Nov. 18, 2021

The Pentagon’s First Financial War

This article discusses China’s strategy for achieving its global ambitions and how it is driven as much by bankers and bribes as bombs and bullets. It looks into how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to take every step imaginable to appropriate dual-use technologies—those with both civil and military applications—from the United States and its allies, while attracting billions of dollars in Western capital used to finance a modernization program for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Nov. 18, 2021

China’s “New Generation” AI-Brain Project

China is pursuing what its leaders call a “first-mover advantage” in artificial intelligence (AI), facilitated by a state-backed plan to achieve breakthroughs by modeling human cognition. While not unique to China, the research warrants concern since it raises the bar on AI safety, leverages ongoing U.S. research, and exposes U.S. deficiencies in tracking foreign technological threats. The article begins with a review of the statutory basis for China’s AI-brain program, examines related scholarship, and analyzes the supporting science.

Nov. 18, 2021

The Origins of Russian Conduct

What are the origins of Russian conduct? Has Russian domestic and foreign policy predominantly been the result of misguided U.S. and European actions? Would the Kremlin have behaved differently if these policies had been more accommodating to Russia as a separate but equal partner in European integration?

Nov. 4, 2021

Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose

Taiwan’s defense approach has long relied on purchases of U.S. equipment and attempts to emulate U.S. doctrine. The U.S. military, however, has focused on projecting power to fight smaller adversaries around the world, while Taiwan faces the prospect of defending its homeland from China’s increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Oct. 20, 2021

Future Directions for Great Power Nuclear Arms Control: Policy Options and National Security Implications

With New START expiring in 2026, this Occasional Paper by 2020 National Defense University-U.S. Strategic Command Scholar Lt T. Justin Bronder, USAF, provides an assessment of several possible nuclear arms control/risk reduction approaches for the United States to consider. The author evaluates each approach for its possible impact on U.S.-Russia strategic stability, extended deterrence, budget costs, and other key factors, and recommends that in the near-term the United States engage other major nuclear powers in talks on new risk reduction and confidence-building measures.

Oct. 19, 2021

Joint Force Quarterly 103 (4th Quarter, October 2021)

This issue of Joint Force Quarterly includes the winning essays from our annual Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions, along with features from a number of seasoned national security professionals. We hope you'll let us know which articles resonate with you.

Oct. 19, 2021

The PRC’s Changing Strategic Priorities in Latin America: From Soft Power to Sharp Power Competition

The willingness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to give billions of dollars in loans across Latin America created the perception that the PRC is spending unlimited resources to woo allies in a region where the United States historically carries significant influence. Currently, the PRC is heightening this perception by delivering millions of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America, buttressed by a robust media operation to shape the information environment. Far less visible are the PRC’s concerted regional efforts to reshape commercial supply chain architecture, cyber and telecommunications systems, and markets to depend on Chinese technologies, standards, and hardware for the PRC’s long-term benefit and America’s loss.

Oct. 14, 2021

Purpose-Built Antiarmor Teams: An Imperative for the Marine Corps Ground Combat Element

The Marine Corps has an “institutional misunderstanding of armor” that leaves its Ground Combat Element (GCE) ill-equipped to defeat the armored platforms that our peer adversaries employ. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has no active antiarmor doctrine and likewise lacks a purpose-built, ground-based antiarmor capability. The Marine Corps must establish modern antiarmor doctrine and restructure the training and equipping of Combined Anti-Armor Teams (CAATs) across the GCE to remain globally competitive across the full spectrum of conflict.

Oct. 14, 2021

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Publications (JPs) under revision and signed within the past six months.

Oct. 14, 2021

Read the Manual: Reversing the Trends of Failure in NATO Humanitarian Interventions with Airpower

Alliance leaders should more heavily weigh insights from their own military doctrine when deliberating if and how to embark on another humanitarian intervention using airpower without a conventional ground force. At a minimum, such consideration should give NATO leaders a better sense of what is realistically possible with airpower. With this better sense, they should be able to make more effective decisions on, if, and how to use the military instrument to achieve humanitarian objectives if airpower is the most robust military means available to them.