Two War Strategies

The Greater Middle East

Preventive War
Interagency Cooperation

Peacetime Engagement

Korea on the Brink
...we need leaders who think, eat, and sleep “jointness,” and who can operate independently on a chaotic battlefield.

—John A. Wickham
On recent trips to the Middle East and the Balkans, I have observed the superb job that the Armed Forces do in safeguarding national interests and maintaining the peace in a complex and dangerous world. Therefore it is appropriate that the JFQ Forum in this issue once again spotlights U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), an organization which encompasses an area of responsibility that is both broad and far-reaching in its strategic implications. The important role of U.S. engagement in this region was a recurring theme in my discussions with President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and King Mohammed VI of Morocco.

The men and women assigned to CENTCOM operate in a region of vital national interest. Daily they patrol the sky over Iraq, enforce sanctions at sea through maritime intercept operations, and assure the physical security of Kuwait. But containing Iraq is not their most challenging task. They must also foster stability and cooperation with partners throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Efforts in this region are only some of the demands of global engagement. When Secretary Cohen and I testified before Congress at hearings on military posture we outlined priorities to keep the force strong. The Armed Forces are noted for their extraordinary people, technological edge, and warfighting skills. Overall the force is relatively healthy; but constant challenges arise in CENTCOM and other combatant commands which stretch resources. Although we remain capable of executing the national military strategy—including the most demanding scenario of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars—the risks have increased as we have dramatically reduced force size while taking on added commitments. Moreover, frequent and persistent deployments disrupt operating budgets, result in lost training opportunities, accelerate wear and tear.

(continued on page 4)
A Word from the Chairman
by Henry H. Shelton

From the Field and Fleet:
Letters to the Editor

Rethinking Two War Strategies
by Michael E. O'Hanlon

Lessons from the National Defense Panel
by John G. McGinn

FORUM

The Greater Middle East

Challenges in the Central Region: An Interview
with Anthony C. Zinni

Crossing Boundaries: Commanders in Chief and Areas of Interest
by Richard A. Lechowich

From Desert One to Southern Watch: The Evolution of U.S. Central Command
by Jay E. Hines

Political Islam and the West
by John M. Esposito

Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East
by Simon Serfaty

Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent
by Kenneth R. Toft

Planning for Preventive War, 1945–1950
by Gian P. Gentile

NATO Exercise Programs: A Case for Improvement
by Phillip Cox and James M. Hudson, Jr.

Reserve Intelligence Support for Operation Allied Force
by Donald C. DeVries

Developing Joint Education for the Total Force
by John B. Driscoll

Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations
by William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline

PHOTO CREDITS

98 Grading Theater Engagement Planning
by Barry M. Blechman, Kevin P. O'Prey, and Renee Lajoie

104 Peacetime Engagement—A Role for Military Advisors?
by Paul Marks

110 The Struggle for Dominance: Korea on the Brink, 1979–1980
by John A. Wickham, Jr.
A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

(continued from page 1)

on systems and equipment, and jeopardize the ret-
tention of our most valuable resource—people.

Health Care

In testifying before Congress I stressed that
my top budget initiative for this coming year is
fixing TRICARE, the largest managed health care
system in the Nation. This program is complex,
confusing, and often not customer-oriented.
While most will agree that the quality of care ad-
ministered by doctors, nurses, and other health
professionals under the program is outstanding,
accessing the system is frustrating. Its region-
based structure has resulted in a lack of standard-
ization for appointments, benefits, claims, and
enrollment across duty stations. Servicemembers,
retirees, and families deserve better.

Some near-term improvements being purs-
ued are straightforward: automatic enrollment for
all active duty family members into TRICARE
Prime that will be honored across regions; easy-
to-understand enrollment materials; designation
of primary care managers so that members know
who is responsible for their care by name; and a
claims system that ensures the government re-
tains the bills, not the beneficiary. Other long-
term enhancements will be more challenging, but
the service chiefs and I recognize that there is a
compelling need to provide more comprehensive
coverage not only for active duty members but
also for retirees. Fixing the health care system is
necessary to keep faith with those who serve
today as well as those who consider a career in
the Armed Forces tomorrow. We ask our soldiers,
sailors, marines, and airmen to be ready to serve
them and their families deserve a more
responsive health care system.

Readiness

My testimony also covered ongoing efforts
to maintain readiness. With the support of the
administration and Congress, last year’s budget
arrested a steep decline in purchasing power and
enabled us to fund critical readiness requirements
while increasing the recapitalization of equip-
ment and facilities. Likewise, timely approval of
the emergency non-offset supplemental appropri-
atation for 1999 was key to meeting the unpro-
grammed costs of the Kosovo operation without
having an impact on other programs.

To sustain this momentum, the President’s
budget for fiscal year 2001 funds critical service
readiness requirements, supports quality of life
initiatives, and satisfies the procurement goal set
by the Quadrennial Defense Review of $60 bil-
ion. The budget supports a range of programs
aimed at protecting our national interests and forces against terrorism, chemical-biological attack, and other asymmetric threats. It also funds some of the lessons learned from Kosovo, such as forming additional EA-6B electronic attack aircraft squadrons, increasing funds for precision munitions, and providing more intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

Congressional approval is important not only for the annual budget but for added funding to keep readiness levels high. Continued prompt action by Congress to provide emergency non-offset funding to replace dollars already obligated is essential to protect readiness in the latter half of this fiscal year and to avoid actions that would disrupt our capabilities and degrade morale in the future.

I also discussed plans to prepare today’s forces to meet tomorrow’s threats. For example, a new joint vision is being developed to meet future challenges, and the procedures of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council are being refined to accommodate warfighting needs early in the acquisition process. Aggressive experimentation is underway to furnish better ideas on how to build the joint force. The Secretary recently designated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, as executive agent for this critical process, which complements experimentation being conducted by the individual services. The command will soon begin working with its first integrating concept—rapid decisive operations—which enables a joint force commander to employ the proper balance of land, sea, amphibious, air, space, and information-based capabilities in order to defeat any enemy.

**Keeping Peace in the Balkans**

A final issue I brought up with Congress was force commitments in the Balkans. Although sporadic violence continues, U.S. and coalition forces have built a secure environment to support the civil implementation program. While it may be necessary to make some minor adjustments to force size in the near term to meet security requirements, we must remain wary of shoudering new missions in Kosovo. The current mission is clear, and any expansion of it would require approval by the North Atlantic Council. But I am less concerned with mission expansion than with mission extension. Soldiers are not the long-term answer to the challenges that the international community faces in Kosovo. A lasting solution requires the accomplishment of a range of civil, political, and economic tasks, including establishment of the rule of law, a functioning judiciary, and an effective police force. The United Nations and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies must fill the void created by the lack of strong civil institutions. We must continue to press the international community to meet these challenges.

I am extraordinarily proud of the work that our people do on a daily basis in CENTCOM and other regions. To make their task easier, we’ll continue to improve TRICARE, maintain readiness, and prepare the force for the future. The Armed Forces remain sound and capable of fulfilling their role in executing the national military strategy. With the help of Congress and the administration, we will guarantee their continued ability to do so in the coming years.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Letters... 

THE DOCTRINE DEBATE

To the Editor—In his article entitled “The Flight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo” (JFQ, Summer 99), COA Peter Herrly misidentifies his subject by claiming that joint doctrine is terribly flawed, when in fact much of it is quite good. The contested doctrine and strategy, misinterprets current doctrine, and impugns the integrity and courage of those who participated in Operation Allied Force.

Herrly profoundly misinterprets the role of doctrine in formulating warfare strategy by asserting, “Operation Allied Force was inconsistent with joint doctrine in both word and spirit.” The purpose of doctrine is to describe the best practices drawn from experience, it informs strategy but is not prescriptive. Strategy applies the basis of statecraft to political problems. In this case, the National Command Authorities (NCA) selected a course of action based on an assessment of the risks and limited aims of the United States. If the details of that strategy are the source of his concern, he should say so. Then his argument could be reduced to matters of cause and effect, or intent and actual results.

Only then can a discussion of the relevancy of current doctrine to shapping the planning and execution of strategy take place.

Herrly compounds the confusion by overemphasizing and misinterpreting current doctrine. First, he nitpicks the use of the term air campaign by the media and some members of the military, when doctrine only refers to a single, overarching joint campaign. This is a nonissue. If an air campaign is invoked as shorthand to refer to the aerospace portion of an overall joint campaign, then assured that no one in the Air Force is losing sleep over this sloppy use of terminology. More importantly, the joint force air component commander understands that the only mission of joint air is to support the joint campaign.

That said, Herrly seems to have a different definition of joint campaign. If I am correct, his interpretation means that every service must be represented for a force to be called joint. This is the antithesis of true joint thinking. Joint warfare is not little league baseball in which each player gets a turn at bat. Force structure is tailored to handle the task at hand, not to ensure equity among all possible participants. If NCA orders an air-only joint campaign, that’s the force that one builds. Joint Pub 3-0 is joint— including Navy and Marine air components (in fact, it was multinational). It was not an Air Force-only campaign, as Herrly implies. He also makes a sweeping assertion: “Joint Pub 3-0... acknowledged that air power was equal to land and naval power.” This claim calls for closer scrutiny. The current version of Joint Pub 3-0 is clearly land-centric—as one would expect, because it was derived from Field Manual 530-5. It firmly posts surface commanders and forces as the focus of joint operations, with airpower in a support role. Factually, Joint Pub 3-0’s under revision, with unanimous joint support to cast airspace power in a more balanced perspective, as a capability that can be supported as well as support.

Having objected to the air campaign, Herrly presents an equally off-balance discussion of strategic attack, which he sees as another less-than-desirable manifestation of airpower theory. He has a dated view of this concept, associating it with Douhet and pre-World War II notions of targeting the morale of an enemy and breaking its will. Then he ties the idea to collateral damage. This interpretation (inflicting shock and terror on enemy cities) is inconsistent with the current construct. Today strategic attack is far more nuanced than the imprecise bludgeoning implied in the article. Herrly attempts to ground his objections to joint doctrine, but he fails. Like his nitpicking of the air campaign, he errs in claiming that Joint Pub 3-0 doesn’t mention strategic attack: “JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area... Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action.” The fact that it doesn’t go into greater depth on strategic attack is understandable; this is a high-level publication which largely deals with overarching concepts, not nuts and bolts. For that matter, Joint Pubs 1 and 3-0 do not explicitly mention most other types of missions that may be assigned to joint forces. That is the role of other joint pubs, several of which discuss strategic attacks, foremost among them Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations: They identify strategic attack as a valid and recognized mission normally assigned to joint force air component commanders. The Air Force was recently designated as lead agency in developing Joint Pub 3-75, Strategic Attack, the final proof of the existence of strategic attack as a doctrinal construct. Strategic attack is indeed an accepted concept. The danger of Herrly’s article is that if one is unfamiliar with joint doctrine, his argument appears to be factual and buttressed with credible documentation.

Today strategic attack is not focused on leveling cities or inflicting terror: The Air Force defines this concept as “operations intended to directly achieve strategic effects by striking directly at the enemy’s centers of gravity.” Herrly asserts that “advanced technology lessens the odds that strategic attack will work,” which is only true if one presumes that strategic attack is synonymous with its original meaning. Advanced technology offers unprecedented capabilities to strike centers of gravity in urban areas with less concern over excessive collateral damage. Both Desert Storm and Kosovo demonstrated the ability to discretely attack key targets in urban areas with acceptable degrees of collateral damage to surrounding facilities and personnel. An acceptable degree is, of course, relative, but a B-2 releasing one weapon against one target is a far cry from several wings of B-17s dropping hundreds of bombs over a wide area to destroy one facility.

Finally, by belittling the contribution of air- men, Herrly throws out a scurrilous insult to all warriors. He cites a French general who said: “What good are members of an armed force who are permitted to kill but not to die?” The answer is found in a line ascribed to George Patton: “No dumb bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won the war by making some other...
dumb bastard die for his country." Henty further declares, "An obsessive fear of casualties not only robs warfare of useful tools..." but on a deeper level strips away its redeeming qualities." is Henty suggesting that American sons and daughters be sacrificed to prove U.S. commitments, or that joint commanders always put troops on the front lines to keep airspace power in its place? Why this smacking of a suspicion of the morality of using aerospace power that recalls turn-of-the-century objections by the Navy to the submarine and the longstanding antipathy by the Army to the sniper. Both innovations were undeniably effective, yet they fell outside the norms of symmetrical attrition warfare that is the hallmark of Western combat. In both cases, traditional-minded officers objected to what they believed was a less than manly instrument of war—as if one-on-one combat was the only edifying form of military engagement. "The Flight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo" does little to advance the debate on the future of joint warfare. Instead it perpetuates myths and masks the state of existing joint doctrine, which does fairly well in describing how the services can form a coherent joint team. The real problem is getting all members of the Armed Forces in the field and fleet to use it. The call by Henty to revise joint doctrine is based on basic misinterpretations that would have adverse results on jointness. —Col Ronald Dietz, USAF

Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell Air Force Base

WORD FROM THE SCHOLARSHIP

To the Editor—As a faculty member at a professional military education (PME) institution, I was extremely interested in read "The Revolution in Military Education" by Richard Chilcoat in the Summer 99 issue of the journal. Although it was gratifying to read such forceful advocacy of JPME, I believe the article missed two critical points. Many discussions of the changing nature of PME are focused immediately on technological developments. Indeed, impressive advancements such as laptop computers, Internet access, and virtual classrooms have made a great difference in educating the Armed Forces, especially given the increased operational tempo. Yet I am afraid that emphasis on technological solutions obscures the fact that jointness is more than simple ticket-punching. Congress performed a great service by setting JPME requirements, but it also established standards for military education must be devised that are realistic but that also reflect more than simple ticket-punching. Congress performed a great service by setting JPME requirements, but it should look more closely at the content of the education being offered at war colleges.

These transformations must take place as part of a serious approach to education. In turn, this
requires a renewed emphasis on critical thought and methods of analysis. Military education must lose its strong emphasis on training. The civilian and military students who attend JFMIE institutions should be granted their desire for intellectual challenge and transformation.

—John F. Garafano  
Strategic Studies Institute  
U.S. Army War College

PROVINCIAL, WHO ME?  
To the Editor—In “Leadership and Parochialism” (JFQ, Summer 99), Brooks Bash argues that service parochialism continues to influence senior military decisionmaking despite the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although his contention is unobjectionable at first reading, a closer look reveals that the author is guilty of the same parochialism he ostensibly decries. In fact, some of the proposed solutions would increase parochialism.

Bash states that he “examines the organizational impediments to optimal military responses in a crisis.” While distinctly true, he succeeds to a common error in policy research: selection bias in choosing cases from which to draw conclusions. He looks at Panama and the Persian Gulf War to illustrate his thesis that “organizational and individual bias still adversely affect force employment.” In both cases, he implies that the Army backgrounds of the regional CINCs and Chairman led them to select courses of action that favored their service at the expense of “the best possible defense.”

The author ignores the possibility that the course favored by Powell may have been the best one available for accomplishing national objectives. The fact that it appears to favor the Army does not prove it was not the best available option; to make that case one must demonstrate that Powell purposefully ignored hard evidence that the Army plan was flawed. The fact that the chiefs of the Navy and Air Force were unhappy with the final plan is hardly unbiased evidence.

The Desert Storm case similarly uses selected evidence to support the assertion that Army officers chose less than optimal force packages and employment options out of loyalty to service rather than national interest. Bash is particularly perturbed by Schwarzkopf’s insistence on the use of airpower to support allied ground forces and to prepare the battlefield for the ground offensive. He cites the commander of the 1st Marine Air Wing: “Schwarzkopf was not willing to let any of us go off and shoot down airplanes or conduct deep strikes at the cost of preparing that battlefield in front of the Army, Marines, and coalition forces.” As one member of that force (commander of a tank platoon in the First Cavalry Division), I believe that Schwarzkopf made the right choice and that only

Douhetian desirers who believe in victory through strategic airpower alone can possibly disagree. Ground forces were decisive in Panama and the Persian Gulf, and the fact that Army flag officers were in command positions was incidental to their courses of action.

The author’s argument is further weakened by examining more recent cases. The air war in Kosovo was directed by an Army regional CINC and with another Army officer serving as Chairman. Nevertheless, the forces deployed and manner in which they were employed were almost exclusively beneficial to the Air Force and Navy. More interestingly, both the Army Chief of Staff and Chairman opposed the request by the Army CINC for increased involvement of Army forces in the conflict. Their reasoned evaluation of the situation and the national interest led them to an opposite decision from the one service parochialism dictated.

This is not to argue that service parochialism does not exist. So long as we have separate services, senior officers will continue to be more comfortable with the forces they grew up with. However, suggesting that they intentionally choose less than optimal courses of action, at risk to the national interest and the lives of servicemen, is an allegation requiring more support than the article presents. Similarly, suggesting that stricter adherence to a service rotation policy in the appointment of Chairmen and unified commanders is a flawed solution to a problem that does not exist. It would be better to increase joint education for officers throughout their careers (as Bash correctly suggests) and then continue selecting the most qualified officer for the job, regardless of service.

Any other interpretation—like the notion that military leaders are basing their decisions on anything except what is best for the Nation—is itself a reflection of service parochialism.

—MAJ John A. Nagi, USA  
U.S. Military Academy

INTO THE LOOKING GLASS  
To the Editor—In “Which Way to the Future?” (JFQ, Summer 99) by Ian Redoucharan and Dana Eyer, it is the discussion of the failure to embrace cultural change and not organization (a strike force, cybercorps, constabulary force, and unconventional/special operations force) that lures the reader. The military today has become a complex adaptive system, seeming to change while maintaining the status quo. An example was the air operations war during Allied Force in the Balkans when the Army attempted to deploy an ad-hoc task force to Albania and new technology was imposed on old structures and cultural practices. Command relationships were numerous, redundant, and vertical, voice communications drove nodal connectivity; the structure for information exchange required was single service in character; systems architecture was overly complex and dependent upon legacy system technology; the flow and exploitation of information were restricted; and information sets were centralized at the highest level. Today’s culture limits the potential of smart soldiers and new technology.

The inability to adapt is especially evident in the military’s sustaring of its industrial-age personnel system. This institution must be changed first if reforms of other areas such as doctrine, force structure, and education are to succeed. Current plans for the future Army look too much like the Army of today where forces still resemble World War II divisions—broad- and centralized and not organized for rapid deployability within a joint task force.

Unfortunately, changes in personnel laws and policies, doctrine, and force structure have taken second place, failing in line behind the adaptation of new technology. Emerging concepts, which fall under Force XXI and the Army After Next programs, pledge revolutionary changes in the way wars will be fought. The focus on Europe and defense was eliminated, and the emphasis shifted to jointness, especially Army-Air Force cooperation, and coalition warfare, as exemplified by Desert Storm and NATO against Serbia. The problem with these brilliant and expensive efforts is that they will take the Army down the road to centralization (literally overcontrol) if the cultural foundation is not addressed. The service needs a revolution in human affairs, which should occur in parallel to advances in technology.

Advanced communications, precision-guided munitions, and the greater range and accuracy of weapons present a paradigm for the Army. While offering opportunities for rapid movement and swift concentration of superior force, the Army is becoming obsessed with technology to the point that breakthroughs in weapon systems are unmanageable and dysfunctional. During the Advanced Warfighting Exercise at Fort Irwin in 1997 over 70 systems were evaluated. It is apparent that the Army seeks technology to avoid direct confrontation and to control the tempo of the battlefield with fires from sensors and precision-guided munitions.

Not only has the Army gone overboard for technology, its plans for adopting new systems are terribly flawed. At the current pace it will experiment for roughly sixteen years before fielding a modernized corps. And what kind of force will experimentation produce? Army simulations are built on attritional model-based scenarios from the Cold War. Will these simulations translate over to real-world scenarios? The Army has placed limits on the
type of operations conducted as well as their envi-
ronment. Recent experiments have been conducted in the desert, where command and control and communications are easiest because of line-of-site and a lack of obstructions. In the conduct of games in 1998, many pitfalls seen in past conflicts arose, including too much overhead and emphasis on technology. So far, such efforts point to a force that will be overcentralized, addicted to technology, and divorced from capabilities. In sum, the Army is shooing doctrine into technology that it hopes to have in the future. Army culture will ensure that the tradition of independent action... cannot sur-

To the Editor—Your review of A Better War which appeared in the last issue was, in a word, disappointing. Twenty-five years after the Vietnam War one might assume that we have reached a point where logic and detachment prevail—where frozen opinions have thawed. Not so, it seems, if the words of Dale Andrade are any indication. In-
deed, the review serves as an illustration of the muddled thinking that has too long confused real analysis of the course and conduct of the war. So while I found the review of A Better War by Dale

WESTY” VERSUS “ABE”

The last two-thirds of the review is a personal attack on the author. “How dare Sorely call into
question beliefs long-held and dear?" Andrade
tems to be asking. He uses a non-sequitur in re-
proach: "But despite [Sorley’s] contention that Abru-
s’ new leadership pushed Hanoi up against
the wall in South Vietnam, the reality is that some
of the biggest battles were still to come."

He misstates positions not taken by the au-
thor. "Sorley may not have seen this change in tac-
tics for what it was, but he uses a quote that makes
it clear that Abrams did." (Sorley, after all, was at-
tempering to present the views of Abrams.) And he
introduces information that is irrelevant to the book’s
thesis: "Sorley also fails to mention one obvious
Abrams undertaking that combined both body
counts and statistics—Operation Speedy Express."

Any critic who disputes an hypothesis should
counter it with a coherent thesis of his own. Dale
Andrade sadly does not. A Better War deserved
a better review. The book strives to elevate the de-
matic notion of what speed is required.

must have more dialog about its structure, a com-
plex process. I would differ, however, in his judgment
about where transformation fits into the relative pri-
orities of the defense establishment.

First, transforming infrastructure—a logical
reaction to the revolution in military affairs—as
supposed by the last Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Panel, U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century, and both po-
itical parties. Yet besides conceptual guidance,
there is not an agreed upon blueprint for transfor-
mation. Looking at current modernization plans for
the defense establishment.

First, transforming infrastructure—a logical
reaction to the revolution in military affairs—as
supposed by the last Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Panel, U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century, and both po-
itical parties. Yet besides conceptual guidance,
there is not an agreed upon blueprint for transfor-
mation. Looking at current modernization plans for
the defense establishment.

GETTING ON WITH TRANSFORMATION

To the Editor—I agree with the position of An-
drew Krepinevich, "Why No Transformation?" (JFQ
Autumn/Winter 19-93), on the need for transfor-
mation and on his analysis of obstacles to that
process. I would differ, however, in his judgment
about where transformation fits into the relative pri-
orities of the defense establishment.

First, transforming infrastructure—a logical
reaction to the revolution in military affairs—as
supposed by the last Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Panel, U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century, and both po-
itical parties. Yet besides conceptual guidance,
there is not an agreed upon blueprint for transfor-
mation. Looking at current modernization plans for
the defense establishment.

First, transforming infrastructure—a logical
reaction to the revolution in military affairs—as
supposed by the last Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Panel, U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century, and both po-
itical parties. Yet besides conceptual guidance,
there is not an agreed upon blueprint for transfor-
mation. Looking at current modernization plans for
the defense establishment.

First, transforming infrastructure—a logical
reaction to the revolution in military affairs—as
supposed by the last Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Panel, U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century, and both po-
itical parties. Yet besides conceptual guidance,
there is not an agreed upon blueprint for transfor-
mation. Looking at current modernization plans for
the defense establishment.
By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON

As new administration officials focus on the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in January 2001, they should rethink the two war construct. While some sort of multi-war capability is needed, the notion of two Desert Storms has outlived its usefulness.

It is not hard to find critics of the two-Desert-Storm approach—which had its origins in efforts by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell to design a post-Cold War base force and gained more popularity under the Clinton administration during the Bottom-Up Review in 1993 and the last QDR in 1997. However, few have proposed an alternative approach. Specificity is both needed and overdue.

Replacing the two-Desert-Storm paradigm with a concept for force-sizing that could be called Desert-Storm-plus-Desert-Shield-plus-Bosnia (IFOR) warrants consideration. Though the term may be cumbersome, after a decade of the two-Desert-Storm jingle we have oversimplified force planning long enough.

This new approach might allow further modest personnel reductions. But its main effects would be on the structure, not the size, of the Armed Forces. Specifically, it would permit a force posture more conducive to executing the types of missions that have recently strained the military. The reasons why it would not jeopardize core national interests are developed below.

Out with the Old

The congressionally mandated report released by the National Defense Panel (NDP), which was published six months after the QDR...
TWO WAR STRATEGIES

report, concluded that “the two theater war concept has been a useful mechanism for determining what forces to retain as the Cold War came to a close. But it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the capabilities we will need in the 2010–2020 time frame.” The panel regarded the two-Desert-Storm concept as little more than a bureaucratic device that was more relevant to institutional requirements than to real-world threats.

However, the dismissive view of the NDP position went too far. Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-il continue to threaten U.S. interests. We cannot drop the two-war construct until convinced that any successor concept will afford adequate deterrent and defense capabilities. Vague musings by the panel about the two-war framework, though useful as cover for debating this subject, hardly form the basis of a new national military strategy.

The way in which the panel dismissed the two-war approach provided Secretary of Defense William Cohen with an easy comeback: which threat should be ignored, Iraq or North Korea? And which national interest should be abandoned, ensuring access to Persian Gulf oil or maintaining the security of South Korea (not to mention general stability and nonproliferation in both theaters)? As long as critics of the two-war framework propose replacing it with a single war capability, they will lose the force planning debate to such fortuitous rebuttals. The ability to handle overlapping crises in two or more locations is indeed a sound strategic pillar on which to base U.S. forces.

In a broader sense, however, the NDP report was right. Positing two simultaneous replays of Desert Storm, most likely in the Persian Gulf and Korea, smacks of preparing to refight the last war. Moreover, it presupposes that we would use virtually identical types and numbers of forces in each case—six to seven active-duty ground combat divisions including Army and Marine Corps contributions, additional ground combat units from the Reserve Components, ten wings of aircraft, four to five carrier battle groups, and other assets. Whether operating on the open desert of Arabia or Bosnian-like terrain in Korea, and whether supported by relatively weak allies in the Persian Gulf or the capable forces of South Korea, planning documents call for roughly the same cookie-cutter U.S. force package—a slightly smaller version of that which fought Desert Storm.

If there were no opportunity costs to keeping the two-Desert-Storm planning framework, the Pentagon would suffer little harm in retaining it. But given likely fiscal constraints in coming years, keeping a high-priced insurance policy against regional conflict would make it impossible to afford other key defense investments—and thus would leave the Nation vulnerable on other fronts. It would also leave us with a force structure not well suited to smaller operations—meaning that ongoing no-fly-zone missions and peace operations will continue to overwork our personnel.

The United States should change its war-fighting strategy from the two-war concept to what can be called a Desert-Storm-plus-Desert-Shield approach. A force of 200,000 troops was sent to protect Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield in 1990. By contrast Desert Storm employed 500,000 American troops to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Actually, it would be more accurate, if more unwieldy, to term this approach a Desert-Storm-plus-Desert-Shield-plus-Bosnia (IFOR) strategy. The latter two need not be seen as simultaneous all-out conflicts because, at some point, worst-case analysis must be plausible. But the requirement to maintain deterrence and presence, while waging a Desert Storm-like operation along with something akin to Desert Shield, seems compelling. This type of construct would still be somewhat artificial, but it would encompass a fuller and broader range of likely U.S. military missions than the current planning framework.

The alternative would still require 90 to 95 percent as many active-duty personnel as current plans. The Desert Storm package would have to err on the side of caution, including a cushion of extra forces in the event the United States and its allies encountered unexpected difficulties such as widespread enemy use of weapons of mass destruction. For example, it might require a total of six Army divisions and twelve Air Force fighter wings as well as currently anticipated levels of Navy and Marine Corps assets. Backup exists in the Army National Guard, which retains almost as much of the combat force structure as the active Army but would have been expected to deploy less than 20 percent of its units into combat under the 1997 version of the two-Desert-Storm plan. Adding a division for a major peace operation would leave an active-duty Army perhaps 90 percent as big as current levels, with slightly smaller cuts in other services.

Something Has To Give

But in a period of fiscal surplus, why not keep the two-war capability while simply adding more forces as needed? The budget situation is admittedly less stark than it appeared at the time the last QDR—even though readiness costs have also grown, laying claim to part of the DOD share
of the budget surplus. Overall, rosy forecasts notwithstanding, it is doubtful that the military will be able to retain current force structure and modernization programs. Large cuts will not be needed, but trimming probably will be.

Budget plans substantially increase procurement for two reasons. First, the spending spree of the 1990s must end because systems purchased during the Reagan era are wearing out quickly. Second, the Pentagon intends to replace existing weapons with more expensive ones like F-22s, not to mention joint strike fighters and F/A-18E/Fs, improved attack helicopters, and submarines. The belief appears to be that increasing procurement to $70 billion per year from the 2001 level of $60 billion will pay anticipated bills. But neutral watchdogs like the Congressional Budget Office tend to estimate steady-state price tags of $80–90 billion for the future force in constant 2000 dollars.1

Meanwhile, other budgetary demands are likely to hold steady or rise under existing plans. Personnel spending will no longer decline because real pay raises will more than counter savings in personnel still to be made in the final stages of the post-Cold War drawdown. Though some hope to realize large savings through privatizing and outsourcing as well as base closings, particularly in operations and maintenance, savings will be modest. Health care, maintenance, and base cleanup continue to exert upward pressure on the budget. Meanwhile reductions in research, development, test, and evaluation are being questioned as unwise—and would not save much.

The bottom line is that real defense spending will likely have to grow by at least $30 billion in the decade ahead to sustain the current force and planned modernization agenda. In other words, spending must increase from the 2000/2001 levels of around $290–320 billion or more. With an available surplus nearing $2 trillion projected for 2001–2010 (not counting surpluses in Social Security and Medicare), that may not seem to be an inordinate defense spending increase because it would probably total only about 20 percent of available funds.

However, expecting the Pentagon to get $300–500 billion next decade is highly optimistic. Out of a $1.8 trillion projected surplus, $600 million would be needed to preserve existing levels of domestic services and allow spending to grow as fast as population rather than just keeping up with inflation. Because many discretionary spending programs—transportation, education, immigration, prisons, environment—are linked to the size of the population or economy, that is a prudent assumption. Efforts to shore up entitlement programs in the long term, given high priority by both political parties and presidential candidates, are likely to require at least $500 billion over the next decade, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. That leaves $700 billion for tax cuts as well as prescription drug benefits for the elderly and education. After all is said and done, it is highly unlikely that anything close to half a trillion dollars in real funding will be added to the DOD budget over the next decade.2

The gap between planned outlays and likely resource levels for defense is likely to amount to $10–20 billion per year over the next ten years. Part of the gap can be closed by reducing service modernization agendas. Absent competitors and given advances in computers, electronics, and robotics, less emphasis should be put on extremely expensive weapons platforms and more on a systems-of-systems approach. But even such a radical change in acquisition may not solve all budgetary problems. That means that a modification of the two war strategy (as well as cutbacks in nuclear forces and a willingness to try new ways to maintain forward presence in the Navy and Marine Corps) is likely to be a budgetary imperative.

