Results:
Category: JFQ

Jan. 23, 2019

Master and Commander in Joint Air Operations: Winning the Air War Through Mission Command

Much has been written on Mission Command and Control since 2012 when CJCS General Martin Dempsey released a white paper which encouraged this leadership style among his subordinates. Mission command is a proven concept in air operations, and will be required to face the challenges of future conflicts. Since the advent of satellite communications and the internet, however, command and control of joint air operations has become increasingly centralized. Mission command is essential to winning future air wars says, the author, which is feasible because new technology allows operational commanders to make tactical decisions from thousands of miles away.

Jan. 23, 2019

War in 140 Characters

How has social media reshaped the way war is fought? Brett Swaney reviews War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century by David Patrikarakos. Every war, says the author, is essentially a clash of narratives. The author’s hypothesis that social media has reshaped not just the nature of conflict but also the entire discourse surrounding warfare remains an open question. Nonetheless, this book is required reading for national security professionals who seek a better understanding of the power of social media and the contemporary conflict increasingly shaped by homo digitalis.

Jan. 23, 2019

Just War Reconsidered

The greatest blind spot of Just War Theory is the accountability of senior civilian and military leaders for wartime decisions. Anthony Pfaff reviews Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by James Dubik. This book covers the responsibilities and obligations of civilians for the decision to go to war, and the higher obligations of military leaders and soldiers pertaining to unnecessary harm, impermissible weapons, the acceptance of surrender, and the treatment of combatants and noncombatants, among others. This book is critical reading for national security professionals in positions where they will make or advise decision-makers regarding warfare.

Jan. 23, 2019

Vietnam

This book tells the tragic story of the Vietnam War. Williamson Murray reviews Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945–1975 by Max Hastings. In this case, the word tragic is not an overstatement. Vietnam weaves the stories of American and Vietnamese soldiers and civilians on all sides of the struggle into a terrifying and impressive tale of both man’s inhumanity to his fellows, and the heroism of those on the sharp end. Perhaps the saddest result from the American point of view is that our political and military leaders learned so little from the high price we paid.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Drone Debate

Since the first drone strike outside of a conventional battlefield in 2002, the U.S. has carried out at least five hundred covert strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia killing 3,500 people, including civilians. Matthew Mueller reviews The Drone Debate: A Primer on the U.S. Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside of Conventional Battlefields by Avery Plaw, Matthew Fricker and Carlos Colon. This book contributes to the growing literature on the use of drones outside of conventional battlefields, and deals with important ethical questions on the use of drones, which makes The Drone Debate ideal for classroom use.

Jan. 23, 2019

Building Militaries in Fragile States

Why does the U.S. have such an uneven record when it comes to building foreign militaries? John Hewitt reviews Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States by Mara Karlin. The U.S. has been involved in building militaries since World War II, which provides ample case material. Karlin surveys the nuts and bolts of building militaries abroad, and investigates alternative strategies. This detailed, informative and prescriptive book should elicit robust conversations, deeper analysis and decisive action among foreign policy analysts, policy wonks, military personnel and anyone interested in foreign affairs.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Ghosts of Kasserine Pass: Maximizing the Effectiveness of Airpower

The American defeat at Kasserine Pass during the 1943 North African Campaign illustrates the consequences of allowing technological development to outpace doctrine. This article reviews the doctrine that constrained airpower during the North African Campaign and traces the development and evolution of modern doctrine that followed. Ideas conceived in North Africa seventy years ago, such as centralized control, decentralized execution, responsiveness and flexibility have stood the test of time, says the author, and remain applicable to today’s Joint Force. To achieve even greater efficiencies, the author recommends updating doctrine continually and establishing a new command structure with global reach.

