April 19, 2018

Paradigm Change: Operational Art and the Information Joint Function

The need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges. During a recent effort by the Joint Staff to update Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, leaders recognized that the joint force was already attempting to use information as a function and that the time to institutionalize information as a function was therefore overdue.

April 19, 2018

Globally Integrated Exercises: Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure

The limitations in the Globally Integrated Exercise construct should not dissuade its utilization. Like any new concept, it requires the necessary time, space, and iterations to meet the Chairman’s intent. There is no shortage of recommendations for tackling the globally integrated operations challenges.

April 17, 2018

Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight: Joint Concepts and Future Readiness

Military forces that quickly adapt to change usually prevail. It is difficult to adapt in the near term, more so when there is an extended time horizon, but not adapting can exact a heavy toll in blood and treasure. The high cost of not adjusting to new situations underlies the stereotypical conservatism of military organizations, and it is borne in their propensity to lean heavily on the lessons of the last war and eschew radical change. But those who do not try to anticipate change risk surrendering the initiative on the future battlefield.

April 17, 2018

A New Approach to Joint Concepts

The future operating environment will feature broad changes in the character of warfare. Driven by the rise of competent and competitive states; economic, social, and environmental challenges; and rapidly evolving technologies, these changes will necessitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DOD). Innovation must develop and employ new capabilities, organizational constructs, and approaches to warfighting to maintain competitive advantage over a broad range of potential adversaries.

April 13, 2018

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates.

April 13, 2018

The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: Focus on Campaign Activities

This article continues the discussion on human security’s1 seven relevant dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.2 Complementing previous Joint Force Quarterly installments on health and food security,3 the following describes the U.S. Government’s approach to environmental security with a focus on combatant commander campaign activities.

April 13, 2018

Exploring the Future Operating Environment

As we move past the plan of the day, proceed outside of the budget cycle, and venture beyond the 10-year horizon of strategic planning efforts, significant ongoing changes in the security environment will alter the character of warfare beyond recognition.

April 13, 2018

America’s First General Staff (Book Review)

This trim book explains the full course of the U.S. Navy’s General Board, its institutional forum for innovation, during the period from 1900 to 1950. To remedy challenges identified during the Spanish-American War, Navy Secretary John D. Long established the board as an experiment. The Secretary realized he needed military advice, so he chose a mix of up-and-coming Navy officers, the head of the Bureau of Navigation that managed careers, and one Marine officer, all led by the redoubtable Admiral George Dewey, to offer it.

April 13, 2018

Anatomy of a Campaign (Book Review)

John Kiszely had an outstanding career in the British army. As a major, he won the Military Cross while leading his company of Scots Guards in the attack on Tumbledown Mountain in the last days of the Falklands War. During his career, he served in the bureaucracy in Whitehall as the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff and served stints in British operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Iraq, finally retiring as a lieutenant general. He has seen war at both ends: the hard, sharp end of combat and the making and coordinating of policy and operations.

April 13, 2018

Illusions of Victory (Book Review)

In Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (Columbia University Press, 2006), Kimberly Zisk Marten recounts the dismal record of Western military interventions that could achieve temporary stability but not foster any lasting political change. Her solution is to lower expectations while extending presence; outsiders cannot shape the course of internal political change but can maintain security for the lengthy period required for equilibrium to be restored after a society is disrupted.

April 12, 2018

Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate: Enabling Senior Leader Decisionmaking

In the coming years, each Service will likely pursue a human capital data analytics solution set that best meets its needs. Regardless of each Service’s chosen path, the paramount requirement before us all is to create systems that balance the data analytic needs of leaders while strengthening the bond of trust with our Servicemembers.

April 12, 2018

Structuring Airpower to Win in 2030: Designing a Joint Division of Labor Between Land- and Sea-Based Combat Aviation

The lessons learned during nearly a decade of concept development must be translated into a joint force structure capable of defeating antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and preserving America’s power projection advantage. However, such a force structure will only be effective if it is pursued through a joint approach to acquisitions.

