July 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

July 17, 2019

The Enduring Relevance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

For over six decades, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan and the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in Japan have served as the foundation of stability, prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is the basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and is a central pillar of its global strategy. The ability to project power halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then homeported in Japan. The deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

June 4, 2019

Thucydides’ Other “Traps”: The United States, China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War

The notion of a “Thucydides Trap” that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict—much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war “inevitable” between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE—has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino-American war.

May 20, 2019

Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces

Current national-level strategic documents exhort the need for creativity and innovation as a precondition of America’s continued competitive edge in the international arena. But what does that really mean in terms of personnel, processes, and culture? This paper argues that an overlooked aspect of talent management, that of cognitive diversity, must be considered when retooling military talent management systems. Going one step further, talent management models must incorporate diversity of both skill set and mindset into their calculus. Specifically, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to recruit, retain, and utilize Servicemembers and civilians with higher than average levels of creativity and a propensity for innovative thinking. It needs “enders.”

May 14, 2019

Diplomatic Security: A Comparative Analysis

In In this new book, two adept editors, Eugenio Cusumano and Christopher Kinsey, combine and edit the work of eleven authors’ different looks at diplomatic security as practiced in nine countries—China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as some overall themes on the subject. The result is perhaps the most comprehensive public study of the topic released to date, and the work stands as a reminder of the high price nations have paid in pursuit of diplomacy, as well as the difficulties and tradeoffs of balancing diplomatic efforts and the security operations meant to protect them.

May 14, 2019

The Cold War and The Cold War’s Killing Fields

Two new books revisit the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad’s The Cold War: A World History and Paul Chamberlin’s The Cold War’s Killing Fields. Westad does not use the standard bracket of 1945-89, but takes the long view back to nineteenth century economic turmoil and turn-of-the-century anti-colonialist sentiment. Chamberlain also emphasizes this same point, that the Cold War was much more than a bipolar ideological struggle. According to reviewer Walter Hudson, neither book is perfect, particularly the Chamberlin book in which American policies and policymakers do not receive fair treatment. Nonetheless, the merits of both books outweigh their flaws.

May 14, 2019

Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, was revised and signed by the Director of Joint Force Development, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, is in the final stages of its revision, tentatively scheduled for release in fall 2019. While both of these documents are commendable, says Mark Berwanger, some will claim that joint doctrine falls short in providing sufficient doctrine to integrate and synchronize all capabilities needed to accomplish the commander’s intent. Until the definition, utilization, and cultural understanding of “fires” is updated to include all offensive capabilities regardless of the weapon system, problems of integration and synchronization will remain.

May 14, 2019

The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine

As the U.S. enters a new era of near-peer competition, Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is insufficient to counter adversary employment of irregular strategies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Violent Extremist Organizations are using irregular methods to include information, cyber, economic, and unconventional warfare to offset conventional military advantages. The doctrinal terms IW and Unconventional Warfare (UW) provide a common point of departure for the doctrinal discussion, but are incomplete, generally not well understood and often misused. According to Pelleriti and co-authors, U.S. planners must reassess and update IW terminology, concepts and authorities to be successful in this new era.

May 14, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

May 14, 2019

Gallipoli: Lessons from the Great War on the Projection of Power and Joint Forcible Entry

The Gallipoli Campaign in April 1915 is one of the few events in WWI that incorporated land, sea, subsurface, air and multinational operations. Today we recognize this as a truly joint operation. This campaign offers the Joint Force important lessons on the projection of power and forcible entries for large scale combat operations within the all-domain operational concept. These include unity of command, joint fires, multiple dilemmas, logistics, the consolidation of gains and medical support services. The Gallipoli Campaign is a case study and a valuable learning tool for modern day planners which should not go to waste.