Jan. 23, 2019

Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters

Security assistance depends on supporting both the militaries and the governments in weak states. Critics argue that security assistance undermines local government institutions and enables undisciplined host-nations to abuse human rights. Why should the U.S. struggle to build strong armies in weak states? Engaging weak states is in our interest, say the authors, because weak states often have governments that lack legitimacy and national identity, and thus provide environments conducive to insurgency and terrorism. Nonetheless, if we offer the right combination of carrots-and-sticks, we can encourage host-nations to reform their armed forces without undermining domestic political stability.

Jan. 23, 2019

Evasive Maneuvers: How Malign Actors Leverage Cryptocurrency

The emergence of cryptocurrencies is a new frontier with profound implications for national security. Bad actors take advantage of innovative digital technologies and global connectivity, which makes it difficult to follow the money. Because of the risks, the U.S. should continue to influence world financial markets and perhaps integrate DOD cyberspace operations into a whole-of-government response. The U.S. Government already has significant defensive and offensive capabilities in cyberspace, but must reimagine its role. The U.S. can lead the way, say the authors, by writing and enforcing new rules and regulations which would ensure the integrity of this new financial landscape.

Jan. 22, 2019

Thinking Differently about the Business of War

Military strategy in protracted competition is similar to organizational strategy. In a fiercely competitive and constantly shifting strategic environment, the authors ask whether success is more about the willingness to change or the ability to focus on fundamentals. In response, the authors apply the business concept of competitive advantage to the military context. This article explains how the Joint Force can organize, train, and procure equipment based on informed assumptions about what will matter most in future wars. As a result, military leaders and strategists can balance current and future requirements, make wise investments and mitigate risk.

Jan. 22, 2019

Force Protection from Moral Injury: Three Objectives for Military Leaders

Moral Injury is an occupational hazard that affects the Joint Force. All combatants are moral actors, say the authors, because they make life and death decisions influenced by their core values and lethal skills. Leaders at every level need to understand how combatants develop and use core values to judge perceptions of their military service and cope with maladaptive emotions, thoughts and behaviors. Today’s leaders cannot control the traumatic effects of combat, but they can prepare service members for the risks they will encounter by embedding moral reasoning within mission command, and by providing resources which facilitate the healing process.

Jan. 22, 2019

"This Breaking News Just In, Emperor Napoleon I Is Still Dead!"

Geographic Combatant Commands have two mission sets: theater engagement and warfighting. This paper proposes dividing theater engagement and warfighting into two separate commands. Geographic Commands under a three-star commander would facilitate theater security cooperation and be responsible for activities such as intelligence, logistics and communications. Meanwhile, three Combat Operations Commands (East, West and Homeland) each under a four-star commander would be responsible for defending the homeland and projecting force elsewhere. The DOD has an opportunity to streamline existing command structures and establish a new paradigm, which would allow the Joint Force to fulfill its mission without confusion or contradiction.

Jan. 22, 2019

Simplicity: A Tool for Working with Complexity and Chaos

The science of simplification can help the Joint Force develop agile and adaptive leaders able to operate in complex and chaotic environments. What is the key to making time sensitive decisions in complex and chaotic situations? Simplicity, says the author, not complexity is the key to accelerating the cognitive process in complex and chaotic situations. Simplification of doctrine improves situational awareness and reduces information overload that contributes to paralysis by analysis. Leaders and doctrine writers should seriously consider taking a new direction toward simplification to help decision makers turn intention into action.

Jan. 22, 2019

Toward a More Lethal, Flexible, and Resilient Joint Force: Rediscovering the Purpose of JPME II

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) has never been more important to the success of the Joint Force. The contemporary security environment demands a lethal, flexible and resilient Joint Force to meet transregional, multidimensional, and multifunctional threats to U.S. national security. Today’s complex security environment demands truly joint warfighters capable of addressing transregional, multi-functional challenges across all domains—sea, air, land, space and cyberspace. The DOD can create the broader and deeper jointness necessary for the Joint Force to succeed, say the authors, only by investing in, rather than divesting from the capacity of JPME schools and programs.

