Due to a lapse in federal funding, this website is not being actively updated or monitored. See OPM status.

May 7, 2019

Covert Action as an Intelligence Subcomponent of the Information Instrument

Covert Action consists of methods to influence political, economic and military conditions abroad where the government’s role is neither readily apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Because oversight of Covert Action is the responsibility of congressional intelligence committees and because the fundamental purpose is to manipulate information (and conceal knowledge about the actors involved) these methods belong to the information instrument of the DIME typology of diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power. Strategists and educators should keep this in mind in order to balance the costs, risks and benefits in support of national security and foreign policy objectives.

May 7, 2019

From DOPMA to Google: Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management

How should we manage cyber talent in the information age? How do we use the military’s existing systems of talent management to optimize recruitment, employment and retention of the cyber force? Although we live in an age of increasing availability of information and integration of artificial intelligence, cyber warfare remains a human endeavor. To ensure the U.S. maintains its qualitative edge in the cyber domain, the Joint Force must attract, develop and retain the right people. This means borrowing good ideas from the private sector, say the authors, encouraging creativity, allowing flexibility and developing future leaders who understand their craft.

May 7, 2019

Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain: Dominating the Enemy

Imagine the possibilities if tactical teams could plan a raid that integrated air and ground support, and on-call fires in the cyber domain. This article argues that our national defense organizations invest in capabilities, tactics and training to successfully conduct tactical maneuver in the cyber domain. The Joint Force must be able to visualize and integrate the cyber domain with other domains to achieve strategic military and national objectives. The ability to dominate the enemy in cyberspace as part of combined arms all-domain operations, says the author, is an essential requirement for the Joint Force.

May 2, 2019

"Untapped Resources" for Building Security from the Ground Up

What are the implications of expanding the U.S. Military's role beyond armed conflict? The author answers with a case study showing how the U.S. Army Special Operations Command forged a successful alliance with business in Honduras. Working by-with-through (BWT) the private sector and the University of Notre Dame Business on the Frontlines program, the U.S. Military overcame bureaucratic resistance to create a powerful and self-sustaining force to enhance security. The result is an unconventional partnership with American and Honduran business leaders, and a creative approach to theater security planning which redefines the concept of jointness.

April 16, 2019

China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform

China’s premier paramilitary force—the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—is undergoing its most profound restructuring since its establishment in 1982. Politically, the reforms reaffirm Chinese Communist Party (and Xi Jinping’s) control over the PAP and may reduce the scope for local abuse of power. Operationally, the reforms narrow the PAP’s responsibilities to three key areas: domestic stability, wartime support, and maritime rights protection. PAP activities beyond China’s borders are likely to increase and could have implications for the United States and other Indo-Pacific states.

March 25, 2019

Russian Challenges from Now into the Next Generation: A Geostrategic Primer

U.S. and Western relations with Russia remain challenged as Russia increasingly reasserts itself on the global stage. Russia remains driven by a worldview based on existential threats—real, perceived, and contrived. As a vast, 11-time zone Eurasian nation with major demographic and economic challenges, Russia faces multiple security dilemmas internally and along its vulnerable and expansive borders. Exhibiting a reactive xenophobia stemming from a long history of destructive war and invasion along most of its borders, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and perceived Western slights, Russia increasingly threatens others and lashes outward. However, time is not on Russia’s side, as it has entered into a debilitating status quo that includes unnecessary confrontation with the West, multiple unresolved military commitments, a sanctions-strained and only partially diversified economy, looming domestic tensions, and a rising China directly along its periphery. Washington still has an opportunity to carefully improve U.S.-Russia relations and regain a more stable relationship in the near term, but only if activities and initiatives are based on a firm and frank appreciation of each other’s core interests, including those of their allies and partners.

