Sept. 30, 2014

An Interview with Raymond T. Odierno

We’re starting from an incredible position of strength because of the experience that the Army has. This is the first time after a long period of war that Army leaders are staying in the Service; they’re not leaving en masse to do other things. So we have an incredible force, and I want to build on that. We have a wealth of experiences from junior to senior officers that we’ve never had before, and we have to learn how to exploit the experiences gained in joint, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental environments, and I think that’s key to the future.

Sept. 30, 2014

Theater Airlift Modernization: Options for Closing the Gap

America’s renewed strategic emphasis on state-on-state conflict highlights significant gaps in the country’s theater airlift capabilities, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Quantitatively, there likely will not be enough airlift capacity available to cover major conflict requirements. Qualitatively, the current program- of-record (POR) airlift fleet (what the Nation has and what it expects to acquire) presents serious shortfalls in the ability to maneuver land forces on the scale, to the destinations, or in the timeframes desired by Army planners. Air commanders also have reason for concern since the core aircraft of the theater fleet, the C-17 and C-130, pose capacity and operational risks in their abilities to support high-volume combat operations at forward bases when threatened or damaged by attack.

Sept. 30, 2014

The Afghanistan National Railway: A Plan of Opportunity

In support of the State Department’s “New Silk Road” initiative, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) formed a planning team of subject matter experts spanning the Department of Defense (DOD), the interagency community, academia, and the U.S. railroad industry to provide recommendations that advance the development of a national railway system for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The Afghanistan National Railway Plan (ANRP) was provided to the Afghanistan Railway Authority (ARA) in August 2013.

Sept. 30, 2014

The USCENTCOM Train: The Deployment and Distribution Operations Center Turns 10

On December 12, 2003, just months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and on the cusp of transition to Operation Iraqi Freedom II, General John Abizaid, USA, accepted on behalf of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) an invitation that would birth the first Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). In an October 24, 2003, memorandum, General John Handy, USAF, commander of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and General Paul Kern, commander of Army Materiel Command, had offered a “joint intermodal distribution team” led by a flag officer who “would have visibility and synchronization authority over all theater-level lift platforms.”1 With General Abizaid’s go-ahead, a team of 42 USTRANSCOM distribution experts began arriving at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait to establish initial operational capability and validate the emerging DDOC concept during the major muscle movements of the Iraqi Freedom II transition.

Sept. 30, 2014

2014 Winners

The NDU Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly essay competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 15–16, 2014, during which 23 faculty judges from 15 participating professional military education institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages.

Sept. 30, 2014

Deterrence with China: Avoiding Nuclear Miscalculation

As China rises and the United States seeks to maintain its global dominance, the world is faced with a new historical phenomenon: a dramatic shift in power between two nuclear-capable nations. As the relative power of each nation nears parity, tension is inevitable and the character of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship poses a risk of nuclear miscalculation. Nuclear use between China and the United States would be a catastrophe, but China is an independent actor, and the United States can only influence, but not control, the crossing of the nuclear threshold. If U.S. policymakers neglect this risk, miscalculation is more likely.

Sept. 30, 2014

The Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence

As a concept, deterrence has been part of the military vernacular since antiquity. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides quotes Hermocrates as stating, “Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear.”2 In the 2,400 years since then, the domains for the conduct of military affairs have expanded from the original land and maritime domains to air, space, and now cyberspace. As warfighting expanded its scope, strategic theory did as well. Today, U.S. doctrine declares that the fundamental purpose of the military is to deter or wage war in support of national policy.3 Therefore, military strategists and planners have a responsibility to assess how adversaries may be deterred in any warfighting domain. Through the joint planning process, planners, working through the interagency process, consider deterrent options for every instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—across all phases of military operations.4 However, most of the thought and analysis in deterrence has revolved around the use of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Sept. 30, 2014

Opportunities in Understanding China’s Approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