Jan. 22, 2019

Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare

Cyberspace is a relatively new warfighting domain which does not conform to the physical limitations of land, sea, air or space. The faceless, borderless and sometimes nationless actors in cyberspace are unrestricted by natural geographic boundaries and traditional rules of war. However, by applying the principles of Irregular Warfare and integrating cyberspace operations across other domains, the Joint Force can optimize resource allocation and improve the effectiveness of cyber power. As cyberspace continues to evolve and expand as a warfighting domain, military leaders and cyber strategists should incorporate unconventional approaches and hybrid warfare in support of national objectives.

Jan. 22, 2019

A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations

Persistent engagement and forward defense are two key concepts in this article by General Paul Nakasone, Commander of USCYBERCOM. This means remaining in constant contact with adversaries while operating as close to them as possible. The idea is to support the National Security Strategy and protect the DOD Information Network while denying advantage to adversaries so the Joint Force can conduct secure operations. Although cyberspace represents a new strategic environment, Nakasone says USCYBERCOM is maturing as a combatant command, transitioning from force generation to sustained readiness for persistent engagement with cyber adversaries.

Jan. 17, 2019

An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone

Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) General Paul Nakasone offers his insights in this fascinating interview. Nakasone explains the foundational concepts of cyber warfare and a few of the challenges he faces leading our defense of cyberspace. He outlines the role of the Joint Force and the key partnerships in government and the private sector which enhance our warfighting capabilities. Perhaps his greatest challenge is to constantly upgrade these capabilities by recruiting, training and retaining a world-class force. Superiority in cyberspace is ephemeral, says Nakasone, and the competition for talent never seems to get any easier.

Nov. 5, 2018

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Nov. 5, 2018

Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics

The Joint Staff has revised Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics. This version focuses on five areas: warfighter readiness, competition below the level of armed conflict, global integration, innovation, and strengthening alliances. This version offers a framework for combatant commanders and subordinate commanders to integrate strategic, operational and tactical support efforts and facilitate movement of forces and materiel around the world. This version takes a big step toward alignment of the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan and best practices used by combatant commands, all of which is essential to success.

Nov. 5, 2018

Building Joint Personnel Recovery Through Multinational Collaboration

The Multinational Capability Development Campaign is a Joint Force initiative, which focuses on conducting coalition and multinational operations associated with personnel recovery. This article shows how partner nations can effectively coordinate their military, diplomatic and civilian efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. By developing a common lexicon and standardizing doctrine and policy, the Joint Force can improve interagency capabilities and solve this common problem affordably and effectively. However, partner nations must first underscore the importance of effective personnel recovery, and senior leaders must prioritize personnel recovery in all preparations and planning.

Nov. 5, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security: Focus on Campaign Activities

The US has been involved in protecting civilians outside national borders for over a century. DOD policy emphasizes the protection of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure during military campaigns. Improving the conditions for effective local governance and minimizing the need for future or extended employment of US forces is central to US national security interests. Therefore, campaign activities should enhance efforts to improve civilian security and earn population support. Careful planning will reinforce viable security institutions, offer assistance to displaced or dislocated civilians, and protect people from torture, unlawful imprisonment and other human rights abuses.

Nov. 5, 2018

Staying the Course: October 1967 to September 1968

Erik Villard’s new volume casts clarifying light on stubbornly held myths about the conduct and strategy of America’s intervention in Vietnam. Even more than the preceding volumes in the Combat Operations series, Staying the Course incorporates the latest historiography, including extensive North Vietnamese sources and newly released Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV) documents. By carefully linking American strategic thinking to MACV 1968 campaign goals and actual operations, Villard, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, uses careful analysis to dispel a variety of myths: that MACV was over-focused on attrition, that the American mission lacked a focus on counterinsurgency or population security, that the Army was overcommitted to “conventional” operations or “search-and-destroy,” or that American forces overlooked the need to build up the South Vietnamese military and do so in a sustainable way. The overall effect is to restore clarity and urgency to the Army’s efforts in Vietnam in that fateful year, as MACV’s leaders fought against the clock to shield and secure the population and build up the Republic of Vietnam and its armed forces against a thinking and reacting enemy with burgeoning plans of its own.

