Nov. 18, 2019

Maximizing the Power of Strategic Foresight

Strategic Foresight is an interdisciplinary skillset concerned with identifying signals of change in uncertain environments. This article argues first that national security professionals need this skillset in this era of ambiguity and unpredictability. In addition, the author identifies several areas where Strategic Foresight can be improved. First, shift analytic focus from technology-focused futures to a more integrated vision of future environments. Second, use lessons from systems thinking to evaluate more accurately the global system. Third, provide more instruction on complexity thinking. Fourth, introduce foresight thinking early in professional development. Fifth, create a unified lexicon of the concepts and terms.

Nov. 18, 2019

Strategic Army: Developing Trust in the Shifting Landscape

Warfare in the information age is a new battleground. The disinformation campaigns of our adversaries undermine trust across the Joint Force and degrade the legitimacy of liberal democracies. The Australian Army serves as a case study of building trust domestically, regionally and globally in order to strengthen the entire rules-based global order. Trust is a strategic asset, say the authors, which strengthens our defense capabilities and can diminish the power of our adversaries. In order to realize a truly strategic army, force design and force structure should complement high quality combat capability.

Nov. 18, 2019

Executive Summary

Our world is in constant motion. If you have a setback or loss, you would be wise to do as the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Marine Corps suggests: improvise, adapt and overcome. Former Secretary James Mattis asked our professional military education (PME) institutions to develop their critical thinking skills and push their intellectual limits. To that end, in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly, we examine past and present conflicts to help you become a better leader. And we offer new ideas to help you maintain your intellectual advantage and keep the Joint Force moving forward.

Nov. 7, 2019

Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence

This paper is the first in a sequence of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by Baltic states in close proximity to a resurgent Russia that the U.S. National Security Strategy describes as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to begin exploration of the most significant Baltic states security challenges through focused strategic research and a series of multinational, interactive theater wargames sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University and Swedish Defence University. This first paper highlights early research and wargaming insights indicating the importance of denial-based deterrence for protection of the Baltic states from potential Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and the Baltic states can best improve their ground, maritime, and air forces to generate credible denial-based deterrence.

Oct. 17, 2019

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 (October 2019)

“Taking Responsibility in a Dangerous World”—the aptly titled feature by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—sets the tone for our latest edition of PRISM.  A non-themed edition, PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 explores the business of terrorism; lessons learned from 18 years of war; the emergence of hybrid warfare; the potential militarization of robotic automated systems and artificial intelligence; Russia’s resurgence, and Sweden’s strategy of Total Defense in response to Russia’s resurgent assertiveness; as well as the rapid growth of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and a comparative analysis of international approaches to diplomatic security. The edition features the perspectives of warfighters, scholars, practitioners, and diplomats from Israel, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Distinguished perspectives include those of a Defense Minister, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, former Commander Joint Special Operations Command, and former UN Under Secretary General for Safety and Security. Irrespective of the rank or specialty, each of our newest authors are thought leaders. 

Oct. 4, 2019

Diplomatic Security: A Comparative Analysis

This book's stark litany of attacks against diplomats from other nations—as well as the information presented regarding the steps their individual nations have taken in the name of diplomatic security—reveals that too often, the attention of the public and members of national governments may have been momentarily seized by attacks on their diplomatic outposts. But discussions about anemic budgets and other higher priority matters quickly diluted the collective anger about the deaths of yet another diplomat serving their country, and little changes.

Oct. 4, 2019

"Total Defense"—an Interview with Swedish Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist

"Total Defense" is the total mobilization of a society in a war situation—what you can mobilize on the civilian side and on the military side together, and what you can do on the civilian side to support the military effort. It includes what you can do in private companies, as well as in the public sector and authorities. Sweden had a huge civil defense organization during the Cold War, but since then it has atrophied, and now we are starting the complicated process of rebuilding that capacity. If the military organization is to work in reality, you need this support from the civilian side, such as infrastructure, healthcare, and all these things that are required for effective military operations.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Digital Maginot Line: Autonomous Warfare and Strategic Incoherence

Just as the Maginot Line created an illusion of security, guaranteed standoff, and physical protection that made its shattering during the blitzkrieg of 1940 all the more shocking to the French polity, the pursuit of militarized robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) has led many to believe that the key to a more efficient and secure future lay within these technologies. The United States Armed Forces owe themselves and their civilian leaders honesty regarding a prudent approach to integrating AI and a pragmatic vision of the threats and risks associated with relying on these systems to achieve future policy goals.