In 2010, two Japanese coast guard vessels and a Chinese fishing boat collided in the disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, sparking increasingly confrontational behavior by both China and Japan. The pattern of escalation continued in 2012 when Japan nationalized several of the disputed islands by purchasing them from the private owner. China promptly responded by sending warships to the area in a show of force. Although escalation to the point of war is unlikely, these incidents underscore the destabilizing regional effects of the disputed islands and associated maritime boundaries. China’s territorial claims are rooted in historical context, nationalism, national security, and economic interests.3 By understanding China’s perspectives, motives, and approaches to resolving this dispute, the United States can anticipate the current pattern of escalation, forecast future Chinese behavior, and identify opportunities for conflict management and eventual de-escalation to improve strategic stability in the region.

Sept. 30, 2014

Cyber Security as a Field of Military Education and Study

Information and communication technologies are acknowledged as enablers and the core arsenal of military capabilities, functions, and operations. An increasing number of nations pursue improved fluency and agility of armed forces personnel in information and communication technology, its contemporary uses, and relevant defense and security implications. Underdeveloped terminology and concepts, combined with recognized functional needs and national ambitions to control the relatively new battlespace and domain, create ambiguity and even anxiety among the current generation of planners and leaders. Particularly challenging is the balance between technical in-depth knowledge requirements and strategic understanding of the cyber domain desirable for joint planners, field commanders, and senior decisionmakers.

Sept. 30, 2014

Low Cost, High Returns: Getting More from International Partnerships

Unbeknownst to most Americans, over 8,000 international military personnel are trained or educated annually in the United States at the invitation of the U.S. Government, studying every aspect of the military profession. The most select officers with future leadership potential are invited to participate in senior Professional Military Education (PME) courses alongside U.S. officers at schools such as National Defense University (NDU) and the Army, Naval, Air, and Marine Corps War Colleges. Many of these students are funded by the United States through security assistance programs such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which has an annual cost of over $100 million. This is a significant investment of time and treasure by the United States, and as we will show, the initial returns of these programs are high.

Sept. 30, 2014

Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry

Much of the strategic studies literature of the past two decades identifies profound novelty in the conduct and challenges of modern war, novelty that ultimately calls into question the nature and even existence of war. War has allegedly now been transformed from a regular, conventional, purportedly symmetric exercise into an irregular, unconventional, asymmetric event, which must be understood anew.

Sept. 30, 2014

Is Military Science “Scientific”?

The term military science generally describes the body of theories, concepts, and methods for employing armed forces. However, as an academic discipline it is ill defined, drawing from a patchwork of curricula including history, foreign affairs, security studies, leadership, operations management, and systems engineering, as well as other elements of the physical and social sciences. Notably, the Department of Defense dictionary does not even provide a definition. This vague categorization is somewhat reflective of the term’s diminished status from its 19th-century usage when Military Science was frequently capitalized and placed alongside Physics, Philosophy, and other well-established academic disciplines.

Sept. 30, 2014

The Best Man for the Job? Combatant Commanders and the Politics of Jointness

The U.S. military today fights jointly. A joint commander—reporting to the Secretary of Defense—commands all Service components during military operations. And as a key sign of this jointness, combatant commanders no longer come solely from a single Service as they once did. In fact, the combatant commanders and their control of operations are often considered the greatest expression of jointness.

Sept. 30, 2014

A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments

The numerous, increasingly advanced cruise missiles being developed and deployed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have largely flown under the public’s radar. This article surveys PRC cruise missile programs and assesses their implications for broader People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities, especially in a Taiwan scenario.

Sept. 30, 2014

Determining Hostile Intent in Cyberspace

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hostile intent is defined as the threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces, or other designated persons or property. It is the indication, the belief, a commander has that an adversary is about to attack. That belief provides the groundwork for “anticipatory self-defense,” an American legal concept that allows a commander to attack before being attacked.