Nov. 5, 2018

Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare

Years ago, when I was working on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) desk in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we were asked by both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations to help persuade allies and partners around the world to contribute additional forces to the mission in Afghanistan. To their credit, many countries around the world did so. But shortly thereafter, operators on the ground began signaling that many such contributions were so difficult to integrate into the mission that it was distracting from ISAF’s ability to prosecute operations. Some states had caveats on their forces, others had interoperability issues, and still others approached the mission with wholly different strategic mindsets than many of their counterparts. In short, we were building the coalition to help us win the war in Afghanistan, but in so doing, we were distracting our warfighters from actually being able to do so. Why were we spending so much time and effort recruiting forces from allies without accounting for the significant operational strains that their incorporation into the ISAF force laydown might cause?

Nov. 5, 2018

Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Directorate S by longtime Washington Post journalist, former think tank president, and now dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, Steve Coll, is a seminal book. It is a highly worthy successor to the author’s Pulitzer Prize–winning 2004 work Ghost Wars. Directorate S is impressive in its scope, level of detail, and readability. It successfully fills much of the gaping void in prior literature on the controversial topic of the U.S. role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a reference for scholars and policymakers, this book is first rate. Although it will not be the final word on the strategic trajectory of South Asia and the future arc of complex U.S. policy choices in that region, Coll’s work makes an indelible mark.

Nov. 5, 2018

On Grand Strategy

John Lewis Gaddis, deemed the “Dean of Cold War Historians” by a New York Times reviewer, has published yet another book, at least the 14th in a long and productive career. The latest, On Grand Strategy, however, will disappoint those hoping for another learned exposition on the American role in the post–World War II era. Rather, Gaddis, the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History and Director of the Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, has written a wide-ranging essay on strategic thinking that begins with the dawn of recorded history and concludes with the momentous challenges facing American leaders during World War II. As such, On Grand Strategy will bring joy to those whose professions depend on strategizing and anyone wanting to rummage through history seeking insights into how past strategists practiced their craft.

Nov. 5, 2018

Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints from World War I to Vietnam

Strategic bombing has dominated US Air Force doctrine for sixty years despite the broader use of air power during this period. What factors led to this? The author finds that in wartime, the Air Force adapts to the needs of the conflict, but in peacetime returns to a more narrow view of air power in national defense. If the last sixty years teaches anything, it’s that every conflict involves new challenges, which means senior leaders and strategists must train for core missions, anticipate the most deadly threats, and be ready at all times for more surprises.

Nov. 5, 2018

Military Transformation: Applying the Kotter Eight-Step Methodology for Change in the U.S. Armed Services

The Joint Force can transform itself and attain its long-term objectives for modernization, says the author, by following a process of change management adapted from John Kotter’s eight step methodology. The author demonstrates the applicability and utility of Kotter’s methodology with a case study of the Navy’s conversion to nuclear propulsion led by the father of the nuclear Navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover. By emulating Rickover’s example building organizational standards, recruiting top talent and improving officer management systems to support the Navy’s nuclear conversion, the Joint Force may successfully execute contemporary transformation efforts.

Nov. 5, 2018

A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities

Restricted cyberattack authority enables operational commanders to attack effectively while simultaneously minimizing the risk of unintended consequences. Because operational commanders face adversaries capable of degrading and destroying our military capabilities, commanders should be armed with as many weapons as possible to employ against an adversary in the event of a crisis. A coherent system of nationally pre-approved cyberattack methods combined with delegation of limited authority, says the author, would offer important advantages. Such a system would increase the menu of options, keep military operations in alignment with the national interest, and ensure that national authorities remain in control.

