May 1, 2014

Strategy and Force Planning in a Time of Austerity

On February 13, 1989, General Colin Powell, who was in a transition between National Security Advisor and Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, addressed the reality of strategy: “All of the sophisticated talk about grand strategy is helpful, but show me your budgets and I will tell you what your strategy is.” What General Powell meant is that the definition of the U.S. role in the world and its strategic goals flow from budgets, not the other way around. This paper fleshes out General Powell’s observation by focusing on the means part of the ends, ways, and means of strategy in order to explain how austerity affects force planning and strategy. By first examining budget reductions as a general matter, the paper describes today’s austere U.S. budgetary environment. It concludes with the current strategic options that will likely characterize the contemporary discussion of strategy and force planning.

April 1, 2014

Letter

I write in response to Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook’s article “From National to Theater: Developing Strategy” that appeared in Joint Force Quarterly 70 (3rd Quarter 2013). I agree wholeheartedly with the authors on their position that only “vital” national interests are worth dying for. However, I caution against accepting their idea that national interests that are (merely) “important” are necessarily worth killing for.

April 1, 2014

Ike Skelton, 1931-2013: Champion of Military Education

Education is persistently undervalued in most military institutions. This lack of attention is based on two realities of military life: education engenders the habit of questioning, while sound discipline, particularly in combat, requires unhesitating obedience; furthermore, education requires reflection, but war demands action. Thus, the military Services tend to draw broad lines of demarcation between their thinkers and their fighters.

April 1, 2014

From the Chairman

Representing Servicemembers who make up today’s Joint Force is my greatest honor as Chairman. As the principal military advisor to the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, I work to develop a shared understanding of our capabilities and the Nation’s needs in order to provide sound advice and to represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To be effective, I must build relationships of trust with those elected to make decisions about the use of military force. But I did not begin to establish relationships with civilian leaders only when I became Chairman.

April 1, 2014

Are We Really Ever Off Duty?

As we in the U.S. military continue to renew our commitment to the Profession of Arms, the title of this article asks a compelling question for everyone who wears the cloth of the Nation. While I believe the question has an easy answer, let us not downplay the significance of asking it at every level of professional development. Most serving in the Armed Forces understand the deeper meaning of the question, as well as the commitment to the profession and the American people that goes along with it. Therefore, most military professionals would provide the short answer: “No, we are never really off duty.”

April 1, 2014

The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations

Cyberspace can be leveraged by first, finding a theory to express and teach the constantly changing vagaries of that domain, including a suitable lexicon, and second, overcoming assorted turf wars and adequately resourcing the study, manning, equipping, and training of the cyberspace force so it can integrate with other domains.

April 1, 2014

Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace: Revolution or Evolution?

Cyberspace considerations are irreversibly proliferating, and five core ideas will help commanders fight a perpetual cyberwar: education and training, a clear chain of custody, explicit processes and procedures and guidance, advanced methods of controlling access to networks and information, and a formal cyberspace mishap investigation process throughout the Defense Department.

April 1, 2014

Combined Effects Power

The Combined Effects Power (CEP) construct does not eliminate the combined arms warfare (CAW) concept, but CEP seeks to overcome CAW’s anomalies by accommodating the behavior of both cyber domain and soft power participants from the natural domains to offset the dangers springing from the information revolution.

April 1, 2014

Information-Sharing with the Private Sector

The Obama administration’s Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21 are a beginning, but establishing public-private information sharing requires matching cyber security legislation to fill in the gaps found in the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, address a multitude of contentious issues, and achieve a unified cyberspace focus.

April 1, 2014

Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy: Reconciling Military Roles

The military’s ability to shape the security environment can be substantially improved by adopting multiple simultaneous stimulants, most prominently the national security strategy shift from deterrence and containment to cooperation and engagement. These capabilities must be sufficiently resourced so Washington’s interests can be pursued short of armed conflict where possible.

April 1, 2014

Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach

Joint doctrine, where it inadequately addresses incorporating Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) organizations into the military planning process, must be revised to give JIIM engagement its due. Moreover, greater cross-organizational exposure among partners should increase understanding and trust and get partners more fully synchronized in both planning and execution.

April 1, 2014

Airpower and Globalization Effects: Rethinking the Five Rings

The Five Rings theory may not provide quick wins against large countries with modern air defense systems, but an escalatory strategic interdiction strategy relying on capable air and navel forces to affect the most critical and vulnerable elements would apply to many crises with its nonlethal and reversible options.

April 1, 2014

Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War cuts both ways. Its tenets work against enemies but can also strike against China. Using the general’s maxims, we can uncover inconsistencies in the grandly moral stance assumed by Chinese leaders. For instance, claims made for public consumption can be juxtaposed with demonstrable fact.