March 13, 2019

El Salvador's Recognition of the People's Republic of China: A Regional Context

In January 2016, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) abandoned an 8-year truce in its war with the Republic of China (ROC) over diplomatic recognition around the world and subsequently moved to aggressively woo traditional Taipei allies. This paper centers on the PRC’s recent successful push into Latin America, and particularly in Central America—historically a primary area of influence for the United States. Through a concerted effort—and often in exchange for promises of mega investments and financial aid—the PRC increasingly receives a warm welcome across the Latin American continent. This paper analyzes recent decisions by several countries in the Western Hemisphere in recognizing PRC and offers an in-depth assessment of El Salvador’s recent decision to break historic ties to Taiwan and embrace Beijing—a move that presents a significant strategic challenge to U.S. regional interests.

Feb. 26, 2019

Only Connect: the Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America

Deeply entrenched over decades, organized crime has married with systemic corruption and high levels of impunity to generate multiple forms of political and economic capital across the ideological spectrum in Latin America. But recent experience gives some provisional grounds for optimism. The end point of popular disaffection with flawed democracies and illicit links between criminal groups, political elites, and the private sector need not inevitably result in an embrace of authoritarianism and/or charismatic caudillos.

Feb. 26, 2019

Extra-regional Actors in Latin America: The United States is not the Only Game in Town

In a multipolar world, jockeying for a geopolitical edge is not uncommon nor necessarily a threat. However, in the case of Latin America, none of the primary competitors with the United States share any of its fundamental values of fostering democracy and rule of law, nor strategic objectives such as drug interdiction, halting migrant flows, or building a mutually beneficial regional security structure. In fact, China, Russia, and Iran see the United States as an enemy and views diminishing U.S. influence and weakening its standing as strategic imperatives.The current trajectory in the Hemisphere cannot be altered solely with displays of military power or occasional threats and sanctions against bad actors. A genuine-whole-of-government strategic approach, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military components, is the only option to shrink the operational space of adversaries intent on diminishing the influence and effectiveness of the United States in Latin America

Feb. 26, 2019

Great Expectations and Grim Realities in AMLO’s Mexico

There is no single strategy that can quickly overcome the violence consuming many Mexican communities. Andrés Manuel López Obrador—known simply as AMLO—assumed Mexico’s presidency on Dec. 1, 2018, with a robust mandate. AMLO can no more save Mexico through massive social programs than President Enrique Nieto could by enacting sweeping economic reforms or President Felipe Calderón by deploying tens of thousands of federal forces. Mexico’s criminal groups have proven to be as complex as the country itself, with an uncanny ability to mutate and migrate. Change will come community by community, municipality by municipality, and state by state by initiating effective violence prevention programs, ensuring genuine transparency, strengthening civilian law enforcement, and building a justice system that is both efficient and fair. The United States should instead concentrate on the long-term task of helping Mexico strengthen law enforcement by sharing expertise to create a new generation of professional police, prosecutors, and judges.

Feb. 25, 2019

The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende's Glasses

The situation in Venezuela is deeply worrisome, and the countries of the hemisphere have an important responsibility to the Venezuelan people. It is also in the national interest of the United States for Venezuela to prosper as a nation, while seeking to pursue policies supported by its people through a stable and fair democratic process. There is a serious lack of meaningful and productive dialogue between the Venezuelan government and its own people at a time when the country’s economy is in crisis. The United States can and should lead, but it should follow the lead of the Venezuelan opposition, and avoid reverting to the Cold War-era unilateral action that until recently defined much of our foreign policy toward the region. Such an approach will not usher Venezuela back to its place as one of the most economically and politically consequential countries in Latin America. At least that is what Allende’s glasses seem to say.

Feb. 19, 2019

The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Organization in Brazil—the PCC

After more than a decade of denying its existence, Brazilian authorities have finally recognized the PCC—referring to Primeiro Comando da Capital, or First Capital Command—as a criminal organization that is a significant threat to public security, whose capacity to threaten democracy and the state can no longer be ignored. Formed in prison, PCC emerged and grew in the dark, ignored by the authorities. Its top leaders are already behind bars yet PCC is the leading criminal organization in Brazil and indeed in South America, benefiting both from the silence of the authorities and from the lack of an approach that acknowledges PCC as a transnational criminal organization that commits crimes from north to south across the length of South America.

