Sept. 30, 2014

Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation

The escalation of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents and related casualties during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom led to a new intelligence field related to technical intelligence (TECHINT) called weapons technical intelligence (WTI), which combined technical and forensic IED exploitation techniques to link persons, places, things, and events. WTI operationalizes technical and forensic activities by fusing the technical, forensic, and biometric disciplines to produce actionable intelligence for countering threat networks. It is an especially powerful tool against terrorist organizations that rely on IEDs as a primary weapon in their arsenals. Given the enduring nature of the IED problem, careful consideration is required to ensure that we have the necessary counter-IED capability and capacity to meet future threats across the range of military operations. Across this range and at each level of war from tactical to strategic, TECHINT and WTI make critical contributions to joint warfare and military decisionmaking.

Sept. 30, 2014

Challenges in Coalition Unconventional Warfare: The Allied Campaign in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945

During World War II, operatives and military advisors of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a precursor to both the current Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces, conducted a challenging unconventional warfare (UW) campaign against the Axis forces with and through guerrilla resistance elements in Yugoslavia. The resistance movement effectively fixed in place 35 German and Italian divisions, consisting of roughly 660,000 soldiers in the western Balkan region during 1941–1945.1 This campaign rendered them strategically irrelevant by preventing their use in other theaters. The combined United Kingdom (UK)–United States (U.S.) contingent achieved this effect with never more than 100 Allied personnel on the ground in the denied area. The number of Axis personnel killed in the Balkans is estimated at 450,000.2 This extremely favorable force ratio and its associated effects commend UW as a low-cost, high-reward method of warfare.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: You Cannot Surge Trust

You Cannot Surge Trust is a valuable review of the unique relationships that bind the U.S. Navy and its British, Canadian, and Australian counterparts. Edited by Sandra Doyle of the Naval History and Heritage Command, the book is a collection of essays by naval historians from the United States, Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom (UK) that provide insights drawn from common experiences derived from combined peace support operations between 1991 and 2003. These insights offer useful pointers for the U.S. Navy leadership as it seeks to establish close cooperative arrangements with other navies around the world.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: Engineers of Victory

Best-selling author and historian Paul Kennedy, the Dilworth Professor of History and Director of International Security Studies at Yale University, has written a stimulating book about the middle—the middle years of World War II, the middle or operational level of war, and the middlemen, problem-solvers, and midlevel commanders that made victory possible. In doing so, he focuses attention on a largely unexplored portion of the war’s history and provides professional historians and general readers a deeper understanding of how and why the Allies won World War II.

Sept. 30, 2014

Book Review: Next-Generation Homeland Security

The threats to U.S. national security have evolved, but the means to respond to them lag far behind. After 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and countless other natural and unnatural disasters, now is the time to rethink U.S. security strategy. John Fass Morton’s Next-Generation Homeland Security could not be timelier in proposing an overhaul of the Cold War–era system. Policy change, he argues, will not be enough; we must change the structure of national security governance because the Cold War structures reflect only the strategic conditions that were relevant at that time. The United States can no longer rely on the forces that made it powerful in the second half of the 20th century, as the international system has changed, so too must our national security system. As globalization has reshaped the meaning of sovereignty, nations are no longer the only important actors. In today’s strategic environment, states play a co-equal role in policy development and strategy formation, and so they must also play a co-equal role in national security governance.

Sept. 30, 2014

Implementing Joint Operational Access: From Concept to Joint Force Development

Strategic guidance issued to the U.S. military over the past 5 years explicitly cites the emerging challenge to what has been a significant advantage for American and partner forces for decades: the unfettered ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish a designated mission. In some instances this ability includes access to sovereign territory, but in all cases it requires access to the global commons. Potential enemies are developing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that could threaten access and jeopardize missions. Concept development, as the bridging mechanism from strategic guidance to operational capabilities, has played a key role in the past few years to guide joint and Service force development activities in this area. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the recently signed Joint Concept for Entry Operations are examples of where strategic guidance to overcome A2/AD challenges is translated into operational concepts intended to guide how the U.S. military is organized, trained, equipped, and employed.

