March 31, 2020

Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain Command and Control

Advances in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems offer enhanced military capabilities to nations who adopt and operationalize these technologies. How might the Joint Force change policy and leadership structures to maximize the benefits of such technologies? In this article, data science concepts are applied to the historical example of the Department of Defense (DOD) 2003 data strategy to yield insights into the changes the Joint Force should make to improve the agility of command and control structures. Making these changes would enable the Joint Force to make better decisions, says the author, and conduct more effective multi-domain operations.

March 31, 2020

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

March 31, 2020

The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace

Mariya Omelicheva reviews The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace by Oscar Jonsson. This book helps the reader understand an adversary that has embraced a form of conflict at odds with Western notions of war and peace. It is a must read for Russia-watchers and all national security analysts and strategists in the Joint Force.

March 31, 2020

To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth

Walter Hudson reviews To Build a Better World: Choices to End the Cold War and Create a Global Commonwealth by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. Zelikow and Rice write not only as scholars but also as actors who played parts in history. This book is valuable to policymakers, warfighters, and students of strategy throughout the Joint Force.

March 31, 2020

Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvili’s American Success

Bryon Greenwald reviews Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvilli’s American Success by Andrew Marble. This fine biography of former CJCS (1993-1997) General John Shalikashvilli offers much to the military reader. He was a competent leader who rose from humble origins to become the most senior officer in the US military.

March 31, 2020

Learning the Art of Joint Operations: Ulysses S. Grant and the U.S. Navy

General Ulysses Grant learned the art of joint operations during the Civil War by working with Andrew Hull Foote, his Navy counterpart who shared Grant’s commitment to winning the war. There was no Joint Force Commander in the 1860s because there was no formal principle of unity of command. Today, this principle mitigates the confusion and complexity of joint operations, as per JP 3-0 Joint Operations which assigns a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Grant’s partnership with Foote exemplifies how to make joint operations work.

March 31, 2020

Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration

The US military continues to make mistakes in detainee operations, which has reduced its ability to achieve national objectives. If we do not place significant emphasis on this critical aspect of planning, says the author, more mistakes will be made and the US military will lose credibility. Moreover, if we do not fix these mistakes, the nation may fail in other aspects of combat operations. This article conveys historical examples of insufficient and ineffective planning for detainee operations, and offers a new paradigm to future planners and specific recommendations to minimize errors and help achieve national and military objectives.

March 31, 2020

The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle

Step into any joint or coalition operations center and you will find planners, intelligence analysts, and operators synchronizing joint fires. The Joint Force commonly conflates the joint information and joint fires functions, limiting its ability to influence the thinking and behavior of audiences not associated with a US adversary. This article argues for establishing a Joint Staff Global Engagement Division to lead the global integration of the joint information function. Adopting this concept, says the author, would address current inadequacies with how the Joint Force integrates the information function into all military operations.

March 31, 2020

The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success

Grand strategy is more art than science, but the practice has always required creativity to translate the Big Idea into a specific plan which uses every instrument of national power to advance the national interest. How do policymakers develop grand strategy? Is it captured in a single concept like containment? Or is it a series of strategic activities orchestrated like a campaign plan? This article explores the “theory of success”, a methodology to formulate grand strategy with an emphasis on strategic logic, the continuous line of thinking which integrates and aligns desired outcomes with existing conditions and constraints.

March 31, 2020

Expanding Atrocity Prevention Education for Rising U.S. National Security Leaders

This article proposes a new mandatory semester-long course in atrocity prevention at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC. In the last century, tens of millions of civilians were killed in atrocities and genocide (mass killings of targeted, unarmed populations). Today, such atrocities and genocide are responsible for three times as many deaths as war. And there is a persistent threat of atrocities in the contemporary security environment. The proposed course would teach practical “upstream-prevention” skills and reinforce moral conduct among senior officers, says the author, and thus influence who holds the high moral ground in great-power competition.

