Sept. 1, 2015

Annex B | Afghanistan Timeline

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Sept. 1, 2015

Annex C | Iraq Timeline

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Sept. 1, 2015

Contributors

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Aug. 1, 2015

An Empirical Analysis of Claimant Tactics in the South China Sea

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim some or all of the land features and maritime territory in the South China Sea. One notable aspect of the South China Sea dispute is that its advocates argue past one another with little reference to a common set of facts. Another is the absence of comprehensive data on the actions claimants have taken to advance or protect their claims. The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University (NDU) set out to create a comprehensive database documenting the various tactics pursued by South China Sea claimants over an 18-year timeframe (1995–2013). This paper draws upon that data to analyze what tactics South China Sea claimants are employing and to present some potential considerations for U.S. and allied policymakers.

July 1, 2015

The Arctic Domain: A Narrow Niche for Joint Special Operations Forces

Global climate change has catapulted the Arctic into the center of geopolitics, as melting Arctic ice transforms the region from one of primarily scientific interest into a maelstrom of competing commercial, national security and environmental concerns.

July 1, 2015

Executive Summary

Every so often we find ourselves in a place where we can take time to assess where we are, where we have been, and where we think we are going—and check it against where we think we should be ending up. This edition of JFQ offers two interviews that are assessments of events past, present, and future. Both are of stories not yet complete: one, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the other, the production of the F-35 fighter aircraft.

July 1, 2015

Rapid Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity

There is widespread agreement among the public and in the foreign and defense communities that the United States should avoid “another Iraq” or “another Afghanistan”—that is, another large-scale, long-term, and highly costly stability operation. President Obama’s reluctance to put “boots on the ground” in Iraq is but the most recent example of this reaction against the high costs and questionable outcomes of the conflicts in those two countries.

July 1, 2015

Quo Vadis? The Education of Senior Military Officers

This article considers approaches to teaching senior military officers at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). It reviews the results of several studies and surveys from the employers of our graduates and from recent graduates themselves on how best to them prepare for future assignments in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic environment.

July 1, 2015

Waffles or Pancakes? Operational- versus Tactical-Level Wargaming

Many planners agree that operational level ‘war gaming’ using the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) is different from tactical level war gaming using the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or the Marine Corps Decision Process (MCDP). But they struggle with understanding the differences because service and joint doctrine only describe their processes and do not compare or point out differences between the processes.

July 1, 2015

An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan

On May 12, 2015, Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief of Joint Force Quarterly, interviewed Lieutenant General Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, Program Executive Officer for the F-35 Lightning II Program, at Bogdan’s office in Arlington, Virginia.

July 1, 2015

Turnaround: The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System

The U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS), a program that embedded social scientists with deployed units, endured a rough start as it began deploying teams to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007. These early experiences had a lasting impact on the program. Although critics have written extensively about HTS struggles with internal mismanagement, most accounts simply cataloged problems, yielded little insight into the organization’s progress over time, and ultimately gave the impression that HTS was never able to make needed corrections.

July 1, 2015

On Military Professionalism and Civilian Control

Recently, the subject of military “professionalism” has gripped the attention of top echelons of the Department of Defense (DOD) to a degree that is perhaps unprecedented. Most notably, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin E. Dempsey has directed each of the Services to review and rearticulate its understanding of the profession of arms in the context of its particular missions, traditions, and practices.

July 1, 2015

Detangling the Web: A Screenshot of U.S. Government Cyber Activity

Blackouts. School testing. Electrical grids. Insurance. These all have one major thing in common: they have all been targets for cyber attacks in a period of two weeks during March 2015. The United States faces thousands of cyber assaults every day. States, state-sponsored organizations, other groups and individuals all combine to incessantly probe, spy on, and attack public and private organizations as well as denizens of the United States. These ongoing problems require a U.S. Government response, so it adopted a bureaucratic approach that has resulted in a complex system that is constantly evolving as new problems are recognized. This article provides a comprehensive look at how the United States has organized to address these challenges. Although U.S. Government efforts seem sizable, private use of the Internet dwarfs government usage.

