April 1, 2014

Silent Watch: The Role of Army Air and Missile Defense

The Army’s G-3/5/7 represents Army air and missile defense (AMD) interests and understands that threats that have evolved in capability, complexity, and capacity; a defense strategy and policy that rely on an enduring deterrence capability; and an increasing need to maintain joint operational access to distant regions ensure its importance.

April 1, 2014

Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa

Washington should pass its domestic emergency response capability along to improve the governance and economics of African nations. The “National Response Platform” (NRP) and “National Response Force” (NRF) concepts will encourage a more impactful whole-of-nation approach, helping African states become contributors to stability and economic growth and maintaining U.S. leadership.

April 1, 2014

The Case for the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training Program

Redundancies in the training of junior logisticians could be eliminated without sacrificing the different ranks, tasks, and courses each Service utilizes. A cross-Service study suggests the need for a comprehensive and unified approach to training from entry level on through the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training program.

April 1, 2014

Dieppe All Over Again: The Quandaries of Combined Joint Operations

The 1942 raid on Dieppe remains enshrouded in questions yet is a treasure of information to the astute student of warfare who can penetrate the ten charges most often leveled at its failure and the overall blaming frenzy, providing insight into the Western mindset and the perpetual facts of war.

April 1, 2014

Bolívar

Any U.S. military officer or civil servant yearning to earn the sobriquet “grand strategist” must understand the ethos of the countries of Latin America. While many bodies of water are of great interest to the people of the United States and its government, the Rio Grande River is a vital interest. A worthy way to expand one’s knowledge of the states south of that long river is to read Marie Arana’s sound and solid biography Bolívar: American Liberator.

April 1, 2014

Intelligence Collection

In this companion piece to the authors’ 2010 work, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, Wayne Hall and Gary Citrenbaum have brought forth a superior forum by which to consider the challenges associated with intelligence collection in complex environments. Each author brings with him a lengthy résumé of credible service in the intelligence field. Hall is a retired U.S. Army officer with over 30 years of intelligence experience, and he has remained active within the intelligence field by participating in numerous seminars on intelligence training and intelligence transformation. Citrenbaum is actively involved in issues associated with intelligence transformation. Accordingly, both speak with authority on the issues they raise.

April 1, 2014

The Revenge of Geography

Ever since the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, international events and circumstances have led to periodic revivals of interest in the ideas and concepts of classical geopolitical theorists. As the Wehrmacht surged into the vast expanses of Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan sought to carve out a greater East Asia and Pacific empire, Western strategists and even popular media outlets such as Time magazine “discovered” the “Heartland” theory first propounded by British geographer Halford Mackinder in his 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History,” revised and expanded in his 1919 masterpiece Democratic Ideals and Reality, and further revised and updated in a 1943 Foreign Affairs article, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.”

April 1, 2014

Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness

Modern technology has vastly increased available capabilities, which are rarely controlled exclusively by any single Service or nation-state. Keeping the U.S. advantage in cross-domain synergy calls for enhanced understanding of jointness and a shift from Service centrism to holism that expands ownership of capabilities.

April 1, 2014

A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions

China’s military modernization is focused on building modern ground, naval, air, and missile forces capable of fighting and winning local wars under informationized conditions. The principal planning scenario has been a military campaign against Taiwan, which would require the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deter or defeat U.S. intervention. The PLA has sought to acquire asymmetric “assassin’s mace” technologies and systems to overcome a superior adversary and couple them to the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems necessary for swift and precise execution of short-duration, high-intensity wars.

March 1, 2014

The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power

DOWNLOAD PDFExecutive Summary Military assistance to Bosnian forces was part of a complex plan to

March 1, 2014

Targeted Killing of Terrorists

The struggle against terrorism—more specifically, the effort to prevent terrorist attacks—has raised difficult legal and policy issues including so-called targeted killing, or the killing of specific individuals because of their involvement in terrorist organizations and operations. As we shall see, this form of targeted killing involves domestic and international legal authorities and policy and prudential issues. A substantial number of countries confronting what they consider to be terrorist attacks and threats engage in targeted killings. Each has to resolve questions about authorities and prudence because, while terrorists are always criminals, they also may be lawful military targets. The dual character of terrorists leads to the conclusion that, as a matter of policy, a state should weigh the totality of the circumstances and conclude that no other action is reasonable to prevent a terrorist attack before engaging in the targeted killing. Careful analysis in advance may preempt problems later.