Nov. 5, 2018

Beyond the Gray Zone: Special Operations in Multidomain Battle

The joint operational approach known as Multi-Domain Battle is the subject of this feature article. The demands of the future battlefield will be characterized by increased lethality, complexity and the loss of traditional US supremacy, and thus test the tactical skill and strategic acumen of Special Forces. Employment of Special Forces can give the Joint Force commander an advantage over conventional land, air and maritime forces in combat. To maximize their effectiveness in the Multi-Domain Battle environment, however, commanders must accept a greater level of risk than has been customary during recent operations.

Nov. 5, 2018

Additive Manufacturing: Shaping the Sustainment Battlespace

The proliferation of 3D Printing technologies, also known as additive manufacturing is the subject of this essay. The authors explain the amazing possibilities of this emergent technology to shorten supply chains, produce hard-to-source parts, and deliver spare parts on demand, such as printed food and even printed human organs. There is no doubt that 3D Printing will expand into other fields, increasing flexibility and significantly shortening supply chains. However, there are still major hurdles to overcome before 3D Printing is fully implemented in a way that best supports the joint war fighter.

Nov. 5, 2018

The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea: How Army Decisions Limited Airpower Effectiveness

The US Air Force was key to halting the North Korean invasion and rescuing US Army forces during the Korean War. Unfortunately, US Army commanders made decisions that limited the effectiveness of US air power, says the author, which made the Korean War more costly than necessary. This historical analysis offers important lessons for the Joint Force. First is that joint doctrine must recognize the need to design ground maneuvers to enhance the effectiveness of air interdiction. And second is that each service has its own unique paradigm of war to achieve national security objectives.

Oct. 31, 2018

Peacekeepers in the Donbas

The ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and separatists backed by Russia has the potential for peaceful settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised many observers when he proposed introducing peacekeepers in Eastern Ukraine. Putin’s proposal may be disingenuous, says the author, but may also be a real opportunity for peace. This essay tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The author, Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Wagner of the US Army wrote this as a student at the US Army War College.

Oct. 31, 2018

Political Warfare with Other Means: 2017 Cyber Attacks on Qatar

Qatar’s state news agency falsely reported in 2017 that a Qatari Emir supported Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Israel. Although this cyberattack was ultimately unsuccessful, the author says we can and should learn from these events, and take a pre-emptive approach to prevent the spread of false and misleading information. This essay tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The author, Major Edwin Y. Chua of the Singapore Army wrote this as a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Oct. 30, 2018

Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas: China’s Strategy and Potential U.S. Options

Coercive Gradualism is the incremental employment of coercive instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion below the threshold of military conflict. In response to aggressive regional challenges, such as China’s use of Coercive Gradualism in the South China Sea, the US needs to develop and implement a coherent strategy utilizing all diplomatic, informational, military and economic options. This essay won the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition. The author, Captain Kapil Bhatia of the Indian Navy wrote this as a student at the US Naval War College.

Oct. 30, 2018

Beyond the Third Offset: Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory

The Third Offset Strategy was introduced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in 2014, which drew from previous offset strategies and focused on innovative ways to sustain the US’s power projection capabilities. In its current formulation, says the author, the Third Offset is essentially a technology strategy which offers no enduring competitive advantage. Therefore, we should simplify the meaning of offset strategy to focus on nullifying an adversary’s advantage by imposing costs that would dissuade them from turning into enemies. Based on this, military strategists should contemplate organizational and doctrinal changes rather than rely on uncertain technologies.

Oct. 30, 2018

Complementary Engagement: An American-Led Response to Rising Regional Rivals

The concept of Complementary Engagement emphasizes capacity-building among US allies and partners while proposing a revised military structure and posture. The goal is to counter aspiring regional hegemons who have expanded their ambitions and capabilities, particularly China, Iran and Russia. Although these regional hegemons cannot match the global reach of the former Soviet Union, they still pose a threat. Therefore, says the author, the US should invest in ballistic missile defense, long range strike capabilities and nuclear weapons, and rebalance our alliances to encourage a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

Oct. 30, 2018

Executive Summary

Editor-in Chief Bill Eliason asks what kind of leaders does the military need. Our authors have answers from across the Joint Force. Our essay competition winners cover topics from China’s expansion in the South China Sea to Russia’s peacekeeping offer in the Ukraine to the rules of engagement and the risks of misinformation cyber warfare. Throughout this issue, we deal with hot topics: Special Forces in multi-domain battle, the long-term transformation of the Joint Force, air power during the Korean War, the doctrine of strategic airpower as it continues to evolve, and newly revised joint logistics doctrine.