Even more importantly, altering the two-Desert-Storm construct is necessary for the well-being of the Armed Forces. Adapting a less demanding two war capability would allow the Army to shift personnel from traditional combat roles to the types of low-density/high demand
TWO WAR STRATEGIES

support activities that are typically overused in today's non-warfighting missions.

**A Rapidly Deployable Force**

A 200,000-strong Desert Shield force would be extremely effective. If deployed promptly, it could defend allied territory and infrastructure against virtually any threat on the horizon today. U.S. commanders were confident that they could defend Saudi Arabia with a Desert Shield force in 1990. Today the high caliber of personnel, combat equipment, and support capabilities such as advanced reconnaissance systems would make such a Desert Shield capability significantly superior to the notional regional aggressor force specified in the Bottom-Up Review, even though the latter force might be two to three times larger.

The airpower component of a Desert Shield-like deployment, smaller but about as capable as that of Desert Storm and larger than that deployed against Serbia during Operation Allied Force in 1999, could devastate enemy forces and industrial infrastructure. The ground component could conduct certain offensive land operations. General Norman Schwarzkopf considered evicting Iraq from Kuwait with a force of this size before asking Washington to double the deployment (and that was before improvements made the military better armed than a decade ago).

The odds that such a force could deploy in time to prevent significant loss of territory are reasonably good. Since the Cold War, the Armed
Forces have positioned more equipment abroad and brought more fast海上 in the form of large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships. In addition to forces routinely deployed overseas, including 37,000 in Korea, somewhat more in Japan, and half as many in the Persian Gulf, Army brigade sets of equipment are based in Kuwait and Korea, another is afloat off Diego Garcia, and elements of a fourth are in Qatar. Marine brigade-equivalent sets are at sea at Diego Garcia and Guam and in the Mediterranean. These units could be married to troops from the United States in a week or so. Further improvements in both lift and prepositioning could shorten response time for other units too. Just as importantly, stocks of precision guided munitions are now located overseas. Stopping an enemy quickly and hitting it from the air might make a major ground counteroffensive unnecessary. At a minimum, it should reduce its urgency.

Hollowing Threats

The militaries of Iraq and North Korea remain dangerous but are markedly weaker than several years ago. Moreover, neither power is likely to get much stronger any time soon. This increases the odds that the United States with a Desert Shield force, and its regional partners, could prevent significant loss of allied territory. Iraqi conventional forces remain about half the size and strength of 1990. As opposed to a pre-Dessert Storm inventory of 3,500 tanks, Baghdad now has 2,200. Levels of light tanks and armored personnel carriers are down from 7,500 to 3,000; troop levels have declined from 1,000,000 to 400,000.*

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 1997 that although North Korean forces are poised near Seoul, their “capability to conduct large-scale combat operations continues to deteriorate as worsening internal economic conditions undermine training, readiness, and sustainment.” And subsequent threat assessments reconfirm that decline, notwithstanding some modest improvements reported in readiness levels over the last year. To be sure, South Korea remains vulnerable to artillery, missiles, and special forces from the North, and Pyongyang unquestionably possesses what amounts to massive terrorist assets to target against Seoul. Any war on the peninsula would cause untold civilian deaths as well as large numbers of military casualties. But there is a difference between terrorism and an invasion.

Indeed, the Iraqi and North Korean threats have declined enough that 200,000 to 300,000 U.S. troops might even suffice for a counterattack. A single robust Desert Storm-like capability of closer to half a million troops should be retained out of prudence. But there is less and less reason to think such a large force would be needed even for a march on Baghdad or Pyongyang.

Allies Count

Economic troubles notwithstanding, the South Korean military is improving and, together with modest American forces in place on the peninsula, could probably withstand an attack. South Korea, combined with U.S. forces—the 24th Infantry Division and forward-based airpower—could inflict great damage to North Korean forces and could most likely stop an assault well short of Seoul. At a minimum, they could buy enough time for U.S. reinforcements to arrive.

Most military casualties would be North Korean. Its military is more obsolescent than that of Iraq; and any invasion attempt would have to cross the most militarized swath of ground on the planet. The density of forward-deployed allied forces near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is greater than was the density of NATO troops along the intra-German border during the Cold War. North Korea would have to rely on roads and bridges that would surely be destroyed in the first minutes of combat. If attacking near Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan corridors, the invaders would have to cross the Han or Imjin Rivers. Both freeze in the winter, but the ice might not be strong enough to support a large armored force. North Korean chemical weapons, commandos deploying through tunnels, and forward-deployed dug-in artillery would complicate the battle and cause many casualties. But armor would have great difficulty breaking through allied lines and reaching Seoul.

Although the South possesses less armor than the North, its technological edge evens the balance of tanks, artillery, planes, and other heavy equipment according to some assessments. Its armor is nearly equal that of U.S. models; for example, the K-1 tank is based on the M-1 and uses some of its important components.

Given the higher state of military readiness of South Korea, it is reasonable to conclude that its forces are superior to those of the North. Looking at the outcomes of a range of past battles, one analyst estimated that such readiness factors can at least double combat capability. Despite the fact that, as another analyst pointed out, DOD models appear to assume that South Koreans would not fight as well as North Koreans, the former are competent soldiers and extremely well postured to stop an invasion. An
attacker attempting to directly penetrate densely prepared positions usually advances only a couple of kilometers a day even when not outclassed technologically, as the North Koreans certainly are. Given the lethality of modern airpower and U.S. ability to quickly fly in combat jet reinforcements, such a slow pace of advance—itself generous to the North—would be a recipe for disaster on the part of an invasion force.

Pyongyang could not pull off a left hook or bypass the Korean equivalent of the Maginot Line because the defenses extend across the peninsula. In addition, the allies enjoy overwhelming dominance in all-weather, day/night reconnaissance that watches over all significant movements. But chemical and biological weapons pose a special threat, especially given the limited confines. U.S. forces have increased attention to such threats, with the QDR initiatives raised by Secretary Cohen being especially noteworthy. One could argue that Seoul should do more as well. But it is more difficult to employ chemical weapons than is commonly asserted, especially for an infantry force like North Korea’s. For example, it is extremely challenging for a foot soldier, suited up in bulky and probably rather substandard protective gear, to cover many kilometers to take advantage of holes in enemy lines created by chemical attack. Nor should the North blithely assume that such attack would not be countered by U.S. nuclear retaliation. Airbursts in corridors north of the DMZ would cause little harm to friendly forces while considerably affecting North Korean units. They would also send a powerful message that America will not tolerate the employment of weapons of mass destruction against its troops or those of allies.

There is a final argument against the two war construct. Just as the capabilities of South Korean forces must not be ignored, one should not overlook the likely role that British forces would play in a conflict in the Persian Gulf. The United Kingdom deployed 30,000 troops during Desert Storm, was prepared to send 50,000 troops to fight against Serbia, and tends to be aligned with the United States on issues of war and peace in Southwest Asia.

Without prejudging the prospects for an integrated European military force, or presuming full agreement between Washington and London in matters of defense and foreign policy, one can venture to say that Britain would probably provide a division and several fighter squadrons to any coalition led by the United States in a future conflict in the Persian Gulf. However, pessimistic American war plans do not now assume such contributions.

Some will see the similarity between this proposal and a plan put forth as a trial balloon by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1994. Known as a win-hold-win strategy, it envisioned completing
an all-out war in one theater while simply holding the line in another. Once the first war was won, forces would be redeployed for a counteroffensive to meet the other challenge. But the caricature of that approach understated its capabilities and doomed it to rejection. Derided as win-hold-oops because of its alleged risk to war plans, it never stood a chance bureaucratically or politically.

The important point is that a Desert Shield force, with its overwhelming airpower and other long-range strike systems, can do more than hold a defensive line despite the limited capabilities of such a force.

The next Quadrennial Defense Review should weigh arguments like those outlined above. The alternative is attempting to prevail in simultaneous worst-case scenarios in the Persian Gulf and Korea (something that the Armed Forces could not have handled even during the Cold War, given U.S. commitments in Europe) at the expense of readiness, research, and preparing for the future. More dangerously, the military could continue to overuse and wear out its most precious asset—its people. That would be a far greater risk than the remote possibility of two nearly simultaneous, all-out conflicts against both Iraq and North Korea.

NOTES

1 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that DOD may be required to spend $90 billion annually on procurement, given current plans combined with the need to replace certain systems that the services have not yet incorporated into their formal acquisition programs. See testimony by Lane Pierrot, “Aging Military Equipment,” Subcommittee on Military Procurement, House Committee on Armed Services, February 24, 1999.


Since the next round of defense reviews is scheduled to commence in early 2001, it is time to review the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP) of 1997. This is particularly critical in the case of the latter effort because, unlike other reviews, it is focused on the long term rather than politically charged short term issues. Although the final version of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 did not contain provisions for the establishment of a permanent NDP review, a similar effort is expected to be commissioned in the near future.

The NDP Initiative

The NDP initiative arose on Capitol Hill. As DOD planners prepared for the QDR process, the panel was meant to radically rethink the roles, composition, and strength of the Armed Forces. Congress wanted an independent, parallel, and complementary effort to the QDR process. Congress created NDP as an advisory commission. This decision reflected recognition of the inherent difficulties that any large organization encounters in reforming itself. The concern was that the nature of DOD made real change improbable because of bureaucratic politics inside the Pentagon. It was believed that an independent panel would have the critical distance to make tough decisions and provide defense reformers with the political cover to spark real reorganization.

Approved as part of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, the Military Force Structure Review Act codified the NDP and QDR processes. The legislation required the former to perform two functions. First, Congress directed it to provide the Secretary of Defense with an in-progress review and a comprehensive assessment on completion of the QDR effort. This reporting was designed in part to energize the NDP process in real time. In the words of one congressional staffer, the legislature wanted drafters of the QDR report to keep in mind that “we have to talk about X so that the NDP won’t kill us.”

Congress also wanted the panel to assess “alternative force structures for the Armed Forces . . . to provide the Secretary and Congress recommendations regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to the national security . . . .” The legislation called for the NDP
process to propose an above-the-line structure which was defined as an Army division, Navy carrier battle group, air wing, or Marine expeditionary force. This level of detail reflected a congressional desire for an alternative to the QDR process which, in the event, proved to be beyond the reach of the panel. With a small staff and brief life span, the NDP effort could not provide such detailed force structure analysis. The panel convinced various constituencies on Capitol Hill that a more general view—focused over the horizon—was preferable to specific force structure options. Thus the panel began to focus on transforming the military.

Assessing the QDR Process

Tackling the first task, evaluating the QDR effort, the panel immediately undertook a broad examination of national security. In its in-progress letter to Secretary of Defense William Cohen on March 14, 1997, it expressed concern over the draft review. It argued, for example, that “the overall strategic direction [of the process] may not give sufficient emphasis to addressing longer term threats, which may be very different in scale and form from those we will confront over the near term.” Although the panel generally approved of the draft QDR strategy, it contended that the review was not adequately addressing the relationship of the defense strategy to other security issues such as foreign assistance, overseas diplomatic presence, and national intelligence.

The panel made similar comments in its formal response to the QDR final report. Although the panel agreed with many of the study’s findings and recommendations, it found the report often lacking. For instance, it stated that there was “insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other.” Furthermore, it observed that “greater attention needs to be given to the important role played by other elements of the national security establishment, as well as the critical support provided by our allies.” While the last comment was not solely directed at DOD, it did indicate the panel’s broad interpretation of its own mandate.

The Final Report

The panel released its final report, entitled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, in December 1997. It recommended launching a transformation strategy immediately...
because "current force structures and information architectures extrapolated to the future may not suffice [for] future battle." In addition, it argued that the Nation must transform the way it conducts foreign affairs, fosters regional stability, and enables projection of military power.2

The panel chairman, Philip Odeen, stated in transmitting the NDP report to the Secretary of Defense that the effort had been successful in stimulating "a wider debate on our defense priorities and the need for a transformation to meet the challenges of 2020" rather than providing a laundry list of specific measures. As a result, the report called for a broad approach, to include adapting alliances to the new security environment and examining the entire security structure to better anticipate and shape changes in that environment.

There were no specific recommendations. For example, the panel urged an increase in joint operations and joint experimentation to institutionalize innovation. It argued for an annual wedge of $5–10 billion for transformation. Although it did not develop a clear plan for achieving this wedge, the report did expect savings from base closures and acquisition reform. Additionally, it singled out a few currently planned purchases as the kinds of weapons systems that may become unnecessary.

The major focus of the NDP report was on transformation. The panel emphasized general strategic issues rather than specific line items in a budget. It recognized that it could not establish alternative force structures. The more the process was projected twenty-five years into the future, the more doubt was cast on the ability to develop above-the-line force structure recommendations. With technology changing so rapidly, the NDP report concluded that forecasting force structures was a dubious proposition, especially given the panel’s staffing, scheduling, and other constraints. Furthermore, as a participant recalled, the last thing the panel wanted was to have contractors lined up outside its doors lobbying for programs. Fundamentally, the object was to keep the NDP process above the budgetary fray and rely on initiatives like joint experimentation to suggest more specific force structure development in the future.

Getting Out the Message

The importance of the NDP effort was its relevance to debate in the policy arena. Initially its message was almost drowned out by a combination of bad timing, bureaucratic shortfalls, and unreceptive media. The crisis over Iraq in late 1997 and early 1998 overshadowed the release of the final report. In addition, the fact that the NDP staff immediately disbanded in December 1997 hampered its ability to get out the message. Congressional testimony by the panel in January 1998 was well received, but the NDP report did not receive much notice in the defense establishment. The lack of immediate attention did not surprise panel members. Odeen noted that the QDR and NDP processes were unlikely to stimulate real change within DOD until after the turn of the century because of the difficulty in reversing the course of the bureaucracy. The real impact would be seen in 2001, when the Pentagon would conduct another strategy review.3

Despite an apparent lack of attention, ideas contained in the NDP report began to percolate within defense circles. The emphasis on transformation led the Pentagon to support several panel recommendations. The responsibility for joint experimentation, for instance, was assigned to U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) in 1998. The prominence of jointness, at least rhetorically, was also enhanced when ACOM was redesignated as U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 1999. The new command has both a geographic area of responsibility, overseeing U.S. forces in the Atlantic, and a functional one, fostering jointness.
its commander, however, must rely largely on the power of persuasion to fulfill the joint role because he has no enforcement authority or even a full-fledged seat on DOD procurement councils. Thus the impact of JFCOM is far from clear. Yet recommendations of the NDP report continue to surface in the defense establishment. Another congressionally mandated effort, the Hart-Rudman Commission (also known as the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century), is attempting to determine how to meet the range of challenges that will confront us in the first quarter of the next century. The NDP effort is likely to inform the work of this commission. Transformation has become a buzzword for change.

The Task Ahead

As the Nation prepares for the next round of defense reviews, it is crucial to draw lessons from the first NDP effort and assess its implications for future reviews and long-range planning. Although the following comments focus on the NDP process, the QDR effort is also integral to any larger planning effort.

NDP encouraged the defense establishment to grapple with a variety of policy issues. They included asymmetric budget cuts across services, reassigning responsibilities across agencies, and exploring international concerns that are too sensitive for the government itself to air publically. An important aspect of such an analysis is properly bounding the process. If it remains too narrow, key issues can go unaddressed. If the process is too broad, it can lose relevance because it lacks focus or a clear place in the bureaucratic framework. Striking a balance between focus and context was indeed a concern expressed by many during the NDP effort.

Some observers held that the NDP process ought to exert pressure on DOD and thereby serve as a direct counterpart to the QDR effort. The contention was that the Pentagon, by virtue of its special role in national security, requirement for comprehensive cross-service planning, long lead times to investment in future capabilities, and dominant claim on resources, has unique needs that demand its own long-term review process. Moreover, both the panel’s focus on defense and link to the Office of the Secretary of Defense make it a logical institutional home for long-term review. DOD should therefore support this effort and respond to its findings.

Others argue that the first panel, with its emphasis on military-related threats and alternative force structures, was too narrowly defined. They contend that future NDP efforts should be recast as national security panels. These would address the full spectrum of threats without an emphasis on a predetermined set of issues, military or otherwise. By necessity, they would also address all relevant governmental agencies in context, including mandates, operations, and relationships.
For its part, the NDP legislation clearly stressed military-related threats (including threats of a nontraditional nature such as information warfare) and alternative force structures but provided the latitude to examine issues identified as germane to long-term security, whatever the source.

As the process unfolded the panel took a middle course, focusing on military-related issues while stressing that DOD must consider the fuller national security picture in its longer-range plans. It observed that the threats and tools to counter them are growing more diverse and less military-dependent. The role of the Armed Forces is unclear in cases such as cyber attacks on nonmilitary U.S. assets.

It is worth noting that the NDP effort did not go much beyond signaling the need for fuller integration of military and nonmilitary dimensions of national security strategy. Future reviews should adopt the same approach and provide substantive analytic content to these critical nonmilitary aspects and integrate them more fully into longer-term strategy.

Future reviews must formally address specific needs of planners. These tasks could be strictly military-related or address other security dimensions. An assignment could be as narrow as reviewing long-term missile defense plans or as broad as recommending revisions to the National Security Act of 1947. There should be latitude in identifying and addressing priority issues.

To the degree that reviews address nonmilitary issues, relevant executive branch agencies need to be more engaged. Though panelists and staff met with representatives of most appropriate agencies, the NDP report did not provide much concrete guidance for them. Among other things, it could have identified interagency recommendations or taskings to the Department of Defense, the Departments of State and Justice, and Defense Intelligence Agency. It would also be useful for the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Energy to formally respond to recommendations that bear directly on their policies, plans, and operations.

Sequencing and Scheduling

Many observers believe that Congress should conduct both the QDR and NDP processes but reverse their order. The argument is that the NDP effort, with its broader mandate and longer timeline, would provide the most effective context for the QDR report, which is a more resource constrained policy document. This is sound logic. Moreover, although the QDR process need not agree with or adopt the contextual parameters of the NDP effort, it must at least acknowledge them and explain deviations. If it is deemed helpful for the NDP process to grade QDR effort, the panelists could do it later.

Scheduling the work of a panel prior to a review effort would change the overall process. The review would not enjoy the same real-time input from the QDR team as the first NDP. This supports the recommendation that it should look at the big picture. The panel can identify the tough questions, focus on strategic issues, and contribute a sound foundation to review plans. Its value will be in its treatment of strategic choices and tradeoffs, identifying emerging threats, and raising questions too sensitive for DOD or the government at large to raise.

Panelists should be nominated by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress in the summer prior to a presidential election year. A skeleton staff should be formed by late summer to handle start-up responsibilities. The NDP effort must be fully functioning by the next January. After the election, it should present its report to
McGinn

Congress and the incoming administration, which would initiate the QDR process at the Pentagon in short order. For continuity, select members of the panel staff (many of whom are military detailers) could participate in the review on returning to their service assignments. They might then make themselves available for an extended time to take part in congressional hearings and the QDR effort. However, the panel must be independent while the review is conducted as an in-house exercise. The respective staffs should be overlapped with care so that the advantages of neither effort are compromised.

Some have argued for maintaining a permanent staff between NDP efforts. This would help avoid a cold start every four years and the sort of delays that vexed the first panel. It proved to be an efficient and effective tool and should receive continued support by Congress. The relationship between the NDP and QDR processes is critical. Leaders in Congress and the Pentagon and other members of the national security community must focus on getting that relationship right. The two efforts can be complementary. It is unfortunate that the panel was not codified in the Defense Authorization Bill and that it will not precede the next QDR effort. The strategic issues raised by the panel are worthy of debate, and any resources devoted to this dialogue are well spent.

Public access to relevant NDP documents is vital. Congress should examine maintaining panel sources and records between cycles. Reliable and neutral sites to house this material include the Congressional Research Service and the National Archives.

Planning for the next round of defense reviews is underway. But only provisions for the QDR process are found in the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2000, which is regrettable. The NDP effort was an important innovation for long-term defense planning. As an independent panel comprised of senior experts with a specific mandate and timeline, it proved to be an efficient and effective tool and should receive continued support by Congress. The relationship between the NDP and QDR processes is critical. Leaders in Congress and the Pentagon and other members of the national security community must focus on getting that relationship right. The two efforts can be complementary. It is unfortunate that the panel was not codified in the Defense Authorization Bill and that it will not precede the next QDR effort. The strategic issues raised by the panel are worthy of debate, and any resources devoted to this dialogue are well spent.

JFQ

NOTES

1 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 stipulated a requirement for the Quadrennial Defense Review, but the need for a National Defense Panel was omitted from the final bill. See http://www.thomas.loc.gov for the various versions of S.1059.


JFQ last profiled the Greater Middle East in Autumn 1995. The articles found in that issue reflected both confidence and caution. They highlighted the increasing capabilities of the United States to play a positive role within the region, especially militarily. Some articles reflected concern over future threats with emphasis on transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

In the span of a few years the dynamics of the region have changed markedly. The potential for everything from a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace accord to the spread of nuclear weapons shifts almost daily. The responsibilities of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have been expanded to include Central Asia. This change in the area of responsibility (AOR) and the unsettled transformational character of the region are the subject of the JFQ Forum that follows.

These articles also resonate confidence and concern with regard to the Greater Middle East, but they reflect new realities. This forum focuses on the scope of U.S. national interests and capabilities, as well as the current geostrategic factors that will most influence the security environment.

In one of his last interviews, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, assesses the region and reviews the elements of the CENTCOM theater strategy. Two subsequent
articles offer insights into the theater strategy from both operational and historical perspectives. Together they demonstrate the importance of cross-regional issues: the CENTCOM mission impacts on U.S. global interests as well as operations in other AORs.

Rounding out the forum are articles on political, economic, and social aspects of the region. Operational concerns can’t be circumscribed by lines drawn on a map. Nor can military issues be isolated from political ones. These articles highlight considerations that transcend national, regional, and functional boundaries, addressing the influence of political Islam, relations between Europe and the Middle East, and demands posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Indian subcontinent.

This JFQ Forum suggests that there is increased immediacy for gaining an understanding of the complexities that influence this highly diverse operational environment.
What basic considerations underpin your theater strategy?

Our theater strategy is built around the mission of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). It has four elements. The first is obvious—providing access to the energy resources of the region, which is a vital national interest. The second element is something often overlooked—the growing commercial significance of the area. The pattern of global trade is shifting from east to west. Investments are flowing into the region because of its geostrategic position. The third is the number of maritime choke points in the region, such as the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz. We must ensure these passages remain open to communication and trade. Fourth, there are issues of stability—the Middle East peace process, extremism, and other concerns that could destabilize the region and reach beyond it. This is more than...
Zinni

There is depletion of the environment, and pollution. Both poor management and cultural reasons prevent some states from getting a handle on environmental issues like the availability of water resources in the Middle East.

JFQ: How does engagement contribute to overall regional stability?

Zinni: Engagement is the first leg of our strategic vision. Its goal is developing professional and responsible militaries in democratic states and states that are undergoing democratization—military organizations that are capable and well-led. We work to create potential coalition partners. We do not have a NATO or formal security agreements with countries in the region. Desert Storm was fought with an ad hoc coalition. Today we work through a series of bilateral relations. We are like the glue that holds things together in the area—it is a constant job. We enjoy informal relationships with many nations and foster potential coalition partnerships, not only in the Persian Gulf—and in places like terrorism. And there are other concerns, not exactly national interests, but things that matter in the long run—especially humanitarian and environmental issues.

JFQ: Are there any serious threats to the region at present?

Zinni: Like all theaters we have threats—Iraq and Iran, each posing different kinds of problems. Iraq is a short-term threat that involves a strategy of containment—which works. But any strategy takes patience and also has its ups and downs. Iran could become a greater long-term threat, but it could change dramatically under the influence of moderates who are making small but steady advances. If they succeed in gaining control from hard liners in some critical areas—weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the direction of the military, and support for terrorist groups—it may be time for us to look at Iran in a new light.

JFQ: How does South Asia figure into your theater strategy?

Zinni: It’s a concern for us, perhaps the biggest, because of nuclear proliferation. India, which is not in the CENTCOM area of interest, has the bomb while Pakistan, which is in our region, also has a nuclear capability. Iran is close behind them. Certainly Iraq would go nuclear if it could. Israel, which is not in our area but just outside it, probably has a capability. This region, unlike the rest of the world, seems to be headed in the wrong direction in terms of WMD. I’m worried that friendly countries may opt for these weapons as a means of deterrence. To my mind, WMD will be a major threat, something that must be reversed under a non-proliferation regime.

JFQ: What other transnational issues do you see on the horizon?

Zinni: We worry about extremism, something that involves more than just the threat of terrorism. There is a movement, a new jihadism, that is coalescing around extremist groups. Its origins can be traced to Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and others have brought extremists together through hostility to the West as well as other countries in the region. They are finding common support that makes this situation dangerous. Moreover, they are going beyond simple acts of terrorism. They are getting involved in major conflicts in Central Asia, such as Chechnya in the Caucasus. Also these groups are attempting to establish extremist states.

JFQ: Why are you particularly concerned about the environment?

Zinni: Down the road we are likely to see major environmental problems caused by demographic trends. The signs are not good in terms of population explosions that could deprecate economies around the world. Some nations that rely on one source of revenue, such as petroleum, could be faced with economic disaster. There are heavy demands on water supplies in the region, and water will be a serious problem in the future. There is depletion of the environment, and pollution. Both poor management and cultural reasons prevent some states from getting a handle on environmental issues like the availability of water resources in the Middle East.

JFQ: How does engagement contribute to overall regional stability?

Zinni: Engagement is the first leg of our strategic vision. Its goal is developing professional and responsible militaries in democratic states and states that are undergoing democratization—military organizations that are capable and well-led. We work to create potential coalition partners. We do not have a NATO or formal security agreements with countries in the region. Desert Storm was fought with an ad hoc coalition. Today we work through a series of bilateral relations. We are like the glue that holds things together in the area—it is a constant job. We enjoy informal relationships with many nations and foster potential coalition partnerships, not only in the Persian Gulf—and in places like

Spring 2000 / JFQ 27
Egypt and Jordan—but in Africa. There is much promise throughout the region, but realizing it requires a more complex, sophisticated program of engagement.

**JQ**: How does your command contribute to U.S. diplomacy?

**Zinni**: We support diplomatic efforts and foreign policy initiatives by establishing close personal relationships with leaders across the region. Not only senior officers, but civilian leaders as well. In our part of the world there is not always a separation between political and military leadership. In fact, they can be one and the same, like Pakistan. You will find military leaders who are also members of royal houses or other elites and thus, in dealing with them as officers, one is moving in political circles. So my official visits to many countries begin with a call on the heads of state, at their insistence. Such relationships not only help in military-to-military contexts, but also in broader contexts which influence U.S. foreign affairs.

**JQ**: What about the CENTCOM role as a combatant command?

**Zinni**: Besides engagement we have warfighting goals. They form the second leg of our vision. We are warfighters, and we must be prepared to respond. We have a family of twelve plans that are serious, each one real. In addition, we are the only unified command that literally goes to war. CENTCOM is a deployable headquarters. When we have to pack up our gear—communications, computers, and the like—we aren’t going off to fight from Honolulu or Stuttgart. That pulls us in two directions and puts a double burden on our staff, coping with strategy and policy—traditional unified command responsibilities—and operational, even tactical, issues.
JFQ: What do you mean by development, the third leg of your strategic vision?

Zinni: It’s a way of looking to the future. Broadly speaking, it seeks to better the command and the environment. It’s what militaries within the region can do to better the environment, help each other, share experiences, and respond to environmental crises. We also help Americans and others better understand the region. We train our people on Islamic and Arabic culture and other aspects of the area. We worry about command climate and the quality of life of our personnel. Moreover, we work with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and others on doctrine development.

JFQ: How does CENTCOM perform its mission without assigned forces?

Zinni: While it’s true that we do not have assigned forces, that’s an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that we own little infrastructure in the region. There are no U.S. bases. There are few headquarters or assets in place. Our forces largely operate from host nation facilities. Those nations also support forward presence. Last year their support—food, fuel, and water—amounted to over $300 million ($500 million in the previous year). The disadvantage is that we must ask other commanders for forces. Sometimes that is unplanned or upsets planning. But we try not to put unnecessary demands on other CINCs or the services. Three things combine to meet our needs: forward presence forces, pre-positioning, and earmarked CONUS alert forces.

JFQ: What would you change in the unified command plan (UCP)?

Zinni: Recent UCP adjustments expanded our area of responsibility (AOR). We have been assigned a fourth subregion, Central Asia. No one who sets out to revamp the way that this plan partitions the world can satisfy all requirements imposed by a given region. In other words, looking at AOs in purely military terms and considering critical questions like span of control, the number and size of militaries in the region, and the scope of potential crises that can be reasonably allotted to one CINC, one kind of approach emerges. But if you look at CENTCOM in strictly cultural terms, it might make sense to circumscribe the entire Islamic world—the Greater Middle East or however you want to refer to this overall region—which suggests another approach. And if you contemplate our AOR in terms of natural resources, such as apportioning scarce supplies of water or arable land in some sort of equitable way, you would come up with another approach to UCP development.

JFQ: Would another approach to the region satisfy everyone concerned?

Zinni: Geographic commands are not delineated in the same way that the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or Joint Staff organize themselves to deal with various regions of the world. CENTCOM interfaces with four different regional bureaus in the State Department, and desk officers on the Joint Staff are not aligned with the current UCP. Looking at international organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or the Organization of African Union, other approaches to the region emerge. Moreover, if you were to cast the region in terms of an energy command—an approach that was considered in the past—in additional to the Persian/Arabian Gulf, you would want to include the Caucasus and extend the region to Nigeria in West Africa.

JFQ: Do such geographical anomalies compound your problems?

Zinni: There is no perfect solution to defining any AOR. For example, would it be advisable to have both protagonists in a conflict in the same region? Should India and Pakistan be incorporated under one command? Should Israel and its Arab neighbors come under one CINC? Obviously, there are pluses to having all parties included in a single unified command. On the other hand, such an arrangement could completely overwhelm any command. In the case of CENTCOM, the Indo-Pakistani dispute or the Middle East peace process could totally consume us.

JFQ: Do the CINCs exert real influence over what the services do?

Zinni: There are a number of myths out there. One is that every thing that CINCs do is bad—joint exercises, requirements, and so forth. We’re seen as adding pressure to the services, operational and personnel temps, and...
constrained budgets. Congress recently cut our exercise budget. And what was cut? Joint exercises. Over the last four years we have had our exercises cut by a third. The assumption is that we put a strain on the system. But what is lost when joint exercises are cut? Engagement, coalition building, preparation for joint warfighting, that's what you really lose.