April 12, 2018

Climate Change and Urbanization: Challenges to Global Security and Stability

Two global trends that present monumental new challenges for civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises are urbanization—the growth of cities across the world—and climate change. The following article explains how these two trends and their interactive effects will increasingly complicate and test civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises.

April 12, 2018

The Importance of Lessons Learned in Joint Force Development

The importance of gathering, developing, and disseminating joint lessons learned cannot be overemphasized. Today, we need real-world lessons learned by the deployed young officer who is experiencing what works, what does not, and what could—if certain changes were made. This is mission of the Joint Staff Joint Force Development Directorate’s Joint Lessons Learned Division (JLLD).

April 12, 2018

A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving

Despite George Santayana’s warning—“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it”—we continue to forget what we have learned and fall into bad habits. Although we have already determined better ways to make decisions and solve problems, we tend to forget them.

April 12, 2018

Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command?

The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 provides that the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will depend substantially on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries. Consistent with the law, implementation guidance over the years has been clear, and increasingly more urgent.

April 12, 2018

Laying the Foundation for a Strategic By-With-Through Approach

Logistics interoperability is critical to the future success of global operations responding to transregional threats, but it requires dedicated efforts in logistics security cooperation to build the foundation for a strategic BWT approach.

April 12, 2018

Sacrifice, Ownership, Legitimacy: Winning Wars By, With, and Through Host-Nation Security Forces

Speed and tactical efficiency do not win civil conflict; host-nation legitimacy combined with eventual tactical victory does. These facts necessitate a conditions-based approach.

April 12, 2018

Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through: How Mattered as Much as What

In January 2017, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, deployed to bolster the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the campaign to annihilate the so-called Islamic State. How we advised ISF commanders was as important as what we advised them to do in order to win.

April 12, 2018

The By-With-Through Approach: An Army Component Perspective

Land forces in U.S. Central Command have adopted an operational approach of “by, with, and through” (BWT) to achieve this endstate. This article provides the USARCENT perspective on how it accomplishes its mission with BWT as the operational approach and demonstrates the need for the joint force to come to a common understanding of what executing operations within a BWT operational approach, and all associated terms, means.

April 12, 2018

The By-With-Through Operational Approach

The U.S. military must organize, resource, and train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments requires common understanding and the development of joint force doctrine.

April 12, 2018

From the Chairman: The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed

Over the past two decades, the strategic landscape has changed dramatically. While the fundamental nature of war has not changed, the pace of change and modern technology, coupled with shifts in the nature of geopolitical competition, have altered the character of war in the 21st century. To keep pace with the changing character of war, we must globally integrate the way we plan, employ the force, and design the force of the future.

April 12, 2018

Outmatched Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks

Understanding how adversaries use threat networks globally to compete with us below the threshold of traditional armed conflict is a critical first step to identifying opportunities to exploit, disrupt, or degrade threat networks. However, the increasing convergence of legitimate and illicit networks complicates our ability to gain the level of understanding required to do this effectively.

April 12, 2018

Moore’s Law and the Challenge of Counter-sUAS Doctrine

In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of the Intel Corporation, made his now famous prediction that the “number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately double every 24 months.” More than 50 years later, his prediction has not only held true, but also the implications of what is now called Moore’s Law define the combat environment for the joint force. The continual miniaturization, mass production, proliferation, and improvement of integrated circuits and microprocessors have introduced powerful computing technology into every aspect of modern life.

April 11, 2018

The Practical Implications of Information as a Joint Function

The integration of the Information as a Joint Function (IJF) with the other six joint functions offers new opportunities for developing and conducting operational art and design. IJF will result in the development of executable plans to deal with future conflicts that are TMM in nature. The ultimate result will be that joint force commanders are able to dominate the informational aspect of their operating environment (the IE) the same way they dominate land, sea, air space, and cyberspace.