Sept. 30, 2014

Dealing with Corruption: Hard Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom has exacted a tremendous cost on the United States in terms of both blood and treasure. By the end of fiscal year 2013, the financial toll had reached $645 billion. While we have made a significant investment in rebuilding Afghanistan, certain actors have seen our sacrifice as an opportunity to enrich themselves by stealing money and materiel intended to aid in the rebuilding of the country.

Sept. 30, 2014

Joint Doctrine Update

DOWNLOAD PDFJoint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)JP 3-02,

Sept. 12, 2014

DTP 106: Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions

This paper examines policy, legal, ethical, and strategy implications for national security of the accelerating science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) revolutions underway in five broad areas: biology, robotics, information, nanotechnology, and energy (BRINE), with a particular emphasis on how they are interacting. The paper considers the timeframe between now and 2030 but emphasizes policy and related choices that need to be made in the next few years to shape the future competitive space favorably, and focuses on those decisions that are within U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) purview. The pace and complexity of technological change mean that linear predictions of current needs cannot be the basis for effective guidance or management for the future. These are issues for policymakers and commanders, not just technical specialists.

Sept. 1, 2014

The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats

Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of militant Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders and foreign tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which began in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However, they should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian security agencies to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to U.S. and international interests in East Africa.

Aug. 22, 2014

DTP 105: A Strategic Vision and a New Management Approach for the Department of the Navy’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Portfolio

This paper considers the Department of the Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program holistically. The underlying premise, that will be expanded on here, is that the Department is not doing a good enough job of strategically managing its RDT&E portfolio and that, at least partly as a result, the Department is spending too much and taking too long in getting new technology-driven capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. The goal of this paper is to identify a workable RDT&E process that better enables the Department of the Navy to identify, develop, and maintain the capabilities of our warfighters as notably the most advanced in the world.

July 1, 2014

Investing in the Minds of Future Leaders

As the Joint Force prepares for the challenges and opportunities of tomorrow, our focus is not simply on military power and platforms. We are laser-focused on leadership. It is the all-volunteer force and its leaders—our people—who remain our greatest strategic asset and the best example of the values we represent to the world.

July 1, 2014

Executive Summary

In a recent meeting I had with a senior military leader, the discussion turned to an assessment of where the Armed Forces are today. His view was that while we are ending a long period of combat that has engaged all the Services to varying degrees, we are not likely to return to any kind of peacetime period as in the past. We are more likely to see a far smaller force that is surging while in Phase Zero, or preconflict operations. Many see the Services, running on a wartime footing for longer than any period in U.S. history, as worn out both materially and psychologically to varying degrees—with the Army being in the poorest shape. Yet the remaining force remains highly active in terms of operations to maintain the Nation’s defense. Now with continuing budgetary pressures and declining resources from Congress, the Services are making hard choices about what they must do to preserve and evolve the military instrument of power.

July 1, 2014

An Interview with Mark A. Welsh III

General Mark A. Welsh III is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of 690,000 Active-duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Welsh and the other Service chiefs function as military advisors to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President.

July 1, 2014

Contexts of Future Conflict and War

The Chairman has emphasized that our forces must be versatile, responsive, and decisive and at the same time affordable. Five proposed contexts of future conflict will help achieve both what is desired and what can be paid for, a planning process that must occur since the force will inevitably change.

July 1, 2014

Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020

U.S. deterrence is neutered by not clearly defining national security threats and aligning resources accordingly, as in favoring offensive Air-Sea Battle against China against defensive A2/AD capabilities with partners, or preparing sufficiently against regional players such as North Korea and Syria. Plans must accord with actual defense policies and dangers.

July 1, 2014

The Role of U.S. Land Forces in the Asia-Pacific

Washington must not yield to fiscal pressures that erode its legitimacy as a global leader. Its forces must remain capable across the spectrum from the smallest to the largest security challenges and control procurement accordingly, using existing resources and allies in a flexible approach the Army will continue to pursue.

July 1, 2014

Resilient Command and Control: The Need for Distributed Control

Centralized control and decentralized execution has been a fundamental principle of Air Force power projection. It will remain seminal as the Service combines a single commander who weighs strategy and tactics for optimal force employment with Airmen empowered to use imagination and initiative.