March 31, 2020

Strategic Leader Research: Answering the Call

One goal for senior service colleges and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools is to transform senior officers into warrior-scholars. This requires taking a new approach to the role of research and writing in the preparation of senior officers for strategic responsibility. Greater emphasis on research and writing would meet the needs of strategic leadership, but also transform the culture of JPME. By making students and faculty active participants in problem-solving and idea generation, schools could inspire a culture of articulate leadership at the cutting edge of strategic progress, which would permeate the Joint Force and the larger strategic community.

March 31, 2020

Electronic Warfare in the Suwalki Gap: Facing the Russian “Accompli Attack”

The Joint Operating Environment 2035 predicts the US will face challenges from both persistent disorders and states contesting international norms. One plausible scenario could be a surprise “accompli” attack with little or no warning, which would exploit disorder, challenge international norms, and establish a fait accompli with a limited resistance. The attacker’s gains could be used as leverage to force a settlement because the risks of escalation and the costs to reverse the attacker’s gains are equally unacceptable. The authors propose a five-point plan to strengthen the Joint Force communication infrastructure and improve information resiliency in the future fight.

March 31, 2020

Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations: Implications for National Security

The development of new space technologies and the falling costs of space launch have enabled the proliferation of low orbiting satellites. Commercial actors are pursuing opportunities in space, which will disrupt traditional business models for commercial satellite communications. However, the success of these endeavors will not be confined to the commercial sector. The proliferation of satellites will change future military operations in space. In order to deny space superiority to our adversaries, the US should take a whole-of-government approach to identify strategic technologies (and other systems with military value) and prevent foreign companies and governments from acquiring these technologies.

March 31, 2020

The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone: How Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Balance Back to the Defense

American adversaries are building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones to keep the US military out of key regions. The Chinese set up A2/AD zones to deny US access to Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Russians have A2/AD zones in Kaliningrad, Crimea, the Kola Peninsula, and the Kuril Islands to block maritime lanes. For the Joint Force, the challenge is to penetrate and degrade these A2/AD zones. Disintegration of an adversary’s A2/AD zone is possible, says the author, but we should not underestimate the resilience of enemy networks and their ability to recover from damage inflicted by US fire power.

March 31, 2020

The Imperative for the U.S. Military to Develop a Counter-UAS Strategy

Years of sustained combat has constrained military readiness and thus impacted the US military's ability to respond to emerging global security challenges. For the first time in decades, US ground forces have found themselves under aerial attack and are generally unable to counter the threat. This risk results in an imperative for the Joint Force to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more commonly referred to as drones. This type of strategy will provide a framework for the Joint Force to leverage emerging technologies, develop a comprehensive training program, and regain the warfighting initiative.

March 31, 2020

Executive Summary

This issue of JFQ shows the way ahead for the Joint Force. In our Forum and JPME Today sections, we discuss emerging battlespace technologies. In Commentary, authors propose the development of a new global engagement cycle. In our Features section are articles about the need to adapt the Joint Force command and control structure, about dealing with Iran as a rival nation-state, and addressing A2/AD threats in the Indo-Pacific region. In Recall, we see how General Ulysses Grant learned the art of joint operations in the Civil War. Finally, we review Andrew Marble’s biography of former CJCS General John Shalikashvilli.

Feb. 10, 2020

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Feb. 10, 2020

The Future of Interagency Doctrine

Interagency synchronization continues to challenge whole-of-government approaches to national security. The Joint Staff has been brainstorming ideas to improve workforce interoperability within the context of joint doctrine. In addition, the Joint Staff created a pathway for non-DOD entities to become more involved in the development process of joint doctrine. Subjects of interest included inter-organizational cooperation, protection of civilians, defense support to civil authorities, joint planning and intelligence activities, special operations, counterdrug operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and combating terrorism. CJCS General Mark Milley indicated that listening to non-DOD contributors is important to building an adaptive and agile force.