Feb. 19, 2019

The U.S. Military in Support of Strategic Objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean

This article examines the role that the U.S. military plays, and can play, in advancing U.S. strategic objectives in Latin America, with a focus on security cooperation and administration of security assistance efforts, as part of coordinated whole-of-government approach. It argues for greater U.S. military attention to the development and application of strategic concepts built around strengthening governance, as the approach that is both appropriate to sensitivities and limitations regarding the employment of U.S. armed forces in Latin America, and as an effective bulwark against the cycle of criminality, corruption, and populism that opens the door for significant strategic threats against the United States. These include authoritarian anti–U.S. governments that serve as enablers for widespread criminality, terrorist threat networks, and collaboration with hostile extra-hemispheric state actors such as Russia and the People's Republic of China.

Feb. 19, 2019

Defending Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere

One glimpse at the covers of the main news and political magazines in recent years is often enough to discern a common theme. These publications often display fatalist titles such as “Democracy in Demise,” “Democracy in Crisis,” “Democracy in Peril,” or maybe the alternative favorite, “Authoritarianism on the Rise.” First the 2008 financial crisis, then the results of certain elections worldwide led many to question the future of liberal democracy. In Latin America, an additional series of events such as the “Operacão Lava Jato” (Operation Car Wash) corruption scandal that put many high-level elected and public officials in jail, paved the way for fed-up citizens to rebel against their governments in the streets and in the polls, ousting traditional parties and political elites from power. Despite the bad news, and the serious backsliding in some specific cases and notorious exceptions (e.g. Cuba and Venezuela), I argue that democracy is not dying. For better or worse, it is moving forward. Recent events do not necessarily mean that democracy is on the brink of extinction; rather, they show that there are challenges inherent to democratic life. If anything, the heated public debates confirm that democracy is a living process, which requires constant maintenance and strengthening

Feb. 19, 2019

Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America

David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez have collaborated to co-author an important contribution to the rich literature of civil-military relations in Latin America. Both are well-known scholars in this specific field: Their partnership in this project adds another contribution with an emphasis on what they term “a multidimensional approach” to “examining what is a complex set of relations between soldiers, politicians, and civilians.” As they acknowledge at the outset of the book, the civil-military relations field is extensive, and is pursued from a number of angles, “perhaps too many.”That said, the net takeaway of the Pion-Berlin and Martínez project is a well-researched, thoughtfully constructed, highly informative, and most readable contribution to the extensive civil military relations literature. Any student or scholar interested in the ongoing discussion of the role of the armed forces in Latin America should have this volume on their bookshelf.

Feb. 19, 2019

China’s Strategic Partnerships in Latin America: Case Studies of China’s Oil Diplomacy in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela 1991–2015

China’s gains in Latin America achieved through strategic partnerships and oil diplomacy are probably an inevitable result of the country’s unprecedented economic growth and need for commodities. However, the relative reduction in U.S. influence is largely a a result of inattention and the lack of a coherent strategy for the Western Hemisphere within the U.S. official strategic community. Yanran Xu’s book, "China's Strategic Partnerships in Latin America," unsurprisingly demonstrates that the Government of China takes a longer view on these issues showing a willingness to accept short-term difficulties in the name of longer-term objectives.

Feb. 11, 2019

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

China’s current military reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization.

Feb. 8, 2019

Introduction Appendix: Central Military Commission Reforms

This appendix analyzes the organizational logic behind the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shift from a system centered on a small Central Military Commission (CMC) staff and the four general departments to a much larger post-reform CMC staff that incorporates many of the functions of the former general departments. It also describes the functions of the 15 new CMC departments, commissions, and offices that were announced on January 11, 2016.