April 11, 2018

Introducing Information as a Joint Function

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a change to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, introducing information as a new and seventh joint function. This issuance portends significant changes in how the joint force will plan and execute transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional operations. As such, it represents an opportunity to reimagine what “combined arms” means in 21st-century warfare.

April 11, 2018

Executive Summary

What kind of force does the United States need in order to meet its mission of protecting the Nation? How do we preserve our working relationships with allies and partners? What about the ongoing issue of readiness needs versus force modernization? No matter how the future turns out, the United States and the joint force will continue to be central elements of how the world is shaped.

March 1, 2018

Technology and National Security: The United States at a Critical Crossroads

Globalization of science and technology, emerging and unpredictable threats (both manmade and natural), conventional and emerging weapons of mass destruction, and an inversion of technology flow from the private to public sectors all present challenges to our national security.

Feb. 1, 2018

Low-Cost Access to Space: Military Opportunities and Challenges

Space activity is critical to the American way of war. The commercialization of space has potentially radical implications for U.S. national security through its impact on a range of military and intelligence functions and on the ability of the nation to effectively project power around the globe.

Jan. 10, 2018

Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Doctrine Update.

Jan. 10, 2018

Born Multinational: Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations

U.S. military operations are conducted in a multinational environment. Given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s emphasis on working with allies and other international partners, there are many advantages to certain capabilities being born multinational. A multinational development team offers the benefits of both inherent interoperability and a broad set of perspectives, insights, and knowledge sources.

Jan. 10, 2018

Department of Defense Terminology Program

The Department of Defense (DOD) Terminology Program was formalized in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and falls under the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).1 The program is overseen by the director of Joint Force Development (DJ7) to improve communications and mutual understanding through the standardization of military and associated terminology within DOD, with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and between the United States and international partners. It includes U.S. participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology development as well as other terminology forums.

Jan. 10, 2018

A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles

While current U.S. doctrine makes the center of gravity (COG) concept the centerpiece in operational planning, there is a broad call for either revising or killing the concept. However, if the COG concept is to remain the centerpiece in military planning, it must not only help link actions, effects, and objectives but also link the JFC level of command with the national strategic level of command.

Jan. 10, 2018

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan

The gap between academia and the military has existed at least since the early 1960s, when Project Camelot crystallized political opposition to the American military/security apparatus by activist academicians. As a result, the military/security community established its own think tanks, designed to replicate social and hard science capabilities, reducing the political noise and fallout inherent in the engagement with a potentially hostile academic community. On the other side of the divide, many academics reacted with anger to social scientists engaged in military activity, political beliefs fusing with concerns of academic freedom and fanned with the flames of opposition to the Vietnam War in what they saw as colonialism and rampant militarization of American society.

Jan. 10, 2018

Elite Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the World

Special operations forces (SOF) have existed in some form and played roles in warfare since the advent of conventional military operations. For example, in biblical times, King David had a special forces platoon. World War II brought growth, greater recognition, and prestige for special forces like the British Commandos, Special Air Service, and the American Office of Strategic Services. The last two decades have witnessed explosive growth in various forms of unconventional or SOF.

Jan. 10, 2018

Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014

For years, the British enjoyed a reputation of counterinsurgency excellence. Their campaigns—Malaya, Kenya, Oman, Northern Ireland—were hailed as successes in this difficult form of war. Afghanistan, however, turned out to be painful for the British. They committed a peak of over 9,500 troops, eventually drawing down to a few hundred by the end of 2014. They faced numerous battlefield reverses. Eventual successes were overshadowed by the arrival of 20,000 U.S. Marines. Britain’s counterinsurgency reputation came out of the campaign tarnished.

Jan. 10, 2018

Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation: Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. Africa Command’s Efforts

U.S. Africa Command’s lack of operationalization of its security cooperation processes, combined with the sheer size of its area of responsibility and the significant changes with the new NDAA, create unique challenges. This article outlines four main areas where USAFRICOM can improve its efforts to operationalize and synchronize its security cooperation efforts.