Feb. 10, 2020

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions

The Joint Force is not well positioned to share best practices in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems (AI/AS). To address this shortcoming, Joint Manning Documents should add an AI/AS cell made up of officers and NCOs in order to incorporate best practices across the seven joint functions. The Army took a similar approach in 2003 with the creation of knowledge management as a distinct discipline and staff function. In order to avoid fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons, the Joint Force should change the way it organizes and employs forces, and embrace a new approach to technological innovation.

Feb. 10, 2020

Failed Megacities and the Joint Force

The greatest international challenge of the 21st century may be the advent the megacity, an urban environment with a population of 10 million people or more. The problems the Joint Force could face when operating in a megacity would stretch the limits of US military capacity. Although joint doctrine addresses traditional urban terrain, it neglects to address the challenges associated with megacities, especially failed megacities. Given the high probability of a failed megacity and the need for military support, the DOD must develop joint doctrine that adequately addresses the challenges posed by operations in a failed megacity.

Feb. 10, 2020

White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War

Edward Salo reviews White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War by John Gans. This book enlightens readers about the foreign policy and national security decision-making process, and demonstrates the importance of experts with bureaucratic, functional and area expertise to maintain a strong national security policy.

Feb. 10, 2020

Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power

Nathaniel L. Moir reviews Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power by Sheila Smith. For national security professionals and those in the Joint Force focused on the Asia-Pacific region, this book is an authoritative account on the Japanese Self Defense Force and a good reminder of the importance of US-Japan relations.

Feb. 10, 2020

Small Arms: Children and Terrorism

Kira McFadden reviews Small Arms: Children and Terrorism by Mia Bloom and John Horgan. This book is a deep dive into an under-examined issue, the long term challenges of children in terrorist organizations. It is a must read for policymakers and planners working to end generational cycles of violent extremism.

Feb. 10, 2020

Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era: Lessons from the Battle of the Bismarck Sea

As China and Russia continue to acquire and integrate precision-guided long-range missiles into their weapons systems, Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is one of the toughest challenges to American maritime dominance. Strategists often look to history to solve current defense problems, and WWII may teach lessons applicable to today’s context. The author uses the 1943 Battle of the Bismarck Sea as a case study to highlight the role of land-based airpower in maritime interdiction. By looking through a counter-A2/AD lens, this battle offers an interesting perspective on attaining maritime dominance in this era of global integration and great power competition.

Feb. 10, 2020

Frustrated Cargo: The U.S. Army’s Limitations in Projecting Force from Ship to Shore in an A2/AD Environment

The Korean peninsula, Taiwan and numerous other contested islands and landmasses in the Pacific highlight the need for a revised Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. The current joint concept relies on a relatively small initial entry force of Marines to establish a lodgment with the preponderance of the Army combat power flowing as follow-on forces through established ports. However, using historical examples the author argues that the Army needs to develop new training and doctrine to support over-the-shore maneuver. This would provide complementary capabilities to the Marine Corps and make better use of Army assets to support the Joint Force.

Feb. 10, 2020

The Revival of Al Qaeda

Al-Qaida has taken advantage of the attention focused on the Islamic State to develop safe havens and exercise control over large swaths of territory. In addition, Al-Qaida has taken security precautions such as diffusing its leadership to a variety of geographic locations, creating cohesion among its global affiliates, and gaining inroads with vulnerable populations in fragile states. It is imperative, therefore, to understand how Al-Qaeda and other such groups employ inconspicuous methods such as exploiting socio-political and ethnic grievances and, exercising strategic patience in order to prevent Al-Qaida from staging a comeback.

Feb. 10, 2020

Adapting to Disruption: Aerial Combat over North Vietnam

During aerial combat in the Vietnam War, both the US Navy and the US Air Force experienced unexpectedly high losses. A comparison of the Navy’s and the Air Force’s different approaches to aerial combat yields four insights regarding military adaptation. First, adaptation depends on senior leadership. Second, taking a broader approach results in more successful adaptation. Third, the not-invented-here syndrome results in less successful adaptation. And fourth, one key component of military effectiveness is the capacity to adapt to disruption. Realistic testing and training, and recent battlefield experience may enable military forces to adapt more quickly to future disruptions.