July 5, 2018

Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion

In this feature article, the author compares the experiences of ancient Greek philosopher Demosthenes and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Though separated by two thousand years, both advocated for rearmament, both were called warmongers, and both were sidelined as a result. Far from provoking conflict, Demosthenes and Churchill sought to avoid war by strengthening military readiness and reinforcing support for their allies to make war less appealing to their adversaries. The lessons of Demosthenes and Churchill are still relevant as the Joint Force struggles with its own challenges in the midst of growing threats from actors across multiple domains.

July 5, 2018

Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols: China’s Joint Force Reforms

This feature article examines the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, particularly its operational capability within the People’s Republic of China and recent efforts to develop its capability as an expeditionary force. While the U.S. military has been reorganizing since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, China has paid close attention and taken significant steps, for example, in the creation of new joint warfighting commands, reorganization of its department system, and creation of new military services. These reform efforts have not been entirely successful, however, due to entrenched bureaucratic interests and the lack of recent combat operations.

July 5, 2018

Bombs, Not Broadcasts: U.S. Preference for Kinetic Strategy in Asymmetric Conflict

In this feature article, the author explores reasons why U.S. strategy in asymmetric conflict has focused so heavily on kinetic operations while conceding the information domain to weaker adversaries. This scenario is a consistent feature of every asymmetric conflict the U.S. has been involved in over the past several decades. In order for the U.S. military to be more successful in asymmetric wars, it needs to give company and battalion commanders authority to conduct information operations, move away from the mentality of treating messages like munitions, and create an organizational culture that fully appreciates the importance of information operations.

July 5, 2018

Defense of the West (Book Review)

In this timely book, one of the most seasoned observers of Atlantic security affairs, Stanley Sloan, offers insights about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These insights are linked to a detailed examination of the Alliance’s origins and development. Sloan pinpoints three key alliance drivers—national interests, common values, and political leadership—and offers a carefully circumscribed optimistic conclusion: common national interests and values are strong, but political leadership is volatile and in need of constructive and effective management.

July 5, 2018

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Book Review)

Famously, Henry Kissinger once wondered out loud, “What in the name of God is strategic superiority? . . . What do you do with it?” Over 40 years later, the questions still resonate, and Georgetown University professor Matthew Kroenig aims to tackle Kissinger’s quandary. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy begins with a puzzle: if the basic premise of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy is supposed to be that the United States can survive a massive nuclear attack and retaliate with great force (so-called assured destruction), why have successive Presidents maintained nuclear capabilities that go well beyond what is required for this goal?

July 5, 2018

The Forgotten Front (Book Review)

This is an important book for theorists and practitioners of counterinsurgency alike. Ladwig, who teaches at King’s College London, begins by pointing out that most U.S. counterinsurgency thinking errs in assuming that the United States will share common goals, interests, and priorities with the local government that it is supporting. As recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan indicate, that assumption should not be taken for granted. In fact, many U.S. elements of strategy applied in counterinsurgency—ending political and military corruption, bolstering political legitimacy by addressing the public’s concerns, engaging in economic reform—may appear just as threatening to the local government’s interests as the insurgency itself. Some local governments’ political and other interests simply do not coincide with those of the United States, and that can lead to tremendous difficulty in convincing them to adopt U.S.-backed reforms. Indeed, Ladwig’s central argument is that the “forgotten front” in these conflicts—the relationship between the United States and local government it is trying to aid—is just as important.