March 1, 2014

The Nightmare Years to Come?

We have entered a particularly dangerous era in the Near East and South Asia— that is, the Greater Middle East. The context of today’s situation is more alarming than respective current crises—as bad as they may be. Rather, there is an increasingly radicalized and violent sectarian environment made up of crosscutting crises occurring in the midst of proliferation; precision weapons; cyber war; increased ungoverned territory vulnerable to global, regional, and local jihadist exploitation; majoritarian authoritarianism; uncompromising sectarianism; ethnic, tribal, and sectarian-driven civil wars; massive popular anger and frustration over the lack of essential services and a diminishing quality of life, particularly in areas such as water, electricity, health, education, employment, and economic collapse; water wars and environmental endangerment; and the vulnerability of sensitive infrastructure targeted by state and nonstate actors, or an empowered lone wolf in the service of a state or nonstate actors.

Jan. 1, 2014

Backbone of the Armed Forces

It was December 17, 1777, and General George Washington’s Continental Army had just returned to winter quarters in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. They were exhausted and had gained minimal success in their fight against the British army. But this period in Valley Forge proved critical for the fledgling army and led General Washington to recruit former Prussian officer Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. His new title: Inspector General. His mission:strengthen the professionalism of the Continental Army.

Jan. 1, 2014

Letter

In Joint Force Quarterly 71 (4th Quarter 2013), Karen Kaya offers a number of perspectives on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) evolving missile defense project, in particular those shaping Turkey’s calculations as it works to define its role. Ms. Kaya makes a numbers of observations that merit comment.

Jan. 1, 2014

Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command-East

Biometric-enabled Intelligence (BEI) has established its value throughout Regional Command–East even though the full potential of biometrics-related collections and applications remains unknown. Importantly, the concept has gained traction at the general government level as well as locally, where Afghan National Security Forces and allies and adversaries are seeing the forensic footprints insurgents leave behind being exploited to erase insurgent anonymity, which has served as a traditional hiding place. Arrests and warrants are up, and BEI operations have impacted insurgents' ability to lead their movement and lower-level cells' ability to function. The pressure grows as coalition and Afghan forces employ biometrically developed watch lists and "be on the lookout" messages as part of focused hunts for offenders.

Jan. 1, 2014

"Gallantry and Intrepidity": Valor Decorations in Current and Past Conflicts

The Nation and its military appear to be growing less generous with decorations for valor. Seventeen Medals of Honor were awarded for the 17 days of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, while 11 have been awarded over the 11-year span of U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. No single factor accounts for the 20-fold reduction in the number of valor decorations in current operations. The most popular reasoning focuses on the changing nature of warfare and military culture, but that leaves gaps. The awards process is kept from public scrutiny, but some evidence suggests changes since Vietnam. The effects of the factors that can be isolated need further analysis to enable today's warriors to be awarded the decorations they earn.

Jan. 1, 2014

In Memoriam

Volunteering for the Army Air Corps shortly after Pearl Harbor, General Jones received his commission and pilot wings in early 1943. During the Korean War, General Jones flew more than 300 hours on combat missions against North Korea. In 1969, he served in the Republic of Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations and then as Vice Commander of the Seventh Air Force.

Jan. 1, 2014

From the Chairman

The Joint Force remains unrivaled. We deter threats, assure partners, and defeat adversaries. We are strong—and our nation is secure—because we commit to being the best led, best trained, and best equipped force as our non-negotiable imperative. You, the men and women of the Joint Force—all volunteers—are the Nation’s qualitative military edge. We are who we are because of your commitment and determination. The world is not getting any safer, but we are becoming more adaptable.

Jan. 1, 2014

Executive Summary

There was a time when “jointness” had no champions. There was a time when professional military education at the Service colleges offered little in the way of joint content. Joint military operations often revealed a lack of basic coordination, much less cooperation or cohesion. Despite examples in World War II of joint coordination in various operations, after the war, Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Chester Nimitz committed their respective Services to work together to establish a joint military education effort 40 years before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required it.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command

The military's new command system, known as mission command, requires that subordinate leaders at all levels are at once aggressive and disciplined in accomplishing the mission. Accordingly, the Chairman's "conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission type orders" calls for commensurate professional military education (PME), but the emphasis on relative autonomy has not been as pronounced as needed. Among areas where PME is found wanting is not allowing students time to think about what they are learning. Implanting civilian instructors with more experience in building in time for research and reflection, and requiring writing—an operations order a week is suggested—will help develop the critical thinking mission command demands.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College

While the war colleges each Service maintains bow to their Services' cultures, and the National War College and Eisenhower School are joint, these institutions share certain commonalities in preparing lieutenant colonels and colonels and their Navy equivalents for the next level of responsibility. Seen from the perspective of an administrator, the war colleges should aim to be "intellectual centers of excellence with a mix of the best and brightest military and civilian faculty members." Properly resourced and staffed, the schools could serve as percolators for new and even counterintuitive thinking egged on by incisive research on impactful areas, and also as launching pads for the sorts of inquiring and innovative officers needed to confront the challenges of a fast-paced age.

Jan. 1, 2014

Putting "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power" to Work: A Wargaming Perspective

Combatant commanders and their subordinates will need to act with allied forces under the umbrella of the Chairman's mission command system, meaning a commander's intent must be transparent to multinational forces. Interoperability between U.S. and UK forces, for instance, can be streamlined through resolution of cultural, doctrinal, and communication/information systems. Immediate steps include continuing exchange officer placement, combined training exercises, and standardized rules of engagement. NATO Allies and other partners can be drawn in as needed, and the Naval War College should continue to take the lead in following this Chief of Naval Operations directive.

Jan. 1, 2014

Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity

Commanders unable to decide what constitutes the enemy center of gravity may find deliverance in the Godzilla Methodology. This fabulous creature symbolizes which force must be neutralized to achieve the objective. Godzilla dispatches each force from the list of critical strengths until deletion of a particular force prevents the objective from being achieved. The methodology is simple and effective, and identification of the center of gravity allows friendly forces to proceed with dismantling resistance by removing those forces that most decisively frustrate achievement of friendly political/military objectives. Moreover, friendly centers of gravity can be identified and protected and perhaps enhanced.

Jan. 1, 2014

Improving DOD Adaptability and Capability to Survive Black Swan Events

Black swan events have no historical precedent to warn us to be prepared; yet, as seen in the 9/11 attacks, they are not entirely unforeseen and general preparation is possible even though their rarity makes it difficult to gather widespread support. Military culture is particularly inoculated against accepting that anything cannot be prepared for, or if it does catch us by surprise, that it cannot be recovered from. Yet even the military is awakening to the growing probability of such events as chemical or biological or other attacks. Low-cost and adaptive measures must not be overlooked as DOD strives to be ready to respond to a broad range of possibilities rather than keying in on anything specific.

Jan. 1, 2014

Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is reassuring to its customers and accordingly leads to competition over resources. Yet successful ISR strategy demands trust and collaboration among organizations. ISR strategy should therefore focus attention on optimal directions and create a common context that entices ISR initiatives more toward problem-solving than production. CJCS correctly asserts that clearly expressing intent is the right way to go about it. Says the author, "Intent must guide the enterprise and joint force toward achieving specific ISR objectives that support campaign goals." Intelligence and operations must be integrated to balance ends, ways, and means. Joint ISR doctrine must evolve accordingly and reflect that ISR should be led rather than managed or it will fail in battle.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Joint Stealth Task Force: An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle

Overcoming antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) requires having sensor and weapons density at range without relying on forward bases or carriers, which urges a return to Air-Sea Battle basics. What is called a joint stealth task force concept is emblematic of the new pluralism regarding platforms. Budget and research agility are needed to address such deficiencies as inadequate range capacity in the air capability, undersea payload capacity, and insufficient development of unmanned systems and hypersonic research. Networking technology is in a comparatively good position to support the concept discussed here. Warfighters need to consider, debate, wargame, and jointly test the stealthy airborne and undersea platforms and the new technologies and operational concepts needed to defeat A2/AD and achieve Air-Sea Battle objectives.

Jan. 1, 2014

Unifying Our Vision: Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR Initiative

As revealed by Unified Vision 2012, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR) must fill a number of operationally applicable needs. JISR integration requires the technical linking of data sources, operational integration, command and control, and optimal tactical employment of ISR capabilities, which cannot be done without mature doctrine, refined tactics, techniques, and procedures, and training for operators. The NATO Allies must have an accessible and dependable apparatus for finding and striking targets that are often mobile and asymmetric; and the Alliance must be able to deploy it despite reduced U.S. financial and other inputs. JISR operators must be organized, trained, and equipped to interface with all allied assets using the appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Jan. 1, 2014

Cut Defense Pork, Revive Presidential Impoundment

Congress builds unnecessary costs into the defense budget by considering employment and contract issues in congressional districts ahead of actual needs. In the face of expenditures beyond what DOD requests, the President should aggressively reenter the fray by jumpstarting the contest between "the powers of the purse versus that of impoundment." There are steps the President can take to "revive his impoundment authority" within constitutional bounds. If a legislative compromise is unobtainable, the President might select a salient example such as the 280 M1 tanks that were produced without being requested and are now candidates for cold storage. With Supreme Court and congressional support, the Commander in Chief may be able to block wasteful or strategically unsound procurement.

Jan. 1, 2014

Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China's Emerging Role

China has the technology, know-how, and capital to exploit Afghanistan's mineral resources and capitalize on its location, which could make it a transportation hub; concurrently, Beijing sees the risks of dealing with a country with corruption at all levels and with the further problems of primitive infrastructure, low education and expertise levels, potentially hostile neighbors, scarcity of water, and forbidding terrain. Afghan analysts themselves see the need to build economic and social stability as trumping other security and military needs. Meantime, U.S. and NATO forces are spending trillions to prepare Afghanistan for China and other countries to reap the benefits. This outcome, while controversial, may be the easiest way for Kabul to rise above its disorder and poverty.

Jan. 1, 2014

Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic

The Arctic's resources and transportation possibilities are drawing increased activity from many nations, and Washington should act at once to bolster what the Coast Guard can do. The lead agency will be the Department of Homeland Security with the Coast Guard as its operational arm, ideally with adequate funding and a seasonal search-and-rescue base at Barrow, Alaska, and at least two new icebreakers to maintain an Arctic presence, protect safety interests from cruise ships and other activities, and respond to environmental calamities.

Jan. 1, 2014

Forging a 21st Century Military Strategy: Leveraging Challenges

Exercises are helping determine optimal military capabilities for the future. The Bold Alligator series saw the Navy–Marine Corps team leading a joint and coalition attempt to shape a flexible insertion force and identify the kind of command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources that will be most helpful going forward. The exercise revealed the importance of the ability of coalition forces to "craft greater capability to transfer the deconfliction of air tasks to integrated data systems." Deconflicting strike and air assets/tasks will call for greater coordination and automation and determining the appropriate nuclear tip. Finding the right policy agenda requires understanding the interactive nature of warfare and anticipating tomorrow's needs rather than relying on outmoded technologies.

Jan. 1, 2014

Learning and Adapting: Billy Mitchell in World War I

Aviation guru Billy Mitchell could have seen any number of reversals as dismal failures, but each setback seemed to place him at the right place and time. Apparent demotions were actually opportunities to step back to think, write, and learn. Accordingly, when the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was swinging into action, even his long-time rival Benjamin Foulois admitted Mitchell was the best candidate to command the AEF's final operations. Mitchell frequently did not see advantages in the making as he was clubbed into less prestigious assignments; yet he persisted, and however mean his assignments were, he processed his experience by writing and analyzing them daily, enabling him to develop an aerial expertise far in advance of his American peers.

Jan. 1, 2014

Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts

The book is best read by political science, international relations, international political economic, and security studies scholars. It may also be of interest to military historians, foreign policy designers, and those generally interested in why and how states get involved in the armed conflicts of others.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice

On November 4, 2008, Paula Loyd, a social scientist with a relatively new U.S. Army program, the Human Terrain System (HTS) and its deployed Human Terrain Teams, was on task in Maiwand, Afghanistan. Deployed to study the sociocultural nuances of the Afghan people and help commanders better understand the host population, this day would lead to Loyd’s death. The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice, by journalist and Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism Professor Vanessa M. Gezari, is a well-researched and deeply personal narrative of the events of that day and the controversies surrounding the program that deployed Loyd into the field.

Jan. 1, 2014

Security Cooperation: How It All Fits

Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation, will most likely deal with the terms and programs supporting U.S. foreign policy and how they relate. The anticipated updating of JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, should be synchronized with it and present expanded discussion of U.S. combat operations to include major counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in support of host countries. Joint Doctrine Note 1-13,Security Force Assistance, will also help provide commanders a doctrinal foundation for identifying tools and resources to assist other militaries. Language redundancies and confusing definitions should not be allowed to impede military ventures—hence the need for doctrine as the fundamental principles guiding force employment toward common objectives. Future joint doctrine must explain the relationship of security cooperation terms.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Flawed Strategic Debate on Syria

Dating from Bashar al-Asad’s first suppression of mass demonstrations in April 2011, the war in Syria is now 3 years old, has killed more than 130,000 Syrians, and displaced nine million Syrians, two million as refugees into neighboring countries. Foreign intervention has increasingly shaped the course of the fighting and will continue to have substantial regional consequences. The complexity of this bitter, nominally internal struggle has dampened American enthusiasm for joining the fray or even paying much attention to Syria, notwithstanding the chemical weapon attacks on Gouta, east of Damascus, last August, which captured the attention of the American people, media, and policy community. With an international taboo broken and a Presidential redline crossed, public debate spiked in August–September 2013 over U.S. interests in Syria and the limits on what we will do to secure them. Debate did not result in a consensus for action.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Defense Acquisition Trilemma: The Case of Brazil

Brazil is a puzzling new player in the global system. Emerging as a complex international actor, it has come to be seen as a significant economic competitor and dynamic force in world politics. But transformational changes in the economic and political realms have not been accompanied by advances in military power. While Brazil has entered the world stage as an agile soft power exercising influence in setting global agendas and earning a seat at the economic table of policymakers, its military capacity lags. The national security strategy announced under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2008 intended to redress this power gap. President Dilma Rousseff ’s 2011 White Paper—so detailed that it is called a “White Book”—provides the conceptual roadmap to achieve a new military balance. But military modernization is still a work in progress.

Dec. 1, 2013

The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces

A first of its kind, this book—of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer—is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services’ NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, “We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit—they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms.”

Dec. 1, 2013

Next Steps in Syria

Nearly 3 years since the start of the Syrian civil war, no clear winner is in sight. Assassinations and defections of civilian and military loyalists close to President Bashar al-Asad, rebel success in parts of Aleppo and other key towns, and the spread of violence to Damascus itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, especially airpower and missiles, and help from Iran and Hizballah.

Nov. 1, 2013

Crisis Stability and Nuclear Exchange Risks on the Subcontinent: Major Trends and the Iran Factor

Crisis stability—the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan—is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India’s vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan’s tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan’s post- 2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange. America’s limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014.

Oct. 28, 2013

Strategic Shift: Appraising Recent Changes in U.S. Defense Plans and Priorities

This paper examines major changes in U.S. defense plans and priorities that the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued through high level strategy and other guidance documents during 2012 and the beginning of 2013. It recommends that DOD “double down” in its pursuit of globally integrated operations through joint force integration in the context of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and the cross-domain synergy needed to operate effectively in the face of sophisticated adversaries.

Sept. 1, 2013

DTP-103: Critical Technology Events (CTEs) that Support the Rationale for Army Laboratories Based on Science and Technology Functions Performed

This report, part of the “Project Hindsight Revisited” series of DTP publications, provides a retrospective look at 58 Critical Technology Events (CTEs) in DoD R&D investment, logically divided across 10 separate categories. The authors demonstrate the continuing relevance of Army laboratories in the development of critical weapons systems. Using specific examples, the study articulates the importance of maintaining quality staff and managers, ensuring the relevance of S&T program investments, and integrating servicemen and women with the larger scientific community to forecast technology trends.