July 1, 2014

Conducting Operations in a Mission Partner Environment

Global effectiveness requires the joint force to partner, which in turn requires it to adopt a Mission Partner Environment (MPE) in place of exclusionary SIPRNET security measures. MPE will aid in attaining the Chairman's goal of seamless allied, coalition, interagency, volunteer, private sector, and intergovernmental initiatives based on solid commonalities.

July 1, 2014

Strengthening PME at the Senior Level: The Case of the U.S. Army War College

Adopting the Army Chief of Staff's vision of officers intellectually capable of solving the most cryptic problems at the strategic level, and reflecting the belief that enhanced human capital is the answer to slashed budgets, the U.S. Army War College is undergoing a renaissance in faculty, curriculum, students, and integration.

July 1, 2014

Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers

Junior officers have been increasingly responsible for joint duties without the joint professional military education that has helped commanders and joint planners through over a decade of combat. Low impact solutions will help bridge this educational gap so an understanding of joint force employment will exist at the tactical level.

July 1, 2014

Defense Strategic Guidance: Thoughtful Choices and Security Cooperation

DOD aids such as amalgamating strategic guidance, Secretarial reviews of campaign and contingency plans, and steady-state activities within theaters will help seal enduring gaps and help planners watch for unintended damage to our security cooperation partners as well as engendering further dialogue in DOD, the combatant commands, and the embassies.

July 1, 2014

Strategic Planning: A "How-to-Guide"

Strategic planning is both short on manuals and complex. It draws on an array of participants and stakeholders, who must know their views and needs are considered if their approval and expertise are to be present throughout planning. Free communication will indicate transparency and a desire for completeness and excellence.

July 1, 2014

Targeted Killing of Terrorists

Targeted killing has detractors, yet it has assisted the Nation in combatting terrorism with minimal U.S. casualties and collateral damage. It thus need not be cast off, but it must continue to be used legally and wisely, and strategists must assess all possible ramifications to retain domestic and international support.

July 1, 2014

Cyber Power in 21st-Century Joint Warfare

Used militarily, cyberspace superiority should ensure the capability to conduct cyber interdiction, thus assisting in kinetic operations, especially air. It could also defeat enemy cyber attacks and neutralize enemy surveillance and finally suppress enemy cyber defense measures and data fusion centers, forcing adversary miscalculation and obtaining a decisionmaking advantage.

July 1, 2014

Defining and Regulating the Weaponization of Space

The weaponization of space can be partially controlled by a trustworthy and empowered standing committee, perhaps under the United Nations, aided by the economic deterrence and enforcement capacity found in the World Trade Organization. With these bodies in place, compliance with international norms is not exclusively a matter of diplomacy.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: War Front to Store Front

Like most junior officers, I prefer my professional military education (PME) action packed and relevant to my immediate Military Occupational Specialty. With that predilection, I assumed that War Front to Store Front would be a slog. I thought I should be spending my time reading stories of lieutenants leading understrength platoons on hills surrounded by ruthless enemies, lone aviators on important missions, or the memoirs of a salty and sage veteran of Vietnam or Okinawa.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Consider

Consider succinctly articulates the need for senior leaders to create “think time” and to reflect in their personal schedules and organizational processes. Forrester firmly believes that “embracing think time and reflection as habits and organizational capabilities will determine success or rapid failure in the twenty-first century.” He supports this perspective through interviews with 55 successful people with varied experiences and identifies these individuals in the acknowledgments section. They include business and military leaders, musicians and designers, academics and economists, and advisors and diplomats.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Leadership in the New Normal

Leadership in the New Normal is a short course in leadership in which the author traces good to great leadership attributes in such forefathers as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, and by doing so he really describes the nature of leadership itself. Lieutenant General Honoré, USA (Ret.), postulates that we won our freedom because of leadership during the critical times in our history, such as Valley Forge and the Civil War, and leadership will continue to help us as we transition to the next “new normal” period.

July 1, 2014

Book Review: Killing Without Heart

The United States faces a stark decision on how to prosecute and conduct future warfare. Accordingly, every national policymaker and decisionmaker should read Killing Without Heart to be better informed on the morality of unmanned and autonomous weapons systems. With advancements in technology, the Nation has the capability to continue down the path toward a military of unmanned and autonomous robots on the battlefield. Continuing on this path will isolate the men and women in uniform from the dangers of the modern battlefield, calling into question the morality of how we fight and whether we can achieve national endstates without sending actual people into combat.