Feb. 7, 2020

Peacemakers: Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain

In regions where the US military operates, commanders should consider employing DOD chaplains to serve as the commander’s representative and coordinate humanitarian assistance. Military commanders must deal with a network of intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international foreign humanitarian entities. This complex network requires ongoing coordination, which a DOD chaplain can accomplish in a way that is consistent with joint doctrine. Although critics may say this blurs the lines between the military and humanitarian actors, DOD chaplains bring expertise as potential liaisons to religious leaders and can facilitate civilian-military relations to achieve national objectives.

Feb. 7, 2020

The Bering Strait: An Arena for Great Power Competition

The rapidly changing environmental conditions in the Arctic Region have increased the potential for great power competition between Russia, China and the US. Because of Russia’s and China’s interest in the region, the Bering Strait more than ever is vital to US economic and national security interests. Since 2014, the US has mostly focused on deterring Russian aggression in Europe. As a result, the US is now in a position of weakness in the Arctic. If steps are not taken, the status of the Arctic as a place of peaceful cooperation and exploration will be jeopardized.

Feb. 7, 2020

A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis: A Special Operations Case Study

For many military commanders, the word assessment induces bouts of eye-rolling, daytime drowsiness and nausea. This condition results from years of overly complicated briefings which are unintelligible to everyone but the presenter. This manuscript offers a remedy: a set of guiding principles to help make better decisions built on better data. Breaking from traditional assessment approaches, the authors focus on building collaborative teams to pursue questions of primary concern to the commander. This article can help every commander and their staff learn to ask questions that matter, conduct useful, hard-nosed analysis, and enhance decision-making across the organization.

Feb. 7, 2020

Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity: The Nature of War as a Complex Adaptive System

Clausewitz described war as a paradoxical trinity comprised of the tendencies of the people, the commander and his army, and the government. The three elements of the Clausewitz trinity interact within and among the other elements to create a pattern of behavior that is understandable yet unpredictable. Within this trinity, Clausewitz captured the social dynamics in war that characterize a complex adaptive system. This article provides an overview of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, and illustrates how complexity theory can be applied as a framework to examine Clausewitz’s observations of the interactions between chance, politics and passion.

Feb. 7, 2020

Asking Strategic Questions: A Primer for National Security Professionals

Asking good strategic questions is not just a useful leadership habit. In the national security profession, it can save lives and change history. Because leaders have so much power over which questions organizations ask, it is essential that leaders understand the basic characteristics of good strategic questions. Leaders cannot be expected to be experts in all things, but guiding or assessing a strategic question is one area in which they must be active and involved. Strategic questions drive organizational attention, energy, and resources, say the authors, and can make the difference between success and failure.

Feb. 7, 2020

Beyond Auftragstaktik: The Case Against Hyper-Decentralized Command

The Prussian concept of mission command emphasizes hyper-decentralization, commander’s intent and low-level initiative. This article argues that such decentralization is no guarantee of command effectiveness. While there is a need to resolve the inherent tension between centralization and decentralization, the author recommends taking a balanced approach, which would empower subordinates to take the initiative while retaining the commander’s ability to coordinate mutual support and mass combat power. While the Prussian approach has some qualities worth emulating, it is less than ideal. An iterative approach based on a continual cycle of synchronization, dissemination and initiative offers the most promising way ahead.

Feb. 7, 2020

Adapting for Victory: DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century

The US’s technological advantage is now under threat. In the era of Great Power competition, the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation are approaching parity in many areas. Their stated intent is to reach full parity and then technological dominance, a situation which would be unacceptable to the US and its allies. The authors call upon the DOD and other government agencies, as well as key partners in industry and academia, to join in a new venture which would reimagine how the US conducts research in fields such as directed energy, artificial intelligence, synthetic biology and other emergent technologies.