Sept. 30, 2014

Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation

The escalation of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents and related casualties during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom led to a new intelligence field related to technical intelligence (TECHINT) called weapons technical intelligence (WTI), which combined technical and forensic IED exploitation techniques to link persons, places, things, and events. WTI operationalizes technical and forensic activities by fusing the technical, forensic, and biometric disciplines to produce actionable intelligence for countering threat networks. It is an especially powerful tool against terrorist organizations that rely on IEDs as a primary weapon in their arsenals. Given the enduring nature of the IED problem, careful consideration is required to ensure that we have the necessary counter-IED capability and capacity to meet future threats across the range of military operations. Across this range and at each level of war from tactical to strategic, TECHINT and WTI make critical contributions to joint warfare and military decisionmaking.

Sept. 30, 2014

Challenges in Coalition Unconventional Warfare: The Allied Campaign in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945

During World War II, operatives and military advisors of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a precursor to both the current Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces, conducted a challenging unconventional warfare (UW) campaign against the Axis forces with and through guerrilla resistance elements in Yugoslavia. The resistance movement effectively fixed in place 35 German and Italian divisions, consisting of roughly 660,000 soldiers in the western Balkan region during 1941–1945.1 This campaign rendered them strategically irrelevant by preventing their use in other theaters. The combined United Kingdom (UK)–United States (U.S.) contingent achieved this effect with never more than 100 Allied personnel on the ground in the denied area. The number of Axis personnel killed in the Balkans is estimated at 450,000.2 This extremely favorable force ratio and its associated effects commend UW as a low-cost, high-reward method of warfare.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: You Cannot Surge Trust

You Cannot Surge Trust is a valuable review of the unique relationships that bind the U.S. Navy and its British, Canadian, and Australian counterparts. Edited by Sandra Doyle of the Naval History and Heritage Command, the book is a collection of essays by naval historians from the United States, Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom (UK) that provide insights drawn from common experiences derived from combined peace support operations between 1991 and 2003. These insights offer useful pointers for the U.S. Navy leadership as it seeks to establish close cooperative arrangements with other navies around the world.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: Engineers of Victory

Best-selling author and historian Paul Kennedy, the Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Studies at Yale University, has written a stimulating book about the middle—the middle years of World War II, the middle or operational level of war, and the middlemen, problem-solvers, and midlevel commanders that made victory possible. In doing so, he focuses attention on a largely unexplored portion of the war’s history and provides professional historians and general readers a deeper understanding of how and why the Allies won World War II.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: Next-Generation Homeland Security

The threats to U.S. national security have evolved, but the means to respond to them lag far behind. After 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and countless other natural and unnatural disasters, now is the time to rethink U.S. security strategy. John Fass Morton’s Next-Generation Homeland Security could not be timelier in proposing an overhaul of the Cold War–era system. Policy change, he argues, will not be enough; we must change the structure of national security governance because the Cold War structures reflect only the strategic conditions that were relevant at that time. The United States can no longer rely on the forces that made it powerful in the second half of the 20th century, as the international system has changed, so too must our national security system. As globalization has reshaped the meaning of sovereignty, nations are no longer the only important actors. In today’s strategic environment, states play a co-equal role in policy development and strategy formation, and so they must also play a co-equal role in national security governance.

Sept. 30, 2014

Implementing Joint Operational Access: From Concept to Joint Force Development

Strategic guidance issued to the U.S. military over the past 5 years explicitly cites the emerging challenge to what has been a significant advantage for American and partner forces for decades: the unfettered ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish a designated mission. In some instances this ability includes access to sovereign territory, but in all cases it requires access to the global commons. Potential enemies are developing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that could threaten access and jeopardize missions. Concept development, as the bridging mechanism from strategic guidance to operational capabilities, has played a key role in the past few years to guide joint and Service force development activities in this area. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the recently signed Joint Concept for Entry Operations are examples of where strategic guidance to overcome A2/AD challenges is translated into operational concepts intended to guide how the U.S. military is organized, trained, equipped, and employed.