July 1, 2014

Overcoming Joint Interoperability Challenges

A growing array of ground, surface, and air platforms with Tactical Data Link (TDL) capabilities account for ever-greater demand for TDL interoperability training for joint, allied, and coalition forces. The TDLs forming the Multi-TDL Network (MTN) have improved situational awareness concurrently with reducing targeting and decisionmaking timelines for maritime and aviation component commanders and aircrews and, more recently, tactical air control players. Examining the concepts and technologies and their applications leading to today's TDL and MTN capabilities will help planners and practitioners get a handle on interoperability issues and training needs, invaluable as technological advances enhance weapons range and mobility, decrease the time to detect and decide, and lead toward real-time command and control from beyond the line of sight.

July 1, 2014

The Indian Jihadist Movement: Evolution and Dynamics

The Indian jihadist movement remains motivated primarily by domestic grievances rather than India-Pakistan dynamics. However, it is far more lethal than it otherwise would have been without external support from the Pakistani state, Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadist groups, and the ability to leverage Bangladesh, Nepal, and certain Persian Gulf countries for sanctuary and as staging grounds for attacks in India. External support for the Indian mujahideen (IM) from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) persists, but the question of command and control is more difficult to discern. The IM is best viewed as an LeT associate rather than an LeT affiliate.

June 1, 2014

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe: Convergent Strategies Open Doors to Improved Cooperation

European concerns regarding U.S. disengagement have dissipated but not entirely disappeared over the past 2 years. Still, U.S. readiness to lead politically and militarily in Europe— for example, in response to the ongoing crisis involving Russia and Ukraine—and adjoining regions remains under close scrutiny. Furthermore, while many Europeans agree in principle that renewed American focus on Asia-Pacific issues should encourage Europeans to assume a greater share of security-related responsibilities in their neighborhood, there is little evidence to date of a sea change in European attitudes toward defense spending and overseas military deployments.

June 1, 2014

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030

The longstanding efforts of the international community writ large to exclude weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from international competition and conflict could be undermined in 2030. The proliferation of these weapons is likely to be harder to prevent and thus potentially more prevalent. Nuclear weapons are likely to play a more significant role in the international security environment, and current constraints on the proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons could diminish. There will be greater scope for WMD terrorism, though it is not possible to predict the frequency or severity of any future employment of WMD. New forms of WMD—beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons—are unlikely to emerge by 2030, but cyber weapons will probably be capable of inflicting such widespread disruption that the United States may become as reliant on the threat to impose unacceptable costs to deter large-scale cyber attack as it currently is to deter the use of WMD. The definition of weapons of mass destruction will remain uncertain and controversial in 2030, and its value as an analytic category will be increasingly open to question.

May 21, 2014

JFQ 70 | From the Chairman

DOWNLOAD PDFPREVIOUS |  NEXTThere are as many reasons to serve the Nation as there are

May 1, 2014

Strategy and Force Planning in a Time of Austerity

On February 13, 1989, General Colin Powell, who was in a transition between National Security Advisor and Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, addressed the reality of strategy: “All of the sophisticated talk about grand strategy is helpful, but show me your budgets and I will tell you what your strategy is.” What General Powell meant is that the definition of the U.S. role in the world and its strategic goals flow from budgets, not the other way around. This paper fleshes out General Powell’s observation by focusing on the means part of the ends, ways, and means of strategy in order to explain how austerity affects force planning and strategy. By first examining budget reductions as a general matter, the paper describes today’s austere U.S. budgetary environment. It concludes with the current strategic options that will likely characterize the contemporary discussion of strategy and force planning.

April 1, 2014

Letter

I write in response to Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook’s article “From National to Theater: Developing Strategy” that appeared in Joint Force Quarterly 70 (3rd Quarter 2013). I agree wholeheartedly with the authors on their position that only “vital” national interests are worth dying for. However, I caution against accepting their idea that national interests that are (merely) “important” are necessarily worth killing for.

