting and dispersed strength. A century after Ellis’s work, China presents new strategic and operational challenges to the US in Asia. Now is the time to develop a coherent strategy that will last another hundred years.

Nov. 18, 2019

Pakistan’s Low Yield in the Field: Diligent Deterrence or De-Escalation Debacle

Having fought three wars and numerous border clashes, the potential for future conflict between Pakistan and India remains high. This includes the future potential of a nuclear exchange. While the nuclear evolution of both countries trace back to the 1960s, this article focuses on developments since the formal declaration of nuclear weapons in 1998. The nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India has produced several close calls though neither state has resorted to using nuclear weapons. While there is cause for concern, encouraging Pakistan and India to comply with international norms may defuse tensions and give us reason for hope.

Nov. 18, 2019

Winners of the 2019 Essay Competitions

NDU Press congratulates the winners of the 2019 Essay Competitions.

Nov. 18, 2019

Strengthening Mission Assurance Against Emerging Threats: Critical Gaps and Opportunities for Progress

The Department of Defense (DOD) 2012 Mission Assurance Strategy does not account for the risk that cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could degrade mission execution. Adversaries are rapidly improving their ability to attack such infrastructure by accessing industrial control systems and exploiting other cyber vulnerabilities. At the same time, US infrastructure systems are becoming increasingly interdependent, heightening the risk of cascading failures across multiple sectors on which the Department depends. The department must strengthen the culture of mission assurance, say the authors, by bringing cybersecurity into the heart of mission assurance and extending such initiatives to all overseas defense installations.

Nov. 18, 2019

Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight

Strategic Foresight is an interdisciplinary skillset concerned with identifying signals of change in uncertain environments. This article argues first that national security professionals need this skillset in this era of ambiguity and unpredictability. In addition, the author identifies several areas where Strategic Foresight can be improved. First, shift analytic focus from technology-focused futures to a more integrated vision of future environments. Second, use lessons from systems thinking to evaluate more accurately the global system. Third, provide more instruction on complexity thinking. Fourth, introduce foresight thinking early in professional development. Fifth, create a unified lexicon of the concepts and terms.

Nov. 18, 2019

Strategic Army: Developing Trust in the Shifting Landscape

Warfare in the information age is a new battleground. The disinformation campaigns of our adversaries undermine trust across the Joint Force and degrade the legitimacy of liberal democracies. The Australian Army serves as a case study of building trust domestically, regionally and globally in order to strengthen the entire rules-based global order. Trust is a strategic asset, say the authors, which strengthens our defense capabilities and can diminish the power of our adversaries. In order to realize a truly strategic army, force design and force structure should complement high quality combat capability.

Nov. 18, 2019

Executive Summary

Our world is in constant motion. If you have a setback or loss, you would be wise to do as the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Marine Corps suggests: improvise, adapt and overcome. Former Secretary James Mattis asked our professional military education (PME) institutions to develop their critical thinking skills and push their intellectual limits. To that end, in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly, we examine past and present conflicts to help you become a better leader. And we offer new ideas to help you maintain your intellectual advantage and keep the Joint Force moving forward.

July 25, 2019

Getting the Joint Functions Right

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a special out-of-cycle revision to joint doctrine, adding Information to the joint functions. The significance of this policy change was highlighted by endorsement from the Secretary of Defense in September 2017, where he stressed that inclusion in the joint functions signaled an elevation of information throughout Department of Defense thinking and practice. This article is an historical overview of the joint functions, intended to overcome the long-standing reluctance to place the soft power elements of the modern battlefield on the same footing as hard power elements.

July 25, 2019

Global Risks and Opportunities: The Great Power Competition Paradigm

The great power competition paradigm outlined in the National Defense Strategy provides a way to think strategically about inter-state competition in a multipolar world. Both history and a survey of current events indicate we should expect great power competition throughout the 21st century between the US, China and Russia in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Although information operations, economic diplomacy and espionage will be the primary weapons of statecraft, say the authors, military cooperation can catalyze greater regional integration, reassure our partners and allies, and support our whole-of-government efforts.

July 25, 2019

Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

America must maintain credible nuclear deterrent capabilities to convince potential adversaries and allies alike that the US will defend its vital interests and will employ those capabilities, all while hedging against an uncertain future. Despite the changing environment, America continues to view nuclear deterrence largely in Cold War terms. The continued reliance on obsolete deterrence concepts exposes a gap between policy and practice. The US must eliminate this gap, say the authors, by developing a tailored and flexible deterrence posture, which will give the Joint Force a broad spectrum of nuclear deterrence capabilities.

July 24, 2019

Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea

US maritime forces currently conduct theater security operations through rotating carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific. Although current engagements and interactions with our competitors in the region fall short of open military conflict, a war at sea may be unavoidable. Some of the most significant deficiencies within the current combat casualty care system occur within this contentious maritime environment. To improve readiness, the authors recommend joint integration of medical capabilities such as incorporating forward resuscitative and surgical platforms, enhancing our medical airlift and sealift evacuation capabilities, supplementing Mercy-class hospital ships, and implementing a medical command and control system.

July 24, 2019

LikeWar

Brett Swaney reviews LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking. The authors examine the role of social media in reshaping the character of war and politics. The result is an insightful overview of the new information battlespace for national security professionals.

July 24, 2019

Strategy, Evolution, and War

Ryan Shaffer reviews Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence by Kenneth Payne. Payne studies the origins of human strategy in evolutionary history, examines the relationship between culture, war and technology, and considers the potential of artificial intelligence to influence military strategy.

July 24, 2019

America vs. the West

Brittany Bounds reviews America vs. the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved? By Kori Schake. Schake gives an efficient summation of the great power competition with China and Russia, says Bounds, and offers several possible scenarios for an alternative to the liberal international order if the US continues to disengage.

July 24, 2019

Flanking the Crater

The Battle of the Crater, fought in 1864 during the US Civil War, is a successful example of tactical innovation except that it did not succeed. The idea was to alter the battlespace by tunneling under the enemy’s fortifications. The local commander made a quick feasibility study, and decided to utilize his soldiers’ skills as civilian miners. The authors use these events as a case study in innovation, particularly the role of mid-level leaders and propose a Joint Innovation Framework. Among their recommendations is appointment of a lead integrator who would help translate tactical opportunities into operational and strategic victories.

July 24, 2019

Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral

Atmospheric littoral operations—in the air between the buildings—exemplify how the inherent capabilities of unmanned systems and autonomy could enable overmatch, particularly for close combat in the land domain where many future conflicts are likely to be decided. A doctrine of exploiting control of the atmospheric littoral offers tactical advantages that provide a driving force for integrating robotic systems into ground combat. By pursuing a low-cost program of prototyping and experimentation, the US can lead the emerging combat capabilities offered by unmanned systems, avoid technological surprise, and lead the fight in three dimensions.

July 24, 2019

The Mayaguez Incident: A Model Case Study for PME

The seizure and rescue of the SS Mayaguez in 1975 serves as a case study in this fascinating article. Considered by many to be the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Mayaguez incident took place just two weeks before the final withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. The author highlights the challenges created by a poor understanding of history, lack of awareness of the strategic situation, numerous communication failures and an inability to overcome groupthink. Although the Mayaguez operation was flawed, says the author, this case is a valuable teaching tool at every level of professional military education.

July 24, 2019

A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education

Perceiving military service as an occupation rather than a profession creates a problem for professional military education (PME). From an occupational point of view, military service is a collection of technical skills. From a professional point of view, the profession of arms is rooted in internal trust shared with other members of the profession, and external trust demanded by society. The trust of one’s government is required for members of this profession, who in turn are granted relative autonomy. One goal of PME, therefore, should be to produce military professionals who are trustworthy in both their professional and private lives.

July 24, 2019

A Framework to Understand and Improve Defense All-Source Intelligence Analysis

This article proposes a framework to optimize the employment and career development of military and civilian intelligence analysts. The author’s framework identifies training gaps and interoperability issues within joint and strategic intelligence organizations. Military intelligence analysts are initially trained to operate at the tactical level, says the author, whereas civilian analysts are trained to operate predominately at the strategic level. In addition, there is a significant convergence of military and civilian personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commands and service intelligence centers. The author’s framework facilitates discussion of professional development for analysts across the Department of Defense.

July 24, 2019

An Interview with Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy

General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, Commander of US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command is interviewed by JFQ Editor-in-Chief Bill Eliason. Objective number one is defending the homeland, which means communicating and cooperating with every other combatant command, with the Department of Homeland Security, as well as global partners and non-traditional partners in the civilian and commercial sectors. When it comes to countering the threat from unmanned aerial systems, protecting critical infrastructure, or engaging adversaries in the cyber domain, says O’Shaughnessy, homeland defense and homeland security are inseparable.

July 24, 2019

Executive Summary

This June, the world observed the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings, which marked the beginning of the end of Nazi control in Europe. In what was probably the last time veterans of that combined campaign could meet in company strength, victorious and liberated nations alike honored their service and sacrifice. We all were reminded of the terrible costs of war as well as our collective responsibility to remember such experiences in hopes they will not be repeated. The awesome power of those young warriors, many of them civilians fresh out of school just months before, shows how well-trained and well-led troops, draftees, and long-serving veterans can achieve strategic ends. A friend sent me a link to a CBS Reports video from 1964 that featured Walter Cronkite interviewing President Dwight D. Eisenhower in England, and later Normandy, about the operation.

July 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

May 14, 2019

The Cold War and The Cold War’s Killing Fields

Two new books revisit the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad’s The Cold War: A World History and Paul Chamberlin’s The Cold War’s Killing Fields. Westad does not use the standard bracket of 1945-89, but takes the long view back to nineteenth century economic turmoil and turn-of-the-century anti-colonialist sentiment. Chamberlain also emphasizes this same point, that the Cold War was much more than a bipolar ideological struggle. According to reviewer Walter Hudson, neither book is perfect, particularly the Chamberlin book in which American policies and policymakers do not receive fair treatment. Nonetheless, the merits of both books outweigh their flaws.

May 14, 2019

Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, was revised and signed by the Director of Joint Force Development, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, is in the final stages of its revision, tentatively scheduled for release in fall 2019. While both of these documents are commendable, says Mark Berwanger, some will claim that joint doctrine falls short in providing sufficient doctrine to integrate and synchronize all capabilities needed to accomplish the commander’s intent. Until the definition, utilization, and cultural understanding of “fires” is updated to include all offensive capabilities regardless of the weapon system, problems of integration and synchronization will remain.

May 14, 2019

The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine

As the U.S. enters a new era of near-peer competition, Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is insufficient to counter adversary employment of irregular strategies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Violent Extremist Organizations are using irregular methods to include information, cyber, economic, and unconventional warfare to offset conventional military advantages. The doctrinal terms IW and Unconventional Warfare (UW) provide a common point of departure for the doctrinal discussion, but are incomplete, generally not well understood and often misused. According to Pelleriti and co-authors, U.S. planners must reassess and update IW terminology, concepts and authorities to be successful in this new era.

May 14, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

May 14, 2019

Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border

Realistic training for military can often be illusive. Factors such as urban growth, pollution, competition for frequencies and airspace, and protected habitats, continually challenge the Department of Defense in carrying out realistic training at installations. However, a small task force in the southwest has developed a solution to keep units training as they fight. At Fort Bliss in Texas, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) has developed innovative training opportunities for units that otherwise may not get the chance. While the benefits are easy to see, JTF-N is always looking for new ways to save money and enhance unit readiness.

May 14, 2019

U.S. Africa Command and Its Changing Strategic Environment

U.S. Africa Command has been training governments to combat terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime while instilling the principles of professionalism and good governance. However, major changes in the strategic environment call for a new approach. Based on changing trade patterns, China’s rising influence, and the U.S.’s new focus on great power competition, say the authors, USAFRICOM must now help African leaders safeguard national independence and root out foreign corruption. A whole-of-government approach is needed to prevent dark money from subverting local governments and turning would-be allies against the United States.

May 14, 2019

Unity of Command: Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice

Military justice has been undergoing constant change recently, as a stream of legislation continues to modify the procedures through which we achieve justice in the military. This period of flux is now coming to an end, as the most sweeping reforms in thirty years passed Congress in 2016. Perhaps the most important outcome is not what has changed, but what stayed the same: the role of the commander in the military justice process. This article examines the commander’s historical role in the military justice process, and the challenges of maintaining authority and responsibility.

May 14, 2019

A Model for Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) are often viewed as burdens and distractions. However, if managed correctly TSCPs can significantly increase unit readiness. This article provides a model based on the authors’ experience in Operation Garuda Shield 17, which placed tactical leaders at strategic points of friction to communicate up and down the chain of command. TSCPs should be viewed as readiness opportunities rather than burdens because they provide opportunity for increased resources, unique experiences, as well as deployment and training readiness. Exercise planners and their partner-nation equivalents are the key audience, say the authors, to influence and ensure success.

May 14, 2019

The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement: An Old Tool for the Modern Military

This article builds on a recent contribution from General Votel and Colonel Keravuori (in JFQ 89) who showed how the BWT approach promotes sustainable multi-national, regional and local defense institutions. Using a simple exchange of supplies and materials by via Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement transactions, the Joint Force can simultaneously build partner capacity and increase logistical interoperability. This simple but effective tool, says the author, allows service members to function in ambiguous, complex and volatile environments. Given the demands of future operations, the Joint Force must utilize all resources available to be leaner, faster and more mobile.