Sept. 30, 2014

Dealing with Corruption: Hard Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom has exacted a tremendous cost on the United States in terms of both blood and treasure. By the end of fiscal year 2013, the financial toll had reached $645 billion. While we have made a significant investment in rebuilding Afghanistan, certain actors have seen our sacrifice as an opportunity to enrich themselves by stealing money and materiel intended to aid in the rebuilding of the country.

Sept. 30, 2014

Joint Doctrine Update

DOWNLOAD PDFJoint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)JP 3-02,

Sept. 12, 2014

DTP 106: Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions

This paper examines policy, legal, ethical, and strategy implications for national security of the accelerating science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) revolutions underway in five broad areas: biology, robotics, information, nanotechnology, and energy (BRINE), with a particular emphasis on how they are interacting. The paper considers the timeframe between now and 2030 but emphasizes policy and related choices that need to be made in the next few years to shape the future competitive space favorably, and focuses on those decisions that are within U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) purview. The pace and complexity of technological change mean that linear predictions of current needs cannot be the basis for effective guidance or management for the future. These are issues for policymakers and commanders, not just technical specialists.

Sept. 1, 2014

The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats

Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of militant Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders and foreign tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which began in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However, they should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian security agencies to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to U.S. and international interests in East Africa.

Aug. 22, 2014

DTP 105: A Strategic Vision and a New Management Approach for the Department of the Navy’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Portfolio

This paper considers the Department of the Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program holistically. The underlying premise, that will be expanded on here, is that the Department is not doing a good enough job of strategically managing its RDT&E portfolio and that, at least partly as a result, the Department is spending too much and taking too long in getting new technology-driven capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. The goal of this paper is to identify a workable RDT&E process that better enables the Department of the Navy to identify, develop, and maintain the capabilities of our warfighters as notably the most advanced in the world.

July 1, 2014

Investing in the Minds of Future Leaders

As the Joint Force prepares for the challenges and opportunities of tomorrow, our focus is not simply on military power and platforms. We are laser-focused on leadership. It is the all-volunteer force and its leaders—our people—who remain our greatest strategic asset and the best example of the values we represent to the world.

July 1, 2014

Executive Summary

In a recent meeting I had with a senior military leader, the discussion turned to an assessment of where the Armed Forces are today. His view was that while we are ending a long period of combat that has engaged all the Services to varying degrees, we are not likely to return to any kind of peacetime period as in the past. We are more likely to see a far smaller force that is surging while in Phase Zero, or preconflict operations. Many see the Services, running on a wartime footing for longer than any period in U.S. history, as worn out both materially and psychologically to varying degrees—with the Army being in the poorest shape. Yet the remaining force remains highly active in terms of operations to maintain the Nation’s defense. Now with continuing budgetary pressures and declining resources from Congress, the Services are making hard choices about what they must do to preserve and evolve the military instrument of power.

July 1, 2014

An Interview with Mark A. Welsh III

General Mark A. Welsh III is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of 690,000 Active-duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Welsh and the other Service chiefs function as military advisors to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President.

July 1, 2014

Contexts of Future Conflict and War

The Chairman has emphasized that our forces must be versatile, responsive, and decisive and at the same time affordable. Five proposed contexts of future conflict will help achieve both what is desired and what can be paid for, a planning process that must occur since the force will inevitably change.

July 1, 2014

Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020

U.S. deterrence is neutered by not clearly defining national security threats and aligning resources accordingly, as in favoring offensive Air-Sea Battle against China against defensive A2/AD capabilities with partners, or preparing sufficiently against regional players such as North Korea and Syria. Plans must accord with actual defense policies and dangers.