July 1, 2015

One Size Does Not Fit All: The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft

To better evaluate the strategic implications of cyber as a domain in which to achieve national security objectives—from antiaccess/area denial to governance, democratization, and economic growth—policymakers need a rigorous, multifaceted framework that examines cyber statecraft not only as a military tool, but also as a more holistic form of statecraft. Such a framework is long overdue to help make sense of the great technological disruption that continues to shape the international political system. While the military component is essential, cyber statecraft is often viewed only through this coercive lens, when in fact it is much broader.

July 1, 2015

Understanding the Indications and Warning Efforts of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

The critical mission of defending the U.S. homeland—homeland defense—requires a fully integrated capability to identify, categorize, and fuse strategic and tactical indications and warnings (I&W) by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Today’s fiscally constrained environment may encourage decisionmakers to eliminate perceived I&W “redundancies” and create an I&W stovepipe for weapons release authorities (WRAs). In a mission area where time is of the essence and failure would result in grave damage to national security, such an arrangement would create an unacceptable risk to homeland defense.

July 1, 2015

Spinning the Top: American Land Power and the Ground Campaigns of a Korean Crisis

Gashed from the yellow earth and scarred by lacerating wire bound to steel posts, the moment Korea’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) comes into view, you cannot avoid the impression that you are witness to a crime. In a way, you are. The DMZ is an ominous wound from an unfinished conflict dividing the Korean Peninsula and serving as a boundary between incarceration and freedom. It carves its way between Korea’s sharp-sloped green hills only 20 short miles from the megacity of Seoul and its surrounding environs with its 25 million people who, after decades of economic development, are enjoying increasingly prosperous lives. The DMZ both signifies suffering already endured and foreshadows violence yet to come. It represents a status quo inter-bellum, which cannot endure. It is like no other place in the world. And the complex strategic and operational challenge that it poses to America’s joint force is likewise daunting.

July 1, 2015

Making Soup with Stones: JMTC Partnership and the NATO Connected Forces Initiative

First published in Europe in 1947 by Marcia Brown after World War II, many children have grown up reading a classic story titled “Stone Soup.” Most of us are probably familiar with this tale, based on French folklore, of three hungry and tired soldiers approaching a village where the peasants hid their meager rations of food upon learning of their approach. In a wily and enterprising solution, the soldiers begin boiling a large pot of water in the town square as they profess to make soup from three small stones. The people of the village, impressed by this notion, begin contributing bits and pieces of meat and vegetables to create a meal for everyone, thus highlighting the power and importance of cooperation and what small contributions by all can produce for the greater good.

July 1, 2015

The Limits of Airpower or the Limits of Strategy: The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies

For most of the world’s population, America’s air wars in Vietnam are now ancient history. The first U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam, conducted in response to attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats on the destroyer USS Maddox in the Tonkin Gulf, occurred a half-century ago this August. Seven months later, America began its longest sustained “strategic bombing” campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, against the North. That effort, and the Linebacker campaigns that followed, dropped a million tons of bombs on North Vietnam. Three million more tons fell on Laos and Cambodia—supposedly “neutral” countries in the conflict. Four million tons fell on South Vietnam—America’s ally in the war against communist aggression. When the last raid by B-52s over Cambodia on August 15, 1973, culminated American bombing in Southeast Asia, the United States had dropped more than 8 million tons of bombs in 9 years. Less than 2 years later, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were communist countries.

July 1, 2015

Harlem's Rattlers and the Great War

In 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois, the eminent American sociologist, scholar, and leader, wrote that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line.” Recent events in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten Island, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and North Charleston, South Carolina should make us realize that, despite America’s recent racial progress, the problem of the 21st century is still the color-line. Harlem’s Rattlers lays bare the bigotry that African-American citizens faced in the early 20th century and, more importantly, details the innumerable accomplishments by black American soldiers despite the racism propagated by the President of the United States, U.S. military, and bigoted American civilians.