Feb. 7, 2020

Reconceiving Modern Warfare: A Unified Model

Joint warfighting requires integrated thinking across many different capabilities, technologies and functions. This article proposes a new model of joint warfare, which brings together several existing paradigms and facilitates strategic discussion, tactical planning and operational design. First, the author presents and defines the new model, and then applies it to the Joint Planning Process. Tailored for modern technologies and emerging concepts, this unified model serves an example of enhanced thinking that goes into the development of warfighting plans and operations, and enables military strategists, planners, and operators to execute modern warfare.

Feb. 7, 2020

The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition

The changing nature of work, demographics and greater integration of national security endeavors will have a major impact on future military personnel. Only by thinking better and building an intellectual edge will military organizations have sufficient capacity to accomplish future national security objectives. Attaining this intellectual edge will require an enterprise wide approach that embraces strategic vision and engagement, and increases investment in joint professional military education. Because the global security environment has changed fundamentally, military organizations must take a more sophisticated approach to academic technology in order to create a culture of continuous learning.

Feb. 7, 2020

Executive Summary

This issue of JFQ covers many topics about the decade ahead. In our Forum section there’s an article about the Australian Army’s efforts to advance intellectual development. In JPME Today, we cover the JPME experience and the nature of war. In Commentary, authors write about climate change and great power competition. In our Features section are articles about the role of chaplains in humanitarian assistance and aerial combat during the Vietnam War. As usual, good thinking leads to good writing on many issues facing the Joint Force.

Feb. 7, 2020

Letter to the Editor

The article “Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea” by Dion Moten, Bryan Teff, Michael Pyle, Gerald Delk, and Randel Clark (JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019) is an insightful piece that brings to light many issues that the Department of the Navy has been diligently pursuing over the past 2 years. In May 2018, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of Navy Medicine’s ability to support the concepts of Distributed Maritime Operations and Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations with the underlying concept of Fleet Design. This review was not conducted solely under the auspices of medical operational requirements in a distributed maritime environment. Rather, it was developed by leveraging capabilities across surface platforms and the combat logistics force in order to enable a comprehensive approach for medical capabilities across warfighting domains.

Nov. 18, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

Nov. 18, 2019

Unmasking the Spectrum with Artificial Intelligence

This article examines the potential of artificial intelligence to improve joint electromagnetic spectrum operations along three lines of discussion. First, current doctrine and process limitations may impact a Joint Force commander’s ability to visualize and understand how Joint Forces are operating within the spectrum. Second, artificial intelligence and specific learning models can help understand how the electromagnetic spectrum connects military forces. And finally, the role of data can fuel machine learning despite the associated risks. Artificial intelligence can improve Joint Force understanding and visualization, say the authors, and help commanders make more accurate and timely decisions.

Nov. 18, 2019

Subordinating Intelligence

Long interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations have resulted in increased scrutiny of civil-military relations and the interagency intelligence community. Subordinating Intelligence analyzes the evolution of civil-military relationships with an emphasis on the post–Cold War era. This book identifies the barriers to cooperation, but also identifies the factors that made a difference where integration was achieved. Given that interagency alignment is a prerequisite for success, both military and intelligence professionals would be well served to read Oakley’s excellent book to find examples of what can go wrong, but also what can go right.

Nov. 18, 2019

Sailing True North

While the emphasis is on naval leaders, Sailing True North provides insights relevant to the entire Joint Force and beyond. This book is for anyone who wants to understand the essential questions of character and leadership under stress. The author is supremely well read, and provides an invaluable distillation over a vast span of history. This book encourages self-examination as the author challenges you, and asks you to identify your heroes and the qualities you admire. Given the author’s leadership experience at the most consequential levels of command, his scholarship on this topic is recommended reading.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Lessons of Tragedy

Colonel Joseph Collins, USA (Ret.), PhD reviews The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order by Hal Brands and Charles Edel. In this excellent book, the focus is on great power politics. And the centrality of survival and security supports this approach. However, the international order has a number of important aspects beyond interstate security politics. The issues of international political economy, trade, globalization and regional/global organizations are a big part of the story. If you can read only one book on world order, says Collins, you would do well to read Lessons of Tragedy. Aristotle would salute your prudence.

