As this column is written, a number of significant events are occurring that will shape the future joint force. The barriers to women engaging in ground combat are being reassessed and, in all likelihood, most if not all will be removed.

Over the past decade, the U.S. and Australian intelligence communities have evolved rapidly to perform new missions. They have developed new capabilities and adapted their business processes, especially in support of joint and complex military operations. But in the coming decade, their greatest challenge will be to develop new capabilities to manage and exploit big data.

The Defense Intelligence Enterprise is on the precipice of tremendous change. The global environment is experiencing a mind-numbing quantity and diversity of challenging crises.

Despite some rare successes in interagency work between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other partners in the past 20 years, successful interagency teamwork remains elusive across the combatant commands.

The complexity, turbulence, and dynamism inherent in postconflict environments make setting the clear, concise objectives and engendering the shared understanding so critical to successful mission command exceedingly difficult.

In 2015, the 9th annual competition was intended to stimulate new approaches to coordinated civilian and military action from a broad spectrum of civilian and military students. Essays were to address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the core competencies of our national security institution.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent is at a turning point. Seven decades have passed since a nuclear weapon was used, and many noted leaders have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons altogether—a “Global Zero.”

How does the United States develop a strategic cyber-enabled special warfare capability? Why are regional powers such as Iran and Russia better prepared for cyber-enabled special warfare operations than the United States?

Cyberspace has also enabled extremist groups to adopt decentralized organizational structures with indiscernible command hierarchies, making them difficult to identify and target using conventional military power.

Advanced professional military education (PME) affords senior officers the opportunity to acquire solid intellectual footing and enter the strategic dialogue following over 20 years of progressively more responsible leadership.

Over the past several years, a number of authors addressing professional military education (PME) have expressed frustration about and occasionally disdain for retired military officers who serve on the faculties of Department of Defense (DOD) senior-level colleges (SLCs).

War plans are used, leveraged, and cited for more than just war planning, and this carries inherent risks. The most common misuse of war plans usually stems from fundamental misunderstandings of the role of any single war plan or war plans in general and of the conceptual timeframes for their execution.

The battle lines have been drawn: containing the growth of military personnel costs is either “a strategic imperative” or “breaking faith with those who have sacrificed so much.”

Consider this possible scenario: A rogue nation threatens to fire ballistic missiles at the United States and its regional allies. In response, a forward-deployed U.S. Army radar transitions to high alert and continually scans the stratosphere, intending to detect and track the adversary’s ballistic missiles.

Military theories help strategists and planners think about, plan for, and generate joint combat power. A codified theory for military cyber power would greatly aid the joint force commander (JFC) in integrating cyberspace operations with joint operations, resulting in expanded combat power.

World War I began on July 28, 1914, 1 month after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Most Europeans expected the conflict to be short—“over by Christmas” was a common refrain—and relatively inexpensive in terms of blood and treasure.

James P. Terry long wore the mantle of being one of the most prolific writers in the areas of security and international law. In 2013 and 2014, his books The War on Terror and Russia and the Relationship Between Law and Power were recognized as providing articulate, extraordinary analyses of both subjects.

Marguerite Bouvard focuses her attention in The Invisible Wounds of War through individual stories that, though incredibly moving, perpetuate many of the sensationalized stereotypes that have plagued the veteran community.

Spring in Afghanistan brings the annual renewal from winter’s snowmelt, as rivers threaten their banks and bring much-needed water to the country’s valleys. This year, spring brought the onslaught of another seasonal occurrence: the annual evidence of rampant corruption in Afghanistan.

In 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Armed Forces to expand the envelope of interagency cooperation. His edict inspired a profusion of Department of Defense (DOD) literature cataloging the challenges of working with non-DOD organizations.

Lessons learned programs are traditionally used to improve organizational performance. As such, in a very true sense, these programs are “leader’s programs” or top-down leadership tools. But at the same time, there is another equally important aspect that sometimes gets overlooked.

Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision