Results:
Category: JFQ

Jan. 22, 2019

Force Protection from Moral Injury: Three Objectives for Military Leaders

Moral Injury is an occupational hazard that affects the Joint Force. All combatants are moral actors, say the authors, because they make life and death decisions influenced by their core values and lethal skills. Leaders at every level need to understand how combatants develop and use core values to judge perceptions of their military service and cope with maladaptive emotions, thoughts and behaviors. Today’s leaders cannot control the traumatic effects of combat, but they can prepare service members for the risks they will encounter by embedding moral reasoning within mission command, and by providing resources which facilitate the healing process.

Jan. 22, 2019

"This Breaking News Just In, Emperor Napoleon I Is Still Dead!"

Geographic Combatant Commands have two mission sets: theater engagement and warfighting. This paper proposes dividing theater engagement and warfighting into two separate commands. Geographic Commands under a three-star commander would facilitate theater security cooperation and be responsible for activities such as intelligence, logistics and communications. Meanwhile, three Combat Operations Commands (East, West and Homeland) each under a four-star commander would be responsible for defending the homeland and projecting force elsewhere. The DOD has an opportunity to streamline existing command structures and establish a new paradigm, which would allow the Joint Force to fulfill its mission without confusion or contradiction.

Jan. 22, 2019

Simplicity: A Tool for Working with Complexity and Chaos

The science of simplification can help the Joint Force develop agile and adaptive leaders able to operate in complex and chaotic environments. What is the key to making time sensitive decisions in complex and chaotic situations? Simplicity, says the author, not complexity is the key to accelerating the cognitive process in complex and chaotic situations. Simplification of doctrine improves situational awareness and reduces information overload that contributes to paralysis by analysis. Leaders and doctrine writers should seriously consider taking a new direction toward simplification to help decision makers turn intention into action.

Jan. 22, 2019

Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) has never been more important to the success of the Joint Force. The contemporary security environment demands a lethal, flexible and resilient Joint Force to meet transregional, multidimensional, and multifunctional threats to U.S. national security. Today’s complex security environment demands truly joint warfighters capable of addressing transregional, multi-functional challenges across all domains—sea, air, land, space and cyberspace. The DOD can create the broader and deeper jointness necessary for the Joint Force to succeed, say the authors, only by investing in, rather than divesting from the capacity of JPME schools and programs.

Jan. 22, 2019

Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare

Cyberspace is a relatively new warfighting domain which does not conform to the physical limitations of land, sea, air or space. The faceless, borderless and sometimes nationless actors in cyberspace are unrestricted by natural geographic boundaries and traditional rules of war. However, by applying the principles of Irregular Warfare and integrating cyberspace operations across other domains, the Joint Force can optimize resource allocation and improve the effectiveness of cyber power. As cyberspace continues to evolve and expand as a warfighting domain, military leaders and cyber strategists should incorporate unconventional approaches and hybrid warfare in support of national objectives.

Jan. 22, 2019

A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations

Persistent engagement and forward defense are two key concepts in this article by General Paul Nakasone, Commander of USCYBERCOM. This means remaining in constant contact with adversaries while operating as close to them as possible. The idea is to support the National Security Strategy and protect the DOD Information Network while denying advantage to adversaries so the Joint Force can conduct secure operations. Although cyberspace represents a new strategic environment, Nakasone says USCYBERCOM is maturing as a combatant command, transitioning from force generation to sustained readiness for persistent engagement with cyber adversaries.

Jan. 17, 2019

An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone

Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) General Paul Nakasone offers his insights in this fascinating interview. Nakasone explains the foundational concepts of cyber warfare and a few of the challenges he faces leading our defense of cyberspace. He outlines the role of the Joint Force and the key partnerships in government and the private sector which enhance our warfighting capabilities. Perhaps his greatest challenge is to constantly upgrade these capabilities by recruiting, training and retaining a world-class force. Superiority in cyberspace is ephemeral, says Nakasone, and the competition for talent never seems to get any easier.

Nov. 5, 2018

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Nov. 5, 2018

Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics

The Joint Staff has revised Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics. This version focuses on five areas: warfighter readiness, competition below the level of armed conflict, global integration, innovation, and strengthening alliances. This version offers a framework for combatant commanders and subordinate commanders to integrate strategic, operational and tactical support efforts and facilitate movement of forces and materiel around the world. This version takes a big step toward alignment of the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan and best practices used by combatant commands, all of which is essential to success.