Jan. 10, 2018

Achieving Secrecy and Surprise in a Ubiquitous ISR Environment

As foreign and commercial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities proliferate, our ability to leverage secrecy and surprise for battlefield advantage is in danger of being severely degraded or lost altogether. We must take prudent near-term steps to address this concern.

Jan. 10, 2018

Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Simplifying an Increasingly Complex Problem

As the complexity of air, cruise, and ballistic missile threats quickly evolves over the next 10 to 20 years, DOD must find a less complicated way to rapidly develop and integrate the Services’ integrated air and missile defense capabilities and employ them across the combatant commands boundaries.

Jan. 10, 2018

Geographic Component Network Analysis: A Methodology for Deliberately Targeting a Hybrid Adversary

As the nature of the adversaries the U.S. military engages on the battlefield changes, so must our thinking on how to systematically analyze and degrade their centers of gravity. Geographic component network analysis (GCNA) enables more rapid analysis of a hybrid enemy in a focused, systematic manner to degrade the adversary’s capability to effectively govern and project combat power from defined territorial strongholds.

Jan. 10, 2018

Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War: Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis

Scipio Africanus’s European and African campaigns during the Second Punic War serve as timeless lessons for joint force planners on how to conduct center of gravity (COG) analysis in support of theater and national military planning.

Jan. 10, 2018

The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure

There has never been a greater historical need and better opportunity to create a strategic joint influence organization and subsequent total joint influence force structure. A unified joint influence force would be able to support and defend the Nation’s strategic interests against all propaganda efforts coming from the likes of adversarial states and nonstate actors well into the foreseeable future.

Jan. 10, 2018

Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts Toward a Joint Solution

As advancements in cyber continue to accelerate and proliferate across multiple domains, and as our potential adversaries adjust their strategies by utilizing these advancements asymmetrically in order to counter our strengths, we can no longer develop domain-specific solutions that require time and effort to synchronize and federate.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process

Is risk management overemphasized in the decisionmaking process? Is caution more valued than boldness in action?

Jan. 9, 2018

Surfing the Chaos: Warfighting in a Contested Cyberspace Environment

To win in the new cyber-contested battles of the future, a combatant must still command, but let go of control and surf the chaos.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Power of Partnership: Security Cooperation and Globally Integrated Logistics

Logistics ought to be substantially integrated into security cooperation efforts, and security cooperation ought to be thoughtfully integrated into the discipline of logistics. While this premise may seem obvious, it is too often overlooked or misunderstood.

Jan. 9, 2018

Multidomain Battle: Time for a Campaign of Joint Experimentation

Concepts on the scale of multidomain battle (MDB) require a campaign of experimentation that provides compelling evidence for the concept by fleshing out its operational and institutional contexts.

Jan. 9, 2018

The Future Is Plural: Multiple Futures for Tomorrow's Joint Force

Multidimensional challenges cannot rely on dartboards or algorithms fed by Big Data. The central question for senior leaders in defense is improving their assessment of risk in ambiguous contexts.

Jan. 9, 2018

Executive Summary

War exacts a toll over time unlike any other human experience. And meeting the demands of combat takes more than one individual’s effort, budget, and ideas to succeed. The joint force has to adapt, adjust, acquire, repurpose, retrain, recruit, and perform a whole range of other functions to continue to meet the mission of protecting our Nation, allies, and partners around the world.

Dec. 21, 2017

Battlefield Geometry in our Digital Age: From Flash to Bang in 22 Milliseconds

This year has been tough for cybersecurity programs. Every month in the first six months of 2017, the world experienced a major cyber event. Open-source attacks included attacks on critical infrastructure, banks, intelligence services, and significant commercial and government entities. Indeed, reflecting on the scope and depth of most publically acknowledged compromises, uncovers the reality of the tremendous and growing risks the country faces nearly two decades into the 21st century. Everything seems to have changed. Virtually every organization within the Department of Defense (DOD) has, sometimes reluctantly, come to embrace digital age technology, to the point that they are completely dependent on it. The result is a shocking degree of paralysis when our access to the services we now rely upon is disrupted.