Feb. 5, 2019

Conclusion: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

China’s military reforms are driven by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is broad political support within the party for Xi’s goal of building a stronger military. The outline of the current military reform agenda was endorsed at the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, and Xi played a central role in working with PLA leaders to develop detailed reorganization plans and implement the reform agenda. At the first meeting of the new leading group on military reform in early 2014, Xi declared that the overriding goal was to produce a military that can “fight and win battles.” The 19th Party Congress work report in October 2017 advanced the timeline for Chinese military modernization, calling for achieving mechanization and making strides on informationization and building strategic capabilities by 2020 and building “world-class forces” [shijie yiliu jun, 世界一流军] by mid-century.

Feb. 5, 2019

System Overload? The 2015 PLA Force Reduction, Military-Locality Relations, and the Potential for Social Instability

Like his predecessors, Xi Jinping has sought to improve the PLA by trimming its size and adjusting its outdated force structure. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Taiwan National Defense University Professor Ma Chengkun and John Chen describe the regulations in place to handle demobilized PLA soldiers. They assess that relocation problems will be reduced by the ability of local governments to provide educational benefits for ex-PLA members and an anti-corruption campaign that has made some former soldiers ineligible for support.

Feb. 5, 2019

Civil-Military Integrations and PLA Reforms

In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA specialist Brian Lafferty provides a comprehensive overview of China’s attempt to close the civilian-military gap, concluding that the “track record suggests that even positive returns will involve a longer and more difficult process than the Party currently acknowledges.”

Feb. 5, 2019

Keeping Up with the Jundui: Reforming the Chinese Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Industrial System

How is China’s military taking advantage of the rapid technical advances being made in the civilian science and technological arena? In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Professor Tai Ming Cheung from UCSD argues that China’s defense industry is becoming an “original innovation leader” that can supply world-class weapons and equipment to China’s combat forces. A key focus of this effort is bridging the institutional divides between China’s civilian science and technological developers, notably in high-tech areas such as IT, robotics, space, and artificial intelligence, and the defense industrial base.

Feb. 5, 2019

The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China's Military to His Vision

In another chapter of the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, Department of Defense analysts Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby address the reshuffling of PLA’s highest command organ, the Central Military Commission, in October 2017. Providing a detailed analysis of the new top brass, they conclude that there is “little doubt that Xi and his generals emerged in a stronger position to steer the PLA towards fulfilling its part in the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’”

Feb. 5, 2019

Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping

One of the key goals of Xi’s military reforms has been to strengthen Chinese Communist Party control over the army. As NDU China specialists Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow discuss in their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," this goal was pursued in several ways: enhancing supervision of officers, reinforcing political education, and encouraging stronger interagency cooperation. Xi has also used a variety of political tools to enhance his own authority, including compensating losers and targeting opponents through an anti-corruption campaign.

Feb. 5, 2019

China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era

One of the key PLA organizational innovations under XI Jinping has been the creation of a new command responsible for operations in the information domain—the Strategic Support Force. It consolidates a number of functions previously scattered in different parts of the PLA covering operations in the space, cyber, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare arenas. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA experts John Costello and Joe McReynolds document the SSF’s background, structure, missions, and leadership. While the SSF aims to fulfill important roles, such as providing intelligence to warfighters, enabling power projection, and supporting strategic defense, the authors conclude on a skeptical note: the “new centralization of information power may be more a function of persistent paranoia and the need for control than a desire to explore innovative means of warfighting.”

Feb. 5, 2019

Making Sense of China's Missile Forces

China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces—previously known as the Second Artillery—have been renamed as the Rocket Force and elevated to the status of a full service, alongside the army, navy, and air force. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Princeton University Ph.D. candidate David Logan reviews the history of China’s missile forces and argue that this component of the PLA might be the “biggest winner” of recent reforms. In contrast to the other services, which lost autonomy as the PLA transitions to a joint command structure, the Rocket Force retains significant control over its subordinate units and could even gain personnel and missions as a full service. Nevertheless, key questions remain about how well the conventional missile forces will be integrated into PLA joint operations.