Oct. 4, 2019

Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield: Implications for Deterrence and Surprise

Predicting the future of technology is a risky business. We know with certainty that AI is being incorporated into an array of military missions with the intent of improving our knowledge of the operational environment, adversary capabilities, and the speed and precision of offensive and defensive weapons. We can usefully speculate about how these developments are poised to change the face of modern warfare and how those changes might affect regional and strategic deterrence stability, based on our understanding of established political and military realities. More elusive, however, is a clear picture of how AI might converge with other technologies to produce unexpected outcomes, or “unknown unknowns.” Nevertheless, there are a few possibilities that could have major strategic consequences and alter the underlying realities on which regional and strategic stability are founded.

Oct. 4, 2019

Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?

PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2 — Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part of an intense revisionist campaign or during war. For example, the current conflict in eastern Ukraine might be viewed as an example of hybrid warfare that is taking place within a wider Russian campaign of regional revisionism and global influence. Likewise, Iranian proxy militia fighting hybrid wars in Syria and Iraq, and against Israel, are part of a wider regional revisionist challenge. Alternatively, any future large-scale war is likely to involve hybrid warfare operations, in parallel with hybrid threats to the homeland. The challenge will be to fight both in parallel.

Oct. 4, 2019

On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch

Punching above its weight is a sign of strong leadership in the Russian cultural-political-military context. As the past two decades show, the Kremlin has been quite consistent in delivering its promises, especially in the political-military sphere. The West has also been very consistent in dismissing Moscow’s promises, finding itself surprised time after time. Unfortunately, in analyzing how Gerasimov’s latest promise was discussed in the West, it is likely to follow the same path, and we all will be “surprised” in a few years when Russia will deploy an intervention force to “protect” its interests abroad.

Oct. 4, 2019

Pathologies of Centralized State-Building

The international community, led by the United States, has invested trillions of dollars in state-building efforts during the past two decades. Yet despite this commitment of substantial resources, conflict and violence remain a challenge in fragile states. It therefore seems especially important to consider the reasons why state-building has not lived up to its expectations. One plausible explanation for the failure of state-building in Afghanistan is that the government remains extremely centralized in all critical dimensions, including the power of the executive, subnational governance, judicial institutions, public budgeting and finance, and the national security forces. Of these, only the Afghan National Army has implemented meaningful reforms. In the other areas, almost no reform has occurred compared to the institutional status quo before 2001. A consequence is that most Afghans continue to experience the same type of centralized, predatory state that they endured prior to 2001. Paradoxically, by resurrecting the centralized, predatory state, the stabilization effort continues to give rise to an antigovernment insurgency across the country.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Meaning of Setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan

From 2011 to 2017, similar processes played out in Iraq and Afghanistan that are deeply significant yet understudied. Between 2011 and 2014, after much effort and some success, the United States drew down its military forces in both countries. Hopes were high that the Iraqi and the Afghan government could take over. Their armies and police were vastly superior in numbers, equipment, and training to those of their adversaries. Nevertheless, the Iraqi and Afghan states both came to the brink of collapse. Gains that had come at high cost and sacrifice for the United States unraveled. Terrorist threats re-emerged. The United States re-entered the conflicts. So far, it has not fully withdrawn. Why these events came to pass has not yet been fully studied. This article explores what happened and the implications for U.S. strategy.

Oct. 4, 2019

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons from the Long War

Considering that more than 2,200 Americans have died in Afghanistan, it would be a dereliction of duty not to extract lessons from nearly 18 years of engagement there. It not only makes sense but also is a statutory obligation for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Our legislative mandate requires us to provide recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and leadership on preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse. As an independent inspector general, my job is to evaluate the effectiveness of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, not to make policy. Nonetheless, I have been asked many times whether the United States and its coalition partners will be in Afghanistan in another 18 years. Although I cannot answer that question directly, I know that we may well be if we fail to learn the lessons from the first 18 years of our nation’s experience in Afghanistan.