**JFQ** What's your assessment of the joint requirements process?

**Zinni** We do not have a definitive voice in the process. While the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) gives us a voice at the table, we don't have a vote. For example, if one service is about to put in a communication system around the world and needs theater injection points, that service will provide them. And when a service looks at its infrastructure in Europe or the Pacific, where will those injection points go? Not in CENTCOM. We only have forward presence forces that rotate in and out of the region, no bases or fixed infrastructure. No Ramstein or Okinawa. So the ability of CINCs to directly influence resources is not as strong as people think. But given the personalities in place today, the service chiefs and the Chairman and Vice Chairman, we are taken seriously and our voices are heard. If we make our case, the services give us every consideration.

**JFQ** How would you fix the joint requirements process?

**Zinni** I would like to see the commander in chief, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), become our guy at the JROC table—with a vote. I think he should represent CINCs on joint doctrine, joint requirements, and joint testing, as well as joint development in a broad sense of the term. Obviously, he should be the joint integrator. He can handle joint experimentation, joint deployment, and related matters. Perhaps I'm more willing than other CINCs to accept this idea, but I can envision this officer as my representative, developing a joint integrated priority list after consulting with every CINC.

**JFQ** Would JFCOM have to arbitrate requirements among CINCs?

**Zinni** First of all, I don't think it would take much arbitration. If you take requirements today, you probably will find about an 80 percent match. If you look at the concerns of CINCs—issues like theater missile defense and protection against WMD—there's a lot of consensus at the top of the list and maybe a few unique ones at the bottom. One CINC may have a particular issue because he lives in a different environment. But certainly the highest priorities and the common ones get attention. Whether we make an issue number one and PACOM makes it number two or three, you will probably find that the vast majority of such items are considered major priorities. So I don't think that there would be any need for a lot of arbitration.

**JFQ** How do you see this role for JFCOM working in practice?

**Zinni** JFCOM should be the bridge between CINCs and service chiefs. I would not want that to increase the power of CINCs at the expense of service chiefs, because everything tends to be seen in that context anyway. It's always some sort of a zero sum game and that's wrong. First of all, this is a great collegial group who work very closely together. In discussing engagement at the last CINCs conference I found that the service chiefs were interested in what we're doing because their resources are involved. And we mulled ways to improve things. For example, the services could meet some training requirements within the context of a joint
training program or exercise, or vice versa. If I draw forces from PACOM, could my joint mission essential task lists (JMETLs) be met by an exercise in Korea? The answer is yes. There are certain units that come to me and also go to Korea, so an exercise like Ulchi Lens could meet my requirements. That is one way that JFCOM could actually help us be more economical. And there are certain functions that all CINCs perform that could be done by one. Consequence management is one example. If there is a WMD event, we pull together disparate and highly specialized agencies. Why should each CINC develop a separate capability? Why not establish a deployable JFCOM consequence management capability that could meet the requirements of any CINC?

**JFQ** So you see JFCOM balancing command and service interests?

**Zinni** JFCOM must not only address CINC requirements, it must grasp service requirements and harmonize them. I don’t want to get into the business of influencing the kinds of tanks, ships, or planes that each service buys. That isn’t our business. I do think that when a program has joint applications we must ensure that interoperability is taken into account. The services have a grip on doctrine. Bringing joint doctrine together is difficult. If it is tied to programmatic or if the service doctrine centers are involved, it’s difficult to get an agreement. The service components are forced to work together in the unified commands. Developing the joint force land component commander concept was done by our components, not by this headquarters. It was done by all the services and produced a workable solution. The current joint doctrine system makes the services adversaries because they are competing for resources, attention, and recruits.

**JFQ** What is the role of the Joint Chiefs in operational matters?

**Zinni** They have a say in how service assets are employed. CINCs brief them on contingency and war plans which, in turn, the chiefs vote on. Can the chiefs trump CINCs? How do we provide input to the interagency process? We are notionally the most knowledgeable players in our regions on operational requirements. We are the warfighters. How do we input a warfighting prospective to the National Command Authorities? Is there a formal process? CINCs are not directly part of the interagency process. We communicate with the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman. We have dual obligations to Congress and the Secretary of Defense. The chiefs have obligations to Congress, the service secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense, relationships that can give rise to competing loyalties. But there are advantages to this system. It introduces checks and balances and lets everyone have a voice. But it can get confusing with 17 four-stars around the table at a CINCs conference—that’s a lot of people speaking with a lot of hats on.

**JFQ** Looking ahead, do we need another defense reorganization act?

**Zinni** I think reforms brought about under Goldwater-Nichols should be expanded to include the entire interagency community. The interagency process is antiquated—it is a difficult system that should be reshaped. We are tied to stove-piped relationships. I must do a lot of business directly with the Department of State. But there is an issue of all such coordination going through the Joint Staff or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And who is my counterpart? Is it the ambassador to a given country or a desk officer at the State Department? How can that be if I am responsible for an entire region? It’s an awkward system.

**JFQ** Finally, how would you transform the defense establishment?

**Zinni** We have to reconsider many aspects of defense. Take unified commands like CENTCOM. Perhaps there will be fewer uniformed personnel in our headquarters in the future. I envision more representation from the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance, even from nongovernmental organizations, agencies that we work with in the region. I see our headquarters resembling a multigovernmental agency that would change the way in which we do the day-to-day business of engagement. Some conflicts require multorganizational approaches and even, at times, conflicts in which the military only has a supporting role.

**JFQ** We have to reconsider many aspects of defense. Take unified commands like CENTCOM. Perhaps there will be fewer uniformed personnel in our headquarters in the future. I envision more representation from the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance, even from nongovernmental organizations, agencies that we work with in the region. I see our headquarters resembling a multigovernmental agency that would change the way in which we do the day-to-day business of engagement. Some conflicts require multorganizational approaches and even, at times, conflicts in which the military only has a supporting role.

**JFQ** Finally, how would you transform the defense establishment?

**Zinni** We have to reconsider many aspects of defense. Take unified commands like CENTCOM. Perhaps there will be fewer uniformed personnel in our headquarters in the future. I envision more representation from the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance, even from nongovernmental organizations, agencies that we work with in the region. I see our headquarters resembling a multigovernmental agency that would change the way in which we do the day-to-day business of engagement. Some conflicts require multorganizational approaches and even, at times, conflicts in which the military only has a supporting role.

**JFQ** Finally, how would you transform the defense establishment?

**Zinni** We have to reconsider many aspects of defense. Take unified commands like CENTCOM. Perhaps there will be fewer uniformed personnel in our headquarters in the future. I envision more representation from the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance, even from nongovernmental organizations, agencies that we work with in the region. I see our headquarters resembling a multigovernmental agency that would change the way in which we do the day-to-day business of engagement. Some conflicts require multorganizational approaches and even, at times, conflicts in which the military only has a supporting role.

**JFQ** Finally, how would you transform the defense establishment?
The CENTCOM area of responsibility includes 25 nations, ranging from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the east, and from Kazakhstan in the north to Kenya in the south. It encompasses some 428 million people who represent 17 different ethnic groups, speak six major languages with hundreds of dialects, and live under distinct forms of government and various standards of living. The four subregions that make up the area are the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), the Northern Red Sea (Egypt and Jordan), the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan), and South and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

The mission of CENTCOM is to promote and protect U.S. interests, ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources and markets, assist regional friends in providing for their own security and regional stability, promote the attainment of a just and lasting Middle East Peace, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other transnational threats, and rapidly deploy joint and combined forces to support the full range of military operations.

CENTCOM Headquarters, which has a staff of over 900 personnel, is located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Its five component commands are: U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), headquartered in Bahrain; U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), headquartered at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina; and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
See the CENTCOM homepage (http://www.centcom.mil) for details on the area of responsibility, component commands, theater strategy, subregional strategies, and other issues, or contact:

U.S. Central Command
ATTN: Public Affairs Office
7115 South Boundary Boulevard
MacDill Air Force Base
Florida 33621-510
Telephones: (813) 828-5895
Fax: (813) 840-5692

Udairi range, Kuwait.

1st Combat Camera (Jim Var egyi)

Jabel Ali, UAE.

U.S. Navy (Gregory S. McCreash)
Unified commands encompass areas of responsibility (AOR) with many millions of people and diverse cultures, languages, topography, and climate. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) extends from the Horn of Africa to South Asia, a region which is home to three great monotheistic religions. Cultures vary from African tribes to desert Bedouins to the peoples of Central Asia who speak 16 major languages and more than 100 dialects. Given this demographic and environmental complexity, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), is confronted daily with a myriad of political-military issues. The intricacy of this situation is increased exponentially by the requirement to shape the strategic environment through long-term engagement. In addition, CENTCOM is the only command which is not headquartered in its AOR and does not own forces, although this does not eliminate the need for engagement. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) both face major geographic demands and demographic heterogeneity that require the application of resources over vast spaces.

**Imperative for Coordination**

CINC's are stretching resources to accomplish missions within their areas of responsibility. Planning is intensified because of the synchronization of multiple regional commands, component commands, and defense agencies across the unified command plan. In CENTCOM, most nations in the area of interest demand daily coordination with other commands. For example, the Middle East peace process permeates the political-military atmosphere of the entire AOR, but Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and North Africa fall in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Turkey influences not only the Middle East...
but also the politics of the newly independent states of Central Asia. Moreover, it is in the EUCOM area of responsibility. The Indo-Pakistani situation has become more tense and violent. In addition to pitting two well-armed conventional powers against each other, friction on the Indian subcontinent risks escalating conflict between the latest members of the nuclear club. This threat requires national level management and specific actions by CENTCOM for Pakistan and by PACOM for India.

Cross-boundary cooperation between CINCs stems from several causes. These include critical threats from continuing or imminent conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflict, Operation Northern Watch, and the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir exemplify international tensions that require close monitoring and absorb vast resources with little immediate progress to show for the effort. CINCs must also cooperate to maintain programs and institutional mechanisms. Examples include the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Middle East peace process. Transnational issues such as refugees, desertification, water supply, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental degradation also call for cooperation.

International tension and violence require the most monitoring and absorb many resources. When issues such as the India-Pakistan nuclear testing are serious enough to engage the National Command Authorities (NCA), an interagency working group may be formed to coordinate U.S. policy. Presidential Decision Directive 56, entitled “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” is one tool used by NCA to bring this group together. Its predecessor was National Security Decision
Directive 311, “U.S.-Soviet Defense and Military Relations,” which established such a group in 1988 to ensure that defense and military contacts with the Soviet Union conformed to the American position. It also required that all “public and private statements of U.S. policy, visits and proposed agreements developed in the course of discussions” be vetted through the interagency group. This guidance will then be passed through the Joint Staff to the concerned CINCs for action and inclusion in their planning.

The second factor is national policy that supersedes geographic and AOR boundaries and requires CINCs to coordinate on programs and institutional mechanisms. Examples include PFP and the multinational forces and the observer mission in Sinai.

Cross-Boundary Coordination

When a crisis transcends regional boundaries the onus is put on the Joint Staff to respond. However, it delegates immediate synchronization to the warfighting CINCs involved. CENTCOM does this through the activation of its crisis action team and operates 24 hours a day to ensure that all operations are coordinated and deconflicted. In addition to immediate crisis response, major commands (MACOMs) organize cells to coordinate ongoing operations across boundaries. Two such efforts are Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. The latter is a CENTCOM-only operation, originating in the states of the southern Arabian Gulf with the mission of enforcing the southern no-fly zones. The implied mission of protecting the Shi’a of southern Iraq and preventing large scale Iraqi movement to threaten the southern Gulf is also partly assigned to Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. This organization is largely based in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait while, conversely, Northern Watch is based in Turkey and has the mission of enforcing the northern no-fly zone and, by extension, protecting Kurdish groups from the Iraqi regime.

These concurrent operations must be coordinated on airspace, electronic warfare, targeting, intelligence, and policy to ensure flight safety and prevent friendly fire incidents. They accomplish these objectives through conversations among commanders, message traffic, and most importantly by exchanging liaison officers. A small EUCOM cell is situated at CENTCOM headquarters with responsibility for information exchange and managing the friction of the situation. It is integrated into the Operations Directorate at CENTCOM and coordinates one of the most active combat theaters in the world. Reliable, secure, and redundant communications are the key.

The Hierarchy

Other situations that require CINC cross-boundary coordination are engagement activities with either long historical roots, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, or follow-on activities from crisis operations such as Desert
Fox. NCA has directed that CINC’s write theater engagement plans (TEPs) to institutionalize the scope of their activities within AORs. The plan requires that all activities be examined to ensure support for national objectives. Although grounded in common sense, this process is more demanding than it appears. To achieve this endstate CENTCOM uses the theater strategy planning system (TSPS).

The TSPS for CENTCOM is modeled on the more mature system used in EUCOM. Both include subregional working groups that meet at least once a year. Staffs can attend the meetings of other CINCs to provide visibility and cross-fertilization and to save time and money. However, staffs must also have adequate information to represent their commands at the working groups. CINC representatives must be prepared to discuss exercises, training, security assistance, exercise-related and military construction, international education and training, and humanitarian assistance, to name some examples. Because this data is a moving target, capturing and accumulating it across directorates within the same command is a challenging task for Staffs.

When a regional working group cannot solve a problem, activities can be coordinated at the national level in other working groups. One such issue is security assistance weapons transfers. A simplified type of interagency working group meets regularly or as needed to consider weapons release requests from worldwide sources. CINCs submit input after internal staffing to the group, which takes a formal vote. Occasionally the interagency working group will defer, delay, request clarification, or attach conditions to a proposed sale. The conditions are relayed to CINCs through the Joint Staff for additional coordination. Weapons transfers can cross command boundaries and often require different commands to explain their positions. The process can also be contentious because two CINCs may have different positions on the same system. For example, advanced air-to-air missiles may be favored by EUCOM but not by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Because these weapons require Mode IV IFF transponders, which are standard in NATO but not in Latin America, there would be disagreement concerning their utility for each AOR.

Interagency working groups are usually event-driven and entail regional or country-specific issues that necessitate policy decisions, such as defense cooperation agreements. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with negotiating such agreements, many operational details are initially delegated to CINCs. Once a workable draft is staffed by a command and the Pentagon, it is forwarded to other concerned agencies for coordination. After a round or two of comments, the draft agreement goes to an interagency working group for approval. The meetings are normally chaired by a representative of the National Security Council and decisions are generally reached through consensus. The Joint Staff represents the interests of commands and serves as the conduit between them in formulating specific DOD positions. When required or requested, the Joint Staff may facilitate contact between commands, who may send representatives to working group meetings to support presentations when the issues are particularly contentious or complex.

Conferences can be useful for cross-boundary coordination. In addition to planning, recent topics at events proposed or held under CENTCOM aegis include environmental security, exercise scheduling, planning, and cooperative defense against weapons of mass destruction. Participants vary like the topics, but cooperation among unified commands is important in almost every case. For example, communications, reconnaissance, intelligence, early warning, and location capability make U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) support vital in any contingency operation and in most peacetime engagement. The transnational issues—terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation—demand national level policy guidance and cross-boundary unified command cooperation. For example, dirty money can be moved across any boundary with the click of a mouse, requiring CENTCOM, EUCOM,
and SOUTHCOM to assist host nations. A comprehensive counterdrug program calls for numerous coordinated programs such as crop substitution, police training, assisting host nation legal systems, counterinsurgency training and assistance, and interdiction. Drugs originating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility could be detected by SPACECOM, survive crop eradication, and be tracked across the AOR in transit to EUCOM for transshipment. EUCOM would then monitor the movement while alerting friendly law enforcement agencies. Finally, either SOUTHCOM or U.S. Joint Forces Command could help domestic law enforcement agencies interdict the shipment and arrest the perpetrators. This description simplifies the intelligence, communications, and organizations but indicates the complexity of such events.

Planning conferences also serve as a tool for bringing together commanders and their staffs across boundaries. Among the advantages of these conferences are regular scheduling, the ability to attract a wide audience, and concentration of effort. The disadvantage is taking players out of the loop, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of other events. Bringing together the national-level participants help more focused commands to reach agreement. The biannual EUCOM conference on the Partnership for Peace program brings together American and foreign program coordinators and managers from the Joint Staff, services, and other agencies and focus on policies, procedures, and activities. Moreover, managers from CENTCOM also participate, including PFP representatives from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

The X Factor

In addition to CINC representatives for short-term working groups, MACOMs have liaison officers assigned or attached to staffs. Some examples include the CENTCOM representative at the U.K. Permanent Joint Headquar ters and coalition-building officers employed during crises and contingencies. This representation has been formalized. A U.S. officer is permanently stationed in Britain and represents the command for purposes of policy, planning, and operations. This link highlights the role of constant clear communications among coalition partners. The difficulties of creating a common effort among one nation’s services are well known. Adding another country with language, cultural, training, doctrinal, and logistic differences increases the level of difficulty. Agreeing on a common definition of the mission can take days rather than hours when language, culture, and doctrine diverge. Even countries with a common language and fifty years in the same alliance structure have problems meshing operations. Yet the British provide historical insight and alternative viewpoints on the region. The prolonged institutional network NATO provides has helped CINCs execute combined operations. By contrast, responding to Iraqi aggression since 1991 has resulted in building ad hoc coalitions. Faced with Bagh dad’s refusal to comply with the will of the international community, the United States has been forced to create a consensus for the use of force. Because nations from all over the world have been involved, CENTCOM has needed to coordinate not only with other commands, but with the Joint Staff and other agencies.

When the international community decided to act, the Department of State began soliciting friends and allies to participate. As countries agreed in principle to join the coalition, CENTCOM was notified and the Joint Staff began preliminary planning. The headquarters planners evaluated the type of forces offered and the political implications of national participation. CENTCOM staff members then performed mission analysis and kept the Joint Staff informed. Based on this analysis,
the Department of State formally invited participation by the host nation. The Joint Staff notified the command of a member’s location (like PACOM for New Zealand). Commands then developed load planning, strategic lift requirements, logistic support, command relationships, radio frequency deconfliction, and other details. CENTCOM would then contact the U.S. defense representative (USDR) in the host nation. This was often the individual best suited for direct coordination, based on his location in the American embassy. USDR was useful in helping coordinate the specific command relationships and in obtaining security clearances from the host nation. These national clearances then had to be translated into the equivalent U.S. clearance. Access to classified information is a critical enabler in combined operations, and those nations without it were severely limited in their ability to contribute in a timely manner.

The liaison officers and advance parties usually moved by commercial air once the details of their country clearances, billeting, messing, and other matters were worked out between the losing command and CENTCOM. Due to small numbers of personnel and equipment items, this process was quick and allowed coalition partners to establish themselves in forward headquarters. Movement of main bodies and equipment was much more complicated and again involved the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, CENTCOM, and losing commands. All deployment details passed among coalition liaison, CENTCOM, other commands, and USDRs, who were also often the answer of last resort concerning host nation issues. In theater, CENTCOM took responsibility for these details but kept the Joint Staff and concerned commands informed.

Another instance of a combined force is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Drawing from several African nations, its purpose is preemptive deployment on the African continent. The Department of State formally invited participation by the host nation. The Joint Staff notified the command of a member’s location (like PACOM for New Zealand). Commands then developed load planning, strategic lift requirements, logistic support, command relationships, radio frequency deconfliction, and other details. CENTCOM would then contact the U.S. defense representative (USDR) in the host nation. This was often the individual best suited for direct coordination, based on his location in the American embassy. USDR was useful in helping coordinate the specific command relationships and in obtaining security clearances from the host nation. These national clearances then had to be translated into the equivalent U.S. clearance. Access to classified information is a critical enabler in combined operations, and those nations without it were severely limited in their ability to contribute in a timely manner.

The liaison officers and advance parties usually moved by commercial air once the details of their country clearances, billeting, messing, and other matters were worked out between the losing command and CENTCOM. Due to small numbers of personnel and equipment items, this process was quick and allowed coalition partners to establish themselves in forward headquarters. Movement of main bodies and equipment was much more complicated and again involved the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, CENTCOM, and losing commands. All deployment details passed among coalition liaison, CENTCOM, other commands, and USDRs, who were also often the answer of last resort concerning host nation issues. In theater, CENTCOM took responsibility for these details but kept the Joint Staff and concerned commands informed.
continent as invited for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations. Efforts to train, equip, and maintain ACRI forces involve elements from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and other nations. Exercises and training all require cross-boundary communication.

Making Coordination Work

Practical experience and organizational theory indicate that as the number of organizational boundaries grows, the difficulty of coordinating increases exponentially. These obstacles can be overcome through planning and sheer hard work with assistance from technology. But even with new information technology, seamless staff coordination is still a goal, not a reality. Within staffs, action officers (AOs) communicate face-to-face or by telephone, e-mail, or fax to attain operational linkage. Once a common operating picture is obtained at headquarters, the next level of challenge arises. Unified commanders must bring together component staffs. In the case of CENTCOM, this means unifying the efforts of distant organizations. U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT), is headquartered in Bahrain and U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT), is located in Hawaii (an 8-hour time difference from Tampa) while Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) is collocated with CENTCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base. Even though U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) and U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) are both situated in the same time zone as headquarters, they are located in Georgia and South Carolina, respectively. It is worth noting that the area of responsibility is 8 hours ahead of the headquarters, giving MARCENT a 16-hour time differential. Each of these organizations faces the same internal challenges for unity of effort, focus, and information flow. Moreover, each component is training, planning, organizing, and running operations in the area of responsibility.

CINCs and their component commanders can overcome this impasse with direct communications by telephone, video teleconferencing, or e-mail. This clarifies the situation among general and flag rank officers. Such communications also must be furnished to directors and other staff principals lest impetus be lost. Information technology can assist staffs in this effort. TPS includes the TEP management information system. Currently, it can only be accessed by the owners in that specific staff. However, as users continue to define the desired software characteristics, the contractor can write a program to permit sharing a global database by providing either total or selected visibility to designated users.

Finally, the Joint Staff serves as the primary conduit for CINCs to make cross-boundary coordination work. Again, AOs perform the day-to-day business of coordinating strategic
interests and feeding command concerns to the Pentagon. Most issues stay within directorates, but when more complex issues arise, interdirectorates or interagency staffing can be required in Washington where the process becomes more formal and is addressed through processes described above.

Although every aspect of U.S. policy and engagement is affected by multiple commands, conducting operations that cross unified boundaries are among the most difficult missions that CINCs face. Problems in coordination, communication, distance, and organizational theory combine to make these missions more complex than organizational charts indicate. Increased friction within and between commands is greater when allies are involved, even in NATO where this Nation has had a longstanding relationship.

Commands have formal and informal procedures to deal with such challenges. Education, exchange programs, direct communication among commanders, and cooperation among headquarters, the Joint Staff, and working groups play a critical role. When lives or mission accomplishment are at stake, such as in Iraq, friction is usually overcome by hard work. Ongoing missions with lower threat levels, such as preparing ACRI for deployment, can be approached more deliberately but with no less dedication.

Informally, the staffs of all organizations involved interact as much as possible to resolve problems. Information technology helps by weakening the bureaucratic barriers but has not erased them. Crossing the invisible boundaries that separate CINC responsibilities is perhaps even more difficult today than when Clausewitz first formalized the concept of friction. Such battlefield seams as cross-boundary situations are a weak point for enemy exploitation. Commanders on all levels will still have to spend additional effort to ensure that these seams are covered.
Following World War II, the United States assumed a global leadership role. The nations in what comprises the area of responsibility of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) were viewed through the prism of the Cold War, with policies focused on denying turf and resources, including the oil of the Middle East, to the Soviet Union. After the British withdrew from east of the Suez in 1967, the United States depended on Iran and Saudi Arabia to promote peace and ensure stability within the region. This approach received added impetus under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on both friends and allies in the region to counter threats within a Cold War context.

This strategy began to unravel in 1979 when the hostage crisis in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised doubt about America’s ability to honor commitments to friendly Arab states and Israel, as well as secure access to resources of the Arabian Gulf. In January 1980 President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that any outside attempt to gain control over the region would be taken as an assault on vital national interests. To enforce the Carter Doctrine, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established in March 1980.

Early Years

At first RDJTF was subordinate to U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM), located since 1972 at MacDill Air Force Base and the successor to U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM). STRICOM was activated during the Kennedy administration in 1962. Among its missions was joint planning of operations in the Middle East, Africa (south of the Sahara), and South Asia (MEAFSA). Because of concern expressed by the Department of State about African reactions to the title of Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE), DOD assigned the added title of Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (CINCMEAFSA).

With an area of responsibility halfway around the world, it was difficult for CINCSTRIKE to carry out his mission as CINCMEAFSA. When military operations were conducted in the area, U.S. European Command
The National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, spoke of a crescent of crisis reaching from Somalia to Pakistan. Two events in late 1979 fundamentally changed attitudes on the region. The Ayatollah Komeini displaced the Shah of Iran, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. A few months later, in March 1980, RDJTF was established. Then the hostage crisis in Tehran led to the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran and the aborted mission to rescue the American hostages. Although these events took place in the RDJTF area of responsibility, this mission was not conducted by the new command.

Enter CENTCOM

The activation of RDJTF was another attempt to solve the vexing geostrategic problems. This was the case in the Congo rescue mission of 1964, evacuation of Americans from Libya and Jordan during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and exercises sponsored by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The MEAFSA mission was lost when REDCOM replaced STRICOM. This accorded with the Nixon Doctrine of gradual disengagement from Third World conflicts. The responsibilities of CINCMEAFSA were divided between EUCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and parts of the Indian Ocean bordering Africa were retained by U.S. Atlantic Command. EUCOM, which already had responsibility for North Africa, now inherited an area that extended as far as Iran. The PACOM region stretched to Pakistan and included the northern Indian Ocean, but not the Red Sea or Arabian Gulf. In 1976, this area was expanded to encompass the entire Indian Ocean.

In the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Chairman proposed establishing a mobile joint task force (JTF) to deal with distant crises, but the concept did not immediately gain support. After an initial review, the Carter administration issued Presidential Directive (PD) 18 in August 1977, which recommended forming a new quick reaction force. But no funding was provided.
to contend with the same difficulties that had plagued its predecessors: long lines of communication, lack of regional bases and forward-based assets, and poor understanding of local conditions. Additional problems were insufficient forces, inadequate funding, and overlapping command responsibilities.

To finally solve these problems the Reagan administration converted the ad hoc RDJTF into a permanent unified command. As the first step RDJTF became a separate JTF in October 1981, no longer subordinate to REDCOM, and its region was more precisely defined and included Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia as well as Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, People’s Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen Arab Republic.

Despite the fact that CENTCOM evolved from RDJTF, the commands were fundamentally different. By definition, JTFs are temporary organizations established by the Secretary of Defense for specific purposes. When RDJTF was formed in 1980, it was regarded as a temporary solution to project U.S. power across the Middle East and East Africa. With the Reagan administration, it was organized as a permanent unified command for the region, under a plan that called for the orderly transition over the next two years.

When CENTCOM was activated in January 1983, Jordan, the Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf were included in its area. The first Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Robert Kingston, USA, was tasked to institute a bona fide unified command and credible force in response to critics who derided RDJTF as not being either rapid or deployable or much of a force. He insisted on having component forces assigned to the command, not the notional forces that characterized RDJTF. Overcoming initial skepticism by EUCOM, which had a headquarters and available forces much closer to the region, Kingston maintained that CENTCOM was a full-fledged unified command in the same sense as others, notwithstanding the fact that its headquarters was geographically distant. Security assistance operations, its most important financial tool for influencing regional military establishments, had to be delayed at EUCOM insistence until the next fiscal year. Similar difficulties postponed the takeover by the Air Force component of the local airborne warning and control system (AWACS) from EUCOM.

When General George Crist, USMC, assumed command in November 1985, he noted that CENTCOM was a unified command in name only. In most quarters, he believed it was “so poorly conceived as to be destined to fail at the outset.” Crist found that similar thinking permeated official views on all levels but failed to take into account the necessity for bilateral consultations with individual countries within the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Moreover, the command was regarded by many nations in the region as “little more than a major intervention force deigned to operate solely for U.S. purposes without their consultation or participation.” Even worse, the new CINC thought that his command was “seen as a pariah by most agencies with vested interests in the area, including the Departments of State and Defense. To counter any perception that CENTCOM was inimical to the interests of countries in the region, Crist set out to convince local leaders that the command sought the support of key nations without “gang-pressing them into actions contrary to their perceived self-interest.” Invoking the Nixon Doctrine, he emphasized that the command was “there to provide them with capabilities that would allow them to stand on their own two feet and, if necessary, to defend their territorial integrity against local or regional threats to their security.” He also wanted to convince them of the ability of the United States “to deal with threats beyond their ability to respond.”

The Gulf War

The Iran-Iraq war severely tested Crist’s vision. It threatened to spread and destabilize the entire region. In May 1987 the United States was drawn into the conflict when missiles fired by Iraq struck USS Stark, killing 37 sailors. As the conflict intensified, Washington sought to ensure safe passage by neutral shipping through the Straits of Hormuz, leading to one of the first combat operations conducted by CENTCOM.
CINCCENT, one concern that the two men discussed was Baghdad's military prowess in the wake of its long war with Iran. But in trips throughout the region Schwarzkopf found that most friendly countries were more concerned with Iran than Iraq. As King Hussein of Jordan informed him, "Don't worry about the Iraqis. They are war weary and have no aggressive intentions toward their Arab brothers." Spurred by the rapid diminution of Soviet aggressiveness under Gorbachev, Schwarzkopf worked to supplant the CENTCOM primary war plan, which involved combat against the Soviets in Iran, with a more realistic scenario. The original plan, which Critz had described as bankrupt as early as 1986, required five and two-thirds divisions to march from the Arabian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains to prevent Soviet forces from seizing oil fields in Iran. Instead, Schwarzkopf began to plan for what he thought was more likely: Iraq, emerging from eight years of war against Iran with the fourth-largest and most battle-hardened military in the world, moving south to capture oil fields whose output was essential to the industrial world.

Schwarzkopf first tested this new strategy in Internal Look, a command post exercise held in July and early August 1990 at Fort Bragg and Hurlburt and Duke Fields. As the exercise unfolded, he noticed that the real world movements of Iraqi air and ground action groups destroyed the Iranian oil platforms at Sasans and Sirri and severely damaged two Iranian frigates and a missile patrol boat. CENTCOM forces, including aircraft from USS Enterprise, neutralized four Iranian naval vessels in the Mubarak oil field while losing only one helicopter. As the tanker war continued, USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Finally, under intense international political and economic pressure, Iran and Iraq agreed to a U.N. cease-fire agreement in August 1988.

After assuming command in November 1988, General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, began to expand diplomatic and military relations with counterparts in the region. During his interview with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci for the position as CINCCENT, he described the political and economic pressures on Iran, which he considered as more important than Iraq. Instead, he focused on the possibilities of a more realistic scenario. The fictional exercise messages so closely resembled real intelligence reports that the latter had to be prominently marked exercise only. During the last days of Internal Look, the Iraqis captured Kuwaiti oil fields, Iraq was poised to acquire even more valuable prizes on the Arabian peninsula.

For the first time since 1974 an American aircraft carrier sailed into the relatively confined waters of the Persian Gulf. By November 1990, the largest exercise is Bright Star, which occurs biannually. The last iteration took place in October and November 1999 and was the most significant coalition military exercise ever mounted as well as the largest-scale deployment/posture drill in the area of responsibility (outside of the Arabian Gulf). It included more than 70,000 troops from the United States and nine other nations—five members of NATO, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates—and utilized a computer-aided command post exercise and joint field training exercise in Egypt.

In the Arabian Gulf region, CENTCOM holds exercises such as Eagle Resolve in Bahrain, an annual C5I-sponsored event that helps the command and military leaders of member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council promote cooperative defense against weapons of mass destruction. Although closely related to other activities, Neon Falcon, which is also held in Bahrain, focuses on chemical, biological, and radiological defense for naval, naval air, and Special Operations Forces. British and French units as well as U.S. and Bahraini forces participated in Neon Falcon '00 which included a field training exercise to refine operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Several exercises held in the United States also benefit CENTCOM capabilities. Blue Flag, conducted by CENTAF, is a framework for command staff, components, and coalition partners to refine warfighting skills and build joint and combined teams. The primary goal of Blue Flag '00 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in March 2000 was the execution of a theater campaign in Southwest Asia. The purpose of Internal Look is similar, but is centered on CENTCOM itself rather than CENTAF. From CENTCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, it allows both staff and components to practice operational planning and execution for a simulated theater campaign scenario.
Schwarzkopf was able to shift to the offensive. Having deterred Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM started planning the liberation of Kuwait. Other forces deployed included a heavy division from the United States and Army corps from Germany with support units, three carrier battle groups, a battleship, an amphibious group with a Marine expeditionary brigade, a Marine expeditionary force, and 410 Air Force aircraft.

Backed by the U.N. Security Council, which had passed Resolution 678 on November 29, authorizing coalition forces to use all means necessary to enforce its earlier resolutions calling for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait, CENTCOM continued to build up a force adequate to the task.

On January 17 at 0300 hours Riyadh time, Operation Desert Storm began with a massive air interdiction strike. Within seven hours planes from Britain, France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States flew some 750 sorties. Targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait included military emplacements, air defense assets, and command and control facilities. The air campaign deprived Saddam Hussein of the initiative and prepared the theater for a coalition ground assault that would complete the destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait with minimal losses.

Kuwait was liberated on February 27, 1991. With coalition objectives met, a cease-fire was declared for February 28 at 0800 hours, exactly one hundred hours after ground hostilities had commenced. A cease-fire conference was held on March 3 at Safwan where the Iraqis agreed to all coalition demands and allowed their forces to disengage near Basra.

Southern Watch

The fourth CINC was General Joseph Hoar, USMC, who took command in August 1991. He inherited an organization that no longer had to justify its existence. Moreover, having served as CENTCOM chief of staff from 1988 to 1990, he was familiar with its mission. Many operations in the wake of Desert Storm were aimed at Iraqi intransigence. Maritime interdiction, which had begun in August 1990 during the initial stage of Desert Shield, enforced U.N. sanctions and were conducted by Australia, Britain, France, and the United States. When the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr opened in July 1993, interception operations were re-instituted in the northern Gulf. By that time, more than 19,150 ships had been challenged and over 8,250 had been boarded and inspected.

CENTCOM began Operation Provide Relief to supply aid to Somalia and northeastern Kenya

Aside from containing Iraq the most significant challenge that Hoar faced was concern over the east African nation of Somalia. There had been no national government since the departure of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, and the country was being racked by clan warfare. To relieve widespread starvation, CENTCOM began Operation Provide Relief in August 1992 to supply aid to Somalia and northeastern Kenya.

UNOSOM II

By late November 1992 it was clear that airlift alone would not suffice. On Thanksgiving Day, President George Bush pledged to send U.S. troops to provide security so that food could reach starving Somalis, dying at the rate of a thousand per day. Operation Restore Hope began in early December in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. A multinational coalition led by CENTCOM and known as United Task Force (UNITAF) provided security for transport and distribution centers, ensured security of relief convoys and operations, and assisted humanitarian relief organizations. When the new administration took office in January 1993, UNITAF worked to accomplish its mission and expeditiously turn over control to the United Nations.
UNITAF provided security through May 1993 as the United Nations created UNOSOM II to meet the challenge of mounting peacemaking operations under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Meanwhile, the airlift of food and other supplies under Operation Provide Relief continued through February 1993, totaling 2,500 missions flown and 28,000 metric tons delivered.

The staff of UNITAF developed detailed instructions for the turnover to the new organization which led to a seamless transition. In May the UNITAF commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, turned over operations to the UNOSOM II commander, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir of Turkey. By then, most U.S. forces had been redeployed, although a residual American presence remained to support the U.N. command. It consisted of the UNOSOM II staff members, a logistic support command with 2,800 personnel, and a quick reaction force with 1,200 troops.

Shortly after the United Nations took over relief operations, security in Mogadishu started to deteriorate, even though UNOSOM II operations in the countryside were relatively successful. The militia fighters under Mohamed Farah Aidid were largely responsible for unrest in the capital and increased hostility toward UNOSOM II forces. Violence erupted once again in September 1993 when the Somalis attacked Nigerian forces. Task Force Ranger conducted several operations in September that captured a few militia leaders. Later in the month, however, three Americans were killed when their helicopter was downed, and further casualties were sustained in the ensuing rescue effort. The most significant combat action occurred in early October, when Task Force Ranger captured six lieutenants of Aidid and several militiamen in a daylight raid. During the withdrawal, Somalis shot down two UH-60 helicopters and brought heavy fire to bear on U.S. soldiers on the ground. In the firefight some 300 Somalis were left dead and hundreds more wounded while 16 Rangers were killed and 83 wounded before the quick reaction force, together with Pakistani and Malaysian soldiers, were able to withdraw to safety. As a result, the President announced that all U.S. troops would be removed from Somalia by the end of March 1994.

Near-Continuous Presence

In August 1994, General Binford Peay, USA, became the fifth CINCCENT and developed an expanded strategy based on maintaining regional access through forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance programs. This new approach promoted stability and protected national interests. By emphasizing deterrence through coalition building and military-to-military access, the new strategy soon encountered a series of threats from Saddam Hussein, requiring U.S. forces to reposition to the region. Terrorist attacks against CENTCOM personnel had lasting effects on command operations. In June 1996, terrorists attacked Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans. Coming after the attack on Saudi Arabian National Guard head-quarters in November 1995, which killed seven people, including five Americans, this tragedy resulted in the relocation of U.S. forces to installations more easily defended against terrorism. Operation Desert Focus began in August 1996 as part of an agreement between Secretary of Defense William Perry and Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan. The multinational Joint Task Force Southwest Asia moved operations from Riyadh and Dhahran to al Kharj. In four months, CENTCOM transferred nearly 5,000 people, 78 aircraft, and maintenance facilities to an unfinished area of Prince Sultan air base. In addition to relocating to more secure locations, Desert Focus reduced the footprint of the command by eliminating nonessential billets and returning dependents home, hardened existing facilities, reduced transportation vulnerability, and institutionalized antiterrorism programs.

Perhaps the most innovative contribution that Peay made to CENTCOM and joint thinking was the concept of near-continuous presence. Comprised of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia as well as personnel from every service, including special operations, near-continuous presence promoted stability, deterred aggression, and facilitated peace-to-war transition. The concept exploited core service competencies.
and integrated them into a forward-deployed force that provided deterrence and engagement. Having such a presence in its theater—near or otherwise—marked a tremendous advance on the over-the-horizon concept that characterized CENTCOM in earlier years.

Desert Fox

In August 1997, General Anthony Zinni, USMC, became the sixth CINCCENT—the first who had previously served as deputy commander in chief. He had also been deputy commander general of the combined task force during Operation Provide Comfort immediately following the Persian Gulf War and commander of the combined task force for Operation United Shield. With this experience he was intimately familiar with all aspects of CENTCOM operations, many of which had grown out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, including Southern Watch and maritime interception.

Rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach Zinni developed strategies specific to each subregion. This included engagement plans that differed between the Arabian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, as well as strategies tailored for South and Central Asia and for Egypt and Jordan. Iraq remained the most pressing near-term threat to U.S. interests while Iran was potentially the most dangerous in the long term. Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism posed other perils.

Iraq's refusal to comply with U.N. inspections led to coalition preparations for air strikes. In a personal effort to resolve the crisis, Secretary General Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad. In February 1998, Saddam Hussein promised compliance with the inspection regime. When the agreement unraveled, Operation Desert Thunder was initiated in November. At the direction of the National Command Authorities, CENTCOM deployed forces and posted in-theater assets for strike operations. This highly visible deployment resulted in Iraq's eventual but short-lived compliance with U.N. inspection requirements.

Finally in December 1998, CENTCOM launched Desert Fox, a four-day operation aimed at installations associated with developing weapons of mass destruction, units providing security to such programs, and Iraqi national command and control. Additional targets included Republican Guard facilities, airfields, and the Basrah oil refinery, which was involved in the illegal production of gas and oil exports. Iraq's integrated air defenses and surface-to-air missiles were also struck to protect coalition forces. Baghdad's ability to build and deliver weapons of mass destruction was set back several years by these strikes.

Since Operation Desert Fox, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia has continued to enforce the southern no-fly zone as EUCOM enforces the northern no-fly zone. By January 2000, SouthernWatch forces had flown nearly 240,000 sorties. Another demonstration of the resolve to preserve regional stability is Operation Desert Spring, which secures the commitment of U.S. ground forces and their support facilities to the defense of Kuwait.

From September through November 1999, Zinni orchestrated the large overseas exercise Bright Star '99/00, begun in 1980. Conducted in Egypt, it involved forces from the host country and Britain, France, Italy, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Eleven participating countries, 33 observer nations, and 70,000 troops took part, which emphasized the interoperability, coalition operations, and computer simulation of exercise events. Both large-scale maneuver operations and a demonstration of CENTCOM amphibious capabilities highlighted this exercise, which underlined regional stability and cultural interaction.

In October 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility over five former republics of the Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These Central Asian states were integrated into the overall collective engagement of the command. According to this strategy, "an ounce of proactive engagement protection is cheaper than a pound of warfighting cure." As a military diplomat, Zinni was directly involved in efforts to defuse long-standing conflicts between countries in his area of responsibility before they led to all-out war. As a result, with over 20 years of evolutionary progress and active engagement in the Central Region, first as RDJTF and then as CENTCOM, the command enters the new century with a proven track record of accomplishment and a proud heritage of achievement.
POLITICAL ISLAM

and the West

By JOHN L. ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st century political Islam, or more commonly Islamic fundamentalism, remains a major presence in governments and oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. New Islamic republics have emerged in Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have been elected to parliaments, served in cabinets, and been presidents, prime ministers, and deputy prime ministers in nations as diverse as Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At the same time opposition movements and radical extremist groups have sought to destabilize regimes in Muslim countries and the West. Americans have witnessed attacks on their embassies from Kenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroad has been accompanied by strikes on domestic targets such as the World Trade Center in New York. In recent years, Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden has become emblematic of efforts to spread international violence.

John L. Esposito is director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is The Oxford History of Islam.
What is Political Islam?

The phenomenon known as political Islam is rooted in a contemporary religious resurgence in private and public life. On one hand, many Muslims have become more observant with regard to the practice of their faith (prayer, fasting, dress, and family). On the other, Islam has reemerged as an alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizations have become sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing political and social activism. The governments of Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have made appeals to Islam in order to enhance their legitimacy and to mobilize popular support for programs and policies.

Islamic movements span the religious and political spectrum from moderate to extremist. Among the more prominent have been Muslim brotherhoods of Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in South Asia, the Refah party in Turkey, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al Nahda in Tunisia, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and Gamaa Islamiyya and Jihad in Egypt. The causes of resurgence have been religiocultural, political, and socioeconomic. Issues of faith, politics, and social justice—authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, housing, social services, distribution of wealth, and corruption—intertwine as catalysts.

A series of crises since the late 1960s has discredited many regimes and Western inspired modernization paradigms, triggering the politics of protest and a quest for greater authenticity. The resulting call for an Islamic alternative has been reflected in slogans such as “Islam is the solution” and “Neither West nor East.” Among the events that acted as catalysts for political Islam were:

- the Arab-Israeli war or Six Day War (1967) when Israel decisively defeated the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and occupied East Jerusalem, Gaza, Sinai, and the West Bank, transforming the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine into a transnational Islamic issue
- the Pakistan-Bangladesh civil war (1971–72) heralding the failure of Muslim nationalism
- the Lebanese civil war (1975–90), caused in part by inequitable distribution of political and economic power between Christians and Muslims, which led to emergence of major Shia groups, Amal, and the Iranian inspired and backed Hizballah
- the Iranian revolution (1978–79), a pivotal event with global implications for the Muslim world and the West
- the Arab-Israeli conflict that spawned its own Islamist movements, among them Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which grew in strength during the Intifada in the 1980s.

Even though Iran offered the most visible and sustained critique of the West, embodying both moderate and more extremist or rejectionist views, the failures of the West (both its modes of development and role as an ally) and the fear of its cultural penetration have been popular themes of resurgence throughout the Greater Middle East. Many groups have blamed social ills on outside influences. Modernization—progressive westernization and secularization—has been perceived as a form of neocolonialism, an evil that supplants religious and cultural identity and values with alien ideas and models of development.

Evolution of an Idea

Political Islam has challenged governments, policymakers, and analysts both politically and intellectually over issues of leadership and ideology, modernization and development, pluralism, democratization, and foreign policy.

Against expectations, so-called modern or westernized Muslim societies (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey) have emerged as centers of Islamic politics. Modernization has not been a matter of making simple choices between Mecca and mechanization, static tradition and dynamic change, and secular leaders or intellectuals and ulama (the traditional religious elite). Countries as dissimilar as Afghanistan, Egypt, the Gulf states, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey demonstrate the complexity and divers nature of Muslim experience and experimentation, various patterns of...
modernization, and differing interpretations and implementations of Islam.

The advent of an alternative Islamic activist elite reflects new realities in the Muslim world. The earlier division of many societies into modern secular versus more traditional religious elites, rooted in a bifurcated system, is complemented by an educated although more Islamically oriented sector. Islamic movements, both moderate and extremist, have proliferated and become agents of change. They establish modern political and social organizations and embrace advanced means to disseminate their message. Most function within civil society as social and political activists. They build schools and hospitals, open lending institutions, offer legal and social services, and provide leadership in politics and the professions. At the same time, a minority of extremists use violence to threaten the stability of many regimes and have extended their global reach by detonating bombs in Paris and New York and at American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

Islamic Threat or Clash of Civilizations? In recent years some observers have spoken of a clash of civilizations—between Islam and modern secular (or Judeo-Christian) democratic values and culture, or between Islamic civilization and the West. Early underestimation of religion as a source of identity as well as a political force (along with its failure as a predictive paradigm) has led to its overestimation today. New recognition of religion’s significance in international affairs has reinforced an exaggerated belief in the impending clash of civilizations. The most provocative articulation of this position was advanced by Samuel Huntington, who declared that in the post Cold War period the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

The creation of an imagined monolithic Islam has resulted in a religious reductionism that views political conflicts in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Sudan as religious conflicts. Although communities in these areas may be broadly identified in religious or confessional terms, like the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland or the Hindu (Tamil) and Buddhist communities in Sri Lanka, local disputes and civil wars have more to do with political, ethnic, and socioeconomic issues than religion.

The challenge in an increasingly interdependent world is recognition of both competing and common interests. American policy towards Japan or Saudi Arabia is not based on shared culture, religion, or civilization but on national or group interests. Cooperation can result from common religious and cultural differences over similarities and equates political, economic, and cultural differences with confrontation. Areas of cooperation and the fact that most countries are primarily, although not solely, driven by national and regional interests are overlooked in his analysis.

Huntington, whose analysis can result from common religious and ethnic backgrounds; however it often is derived from common national and strategic interests. Although a clash of civilizations might be used to justify aggression, future conflicts will be due less to a clash of civilizations and more to other interests.

Secular fundamentalism is implicit in many analyses of political Islam, an interpretation that regards mixing religion and politics as abnormal, irrational, dangerous, and extremist. Those who subscribe to this view are known as fundamentalists or religious fanatics. Thus when secular Westerners encounter Muslims who speak of Islam as a comprehensive way of life, they dub them retrogressive and resistant to change.

Assuming that mixing religion and politics inevitably leads to extremism has contributed to the attitude that all Islamic movements are extremist and incompatible with democracy. Failure to differentiate between Islamic movements is misleading. Few equate actions by Jewish or Christian extremists with Judaism and Christianity as a whole. Similarly, the United States does not object officially to mixing religion and politics in Israel, Eastern Europe, or Latin America. Comparable liberality is absent when dealing with Islam.

Many nations identify political Islam as a threat to their domestic and international security concerns. Bombings and murders in the Middle East, Europe, and North America bolster this argument. However, questions remain. Should social problems be blamed on fundamentalist fanatics? Are the activities of a radical minority being used as a convenient excuse for the failures of local governments to build equitable societies? Does this perceived threat support authoritarian military regimes whose nenelected rulers want first and foremost to perpetuate their own power? Analysis and strategic planning require movement beyond an imagined monolithic political Islam. Differences in state Islam as seen in Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan are also found in the varieties among Islamic movements. They range from moderates or pragmatists.
who work within the system to radical extremists who seek to overthrow regimes and impose their own brand of Islam. Muslim brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, the Refah Party in Turkey, al-Nahda in Tunisia, and Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria eschew violence and participate in electoral politics. At the same time, Gamaa Islamiyya in Egypt, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and Jihad organizations in many countries have engaged in acts of violence and terrorism.

What Is the Threat?
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed on August 7, 1998, killing 263 people and injuring another 5,000, which again raised the specter of international terrorism. Once more the international community witnessed the extremist fringe of political Islam. On August 27, the United States attacked alleged terrorist militia training sites associated with Osama bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan. This response marked a new phase in the war against terrorism focused on non-state actors, in particular a specific individual accused of supporting terrorist groups.

Militias have played a significant role in Muslim politics. While some are associated with organizations that seek to topple governments through violence, others function in their societies. The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria and Gamaa Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad in Egypt are cases of violent revolutionaries. Both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel and Palestine function in mainstream society but also engage in armed struggle. The Taliban militia has fought its way into power in Afghanistan. The tactics and agendas of such groups, though religiously legitimized, are often products of political and economic factors as much as ideological and theological precepts. Just as Hezbollah was a response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, supported by Khomeini’s Iran, the Taliban of Afghanistan is a product of U.S.-supported resistance to the Soviets and subsequent tribal warfare. Hamas was a reaction to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation.

Muslim politics in the 1990s witnessed attacks, bombings, and murders both domestically and internationally. U.S.-supported resistance to the Soviets and subsequent tribal warfare. Hamas was a reaction to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Muslim politics in the 1990s witnessed attacks, bombings, and murders both domestically and internationally. To some, such events characterized a global war waged by Islamic militants, particularly against American interests. Its symbol became Osama bin Laden, who is regarded as a freedom fighter by some observers and a supporter of international terrorism by others.

The violence encouraged by bin Laden resonates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. A sharp critic of U.S. foreign policy, he denounces its tilt towards Israel. He charges that America is responsible for the failure of the peace process and assails its refusal to condemn Israeli military action in Lebanon and insists on continued sanctions against Iraq, which have resulted in the death of many civilians.
Esposito

Curbing moderate Islamic groups can lead to political confrontation and a spread of regime violence and movement counterviolence, furthering the contention that Islamic movements are inherently violent, antidemocratic, and a threat to stability.

State repression and Islamist counterviolence in Algeria contrasts with policies of inclusion, cooption, or control in Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey, where there has been nonviolent Islamist participation in electoral politics. The record of Islamic movements in tolerating diversity once in power raises serious questions as seen in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan. Islamic revivalism has been attended by attempts to silence political and religious opposition.

The issue of political participation and democratization in Muslim societies is not primarily one of religion but of political culture and education. Failure to strengthen civil society and support the culture of political participation encourages both religious and secular authoritarianism.

The Western Response

Many Muslim governments use the danger of radicalism as justification to suppress Islamic movements, much as anticommunism was used as an excuse for authoritarian rule and

Spring 2000 / JFQ 53
lack of American support for the Shi’a in Iraq after the Gulf War. As the Republican Guard moved to crush the Shi’a uprising in southern Iraq in 1991, the United States remained unaffected by Shi’a pleas for help. Policymakers in Washington appeared to be captured by what some media reports called historical Shi’a opposition to the United States. Western silence on the repression of Shi’a opposition in Bahrain—in government as well as the media—seems motivated by the same perspective.

Sunni Islamism has been considered a lesser evil. Absent the hegemonic ambitions of Iran, Islamism was...
its allies may face a new dynamic—a conflict between Shi’as and Sunnis (the opening phase having occurred with the massacre of Shi’as in Mazar Sharif and Bamiyan by the Taliban and the military standoff on the Iran-Afghanistan border).

The complexity of this issue is reflected in the influence of Sunni militancy on the regional and domestic affairs of Pakistan. In 1999 the Pakistani military used Sunni militants as a cover for an incursion into the Kargil area of Kashmir. This precipitated a standoff between nuclear powers and damaged a year of diplomatic initiatives by India and Pakistan. The role of Sunni militants in Indo-Pakistani relations will no doubt complicate negotiations. The same militant forces involved in Kargil were used by General Pervez Musharraf, who masterminded that operation, to precipitate a law and order crisis in Pakistan to undermine a democratically elected government. In the days leading to the military coup of October 1999, some 45 Shi’as religious and communal leaders were assassinated across Pakistan by Sunni sectarian gangs including fighters from Kashmir. Political change in Pakistan is important for the United States. The underlying issues cannot be adequately addressed by applying an Islam versus secularism model. It requires a nuanced approach that is cognizant of the many dimensions of Islam in regional and domestic politics.

Muslim politics at the dawn of the 21st century will continue to reveal the significance and impact of political Islam. At the same time, it will challenge the ability of senior policymakers and defense analysts to appreciate and revise strategies in response to changing realities.
The influence that Europe exercises on the Middle East will depend more on the evolution of the European Union (EU) than on the policies of individual states. How EU institutions are reformed and enlarged, pursue economic and monetary union, and develop a common security and defense policy over the next several years will impact Europe’s relations with new members in the east and neighbors to the south. Overall, decisions in these areas will complete the reorganization of European political space, with significant consequences for the Mediterranean region.

A New Europe

The 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties will be celebrated in 2007, marking an event that launched a modest Common Market, the first phase in forming an ever-closer union which the six original members pledged to establish. Before the European Union can be enlarged to incorporate additional states in the east, it must reform its institutions through
one or more intergovernmental conferences, the first in 2000 and another in 2003 or 2004. When the European Community was smaller and more homogeneous, equality among its members prevailed. Now with 15 members involved in a range of increasingly significant issues, larger states want to exert more control over the agenda. Looming ahead in 2000 are delicate matters such as the composition and authority of the European Commission, the role and transparency of its parliament, and the voting procedures of its council. Once these and other issues are decided, they will become applicable to new members. Only then, in 2005–2007, can enlargement begin.

The economic and monetary union established with the euro in January 1999 must proceed. That the euro will be the sole legal tender for all 15 EU states after 2004 is almost a given. As goes the euro, so goes Europe. A strong, integrated union presupposes a stable and increasingly global currency. The consequences of such a currency are unclear. It changed the American perception in 1998, giving European integration a seriousness that had often been lacking. Over time the euro may emerge as an alternative currency for determining the price of vital commodities and high-tech exports. In addition, countries especially dependent on relations with EU members might switch to the euro, creating a monetary zone that extends beyond the union and even Europe. In short, the euro may widen European influence—often, though not always, at the expense of the United States.

Another item on the European agenda is the development of a common foreign and defense policy to accompany the rise of the euro. switch in a shift in policy. With entry into the euro zone too controversial to consider, defense was the only issue that Prime Minister Tony Blair could use in his bid for EU leadership. The Anglo-French summit at St. Malo in December 1998 was the opening gambit in this campaign. It was pursued until last year when London endorsed a Franco-German request for Eurocorps to assume command of a peacekeeping force of 48,000 personnel in Kosovo in April 2000. That Britain would permanently assign forces to a military formation that it had previously dismissed confirms a commitment to a strong European defense. In reaction to the British role, France in turn seemed to acknowledge that its longstanding military project for Europe could be implemented only within NATO.

The Mediterranean
The Europe foreseen after 2007 will demand closer relations between the United States and the European Union. As the union acquires military capabilities, its contribution to NATO will be seen as both a relief and added defense burden to America. To achieve such capabilities, however, European nations must spend more on defense, which is unlikely in 2000–2004. Absent additional outlays they must at least stop cutting their levels of spending, especially Germany, and use limited resources more efficiently. Finally, as the EU presence in NATO grows, membership in both organizations must converge. Otherwise, ambiguities in NATO versus Western European Union commitments will expand, including backdoor arrangements that the United States might be reluctant to honor.

Even as new European security dimensions unfold, NATO will likely remain the security institution of choice on both sides of the Atlantic. Its explicit endorsement will remain necessary whether its members act as either
an alliance or an ad hoc coalition of the willing. Europe will not attain mili-
tary parity with the United States in the near term, but it can achieve a suf-
cient capability to both relieve some of the burden on America and gain au-
thority in the Alliance. Even a strong European Union must realize that it
can still depend on a stronger NATO with its U.S. capabilities. In Europe,
proper, states are unlikely to intervene militarily without U.S. contributions.
Similarly, America may well be a peer-
less power, but even a power without peers needs allies. Public support for
interventions that cannot rely on al-
lie contributions will not be sustain-
able for long.

The Persian Gulf War, Albanian
operation, and Kosovo conflict are un-
reliable models for the future. The
conditions in Iraq cannot be duplic-
cated, the reproducible conditions in
the Balkans are undesirable, and the
conditions deemed valuable in Alba-
nia are neither credible nor repeatable.
Instead, future conflicts are more
likely to depend on ad hoc coalitions
endorsed by NATO political authori-
ties, using committed military assets,
the EU agenda for 2000–2007 makes
the continent more vulnerable to
Mediterranean conditions

and employing some elements of the
allied military structure. But coalitions
of the willing must be coalitions of the capable, meaning that specific contributions made by nations with significant force projection capacity and related assets (including base ac-
cess) will determine their degree of participation in the operation and thus in detailed enforcement. While Europe may become more willing and able to engage militarily even absent American participation, the Armed
Forces will still be expected to provide
guarantees of last resort.

Finally, the EU agenda over the
next few years risks neglecting Mediter-
nanean countries, notwithstanding a
commitment to growth and stability in
the region. Specifically, the European
Monetary Union will impact the size
and composition of trade between the
two areas. Trade flows will be invoiced
in euros, not only between the union
and nations in the Mediterranean but
among nations in the region them-
selves, which will convert part of their dollar reserves into
euros. And, with their external
debt mainly denominated in dollars, these countries will be
crucially dependent on the
volatility of the euro relative
to the dollar, and hence on the stability
brought by the European Central Bank.

Similarly, even as enlargement di-
verts resources from the South toward
the East, it may also impede new or re-
infused arrangements with Mediter-
nanean countries. The European Union
now stands as the dividing line between
economic affluence and stagnation or
decline. Across the Mediterranean.

Europe and the Middle East
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S.
and European influence in the
Middle East has ceased to be a zero-
sum game. As American influence
grows, the European role need not de-
crease or vice versa. The most signifi-
cant accomplishments within the re-
gion since the Gulf War have followed
the lead of the United States. Yet they
were repeatedly made possible by Eu-
ropean assistance that helped start, en-
force, or pursue initiatives, beginning
with the Oslo agreements. European
nations now act in the context of their
institutions of choice even when pursu-
ing traditional interests: France
through the European Union (but not
against the United States), Britain on
behalf of NATO (but no longer without
the European Union), Italy with and in
both institutions, and either some or
all other countries with the legitimacy
of the United Nations whenever possi-
ble or desirable.

The EU agenda over the
next few years risks neglecting Mediter-
nanean countries, notwithstanding a
commitment to growth and stability in
the region. Specifically, the European
Monetary Union will impact the size
and composition of trade between the
Serfaty emerge as a Middle Eastern power. But neither outcome is likely as long as millions are being stopped by legal and physical barriers. Turkey's bid for membership will be lost in the maze of institutional reforms and a multitude of applicants from Eastern Europe.

Tension in building a multicultural community within the European Union confirms the difficulty of developing a cross-boundary community between EU and non-EU states south of the Mediterranean. Proposals for such a community inflame perilous myths that worsen Europe's concerns over its neighbors to the south and arouse self-defeating expectations among the southern states. Strictly speaking, a community requires a will to share resources, a surrender of force as a solvent of differences within it, and a common identity. None of these features exist nor are they likely to emerge. A Mediterranean region that remains politically invisible can only afford a security structure—with Europe and the United States—that also remains invisible. Thus a broad Mediterranean community is more realistic than a more limited and low profile framework based on financial support and institutional linkages.

A second variable is the European need for political stability to enforce its agenda. In most EU nations, a situation that could erode national sovereignty and identity is causing restlessness. For many the main threat comes from immigrants who create their own societies wherever they go. Although tens of millions may be needed by 2015 to compensate for Europe's dwindling and aging population, new obstacles are being raised, especially from Islamic countries. Moreover, Muslims in Europe who have become citizens are viewed with ambivalence or hostility. Faced as a source of social disorder and political divisions, Muslim citizens in Europe could change domestic policies as well as the foreign relations of their adopted countries.

As EU boundaries move toward Malta and Cyprus, a larger and more youthful Middle East is seen as a dagger pointed at the heart of a smaller and older Europe. A cultural self-definition of the European Union and its members is influencing the debate over Turkey's prospects for accession. If Turkey received a role commensurate with its size and potential, the European Union would be transformed into a power in the Middle East, and if Europe opened its doors to Muslim immigrants it could emerge as a Middle Eastern power. But neither outcome is likely as long as millions are being stopped by legal and physical barriers. Turkey's bid for membership will be lost in the maze of institutional reforms and a multitude of applicants from Eastern Europe.
In 1999–2000 developments on the southern rim of this invisible Mediterranean community were encouraging: a trend toward liberalization, including less stifling bureaucracies, improving legal systems, elements of political stability, growing macroeconomic security, and a vast demand for capital goods and technology. More specifically, leaving aside the civil war in Algeria and the Arab-Israeli conflict (with no reliable prospect for a final settlement in sight), there is evidence that a new political generation might promote a more open brand of Islam, democratic and secular. Unexpectedly, the sons of both the late King Hussein bin Talal Al-Hashimi of Jordan and the late King Hassan II of Morocco acted swiftly and boldly. As other generational changes are awaited over the next few years, Europe and the United States should not miss opportunities in Jordan and Morocco to demonstrate their capacity to assist governments that help themselves. Each successful transformation adds to the prospect that new regimes elsewhere might follow a similar path. Yet transitions from one leader and one generation to another will need benign conditions to provide stability. Bad news—like the spillover of an economic crisis in the West—could trigger a turn for the worse in countries from which we expect the best, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

**Euro-American Implications**

EU states have varying concerns and aspirations about the Middle East. These differences create different priorities and vulnerabilities that impede the adoption of common policies. Instead, special bilateral relationships abound between France and Algeria, Britain and Saudi Arabia, Italy and Libya, and Spain and Morocco.