July 1, 2014

The Role of U.S. Land Forces in the Asia-Pacific

Washington must not yield to fiscal pressures that erode its legitimacy as a global leader. Its forces must remain capable across the spectrum from the smallest to the largest security challenges and control procurement accordingly, using existing resources and allies in a flexible approach the Army will continue to pursue.

July 1, 2014

Resilient Command and Control: The Need for Distributed Control

Centralized control and decentralized execution has been a fundamental principle of Air Force power projection. It will remain seminal as the Service combines a single commander who weighs strategy and tactics for optimal force employment with Airmen empowered to use imagination and initiative.

July 1, 2014

Conducting Operations in a Mission Partner Environment

Global effectiveness requires the joint force to partner, which in turn requires it to adopt a Mission Partner Environment (MPE) in place of exclusionary SIPRNET security measures. MPE will aid in attaining the Chairman's goal of seamless allied, coalition, interagency, volunteer, private sector, and intergovernmental initiatives based on solid commonalities.

July 1, 2014

Strengthening PME at the Senior Level: The Case of the U.S. Army War College

Adopting the Army Chief of Staff's vision of officers intellectually capable of solving the most cryptic problems at the strategic level, and reflecting the belief that enhanced human capital is the answer to slashed budgets, the U.S. Army War College is undergoing a renaissance in faculty, curriculum, students, and integration.

July 1, 2014

Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers

Junior officers have been increasingly responsible for joint duties without the joint professional military education that has helped commanders and joint planners through over a decade of combat. Low impact solutions will help bridge this educational gap so an understanding of joint force employment will exist at the tactical level.

July 1, 2014

Defense Strategic Guidance: Thoughtful Choices and Security Cooperation

DOD aids such as amalgamating strategic guidance, Secretarial reviews of campaign and contingency plans, and steady-state activities within theaters will help seal enduring gaps and help planners watch for unintended damage to our security cooperation partners as well as engendering further dialogue in DOD, the combatant commands, and the embassies.

July 1, 2014

Strategic Planning: A "How-to-Guide"

Strategic planning is both short on manuals and complex. It draws on an array of participants and stakeholders, who must know their views and needs are considered if their approval and expertise are to be present throughout planning. Free communication will indicate transparency and a desire for completeness and excellence.

July 1, 2014

Targeted Killing of Terrorists

Targeted killing has detractors, yet it has assisted the Nation in combatting terrorism with minimal U.S. casualties and collateral damage. It thus need not be cast off, but it must continue to be used legally and wisely, and strategists must assess all possible ramifications to retain domestic and international support.

July 1, 2014

Cyber Power in 21st-Century Joint Warfare

Used militarily, cyberspace superiority should ensure the capability to conduct cyber interdiction, thus assisting in kinetic operations, especially air. It could also defeat enemy cyber attacks and neutralize enemy surveillance and finally suppress enemy cyber defense measures and data fusion centers, forcing adversary miscalculation and obtaining a decisionmaking advantage.

July 1, 2014

Defining and Regulating the Weaponization of Space

The weaponization of space can be partially controlled by a trustworthy and empowered standing committee, perhaps under the United Nations, aided by the economic deterrence and enforcement capacity found in the World Trade Organization. With these bodies in place, compliance with international norms is not exclusively a matter of diplomacy.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: War Front to Store Front

Like most junior officers, I prefer my professional military education (PME) action packed and relevant to my immediate Military Occupational Specialty. With that predilection, I assumed that War Front to Store Front would be a slog. I thought I should be spending my time reading stories of lieutenants leading understrength platoons on hills surrounded by ruthless enemies, lone aviators on important missions, or the memoirs of a salty and sage veteran of Vietnam or Okinawa.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Consider

Consider succinctly articulates the need for senior leaders to create “think time” and to reflect in their personal schedules and organizational processes. Forrester firmly believes that “embracing think time and reflection as habits and organizational capabilities will determine success or rapid failure in the twenty-first century.” He supports this perspective through interviews with 55 successful people with varied experiences and identifies these individuals in the acknowledgments section. They include business and military leaders, musicians and designers, academics and economists, and advisors and diplomats.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Leadership in the New Normal