Nov. 18, 2019

Wolfe, Montcalm, and the Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign of 1759

Analysis of the 1759 French and Indian War Quebec Campaign demonstrates that Britain achieved victory because it adhered to the principles of joint operations better than the French did. This historical case study examines the commanders’ uneven application of joint operating principles given contemporary technology and the physical environment. While the British lacked formal doctrine listing the principles of joint operations, the thought process and underlying concepts of current doctrinal principles shaped their military decisions. It is important that our joint leaders can do likewise, to learn from history and use their creativity to apply joint operating principles in combat.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System: A Case Study in Defense Innovation

The Chain Home Early Warning Radar System played an important role in Great Britain’s defense during the 1940 Battle of Britain. The system’s ability to warn the Royal Air Force about incoming Luftwaffe attacks helped restore a measure of Britain’s protection from continental states, contributing to the resistance and eventual defeat of Nazi Germany. Today, creation of the Chain Home System serves as a case study in military innovation, which shows the importance of strategic planning in the acquisition process, the importance of wartime adaptation, and the need to have the right team to manage development and implementation.

Nov. 18, 2019

3D Printing for Joint Agile Operations

Additive manufacturing (AM), also known as 3D printing, can enable the production of replacement parts when and where they are needed, which is required to enable future agile operations. As such, AM development in the DOD represents a critical enabler of forward basing and denied area operations. However, creating reliable and trusted repair parts to the correct specification is challenging, especially in an austere environment. In order to overcome AM employment challenges and leverage this technology effectively and efficiently, unity of effort for development and implementation is required across the joint enterprise.

Nov. 18, 2019

Development Beyond the Joint Qualification System: An Overview

The Joint Qualification System’s narrow focus on officers working at the strategic level is insufficient to build the joint-ready force needed to meet our nation’s warfighting demands. Given that the Joint Qualification System was introduced ten years ago, it is time to assess how well the current system is meeting current needs. The Air Force is developing a talent management system to complement the Joint Qualification System. This initiative can inform similar efforts in other services to ensure that leaders are prepared for the challenges they will confront in increasingly sophisticated complex joint operations of the future.

Nov. 18, 2019

Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete, and Win: Competition Below Armed Conflict with Revisionist Powers

The current geopolitical environment is complex, dynamic and dangerous. Since the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has battled an assortment of rogue regimes and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). While these actors remain a security threat to the US and its allies, the 2018 National Defense Strategy directs the DOD to focus on long-term, strategic competition with two revisionist powers: Russia and China. The regional and global ambitions of these two nuclear powers, along with the emergent threats posed by rogue regimes and VEOs, presents the Joint Force with a unique security challenge.

Nov. 18, 2019

Attacking Fielded Forces: An Airman's Perspective from Kosovo

The ability of air forces to attack ground forces has been disputed since airplanes first strafed enemy trenches in World War I. The controversy that arose over NATO’s Battle Damage Assessment after the joint air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 is a case study in the effectiveness of air forces directly attacking ground forces. This article takes the experience of an A-10 pilot who flew numerous combat missions over Kosovo and visited his strike sites eleven years later. The author highlights lessons learned for joint military leaders on the conduct of joint air operations against conventional ground forces.

Nov. 18, 2019

Why Normandy Still Matters: Seventy-Five Years On, Operation Overlord Inspires, Instructs, and Invites Us to Be Better Joint Warfighters

Operation Overlord took place seventy-five years ago. Operation Overlord was strategically audacious and required an amazing amount of intellectual capacity and organizational acumen to have any chance of success. Today it teaches valuable lessons concerning the difficulty of planning and conducting integrated, all-domain, joint and combined forced-entry operations against a lethal enemy whose anti-access and area denial preparations were immense. Though much has changed since June 1944, this article highlights the operational approach, all-domain planning, and synchronized integration of Operation Overlord and asks if today’s Joint Force is intellectually prepared to plan such an operation.