Oct. 4, 2019

Taking Responsibility in a Dangerous World

The NATO partnership is indeed evolving, and some analysts describe a growing rift across the ocean. Yet transatlantic cooperation today is more important than ever. Beyond any disagreement we might have, European and American interests very often coincide. On most foreign policy issues—from Ukraine to Syria, from Africa’s security to North Korea—transatlantic cooperation is in great shape. During the five-year term of the current EU leadership, the European Union and NATO have signed two historic Joint Declarations, which have opened a whole new phase in our partnership. Our two organizations share 22 Members and the same set of values: our mandates are different but—most importantly—they are complementary. While NATO remains the pillar of Europe’s collective defense, there are tasks that can only be performed by an organization of a different nature, such as the European Union (EU). The EU contribution to our common security is unique and increasingly relevant in our dangerous world.

Oct. 4, 2019

The Business Case for Terrorism

Two of the deadliest and most notorious terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), have boasted many of the same structures and utilized tactics common to organizations in the business world. While AQ (having existed and thrived longer) has gradually built a global network of operatives, IS has focused on rapid expansion. Circumstances have forced the two organizations to compete for influence, resources, and success. In this, article we will reconceptualize terrorist groups as business organizations and explore how such organizations can best be countered, based on insights from the business world.

Oct. 4, 2019

Temperature Rising: Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Wars in the Middle East

The academic literature on the IRGC, Iran’s elite force, has been rapidly growing. Nader Uskowi’s book differs from other offerings in the sense that the author does not claim objectivity. On the first page, the author dedicates the book to his father, a former major general in the Iranian Imperial Army—the military arm of the Pahlavi regime, toppled by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. There is nothing wrong or unusual about taking one side in a political debate. The Islamic Revolution created a large number of both loyalists and opponents. Certainly, both sides have the right to make their case.

July 31, 2019

Five Conundrums: The United States and the Conflict in Syria

For the past 8 years, two U.S. administrations, the United Nations (UN), and numerous foreign governments have sought to end the catastrophic war in Syria and reach a negotiated political settlement to the conflict. Their efforts have repeatedly been complicated, even thwarted, by the highly contested and violent politics underlying the conflict, the sheer number of conflict actors inside and outside of Syria, and those actors’ diverse and often irreconcilable objectives.

July 29, 2019

Joint Force Quarterly 94 (3rd Quarter, July 2019)

What have you learned from the past? What future do you see? Why not write about it and share it with us?  Our Forum section in this issue opens with an interview of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. With arguably some of the most important responsibilities in the joint force, he discusses how his commands work to protect the homeland, defend the airspace above the United States and Canada, and how the joint force is working to achieve the Chairman’s Globally Integrated Operations challenge.

July 25, 2019

Can the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Avoid the Fate of the F-22 Raptor?

Has the US made the right choices in our defense industrial base for advanced combat aircraft? The author analyzes two major weapons systems—the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II—looking for ways to save money, improve interoperability, and enhance military-industrial cooperation between the US and its allies. The author’s analysis of the F-22 program raises questions that might be common to both programs. Why, for example, was the single purpose non-joint aircraft (the F-22) program cancelled after only 25% of the intended aircraft had been procured? Does the F-22’s fate offer any lessons for multipurpose joint aircraft?

July 25, 2019

Getting the Joint Functions Right

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a special out-of-cycle revision to joint doctrine, adding Information to the joint functions. The significance of this policy change was highlighted by endorsement from the Secretary of Defense in September 2017, where he stressed that inclusion in the joint functions signaled an elevation of information throughout Department of Defense thinking and practice. This article is an historical overview of the joint functions, intended to overcome the long-standing reluctance to place the soft power elements of the modern battlefield on the same footing as hard power elements.

July 25, 2019

Global Risks and Opportunities: The Great Power Competition Paradigm

The great power competition paradigm outlined in the National Defense Strategy provides a way to think strategically about inter-state competition in a multipolar world. Both history and a survey of current events indicate we should expect great power competition throughout the 21st century between the US, China and Russia in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Although information operations, economic diplomacy and espionage will be the primary weapons of statecraft, say the authors, military cooperation can catalyze greater regional integration, reassure our partners and allies, and support our whole-of-government efforts.