Nov. 5, 2018

Building Joint Personnel Recovery Through Multinational Collaboration

The Multinational Capability Development Campaign is a Joint Force initiative, which focuses on conducting coalition and multinational operations associated with personnel recovery. This article shows how partner nations can effectively coordinate their military, diplomatic and civilian efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. By developing a common lexicon and standardizing doctrine and policy, the Joint Force can improve interagency capabilities and solve this common problem affordably and effectively. However, partner nations must first underscore the importance of effective personnel recovery, and senior leaders must prioritize personnel recovery in all preparations and planning.

Nov. 5, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security: Focus on Campaign Activities

The US has been involved in protecting civilians outside national borders for over a century. DOD policy emphasizes the protection of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure during military campaigns. Improving the conditions for effective local governance and minimizing the need for future or extended employment of US forces is central to US national security interests. Therefore, campaign activities should enhance efforts to improve civilian security and earn population support. Careful planning will reinforce viable security institutions, offer assistance to displaced or dislocated civilians, and protect people from torture, unlawful imprisonment and other human rights abuses.

Nov. 5, 2018

Staying the Course: October 1967 to September 1968

Erik Villard’s new volume casts clarifying light on stubbornly held myths about the conduct and strategy of America’s intervention in Vietnam. Even more than the preceding volumes in the Combat Operations series, Staying the Course incorporates the latest historiography, including extensive North Vietnamese sources and newly released Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV) documents. By carefully linking American strategic thinking to MACV 1968 campaign goals and actual operations, Villard, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, uses careful analysis to dispel a variety of myths: that MACV was over-focused on attrition, that the American mission lacked a focus on counterinsurgency or population security, that the Army was overcommitted to “conventional” operations or “search-and-destroy,” or that American forces overlooked the need to build up the South Vietnamese military and do so in a sustainable way. The overall effect is to restore clarity and urgency to the Army’s efforts in Vietnam in that fateful year, as MACV’s leaders fought against the clock to shield and secure the population and build up the Republic of Vietnam and its armed forces against a thinking and reacting enemy with burgeoning plans of its own.

Nov. 5, 2018

Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare

Years ago, when I was working on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) desk in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we were asked by both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations to help persuade allies and partners around the world to contribute additional forces to the mission in Afghanistan. To their credit, many countries around the world did so. But shortly thereafter, operators on the ground began signaling that many such contributions were so difficult to integrate into the mission that it was distracting from ISAF’s ability to prosecute operations. Some states had caveats on their forces, others had interoperability issues, and still others approached the mission with wholly different strategic mindsets than many of their counterparts. In short, we were building the coalition to help us win the war in Afghanistan, but in so doing, we were distracting our warfighters from actually being able to do so. Why were we spending so much time and effort recruiting forces from allies without accounting for the significant operational strains that their incorporation into the ISAF force laydown might cause?

Nov. 5, 2018

Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Directorate S by longtime Washington Post journalist, former think tank president, and now dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, Steve Coll, is a seminal book. It is a highly worthy successor to the author’s Pulitzer Prize–winning 2004 work Ghost Wars. Directorate S is impressive in its scope, level of detail, and readability. It successfully fills much of the gaping void in prior literature on the controversial topic of the U.S. role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a reference for scholars and policymakers, this book is first rate. Although it will not be the final word on the strategic trajectory of South Asia and the future arc of complex U.S. policy choices in that region, Coll’s work makes an indelible mark.

Nov. 5, 2018

On Grand Strategy

John Lewis Gaddis, deemed the “Dean of Cold War Historians” by a New York Times reviewer, has published yet another book, at least the 14th in a long and productive career. The latest, On Grand Strategy, however, will disappoint those hoping for another learned exposition on the American role in the post–World War II era. Rather, Gaddis, the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History and Director of the Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, has written a wide-ranging essay on strategic thinking that begins with the dawn of recorded history and concludes with the momentous challenges facing American leaders during World War II. As such, On Grand Strategy will bring joy to those whose professions depend on strategizing and anyone wanting to rummage through history seeking insights into how past strategists practiced their craft.