July 5, 2018

Defending the AEF: Combat Adaptation and Jointness in the Skies over France

This article recalls how an untrained cadre of men modified existing French equipment and doctrine to build a small but effective anti-aircraft force during WWI. This history of the A.E.F. Antiaircraft Service highlights how the U.S. military responded to a threat that did not exist a mere decade earlier. In many respects, this type of challenge is familiar to contemporary observers who have watched the Joint Force struggle with intra-service parochialism and the unwillingness to learn from others. Nevertheless, this case history shows what can happen when leaders encourage innovation and adaptation at all levels, top-down, middle-out and bottom-up.

July 3, 2018

Cooking Shows, Corollas, and Innovation on a Budget

This commentary explains how the effects of globalization and rapid advancements in technology have changed the geopolitical power balance. Advances in military technology and the introduction of hybrid threat capabilities have obscured traditional categories of warfare and increased the difficulty of matching capabilities to meet contemporary challenges. For the U.S. to maintain preeminence, says the author, it must develop innovative technological solutions without neglecting other aspects of innovation. For example, the U.S. should invest widely in technology and science, but also create more flexible and adaptive organizations and cultivate leaders prepared to innovate and accept the inherent risk.

July 3, 2018

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design

This commentary introduces a new approach to problem-solving developed by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The USSOCOM Design Way is a fusion of design thinking and military planning, which promotes creativity, critical thinking and innovation, and emphasizes divergent perspectives across the Joint Force. The USSOCOM Design Way goes beyond operations planning and has proven successful dealing with the complexities of resourcing, policy, acquisitions, as well as joint planning and programming. As the authors suggest, this approach has demonstrated appeal across the Joint Force, from the commander to the action officer, in response to a wide range of complex challenges.

July 3, 2018

The Case for Joint Force Acquisition Reform

This article calls attention to the flaws in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) which promote competition rather than cooperation. The authors argue that the Services are motivated by parochial incentives which do not align with the combatant command structure despite the jointness imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In order to empower Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff with early and direct influence over materiel development, the DAS must be reformed. The Services must act as agents working in alignment with the combatant command structure, and Service procurement budgets must allow for greater flexibility to promote Joint Force development.

July 3, 2018

Transregional Capstone Exercise: Training for Tomorrow’s Fight

This article proposes a Transregional Capstone Exercise to address shortfalls in Joint Force training against potential challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others. This article proposes four training objectives and a concise framework for regular exercises to help fulfill the Chairman’s vision for the Joint Force, and satisfy the need for all combatant commanders to anticipate transregional, multifunctional, and multi-domain conflict in a global scenario. Despite the logistical challenges and lack of transregional doctrine, these exercises would set the Joint Force on a trajectory to defend the U.S. against the transregional threats of tomorrow.

July 3, 2018

568 Balls in the Air: Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities

This article explores the integration of space capabilities and explains the strategic, operational and tactical risks the U.S. military has assumed as a result. The authors recommend that joint warfighters of the future begin to prepare now, with continuity plans when space is denied, degraded or disrupted. Failure to consider such risk factors could lead to severe degradation of U.S. military capability with disastrous results. Measured in terms of lives lost, such a failure would be reminiscent of wars fought in the pre-digital age. However, losses on this scale are simply unacceptable, especially when this risk can be mitigated.

July 3, 2018

The Future of the Aircraft Carrier and the Carrier Air Wing

What is the future of the aircraft carrier for the U.S. Navy? Based on a variety of threats ranging from computer systems vulnerable to hacking, China’s latest ballistic missiles, the proliferation of quiet attack submarines and the spread of nuclear weapons, you could argue the carrier may someday become obsolete. Others predict that carriers will continue to perform many of the same missions as they’ve always done. In any case, the U.S. Navy should rethink joint warfighting concepts in strategic as well as technological terms and figure out what this means for the carrier fleet and associated carrier wings.