April 1, 2014

Geography Matters in Maintaining Global Mobility

Geography impacts global mobility, and USTRANSCOM works with the components, the Defense Logistics Agency, and commercial partners to overcome vast distances and to subdue the burdens of time and cost. Crises evolve rapidly and the United States must maintain its unique ability to project power anywhere, any time.

April 1, 2014

Reflections on Operation Unified Protector

Committed people accounted for the success of Operation Unified Protector in Libya. NATO and partner participants in the air-heavy campaign arrived in haste and had to find fast solutions to endless challenges and shifting capabilities requirements. Skillful leadership enabled unity to survive as the center of gravity.

April 1, 2014

Silent Watch: The Role of Army Air and Missile Defense

The Army’s G-3/5/7 represents Army air and missile defense (AMD) interests and understands that threats that have evolved in capability, complexity, and capacity; a defense strategy and policy that rely on an enduring deterrence capability; and an increasing need to maintain joint operational access to distant regions ensure its importance.

April 1, 2014

Leveraging U.S. Civilian Capabilities in Africa

Washington should pass its domestic emergency response capability along to improve the governance and economics of African nations. The “National Response Platform” (NRP) and “National Response Force” (NRF) concepts will encourage a more impactful whole-of-nation approach, helping African states become contributors to stability and economic growth and maintaining U.S. leadership.

April 1, 2014

The Case for the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training Program

Redundancies in the training of junior logisticians could be eliminated without sacrificing the different ranks, tasks, and courses each Service utilizes. A cross-Service study suggests the need for a comprehensive and unified approach to training from entry level on through the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training program.

April 1, 2014

Dieppe All Over Again: The Quandaries of Combined Joint Operations

The 1942 raid on Dieppe remains enshrouded in questions yet is a treasure of information to the astute student of warfare who can penetrate the ten charges most often leveled at its failure and the overall blaming frenzy, providing insight into the Western mindset and the perpetual facts of war.

April 1, 2014

Bolívar

Any U.S. military officer or civil servant yearning to earn the sobriquet “grand strategist” must understand the ethos of the countries of Latin America. While many bodies of water are of great interest to the people of the United States and its government, the Rio Grande River is a vital interest. A worthy way to expand one’s knowledge of the states south of that long river is to read Marie Arana’s sound and solid biography Bolívar: American Liberator.

April 1, 2014

Intelligence Collection

In this companion piece to the authors’ 2010 work, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, Wayne Hall and Gary Citrenbaum have brought forth a superior forum by which to consider the challenges associated with intelligence collection in complex environments. Each author brings with him a lengthy résumé of credible service in the intelligence field. Hall is a retired U.S. Army officer with over 30 years of intelligence experience, and he has remained active within the intelligence field by participating in numerous seminars on intelligence training and intelligence transformation. Citrenbaum is actively involved in issues associated with intelligence transformation. Accordingly, both speak with authority on the issues they raise.

April 1, 2014

The Revenge of Geography

Ever since the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, international events and circumstances have led to periodic revivals of interest in the ideas and concepts of classical geopolitical theorists. As the Wehrmacht surged into the vast expanses of Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan sought to carve out a greater East Asia and Pacific empire, Western strategists and even popular media outlets such as Time magazine “discovered” the “Heartland” theory first propounded by British geographer Halford Mackinder in his 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History,” revised and expanded in his 1919 masterpiece Democratic Ideals and Reality, and further revised and updated in a 1943 Foreign Affairs article, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.”

April 1, 2014

Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness

Modern technology has vastly increased available capabilities, which are rarely controlled exclusively by any single Service or nation-state. Keeping the U.S. advantage in cross-domain synergy calls for enhanced understanding of jointness and a shift from Service centrism to holism that expands ownership of capabilities.

April 1, 2014

A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions

China’s military modernization is focused on building modern ground, naval, air, and missile forces capable of fighting and winning local wars under informationized conditions. The principal planning scenario has been a military campaign against Taiwan, which would require the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deter or defeat U.S. intervention. The PLA has sought to acquire asymmetric “assassin’s mace” technologies and systems to overcome a superior adversary and couple them to the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems necessary for swift and precise execution of short-duration, high-intensity wars.