Overall the differences among European countries have diminished, and initiatives based on specific national interests now embody an integrated regional policy. Thus by the late 1990s, EU members with historic interests in the Middle East—including Britain, France, and Italy—sought more active roles as go-betweens on behalf of their European partners as well as the United States and Israel. British intervention facilitated bilateral talks between Syria and Israel in Washington in late 1999. French support for this initiative complemented that of Britain and did not distract from the leading role assumed by the United States. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi welcomed the return of Iran to Europe during his visit to Tehran (following a trip to Washington), setting the stage for subsequent visits to Rome, Paris, and London by President Ali Mohammad Khatemi-Ardakani. Simultaneously, both Britain and France helped devise a formula at the United Nations that might control Iraqi armament while relaxing sanctions against that country. What made these initiatives both useful and distinctive is that they did not cause the degree of transatlantic or intra-European discord that would once have been expected. The United States and members of the European Union have common designs and policies. The former needs support from a unified Europe while the latter need the leadership of an engaged America. For example, Europe is a major donor to the Palestinian Authority, and even though that aid often goes to nonproductive public sector jobs, it gives the West a good name that benefits both sides of the Atlantic. Would the Palestinians have tolerated the slow pace of the Arab-Israeli peace process without such financial support, and is a peace agreement between Syria and Israel likely without EU pledges to both nations? Such complementarity will hopefully be reinforced in coming years. Any change would have ramifications for both sides of the Atlantic and for the region.
Within the transatlantic context, U.S. interests in Europe are too important to be left to Europeans alone. This is arguably the most enduring legacy of the two world wars and Cold War that shaped the 20th century. America is not a European power, but it is a power in Europe whose presence can’t be ignored. Whether in 2007 or 2014, this emerging Euro-Atlantic community must gain a more tangible institutional dimension—possibly a U.S.-EU treaty, however it is drafted and signed. But even as America comes to grips with the reality of its return to the Old World, Europe must confront its continued dependence on a significant U.S. role. Reliance on America remains indispensable, for better or worse.

**Transatlantic Engagement**

The Middle East is as important (energy supplies) as it is reckless (terrorism), dangerous (four major conflicts), unstable (fin de régimes), expensive (for keeping the peace or waging war), and intrusive (because of the domestic dimensions of policy decisions for the area).

There is no room for exclusive laissez faire with such a region. Admittedly, completion of the European Union over time—its reformed institutions, enlargement to the east, economic and monetary union, and common foreign and security policy with capabilities and institutions of its own—may impact U.S. leadership south of the Mediterranean. Yet for years to come American interests in the Mediterranean will remain too significant to be left to Europeans, whose policies are likely to show continued capability gaps and institutional insufficiencies. On the other side of the Atlantic, Europeans may also fear that U.S. goals, such as comprehensive peace, dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and Turkey’s EU membership, are so excessive as to produce policies that are more illusory than real. In any case, European interests are also too vital to depend exclusively on U.S. policies. On both sides, the apprehension is over partners who fail to do what they say even as they fail to say what they do.

The soft security issues that impact the stability of individual nations and determine prospects for reconstruction and development across the region are best handled by the European Union and its members, with occasional help from the United States or NATO. Conversely, hard security issues that impact the stability of the whole region, and thus determine reconciliation and peace among its states, are best managed by the United States, with occasional help from EU states and even NATO. This is not an artificial division of labor: both sets of issues are separable but they cannot be separated, and accordingly neither can policies that address these matters. Neglect of soft security issues would exacerbate those of hard security, while neglect of hard security issues would stall those of development and reconstruction.

With scant opportunity for an exclusively unilateral American or European leadership role in the Middle East, there is little alternative to pooling capabilities and coordinating initiatives that are of mutual interest, although they may not be of identical interest. This is not much of a conclusion; yet it remains critical for Europe and America to reach an accommodation. The 50th anniversary of the Common Market in 2007 will provide an opportunity to renew the vows of the transatlantic union, made in 1949 and repeated with three new members fifty years later.
The failure to force India to grant independence, or at least autonomy, to the northern state of Jammu-Kashmir has been an irritant to Pakistan since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Pakistan has gone to war twice over Kashmir, a reflection of its troubled relationship with India.

Islamabad is obsessed with its powerful neighbor. The average Pakistani is convinced that India is determined to destroy his country or annex it as a province, though such outcomes would hardly be in the security interest of New Delhi. Destroying or dismantling Pakistan would expose India to greater instability on its northwest border, and annexation would add 60 million Muslims to a country where Hindu-Muslim tension is already at the boiling point.

For its part India maintains a policy of nonalignment and regional dominance. Historically, that has translated into a strategy of keeping foreign powers out of the region while it pursues its objectives from a position of strength. Only Pakistan has thwarted India by seeking financial and military assistance from the United States and China. The end of the Cold War saw a decrease of foreign interest in the region. Nevertheless, tensions have escalated, especially since India and Pakistan became open members of the nuclear club. Understanding why confrontation between these two countries has evolved into the world’s only ongoing nuclear arms race requires exploring the historical and geopolitical roots of this volatile region.

The Indian Enigma

Many observers contend that the current situation in South Asia stems from ancient Hindu-Muslim hatred,
Midnight’s Children

In July 1947 Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act which ordered the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan by midnight on August 14 of that same year. Under this decision the government, in less than a month, divided the largest possession in the Empire, and one that had been integrated for more than a century under the British Raj.

The debate over whether to create two separate states was one of the most divisive aspects of the Indian independence movement. The concept of a Muslim homeland was formally adopted by the All India Muslim League in 1940, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. When negotiations for the creation of a federated Hindu-Muslim state broke down in 1946, Jinnah called on the so-called Muslim Nation to launch direct action, precipitating a bloody year of civil war. Hindu-Muslim communal violence rapidly spread to all corners of the subcontinent and increased as the prospects of independence arose. In the summer of 1947, racing the deadline, two boundary commissions worked desperately to partition Punjab and Bengal in such a way that a majority of the Muslims in these regions would comprise the separate state of Pakistan. As soon as the new borders became known, 10 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs fled their homes. In the course of this exodus, one million people were slaughtered in clashes between rival ethnic and religious factions.

In the wake of partition, Pakistan consisted of two wings separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory, West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Instability in the political order and economic problems became prominent issues from the moment Pakistan was created. Today the country is comprised of four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan) as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Federal Capital Area (Islamabad).

The commonwealth dominion of India (reestablished as a constitutional republic in 1950) is made up of 25 states and 7 union territories with its capital in New Delhi. Despite migration of Muslims to West and East Pakistan, India’s initial history was plagued by the legacy of partition. Refugee resettle-ment, economic disruption, inadequate resources, and communal violence (as over 10 percent of the population remained Muslim) threatened the fledgling nation.

Relations between these states quickly deteriorated. Within months of independence, India was engaged in an undeclared war with Pakistan over Kashmir, an unintended consequence of the hasty partition and a continuing source of friction.

but this ignores socioeconomic developments in India and the shortsighted policies of its leaders over the past twenty years. Urbanization lured millions from traditional occupations and communities, but the economy could not provide jobs for them. Unemployment led many of these Indians into gangs, whose strong-arm tactics were used by politicians to intimidate and incite tension, particularly communal violence. Politicians played a numbers game by appealing to social caste and religious sentiments to sow the seeds of discord and influence elections without regard to the long-term social consequences.

Political stability was provided by the prolonged rule of the Congress Party and the continuity of its leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and her son Rajiv Gandhi. Monolithic as a political power, Congress supported distinctive rights for Muslims, leading Hindus to assume that the government stood for minority appeasement and pseudosecularism, and to lose confidence in it as a positive social force.

The 1980s brought internal violence. Indira Gandhi was shot by Sikhs and Rajiv Gandhi was killed by Tamils. There is little wonder that India treats secessionist movements with the utmost concern, especially in Kashmir, which it regards as intermingled with Pakistani geostrategic aims.

Domestic struggle has profoundly affected foreign relations. Any regional interference is viewed as endangering internal cohesion. The government was critical of both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American decision to build facilities on Diego Garcia and expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It found Pakistani military and economic ties with China as well as the United States less forgivable. From its self image as the guardian of peace on the subcontinent, India interpreted these incursions and alliances as a treacherous threat to its security and position as the dominant regional power.

China remains a security concern. As early as 1954, India thought it could appease China by basically yielding its rights to Tibet. Hope for amicable Sino-Indian relations were dashed in 1962 when China seized border territory it felt had been stolen by the British and wrongfully ceded to India.

The Sino-Indian confrontation had a dramatic impact on the Indian military.

in 1962 when China seized border territory it felt had been stolen by the British and wrongfully ceded to India.

The Sino-Indian confrontation had a dramatic impact on the Indian military. Nehru, father of the state, was mistrustful of the armed forces. Carrying the banner of peaceful coexistence with neighbors, he provided scant resources to them. Ill-equipped and poorly led, the army suffered an embarrassing defeat in less than a month. China unilaterally withdrew, but not before gobbling up 104,000 square kilometers of Indian territory.

India learned that peaceful coexistence was unlikely without the military might to dissuade aggression. The nation remedied the situation through a buildup—first in conventional arms
and then covert nuclear weapons, along with a drive for ballistic missiles. The drive strained relations with China and the United States. Both powers shipped weapons to Pakistan against the ominous prospect of a militarized India. In the face of an unfriendly wind blowing from the north, India moved toward the Soviet camp. In sum, relations with Pakistan was not the only factor that drove confrontation between India and China. Both domestic politics and the relentless push for regional hegemony within India fueled the fire.

**A Peculiar State**

Similar post-independence difficulties affected both India and Pakistan. From the outset Pakistan was in worse condition in terms of economic development, overpopulation, and poverty. It was beset by the added problem of being divided in two parts. With a thousand miles of Indian territory between them, East and West Pakistan were even further split culturally and politically.

The Bengalis of East Pakistan shared a common religion but little else with diverse ethnic groups in the West, the largest being the Punjabis. Political and military power was concentrated in Islamabad despite the greater population density of the East. The whole of East Pakistan constituted one of five provinces and thus had just 20 percent of the seats in parliament. With only 15 percent of the budget, Bengalis felt that Punjabis treated them as a captive market for West Pakistan.

Tensions grew when a catastrophic cyclone struck, followed by an enormous tidal wave, leaving 200,000 dead and a million homeless in 1970. The government was unable or unwilling to provide effective relief, and separatist tendencies in East Pakistan came to the surface. Repression followed natural disaster in the form of a bloody assault on the Bengali people. Three million East Pakistanis died at the hands of a Pakistani army numbering 70,000 troops. Bengalis resisted with guerrilla warfare, and the conflict took on the proportions of civil war. Three million East Pakistanis died at the hands of a Pakistani army numbering 70,000 troops. Bengalis resisted with guerrilla warfare, and the conflict took on the proportions of civil war. India intervened on the side of East Pakistan in 1971. After fierce fighting and a half million casualties on both sides, Pakistan surrendered and the independent nation of Bangladesh was born out of East Pakistan. The victory for India was more decisive than the 1965 war with Pakistan, and its national security and regional influence were vastly upgraded.

The 1970–71 clash had Cold War repercussions. Washington continued its economic and military assistance to...
Totty

policy enables one to make sense of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

When Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, it claimed Kashmir with its predominantly Muslim population. India objected, seeking a buffer to the north against an unstable China, then in the midst of civil war. The Indian government put the question to the provincial ruler of Kashmir, a Muslim, who elected to remain a part of India.

Today the main issue is whether Kashmiris—who live on both sides of the Indo-Pakistani line of control—should be allowed self-determination with regard to forming an independent state. As an initial step, Islamabad favors conducting a plebiscite administered by the United Nations that was originally provided for in a resolution passed in the late 1940s, and that New Delhi agreed to but never honored. If an independent Kashmir were created, Pakistan would exert a strong influence over the Muslim state. For this reason if for no other, India maintains that Kashmiri affairs are an internal matter and will brook no interference.

The Indo-Pakistani conflict took on global dimensions in the sixties and early seventies as both sides lined up against each other. The United States described the termination of arms transfers as evenhanded. In fact, though it was not a major concern to India, it was devastating to Pakistan, which was 100 percent dependent on American equipment while that figure for India was only 10 percent. The Soviet Union continued to supply India. Faced with dwindling provisions, Pakistan had no choice but to accept a cease-fire. India revealed in victory and was pleased that Pakistani military pacts had proven hollow.

The events of 1971 have influenced the foreign policy of Pakistan ever since. Suspicious and aggrieved, defeated once more and abandoned by its allies, Islamabad accepted U.S. aid when it was offered in the seventies and eighties while seeking elsewhere for “genuine” friends to counter Indian regional power. Then, when India exploded an underground nuclear device in a “friendly” test in 1974, the subcontinental nuclear arms race was on.

Conflict in Kashmir

One Western observer likened the Indo-Pakistani confrontation in the highlands of Kashmir to two bald men fighting over a comb. That remark reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict and strategic relationship between the two countries. Only a grasp of the Indian worldview and Pakistani skepticism of Indian security
up superpower support. Neither was satisfied with foreign involvement, Pakistan because it lost the wars and India because its goals of nonalignment were derailed. The area continues to attract worldwide concern now that nuclear arms are involved.

After China detonated a nuclear device in 1964, India immediately sought the protection of a nuclear umbrella from the United States and Britain as well as the Soviet Union. Discussions by all parties were conditioned on India signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India declined since it felt the treaty discriminated against non-nuclear states by prohibiting development while having no provision to decrease or even cap the number of nuclear weapons among countries that already possessed them. From the Indian perspective, the treaty was a transparent attempt to block it from a rightful place as a regional leader and participant in world affairs. Vulnerable and ten years behind Beijing, New Delhi defined Western economic and military sanctions and worked feverishly to develop a nuclear capability, culminating in its first nuclear test in 1974.

Indian actions in response to the China factor have led to a more volatile Pakistan factor. Until 1965 Islamabad had not conducted nuclear research or development. But by 1972 it built the first atomic power plant. In 1975, after Indian tests, it began to pursue nuclear arms in earnest. The Pakistanis make no bones today about the fact that they bought everything needed to make the bomb through clandestine acquisition, with 100 percent of materials coming from the West.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington provided $500 million annually in military and economic assistance to Islamabad. Although aid was contingent on certification of Pakistan’s nuclear energy program, verification was little more than perfunctory, and the country’s geopolitical importance in this period left the United States reluctant to antagonize its most vital ally in the region. Washington downgraded the relationship when the Soviets withdrew and suspended $564 million in relief in 1991 because of mounting evidence that Islamabad was developing nuclear weapons.

This loss of aid was a blow to Pakistan’s economy. Coming prior to the national elections following removal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by the military, the termination was perceived as a means to punish her enemies and interfere with internal affairs. The Persian Gulf War further eroded U.S.-Pakistani relations. While the civil government condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and sent troops to Saudi Arabia to protect Islamic holy sites, there was strong popular support for Saddam Hussein, mirrored in the military, due to the widespread perception that the United States had exceeded its U.N. mandate to liberate Kuwait.

Once again feeling betrayed by Washington, and suspecting New Delhi of expanding its regional influence, Islamabad increased military spending. Despite a severely strapped economy, it spent over a third of national revenues on defense in the 1990s. Moreover, it continued its nuclear program. From 1987 to 1998, its official policy was to defer nuclear readiness, but when India tested, Pakistan felt forced to do the same.

The Nuclear Club

While officially China’s ascension as an Asiatic power has driven India’s nuclear policy, relations between the two nations have stabilized and led to considerable progress in solving border problems diplomatically. New Delhi seems to have larger strategic goals in mind. Arguably, India believes nuclear weapons are a qualifying instrument for great power status. If the nations of the world are determined to exert international power using nuclear stockpiles, India is determined not to be left out of the club.

China seeks to use economic power to provide punch to its political and military objectives, a strategy solidified with more than $200 billion in foreign reserves, second only to Japan and more than the United States and Germany combined. By contrast, India
Pakistan will not consider denuclearization as long as its neighbor possesses such arms
treated as an equal partner by the West, in particular by the United States. Islamabad has always felt slighted by American foreign policy as compared to its rival. Finally, as a rejoinder to India, Pakistan will challenge any discussions of Indian veto power on the Security Council unless it is given the same power.

Prospects for the Future

New Delhi considers global disarmament as the only way of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Yet in light of China's emergence as a potential nuclear superpower, return to a nuclear free South Asia is unlikely. Furthermore, China's announced intention to develop the naval power to dominate the South China Sea is further incentive for India to retain a policy of naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and of research and development on nuclear weapons. Pakistan also will not consider denuclearization as long as its neighbor possesses such arms.

India regards pressure exerted by nuclear powers for it to sign the non-proliferation treaty and renounce nuclear weapons development as the height of hypocrisy. Until other powers desist, New Delhi will continue to develop its own arsenal. Nuclear retaliation remains the cornerstone of its strategy to prevent an attack with weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological arms. India points out that the United States is an illustration of the benefits of retaining nuclear weapons for defense. For New Delhi, only a colonial and even racist mentality can explain the expectation that other states should forego the influence that is derived from weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan's nuclear commitment is equally strong. It does not have a policy of no first use to limit employment of nuclear weapons. Taking its lead from the Cold War example, it embraced the opposite strategy. NATO was unwilling to declare no first use in order to deter a conventional attack when the Warsaw Pact had numerical superiority. Pakistan also faces hostile conventional forces many times larger than its own. The threat of nuclear weapons is therefore an equalizer. The efficacy of this strategy, as Pakistan points out, is proven by the fact that Western Europe was never invaded. Likewise, Islamabad is convinced its nuclear threat averted war with India during the 1990-91 Kashmir uprising.

Although Pakistan's approach imitates NATO strategy, its implementation of strategy does not. Allied nuclear assets were under civilian control during the Cold War. By contrast Islamabad has authorized field commanders to use nuclear weapons against Indian forces in the event of war. This doctrine has a basis in the inability of Islamabad to develop a system sufficiently sophisticated to achieve central command and control of nuclear weapons. Since soldiers in combat are expected to fight as long as they have the means to resist, a commander is more likely than a civilian to remove nuclear weapons from their military capabilities or discuss restrictions for the future. They have been unwilling to accept limits on their military capabilities or discuss restrictions for the future.

In South Asia, nuclear arms have value beyond their use as weapons or political bargaining chips. Nuclear research and development are seen as symbols of national sovereignty and prestige and a rite of passage from Third World to developed nation status. Both New Delhi and Islamabad find it difficult to make concessions on nuclear arms even if inclined to do so.

But neither nation is so inclined. They have been unwilling to accept limits on their military capabilities or discuss restrictions for the future. Treaties and confidence-building efforts have not seriously altered military rivalry, stabilized nuclear competition, or curbed aggressiveness between India and Pakistan. The concept of arms control plays no significant role in shaping defense policy in South Asia. Absent radical shifts in the domestic or external conditions of these two countries, the nuclear standoff on the subcontinent will be with us for a long time to come.
A striking premise underpins war plans developed between 1945 and 1950. Planners (and probably most other Americans) believed that a conflict with the Soviet Union would be total. As the head of the Joint Strategic Plans Group, George Lincoln, observed: "It must be understood that another war will be the equivalent of an Armageddon and that we must count on the use of atomic weapons. ... This point is an essential basis for U.S. planning."1 It was accepted that the Nation would mount a strategic bombing campaign using atomic weapons against key targets. Destroying the means to make war was seen as leading to the collapse of enemy will.

This approach was not new. During the interwar years strategists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell outlined the optimum targets and objectives of strategic air campaigns. Although historians may debate the extent of their influence on planning during World War II, airpower was commonly seen as a distinct and perhaps decisive form of modern combat.

In the aftermath of World War II planners did not see atomic weapons as revolutionary. They thought of strategic bombing, conventional and atomic, as a method of attack against enemy war-making capacity that could lead to the breakdown of enemy will. This concept helped shape military strategy in the late 1940s and was based on war-winning, not war-detering.

Thinking the Unthinkable

Airpower theorists suggested that for strategic bombing to be successful it would be highly advantageous to attack first. As one general put it, "If you want to prevent getting hit, hit."2 Since there was no complete defense against strategic bombers, it was logical to destroy the bombers...
and their support facilities before they were used against the United States. The notion of preventive war—striking an enemy when it appeared to threaten the Nation with a strategic air attack—became widespread. Yet since that meant attacking first, which went against a powerful American ideal of never throwing the first blow, leaders were often cryptic in advocating preventive war against the Soviet Union. Still the concept existed and influenced postwar planning.

In October 1945 the Joint Chiefs approved a report on the impact of the atomic bomb on postwar organization and strategy. The United States would use the bomb as a strategic weapon against concentrated industrial areas and “centers of population with a view to forcing an enemy state to yield through terror and disintegration of national morale.”4 This report simply endorsed the traditional concept of strategic airpower as a means of destroying enemy war-making capacity. However, perhaps because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they gave equal weight to the bomb as a weapon of terror, which could force an enemy to surrender by directly attacking its will to resist.

JCS reflected conflicting views toward atomic weapons that many war plans would manifest.4 Drawing on lessons learned, the plan called for advanced bases in Britain, Egypt, and India for the Air Force to launch an immediate strategic air offensive. The Navy would again play a key role by securing the sea lines of communications to the bases and blockading Soviet naval forces and shipping. While the Navy and Air Force carried out these operations the Nation would mobilize to invade the Soviet Union. Even though a ground invasion was critical to Pincher planning, emphasis was on a quick, powerful atomic air offensive that might obviate its need.

In four draft plans produced between April and June 1946, the primary task “was a prompt strategic air offensive” that would “destroy the Soviet war-making capacity.” The bomb would be critical because the United States in 1946 held sole ownership of atomic weapons, which produced a distinct advantage. War would be total. To destroy the Soviet will to resist would require first destroying the effectiveness of the Soviet war machine.

Just as the overall concept of Pincher drew on the experience of World War II, so did target selection. Industries devoted to transport, petroleum, tanks, ball bearings, and other military needs were generally the same types of targets attacked in Germany and Japan. The plan also recognized that attacking such industries could require area bombing of cities. Although the Joint Chiefs never officially approved Pincher’s warfighting concepts, its premise survived in subsequent plans.

In November 1947 the chiefs approved war plan Broiler. Like its predecessor it relied on an early atomic campaign and advanced bases to launch an air offensive. But where Pincher had assumed that massive force requirements would be met, Broiler reflected the reduced resources available in 1948.

The Broiler target lists still emphasized industrial systems. The plan did acknowledge that atomic attacks on urban industries would kill many civilians and destroy political control centers. Suffering by the civilian population was seen as a bonus. The primary objective was destruction of Soviet war-making capacity.

A number of factors shaped the overall approach in the plans. There was a political need to maintain unity against Soviet aggression among friendly European nations. Planners thus moved away from the Pincher concept of withdrawing from Europe and by 1948 adopted a new approach: American and British forces conducting a fighting retreat would attempt to hold the Soviets at the Rhine. Detonation of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949 also had an impact. The Joint Chiefs became increasingly focused on blunting Moscow’s ability to occupy Western Europe and to attack the United States.
with atomic weapons. Whatever the influence, the key concept in war plans and studies at this time was a quick, devastating strategic air attack, relying heavily on atomic bombs, to destroy industrial infrastructure. No external threat, international event, domestic issue, or amount of interservice rivalry over budget allocations would change this approach.

In 1948, in the Crankshaft war plan, the Joint Chiefs made important modifications. With regard to taking the war to the Soviet Union, Crankshaft demonstrated remarkable continuity with Broiler and Pincher. It called for “an air offensive against vital strategic elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.”

Crankshaft envisioned using strategic bombers to attack critical elements such as command and control facilities, industrial parks, petroleum refineries, submarine docks, transport systems, aircraft factories, foundries, and power plants. The plan recognized that many of these sites were in built-up areas. Like Broiler, Crankshaft considered directly targeting morale by killing civilians in cities. At one point it even acknowledged that “it may become advisable to abandon the concept of destruction of the enemy’s physical means to wage war in favor of a concept involving destruction of his will through massive attack [on the Soviet] people.” But the planners withdrew, calling for a better understanding of the link between attacking people and breaking their will.

The Joint Chiefs released the Harmon Report in 1949, which analyzed the probable effects of atomic bombs on seventy Soviet cities. It concluded that the United States could launch such an offensive; but while it would destroy 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industry, it would not appreciably affect public will. In fact it could “validate Soviet propaganda against the United States, unify the people, and increase their will to fight.” The study concluded that the most tangible benefit of the offensive was speed: it “would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.” Striking first and hard could be a credible warfighting concept.

**Deterrence or Warfighting?**

According to early postwar studies the Soviets had a considerable conventional advantage over American, British, and French forces and could easily overrun major portions of Western Europe. But the studies showed that they would avoid a major conflict with the United States for several years. If war did occur it would be due to Soviet miscalculation of the risks.

Russell Weigley found that the emerging concept of deterrence in postwar strategic thought was based on a massive atomic capability to retaliate against the Soviets using strategic airpower. He argued that the use of bombs to deter an attack on the United States had always been part of military policy, but that prior to 1945 that idea was secondary to using the Armed Forces to achieve national objectives. It was not until after August 1945 that, because of the revolutionary nature of atomic weapons, war deterrence was adopted as military policy.

American war planning, however, does not support this assessment. Planners continued to place primary importance on fighting and winning wars. If atomic capabilities could deter war, all the better. But the priority was still on using the preponderance of strategic airpower to destroy Soviet war-making capability.

Some leaders theorized that due to technological advancements the incredible destruction of total war could come without warning like the attack on Pearl Harbor. That might be prevented by anticipating enemy intentions to attack the United States and initiating massive preemptive action. Adopting that policy would not deter war but rather win it by launching a surprise attack.

Admiral Ralph Ofstie, a director on the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and a senior board member for Operation Crossroads (atomic tests at the Bikini Islands in 1946), had no problem with “knocking hell out of Moscow with atomic bombs.” America should also use the weapons on other urban and industrial areas. In a classified memo to the Navy General Board, Ofstie hinted at a willingness to launch a surprise bacteriological attack if there was evidence of the Soviet intention to attack the Nation with biological weapons. In the same memo, he strongly advocated a heavily nuclear preventive war.

**Offense as Defense**

Preventive war such as that suggested by Ofstie raised some troubling questions. Were threats declaring the defeat of capitalism justification for launching war? Once the Soviet Union exploded the bomb, would a preventive attack be warranted because the United States could be attacked with atomic weapons? Such uncertainties, along with the idea that America should not throw the first punch, meant preventive war never became official policy.

Yet in selected fora and under certain conditions key military and political leaders advocated preventive war. General Orvil Anderson, primary
Gentile

author of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey report, provided a glowing assessment of the strategic air campaign against Japan and concluded with some signposts for the future. The report argued that because of the changed nature of war, "an overt act of war has been committed by an enemy when that enemy builds a military force intended for our eventual destruction, and that destruction of that force before it can be launched or employed is defensive action and not aggression." This phraseology is revealing because it places offensive action under the mantle of defense. War is won by preventing, not deterring, an enemy from striking first.

As the commandant of the Air War College beginning in 1947, Anderson often lectured on airpower strategy. He argued that a strategic bombing attack on the United States would mostly reach its targets, then posited that the only defense would be to take the offensive by destroying the capacity that produced enemy airpower. Thus what appeared to be offensive action against enemy targets was in fact defensive because it prevented attack on the United States. This line of thinking allowed Anderson in a 1950 interview to recommend a preventive war against the Soviet Union.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg, relieved Anderson from his post for publicly stating views that openly challenged the official policy of containing—not rolling back—the Soviet Union and terrified the American people. Simply put, he crossed the line.

Other officers made similar arguments in Air Quarterly Review. In an article published in 1947
the author argued for using strategic bombers to conduct one-way missions over the Soviet Union. He added that the United States could not rely on defensive measures to prevent an atomic attack on itself. "The complexion of atomic war reemphasizes the old cliche that the best defense is a good offense and alters it somewhat: the best defense is the first offense in force." Writing a year later, Colonel Matthew Deichelmann spelled out his case for preventive war and national survival. He believed that the public should be "enlightened" about the security problems of the atomic age. An informed public would give the National Command Authorities the "power to take action in the furtherance of the command defense." And that action would be preventive against an enemy that was preparing to attack the United States.9

Many military leaders believed that if the Soviets opted for war they would certainly launch a preventive attack using strategic airpower (probably with atomic bombs) on American cities. One could characterize such thinking as reverse-preventive war. Applying the notion of preventive war to the military policy of the Soviet Union allowed airmen to endorse a force in being to respond to such a strike or launch a preventive attack of its own.

Advocates of preventive war—or reverse-preventive war—were not limited to the military. Just prior to Anderson's public remarks, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews also stridently advocated such a policy. In a speech at the Boston Navy Yard in August 1950, he argued that the Nation "should get ready to ward off any possible attack and, reversing the traditional attitude of a democracy, we should boldly proclaim our undeniable objective to be a world at peace." Yet for the United States to establish world peace it would have to declare its willingness and intention "to pay any price, even the price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace."8

**Reorienting Policy**

In a February 1947 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs sought to guide industrial mobilization in case of war. They expressed great concern over the Soviet ability to launch a surprise attack that would preclude the Nation's ability to expand "war-making industry and training." If the warning period was not sufficient to allow for industrial buildup, the memo argued:

It would be of the greatest importance that the United States recognize early that a war is practically at hand, that the war will involve vital American interests, that early U.S. entry will yield important military advantages, and may in fact be essential to the prevention of military domination of the world by the USSR.10

Demonstrating the same concern, Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, the director of plans and operations on the Army Staff, spoke at the National War College in January 1947 about the urgent need to understand that the Soviet Union would have atomic weapons within a few years and could launch a surprise attack, inflicting a catastrophic defeat.

At the time the general made his speech he was a member of the board for the evaluation of the Bikini Island tests. The Operation Crossroads evaluation team was headed by the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Karl Compton, and included General Joseph Stilwell, Admiral Ofstie, and Admiral D.S. Parsons as special advisors among other military officers.