Feb. 5, 2019

The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms: The PLA Army

Long the largest and most influential of the PLA’s services, the PLA ground forces has been the subject of repeated cuts over the past two decades as China’s leaders prioritize the maritime and aerospace domains. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA expert Dennis Blasko argues that the army has been the “biggest loser” of the Xi-era reforms, taking the brunt of the 300,000-person downsizing and losing five of its 18 group armies. Blasko examines recent developments to the army’s leadership, structure, training, education, doctrine, and operational deployments. He concludes that due to its outdated “institutional mindset” and challenges in training a new generation of competent officers, the army will have significant trouble becoming an integral part of a joint force.

Feb. 5, 2019

PLA Force Reductions: Impact on the Services

Like his predecessors, Xi Jinping has sought to improve the PLA by trimming its size and adjusting its outdated force structure. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Department of Defense analyst Daniel Gearin compares the current round of reforms with previous downsizings. He argues that reformers have been willing to make cuts for several reasons, including streamlining the PLA’s structure, enhancing interoperability, reducing the outsized influence of the ground forces, and prioritizing quality over quantity.

Feb. 5, 2019

A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA

In their chapter, "A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA," NDU China specialists Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders explore how recent changes in China’s military education, training, and personnel systems could strengthen PLA joint operations. Nevertheless, they argue that cultivating qualified joint commanders will be a “generational project” as more capable PLA officers rise through the ranks.

Feb. 4, 2019

Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: The Long March Toward Joint Logistics

A key change to the PLA’s structure under Xi Jinping has been the transition from seven ground force-dominated military regions to five joint theater commands. In their chapter of the new NDU Press volume, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," independent analyst Leigh-Ann Luce and DIA expert Erin Richter assess how reforms could enable stronger logistics support to joint theater commanders. They concluded that the reforms will “depend on how effectively the PLA can professionalize logistics operations to ensure reliability within the system and modernize its information technology.”

Feb. 4, 2019

Coming to a (New) Theater Near You: Command, Control, and Forces

A key change to the PLA’s structure under Xi Jinping has been the transition from seven ground force-dominated military regions to five joint theater commands. In their chapter of the new NDU Press volume, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," RAND experts Edmund Burke and Arthur Chan provide a comprehensive review of the new system and discuss the operational drivers, such as improving jointness in the PLA and streamlining responsibilities. In another chapter, independent analyst Leigh-Ann Luce and DIA expert Erin Richter assess how reforms could enable stronger logistics support to joint theater commanders. They concluded that the reforms will “depend on how effectively the PLA can professionalize logistics operations to ensure reliability within the system and modernize its information technology.”

Feb. 4, 2019

Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

One of the key drivers of Xi Jinping’s military reform agenda has been building a PLA more capable of conducting joint operations, such as blockades and amphibious landings. RAND analyst Mark Cozad shows in his chapter of the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," that this is not a new goal for the PLA. While reforms build on increasing realistic joint training exercises, Cozad argues that a risk-averse organizational culture could pose continuing challenges to fielding an effective joint force. In their chapter, NDU China specialists Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders explore how recent changes in China’s military education, training, and personnel systems could strengthen PLA joint operations. Nevertheless, they argue that cultivating qualified joint commanders will be a “generational project” as more capable PLA officers rise through the ranks.

Feb. 4, 2019

The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA and China's Great Leap Outward

How can the PLA protect China’s overseas interests while also preparing for regional wars? This question is becoming more acute as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expands China’s international presence. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," RAND analysts Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga review options for how China can secure Chinese civilians and assets abroad, including by opening new military bases and enhancing the PLA’s power projection capabilities. The chapter dives deep into three cases—China’s inaugural base in Djibouti, reliance on Pakistani assistance since 2007, and evacuation of Chinese personnel from Yemen in 2015—showing that Beijing has a varied toolset for protecting overseas interests, with the PLA often playing only a supporting role.

Feb. 4, 2019

The Impacts of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy

Will China’s navy be a key winner of Xi Jinping’s military reforms? In their chapter from the new NDU Press book "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Naval War College Professor of Strategy Andrew Erickson and National Defense University Contract Researcher Ian Burns McCaslin outline three main lines of PLA navy modernization over the past decade: as a blue water navy responsible for defending Chinese interests in far-flung regions, as an interagency maritime force responsible for defending Chinese sovereignty closer to home, and as the maritime component of a combat-oriented joint force. While the navy has steadily developed along each of these paths, the authors argue that the reforms could hamper navy chiefs as operational control transitions from the services to five theater commands. The navy will also have to contend with shrinking budgets and competition for missions with the other services.