May 14, 2019

Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border

Realistic training for military can often be illusive. Factors such as urban growth, pollution, competition for frequencies and airspace, and protected habitats, continually challenge the Department of Defense in carrying out realistic training at installations. However, a small task force in the southwest has developed a solution to keep units training as they fight. At Fort Bliss in Texas, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) has developed innovative training opportunities for units that otherwise may not get the chance. While the benefits are easy to see, JTF-N is always looking for new ways to save money and enhance unit readiness.

May 14, 2019

U.S. Africa Command and Its Changing Strategic Environment

U.S. Africa Command has been training governments to combat terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime while instilling the principles of professionalism and good governance. However, major changes in the strategic environment call for a new approach. Based on changing trade patterns, China’s rising influence, and the U.S.’s new focus on great power competition, say the authors, USAFRICOM must now help African leaders safeguard national independence and root out foreign corruption. A whole-of-government approach is needed to prevent dark money from subverting local governments and turning would-be allies against the United States.

May 14, 2019

Unity of Command: Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice

Military justice has been undergoing constant change recently, as a stream of legislation continues to modify the procedures through which we achieve justice in the military. This period of flux is now coming to an end, as the most sweeping reforms in thirty years passed Congress in 2016. Perhaps the most important outcome is not what has changed, but what stayed the same: the role of the commander in the military justice process. This article examines the commander’s historical role in the military justice process, and the challenges of maintaining authority and responsibility.

May 14, 2019

A Model for Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) are often viewed as burdens and distractions. However, if managed correctly TSCPs can significantly increase unit readiness. This article provides a model based on the authors’ experience in Operation Garuda Shield 17, which placed tactical leaders at strategic points of friction to communicate up and down the chain of command. TSCPs should be viewed as readiness opportunities rather than burdens because they provide opportunity for increased resources, unique experiences, as well as deployment and training readiness. Exercise planners and their partner-nation equivalents are the key audience, say the authors, to influence and ensure success.

May 14, 2019

The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement: An Old Tool for the Modern Military

This article builds on a recent contribution from General Votel and Colonel Keravuori (in JFQ 89) who showed how the BWT approach promotes sustainable multi-national, regional and local defense institutions. Using a simple exchange of supplies and materials by via Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement transactions, the Joint Force can simultaneously build partner capacity and increase logistical interoperability. This simple but effective tool, says the author, allows service members to function in ambiguous, complex and volatile environments. Given the demands of future operations, the Joint Force must utilize all resources available to be leaner, faster and more mobile.

May 7, 2019

Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain

Bloom’s Taxonomy (named for educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom) is a system to classify learning objectives according to their level of complexity. In Professional Military Education (PME) Bloom’s Taxonomy is used to differentiate learning levels and create sequential learning objectives. This approach makes sense for most PME students but not everyone. Thus, the authors propose a stratified systems theory as a complementary framework that can be used to meet the contextual need across all PME educational systems. Implementing this recommendation, say the authors, will enhance PME and better prepare graduates to face the challenges associated with a dynamic, uncertain future.

May 7, 2019

Covert Action as an Intelligence Subcomponent of the Information Instrument

Covert Action consists of methods to influence political, economic and military conditions abroad where the government’s role is neither readily apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Because oversight of Covert Action is the responsibility of congressional intelligence committees and because the fundamental purpose is to manipulate information (and conceal knowledge about the actors involved) these methods belong to the information instrument of the DIME typology of diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power. Strategists and educators should keep this in mind in order to balance the costs, risks and benefits in support of national security and foreign policy objectives.

May 7, 2019

From DOPMA to Google: Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management

How should we manage cyber talent in the information age? How do we use the military’s existing systems of talent management to optimize recruitment, employment and retention of the cyber force? Although we live in an age of increasing availability of information and integration of artificial intelligence, cyber warfare remains a human endeavor. To ensure the U.S. maintains its qualitative edge in the cyber domain, the Joint Force must attract, develop and retain the right people. This means borrowing good ideas from the private sector, say the authors, encouraging creativity, allowing flexibility and developing future leaders who understand their craft.