July 25, 2019

Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

America must maintain credible nuclear deterrent capabilities to convince potential adversaries and allies alike that the US will defend its vital interests and will employ those capabilities, all while hedging against an uncertain future. Despite the changing environment, America continues to view nuclear deterrence largely in Cold War terms. The continued reliance on obsolete deterrence concepts exposes a gap between policy and practice. The US must eliminate this gap, say the authors, by developing a tailored and flexible deterrence posture, which will give the Joint Force a broad spectrum of nuclear deterrence capabilities.

July 24, 2019

Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea

US maritime forces currently conduct theater security operations through rotating carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific. Although current engagements and interactions with our competitors in the region fall short of open military conflict, a war at sea may be unavoidable. Some of the most significant deficiencies within the current combat casualty care system occur within this contentious maritime environment. To improve readiness, the authors recommend joint integration of medical capabilities such as incorporating forward resuscitative and surgical platforms, enhancing our medical airlift and sealift evacuation capabilities, supplementing Mercy-class hospital ships, and implementing a medical command and control system.

July 24, 2019

LikeWar

Brett Swaney reviews LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking. The authors examine the role of social media in reshaping the character of war and politics. The result is an insightful overview of the new information battlespace for national security professionals.

July 24, 2019

Strategy, Evolution, and War

Ryan Shaffer reviews Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence by Kenneth Payne. Payne studies the origins of human strategy in evolutionary history, examines the relationship between culture, war and technology, and considers the potential of artificial intelligence to influence military strategy.

July 24, 2019

America vs. the West

Brittany Bounds reviews America vs. the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved? By Kori Schake. Schake gives an efficient summation of the great power competition with China and Russia, says Bounds, and offers several possible scenarios for an alternative to the liberal international order if the US continues to disengage.

July 24, 2019

Flanking the Crater

The Battle of the Crater, fought in 1864 during the US Civil War, is a successful example of tactical innovation except that it did not succeed. The idea was to alter the battlespace by tunneling under the enemy’s fortifications. The local commander made a quick feasibility study, and decided to utilize his soldiers’ skills as civilian miners. The authors use these events as a case study in innovation, particularly the role of mid-level leaders and propose a Joint Innovation Framework. Among their recommendations is appointment of a lead integrator who would help translate tactical opportunities into operational and strategic victories.

July 24, 2019

Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral

Atmospheric littoral operations—in the air between the buildings—exemplify how the inherent capabilities of unmanned systems and autonomy could enable overmatch, particularly for close combat in the land domain where many future conflicts are likely to be decided. A doctrine of exploiting control of the atmospheric littoral offers tactical advantages that provide a driving force for integrating robotic systems into ground combat. By pursuing a low-cost program of prototyping and experimentation, the US can lead the emerging combat capabilities offered by unmanned systems, avoid technological surprise, and lead the fight in three dimensions.

July 24, 2019

The Mayaguez Incident: A Model Case Study for PME

The seizure and rescue of the SS Mayaguez in 1975 serves as a case study in this fascinating article. Considered by many to be the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Mayaguez incident took place just two weeks before the final withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. The author highlights the challenges created by a poor understanding of history, lack of awareness of the strategic situation, numerous communication failures and an inability to overcome groupthink. Although the Mayaguez operation was flawed, says the author, this case is a valuable teaching tool at every level of professional military education.

July 24, 2019

A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education

Perceiving military service as an occupation rather than a profession creates a problem for professional military education (PME). From an occupational point of view, military service is a collection of technical skills. From a professional point of view, the profession of arms is rooted in internal trust shared with other members of the profession, and external trust demanded by society. The trust of one’s government is required for members of this profession, who in turn are granted relative autonomy. One goal of PME, therefore, should be to produce military professionals who are trustworthy in both their professional and private lives.