March 1, 2014

The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power

DOWNLOAD PDFExecutive Summary Military assistance to Bosnian forces was part of a complex plan to

March 1, 2014

Targeted Killing of Terrorists

The struggle against terrorism—more specifically, the effort to prevent terrorist attacks—has raised difficult legal and policy issues including so-called targeted killing, or the killing of specific individuals because of their involvement in terrorist organizations and operations. As we shall see, this form of targeted killing involves domestic and international legal authorities and policy and prudential issues. A substantial number of countries confronting what they consider to be terrorist attacks and threats engage in targeted killings. Each has to resolve questions about authorities and prudence because, while terrorists are always criminals, they also may be lawful military targets. The dual character of terrorists leads to the conclusion that, as a matter of policy, a state should weigh the totality of the circumstances and conclude that no other action is reasonable to prevent a terrorist attack before engaging in the targeted killing. Careful analysis in advance may preempt problems later.

March 1, 2014

The Nightmare Years to Come?

We have entered a particularly dangerous era in the Near East and South Asia— that is, the Greater Middle East. The context of today’s situation is more alarming than respective current crises—as bad as they may be. Rather, there is an increasingly radicalized and violent sectarian environment made up of crosscutting crises occurring in the midst of proliferation; precision weapons; cyber war; increased ungoverned territory vulnerable to global, regional, and local jihadist exploitation; majoritarian authoritarianism; uncompromising sectarianism; ethnic, tribal, and sectarian-driven civil wars; massive popular anger and frustration over the lack of essential services and a diminishing quality of life, particularly in areas such as water, electricity, health, education, employment, and economic collapse; water wars and environmental endangerment; and the vulnerability of sensitive infrastructure targeted by state and nonstate actors, or an empowered lone wolf in the service of a state or nonstate actors.

Jan. 1, 2014

Backbone of the Armed Forces

It was December 17, 1777, and General George Washington’s Continental Army had just returned to winter quarters in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. They were exhausted and had gained minimal success in their fight against the British army. But this period in Valley Forge proved critical for the fledgling army and led General Washington to recruit former Prussian officer Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. His new title: Inspector General. His mission:strengthen the professionalism of the Continental Army.

Jan. 1, 2014

Letter

In Joint Force Quarterly 71 (4th Quarter 2013), Karen Kaya offers a number of perspectives on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) evolving missile defense project, in particular those shaping Turkey’s calculations as it works to define its role. Ms. Kaya makes a numbers of observations that merit comment.

Jan. 1, 2014

Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command-East

Biometric-enabled Intelligence (BEI) has established its value throughout Regional Command–East even though the full potential of biometrics-related collections and applications remains unknown. Importantly, the concept has gained traction at the general government level as well as locally, where Afghan National Security Forces and allies and adversaries are seeing the forensic footprints insurgents leave behind being exploited to erase insurgent anonymity, which has served as a traditional hiding place. Arrests and warrants are up, and BEI operations have impacted insurgents' ability to lead their movement and lower-level cells' ability to function. The pressure grows as coalition and Afghan forces employ biometrically developed watch lists and "be on the lookout" messages as part of focused hunts for offenders.

Jan. 1, 2014

"Gallantry and Intrepidity": Valor Decorations in Current and Past Conflicts

The Nation and its military appear to be growing less generous with decorations for valor. Seventeen Medals of Honor were awarded for the 17 days of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, while 11 have been awarded over the 11-year span of U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. No single factor accounts for the 20-fold reduction in the number of valor decorations in current operations. The most popular reasoning focuses on the changing nature of warfare and military culture, but that leaves gaps. The awards process is kept from public scrutiny, but some evidence suggests changes since Vietnam. The effects of the factors that can be isolated need further analysis to enable today's warriors to be awarded the decorations they earn.

Jan. 1, 2014

In Memoriam

Volunteering for the Army Air Corps shortly after Pearl Harbor, General Jones received his commission and pilot wings in early 1943. During the Korean War, General Jones flew more than 300 hours on combat missions against North Korea. In 1969, he served in the Republic of Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations and then as Vice Commander of the Seventh Air Force.

Jan. 1, 2014

From the Chairman

The Joint Force remains unrivaled. We deter threats, assure partners, and defeat adversaries. We are strong—and our nation is secure—because we commit to being the best led, best trained, and best equipped force as our non-negotiable imperative. You, the men and women of the Joint Force—all volunteers—are the Nation’s qualitative military edge. We are who we are because of your commitment and determination. The world is not getting any safer, but we are becoming more adaptable.