Sept. 1, 2013

DTP-104: External Collaboration in Army Science and Technology: The Army’s Research Alliances

In this study, the authors examine the decision for Army Research Laboratories to engage in external, formal collaborations such as collaborative alliances. They go on to assess ARL Collaborative Technology Alliances (CTAs), Collaborative Research Alliances (CRAs), and Information Technology Alliance (ITAs). The report concludes by examining the effectiveness of the examples given above, and a recommendation for formulating a set of assessment questions for Army managers considering collaboration in the future.

Sept. 1, 2013

Transitional Justice for Syria

Transitional justice is the provision of justice in the transition from one form of government, often perceived as illegitimate, unjust, and tyrannical, or an anarchic society, to one that observes the rule of law and administers justice. It also is about choices: how to allocate scarce prosecutorial, judicial, police, and prison resources. The goal is to make the rule of law ordinary.

Aug. 30, 2013

DTP-102: “Chance favors only the prepared mind:” The Proper Role for U.S. Department of Defense Science and Engineering Workforce

This publication provides critical recommendations for managing the DoD’s 130,000 person Science and Technology workforce through a period of growing fiscal and geopolitical ambiguity. The report outlines a strategy that: prioritizes lessons learned through hands-on experience; cultivates practices that identify and support the most promising trends in technology and research; promotes advocacy for worthy programs, and; develops a process for ensuring competent “third parties” determine a fair price for acquisition and development. It concludes by urging the DoD return to a prudently managed, conservative S&T strategy that emphasizes workforce recruitment and training, adequate funding for research and development, and increased engagement with colleges and universities.

Aug. 1, 2013

The Future Can’t Wait

In Spring of 2011 USAID’s Science and Technology Office and NDU agreed to co-host a symposium on future development challenges. USAID and NDU agreed to collaborate on a follow-up publication to the symposium.

Aug. 1, 2013

The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security

Upon taking office in January 2009, Obama administration officials proclaimed a U.S. “return to Asia.” This pronouncement was backed with more frequent travel to the region by senior officials (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first trip was to Asia) and increased U.S. participation in regional multilateral meetings, culminating in the decision to sign the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and to participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS) at the head-of-state level. The strategic “rebalance to Asia” announced in November 2011 builds on these earlier actions to deepen and institutionalize U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

July 1, 2013

Valued Sustainable Services: Building Partnership Capacity Through Collaborating Approaches

The Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of local populations. It emphasizes the interdependency among telecommunications, reliable power, and information-sharing support, and encourages projects to be developed in integrated packages rather than in stove-piped lines of effort. ValSServ focuses on bottom-up projects in complex civil-military operations that can be funded, planned, and executed at local levels, while being consistent with top-down national and theater strategies. It takes a system-of-systems approach, recognizing that successful projects can generate positive ripple effects in local environments and throughout extended networks. This paper focuses on ValSServ within the wide range of U.S. Department of Defense operating environments, such as capacity-building to help shape peacetime conditions in partner nations, post-disaster recovery, and helping to move from the “hold” to the “build” phases in counterinsurgency operations.

July 1, 2013

Sharing to Succeed: Lessons from Open Information-sharing Projects in Afghanistan

The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations is important, yet actors rarely do it well. U.S. and allied military forces must be able to communicate, collaborate, and exchange information effectively with the local populations they seek to influence, or they cannot achieve the goals for which they have been committed. Nonetheless, experience from stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions, and efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners suggest that effective information-sharing is much harder than might be expected. This paper sheds light on the difficulties of setting up and sustaining projects to share information in such situations and suggests ways to do better in the future.

July 1, 2013

Valued Sustainable Services: Building Partnership Capacity Through Collaborating Approaches

The Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of local populations. It emphasizes the interdependency among telecommunications, reliable power, and information-sharing support, and encourages projects to be developed in integrated packages rather than in stovepiped lines of effort. ValSServ focuses on bottom-up projects in complex civil-military operations2 that can be funded, planned, and executed at local levels, while being consistent with top-down national and theater strategies. It takes a system-of-systems approach, recognizing that successful projects can generate positive ripple effects in local environments and throughout extended networks. This paper focuses on ValSServ within the wide range of U.S. Department of Defense operating environments, such as capacity-building to help shape peacetime conditions in partner nations, post-disaster recovery, and helping to move from the “hold” to the “build” phases in counterinsurgency operations.