May 7, 2019

Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain

Bloom’s Taxonomy (named for educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom) is a system to classify learning objectives according to their level of complexity. In Professional Military Education (PME) Bloom’s Taxonomy is used to differentiate learning levels and create sequential learning objectives. This approach makes sense for most PME students but not everyone. Thus, the authors propose a stratified systems theory as a complementary framework that can be used to meet the contextual need across all PME educational systems. Implementing this recommendation, say the authors, will enhance PME and better prepare graduates to face the challenges associated with a dynamic, uncertain future.

May 7, 2019

Covert Action as an Intelligence Subcomponent of the Information Instrument

Covert Action consists of methods to influence political, economic and military conditions abroad where the government’s role is neither readily apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Because oversight of Covert Action is the responsibility of congressional intelligence committees and because the fundamental purpose is to manipulate information (and conceal knowledge about the actors involved) these methods belong to the information instrument of the DIME typology of diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power. Strategists and educators should keep this in mind in order to balance the costs, risks and benefits in support of national security and foreign policy objectives.

May 7, 2019

From DOPMA to Google: Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management

How should we manage cyber talent in the information age? How do we use the military’s existing systems of talent management to optimize recruitment, employment and retention of the cyber force? Although we live in an age of increasing availability of information and integration of artificial intelligence, cyber warfare remains a human endeavor. To ensure the U.S. maintains its qualitative edge in the cyber domain, the Joint Force must attract, develop and retain the right people. This means borrowing good ideas from the private sector, say the authors, encouraging creativity, allowing flexibility and developing future leaders who understand their craft.

May 7, 2019

Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain: Dominating the Enemy

Imagine the possibilities if tactical teams could plan a raid that integrated air and ground support, and on-call fires in the cyber domain. This article argues that our national defense organizations invest in capabilities, tactics and training to successfully conduct tactical maneuver in the cyber domain. The Joint Force must be able to visualize and integrate the cyber domain with other domains to achieve strategic military and national objectives. The ability to dominate the enemy in cyberspace as part of combined arms all-domain operations, says the author, is an essential requirement for the Joint Force.

Jan. 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Jan. 23, 2019

Joint Publications 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The Joint Staff has revised JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which provides instructions and doctrine to plan, execute, and assess counterinsurgency operations. JP 3-24 is a priority publication, which supports the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. JP 3-24 defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Accordingly, JP 3-24 provides authoritative doctrine relative to counterinsurgency. Highlights include analysis of the COIN operational environment, the nature of an insurgency, considerations for COIN planning, and how to conduct a COIN assessment.

Jan. 23, 2019

Master and Commander in Joint Air Operations: Winning the Air War Through Mission Command

Much has been written on Mission Command and Control since 2012 when CJCS General Martin Dempsey released a white paper which encouraged this leadership style among his subordinates. Mission command is a proven concept in air operations, and will be required to face the challenges of future conflicts. Since the advent of satellite communications and the internet, however, command and control of joint air operations has become increasingly centralized. Mission command is essential to winning future air wars says, the author, which is feasible because new technology allows operational commanders to make tactical decisions from thousands of miles away.

Jan. 23, 2019

War in 140 Characters

How has social media reshaped the way war is fought? Brett Swaney reviews War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century by David Patrikarakos. Every war, says the author, is essentially a clash of narratives. The author’s hypothesis that social media has reshaped not just the nature of conflict but also the entire discourse surrounding warfare remains an open question. Nonetheless, this book is required reading for national security professionals who seek a better understanding of the power of social media and the contemporary conflict increasingly shaped by homo digitalis.

Jan. 23, 2019

Just War Reconsidered

The greatest blind spot of Just War Theory is the accountability of senior civilian and military leaders for wartime decisions. Anthony Pfaff reviews Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by James Dubik. This book covers the responsibilities and obligations of civilians for the decision to go to war, and the higher obligations of military leaders and soldiers pertaining to unnecessary harm, impermissible weapons, the acceptance of surrender, and the treatment of combatants and noncombatants, among others. This book is critical reading for national security professionals in positions where they will make or advise decision-makers regarding warfare.

Jan. 23, 2019

Vietnam

This book tells the tragic story of the Vietnam War. Williamson Murray reviews Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945–1975 by Max Hastings. In this case, the word tragic is not an overstatement. Vietnam weaves the stories of American and Vietnamese soldiers and civilians on all sides of the struggle into a terrifying and impressive tale of both man’s inhumanity to his fellows, and the heroism of those on the sharp end. Perhaps the saddest result from the American point of view is that our political and military leaders learned so little from the high price we paid.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Drone Debate

Since the first drone strike outside of a conventional battlefield in 2002, the U.S. has carried out at least five hundred covert strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia killing 3,500 people, including civilians. Matthew Mueller reviews The Drone Debate: A Primer on the U.S. Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside of Conventional Battlefields by Avery Plaw, Matthew Fricker and Carlos Colon. This book contributes to the growing literature on the use of drones outside of conventional battlefields, and deals with important ethical questions on the use of drones, which makes The Drone Debate ideal for classroom use.

Jan. 23, 2019

Building Militaries in Fragile States

Why does the U.S. have such an uneven record when it comes to building foreign militaries? John Hewitt reviews Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States by Mara Karlin. The U.S. has been involved in building militaries since World War II, which provides ample case material. Karlin surveys the nuts and bolts of building militaries abroad, and investigates alternative strategies. This detailed, informative and prescriptive book should elicit robust conversations, deeper analysis and decisive action among foreign policy analysts, policy wonks, military personnel and anyone interested in foreign affairs.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Ghosts of Kasserine Pass: Maximizing the Effectiveness of Airpower

The American defeat at Kasserine Pass during the 1943 North African Campaign illustrates the consequences of allowing technological development to outpace doctrine. This article reviews the doctrine that constrained airpower during the North African Campaign and traces the development and evolution of modern doctrine that followed. Ideas conceived in North Africa seventy years ago, such as centralized control, decentralized execution, responsiveness and flexibility have stood the test of time, says the author, and remain applicable to today’s Joint Force. To achieve even greater efficiencies, the author recommends updating doctrine continually and establishing a new command structure with global reach.

Jan. 23, 2019

Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters

Security assistance depends on supporting both the militaries and the governments in weak states. Critics argue that security assistance undermines local government institutions and enables undisciplined host-nations to abuse human rights. Why should the U.S. struggle to build strong armies in weak states? Engaging weak states is in our interest, say the authors, because weak states often have governments that lack legitimacy and national identity, and thus provide environments conducive to insurgency and terrorism. Nonetheless, if we offer the right combination of carrots-and-sticks, we can encourage host-nations to reform their armed forces without undermining domestic political stability.

Jan. 23, 2019

Evasive Maneuvers: How Malign Actors Leverage Cryptocurrency

The emergence of cryptocurrencies is a new frontier with profound implications for national security. Bad actors take advantage of innovative digital technologies and global connectivity, which makes it difficult to follow the money. Because of the risks, the U.S. should continue to influence world financial markets and perhaps integrate DOD cyberspace operations into a whole-of-government response. The U.S. Government already has significant defensive and offensive capabilities in cyberspace, but must reimagine its role. The U.S. can lead the way, say the authors, by writing and enforcing new rules and regulations which would ensure the integrity of this new financial landscape.

Jan. 22, 2019

Thinking Differently about the Business of War

Military strategy in protracted competition is similar to organizational strategy. In a fiercely competitive and constantly shifting strategic environment, the authors ask whether success is more about the willingness to change or the ability to focus on fundamentals. In response, the authors apply the business concept of competitive advantage to the military context. This article explains how the Joint Force can organize, train, and procure equipment based on informed assumptions about what will matter most in future wars. As a result, military leaders and strategists can balance current and future requirements, make wise investments and mitigate risk.

Jan. 22, 2019

Force Protection from Moral Injury: Three Objectives for Military Leaders

Moral Injury is an occupational hazard that affects the Joint Force. All combatants are moral actors, say the authors, because they make life and death decisions influenced by their core values and lethal skills. Leaders at every level need to understand how combatants develop and use core values to judge perceptions of their military service and cope with maladaptive emotions, thoughts and behaviors. Today’s leaders cannot control the traumatic effects of combat, but they can prepare service members for the risks they will encounter by embedding moral reasoning within mission command, and by providing resources which facilitate the healing process.

Jan. 22, 2019

"This Breaking News Just In, Emperor Napoleon I Is Still Dead!"

Geographic Combatant Commands have two mission sets: theater engagement and warfighting. This paper proposes dividing theater engagement and warfighting into two separate commands. Geographic Commands under a three-star commander would facilitate theater security cooperation and be responsible for activities such as intelligence, logistics and communications. Meanwhile, three Combat Operations Commands (East, West and Homeland) each under a four-star commander would be responsible for defending the homeland and projecting force elsewhere. The DOD has an opportunity to streamline existing command structures and establish a new paradigm, which would allow the Joint Force to fulfill its mission without confusion or contradiction.