July 24, 2019

A Framework to Understand and Improve Defense All-Source Intelligence Analysis

This article proposes a framework to optimize the employment and career development of military and civilian intelligence analysts. The author’s framework identifies training gaps and interoperability issues within joint and strategic intelligence organizations. Military intelligence analysts are initially trained to operate at the tactical level, says the author, whereas civilian analysts are trained to operate predominately at the strategic level. In addition, there is a significant convergence of military and civilian personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commands and service intelligence centers. The author’s framework facilitates discussion of professional development for analysts across the Department of Defense.

July 24, 2019

An Interview with Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy

General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF, Commander of US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command is interviewed by JFQ Editor-in-Chief Bill Eliason. Objective number one is defending the homeland, which means communicating and cooperating with every other combatant command, with the Department of Homeland Security, as well as global partners and non-traditional partners in the civilian and commercial sectors. When it comes to countering the threat from unmanned aerial systems, protecting critical infrastructure, or engaging adversaries in the cyber domain, says O’Shaughnessy, homeland defense and homeland security are inseparable.

July 24, 2019

Executive Summary

This June, the world observed the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings, which marked the beginning of the end of Nazi control in Europe. In what was probably the last time veterans of that combined campaign could meet in company strength, victorious and liberated nations alike honored their service and sacrifice. We all were reminded of the terrible costs of war as well as our collective responsibility to remember such experiences in hopes they will not be repeated. The awesome power of those young warriors, many of them civilians fresh out of school just months before, shows how well-trained and well-led troops, draftees, and long-serving veterans can achieve strategic ends. A friend sent me a link to a CBS Reports video from 1964 that featured Walter Cronkite interviewing President Dwight D. Eisenhower in England, and later Normandy, about the operation.

July 23, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

July 17, 2019

The Enduring Relevance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

For over six decades, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan and the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in Japan have served as the foundation of stability, prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is the basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and is a central pillar of its global strategy. The ability to project power halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then homeported in Japan. The deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

June 4, 2019

Thucydides’ Other “Traps”: The United States, China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War

The notion of a “Thucydides Trap” that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict—much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war “inevitable” between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE—has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino-American war.

May 20, 2019

Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces

Current national-level strategic documents exhort the need for creativity and innovation as a precondition of America’s continued competitive edge in the international arena. But what does that really mean in terms of personnel, processes, and culture? This paper argues that an overlooked aspect of talent management, that of cognitive diversity, must be considered when retooling military talent management systems. Going one step further, talent management models must incorporate diversity of both skill set and mindset into their calculus. Specifically, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to recruit, retain, and utilize Servicemembers and civilians with higher than average levels of creativity and a propensity for innovative thinking. It needs “enders.”

May 14, 2019

Diplomatic Security: A Comparative Analysis

In In this new book, two adept editors, Eugenio Cusumano and Christopher Kinsey, combine and edit the work of eleven authors’ different looks at diplomatic security as practiced in nine countries—China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as some overall themes on the subject. The result is perhaps the most comprehensive public study of the topic released to date, and the work stands as a reminder of the high price nations have paid in pursuit of diplomacy, as well as the difficulties and tradeoffs of balancing diplomatic efforts and the security operations meant to protect them.

May 14, 2019

The Cold War and The Cold War’s Killing Fields

Two new books revisit the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad’s The Cold War: A World History and Paul Chamberlin’s The Cold War’s Killing Fields. Westad does not use the standard bracket of 1945-89, but takes the long view back to nineteenth century economic turmoil and turn-of-the-century anti-colonialist sentiment. Chamberlain also emphasizes this same point, that the Cold War was much more than a bipolar ideological struggle. According to reviewer Walter Hudson, neither book is perfect, particularly the Chamberlin book in which American policies and policymakers do not receive fair treatment. Nonetheless, the merits of both books outweigh their flaws.

May 14, 2019

Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, was revised and signed by the Director of Joint Force Development, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, is in the final stages of its revision, tentatively scheduled for release in fall 2019. While both of these documents are commendable, says Mark Berwanger, some will claim that joint doctrine falls short in providing sufficient doctrine to integrate and synchronize all capabilities needed to accomplish the commander’s intent. Until the definition, utilization, and cultural understanding of “fires” is updated to include all offensive capabilities regardless of the weapon system, problems of integration and synchronization will remain.