July 1, 2015

Book Review: The Modern Mercenary

At their peak, contractors comprised more than 50 percent of U.S. personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite complaints about contractor performance, the Pentagon has stated that contractors will make up half of any future U.S. force deployments. Why? Because they work. This reality requires defense professionals to seek a deeper understanding of what contractors do and the implications for future conflict—making Sean McFate’s The Modern Mercenary a very timely book. In it, he not only carefully examines contractors, but also describes the changing international environment in which they will operate.

July 1, 2015

Book Review: Meeting China Halfway

China is on the minds of many today. In fact, an informal term has been coined for the group of scholars and defense officials who spend most of their waking hours thinking, talking, and writing about China. They are so-called China Watchers. In no other foreign policy realm is a similar term used with such frequency. This alone should give everyone pause. Watching for what, exactly?

July 1, 2015

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

July 1, 2015

Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Since the establishment of the center of gravity (COG) concept as a fundamental planning factor in joint military doctrine, its proper identification has been considered crucial in successful attainment of desired objectives. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states, “This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.”

July 1, 2015

China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy

Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased the frequency, duration, complexity, and distance from the mainland of its operations. Not only does China maintain a permanent counterpiracy escort flotilla in the Indian Ocean, it also now routinely conducts naval exercises and operations beyond the first island chain throughout the year. This normalization of PLAN operations in the Western Pacific and beyond is an important step toward an emerging new maritime strategy that will incorporate far seas defense.

July 1, 2015

Understanding Putin Through a Middle Eastern Looking Glass

The resurgence of Russian influence in the Middle East has surprised Moscow as much as any other capital. Russia has done better than the Kremlin and its Middle East experts feared when the Arab Spring began. Despite Moscow’s deep involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, Russia is now in a stronger position with national leaderships across the Middle East than it was in 2011, although its stock with Sunni Arab public opinion has been sinking.

May 6, 2015

DTP 107: Shifting Human Environment: How Trends in Human Geography Will Shape Future Military Operations

In January 2014 the Center for Technology and National Security Policy was asked to examine some major trends within the domain of human geography, developments that will have important influence on the type of environments future military forces will be operating in.

April 1, 2015

Letter

In response to “Opportunities in Understanding China’s Approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” by Lieutenant Colonel Bradford John Davis, USA (Joint Force Quarterly 74 (4th Quarter 2014), I must argue against his proposal for joint patrols/resource development.

April 1, 2015

From the Chairman: Defining Duty

Throughout over 40 years of service, I have maintained a list of principles to judge my actions against. Chief among these principles is duty. I have reflected and written on this topic throughout my career, and I strongly believe the concept of duty is central to the Profession of Arms.

April 1, 2015

Executive Summary

A century and a half has passed since the end of the American Civil War and reminders both physical and cultural surround us, especially here in the Nation’s capital. So let us reflect on one important idea of that time that today all Americans should consider, one that President Abraham Lincoln himself held in the front of his mind throughout the war: the value of seeking unity from diverse opinions.

April 1, 2015

Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence

As the Department of Defense (DOD) formulates strategy and doctrine for operating in cyberspace, it is vital to understand the domain and how it relates to the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space.

April 1, 2015

Framing the Big Data Ethics Debate for the Military

Big data is everywhere these days. It shows up in many realms of contemporary life, ranging from how people are guided to potential purchases as they shop online, to how political campaigns win elections, and even to when farmers plant crops and apply fertilizer to their fields.

April 1, 2015

Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis

The vast amount of information that the Intelligence Community (IC) collects demands a transformation in the way the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and presents data.

April 1, 2015

The Defense Innovation Initiative: The Importance of Capability Prototyping

The recently unveiled Defense Innovation Initiative aims to “pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century” by finding “new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources.”

April 1, 2015

The Quantum Leap into Computing and Communication: A Chinese Perspective

For a few decades, nations have been relying on encryption systems to protect a wide variety of computerized transmissions ranging from commerce to government to military communications. While today’s encryption systems are considered reasonably secure, the possibilities of quantum cryptography and quantum computing offer a whole new dimension and threat to computerized secrecy.

April 1, 2015

Writing Faculty Papers for Joint Professional Military Education

In joint professional military education (JPME), there is no tool more powerful than the written word. Whether in the form of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, or course papers, students and faculty members demand high levels of intellectual rigor and reflection in both the products they read and the ones they produce.

April 1, 2015

Joint Professional Military Education: A Retrospective of the Skelton Panel

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April 1, 2015

Relying on the Kindness of Machines? The Security Threat of Artificial Agents

Modern technology is a daily part of our lives. It serves critical functions in defense, responding to natural disasters, and scientific research. Without technology, some of the most common human tasks would become laborious or, in many cases, impossible. Since we have become dependent on technology and its uses, and technology is becoming ever more capable, it is necessary that we consider the possibility of goal-driven, adaptive agents becoming an adversary instead of a tool.

April 1, 2015

Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?

Much of the future-looking discussion in national security circles today focuses on autonomous systems and cyber weapons. Largely missing from this discussion is a place for humans on the battlefield. Do today’s emerging and potentially disruptive technologies mean that humans will no longer be important in future warfare? A look at historical military operations and current technologies suggests the proper response is that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of man’s obsolescence have been exaggerated.

April 1, 2015

I Corps: U.S. Pacific Command's Newest Asset

In January 2012, the United States redefined its global security priorities with the words above. The changing global environment, signified by the rising political and economic power of Asia, necessitated an adjustment of national strategic goals. On the surface, little may appear changed in a region mostly covered with blue water. Army forces are still in Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. That surface view belies the strategic, operational, and tactical changes that have occurred as the Army’s direction has shifted to the Pacific, spearheaded operationally by I Corps.

April 1, 2015

After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia

The United States has never fought a conventional war against a nuclear-armed adversary. Yet the United States and its allies must prepare for a range of military contingencies with both North Korea and China, and avoiding nuclear escalation would be a U.S. objective in all of them. Developing strategies for managing escalation will be an essential part of U.S. efforts to extend deterrence and assure its allies in Northeast Asia.

April 1, 2015

Fighting More Fires with Less Water: Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design

Imagine that you are the fire chief for a mid-sized community. The city council informs you that it is reducing your budget this year by 30 percent. It is redirecting these funds for community outreach and fire-prevention education programs. Ironically, the council has also instructed you to organize and conduct these programs. In every previous year, you have used the entire budget to train and equip your firefighters and to respond to fire emergencies in the city. You know that outreach is important and may indeed help to lower the incidence of fires in the city—assuming, of course, that your city is not rife with arsonists. However, will you now have sufficient resources to accomplish your primary mission? Put another way, is putting out fires or preventing them a better use of your resources?

April 1, 2015

Distributed Common Ground System–Future: Moving into the 22nd Century Today

While supporting a free medical clinic in western Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces question local villagers about an increase in recent enemy activity. They learn of unusual vehicle movements and a larger number of fighters in the village over the past several weeks. After returning to base, this information is passed to the unit intelligence officer who annotates it in an initial report that is made available through a shared intelligence database. Several hours later, a known enemy signal is intercepted not far from the village and is passed by way of secure joint chat rooms and product reports. At nearly the same time, advanced imaging data from a Navy Triton unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) shows unusual disturbances in the same area. Shortly thereafter, an Army unit begins a patrol in the vicinity with a Shadow UAV performing overwatch. As the patrol reaches the area where the disturbances were noted, they are ambushed and take significant losses.

April 1, 2015

DOD Response Under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action

Hurricane Katrina revealed our nation’s lack of preparedness to respond to a complex catastrophe in a rapid, efficient, and effective manner.1 This catastrophe forced a reevaluation of how we plan for and respond to natural disasters and/or emergencies. Over the last 10 years, efforts have focused on new response frameworks and building capacity to respond to such events, but little consideration has been given to capitalizing on a process that would rapidly generate and deploy Title 10 Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities, especially the Reserve components. DOD needs to revise processes in the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) to recognize and capitalize on the inherent advantage of using Reserve forces in closest proximity to incidents. The current process is cumbersome, inefficient, and potentially leads to unnecessary loss of life and human suffering. History has illustrated over and over again that the first 72 hours of any catastrophe is the window in which we are most likely to save lives. Squandering time to run mobilization of Reserve units through the current force generation process is unacceptable.