Feb. 4, 2019

Choosing the "Least Bad Option": Organizational Interests and Change in the PLA Ground Forces

How has the PLA ground force defended its interests in a time of slowing budget growth, reorganization, and changing missions that put more emphasis on air and naval power? In his chapter from the new NDU Press book "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA expert John Chen shows that army leaders weighed various options for preserving their resources as top Chinese officials encouraged the growth of the other services. He shows that the army has tried to position itself as a key component of a joint force: this required sacrificing some autonomy but was ultimately the “least bad option” because it aligned with the long-range modernization goals of top Chinese Communist Party and military officials. Chen argues that the ground force could become more offensive-oriented as its missions change, putting less attention on its traditional deter and defend roles.

Feb. 4, 2019

Breaking the Paradigm: Drivers Behind the PLA's Current Period of Reform

What prompted Xi Jinping and his colleagues in the military to launch the most ambitious restructuring of the PLA in a generation? In this chapter from the new NDU Press book "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," CNA Vice President David M. Finkelstein argues that three factors can help explain the reforms: the political need to reaffirm Chinese Communist Party authority within the military (which firmly remains a Leninist “party army”), an operational imperative to overcome institutional barriers to the army’s ability to wage modern joint operations, and an increasingly fragile national security environment requiring a stronger armed force. Finkelstein also suggests that Xi has been supported in his endeavor by a cast of professional PLA officers who have advocated for change from the inside, often drawing from U.S. and Russian examples.

Feb. 4, 2019

Appendix: Central Military Commission Reforms

.CharOverride-4, .CharOverride-5, .CharOverride-11{ font-style:italic; }

Feb. 4, 2019

Introduction: Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA

Integral to Xi Jinping’s vision of restoring China to greatness—what he defines as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” [zhonghua minzu weida fuxing, 中华民族伟大复兴]—is building a more modern, capable, and disciplined military. China’s economic development, territorial integrity, and even the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself cannot be guaranteed without an army that can fight and prevail in modern warfare. Articulating the need for a stronger military, Xi and his colleagues have reflected on periods of Chinese weakness, such as the era of imperial decline in the late 19th century and the Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 1940s. In Xi’s words, a “nation’s backwardness in military affairs has a profound influence on a nation’s security. I often peruse the annals of modern Chinese history and feel heartbroken at the tragic scenes of us being beaten because of our ineptitude.” Such humiliations, in his view, should never be repeated.

Feb. 4, 2019

Acknowledgments

Other than the introduction and conclusion, all the chapters in this book were originally presented as part of the PLA conference series co-sponsored by Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), National Defense University (NDU), and the RAND Corporation. The editors thank the authors for their patience and hard work in revising and updating their papers for publication.

Jan. 30, 2019

A Strategic Overview of Latin America: Identifying New Convergence Centers, Forgotten Territories, and Vital Hubs for Transnational Organized Crime

This paper outlines a number of critical strategic challenges in Latin America for U.S. policymakers, which were directly identified in the December 2017 National Security Strategy. However, despite this recognition, these issues are seldom featured in policy discussions about the region.

Jan. 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Updates.

Jan. 23, 2019

Joint Publications 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The Joint Staff has revised JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which provides instructions and doctrine to plan, execute, and assess counterinsurgency operations. JP 3-24 is a priority publication, which supports the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. JP 3-24 defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Accordingly, JP 3-24 provides authoritative doctrine relative to counterinsurgency. Highlights include analysis of the COIN operational environment, the nature of an insurgency, considerations for COIN planning, and how to conduct a COIN assessment.

Jan. 23, 2019

Master and Commander in Joint Air Operations: Winning the Air War Through Mission Command

Much has been written on Mission Command and Control since 2012 when CJCS General Martin Dempsey released a white paper which encouraged this leadership style among his subordinates. Mission command is a proven concept in air operations, and will be required to face the challenges of future conflicts. Since the advent of satellite communications and the internet, however, command and control of joint air operations has become increasingly centralized. Mission command is essential to winning future air wars says, the author, which is feasible because new technology allows operational commanders to make tactical decisions from thousands of miles away.

Jan. 23, 2019

War in 140 Characters

How has social media reshaped the way war is fought? Brett Swaney reviews War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century by David Patrikarakos. Every war, says the author, is essentially a clash of narratives. The author’s hypothesis that social media has reshaped not just the nature of conflict but also the entire discourse surrounding warfare remains an open question. Nonetheless, this book is required reading for national security professionals who seek a better understanding of the power of social media and the contemporary conflict increasingly shaped by homo digitalis.

Jan. 23, 2019

Just War Reconsidered

The greatest blind spot of Just War Theory is the accountability of senior civilian and military leaders for wartime decisions. Anthony Pfaff reviews Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by James Dubik. This book covers the responsibilities and obligations of civilians for the decision to go to war, and the higher obligations of military leaders and soldiers pertaining to unnecessary harm, impermissible weapons, the acceptance of surrender, and the treatment of combatants and noncombatants, among others. This book is critical reading for national security professionals in positions where they will make or advise decision-makers regarding warfare.

Jan. 23, 2019

Vietnam

This book tells the tragic story of the Vietnam War. Williamson Murray reviews Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945–1975 by Max Hastings. In this case, the word tragic is not an overstatement. Vietnam weaves the stories of American and Vietnamese soldiers and civilians on all sides of the struggle into a terrifying and impressive tale of both man’s inhumanity to his fellows, and the heroism of those on the sharp end. Perhaps the saddest result from the American point of view is that our political and military leaders learned so little from the high price we paid.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Drone Debate

Since the first drone strike outside of a conventional battlefield in 2002, the U.S. has carried out at least five hundred covert strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia killing 3,500 people, including civilians. Matthew Mueller reviews The Drone Debate: A Primer on the U.S. Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside of Conventional Battlefields by Avery Plaw, Matthew Fricker and Carlos Colon. This book contributes to the growing literature on the use of drones outside of conventional battlefields, and deals with important ethical questions on the use of drones, which makes The Drone Debate ideal for classroom use.

Jan. 23, 2019

Building Militaries in Fragile States

Why does the U.S. have such an uneven record when it comes to building foreign militaries? John Hewitt reviews Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States by Mara Karlin. The U.S. has been involved in building militaries since World War II, which provides ample case material. Karlin surveys the nuts and bolts of building militaries abroad, and investigates alternative strategies. This detailed, informative and prescriptive book should elicit robust conversations, deeper analysis and decisive action among foreign policy analysts, policy wonks, military personnel and anyone interested in foreign affairs.

Jan. 23, 2019

The Ghosts of Kasserine Pass: Maximizing the Effectiveness of Airpower

The American defeat at Kasserine Pass during the 1943 North African Campaign illustrates the consequences of allowing technological development to outpace doctrine. This article reviews the doctrine that constrained airpower during the North African Campaign and traces the development and evolution of modern doctrine that followed. Ideas conceived in North Africa seventy years ago, such as centralized control, decentralized execution, responsiveness and flexibility have stood the test of time, says the author, and remain applicable to today’s Joint Force. To achieve even greater efficiencies, the author recommends updating doctrine continually and establishing a new command structure with global reach.

Jan. 23, 2019

Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters

Security assistance depends on supporting both the militaries and the governments in weak states. Critics argue that security assistance undermines local government institutions and enables undisciplined host-nations to abuse human rights. Why should the U.S. struggle to build strong armies in weak states? Engaging weak states is in our interest, say the authors, because weak states often have governments that lack legitimacy and national identity, and thus provide environments conducive to insurgency and terrorism. Nonetheless, if we offer the right combination of carrots-and-sticks, we can encourage host-nations to reform their armed forces without undermining domestic political stability.