May 14, 2019

The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine

As the U.S. enters a new era of near-peer competition, Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is insufficient to counter adversary employment of irregular strategies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Violent Extremist Organizations are using irregular methods to include information, cyber, economic, and unconventional warfare to offset conventional military advantages. The doctrinal terms IW and Unconventional Warfare (UW) provide a common point of departure for the doctrinal discussion, but are incomplete, generally not well understood and often misused. According to Pelleriti and co-authors, U.S. planners must reassess and update IW terminology, concepts and authorities to be successful in this new era.

May 14, 2019

Joint Doctrine Updates

Joint Doctrine Updates

May 14, 2019

Gallipoli: Lessons from the Great War on the Projection of Power and Joint Forcible Entry

The Gallipoli Campaign in April 1915 is one of the few events in WWI that incorporated land, sea, subsurface, air and multinational operations. Today we recognize this as a truly joint operation. This campaign offers the Joint Force important lessons on the projection of power and forcible entries for large scale combat operations within the all-domain operational concept. These include unity of command, joint fires, multiple dilemmas, logistics, the consolidation of gains and medical support services. The Gallipoli Campaign is a case study and a valuable learning tool for modern day planners which should not go to waste.

May 14, 2019

Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border

Realistic training for military can often be illusive. Factors such as urban growth, pollution, competition for frequencies and airspace, and protected habitats, continually challenge the Department of Defense in carrying out realistic training at installations. However, a small task force in the southwest has developed a solution to keep units training as they fight. At Fort Bliss in Texas, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) has developed innovative training opportunities for units that otherwise may not get the chance. While the benefits are easy to see, JTF-N is always looking for new ways to save money and enhance unit readiness.

May 14, 2019

U.S. Africa Command and Its Changing Strategic Environment

U.S. Africa Command has been training governments to combat terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime while instilling the principles of professionalism and good governance. However, major changes in the strategic environment call for a new approach. Based on changing trade patterns, China’s rising influence, and the U.S.’s new focus on great power competition, say the authors, USAFRICOM must now help African leaders safeguard national independence and root out foreign corruption. A whole-of-government approach is needed to prevent dark money from subverting local governments and turning would-be allies against the United States.

May 14, 2019

Unity of Command: Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice

Military justice has been undergoing constant change recently, as a stream of legislation continues to modify the procedures through which we achieve justice in the military. This period of flux is now coming to an end, as the most sweeping reforms in thirty years passed Congress in 2016. Perhaps the most important outcome is not what has changed, but what stayed the same: the role of the commander in the military justice process. This article examines the commander’s historical role in the military justice process, and the challenges of maintaining authority and responsibility.

May 14, 2019

A Model for Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) are often viewed as burdens and distractions. However, if managed correctly TSCPs can significantly increase unit readiness. This article provides a model based on the authors’ experience in Operation Garuda Shield 17, which placed tactical leaders at strategic points of friction to communicate up and down the chain of command. TSCPs should be viewed as readiness opportunities rather than burdens because they provide opportunity for increased resources, unique experiences, as well as deployment and training readiness. Exercise planners and their partner-nation equivalents are the key audience, say the authors, to influence and ensure success.

May 14, 2019

The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement: An Old Tool for the Modern Military

This article builds on a recent contribution from General Votel and Colonel Keravuori (in JFQ 89) who showed how the BWT approach promotes sustainable multi-national, regional and local defense institutions. Using a simple exchange of supplies and materials by via Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement transactions, the Joint Force can simultaneously build partner capacity and increase logistical interoperability. This simple but effective tool, says the author, allows service members to function in ambiguous, complex and volatile environments. Given the demands of future operations, the Joint Force must utilize all resources available to be leaner, faster and more mobile.

May 7, 2019

Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain

Bloom’s Taxonomy (named for educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom) is a system to classify learning objectives according to their level of complexity. In Professional Military Education (PME) Bloom’s Taxonomy is used to differentiate learning levels and create sequential learning objectives. This approach makes sense for most PME students but not everyone. Thus, the authors propose a stratified systems theory as a complementary framework that can be used to meet the contextual need across all PME educational systems. Implementing this recommendation, say the authors, will enhance PME and better prepare graduates to face the challenges associated with a dynamic, uncertain future.