May 7, 2019

Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain: Dominating the Enemy

Imagine the possibilities if tactical teams could plan a raid that integrated air and ground support, and on-call fires in the cyber domain. This article argues that our national defense organizations invest in capabilities, tactics and training to successfully conduct tactical maneuver in the cyber domain. The Joint Force must be able to visualize and integrate the cyber domain with other domains to achieve strategic military and national objectives. The ability to dominate the enemy in cyberspace as part of combined arms all-domain operations, says the author, is an essential requirement for the Joint Force.

May 2, 2019

"Untapped Resources" for Building Security from the Ground Up

What are the implications of expanding the U.S. Military's role beyond armed conflict? The author answers with a case study showing how the U.S. Army Special Operations Command forged a successful alliance with business in Honduras. Working by-with-through (BWT) the private sector and the University of Notre Dame Business on the Frontlines program, the U.S. Military overcame bureaucratic resistance to create a powerful and self-sustaining force to enhance security. The result is an unconventional partnership with American and Honduran business leaders, and a creative approach to theater security planning which redefines the concept of jointness.

April 16, 2019

China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform

China’s premier paramilitary force—the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—is undergoing its most profound restructuring since its establishment in 1982. Politically, the reforms reaffirm Chinese Communist Party (and Xi Jinping’s) control over the PAP and may reduce the scope for local abuse of power. Operationally, the reforms narrow the PAP’s responsibilities to three key areas: domestic stability, wartime support, and maritime rights protection. PAP activities beyond China’s borders are likely to increase and could have implications for the United States and other Indo-Pacific states.

March 25, 2019

Russian Challenges from Now into the Next Generation: A Geostrategic Primer

U.S. and Western relations with Russia remain challenged as Russia increasingly reasserts itself on the global stage. Russia remains driven by a worldview based on existential threats—real, perceived, and contrived. As a vast, 11-time zone Eurasian nation with major demographic and economic challenges, Russia faces multiple security dilemmas internally and along its vulnerable and expansive borders. Exhibiting a reactive xenophobia stemming from a long history of destructive war and invasion along most of its borders, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and perceived Western slights, Russia increasingly threatens others and lashes outward. However, time is not on Russia’s side, as it has entered into a debilitating status quo that includes unnecessary confrontation with the West, multiple unresolved military commitments, a sanctions-strained and only partially diversified economy, looming domestic tensions, and a rising China directly along its periphery. Washington still has an opportunity to carefully improve U.S.-Russia relations and regain a more stable relationship in the near term, but only if activities and initiatives are based on a firm and frank appreciation of each other’s core interests, including those of their allies and partners.

March 13, 2019

El Salvador's Recognition of the People's Republic of China: A Regional Context

In January 2016, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) abandoned an 8-year truce in its war with the Republic of China (ROC) over diplomatic recognition around the world and subsequently moved to aggressively woo traditional Taipei allies. This paper centers on the PRC’s recent successful push into Latin America, and particularly in Central America—historically a primary area of influence for the United States. Through a concerted effort—and often in exchange for promises of mega investments and financial aid—the PRC increasingly receives a warm welcome across the Latin American continent. This paper analyzes recent decisions by several countries in the Western Hemisphere in recognizing PRC and offers an in-depth assessment of El Salvador’s recent decision to break historic ties to Taiwan and embrace Beijing—a move that presents a significant strategic challenge to U.S. regional interests.

Feb. 26, 2019

Only Connect: the Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America

Deeply entrenched over decades, organized crime has married with systemic corruption and high levels of impunity to generate multiple forms of political and economic capital across the ideological spectrum in Latin America. But recent experience gives some provisional grounds for optimism. The end point of popular disaffection with flawed democracies and illicit links between criminal groups, political elites, and the private sector need not inevitably result in an embrace of authoritarianism and/or charismatic caudillos.