April 1, 2015

The Military's Role in Rule of Law Development

As Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan transitions to the Resolute Support Mission, many believe that military engagements abroad involving the United States will decrease and that the Nation will become a disengaged actor on the world stage. Given the complexity and volatility of relationships among nations, however, as well as the continual rise of hostile transnational groups, it appears the United States will remain substantially engaged on the international stage for the foreseeable future. As part of its future engagement strategy, the United States must consider and plan for conducting operations in states at risk of failure, in failed states where the central government is so weakened that the people have virtually returned to the natural state described by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan, in states emerging from long periods of conflict such as Afghanistan, and in states in peaceful postconflict rebuilding periods.

April 1, 2015

On Operational Leadership

Success of any military organization depends on the experience and good judgment of its leaders. Ideally, all commanders should have a high level of professional education and training in addition to some critically important character traits. Moreover, the higher the level of command, the more important it is that commanders and staff meet these requirements. Wars are not won or lost at the tactical level but at the operational and strategic levels. Hence, it is critically important that operational commanders are selected based solely on their proven or potential warfighting abilities and not their political connections or management skills. Operational commanders are not managers but should be first and foremost warfighters.

April 1, 2015

Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders

On April 10, 1865, Robert E. Lee wrote a letter to the soldiers of his army that began, “After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been forced to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.” At this moment, the Civil War essentially ended in victory for the Union, and the process of reuniting the United States of America began. Lee’s immediate view of the circumstances, that the Confederate armies had done everything possible but were overmatched by Northern numbers, provided a means by which his veterans could feel that they had served honorably, but it was challenged almost immediately by other Confederate military and political leaders who blamed instead such factors as incompetent government, social divisions, and political squabbling for their defeat. The Confederacy, many felt, would not have embarked on a war it could not win. Indeed, its success in repelling invasions over the first 2 years of the war led many to believe that the war had almost been won.

April 1, 2015

Book Review: World Order

Henry Kissinger, the scholar, statesman, and philosopher, writes a fascinating, insightful, and thought-provoking history of the concept of the state, statecraft, grand strategy, and international cooperation in the pursuit of order and stability among nations. Although no true universal arrangement among states has ever existed, he asserts the order that does exist is at risk because of developing forces beyond the control of states themselves. So we must ask whether collective state order can be achieved while maintaining individual state freedom in an increasingly intricate and turbulent global environment.

April 1, 2015

Russia and the Relationship Between Law and Power

Winston Churchill stated, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” James Terry patiently peels away each of those layers to hypothesize an unrelenting consistency and prevailing logic to Russian behavior as it seeks power, for myriad reasons, over those who dwell within and without its self-defined boundaries. The release of this compact yet intricate work by Dr. Terry, addressing the long and convoluted history of Russia and its recurrent international “habits,” could not be timelier in multiple contexts.

April 1, 2015

The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur

Douglas MacArthur and Franklin Roosevelt first met in 1916 when both were involved in planning prewar mobilization for the Woodrow Wilson administration. Two years later, MacArthur was commanding the Rainbow Division in France where he earned seven Silver Stars for courage and bravery in leading his troops in battle against the Germans, while Roosevelt was serving as President Wilson’s assistant Secretary of the Navy. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, MacArthur was the Army’s chief of staff (having been appointed by President Herbert Hoover). Roosevelt, mainly for political reasons, extended MacArthur’s term as Army chief of staff, but the two repeatedly clashed over budget matters. During World War II, Roosevelt as commander in chief selected MacArthur to lead the U.S. war effort in the Southwest Pacific.

April 1, 2015

The Way Ahead for Joint Operations and Planning Doctrine

Two of joint doctrine’s keystone1 joint publications (JPs) have entered the window for revision—JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Both publications received comprehensive assessments in 2014, which generated a wide variety of recommended changes from combatant commands (CCMD), the Services, National Guard Bureau, Defense agencies, and the Joint Staff. This article describes the more significant of these.