The board released its final report in December 1947. It found that the atomic bomb, when employed in conjunction with other weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemical arms, would "depopulate vast areas of the earth's surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's material works." Because an enemy that possessed such weaponry could launch a surprise attack the report stated that America needed to revise its traditional attitudes toward what constitutes acts of aggression so that our Armed Forces may plan and operate in accordance with the realities of atomic warfare. Our attitude of national defense must provide for...
the employment of every practical means to prevent surprise attack. Offensive measures will be the only generally effective means of defense, and the United States must be prepared to employ them before a potential enemy can inflict significant damage upon us.\textsuperscript{11} Reviewing the report’s findings, the Joint Chiefs agreed the President should consider reorienting national military strategy to allow for an offensive strike against the Soviet Union to prevent defeat in total war.

Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs forwarded the Crossroads Report to the White House, they bracketed the paragraphs concerning preventive war so the President could carefully consider this proposed crucial shift in policy. They acknowledged in a cover letter that a substantial turn toward preventive war was a political decision the commander in chief had to make.\textsuperscript{12} Yet the chiefs made no attempt to discredit a proposed shift. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal attached a covering letter pointing out that bracketed portions related to enacting legislation to redefine aggression and incipient attack and make it a Presidential duty, after consultation with the Cabinet, to order atomic retaliation to prevent or hinder an atomic attack on the United States. By using the term \textit{retaliation} the Secretary hedged on fully advocating a policy shift toward preventive war. Yet it was implicit that America was already at war and thus retaliation was synonymous with prevention—that is, launching a surprise attack to “frustrate an atomic energy attack” on the United States.

Truman noted in his memoirs that many in the military advocated preventive war; but it was foolish to theorize “that war can be stopped by war. You don’t ‘prevent’ anything by war except peace.” According to the former President, the Nation clearly did “not believe in aggression or in preventive war.”\textsuperscript{13} Like others who came after him, Truman tried to superimpose the framework of deterrence that evolved after 1950 on the period 1945–50. This understandable but flawed approach distorts the way political and military leaders and defense analysts thought about bombing and war during that time. They did not fundamentally base military policy on deterrence but on winning a war by
destroying Soviet war-making capacity. This concept of preventive war, although troubling, comfortably fit the logic of airpower theory expressed by Anderson, Wedemeyer, and Matthews.

Renowned postwar strategist Bernard Brodie wrote to Anderson shortly after the general’s relief as commandant of the Air War College that the incident had presented the general’s view on preventive war to the Nation “in a much more forceful and commanding way . . . than would otherwise have been possible.” Perhaps Brodie understood better than anyone else the dilemma posed by atomic weapons for U.S. security and the logic of public statements made by Anderson. Reflecting on the first decade and a half of the nuclear age, Brodie indicated in his classic study, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, that at least prior to 1950, when the Soviet Union started to establish a substantial nuclear stockpile, preventive war was a “live issue . . . among a very small but earnest minority of American citizens.” Some U.S. political and military leaders believed that the next struggle would truly be a total war, and a preventive attack to destroy Soviet war-making capacity perfectly suited their vision of future conflict.

NOTES

1 Memorandum from George Lincoln to Alfred Wedemeyer, dated April 16, 1947 (see GAL file, Box 3, April 1947 folder, War Department files, George A. Lincoln Papers, Special Collections, United States Military Academy, West Point.


7 Memo from Ofstie to Chairman, General Board, “General Board Serial 315,” April 8, 1948 (box 3, Ralph A. Ofstie Papers), Naval Historical Center, Washington.


12 Ibid., pp. 97–115.


Last year the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recast its strategic doctrine at the summit meeting held in Washington to mark its 50th anniversary. The new doctrine states that, while operations conducted under Article 5 (self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty remain unchanged, the Alliance must be prepared to mount peace support operations outside its traditional geographical employment region. The current NATO-sponsored exercise program is designed to support and train toward these two primary missions. However, it is failing to achieve this goal. A thorough revision is required to produce capable commanders and well-trained staffs.

Exercise Mechanisms

NATO was founded to counter an attack against Western Europe by the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Cold War, its General Defence Plan, along with myriad supporting plans, became largely pointless and left the Alliance without purpose. Leaders soon recognized that military staffs must be trained to develop and execute operational plans for any crisis throughout the
spectrum of conflict. This was in line with doctrinal moves from static to maneuver-based operations linked to reductions in friendly forces. Training in such an environment would produce a well drilled battle staff which thinks jointly and can quickly develop contingency and operational plans for emerging crises like Kosovo.

To meet this requirement planners must accomplish two features of training, planning, and execution while not violating political sensitivities. First, they must create an exercise scenario with enough detail to originate a plan. Second, they must conduct an exercise that presents commanders and staff officers with challenges by using the general scenario and the approved operations plan to yield a specific situation. Devising a scenario with enough detail is a major challenge. The scenario in the General Defence Plan during the Cold War was fairly straightforward. Different parts were tested using real world intelligence to craft the scene. Now exercise directors are confronted with political constraints regarding planning against a potential real life enemy; thus there is a tendency to use fictional countries. Inventing a notional aggressor has usually involved redrawing the map of Europe or devising an imaginary land mass where friendly and enemy states are situated. Exercise and operational planners no longer have access to real world intelligence and must produce their own, normally by inventing country books or studies. This demands a great deal of imagination on the part of a small planning staff, partially because NATO has not accepted the use of a generic opposing force. Contractors help in this area but at a direct cost to the Alliance and without always including details which operational planners need.

During exercise development, planners on the regional level are usually tasked with creating a complete joint operations or campaign plan. This is hampered in a number of ways. Operations planners and intelligence staffs are not being trained in accordance with doctrine since they cannot use normal procedures to request intelligence support. Those agencies usually approached are not typically involved in the exercise. It thus falls on the planners to simulate this function. And if the exercise is set in a fictional land, there is no readily available information on friendly nations.

Moreover, Article 5 exercises tend to be focused on actual combat operations which miss build-up phases with their emphasis on crisis management, movements, and logistics. The same is true of post-conflict issues involving reconstitution, nation rebuilding, and force redeployment. Staff elements would receive more benefit if scenarios exercised pre- and post-conflict periods.

Once an exercise begins, the training audience is presented with a specific situation which may be unlike the general scenario which the operations plan was originally written against. While this appears to accord with reality, planners would have been participating in the build-up instead of being thrown directly into a crisis. During one regional exercise the scenario showed the build-up toward a major attack against NATO nations. The starting point was 14 days after the initial strike. That required the participants to deal with a dearth of details about an enemy which in a real conflict would have been generated over two weeks of intense combat. Snapshot play versus actual campaign planning contributes to the dissatisfaction of training audiences, who are constantly reminded of the artificiality of the environment. Most intensive planning early in exercise development is seen as wasted because it is not used or tested to ensure planners covered all factors of operations.

Participants have suggested a specific combat situation rather than a transition to combat in part because of the desire that the headquarters be exercised at the same tempo for the same length of time. The intent is exercising the joint arena simultaneously while satisfying subregional and single service objectives. Unfortunately, it tends to ignore the most recent examples of joint warfare, which show an inclination toward air and maritime capabilities at the start with land forces providing the focus in the later stages.

Exercise Mindset

Since NATO has become actively engaged in peace support in the Balkans, a scenario that stresses ground forces later on has gained favor

---

NATO Exercise Programs

---

JFQ / Spring 2000
and is the most likely employment of allied forces in the future. Therefore it makes sense to train commanders and staff officers who are most likely to perform such operations. Article 5 exercises, while supposedly addressing the employment of the Alliance in war, have received much less attention. For example, in the recent development of such a major exercise in the Central Region, it was recognized that it had been five years since the region and its command structure had last participated in a warfighting exercise. This dynamic of training in two opposing directions is difficult to resolve, though there are still basic procedures present in both types of operations which require practice.

The training requirements developed by commanders, staffs, and exercise planners in peace support drills are different from the mindset needed for high intensity warfighting exercises. Peace support exercises have a tightly controlled opposing force in order to accomplish specific training objectives. Most decision points are confined to the highest levels, which detracts from integrating a battle staff with the commander.

Unfortunately, NATO has continued to use the notion of a tightly controlled opposing force in warfighting exercises. This can be attributed to the unstated need to be seen as winning in order to fully achieve training objectives. The fact that more can be learned from losing than winning is missed. Instructive was the British battleship commander in the early 1900s who was sunk three times by submarines (a new and not widely accepted weapons system) and was asked to leave the exercise: “You be damned!” was his response. This attitude toward submarine warfare typifies the inflexibility sometimes displayed by senior staff.

One aspect of warfighting which is lost by NATO is that an enemy has a vote. Moltke the Elder stated that “an enemy always seemed to have three alternatives open to him and he usually chose the fourth.” During a recent Article 5 exercise the air campaign did not progress as planned because opposing forces developed good intelligence pertaining to enemy operating parameters and placed themselves to counter Alliance actions. The result was not used as a learning experience but rather brought a demand for the controlling staff to limit opposing force capabilities. The attitude of winning by controlling an enemy must be removed to improve performance.

Another adjustment is recognizing that NATO combat capabilities have shrunk. Since 1991 there has been a reduction of 25 percent in...
land and air forces and increased reliance upon reserve forces. Most senior commanders and their staff officers matured during the Cold War, which did not prepare them to plan with current restricted force levels. When planners try to inject this reality into exercises, they are compelled to bend mobilization timelines or make greater forces available to appease commanders. In preparing for a recent Article 5 exercise, operational planners demanded 100 percent of the naval forces maintained by participants without acknowledging mobilization lead time or the fact that forces were not being maintained at previous readiness levels. This calls for more training using realistic force levels without allowing the expectation of unlimited capabilities to dominate planning.

There is also a perception that commanders and their senior staffs exert undue influence on the exercise controlling staff. Different reactions occur in various headquarters when the directing staff introduces difficult issues. Sometimes an issue is accepted, with the headquarters devoting its energy to solving the problem while maintaining awareness of the rest of the conflict. In the more common approach the directing staff modifies or removes the problem. This was illustrated during an exercise when a mistake in establishing logistics stockpiles gave NATO forces unlimited logistic support even after 14 days of high intensity combat. The directing staff discovered the problem and limited some weapons availability, leading a member of the regional command staff to order that the original numbers and availability be restored. In this case the directing staff was able to resist the order. However, most of the staff is provided by a participating headquarters and tends to be compliant to its wishes. Commanders, especially multinational, sometimes avoid operational or strategic level decisions that are sensitive and highlight deficiencies of a particular nation.
One can argue that modifying exercise inputs is not serious because commanders will do what is right in a real operation, but that is not always the case. Prior to the Battle of Midway, the Japanese conducted a wargame in which the United States attacked their carrier force by surprise. Several Japanese carriers were severely damaged and two ruled sunk. The commanders overruled the umpires and disavowed the sinkings in order to obtain the desired results. But history would prove the umpires correct.

Continuum Approach

To address the issue of modifying exercise inputs, a different approach to exercise planning and conduct should be explored. This proposal involves a continuum method of staff training. NATO recently completed a successful series of Partnership for Peace exercises known as Cooperative Guard. Forces from allied and partnership countries conducted peace operations set in a fictitious country with mostly real world geography. The Alliance also used that same setting for a combined joint task force trial. In each iteration, both planners and players submitted numerous requests for information, which the directing staff provided to the best of its ability. In turn, the staff captured the requests and answers in standing country books. Because the same scenario was used throughout the series, the background information became very robust.

The Cooperative Guard example can be followed simply by expanding the current scope to encompass an Article 5 scenario while not limiting its location and possibly using a computer modelling support system. Once the basic scenario is determined, the next step would be creating the initial background information and country studies and picking a timeline for the first exercise. The most important planning factor in the continuum approach is establishing a policy by which the ending situation from each exercise determines the starting situation of the next.

The background can be plagiarized from previous exercises and modified for the scenario. It should concentrate on intelligence requirements such as geopolitical setting, military capabilities, mapping information, and support infrastructure. This enables operational planners to start on the overall joint campaign plan as exercise planners begin the computer data base for exercise support. The timeframe for beginning should be set to pre-conflict. The first exercise in an Article 5 series would cover the pre-conflict phase, the second transition to conflict, the third major conflict, and the fourth transition to post-conflict.

A series of four exercises would thus address the same general situation and setting without an entirely new scenario and background for each iteration. Like Cooperative Guard, background should improve with each exercise as participants capture the information created. In addition, the starting point for follow-on exercises would improve fidelity because they are the ending point of the previous drill. Computer modelling makes this even easier because the data base need not be repeatedly recreated, and computers can give detailed reports on the total situation on completion. Because less time is required for each work-out after the first, more resources can be invested in the frequency of exercises. The current practice calls for an annual major regional drill and alternating the theme each year between peace support operations and high intensity conflict. This approach allows commanders to assess staff effectiveness more often while negating required spool-up time for staffs, which results in part from rotating personnel.

Planners would have the period before the first exercise to create an overall campaign plan, with emphasis on the initial stages. Mistakes by training audiences should not be corrected by the directing staff but rather captured for post exercise critiques. There would be time after exercises to modify the plan and address upcoming phases, incorporating lessons learned. That corrects the deficiency of not exercising exactly what the operators have planned since the series encompasses the entire campaign, while delays allow for creative thought on problems arising during the drill.

Probably the biggest improvement this approach offers is that it works all elements of the Alliance structure, albeit not simultaneously. The
first exercise can concentrate on deployment, crisis management, and the establishment of national and multinational logistic stockpiles, an area that is not normally addressed in exercises on the regional level. The second can be focused on the escalating crisis, mobile defense, reestablishing sea control, and air superiority. The third can then achieve conditions needed for counterattack to restore territorial integrity. The final exercise should cover the decisive counterattack, removing the threat along with transition tasks and redeployment.

The designation of an opposing force and its controlling staff to oversee the exercise is also critical to the continuum approach. The NATO command structure has embedded joint subregional headquarters in major regions which can act as the red team. They can fight an independent battle with strategic and operational restraints but no tactical constraints, contributing a missing element from Alliance training theory. Since most regions have multiple joint subregional commands, and these exercises are based on a fictional landmass (thus without territorial allegiance), the opposing force can be rotated among headquarters to spread training benefits. In addition, these organization will be less susceptible to manipulation by training audiences because of their independence and completeness as joint headquarters.

**Adding the Digital Age**

One possible solution for the compliant directing staff is the increased use of computer aids in command post exercises. A computer does not care if results conform to a commander's plan. It cannot be forced to change results without disjoining the exercise, making any changes apparent to all participants.

Computers can also increase exercise fidelity. They can generate the myriad reports which modern militaries produce, while a directing staff can prevent erroneous information from reaching training audiences. Moreover, they can provide reports that include joint logistics, medical, and communications details that cannot be simulated on the operational level by paper reports generated by a small directing staff. In addition, that staff can improve the quality of computer output while concentrating on aspects of the exercise the computer cannot replicate, such as political maneuvers or high level intelligence inputs.

The capabilities and limitations of a computer aided exercise must be understood by staff and players. Mid-exercise alterations to a computer model are bound to degrade exercise play and must be resisted unless there is a major threat to exercise aims.

A recent computer aided exercise revealed that commanders thought the computer, refusing to believe that a lack of integrated effort on the operational/tactical level resulted in a larger number of casualties than expected. The body-bag syndrome is prevalent in exercises, but commanders and staffs must recognize that NATO plans for combined operations during the Cold War allowed for a large number of casualties. Why should a modern Article 5 operation be different? It is likely that casualty rates will be high because of improved weaponry. To exercise commanders and staff officers to deal with the public reaction to casualties is valuable training in its own right.

The Alliance should create a permanent red cell for exercise support. This group can be the professional element of the directing staff for command post exercises in both strategic commands. A current example is the red element at the Warrior Preparation Center, which acts as the opposing force for corps/divisional level land battles for European based training by the Army. The NATO Command and Staff Training Program recently organized by Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe can take on this role. It can report directly to both strategic commanders, making them less vulnerable to command influence on exercise conduct. They can also become experts on making computer aided drills easier. Knowing how actual models react in given situations would make the results more palatable to commanders. The major problems are the personnel costs and obtaining the billets from NATO.

The continuum approach creates a series of exercises that play every facet of warfighting whilst allowing players to apply lessons learned. It incorporates a motivated joint opposing force to drive innovative responses and allows freedom of action. It saves money, permitting more frequent training of commanders and their staffs. The current NATO exercise program is not delivering the training benefits Alliance nations deserve. Improvements to overall exercise development and conduct are required to deliver a well prepared commander and battle staff.

**NOTES**

When the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the peacetime use of Reserve component intelligence elements in January 1995, few appreciated the positive impact this action would have on revolutionizing Reserve intelligence support for active commands in a crisis. Four years later, highly qualified members of a Reserve battle damage assessment team arrived in Britain to support Operation Allied Force. Within 72 hours of leaving their Reserve unit at Fort Sheridan, they were working at computer terminals at the Joint Analysis Center (JAC), RAF Molesworth. Employing Reservists was hardly a surprise. The use of Reserve intelligence forces has become necessary for the active commands to meet daily mission requirements. The joint Reserve intelligence program (JRIP) directly supports combatant commands from both joint Reserve intelligence centers (JRICs) in the United States and locations in U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

The Taproot of Change

An experienced, skilled JRIP did not materialize overnight. It had its origins in initiatives that go back to June 1982, when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated “Units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.” This concept was a catalyst for JRIP since intelligence Reservists can only be adequately trained when given access to the same infrastructure, software, and training as active duty forces. Another factor that helped create JRIP was the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with its focus on jointness. The third factor is the continuing reorganization within DOD. Downsizing has made a
RESERVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

greater operational use of Reservists imperative for support of gaining commands. To address these issues, the Secretary of Defense directed measures to improve the use of Reserve capabilities.

After two years of coordination, DOD approved Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements: Implementation Plan for Improving the Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force, which changes the way the Reserve and active forces are integrated. And in 1995, the Chairman notified the unified commands that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence would issue instructions on implementing the plan and incorporating its substance into DOD directives.

The plan details overall responsibilities; increases efficiencies through joint organizations, functional management structures, and flexible drills; improves relations among drilling Reservists, their units, and defense intelligence elements; and calls for the creation of a common database for Reserve intelligence specialties. It also addresses appropriations for pay and allowances provided to Reserve intelligence personnel by unified commands and selected defense agencies.

To compensate for a projected drawdown in active military and civilian intelligence staffs, the plan underscores the need for the full engagement of Reservists from peacetime to mobilization. It directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to integrate the efforts of organizations responsible under this plan for intelligence mission development, tasking, and management to apply a cohesive and comprehensive approach to using the Reserve components. It further assigns DIA to create the Reserve Intelligence Integration Division to implement the plan, oversee the formation of JRICs, and direct the Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP).

In addition to serving as a clearing house for operations, the staff element of DIA provides a data processing/communications infrastructure with general defense intelligence program funding (through which Reservists who are geographically separated from gaining commands or customers can be tasked to support requirements during inactive duty and active training periods). Under this program JRICs have evolved at military sites across the United States and are accessible to drilling Reservists. Each is a secure facility with state-of-the-art systems that Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees from all services use to provide peacetime-through-wartime intelligence support. Of 29 sites, the Army operates 11, the Army National Guard 3, the Navy 9, the Marine Corps 2, the Air Force 2, and the Air National Guard 2, with Joint Forces Intelligence Command and the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center each operating a site.

The advanced technology at these sites includes communications bandwidth and software necessary to pull information from remote databases, build products, and deliver those products in a timely manner. It is capable of supporting most phases of intelligence production. Through the sites, directly connected to the active forces, Reservists can improve their skills while operating on the same systems used in a mobilization. At the same time, this arrangement allows warfighting units to employ the Reserves as a force multiplier through reach-back.

From Reserve to Allied Force

When the United States became involved with NATO in Kosovo, it was necessary for JAC at RAF Molesworth to request joint Reserve intelligence support elements. The center could not have supported forces in the Balkans and meet its other requirements without increasing manpower through active and Reserve augmentation. EUCOM and JAC took the initiative and called upon the Reserves to support projected manpower shortfalls. Because of limited space at Molesworth and to conserve funds, several Reserve sites were directed to remote elements in JRICs at Fort Sheridan and Fort Gillem. If the crisis continued, a significant number of Reservists and augmentees would have been mobilized to JRICs.

The 117th Intelligence Squadron of the Alabama Air National Guard was integrated into the JAC division of imagery U–2 exploitation cell at RAF Molesworth. This unit, along with a Naval Reserve imagery cell from JRISE at Fort Gillem, drills at JRIC in Birmingham, Alabama. The units provide imagery exploitation and analysis and intelligence reporting to EUCOM, JAC, and DIA Missile and Space Intelligence Center. Of the 76 officer and enlisted personnel in this squadron, half are qualified imagery analysts and the balance are imagery mechanics, technicians, and administrators.

The success of the unit is a result of consistent interaction with JAC. Up to three times a year the squadron sends a detachment of imagery analysts to RAF Molesworth to perform annual training and support intelligence imagery requirements. Their skills have been enhanced by access to computer systems at the drill site in Alabama. Also contributing to success is their knowledge of the fundamental light table analysis of U–2 and other products. JAC is the only joint intelligence center outside the United States that works extensively...
DeVries

with U–2 image exploitation. Moreover, members of the 117th Intelligence Squadron have trained active duty analysts in imagery exploitation. Because the squadron has a continuing relationship with JAC, uses the same exploitation software, and understands the theater, it can easily support the center in crises. The unit was ready when Operation Allied Force began. One of its senior enlisted imagery analysts was deployed to JAC and assigned to a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) exploitation cell. The squadron master sergeant was quickly integrated into the cell and, after working two consecutive shifts for a period of time, became night shift supervisor. It was as a result of this type of Reserve commitment that the UAV exploitation program succeeded during Operation Allied Force.

Use by JAC of the Linked Operations-Intelligence Center Europe, which furnishes NATO, American, and other Allied militaries with near-real time collection, exploitation, and dissemination at the secret releasable to NATO classification level, became a conduit for UAV exploitation. Through that channel, with a Naval Reserve intelligence officer as deputy chief, the exploitation cell gained access to NATO and other allied UAV imagery for both battle damage assessment and targeting. This set the stage for future shared systems. Because of his expertise, the Naval Reservist was deployed forward to Macedonia as officer in charge of the center’s forward detachment.

The cell also worked with the exploitation cell of the 13th Intelligence Squadron located at Beale Air Force Base which provided much of the remote exploitation from the Air Force Predator...
RESERVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

UAV program. Additionally, Reservists were mobilized at the base from the 152d Reconnaissance Squadron drilling at JRIC in Reno. JAC sent an active duty servicemember familiar with the center and the European theater to help coordinate the program. As demands increased on the center to keep its staff in theater or deploy forward, it was found that this stateside liaison role could be performed by Reservists from the 117th Intelligence Squadron who were both familiar with EUCOM and had a good working relationship with JAC counterparts.

One of the greatest successes was the activation of the Reserve Battle Damage Assessment EUROM Support Team formed during JRISE drilling at JRIC in the North Central Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center at Fort Sheridan. This team was undergoing training when it was first recalled for contingency support in Autumn 1998. It immediately began honing targeting skills in the initial Kosovo work-up phase. After tours lasting from 30 to 90 days at JAC, team members returned home. Recalled again in May 1999 as a fully trained team, they arrived at the center within 72 hours and immediately went to work doing battle damage assessment and supporting targeting. By contrast, most active duty augmentees EUCOM recalled for the same crisis required 40 days to arrive in theater.

In addition, active duty augmentees could not remain beyond 179 days without making a permanent change of station. These issues make active duty augmentees less desirable than Reservists. The targeting section alone increased manning by half to accomplish its 24-hour mission, and 15 percent of the augmentees were Reservists. It was the Reserves who were timely, had the required expertise, and understood JAC systems and software and the European theater.

In response to increased operational tasking, JAC took the initiative and became the first joint center to use JRIC as a remote site in a crisis, in the process creating a Reserve intelligence production center. As events intensified and production requirements could not be met, the center transferred all-source analytic mission support for the Middle East and Africa to JRISE at Fort Gillem. JAC deployed one analyst to Fort Gillem and JRIC sent another to the center. This exchange allowed the five Reserve analysts to be skillfully employed. Reservists were mobilized to the site and targeting orders were instituted. During the mobilization, JRISE produced 130 theater intelligence digest updates and products with graphics which were posted on Intelink. Moreover, Reservists at Fort Gillem responded to a request for information from a ship at sea, highlighting the reach possible from real-time connectivity.

During the Kosovo crisis, the center also began to transfer part of its order of battle (OOB) mission to Fort Sheridan. Personnel in the OOB branch were transferred to the Balkans Intelligence Support Element (BISE) and could not continue with the full OOB mission. By shifting this task to the Reserves, JAC could continue to meet these requirements. In fact, the branch at Fort Sheridan is responsible for researching and maintaining part of the center's modernized integrated database, resulting in ground, naval, and air order of battle updates being generated for twenty countries at present. The unit from Fort Sheridan is tasked to provide full-time support to the database mission with a team of Reserve analysts who were activated to directly assist with the Balkans crisis. They continue in that role today.

Increased Operational Tempo

The Joint Analysis Center uses Reservists throughout the command and deploys a number to forward locations. In the past, joint Reserve intelligence support has been provided primarily at JAC in Britain, but increasing support comes directly from JRCs at Fort Gillem, Fort Sheridan, and Birmingham.

Reserve and National Guard members available for tasking in FY99 included 200 officers and
350 enlisted servicemembers drilling as unit members or individual mobilization augmentees. Through extensive use of systems and connectivity, FY99 JRIC production increased 100 percent over FY98. During Operation Allied Force, JAC required the augmentation of 152 Reservists, of which a third were Army and many had JRISE training that enabled them to provide immediate support on arrival. The Naval Reserve intelligence program provided 65 percent of augmentees to the center. Furthermore, the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command sent 40 members who provided reach-back support at DIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Space Command, and U.S. Transportation Command in direct support of Operation Allied Force as well as manpower for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, EUCOM, and Sixth Fleet. Naval Reserve personnel at JAC and elsewhere also filled valid Joint Task Force Noble Anvil billets normally filled by active duty personnel. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence (N-2), Sixth Fleet, was strongly supportive of both his war- traced and other Reservists. Their intelligence capabilities were enhanced by access to JRBCs and to the secret Internet protocol network at some of their drilling sites.

With advanced collection comes almost limitless data to analyze. When a downsized force is factored in, combatant commands and services must rely more upon joint Reserve intelligence support in peacetime and mobilization. JAC alone is responsible for 66 percent of the countries in DIA Watchcon status and in 1998 supported 18 real world operations. To meet the increased collection and dissemination during Operation Allied Force, the center relied on an average of 130 Reserve augmentees at RAF Molesworth. These joint Reservists not only supported JAC there but were mobilized to JRBCs and forward deployed in Skopje and Sarajevo and with Commander, Sixth Fleet, and the Combined Air Operations Center. As the director of
the division of targeting stated, they were "so good that they were totally integrated with and indistinguishable from permanent party personnel." Moreover, as the head of BISE noted, "Without the Reserves, we would not have been able to do ground mobile target assessment and target value analysis."

**Recommendations**

In the next crisis, establishing an advanced UAV exploitation cell will require twenty more personnel to operate on a 24-hour basis. In addition, funds will be needed for a video exploitation suite with sophisticated storage and retrieval systems and to provide training. Since JAC does not have the manpower to support an exploitation cell, the most likely source is the 117th Intelligence Squadron. Only if that unit was directly war-traced to the center and given the funding, systems, communications bandwidth, and training could it provide the requisite video exploitation. Further, the center could reach back to JRIC in Birmingham and activate a remote exploitation cell. For that to happen, use of JRICs as mobilization sites must be addressed, especially by the Army Reserve, combatant commanders, and Defense Intelligence Agency. Resulting policies and procedures will have to be agreed upon.

As more and more potential exists for employing JRICs as remote production sites during contingencies, more funding and equipment will be required to maintain them as viable intelligence centers. They will need the same software and equipment upgrades as the combatant commands as well as adequate bandwidth. As stated previously, if JRICs are to become remote sites, the service chiefs, especially in case of the Army Reserve, must review their mission and support this concept. The Reserves can no longer afford to keep training for the big mobilization day or follow a strict Title 10 interpretation.

Every service component must examine how to better support its customers from peacetime through mobilization. The Air Force intelligence program, as a force engaged, provided 57 percent of Reserve augmentees involuntarily recalled in connection with Kosovo operations. That number equaled 4,000 man-days for EUCOM, either from in-theater or through reach-back operations, which marked the first time the Air Force responded to the command by waiving its 179-day rule. Reserve intelligence systems, connectivity, training, and missions must continue to be reviewed and actively supported if the joint Reserve intelligence forces are to complete their mission. Those activated for Kosovo were the first in, last out. The active duty augmentation process, which relies on personnel force lists submitted by requesting commands, is part of the answer but is not timely enough.

The role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence in writing the implementation directive and instructions must continue, with DIA following up on implementation. During this intense process, services and combatant commands can agree on the ultimate use of JRICs. With the reality of virtual collaboration and reach-back and the seamless integration of software applications through joint intelligence virtual architecture, and with proliferation of Web-based applications just around the corner, the joint intelligence Reservist must continue to be provided the most realigned infrastructure and connectivity. In concert, both baseline intelligence and theater-specific training to improve Reserve ability to support warfighters must be provided to joint intelligence Reservists no matter where they are located.

The revolution in military technology has arrived and the United States must reevaluate its defense programs and fund them as appropriate. Only then will the joint Reserve intelligence program continue to be a force multiplier.
Joint professional military education (JPME) develops leaders, a key ingredient in unifying doctrine, technology, organization, and culture. In early 1998 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated an effort entitled "Joint Professional Military Education 2010" to update and upgrade JPME. It tackled a number of critical issues. During the first phase, requirements and technology teams confirmed the need for change and existence of available technology to assist in this process. In the second phase, a course of action development team began transitional discussions involving the Chairman, combatant commanders, and services. Their recommendations underpinned a report to Congress on educating Reserve component officers in joint matters. This article describes how the general outlines of a new JPME system have emerged from these recent actions.

**Challenging the Total Force**

Today a greater number of Reservists are being deployed to contingencies worldwide. One study found that 4,400 of the duty positions held by Reserve officers in grades O4 to O6 need joint education. Of these, 1,200 need advanced instruction. War plans project requirements for another 2,200 joint duty positions for members of the Reserve components.