Nov. 5, 2018

Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints from World War I to Vietnam

Strategic bombing has dominated US Air Force doctrine for sixty years despite the broader use of air power during this period. What factors led to this? The author finds that in wartime, the Air Force adapts to the needs of the conflict, but in peacetime returns to a more narrow view of air power in national defense. If the last sixty years teaches anything, it’s that every conflict involves new challenges, which means senior leaders and strategists must train for core missions, anticipate the most deadly threats, and be ready at all times for more surprises.

Nov. 5, 2018

Military Transformation: Applying the Kotter Eight-Step Methodology for Change in the U.S. Armed Services

The Joint Force can transform itself and attain its long-term objectives for modernization, says the author, by following a process of change management adapted from John Kotter’s eight step methodology. The author demonstrates the applicability and utility of Kotter’s methodology with a case study of the Navy’s conversion to nuclear propulsion led by the father of the nuclear Navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover. By emulating Rickover’s example building organizational standards, recruiting top talent and improving officer management systems to support the Navy’s nuclear conversion, the Joint Force may successfully execute contemporary transformation efforts.

Nov. 5, 2018

A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities

Restricted cyberattack authority enables operational commanders to attack effectively while simultaneously minimizing the risk of unintended consequences. Because operational commanders face adversaries capable of degrading and destroying our military capabilities, commanders should be armed with as many weapons as possible to employ against an adversary in the event of a crisis. A coherent system of nationally pre-approved cyberattack methods combined with delegation of limited authority, says the author, would offer important advantages. Such a system would increase the menu of options, keep military operations in alignment with the national interest, and ensure that national authorities remain in control.

Nov. 5, 2018

Beyond the Gray Zone: Special Operations in Multidomain Battle

The joint operational approach known as Multi-Domain Battle is the subject of this feature article. The demands of the future battlefield will be characterized by increased lethality, complexity and the loss of traditional US supremacy, and thus test the tactical skill and strategic acumen of Special Forces. Employment of Special Forces can give the Joint Force commander an advantage over conventional land, air and maritime forces in combat. To maximize their effectiveness in the Multi-Domain Battle environment, however, commanders must accept a greater level of risk than has been customary during recent operations.

Nov. 5, 2018

Additive Manufacturing: Shaping the Sustainment Battlespace

The proliferation of 3D Printing technologies, also known as additive manufacturing is the subject of this essay. The authors explain the amazing possibilities of this emergent technology to shorten supply chains, produce hard-to-source parts, and deliver spare parts on demand, such as printed food and even printed human organs. There is no doubt that 3D Printing will expand into other fields, increasing flexibility and significantly shortening supply chains. However, there are still major hurdles to overcome before 3D Printing is fully implemented in a way that best supports the joint war fighter.

Nov. 5, 2018

The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea: How Army Decisions Limited Airpower Effectiveness

The US Air Force was key to halting the North Korean invasion and rescuing US Army forces during the Korean War. Unfortunately, US Army commanders made decisions that limited the effectiveness of US air power, says the author, which made the Korean War more costly than necessary. This historical analysis offers important lessons for the Joint Force. First is that joint doctrine must recognize the need to design ground maneuvers to enhance the effectiveness of air interdiction. And second is that each service has its own unique paradigm of war to achieve national security objectives.

Oct. 31, 2018

Peacekeepers in the Donbas

The ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and separatists backed by Russia has the potential for peaceful settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised many observers when he proposed introducing peacekeepers in Eastern Ukraine. Putin’s proposal may be disingenuous, says the author, but may also be a real opportunity for peace. This essay tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The author, Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Wagner of the US Army wrote this as a student at the US Army War College.

Oct. 31, 2018

Political Warfare with Other Means: 2017 Cyber Attacks on Qatar

Qatar’s state news agency falsely reported in 2017 that a Qatari Emir supported Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Israel. Although this cyberattack was ultimately unsuccessful, the author says we can and should learn from these events, and take a pre-emptive approach to prevent the spread of false and misleading information. This essay tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The author, Major Edwin Y. Chua of the Singapore Army wrote this as a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Oct. 30, 2018

Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas: China’s Strategy and Potential U.S. Options

Coercive Gradualism is the incremental employment of coercive instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion below the threshold of military conflict. In response to aggressive regional challenges, such as China’s use of Coercive Gradualism in the South China Sea, the US needs to develop and implement a coherent strategy utilizing all diplomatic, informational, military and economic options. This essay won the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition. The author, Captain Kapil Bhatia of the Indian Navy wrote this as a student at the US Naval War College.

Oct. 30, 2018

Beyond the Third Offset: Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory

The Third Offset Strategy was introduced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in 2014, which drew from previous offset strategies and focused on innovative ways to sustain the US’s power projection capabilities. In its current formulation, says the author, the Third Offset is essentially a technology strategy which offers no enduring competitive advantage. Therefore, we should simplify the meaning of offset strategy to focus on nullifying an adversary’s advantage by imposing costs that would dissuade them from turning into enemies. Based on this, military strategists should contemplate organizational and doctrinal changes rather than rely on uncertain technologies.

Oct. 30, 2018

Complementary Engagement: An American-Led Response to Rising Regional Rivals

The concept of Complementary Engagement emphasizes capacity-building among US allies and partners while proposing a revised military structure and posture. The goal is to counter aspiring regional hegemons who have expanded their ambitions and capabilities, particularly China, Iran and Russia. Although these regional hegemons cannot match the global reach of the former Soviet Union, they still pose a threat. Therefore, says the author, the US should invest in ballistic missile defense, long range strike capabilities and nuclear weapons, and rebalance our alliances to encourage a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

Oct. 30, 2018

Executive Summary

Editor-in Chief Bill Eliason asks what kind of leaders does the military need. Our authors have answers from across the Joint Force. Our essay competition winners cover topics from China’s expansion in the South China Sea to Russia’s peacekeeping offer in the Ukraine to the rules of engagement and the risks of misinformation cyber warfare. Throughout this issue, we deal with hot topics: Special Forces in multi-domain battle, the long-term transformation of the Joint Force, air power during the Korean War, the doctrine of strategic airpower as it continues to evolve, and newly revised joint logistics doctrine.

July 5, 2018

Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion

In this feature article, the author compares the experiences of ancient Greek philosopher Demosthenes and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Though separated by two thousand years, both advocated for rearmament, both were called warmongers, and both were sidelined as a result. Far from provoking conflict, Demosthenes and Churchill sought to avoid war by strengthening military readiness and reinforcing support for their allies to make war less appealing to their adversaries. The lessons of Demosthenes and Churchill are still relevant as the Joint Force struggles with its own challenges in the midst of growing threats from actors across multiple domains.

July 5, 2018

Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols: China’s Joint Force Reforms

This feature article examines the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, particularly its operational capability within the People’s Republic of China and recent efforts to develop its capability as an expeditionary force. While the U.S. military has been reorganizing since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, China has paid close attention and taken significant steps, for example, in the creation of new joint warfighting commands, reorganization of its department system, and creation of new military services. These reform efforts have not been entirely successful, however, due to entrenched bureaucratic interests and the lack of recent combat operations.

July 5, 2018

Bombs, Not Broadcasts: U.S. Preference for Kinetic Strategy in Asymmetric Conflict

In this feature article, the author explores reasons why U.S. strategy in asymmetric conflict has focused so heavily on kinetic operations while conceding the information domain to weaker adversaries. This scenario is a consistent feature of every asymmetric conflict the U.S. has been involved in over the past several decades. In order for the U.S. military to be more successful in asymmetric wars, it needs to give company and battalion commanders authority to conduct information operations, move away from the mentality of treating messages like munitions, and create an organizational culture that fully appreciates the importance of information operations.

July 5, 2018

Defense of the West (Book Review)

In this timely book, one of the most seasoned observers of Atlantic security affairs, Stanley Sloan, offers insights about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These insights are linked to a detailed examination of the Alliance’s origins and development. Sloan pinpoints three key alliance drivers—national interests, common values, and political leadership—and offers a carefully circumscribed optimistic conclusion: common national interests and values are strong, but political leadership is volatile and in need of constructive and effective management.

July 5, 2018

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Book Review)

Famously, Henry Kissinger once wondered out loud, “What in the name of God is strategic superiority? . . . What do you do with it?” Over 40 years later, the questions still resonate, and Georgetown University professor Matthew Kroenig aims to tackle Kissinger’s quandary. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy begins with a puzzle: if the basic premise of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy is supposed to be that the United States can survive a massive nuclear attack and retaliate with great force (so-called assured destruction), why have successive Presidents maintained nuclear capabilities that go well beyond what is required for this goal?

July 5, 2018

The Forgotten Front (Book Review)

This is an important book for theorists and practitioners of counterinsurgency alike. Ladwig, who teaches at King’s College London, begins by pointing out that most U.S. counterinsurgency thinking errs in assuming that the United States will share common goals, interests, and priorities with the local government that it is supporting. As recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan indicate, that assumption should not be taken for granted. In fact, many U.S. elements of strategy applied in counterinsurgency—ending political and military corruption, bolstering political legitimacy by addressing the public’s concerns, engaging in economic reform—may appear just as threatening to the local government’s interests as the insurgency itself. Some local governments’ political and other interests simply do not coincide with those of the United States, and that can lead to tremendous difficulty in convincing them to adopt U.S.-backed reforms. Indeed, Ladwig’s central argument is that the “forgotten front” in these conflicts—the relationship between the United States and local government it is trying to aid—is just as important.

July 5, 2018

Defending the AEF: Combat Adaptation and Jointness in the Skies over France

This article recalls how an untrained cadre of men modified existing French equipment and doctrine to build a small but effective anti-aircraft force during WWI. This history of the A.E.F. Antiaircraft Service highlights how the U.S. military responded to a threat that did not exist a mere decade earlier. In many respects, this type of challenge is familiar to contemporary observers who have watched the Joint Force struggle with intra-service parochialism and the unwillingness to learn from others. Nevertheless, this case history shows what can happen when leaders encourage innovation and adaptation at all levels, top-down, middle-out and bottom-up.

July 3, 2018

Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget

This commentary explains how the effects of globalization and rapid advancements in technology have changed the geopolitical power balance. Advances in military technology and the introduction of hybrid threat capabilities have obscured traditional categories of warfare and increased the difficulty of matching capabilities to meet contemporary challenges. For the U.S. to maintain preeminence, says the author, it must develop innovative technological solutions without neglecting other aspects of innovation. For example, the U.S. should invest widely in technology and science, but also create more flexible and adaptive organizations and cultivate leaders prepared to innovate and accept the inherent risk.

July 3, 2018

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design

This commentary introduces a new approach to problem-solving developed by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The USSOCOM Design Way is a fusion of design thinking and military planning, which promotes creativity, critical thinking and innovation, and emphasizes divergent perspectives across the Joint Force. The USSOCOM Design Way goes beyond operations planning and has proven successful dealing with the complexities of resourcing, policy, acquisitions, as well as joint planning and programming. As the authors suggest, this approach has demonstrated appeal across the Joint Force, from the commander to the action officer, in response to a wide range of complex challenges.

July 3, 2018

The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform

This article calls attention to the flaws in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) which promote competition rather than cooperation. The authors argue that the Services are motivated by parochial incentives which do not align with the combatant command structure despite the jointness imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In order to empower Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff with early and direct influence over materiel development, the DAS must be reformed. The Services must act as agents working in alignment with the combatant command structure, and Service procurement budgets must allow for greater flexibility to promote Joint Force development.

July 3, 2018

Transregional Capstone Exercise: Training for Tomorrow’s Fight

This article proposes a Transregional Capstone Exercise to address shortfalls in Joint Force training against potential challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others. This article proposes four training objectives and a concise framework for regular exercises to help fulfill the Chairman’s vision for the Joint Force, and satisfy the need for all combatant commanders to anticipate transregional, multifunctional, and multi-domain conflict in a global scenario. Despite the logistical challenges and lack of transregional doctrine, these exercises would set the Joint Force on a trajectory to defend the U.S. against the transregional threats of tomorrow.

July 3, 2018

568 Balls in the Air: Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities

This article explores the integration of space capabilities and explains the strategic, operational and tactical risks the U.S. military has assumed as a result. The authors recommend that joint warfighters of the future begin to prepare now, with continuity plans when space is denied, degraded or disrupted. Failure to consider such risk factors could lead to severe degradation of U.S. military capability with disastrous results. Measured in terms of lives lost, such a failure would be reminiscent of wars fought in the pre-digital age. However, losses on this scale are simply unacceptable, especially when this risk can be mitigated.