Feb. 26, 2019

Extra-regional Actors in Latin America: The United States is not the Only Game in Town

In a multipolar world, jockeying for a geopolitical edge is not uncommon nor necessarily a threat. However, in the case of Latin America, none of the primary competitors with the United States share any of its fundamental values of fostering democracy and rule of law, nor strategic objectives such as drug interdiction, halting migrant flows, or building a mutually beneficial regional security structure. In fact, China, Russia, and Iran see the United States as an enemy and views diminishing U.S. influence and weakening its standing as strategic imperatives.The current trajectory in the Hemisphere cannot be altered solely with displays of military power or occasional threats and sanctions against bad actors. A genuine-whole-of-government strategic approach, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military components, is the only option to shrink the operational space of adversaries intent on diminishing the influence and effectiveness of the United States in Latin America

Feb. 26, 2019

Great Expectations and Grim Realities in AMLO’s Mexico

There is no single strategy that can quickly overcome the violence consuming many Mexican communities. Andrés Manuel López Obrador—known simply as AMLO—assumed Mexico’s presidency on Dec. 1, 2018, with a robust mandate. AMLO can no more save Mexico through massive social programs than President Enrique Nieto could by enacting sweeping economic reforms or President Felipe Calderón by deploying tens of thousands of federal forces. Mexico’s criminal groups have proven to be as complex as the country itself, with an uncanny ability to mutate and migrate. Change will come community by community, municipality by municipality, and state by state by initiating effective violence prevention programs, ensuring genuine transparency, strengthening civilian law enforcement, and building a justice system that is both efficient and fair. The United States should instead concentrate on the long-term task of helping Mexico strengthen law enforcement by sharing expertise to create a new generation of professional police, prosecutors, and judges.

Feb. 25, 2019

The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende's Glasses

The situation in Venezuela is deeply worrisome, and the countries of the hemisphere have an important responsibility to the Venezuelan people. It is also in the national interest of the United States for Venezuela to prosper as a nation, while seeking to pursue policies supported by its people through a stable and fair democratic process. There is a serious lack of meaningful and productive dialogue between the Venezuelan government and its own people at a time when the country’s economy is in crisis. The United States can and should lead, but it should follow the lead of the Venezuelan opposition, and avoid reverting to the Cold War-era unilateral action that until recently defined much of our foreign policy toward the region. Such an approach will not usher Venezuela back to its place as one of the most economically and politically consequential countries in Latin America. At least that is what Allende’s glasses seem to say.

Feb. 19, 2019

The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Organization in Brazil—the PCC

After more than a decade of denying its existence, Brazilian authorities have finally recognized the PCC—referring to Primeiro Comando da Capital, or First Capital Command—as a criminal organization that is a significant threat to public security, whose capacity to threaten democracy and the state can no longer be ignored. Formed in prison, PCC emerged and grew in the dark, ignored by the authorities. Its top leaders are already behind bars yet PCC is the leading criminal organization in Brazil and indeed in South America, benefiting both from the silence of the authorities and from the lack of an approach that acknowledges PCC as a transnational criminal organization that commits crimes from north to south across the length of South America.

Feb. 19, 2019

The U.S. Military in Support of Strategic Objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean

This article examines the role that the U.S. military plays, and can play, in advancing U.S. strategic objectives in Latin America, with a focus on security cooperation and administration of security assistance efforts, as part of coordinated whole-of-government approach. It argues for greater U.S. military attention to the development and application of strategic concepts built around strengthening governance, as the approach that is both appropriate to sensitivities and limitations regarding the employment of U.S. armed forces in Latin America, and as an effective bulwark against the cycle of criminality, corruption, and populism that opens the door for significant strategic threats against the United States. These include authoritarian anti–U.S. governments that serve as enablers for widespread criminality, terrorist threat networks, and collaboration with hostile extra-hemispheric state actors such as Russia and the People's Republic of China.