April 1, 2014

Ike Skelton, 1931-2013: Champion of Military Education

Education is persistently undervalued in most military institutions. This lack of attention is based on two realities of military life: education engenders the habit of questioning, while sound discipline, particularly in combat, requires unhesitating obedience; furthermore, education requires reflection, but war demands action. Thus, the military Services tend to draw broad lines of demarcation between their thinkers and their fighters.

April 1, 2014

From the Chairman

Representing Servicemembers who make up today’s Joint Force is my greatest honor as Chairman. As the principal military advisor to the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, I work to develop a shared understanding of our capabilities and the Nation’s needs in order to provide sound advice and to represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To be effective, I must build relationships of trust with those elected to make decisions about the use of military force. But I did not begin to establish relationships with civilian leaders only when I became Chairman.

April 1, 2014

Are We Really Ever Off Duty?

As we in the U.S. military continue to renew our commitment to the Profession of Arms, the title of this article asks a compelling question for everyone who wears the cloth of the Nation. While I believe the question has an easy answer, let us not downplay the significance of asking it at every level of professional development. Most serving in the Armed Forces understand the deeper meaning of the question, as well as the commitment to the profession and the American people that goes along with it. Therefore, most military professionals would provide the short answer: “No, we are never really off duty.”

April 1, 2014

The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations

Cyberspace can be leveraged by first, finding a theory to express and teach the constantly changing vagaries of that domain, including a suitable lexicon, and second, overcoming assorted turf wars and adequately resourcing the study, manning, equipping, and training of the cyberspace force so it can integrate with other domains.

April 1, 2014

Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace: Revolution or Evolution?

Cyberspace considerations are irreversibly proliferating, and five core ideas will help commanders fight a perpetual cyberwar: education and training, a clear chain of custody, explicit processes and procedures and guidance, advanced methods of controlling access to networks and information, and a formal cyberspace mishap investigation process throughout the Defense Department.

April 1, 2014

Combined Effects Power

The Combined Effects Power (CEP) construct does not eliminate the combined arms warfare (CAW) concept, but CEP seeks to overcome CAW’s anomalies by accommodating the behavior of both cyber domain and soft power participants from the natural domains to offset the dangers springing from the information revolution.

April 1, 2014

Information-Sharing with the Private Sector

The Obama administration’s Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21 are a beginning, but establishing public-private information sharing requires matching cyber security legislation to fill in the gaps found in the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, address a multitude of contentious issues, and achieve a unified cyberspace focus.

April 1, 2014

Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy: Reconciling Military Roles

The military’s ability to shape the security environment can be substantially improved by adopting multiple simultaneous stimulants, most prominently the national security strategy shift from deterrence and containment to cooperation and engagement. These capabilities must be sufficiently resourced so Washington’s interests can be pursued short of armed conflict where possible.

April 1, 2014

Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach

Joint doctrine, where it inadequately addresses incorporating Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) organizations into the military planning process, must be revised to give JIIM engagement its due. Moreover, greater cross-organizational exposure among partners should increase understanding and trust and get partners more fully synchronized in both planning and execution.

April 1, 2014

Airpower and Globalization Effects: Rethinking the Five Rings

The Five Rings theory may not provide quick wins against large countries with modern air defense systems, but an escalatory strategic interdiction strategy relying on capable air and navel forces to affect the most critical and vulnerable elements would apply to many crises with its nonlethal and reversible options.

April 1, 2014

Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War cuts both ways. Its tenets work against enemies but can also strike against China. Using the general’s maxims, we can uncover inconsistencies in the grandly moral stance assumed by Chinese leaders. For instance, claims made for public consumption can be juxtaposed with demonstrable fact.

April 1, 2014

Geography Matters in Maintaining Global Mobility

Geography impacts global mobility, and USTRANSCOM works with the components, the Defense Logistics Agency, and commercial partners to overcome vast distances and to subdue the burdens of time and cost. Crises evolve rapidly and the United States must maintain its unique ability to project power anywhere, any time.

April 1, 2014

Reflections on Operation Unified Protector

Committed people accounted for the success of Operation Unified Protector in Libya. NATO and partner participants in the air-heavy campaign arrived in haste and had to find fast solutions to endless challenges and shifting capabilities requirements. Skillful leadership enabled unity to survive as the center of gravity.