Although the demand is increasing, the challenge of providing joint education to Reservists is...
nothing new. Their lack of access to JPME opportunities has drawn attention from Congress. In fact, the Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically directed that:

_The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for Reserve officers not on the active duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the Reserve components, be similar to the policies for the active component._

Despite this legislative initiative insufficient advances were made over the last decade. In 1998 the House National Security Committee directed CJCS to report on progress to establish a mid-career JPME course. Citing inadequate preparation of Reservists for joint duty, the committee directed development of educational opportunities similar in content to the resident programs of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) for active duty officers. This congressional concern is backed by the conclusions of the JPME 2010 requirements team, which found that service participation in joint organizations and operations is now part of the experience of Reserve officers, although JPME is not. This is because the services fill their quotas at AFSC to qualify active duty personnel as joint specialty officers. The result is that Reservists are excluded from the three month course at the college. In addition, Reserve officers are finding that increased operational tempo, service PME requirements, and the demands of their civilian jobs make three-month active duty courses unrealistic. In sum, the opportunity for Reservists to pursue joint education has been declining. Any education intended for the Reserve components must be presented in a format that can be accomplished during two-week active duty tours and/or weekend drills. A nonresident course which combines distance learning and periodic face-to-face interaction in a group setting is needed in order to replicate the level of joint acculturation and competency achieved in resident programs. Meanwhile, active component officers assigned to joint billets also face a perplexing set of challenges. They are uprooted from joint assignments for three months of temporary duty to meet joint education requirements at AFSC. In residence they encounter a curriculum with disconnects and redundancies in joint matters taught at service colleges. Also, JPME programs do not fully provide the competency to master the demands of interagency operations.

The three months on temporary duty for JPME by active component officers is particularly contentious. Interviews conducted with students revealed that over half attended AFSC after serving in joint duty positions for a year or more. In addition, long periods away from duty positions increased the strains of operational tempo and detracted from unit readiness. Finally, despite the fact that officers are uprooted to attend educational programs, after action reports indicate that joint headquarters are not sufficiently staffed by officers who have met joint educational requirements. Another downside of the current system is the lack of appreciation for the growing importance of joint task forces which are employed operationally on all levels. This is best taught by emphasizing JTF doctrine during the primary phase of officer development. In addition, a menu of so-called just-in-time modules could be built on this foundation through various resident, nonresident, distributed, and distance learning techniques. In short, the requirements team confirmed that a seamless, flexible JPME system is needed for officers from pre-commissioning to the general/flag level.

Current joint doctrinal changes and the transition to Joint Vision 2010 are driving the need for deepened and broadened joint education. Current joint educational opportunities has drawn attention from Congress. In fact, the Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically directed that:

_The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for Reserve officers not on the active duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the Reserve components, be similar to the policies for the active component._

Despite this legislative initiative insufficient advances were made over the last decade. In 1998 the House National Security Committee directed CJCS to report on progress to establish a mid-career JPME course. Citing inadequate preparation of Reservists for joint duty, the committee directed development of educational opportunities similar in content to the resident programs of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) for active duty officers. This congressional concern is backed by the conclusions of the JPME 2010 requirements team, which found that service participation in joint organizations and operations is now part of the experience of Reserve officers, although JPME is not. This is because the services fill their quotas at AFSC to qualify active duty personnel as joint specialty officers. The result is that Reservists are excluded from the three month course at the college. In addition, Reserve officers are finding that increased operational tempo, service PME requirements, and the demands of their civilian jobs make three-month active duty courses unrealistic. In sum, the opportunity for Reservists to pursue joint education has been declining. Any education intended for the Reserve components must be presented in a format that can be accomplished during two-week active duty tours and/or weekend drills. A nonresident course which combines distance learning and periodic face-to-face interaction in a group setting is needed in order to replicate the level of joint acculturation and competency achieved in resident programs. Meanwhile, active component officers assigned to joint billets also face a perplexing set of challenges. They are uprooted from joint assignments for three months of temporary duty to meet joint education requirements at AFSC. In residence they encounter a curriculum with disconnects and redundancies in joint matters taught at service colleges. Also, JPME programs do not fully provide the competency to master the demands of interagency operations.

The three months on temporary duty for JPME by active component officers is particularly contentious. Interviews conducted with students revealed that over half attended AFSC after serving in joint duty positions for a year or more. In addition, long periods away from duty positions increased the strains of operational tempo and detracted from unit readiness. Finally, despite the fact that officers are uprooted to attend educational programs, after action reports indicate that joint headquarters are not sufficiently staffed by officers who have met joint educational requirements. Another downside of the current system is the lack of appreciation for the growing importance of joint task forces which are employed operationally on all levels. This is best taught by emphasizing JTF doctrine during the primary phase of officer development. In addition, a menu of so-called just-in-time modules could be built on this foundation through various resident, nonresident, distributed, and distance learning techniques. In short, the requirements team confirmed that a seamless, flexible JPME system is needed for officers from pre-commissioning to the general/flag level.

Current joint doctrinal changes and the transition to Joint Vision 2010 are driving the need for deepened and broadened joint education. Current joint educational opportunities has drawn attention from Congress. In fact, the Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically directed that:

_The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for Reserve officers not on the active duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the Reserve components, be similar to the policies for the active component._

Despite this legislative initiative insufficient advances were made over the last decade. In 1998 the House National Security Committee directed CJCS to report on progress to establish a mid-career JPME course. Citing inadequate preparation of Reservists for joint duty, the committee directed development of educational opportunities similar in content to the resident programs of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) for active duty officers. This congressional concern is backed by the conclusions of the JPME 2010 requirements team, which found that service participation in joint organizations and operations is now part of the experience of Reserve officers, although JPME is not. This is because the services fill their quotas at AFSC to qualify active duty personnel as joint specialty officers. The result is that Reservists are excluded from the three month course at the college. In addition, Reserve officers are finding that increased operational tempo, service PME requirements, and the demands of their civilian jobs make three-month active duty courses unrealistic. In sum, the opportunity for Reservists to pursue joint education has been declining. Any education intended for the Reserve components must be presented in a format that can be accomplished during two-week active duty tours and/or weekend drills. A nonresident course which combines distance learning and periodic face-to-face interaction in a group setting is needed in order to replicate the level of joint acculturation and competency achieved in resident programs. Meanwhile, active component officers assigned to joint billets also face a perplexing set of challenges. They are uprooted from joint assignments for three months of temporary duty to meet joint education requirements at AFSC. In residence they encounter a curriculum with disconnects and redundancies in joint matters taught at service colleges. Also, JPME programs do not fully provide the competency to master the demands of interagency operations.
Driscoll

creating a two-month en route summer school before joint duty tours

- developing a pilot project to test new initiatives
- establishing a joint center of excellence in operational art at AFSC with a resident joint intermediate staff school (JISS) and a resident school for advanced joint education (SAJE)
- developing a robust nonresident JPME capability.

CINCs provided a valuable critique of the approach recommended by the phase II analysis. They supported the addition of multinational and interagency competencies, reform of joint officer management, introduction of advanced distance and virtual learning, and creation of a two-month summer school for officers bound for joint duty positions. Moreover, they conditionally endorsed a pilot project, CINC joint learning centers, and establishing a distance and distributed education hub for joint operational art. However, in contrast with the course of action team and MECC, they favored full joint education taught at each of the service colleges. Neither CINCs nor the MECC team advocated JISS or SAJE. CINCs were concerned over the competition for faculty, students, and resources. There was a general reluctance to operate another college that keeps officers from duty assignments for another year.

The overlap between military training and education—and the friction between institutional prerogatives and operational imperatives—is a cause of dispute. U.S. Joint Forces Command, for instance, which administers a center of joint operational excellence, objected to designating AFSC as a center of excellence in joint operational art.

All CINCs, however, argued for mandatory, standardized joint education modules across the services, and they wanted to ensure that officers meet similar standards prior to assuming joint assignments. They also wanted flexibility, with joint education modules available to all personnel at all times. As part of a larger curriculum, they supported developing modules that could be used from the joint duty location to provide regional and functional knowledge unique to the duty tour. The vision drawn from CINCs was a system in which individuals might enhance their joint
knowledge as needed as well as conduct research. Commanders believed that with some changes undertaken by the National Defense University at AFSC, the appropriate content for these modules could be coordinated. They argued that intermediate and senior level colleges should graduate officers who are fully educated in joint matters by providing them with access to accredited joint learning modules. They also wanted officers to complete both phase I and phase II of JPME on one set of orders.

Moreover, CINCs took the report to task on the quality of joint education. Although they believed the JPME 2010 system should complement service education requirements, they insisted that it exceed service standards. They wanted content of joint education to be upgraded to enhance analytical skills, build joint culture, elucidate multinational and interagency competencies, present electives in addition to a concentrated core education, and incorporate a joint task force wargame.

The Pilot Program
The Chairman accepted the notion of full JPME in service colleges and converted the JSJS and SAJE proposals to a single 9-10 month joint operations school (JOS). Here, the first priority will have to be developing in-depth faculty expertise in joint operational art and education. CJCS acknowledged that distance and distributed education fails if course content and design are poor. Competent teachers and curriculum design are essential.

The proposed JOS should free resources. Placing students in 300 seats for three months three times a year at AFSC requires at least 210 officer-years from the military departments. In contrast, a 60 military member JOS student body will cost only 60 officer-years, saving $12 million annually. Temporary duty and travel funds paid out for 900 servicemembers attending the AFSC short course have exceeded $5.4 million. If, for example, 650 could complete full JPME while still in their service colleges, the savings in service temporary duty and travel funds would be $3.9 million.

Based on the potential of distributed education, CJCS responded to a recent congressional inquiry on Reserve component education pointing out that JPME for Reservists was being addressed in the broader modernization of the education process. From now on, according to the Report to Congress on Reserve Component Joint Professional Military Education, JPME would integrate the joint military education of Reserve with active duty officers.

[Reserve component] JPME should enjoy a similar degree of support [as active component JPME] through the proposed [Reserve] pilot program, which will be the catalyst for implementing remote learning for joint staff officers across the total force. . . .

A distributed learning framework will help develop common distance learning for both active and Reserve component officers.

Senior faculty at AFSC have also developed and tested a joint planning course to respond to the congressional requirement for similar education for Reservists. The two week pilot curriculum consisted of three primary instruction blocks. The first surveyed deliberate and crisis action planning processes and reviewed service and component capabilities. Second came hands-on experience with the joint operations planning and execution system. This familiarized the class with tools to support force deployment. Third, students walked through a crisis deployment exercise, facilitating critical thought and constructive dialogue.

Thirty active and Reserve component personnel in grades E6 to O6 received the joint planning course, completed extensive measurement instruments, and recommended improvements. Both functional and substantive elective modules might eventually be linked through a coordinated educational system to a common core. When greater competency is needed in a specific area, for example, students could devote more time to an appropriate elective module.
Based on this experience and CJCS objectives for joint education, AFSC has proposed a course of 110 hours of advanced distributed learning and 130 hours of classroom instruction that Reserve component officers could accomplish during drill weekend and a two week active duty training period. Implementation of this curriculum should begin next summer and, depending on availability of resources, be phased in over the next two years.

JPME 2010 also found that joint education for general/flag officers required updating. The Capstone course at the National Defense University in collaboration with the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), an element of U.S. Joint Forces Command, planned and rehearsed a three-day module that puts senior leaders through a JTF life cycle: forming, planning, deploying, employing, transitioning, and redeploying. Capstone course senior fellows and JWFC team members with the support of a state-of-the-art joint training, analysis, and simulation center, conducted the rehearsal. Through this new module, senior leaders discover critical JTF commander issues in each phase of a scenario. The process drives home learning objectives with the use of plenary groups, academic seminars, small group exercises, plenary back briefs, and facilitated discussions. Such efforts are designed to build on competencies being developed in pilot programs, creating a continuum of joint education from the junior officer to senior leadership level.

The Way Ahead

The debate over the course of action proposal, the examination of numerous resource combinations, and the early outline of a pilot program have marked an important transition. It is already clear that the law must be changed to allow AFSC to teach distance and distributed JPME curricula. Similarly, PME standards will have to reflect the central role of distance and distributed education. Resources will come partly from reprogramming manpower and funding, partly from collaborating with the current program centered infrastructure, and additionally from coordinating resident and distance education from the entire system. Implementation will proceed indefinitely and require constant collaboration among services, components, and the joint community at large.

Both distance and distributed learning will increase the quality and quantity of education. The evolution to virtual classrooms, however, will require a concerted effort. To succeed, distance and distributed teaching of JPME 2010 will have to look, resemble, and in fact be better than what is accepted as JPME today.

The naval services have a particular challenge in addressing expanding JPME requirements. The education of 3,100 more officers annually in joint matters requires the Navy to increase staff college and joint operations school attendance. Navy and Marine Corps officers who complete staff colleges must have a joint education in order to match Army and Air Force officers. Virtually linking officers through distributed learning clusters, as well as resident seminars at staff colleges and the joint operations school, is one way to achieve such a balance.

Joint education for noncommissioned officers also must be addressed. Some 2,200 men and women in the grades E7 through E9 support the Chairman, CINCs, and standing JTFs, and more serve in contingency JTFs. They need knowledge about the cultures and capabilities of other services and techniques for mentoring the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen entrusted to them. They also require a better understanding of joint force packaging and joint command and control.

A seamless JPME system must be implemented within the context of a new joint personnel environment. The leaders of joint multinational and interagency military operations will come from a large pool of individuals educated in joint matters rather than from the current intermittent stream of officers and noncommissioned officers.
Residential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” mandates reform in the joint/interagency coordination process. It recognizes that the United States will continue to conduct complex contingency operations (CCOs). Greater coordination is required to appropriately bring all instruments of national power to bear on all such operations.

Those who have served in these operations can attest to the friction and failure caused by poor planning and the lack of interagency coordination. Although PDD 56 takes a significant step toward incorporating planning mechanisms to achieve unity of effort, the program is in its infancy and in some aspects falls short of the President’s intent.

Mandates, Directives, and Doctrine

Following the Cold War the internal collapse of weak nations often unleashed destabilizing forces with the potential to spread to neighboring states. Refugee movements, ethnic and
political unrest, organized crime, and other crises (disease, famine, and human rights abuses) occurred with such an intensity and frequency that the United States was unprepared to handle them. As a result, America has developed a different approach. President Clinton directed an interagency review of peacekeeping policies, programs, and procedures to establish a comprehensive policy framework to address post-Cold War realities. Completed in 1994, the review led to the issuance of PDD 25 on the reform of multilateral peace operations.

PDD 25 established instructions for peace operations and focused attention on the need for improved dialog and decisionmaking among governmental agencies. It laid the basis for PDD 56, which institutionalized policies and procedures on managing complex crises. The former directive became the President’s master strategy for dealing with internal strife in so-called failed states.

While PDD 25 articulated a policy on integrating operations, joint doctrine provided limited guidance. Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, cited interagency coordination as part of team warfare. However, Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, did not convey a strong message on unity and failed to provide guidance to commanders. Until 1996, only Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Countering Operations*, contained useful information on interagency planning and operations. Lack of guidance led to Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. First published in 1996, it discusses interagency processes and players, the evolving role of the Armed Forces, and the functions of the National Security Council system. It also outlines both principles for organizing interagency efforts on the operational level and roles and responsibilities for JTFs. The publication contained guidance for coordination between CINCs and agencies as well as methodologies for interagency operations. Although publication of joint doctrine was a welcome addition, it was not enough. Joint manuals did not adequately explain methods for interagency planning, coordination, and execution.

Thus DOD and other agencies identified a need for policy guidance such as that found in PDD 56.

**Criticisms, Challenges, and Choices**

Problems have existed on all levels of interagency coordination from the strategic to the tactical, but the strategic and operational levels must be immediately improved for success in future CCOs. Civilian agencies lack sufficient authority and accountability to execute humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks. They have the luxury of picking some and discarding others. Although U.S. customs officials participated in sanctions against Bosnia, they declined to take part in similar actions against Iraq and Serbia. Such ad hoc responses make it hard for CINCs to predict which requirements the military must meet.

Another shortfall is that most civilian organizations do not maintain large staffs and are not equipped to conduct expeditionary operations. In Somalia, neither the Department of State nor the U.S. Agency for International Development had sufficient personnel in the region. For example, while Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff remained fully engaged working with the military in Somalia, there were not enough civilian personnel to negotiate with the various factions or to assist local village elders in establishing councils and security forces. Army civil affairs teams had to assume those responsibilities.

In addition to insufficient authority, accountability, and staffing, many civilian agencies do not have standard operating procedures or the doctrine to guide efforts on the operational level.
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

As a result, responses are often slow and ad hoc, making it difficult to conduct military planning. In Rwanda, for instance, some agencies could not decide what to contribute, so U.S. European Command planners were hard pressed to determine what military resources were required.

A final operational consideration involves the unique position of CINCs in the interagency process since their interaction tends to be vertical versus lateral. They do not have civilian agency counterparts. The Department of State has regional assistant secretaries, but they are not deployed or responsible for operations on the ground. Meanwhile ambassadors, who reside in the area and are responsible for field level operations, are assigned to specific countries and are not equipped to coordinate regional efforts. Because most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the absence of a compatible operational framework between officials of the Department of State and the CINCs is a problem. By default unified commanders are the only officials who can provide leadership on behalf of the Nation even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Complications arise between the Department of State (with its country teams) and the Department of Defense (with its regional commands). Planning and conducting operations and identifying counterparts across agencies further frustrates cohesive regional efforts. These problems demonstrated the need for an overarching policy to guide all facets of operations. Thus PDD 56 was born in 1997, the

PDD 56 was born in 1997, the result of such undertakings as Restore Hope and Support Hope.

As a result, responses are often slow and ad hoc, making it difficult to conduct military planning. In Rwanda, for instance, some agencies could not decide what to contribute, so U.S. European Command planners were hard pressed to determine what military resources were required.

A final operational consideration involves the unique position of CINCs in the interagency process since their interaction tends to be vertical versus lateral. They do not have civilian agency counterparts. The Department of State has regional assistant secretaries, but they are not deployed or responsible for operations on the ground. Meanwhile ambassadors, who reside in the area and are responsible for field level operations, are assigned to specific countries and are not equipped to coordinate regional efforts. Because most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the absence of a compatible operational framework between officials of the Department of State and the CINCs is a problem. By default unified commanders are the only officials who can provide leadership on behalf of the Nation even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Complications arise between the Department of State (with its country teams) and the Department of Defense (with its regional commands). Planning and conducting operations and identifying counterparts across agencies further frustrates cohesive regional efforts. These problems demonstrated the need for an overarching policy to guide all facets of operations. Thus PDD 56 was born in 1997, the

PDD 56 was born in 1997, the result of such undertakings as Restore Hope and Support Hope.

As a result, responses are often slow and ad hoc, making it difficult to conduct military planning. In Rwanda, for instance, some agencies could not decide what to contribute, so U.S. European Command planners were hard pressed to determine what military resources were required.

A final operational consideration involves the unique position of CINCs in the interagency process since their interaction tends to be vertical versus lateral. They do not have civilian agency counterparts. The Department of State has regional assistant secretaries, but they are not deployed or responsible for operations on the ground. Meanwhile ambassadors, who reside in the area and are responsible for field level operations, are assigned to specific countries and are not equipped to coordinate regional efforts. Because most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the absence of a compatible operational framework between officials of the Department of State and the CINCs is a problem. By default unified commanders are the only officials who can provide leadership on behalf of the Nation even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Complications arise between the Department of State (with its country teams) and the Department of Defense (with its regional commands). Planning and conducting operations and identifying counterparts across agencies further frustrates cohesive regional efforts. These problems demonstrated the need for an overarching policy to guide all facets of operations. Thus PDD 56 was born in 1997, the

As a result, responses are often slow and ad hoc, making it difficult to conduct military planning. In Rwanda, for instance, some agencies could not decide what to contribute, so U.S. European Command planners were hard pressed to determine what military resources were required.

A final operational consideration involves the unique position of CINCs in the interagency process since their interaction tends to be vertical versus lateral. They do not have civilian agency counterparts. The Department of State has regional assistant secretaries, but they are not deployed or responsible for operations on the ground. Meanwhile ambassadors, who reside in the area and are responsible for field level operations, are assigned to specific countries and are not equipped to coordinate regional efforts. Because most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the absence of a compatible operational framework between officials of the Department of State and the CINCs is a problem. By default unified commanders are the only officials who can provide leadership on behalf of the Nation even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Complications arise between the Department of State (with its country teams) and the Department of Defense (with its regional commands). Planning and conducting operations and identifying counterparts across agencies further frustrates cohesive regional efforts. These problems demonstrated the need for an overarching policy to guide all facets of operations. Thus PDD 56 was born in 1997, the
result of such undertakings as Restore Hope and Support Hope.

The directive applies to situations that require multidimensional operations with diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security components. According to it:

The PDD defines CCOs as peace operations such as the Dayton Peace accord implementation operations in Bosnia (1995-present) . . . and foreign humanitarian assistance operations in central Africa and Bangladesh. Unless otherwise directed PDD 56 does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counterterrorism, hostage rescue operations, and international armed conflict.

The directive thus does not apply to combat operations.

The interagency structure for handling such operations is led by the Deputies Committee. The group consists of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or his principal deputy, the Vice Chairman, the Under or Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Deputy National Security Advisor, with participation from other departments as needed. When a crisis arises, that body takes the lead and sets an interagency effort in motion to plan and manage a CCO.

Operating under the Deputies Committee is the Executive Committee (ExComm), led by the assistant or deputy assistant secretaries of the various departments and the Director or Vice Director of the Joint Staff. ExComm is responsible for day-to-day implementation of the PDD 56 process and oversees the workings of the interagency working group.

The Deputies Committee requires a political-military plan in order to react to a contingency. It is developed by the working group using the generic political-military scheme as a template. It covers at a minimum: situation assessment, national interests, mission statement, objectives, concept of operations and organization, desired endstate, preparatory tasks, transition/exit strategy, functional or mission area tasks/agency plans, and lead agency responsibilities.

The second area, identifying national interests and stating a purpose and mission, is critical to the plan. The mission statement must yield achievable and measurable criteria, including an exit vision or transition strategy.

A major feature of the PDD 56 process is rehearsing before implementing. The Deputies Committee conducts the rehearsal by going through the plan in time sequence to ensure that every element follows logically. Representatives from every government department involved participate to explain their role and address any problems that arise.

After the decision to conduct the operation is reached, comprehensive after action reviews are needed during and after the implementation phase. The military is familiar with after action reports and lessons learned. PDD 56 captures lessons in reviews of interagency performance both in the field and in Washington, as well as legal and budgetary problems and agency execution. The focus is on developing solutions so future operations do not repeat the same mistakes.

A key mechanism of PDD 56 is inculcating interagency cooperation into leaders at every government agency. In training, the directive aims to create “a cadre of professionals familiar with this integrated planning process . . . to manage future operations.”

A number of institutions, including the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, National Defense University, and service colleges, are developing interagency training. As a former foreign service officer has argued, success in military operations other than war calls for “greater than ever cooperation between civilian and military operators.” Exposing leaders to the doctrine, attitudes, and capabilities of other agencies in an academic setting can build trust and cooperation.

Military education has emphasized interagency coordination and developed a CCO exercise that includes role players from other agencies, non-governmental organizations, and host nations.
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

Outcomes and Agendas

Although it may be too early to evaluate the impact of PDD 56, its approach has promise and includes primary elements (such as the political-military plan, joint training, rehearsals, and ExComm) that have proven successful in earlier operations. For example, in Haiti and to a lesser extent during United Task Force in Somalia, processes contained in the PDD 56 framework had positive results. Policies and procedures outlined in the directive have met the principal objective of enhancing the effectiveness of interagency coordination and management of CCOs. However, despite improving coordination the directive has its weaknesses.

As in any new initiative, PDD 56 needs leadership. Though endorsed by the President, not all civilian and military leaders have bought into the process.4 Key officials in agencies such as the Departments of State and Justice must embrace its concepts and ensure that the right people are trained. Military leaders must adjust their cultural mindsets as well. Lieutenant General Martin Steele, USMC, explained that “a generational shift must occur with interagency training and education.”5 Military leaders from the Chairman and CINCs down must support education and training efforts so that everyone is familiar with interagency processes and ground level procedures to implement PDD 56 concepts. CINCs, with their unique capacity to pull together regional activities, must provide leadership even in a supporting role. They can assist by fostering cultural changes required by the directive. By stepping outside traditional stovepipes, they can help subordinate commanders capitalize on all national capabilities by integrating civilian and military efforts in contingencies. Achieving unity of effort will not be easy, especially during the transitional phase of an operation. As David Bowker explains:

PDD 56 underemphasizes transitional periods and fails to provide an adequate framework for their management. The pol-mil plan presents minimal guidance on how to handle transitions, while the PDD neglects to explain managing an operation as it moves from peacekeeping to peace building. A more compelling question with respect to transitions and long-term issues not addressed in the PDD is how will the ExComm operate in the peace building phase and how can regional specialists play a greater facilitation role?6

There are no institutional mechanisms for integrating regional specialists into a developing...
operation, even though they will be asked to chair the interagency ExComm in the latter stages of peace building. For example, as CCOs move into the peace building phase, functional chairmen must hand off to regional specialists. According to Bowker, “PDD 56 fails to address the civil-military relationship in clear terms. No mention is made to limit military involvement in traditional civilian tasks. Similarly, the directive overemphasizes the military role and downplays the civilian part in the latter stages of peacekeeping and peace building.” Often an operation loses continuity because no formal process facilitates such a transfer of leadership. Although some consider it as the most important phase, PDD 56 misses an opportunity to provide guidance for crisis recovery (peace building), which requires a coordinated effort across a range of issues including funding, logistics, political will, commitment of time, and understanding host nation customs, laws, and culture. Part of crisis recovery may include providing food, water, shelter, medical care, housing for refugees, and utility/infrastructure repairs. Unless such tasks are coordinated, a region could be thrown back into crisis.

Operation Allied Force in Serbia and neighboring states provides a compelling argument for expanding PDD 56 to include combat operations. Since the end of the Cold War most CCOs have had the potential to erupt in violence. In Somalia, better interagency coordination might have prevented mission creep and combat operations against General Aideed. In Haiti, a combat operation turned into a peaceful intervention at the eleventh hour. In Kosovo, when diplomacy failed to create a solution, NATO resorted to force. PDD 56 should be expanded to govern interagency coordination for combat as well as peace operations. No civilian agency has the right to put its stamp of approval on campaign plans developed by CINCs once a decision has been made to use force. However, every combat operation will require interagency coordination. For example, refugees and displaced persons have an impact on other nations in any given region while information operations affect the overall effort, not just military considerations. The need to include combat operations is especially salient when allowing for the fuzzy lines that separate peace and combat operations in today’s world.

The following recommendations are intended to overcome the barriers which are preventing governmental agencies from implementing this directive:

- integrate the PDD 56 process into service colleges and other agency training curricula
- provide presidential-directed funding for interagency training and exercises
- increase leadership support from senior civilian and military officials
- expand the scope of the directive to include combat as well as peace operations.

PDD 56 is vital in dealing with complex contingency operations. Although not fully tested, it incorporates proven integrated planning mechanisms that have enhanced interagency efforts. The next administration should maintain the momentum of these efforts by embracing the suggestions discussed above. Perhaps Congress will establish a continuing requirement which calls on every agency of government to adopt the reforms that are contained in this directive. One can only trust that progress made to date will not be swept away.

NOTES

2 Jennifer M. Tase, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1997), p. 8.
6 Bowker, “New Management,” p. 64.
7 Ibid., p. 65.
The Pentagon institutionalized planning for shaping forces and other assets for peacetime engagement in 1997. It organizes such efforts through theater engagement plans. First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense prioritizes its regional objectives in Contingency Planning Guidance. In turn, the Chairman develops a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and then formally tasks CINCs and executive agents to produce their respective plans.

Overall the results of shaping have been positive. The fact that the noncombat use of forces is systematically evaluated bodes well. Militaries have always had political and policy applications. Shaping merely recognizes that reality and seeks to exploit it. That said, a number of issues have been raised as part of the more systematic use of shaping by DOD, and the current system could do with some revision.

Regional Focus
An analysis of global shaping activities reveals that regional differentiation is fundamental. Regions, even countries, require unique shaping strategies and programs. However, it seems that the planning process for theater engagement falls
short of developing coherent and unique regional strategies. For example, there is significant inertia and logrolling. Although regional CINCs have authority over an entire area of responsibility (AOR), they must rely on component commands, the services, and defense agencies to carry out theater engagement plans. Because organizations have their own requirements and preferences, commanders can be presented with conflicting proposed activities of varying utility. Unless they are willing to invest great time and energy in the process, elements of the plan will reflect bureaucratic compromise rather than realistic needs.

A review of political-military situations suggests that each region has shaping needs that cannot be met by a supply-push process driven by service components and functional commands. Asia and the Pacific. This region is an obvious candidate for confidence building measures and military transparency. Mutual suspicion among smaller states and concerns over the intentions and capabilities of China, Japan, North Korea, and India place this area at risk for both arms races and spiraling cycles of tension. Planning by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) should underscore multilateral instruments and activities that improve transparency, if not ties, among Asian nations.

Central Europe. New frontiers on the continent present different issues to U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The militaries in this region are well developed and most are oriented on the West. However, they are influenced by the legacy of the Warsaw Pact in doctrine and equipment. Moreover, not unlike the United States, they are interested in bolstering defenses against any future threats from the former Soviet Union. One objective of EUCOM theater engagement is improved interoperability with militaries in Central Europe. Combined exercises and education thus assume priority in the theater engagement plan.

The other important planning issue relates to conflicts emerging from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which pose continuing challenges to the stability of Southeastern Europe and NATO. To cope with these demands, EUCOM has focused on building the defense capabilities of nations in the surrounding area. In addition, encouraging participation in future combined operations under the Atlantic Alliance or through a coalition of the willing has made continuing ties, trust, and access into crucial issues for the command engagement plans.

Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though the Nation does not have many vital interests in either Latin America or Africa south of the Sahara, stability in these regions is relevant because it reduces the likelihood that the Armed Forces will be called on to intervene in the future, whether in armed conflict or humanitarian relief. Modest engagement could go a long way toward limiting the need for such operations. The key issue for enhancing stability is the professionalism of foreign militaries. Because these regions have been traditionally characterized by an inordinate number of coups, efforts by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Persian Gulf should be focused on continued access to those facilities. The need for interoperability in coalitions makes combined exercises a priority. CENTCOM to consider confidence building measures and promoting professionalism in nascent military organizations. Finally, the need exists in South Asia for PACOM and CENTCOM to consider confidence building and transparency to reduce tension between India and Pakistan.

Discrimination and Sufficiency

Another aspect of theater engagement is determining how much is needed. Because many of its benefits only emerge over the mid to long term, it is difficult to gauge what is a sufficient for shaping. Moreover, there are clear limits to effectiveness. Because general considerations such as stability of a government or defense of a given nation are determined by many factors, military-to-military engagement should be expected to accomplish only so much. Determining the sufficiency of shaping requires great sensitivity to conditions in target countries.

The significance of context was demonstrated in Albania and Poland, two nations located in the same region that benefited from extensive engagement in the 1990s. But the results for these countries differed markedly. Under the tenure of Secretary of Defense
William Perry, Albania was the recipient of a generous engagement program. Yet many gains were lost when the government collapsed because of a failed pyramid scheme. As a result, a national military establishment which the United States had been engaging essentially disappeared. By contrast, engagement programs were integral in helping the Polish military by reinforcing its increasingly westward orientation and preparing it for NATO membership. Although Poland was more advanced militarily than Albania, the more critical difference related to the stability and reform character of the Polish government.