Feb. 19, 2019

Defending Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere

One glimpse at the covers of the main news and political magazines in recent years is often enough to discern a common theme. These publications often display fatalist titles such as “Democracy in Demise,” “Democracy in Crisis,” “Democracy in Peril,” or maybe the alternative favorite, “Authoritarianism on the Rise.” First the 2008 financial crisis, then the results of certain elections worldwide led many to question the future of liberal democracy. In Latin America, an additional series of events such as the “Operacão Lava Jato” (Operation Car Wash) corruption scandal that put many high-level elected and public officials in jail, paved the way for fed-up citizens to rebel against their governments in the streets and in the polls, ousting traditional parties and political elites from power. Despite the bad news, and the serious backsliding in some specific cases and notorious exceptions (e.g. Cuba and Venezuela), I argue that democracy is not dying. For better or worse, it is moving forward. Recent events do not necessarily mean that democracy is on the brink of extinction; rather, they show that there are challenges inherent to democratic life. If anything, the heated public debates confirm that democracy is a living process, which requires constant maintenance and strengthening

Feb. 19, 2019

Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America

David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez have collaborated to co-author an important contribution to the rich literature of civil-military relations in Latin America. Both are well-known scholars in this specific field: Their partnership in this project adds another contribution with an emphasis on what they term “a multidimensional approach” to “examining what is a complex set of relations between soldiers, politicians, and civilians.” As they acknowledge at the outset of the book, the civil-military relations field is extensive, and is pursued from a number of angles, “perhaps too many.”That said, the net takeaway of the Pion-Berlin and Martínez project is a well-researched, thoughtfully constructed, highly informative, and most readable contribution to the extensive civil military relations literature. Any student or scholar interested in the ongoing discussion of the role of the armed forces in Latin America should have this volume on their bookshelf.

Feb. 19, 2019

China’s Strategic Partnerships in Latin America: Case Studies of China’s Oil Diplomacy in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela 1991–2015

China’s gains in Latin America achieved through strategic partnerships and oil diplomacy are probably an inevitable result of the country’s unprecedented economic growth and need for commodities. However, the relative reduction in U.S. influence is largely a a result of inattention and the lack of a coherent strategy for the Western Hemisphere within the U.S. official strategic community. Yanran Xu’s book, "China's Strategic Partnerships in Latin America," unsurprisingly demonstrates that the Government of China takes a longer view on these issues showing a willingness to accept short-term difficulties in the name of longer-term objectives.

Feb. 11, 2019

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

China’s current military reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization.

Feb. 8, 2019

Introduction Appendix: Central Military Commission Reforms

This appendix analyzes the organizational logic behind the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shift from a system centered on a small Central Military Commission (CMC) staff and the four general departments to a much larger post-reform CMC staff that incorporates many of the functions of the former general departments. It also describes the functions of the 15 new CMC departments, commissions, and offices that were announced on January 11, 2016.

Feb. 5, 2019

Conclusion: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

China’s military reforms are driven by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is broad political support within the party for Xi’s goal of building a stronger military. The outline of the current military reform agenda was endorsed at the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, and Xi played a central role in working with PLA leaders to develop detailed reorganization plans and implement the reform agenda. At the first meeting of the new leading group on military reform in early 2014, Xi declared that the overriding goal was to produce a military that can “fight and win battles.” The 19th Party Congress work report in October 2017 advanced the timeline for Chinese military modernization, calling for achieving mechanization and making strides on informationization and building strategic capabilities by 2020 and building “world-class forces” [shijie yiliu jun, 世界一流军] by mid-century.

Feb. 5, 2019

System Overload? The 2015 PLA Force Reduction, Military-Locality Relations, and the Potential for Social Instability

Like his predecessors, Xi Jinping has sought to improve the PLA by trimming its size and adjusting its outdated force structure. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Taiwan National Defense University Professor Ma Chengkun and John Chen describe the regulations in place to handle demobilized PLA soldiers. They assess that relocation problems will be reduced by the ability of local governments to provide educational benefits for ex-PLA members and an anti-corruption campaign that has made some former soldiers ineligible for support.