Jan. 1, 2014

Executive Summary

There was a time when “jointness” had no champions. There was a time when professional military education at the Service colleges offered little in the way of joint content. Joint military operations often revealed a lack of basic coordination, much less cooperation or cohesion. Despite examples in World War II of joint coordination in various operations, after the war, Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Chester Nimitz committed their respective Services to work together to establish a joint military education effort 40 years before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required it.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command

The military's new command system, known as mission command, requires that subordinate leaders at all levels are at once aggressive and disciplined in accomplishing the mission. Accordingly, the Chairman's "conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission type orders" calls for commensurate professional military education (PME), but the emphasis on relative autonomy has not been as pronounced as needed. Among areas where PME is found wanting is not allowing students time to think about what they are learning. Implanting civilian instructors with more experience in building in time for research and reflection, and requiring writing—an operations order a week is suggested—will help develop the critical thinking mission command demands.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College

While the war colleges each Service maintains bow to their Services' cultures, and the National War College and Eisenhower School are joint, these institutions share certain commonalities in preparing lieutenant colonels and colonels and their Navy equivalents for the next level of responsibility. Seen from the perspective of an administrator, the war colleges should aim to be "intellectual centers of excellence with a mix of the best and brightest military and civilian faculty members." Properly resourced and staffed, the schools could serve as percolators for new and even counterintuitive thinking egged on by incisive research on impactful areas, and also as launching pads for the sorts of inquiring and innovative officers needed to confront the challenges of a fast-paced age.

Jan. 1, 2014

Putting "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power" to Work: A Wargaming Perspective

Combatant commanders and their subordinates will need to act with allied forces under the umbrella of the Chairman's mission command system, meaning a commander's intent must be transparent to multinational forces. Interoperability between U.S. and UK forces, for instance, can be streamlined through resolution of cultural, doctrinal, and communication/information systems. Immediate steps include continuing exchange officer placement, combined training exercises, and standardized rules of engagement. NATO Allies and other partners can be drawn in as needed, and the Naval War College should continue to take the lead in following this Chief of Naval Operations directive.

Jan. 1, 2014

Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity

Commanders unable to decide what constitutes the enemy center of gravity may find deliverance in the Godzilla Methodology. This fabulous creature symbolizes which force must be neutralized to achieve the objective. Godzilla dispatches each force from the list of critical strengths until deletion of a particular force prevents the objective from being achieved. The methodology is simple and effective, and identification of the center of gravity allows friendly forces to proceed with dismantling resistance by removing those forces that most decisively frustrate achievement of friendly political/military objectives. Moreover, friendly centers of gravity can be identified and protected and perhaps enhanced.

Jan. 1, 2014

Improving DOD Adaptability and Capability to Survive Black Swan Events

Black swan events have no historical precedent to warn us to be prepared; yet, as seen in the 9/11 attacks, they are not entirely unforeseen and general preparation is possible even though their rarity makes it difficult to gather widespread support. Military culture is particularly inoculated against accepting that anything cannot be prepared for, or if it does catch us by surprise, that it cannot be recovered from. Yet even the military is awakening to the growing probability of such events as chemical or biological or other attacks. Low-cost and adaptive measures must not be overlooked as DOD strives to be ready to respond to a broad range of possibilities rather than keying in on anything specific.

Jan. 1, 2014

Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is reassuring to its customers and accordingly leads to competition over resources. Yet successful ISR strategy demands trust and collaboration among organizations. ISR strategy should therefore focus attention on optimal directions and create a common context that entices ISR initiatives more toward problem-solving than production. CJCS correctly asserts that clearly expressing intent is the right way to go about it. Says the author, "Intent must guide the enterprise and joint force toward achieving specific ISR objectives that support campaign goals." Intelligence and operations must be integrated to balance ends, ways, and means. Joint ISR doctrine must evolve accordingly and reflect that ISR should be led rather than managed or it will fail in battle.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Joint Stealth Task Force: An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle

Overcoming antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) requires having sensor and weapons density at range without relying on forward bases or carriers, which urges a return to Air-Sea Battle basics. What is called a joint stealth task force concept is emblematic of the new pluralism regarding platforms. Budget and research agility are needed to address such deficiencies as inadequate range capacity in the air capability, undersea payload capacity, and insufficient development of unmanned systems and hypersonic research. Networking technology is in a comparatively good position to support the concept discussed here. Warfighters need to consider, debate, wargame, and jointly test the stealthy airborne and undersea platforms and the new technologies and operational concepts needed to defeat A2/AD and achieve Air-Sea Battle objectives.