Leadership in the New Normal is a short course in leadership in which the author traces good to great leadership attributes in such forefathers as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, and by doing so he really describes the nature of leadership itself. Lieutenant General Honoré, USA (Ret.), postulates that we won our freedom because of leadership during the critical times in our history, such as Valley Forge and the Civil War, and leadership will continue to help us as we transition to the next “new normal” period.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Killing Without Heart

The United States faces a stark decision on how to prosecute and conduct future warfare. Accordingly, every national policymaker and decisionmaker should read Killing Without Heart to be better informed on the morality of unmanned and autonomous weapons systems. With advancements in technology, the Nation has the capability to continue down the path toward a military of unmanned and autonomous robots on the battlefield. Continuing on this path will isolate the men and women in uniform from the dangers of the modern battlefield, calling into question the morality of how we fight and whether we can achieve national endstates without sending actual people into combat.

July 1, 2014

Overcoming Joint Interoperability Challenges

A growing array of ground, surface, and air platforms with Tactical Data Link (TDL) capabilities account for ever-greater demand for TDL interoperability training for joint, allied, and coalition forces. The TDLs forming the Multi-TDL Network (MTN) have improved situational awareness concurrently with reducing targeting and decisionmaking timelines for maritime and aviation component commanders and aircrews and, more recently, tactical air control players. Examining the concepts and technologies and their applications leading to today's TDL and MTN capabilities will help planners and practitioners get a handle on interoperability issues and training needs, invaluable as technological advances enhance weapons range and mobility, decrease the time to detect and decide, and lead toward real-time command and control from beyond the line of sight.

July 1, 2014

The Indian Jihadist Movement: Evolution and Dynamics

The Indian jihadist movement remains motivated primarily by domestic grievances rather than India-Pakistan dynamics. However, it is far more lethal than it otherwise would have been without external support from the Pakistani state, Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadist groups, and the ability to leverage Bangladesh, Nepal, and certain Persian Gulf countries for sanctuary and as staging grounds for attacks in India. External support for the Indian mujahideen (IM) from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) persists, but the question of command and control is more difficult to discern. The IM is best viewed as an LeT associate rather than an LeT affiliate.

June 1, 2014

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe: Convergent Strategies Open Doors to Improved Cooperation

European concerns regarding U.S. disengagement have dissipated but not entirely disappeared over the past 2 years. Still, U.S. readiness to lead politically and militarily in Europe— for example, in response to the ongoing crisis involving Russia and Ukraine—and adjoining regions remains under close scrutiny. Furthermore, while many Europeans agree in principle that renewed American focus on Asia-Pacific issues should encourage Europeans to assume a greater share of security-related responsibilities in their neighborhood, there is little evidence to date of a sea change in European attitudes toward defense spending and overseas military deployments.

June 1, 2014

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030

The longstanding efforts of the international community writ large to exclude weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from international competition and conflict could be undermined in 2030. The proliferation of these weapons is likely to be harder to prevent and thus potentially more prevalent. Nuclear weapons are likely to play a more significant role in the international security environment, and current constraints on the proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons could diminish. There will be greater scope for WMD terrorism, though it is not possible to predict the frequency or severity of any future employment of WMD. New forms of WMD—beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons—are unlikely to emerge by 2030, but cyber weapons will probably be capable of inflicting such widespread disruption that the United States may become as reliant on the threat to impose unacceptable costs to deter large-scale cyber attack as it currently is to deter the use of WMD. The definition of weapons of mass destruction will remain uncertain and controversial in 2030, and its value as an analytic category will be increasingly open to question.

May 21, 2014

JFQ 70 | From the Chairman

DOWNLOAD PDFPREVIOUS |  NEXTThere are as many reasons to serve the Nation as there are