Feb. 5, 2019

Civil-Military Integrations and PLA Reforms

In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA specialist Brian Lafferty provides a comprehensive overview of China’s attempt to close the civilian-military gap, concluding that the “track record suggests that even positive returns will involve a longer and more difficult process than the Party currently acknowledges.”

Feb. 5, 2019

Keeping Up with the Jundui: Reforming the Chinese Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Industrial System

How is China’s military taking advantage of the rapid technical advances being made in the civilian science and technological arena? In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Professor Tai Ming Cheung from UCSD argues that China’s defense industry is becoming an “original innovation leader” that can supply world-class weapons and equipment to China’s combat forces. A key focus of this effort is bridging the institutional divides between China’s civilian science and technological developers, notably in high-tech areas such as IT, robotics, space, and artificial intelligence, and the defense industrial base.

Feb. 5, 2019

The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China's Military to His Vision

In another chapter of the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, Department of Defense analysts Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby address the reshuffling of PLA’s highest command organ, the Central Military Commission, in October 2017. Providing a detailed analysis of the new top brass, they conclude that there is “little doubt that Xi and his generals emerged in a stronger position to steer the PLA towards fulfilling its part in the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’”

Feb. 5, 2019

Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping

One of the key goals of Xi’s military reforms has been to strengthen Chinese Communist Party control over the army. As NDU China specialists Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow discuss in their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," this goal was pursued in several ways: enhancing supervision of officers, reinforcing political education, and encouraging stronger interagency cooperation. Xi has also used a variety of political tools to enhance his own authority, including compensating losers and targeting opponents through an anti-corruption campaign.

Feb. 5, 2019

China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era

One of the key PLA organizational innovations under XI Jinping has been the creation of a new command responsible for operations in the information domain—the Strategic Support Force. It consolidates a number of functions previously scattered in different parts of the PLA covering operations in the space, cyber, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare arenas. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA experts John Costello and Joe McReynolds document the SSF’s background, structure, missions, and leadership. While the SSF aims to fulfill important roles, such as providing intelligence to warfighters, enabling power projection, and supporting strategic defense, the authors conclude on a skeptical note: the “new centralization of information power may be more a function of persistent paranoia and the need for control than a desire to explore innovative means of warfighting.”

Feb. 5, 2019

Making Sense of China's Missile Forces

China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces—previously known as the Second Artillery—have been renamed as the Rocket Force and elevated to the status of a full service, alongside the army, navy, and air force. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Princeton University Ph.D. candidate David Logan reviews the history of China’s missile forces and argue that this component of the PLA might be the “biggest winner” of recent reforms. In contrast to the other services, which lost autonomy as the PLA transitions to a joint command structure, the Rocket Force retains significant control over its subordinate units and could even gain personnel and missions as a full service. Nevertheless, key questions remain about how well the conventional missile forces will be integrated into PLA joint operations.

Feb. 5, 2019

The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms: The PLA Army

Long the largest and most influential of the PLA’s services, the PLA ground forces has been the subject of repeated cuts over the past two decades as China’s leaders prioritize the maritime and aerospace domains. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," PLA expert Dennis Blasko argues that the army has been the “biggest loser” of the Xi-era reforms, taking the brunt of the 300,000-person downsizing and losing five of its 18 group armies. Blasko examines recent developments to the army’s leadership, structure, training, education, doctrine, and operational deployments. He concludes that due to its outdated “institutional mindset” and challenges in training a new generation of competent officers, the army will have significant trouble becoming an integral part of a joint force.

Feb. 5, 2019

PLA Force Reductions: Impact on the Services

Like his predecessors, Xi Jinping has sought to improve the PLA by trimming its size and adjusting its outdated force structure. In his chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Department of Defense analyst Daniel Gearin compares the current round of reforms with previous downsizings. He argues that reformers have been willing to make cuts for several reasons, including streamlining the PLA’s structure, enhancing interoperability, reducing the outsized influence of the ground forces, and prioritizing quality over quantity.

Feb. 5, 2019

A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA

In their chapter, "A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA," NDU China specialists Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders explore how recent changes in China’s military education, training, and personnel systems could strengthen PLA joint operations. Nevertheless, they argue that cultivating qualified joint commanders will be a “generational project” as more capable PLA officers rise through the ranks.

Feb. 4, 2019

Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: The Long March Toward Joint Logistics

A key change to the PLA’s structure under Xi Jinping has been the transition from seven ground force-dominated military regions to five joint theater commands. In their chapter of the new NDU Press volume, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," independent analyst Leigh-Ann Luce and DIA expert Erin Richter assess how reforms could enable stronger logistics support to joint theater commanders. They concluded that the reforms will “depend on how effectively the PLA can professionalize logistics operations to ensure reliability within the system and modernize its information technology.”

Feb. 4, 2019

Coming to a (New) Theater Near You: Command, Control, and Forces

A key change to the PLA’s structure under Xi Jinping has been the transition from seven ground force-dominated military regions to five joint theater commands. In their chapter of the new NDU Press volume, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," RAND experts Edmund Burke and Arthur Chan provide a comprehensive review of the new system and discuss the operational drivers, such as improving jointness in the PLA and streamlining responsibilities. In another chapter, independent analyst Leigh-Ann Luce and DIA expert Erin Richter assess how reforms could enable stronger logistics support to joint theater commanders. They concluded that the reforms will “depend on how effectively the PLA can professionalize logistics operations to ensure reliability within the system and modernize its information technology.”

Feb. 4, 2019

Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?

One of the key drivers of Xi Jinping’s military reform agenda has been building a PLA more capable of conducting joint operations, such as blockades and amphibious landings. RAND analyst Mark Cozad shows in his chapter of the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," that this is not a new goal for the PLA. While reforms build on increasing realistic joint training exercises, Cozad argues that a risk-averse organizational culture could pose continuing challenges to fielding an effective joint force. In their chapter, NDU China specialists Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders explore how recent changes in China’s military education, training, and personnel systems could strengthen PLA joint operations. Nevertheless, they argue that cultivating qualified joint commanders will be a “generational project” as more capable PLA officers rise through the ranks.

Feb. 4, 2019

The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA and China's Great Leap Outward

How can the PLA protect China’s overseas interests while also preparing for regional wars? This question is becoming more acute as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expands China’s international presence. In their chapter in the new NDU Press book, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," RAND analysts Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga review options for how China can secure Chinese civilians and assets abroad, including by opening new military bases and enhancing the PLA’s power projection capabilities. The chapter dives deep into three cases—China’s inaugural base in Djibouti, reliance on Pakistani assistance since 2007, and evacuation of Chinese personnel from Yemen in 2015—showing that Beijing has a varied toolset for protecting overseas interests, with the PLA often playing only a supporting role.

Feb. 4, 2019

The Impacts of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy

Will China’s navy be a key winner of Xi Jinping’s military reforms? In their chapter from the new NDU Press book "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms," Naval War College Professor of Strategy Andrew Erickson and National Defense University Contract Researcher Ian Burns McCaslin outline three main lines of PLA navy modernization over the past decade: as a blue water navy responsible for defending Chinese interests in far-flung regions, as an interagency maritime force responsible for defending Chinese sovereignty closer to home, and as the maritime component of a combat-oriented joint force. While the navy has steadily developed along each of these paths, the authors argue that the reforms could hamper navy chiefs as operational control transitions from the services to five theater commands. The navy will also have to contend with shrinking budgets and competition for missions with the other services.