Jan. 1, 2014

Unifying Our Vision: Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR Initiative

As revealed by Unified Vision 2012, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR) must fill a number of operationally applicable needs. JISR integration requires the technical linking of data sources, operational integration, command and control, and optimal tactical employment of ISR capabilities, which cannot be done without mature doctrine, refined tactics, techniques, and procedures, and training for operators. The NATO Allies must have an accessible and dependable apparatus for finding and striking targets that are often mobile and asymmetric; and the Alliance must be able to deploy it despite reduced U.S. financial and other inputs. JISR operators must be organized, trained, and equipped to interface with all allied assets using the appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Jan. 1, 2014

Cut Defense Pork, Revive Presidential Impoundment

Congress builds unnecessary costs into the defense budget by considering employment and contract issues in congressional districts ahead of actual needs. In the face of expenditures beyond what DOD requests, the President should aggressively reenter the fray by jumpstarting the contest between "the powers of the purse versus that of impoundment." There are steps the President can take to "revive his impoundment authority" within constitutional bounds. If a legislative compromise is unobtainable, the President might select a salient example such as the 280 M1 tanks that were produced without being requested and are now candidates for cold storage. With Supreme Court and congressional support, the Commander in Chief may be able to block wasteful or strategically unsound procurement.

Jan. 1, 2014

Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China's Emerging Role

China has the technology, know-how, and capital to exploit Afghanistan's mineral resources and capitalize on its location, which could make it a transportation hub; concurrently, Beijing sees the risks of dealing with a country with corruption at all levels and with the further problems of primitive infrastructure, low education and expertise levels, potentially hostile neighbors, scarcity of water, and forbidding terrain. Afghan analysts themselves see the need to build economic and social stability as trumping other security and military needs. Meantime, U.S. and NATO forces are spending trillions to prepare Afghanistan for China and other countries to reap the benefits. This outcome, while controversial, may be the easiest way for Kabul to rise above its disorder and poverty.

Jan. 1, 2014

Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic

The Arctic's resources and transportation possibilities are drawing increased activity from many nations, and Washington should act at once to bolster what the Coast Guard can do. The lead agency will be the Department of Homeland Security with the Coast Guard as its operational arm, ideally with adequate funding and a seasonal search-and-rescue base at Barrow, Alaska, and at least two new icebreakers to maintain an Arctic presence, protect safety interests from cruise ships and other activities, and respond to environmental calamities.

Jan. 1, 2014

Forging a 21st Century Military Strategy: Leveraging Challenges

Exercises are helping determine optimal military capabilities for the future. The Bold Alligator series saw the Navy–Marine Corps team leading a joint and coalition attempt to shape a flexible insertion force and identify the kind of command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources that will be most helpful going forward. The exercise revealed the importance of the ability of coalition forces to "craft greater capability to transfer the deconfliction of air tasks to integrated data systems." Deconflicting strike and air assets/tasks will call for greater coordination and automation and determining the appropriate nuclear tip. Finding the right policy agenda requires understanding the interactive nature of warfare and anticipating tomorrow's needs rather than relying on outmoded technologies.

Jan. 1, 2014

Learning and Adapting: Billy Mitchell in World War I

Aviation guru Billy Mitchell could have seen any number of reversals as dismal failures, but each setback seemed to place him at the right place and time. Apparent demotions were actually opportunities to step back to think, write, and learn. Accordingly, when the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was swinging into action, even his long-time rival Benjamin Foulois admitted Mitchell was the best candidate to command the AEF's final operations. Mitchell frequently did not see advantages in the making as he was clubbed into less prestigious assignments; yet he persisted, and however mean his assignments were, he processed his experience by writing and analyzing them daily, enabling him to develop an aerial expertise far in advance of his American peers.

Jan. 1, 2014

Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts

The book is best read by political science, international relations, international political economic, and security studies scholars. It may also be of interest to military historians, foreign policy designers, and those generally interested in why and how states get involved in the armed conflicts of others.

Jan. 1, 2014

The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice

On November 4, 2008, Paula Loyd, a social scientist with a relatively new U.S. Army program, the Human Terrain System (HTS) and its deployed Human Terrain Teams, was on task in Maiwand, Afghanistan. Deployed to study the sociocultural nuances of the Afghan people and help commanders better understand the host population, this day would lead to Loyd’s death. The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice, by journalist and Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism Professor Vanessa M. Gezari, is a well-researched and deeply personal narrative of the events of that day and the controversies surrounding the program that deployed Loyd into the field.

Jan. 1, 2014

Security Cooperation: How It All Fits

Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation, will most likely deal with the terms and programs supporting U.S. foreign policy and how they relate. The anticipated updating of JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, should be synchronized with it and present expanded discussion of U.S. combat operations to include major counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in support of host countries. Joint Doctrine Note 1-13,Security Force Assistance, will also help provide commanders a doctrinal foundation for identifying tools and resources to assist other militaries. Language redundancies and confusing definitions should not be allowed to impede military ventures—hence the need for doctrine as the fundamental principles guiding force employment toward common objectives. Future joint doctrine must explain the relationship of security cooperation terms.