July 3, 2018

The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing

What is the future of the aircraft carrier for the U.S. Navy? Based on a variety of threats ranging from computer systems vulnerable to hacking, China’s latest ballistic missiles, the proliferation of quiet attack submarines and the spread of nuclear weapons, you could argue the carrier may someday become obsolete. Others predict that carriers will continue to perform many of the same missions as they’ve always done. In any case, the U.S. Navy should rethink joint warfighting concepts in strategic as well as technological terms and figure out what this means for the carrier fleet and associated carrier wings.

July 3, 2018

Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive Space

This article presents a new concept called Strategic Shaping, an integrated whole-of-government approach which targets an adversary’s strategic intentions, disrupts their political calculus, and thus deters them from military action. The idea is to present multiple, complex dilemmas to an adversary’s leadership and remove their sense of control over the situation. Strategic Shaping will help the U.S. defense establishment maintain military advantage prior to or during a crisis with major competitors such as China and Russia, both of whom have recently exploited advantages below the threshold of armed conflict to accomplish their strategic objectives.

July 3, 2018

Intelligence in a Data-Driven Age

In this article, the authors explore alternative methods to create long-term competitive advantage by increasing collaboration between the intelligence community and machines, with an emphasis on artificial intelligence and machine learning. The intelligence community is battle-trained if overworked as a result of continuous operations since 2001, and its technological advantage may be at risk because intelligence systems are collecting data in too many disconnected and diverse formats, and relying on systems that are disconnected, non-standard or inaccessible. Nonetheless, artificial intelligence and machine learning will be instrumental to increase the effectiveness of future intelligence analysts and to sustain our competitive advantage.

July 3, 2018

Executive Summary

How well does the U.S. military transform? When are the best time and circumstances to change how the joint force does business? In search of some answers, I came across a short but powerful article written a few years ago by two consultants to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, David Chinn and John Dowdy. They conducted a survey in December 2014 of “almost 1,000 leaders and senior employees in more than 30 U.S. Government agencies and found that only 40 percent believed that their transformation programs succeeded.” Even though these results do not seem heartening to those “change agents” among us, their research suggests how to change one’s military even in a period of budgetary pressure, as was recently experienced in Europe and the United States. In fact, as of this writing, the Budgetary Control Act (or so-called sequestration) is still in force, but the Department of Defense budgetary outlook is fairly bright. So, if we needed to do some thinking when money was tight, should these suggestions not be applied as the situation improves? Let’s take a minute to see if this is the case.

April 19, 2018

Paradigm Change: Operational Art and the Information Joint Function

The need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges. During a recent effort by the Joint Staff to update Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, leaders recognized that the joint force was already attempting to use information as a function and that the time to institutionalize information as a function was therefore overdue.

April 19, 2018

Globally Integrated Exercises: Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure

The limitations in the Globally Integrated Exercise construct should not dissuade its utilization. Like any new concept, it requires the necessary time, space, and iterations to meet the Chairman’s intent. There is no shortage of recommendations for tackling the globally integrated operations challenges.

April 17, 2018

Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight: Joint Concepts and Future Readiness

Military forces that quickly adapt to change usually prevail. It is difficult to adapt in the near term, more so when there is an extended time horizon, but not adapting can exact a heavy toll in blood and treasure. The high cost of not adjusting to new situations underlies the stereotypical conservatism of military organizations, and it is borne in their propensity to lean heavily on the lessons of the last war and eschew radical change. But those who do not try to anticipate change risk surrendering the initiative on the future battlefield.

April 17, 2018

A New Approach to Joint Concepts

The future operating environment will feature broad changes in the character of warfare. Driven by the rise of competent and competitive states; economic, social, and environmental challenges; and rapidly evolving technologies, these changes will necessitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DOD). Innovation must develop and employ new capabilities, organizational constructs, and approaches to warfighting to maintain competitive advantage over a broad range of potential adversaries.

April 13, 2018

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

April 13, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: Focus on Campaign Activities

This article continues the discussion on human security’s1 seven relevant dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.2 Complementing previous Joint Force Quarterly installments on health and food security,3 the following describes the U.S. Government’s approach to environmental security with a focus on combatant commander campaign activities.

April 13, 2018

Exploring the Future Operating Environment

As we move past the plan of the day, proceed outside of the budget cycle, and venture beyond the 10-year horizon of strategic planning efforts, significant ongoing changes in the security environment will alter the character of warfare beyond recognition.