Measuring Results

Despite the overriding importance of context, shaping should strive for common measures of effectiveness. Although the theater engagement process is designed to translate regional policy objectives into concrete plans, the experience to date demonstrates that this approach is difficult to apply. The problem appears to be balancing the latitude given theater engagement planners to craft appropriate programs with concrete policy guidance. In particular, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy generates prioritized regional objectives to guide engagement planning. But in deferring to CINCAs as the best means of addressing these objectives, not much specificity is provided.

The problem that emerges is evaluating progress of an engagement plan for the entire year. One general officer visit or ship port call is likely to support broadly stated goals. For example, respect for human rights or improved civil-military relations are ideals that exceed the ability of a single program. The same is true for objectives such as improving military professionalism. Progress in such areas often combines programs conducted over many years.

One solution is a two-tiered system for evaluating shaping. The first tier measure of merit should address how a program succeeded or failed. The second tier of evaluation should relate to broader engagement aims. For example, improving the ability of host country militaries—such as through combined exercises or the African crisis response initiative—should be appraised as the product of a general strategy rather than a particular effort. A model exists in the Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations. Generated by the Department of State to describe proposed activities for the following fiscal year, the presentation provides specific measures of merit for each program.

Policy Guidance

As the United States increasingly relies on the Armed Forces to conduct programs which have policy relevance, they should be linked to defense and foreign policy on a global, regional, and especially national basis. The theater engagement process does not consistently include policy guidance on any of these levels.

One problem in the process is continuing strain in the defense establishment. Even though the Goldwater-Nichols Act benefitted military planning, it created tension on policy issues among theater commanders, the Joint Staff, and the defense secretariat. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with providing defense policy guidance, CINCAs are effectively czars in their AORs. As a result, there is tension between the two. Indeed, OSD possesses much of the institutional knowledge of various regions. Because planners at regional commands tend to work on two-year rotations, they lack sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and expertise that action officers in the defense secretariat can develop by following one region for many years. Nevertheless, even if differences do exist over policy between OSD and CINCAs, the process is biased in favor of unified commanders. Although extremely controversial issues might go to the Secretary or Chairman for arbitration, the views of CINCAs or the Joint Staff prevail in most cases.

The solution to this problem would involve revising the planning process to require OSD to
provide more specific guidance at the onset towards formulation of specific national, regional, and theater level objectives. Arguably, the Secretary should go beyond vague priorities and guidance to identify particular objectives and programs for protecting sealines in each year’s plans. Second, OSD should take a greater systematic role in formulating the activities in annexes. While specific activities pursued regionally are primarily the responsibility of CINCs, the political-military effects of shaping necessitates systematic OSD participation in planning.

While incorporating policy guidance from the defense secretariat in engagement plans could improve the existing process, it would not be a panacea. The process also lacks a systematic way of coordinating plans with the Department of State. One peculiarity of the post-Cold War period is that while foreign policy is principally the responsibility of the Department of State, DOD has much more call on resources to affect it. This disconnect has historically been solved partly through the foreign operations budget, which is controlled by the Department of State. However the expansion of defense shaping efforts to include items from its operations budget allows the Armed Forces to exercise great influence.

Forcing Trade-Offs

Another shortfall in the current process is that it does not compel hard trade-offs between theaters, activities, or strategies. In particular, though the process allows for engagement planning to be harmonized and rationalized into a family of plans, it appears that neither the Chairman nor the Joint Staff has yet taken on this task. Integrating the plans into an overall plan would provide an ideal opportunity to evaluate the global picture for shaping—to balance interests, strategies, objectives, and resources. For example,
this part of the process appears to be the logical candidate for determining whether DOD is devoting an appropriate level of resources to Europe, Asia, and Latin America. It is also an excellent opportunity to balance calls for current shaping with the need to maintain force readiness.

Yet current implementation falls short of providing effective program management. Instead the Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, seems to gather various plans and their activity annexes in a single document without imposing any trade-offs. Assuredly, there are good reasons for the lack of strong oversight. First, the Joint Staff is ill suited to evaluate trade-offs between policy objectives in a given region. Secondly, because any hard choices would require that the Joint Staff challenge a three-star staff officer and four-star unified combatant commander—it is hard to imagine the Joint Staff winning a bureaucratic row regardless of the strength of its case. Thus far the Chairman has demonstrated no keen interest in weighing in on such matters. Given other strategic and defense policy issues, few situations will motivate CJCS to take on CINCs in matters concerning their AORs. Moreover, he would not necessarily find allies among commanders who probably find combined defense of their privileges more critical than marginal gains over one another in shaping. In sum, although the process should be used to allocate resources, there are obstacles to realizing that potential.

The "Lost" Policy

A final problem with the current theater engagement plan process regards the lost countries—Russia, Canada, and Mexico—which do not fall into any AOR. The Joint Staff J-5 regional offices write the theater engagement plan for them. This poses problems. First, the Joint Staff does not possess the same systematic insight into a particular region as fully engaged CINCs. In addition, Joint Staff officers are less versed than their unified command counterparts in regional issues. Nor do they control the instruments these commands could bring to bear.

Second, the Joint Staff—directed by a three-star general/flag officer—lacks the bureaucratic muscle to command adequate resources for its proposed shaping programs. Although the current practice of deferring influence to the CINCs is problematic from a policy perspective, it has virtues from a defense resources perspective. In particular, the same factors that make a CINC’s influence problematic also ensure that his shaping program would be provided with sufficient resources. A three-star general [executive agent] on the Joint Staff is much less able to argue the case for shaping programs over the desires of four-star regional commanders.

These features would not necessarily be problems if the countries in question ranked relatively low on the scale of U.S. interests. But Russia or Mexico could have great impact on security. Russia, the one country that might still challenge the United States on the strategic nuclear level, is also one of the few without a CINC charged with rationalizing a shaping strategy towards it. Although the defense challenges are different with Mexico, the irony remains that a country sharing a 1,920 mile border and a range of migration and drug trafficking issues with the United States does not merit a four-star general to formulate and integrate defense policy.

Comparing the planning process and outcomes for lost countries with those for Albania or Benin is striking. In the latter case, CINCs are charged with making sure that country engagement programs are properly resourced. Moreover, the blessing of CINCs provides protection—real or imagined—over a particular engagement plan. The sanction of a flag rank officer on the Joint Staff cannot hope to accomplish the same. We are moving in the right direction with shaping and theater engagement planning. Implementation, however, is not keeping pace. Moreover, as DOD
takes a larger role in foreign policy, serious questions remain about how its policies and programs are synchronized with the Department of State and the interagency community.

Implications for Force Planners

Current readiness and tempo problems underscore the tension between shaping responsibilities, contingency and crisis response demands, and wartime readiness requirements. Can DOD better plan for shaping activities? Should shaping requirements be considered explicitly in force structure planning and budgeting? As the next defense review approaches, these questions need to be assessed to ensure that our forces have the resources to support shaping objectives.

Planning for shaping requires full accounting of costs and benefits. While many advantages of shaping are impossible to quantify, the resources required to perform these missions should be easier to determine. A cursory review, however, reveals a confusing number of funding sources and accounts in the Departments of Defense and State, regional commands, services, and other agencies. To increase the transparency of funding, organizations supporting shaping efforts should report budget information through a central source, such as the Congressional Presentation Document on Foreign Operations. Understanding true costs would help the services, component commands, and CINCs measure effectiveness, target resources, and make trade-offs. Theater engagement could also help manage the operational tempo of forces in peacetime. When preparing CINC operations and exercise agendas, planners could integrate requirements for either contingencies or other operations into existing force planning efforts such as contingency scheduling conducted on the component command and service levels. Specific units could be named in the plan rather than just desired capabilities. While much of this is performed informally, making the process systematic by using existing command and control networks would provide defense leadership a master list of near-term requirements.

This process would identify where specific commands or forces would be committed to contingencies and readiness events or overtaxed by multiple taskings. Coordinating this planning would also identify in advance the personnel or units that will be in high demand in the next year. That would allow services to increase the availability of such units, prepare them for deployment, or identify substitutions to meet shaping needs. Trade-offs could be made between desired efforts and those feasible under readiness and tempo guidelines. More fundamentally, units could know far in advance when they are scheduled for a shaping event.

The theater engagement plan process shows great promise in rationalizing and disciplining efforts to conduct meaningful, focused, and productive peacetime engagement. Yet the process needs refinement to fashion a system that is more responsive to both CINC and interagency needs. Military capabilities must be scrutinized and reformed to achieve the optimum balance between shaping and warfighting capabilities. The current process gets a passing grade, but there is much room for improvement.

This process would identify where specific commands or forces would be committed to contingencies and readiness events or overtaxed by multiple taskings. Coordinating this planning would also identify in advance the personnel or units that will be in high demand in the next year. That would allow services to increase the availability of such units, prepare them for deployment, or identify substitutions to meet shaping needs. Trade-offs could be made between desired efforts and those feasible under readiness and tempo guidelines. More fundamentally, units could know far in advance when they are scheduled for a shaping event.
The Armed Forces are increasingly being called upon to intervene in complex emergencies. The requirements for personnel, resources, and readiness, in particular in military operations other than war, demand a more proactive approach to threat reduction. Necessity will drive earlier and smarter interventions aimed at accomplishing the same long-term goals as current involvements but with fewer assets and less commitment. This article argues that it is time to reconsider a tool rarely used in peacetime military engagement, the full-time military advisor. It proposes advisory efforts for two nations in the Pacific region. Early preventive intervention in such states could efficiently accomplish long-term security objectives.

National military strategy refers to early intervention as shaping the environment, but thus far this approach has not proven very successful. From drugs to terrorism to nuclear proliferation, the world is becoming more dangerous. Yet the role of military advisors in providing host country militaries with the means to combat such threats commands little attention. The legacy of Vietnam, coupled with concern over force protection, makes many civilian officials and senior officers wary of sending advisors in harm’s way.

As a result, the United States is missing out on opportunities to help unstable nations not be-
come failed states. Sri Lanka and Cambodia are cases in point. Both are democratic countries with societies which exhibit varying degrees of pluralism. Governmental institutions in Sri Lanka are older and have greater stability and legitimacy. The concept of a professional military operating under civilian control is more firmly established. By contrast, democracy only recently arrived in Cambodia via U.N.-sponsored elections in 1993. Cambodian society suffered a setback in 1997 when one of its co-prime ministers forced the other from office by employing one military fac-

tion against another. An election in 1998 put the country back on a democratic track. Although it is uncertain that Prime Minister Hun Sen will step down if defeated at the polls, the potential for real democracy exists. Both countries face problems, but when considered together they illustrate the need for early intervention to deal with transnational threats under diverse circumstances.

Sri Lanka: A Nation at War

Sri Lanka, a country of 18 million people, is beset by a bloody insurgency.¹ The Sinhalese are its dominant ethnic group. Buddhists make up 75 percent of the population, including most of the Sinhalese, but feel threatened by the larger Tamil population of southern India. In Sri Lanka the Tamils, who are mostly Hindus, form 13 percent of the population. The conflict originally involved various groups advocating a Tamil homeland (Tamil Eelam), but that movement today is being carried out by just one group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has been fighting since the early 1980s. Once avowedly Marxist, LTTE now downplays ideology. It seeks an independent socialist state. The government has responded with legislation and structures that allow limited local autonomy but it has been unwilling to go farther. Any effort to establish a de facto partition of the country would bring swift electoral retribution against the party in power, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who narrowly won reelection some three days after she lost an eye in an LTTE assassination attempt in December 1999.

Tamil Tigers operate ocean-going vessels that are capable of mounting interdiction operations

The present conflict follows a typical pattern of insurgency, with some events dominated by conventional operations and others by guerrilla warfare. LTTE regularly uses terror and suicide bombings which led the United States and Britain to categorize it as a terrorist organization. This group has engaged in international acts of terrorism, including the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the Indian southern state of Tamil Nadu in May 1991. Recent Indian press reports claim that combined training and coordination is being conducted between LTTE and insurgents in northeastern India. Tamil Tigers operate ocean-going vessels that are capable of reaching Thailand and Cambodia to purchase weapons and ammunition on the black market and mounting interdiction operations against the Sri Lankan navy. They fund their movement through contributions gathered from Tamils living abroad and by exporting drugs and arms. For instance, Canadian officials told the press in 1996 that LTTE was raising up to $1 million a month through criminal activities in that country, including the sale of heroin and guns.

Thus LTTE presents a threefold transnational threat. First, it could spread terrorism to both the United States and Western Europe. Second, it can continue to engage in smuggling drugs and weapons abroad. Third, it can destabilize India not only through the insurgent connection but by transferring operations from Sri Lanka to Tamil Nadu, the home of 55 million Tamils.

Cambodia: In Search of a Stable Future

After thirty years of conflict, Cambodia has less of a security problem than Sri Lanka.² The genocidal Khmer Rouge is no longer in power. And there are other promising signs. Politically, the Kingdom of Cambodia took its place as the tenth and last member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999. Domestically, it formed a coalition government which is now in its second year. The Department of State recognized the 1998 elections as a peaceful and orderly process which was free from intimidation. More than 90 percent of those eligible voted, and 60 percent chose a party other than the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

However, Cambodia is not without challenges. While democracy is taking hold, respect for human rights is poor and the rule of law barely exists. Security forces, including both the military and the police, are not professional organizations. They engage in illegal activities with impunity, and over a hundred unresolved extrajudicial killings date to factional fighting in 1997. As previously mentioned, weapons and ammunition from Cambodia have found their way to insurgents in Sri Lanka, including SA–7 antiaircraft missiles. The problem is serious enough that in 1999 the foreign minister of Sri Lanka went to Cambodia and Thailand seeking cooperation to halt this transnational threat. Other insurgent

² http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/13455.htm

¹ http://www.state.gov/t/22400.htm
groups buy arms on the Cambodian black market. In late 1999 Thai security forces reported intercepting two SA–7s and ammunition which originated in Cambodia bound for the United Wa State Army, the dominant Burmese narco-trafficking group in the Golden Triangle.

In addition to the trade in arms Cambodia is a leading producer of marijuana, with a porous coast used to transship heroin and other drugs from the Golden Triangle. The United States lists the country as a significant drug supplier and Vietnam has reported a steady increase in attempts to smuggle marijuana, heroin, and especially methamphetamines in from Cambodia.

Such threats, emanating from an emerging democracy, as well as the moral imperative of restoring civil society in a country where international negligence allowed genocide to run rampant, justify early action. And, given the unprepared Cambodian coastline that serves as a transshipment site for both drugs and guns, LTTE may be a main player in both threats.

Peacetime Engagement

Unlike many states with internal problems that pose a threat to the United States, Sri Lanka and Cambodia are functioning democracies. Even though the rule of law has not fully taken hold in Cambodia as it has in Sri Lanka, there is cause for optimism. Moreover, both have market economies and enjoy healthy trade relations with the United States. And they are legitimate authorities within their respective borders. In accord with U.S. national security objectives—promoting democracy, market economies, human rights, and the reduction of transnational threats—they are candidates for aggressive engagement programs that would help them contain internal problems before they escalate. Traditional engagement activities, including short-term training teams, unit exchanges, and individual training in the United States, have been insufficient against the transnational threats discussed above. Full-time military advisors to help the armed forces of these countries solve their internal problems would be more effective. Diplomatic initiatives to obtain agreement and active participation by the host nations must occur first, but it is unlikely that either country would refuse American assistance toward helping themselves.

Neither Sri Lanka nor Cambodia need military advisors on the same level as South Vietnam in the 1960s. A small number of foreign area officers, Special Forces officers, noncommissioned officers, and functional specialists, serving on permanent change of station assignments under the auspices of a security assistance office, would suffice. Measures of effectiveness tied to goals are critical and are identified below. The key to defeating specific transnational threats is addressing the broader issues of professionalism, force structure, strategy, and operations that combined will not only enable host nations to neutralize threats but make their militaries politically neutral institutions. In the case of Cambodia, enabling its armed forces to contribute to national reconstruction will also help build the economy of one of the poorest countries in the world.

Supporting Sri Lanka

The response to LTTE is led by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF), which are not equal to the task. They are dominated by the army, which has grown from an overall strength of 6,000 and five infantry battalions in 1983 to 120,000 with nine infantry divisions (eighty combat battalions), a navy, and a jet-equipped air force. Rapid expansion without concomitant training has had disastrous consequences.

Strategic direction from the political authorities has never been adequate, although tentative steps began in 1994–95 to develop a national plan. This absence of strategy is matched by a lack of success. SLAF has often lost the initiative, failed
to exploit achievements, spread itself too thin, and made operational blunders. It lacks the ability to formulate and execute joint and combined planning and operations. But it has not as yet developed a theater approach to integrating assets. The mobility to generate combat formations or sustain operations is absent. Commanders do not sufficiently coordinate tactical and operational fires. While they have close air support, including Russian Mi–24 Hind helicopters and Israeli Kfir aircraft, they do not have forward air controllers. In addition, stovepiped intelligence reporting does not benefit tactical commanders. Both tactical and operational logistics are poor, with transport assets too centralized to be responsive. Two small special forces brigades have deteriorated from successful unconventional warfare units into Ranger-type light infantry that conducts an inordinate number of conventional operations. One sign of progress is that SLAF is skilled at civil-military operations and integrating civilian authorities into interagency efforts.

SLAF has weaknesses in doctrine, training, and force development. While a staff college was recently established, the majority of officers have one year or less of formal training. Foreign training is primarily done in India with a small number of officers going to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Britain, and the United States. There are branch schools, but in-unit training is the norm. Because of the rapid growth of the army, few officers have any expertise in planning and coordinating large operations. There is no intelligence school. Operational demands necessitated by war have made training and education a second priority.

Overall, SLAF is a professional military—human rights violations, common in the 1980s, are declining—but after 18 years its tactical and operational successes have come to naught because of the lack of an overarching strategic concept to bring the conflict to a close.

U.S. military advisors in Sri Lanka should focus on preparation of strategy, operational planning, and assistance in functional skills augmented by instruction by Special Operations Forces on specific tactical skills such as air assault, naval infiltration, and counternaual infiltration.

There is also a need for doctrine development that ties functional skills into a battle-focused training system. The goal would be defeat of LTTE in three years and the withdrawal of advisors within five. Measures of effectiveness could include:

- adopting a national security and military strategy within six months
- developing a combined plan with India to prevent use of Tamil Nadu as a rebel base

Spring 2000 / JFQ 107
Cambodian Security Challenges

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) is an amalgam of 100,000 personnel drawn from four former protagonists: the State of Cambodia (Kampuchea) army which was formed by Vietnam during its occupation from 1979 to 1989, the Khmer Rouge which surrendered and was integrated into the national army between 1996 and 1999, republican forces which fought the State of Cambodia between 1979 and 1989; and royalist units which also opposed the government. The most powerful are former State of Cambodia officers who remain politicized. Many are members of the ruling party, some generals are on the party’s central committee, and a number of officers are loyal to the prime minister rather than to the constitution or the king.

Annual funding for RCAF is only $214 million, 35 percent of the modest national budget. Operationally, the service chiefs report to a commander in chief, currently an army officer, who reports to the minister of defense. In addition to the army, navy, and air force, there is a French-trained and equipped national police force or gendarmerie. It is part of the ministry of defense but performs civil duties. It has been implicated in drug running and illegal taxation (literally re-sorting to highway robbery).

The salary of Cambodian privates is $18 and 22.5 kilograms of rice per month. Typically soldiers receive the rice, but the pay may be three months late. A general officer officially receives $40 per month, but special allowances vary from $500 to $1,000. Most officers run businesses to survive. New lieutenants come from a small military academy. There is also a barely functioning noncommissioned officers academy. A staff college runs a mandatory three-month course for all field grade officers. Branches conduct basic training for both enlisted personnel and officers. All administration for the force of 100,000 is done by pencil and paper. There are fewer than a dozen computers in the military and no facsimile machine. A dozen officers train in France each year and a smaller number in Indonesia, Malaysia, and more recently China. The United States suspended training for RCAF in July 1997. The HIV rate in the armed forces is between 4 and 8 percent.

U.S. military advisors in Cambodia should focus on developing professionalism

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) is an amalgam of 100,000 personnel drawn from four former protagonists: the State of Cambodia (Kampuchea) army which was formed by Vietnam during its occupation from 1979 to 1989, the Khmer Rouge which surrendered and was integrated into the national army between 1996 and 1999, republican forces which fought the State of Cambodia between 1979 and 1989; and royalist units which also opposed the government. The most powerful are former State of Cambodia officers who remain politicized. Many are members of the ruling party, some generals are on the party’s central committee, and a number of officers are loyal to the prime minister rather than to the constitution or the king.

Annual funding for RCAF is only $214 million, 35 percent of the modest national budget. Operationally, the service chiefs report to a commander in chief, currently an army officer, who
A possible advisory force that could assist with these goals is shown in figure 2.

Employing full-time military advisors will require adjustments in the conduct of preemptive engagement. Even though CINCs can deploy advisors using operations and maintenance funds, the preferred approach is security assistance or foreign military financing grant credits earmarked by Congress. Credits would fund countries like Sri Lanka and Cambodia that cannot afford the cost. Today, the major recipients of credits are Israel, Egypt, and countries in Eastern Europe. As transnational threats increase and preemptive action becomes necessary this allocation will change.

Within the interagency process, it is vital that the objectives of military advisory efforts are detailed in theater engagement plans developed by CINCs and mission performance plans prepared by U.S. embassies. The language used in these plans should be identical, with the same objectives incorporated into both types of plans and detailed right down to individual advisory positions.

The stigma of military advisory efforts is unwarranted when compared with their potential benefit. The fear of involvement in another Vietnam led Congress to outlaw advisors in Cambodia in 1970. But future threats are not declining in either complexity or number. Such efforts offer a cost-effective, efficient mechanism for defeating threats before they call for contingency operations. Countries such as Cambodia and Sri Lanka may manage their problems indefinitely, but while the survival of these states may not be threatened, the danger to other countries, including the United States, is growing.

An effective preventive engagement program for countries at risk would go a long way in minimizing the danger from transnational threats and contributing to democratization.

Figure 2. Proposed Advisory Responsibilities in Cambodia

The ten military personnel required for this effort include:

- O3/O4—advises joint staff on national security strategy, national military strategy, defense organization, and professionalization; also teaches at armed forces staff college and command and general staff college
- O4/O5—advises joint staff and training bureau on organization and theater engagement activities; also teaches at armed forces staff college and command and general staff college
- O4/O5—serves as senior advisor to joint staff on organization, demobilization, downsizing, budget reform, pay system reform, and automation
- O3, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer—advises on reorganization, demobilization, downsizing, budget reform, pay system reform, and automation
- O3/O4, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer—advises engineer command on civil engineering, road building, and demining
- O3/O4—advises health command on medical training with emphasis on basic medical skills and preventive medicine
- O4/O5—serves as senior advisor to navy on coastal patrolling, drug interdiction, and environmental protection
- O3/O4 or petty officer—advises navy on inland waterway patrolling
- O3/O4 or noncommissioned officer—advises deputy chief of general staff for civil affairs on reintegrating former Khmer Rouge units; plays critical role in integrating military civic action with non-governmental organization activities and information operations; augmented by active and Reserve component temporary civil affairs personnel.
- O3/O4—serves as legal advisor to judge advocate general on drafting a code of military justice and getting code passed into law, reforming military court system, and training military lawyers; also teaches human rights, law of land warfare, and military law classes at armed forces staff college and command and general staff college.

- demobilizing the armed forces to a manageable end strength of no more than 50,000 (with savings going to fund other reforms)
- reorganizing administration through automation together with increasing military pay and depositing the salaries of soldiers on time through direct deposits to bank accounts
- improving health care for soldiers with simple preventive medicine (mosquito nets, hand-washing, and condoms)
- introducing naval policing of illegal fishing and interdicting drug and arms traffickers
- dedicating engineer command to horizontal construction and demining with priority on building and re-habilitating secondary roads to connect remote and poor areas which traditionally are bases for insurgents.

NOTES

1 Information on Sri Lanka comes from open sources and interviews with Michael Poore, former U.S. defense attaché to Sri Lanka; Mahesh Senanayake, former commander of the Sri Lanka 3rd Special Forces Regiment; and Thomas Marks, a Sri Lanka specialist and author of Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1996).

2 Information on Cambodia is drawn from open sources and the author’s experiences as CINCPAC defense programs officer in that country from 1996 to 1999 as well as temporary duty as a U.N. military observer in 1993.
IN OCTOBER 1979, the head of Korean Central Intelligence assassinated President Park Chung-hee. At midnight on December 12, 1979—in what became known as the “12/12 incident”—a coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan overthrew the civilian government under Choi Kyu-ha. Five months later bloody protests erupted in Kwangju. During this period of violence and unrest American and South Korean troops warily watched the demilitarized zone (DMZ), fearful that Pyongyang might exploit instability in Seoul as an invitation for aggression. General John Wickham, the U.S. and combined forces commander on the scene, now has recounted his role in those turbulent events in a new book, Korea on the Brink: From the “12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–1980. The following excerpt describes the reaction of a commander in chief when faced with a military coup by an ally.

A Countercoup Declined

It was early morning when the visitor was ushered into my office in the Combined Forces Command headquarters. His visit was unexpected, which was unusual because Koreans rarely show up unannounced. Although I had known him for several months, our official contacts were infrequent and seldom on a personal basis.

He was a lieutenant general stationed in Seoul, impressive-looking and, from what I knew...
about him, well-connected in the army. His English was fluent enough that he did not need an interpreter, and he specifically asked that none attend our meeting. We talked alone with the door closed for more than half an hour. It was obvious that he wanted to speak in confidentiality. After a short period of candid talk about the existing situation and the North Korean threat, he asked if he could speak frankly about the incident on December 12. When I told him he could, he bluntly asked if the “Americans would be prepared to support a countercoup. The purpose of this countercoup would be to eject Major General Chun Doo-hwan and his group of supporters and restore power to legitimate civil and military authorities.” He said he “spoke for an important faction within the military that was very upset with events and what they might portend for the future.” Leaning closer, he said he “was deadly serious with the proposal and did you understand it?”

I was astonished. Only a few days earlier General Lee Hyoung-keon, the former Chairman of the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me that Americans would be the last people to get any reliable information about the possibilities of insurgent action. This was more than information; it was advance warning.

Before responding, I took a moment to think through the ramifications. As a minimum, his group obviously wanted a tacit go-ahead for their endeavor, and it probably wanted an assurance that the United States would withhold the kind of withering criticism that was being heaped on Chun. But perhaps he and his faction wanted more than political support. Perhaps, just in case things went awry, they wanted an assurance that U.S. forces would intervene on their behalf.

Obviously, I could not speak for the U.S. Government or Ambassador to Korea Bill Gleysteen. But we had already come close to civil war on the night of December 12. The general’s offer reopened that possibility with its inherent dangers, both for America to become caught between several contending factions and for North Korea to exploit the situation. I was tempted to ask him about his military faction, the scope and nature of their plan, and their specific goals, but such questions might have been misinterpreted as more than passing interest on my part.

I told him that “the United States is not in the business of supporting coups and absolutely would not support any counteraction by the military faction he represented or any other faction.” He paused for a moment, apparently to be sure that he fully understood, and then awkwardly thanked me for the opportunity to discuss such important matters. His face and manner revealed his disappointment, but he expressed his appreciation for my unequivocal answer. When I escorted him out of the building we parted amicably.

I probably should have consulted with Bill Gleysteen and my military superiors before I answered him, but I thought any delay might be misconstrued as interest. As soon as he was gone, though, I briefed Bill on the secure phone. He agreed with what I had done, but we wondered whether my response was enough to stop the general’s faction dead in its tracks and, even if it was, whether other factions would appear in the months to come. CIA station chief Bob Brewster and his operatives had surfaced any number of reports of unrest within the military over Chun’s actions.

In hindsight, I suppose a critical argument could be made that by spurning the proposed countercoup, we were thrust into the position of tacitly supporting Chun and his group. It was U.S. policy not to do so at the time, but rather to keep Chun at arm’s length and to deal only with...
the legitimate authorities, although the faction the general represented undoubtedly perceived my response as a vote of support for Chun.

There were a great many what ifs. Perhaps the general and his faction were sincere in their promise to restore civilian leadership and the constitutional process, in which case my response was antithetical to the Carter administration’s avid desire to advance the democratization of South Korea.

But the reality was that we knew nothing about this particular faction. Another reality was that it would have been wrong to meddle in our ally’s political fate. We could protest and cajole, but a direct intervention or an alliance with an internal conspiracy was out of bounds.

Bob Brewster visited a few days later for one of our regular weekly meetings. Bill Clevstein had already told him about my meeting with the general who represented the countercoup faction, and Bob said he was in complete agreement with my response. Aside from the other considerations, if Chun were to discover U.S. support for an effort to overthrow him, we would face real trouble.

Bob then went on to point out that Chun was the “only horse in town and we have to work with him, even if it has to be at arm’s length.” He said, “We have to do our best to assure that Chun’s movement toward total control over the political structure, if that’s what Chun intends, is accomplished in legitimate ways and without jeopardizing domestic stability or provoking a North Korean intervention.”

He said he recognized that U.S. policy was to avoid any actions that implied an endorsement of Chun or what he had done, but it was still “absolutely essential to maintain an open dialogue with Chun and his cohorts.” Chun could not be ignored since he had already moved with surprising swiftness to grasp control over the army chief of staff. Of course they did not know Chun and were therefore suspicious. Bob answered that he had developed a close relationship with Chun—not close enough to have been.warned in advance of Chun’s move on December 12, but close enough that the two frequently consulted on important matters. He offered me that channel if I ever needed it.

Chun restricts contacts with U.S. officials

Chun must have realized that pockets of resistance were forming inside the military. Instructions were issued from Defense Security Command (DSC) headquarters to all its agents to report immediately on any unusual meetings, secret gatherings, or comments by senior officers that hinted at resistance to Chun. Officers known to have been loyal to the recently arrested army chief of staff, General Chung Sung-hwa (who had been implicated by Chun in the assassination plot), were to be watched closely, and those holding command positions were to be replaced as soon as possible with officers loyal to Chun. That was one of the first instructions given to the new army chief of staff, General Lee Hee-sung.

Chun also seemed to recognize that the Americans might be approached by potential countercoup groups, so he issued blanket instructions that all high-level contacts with American officials were to be cleared with the DSC. Hidden tape recorders were to be used at all high-level meetings, and the transcriptions were to be reviewed by key officers in the DSC. Any suspicious items were to be reported directly to Chun. Also, he instructed that all official sedans would have their windows blackened so observers on the streets and potential assassins could not see who was inside. Chun was taking no chances.

My office was notified that it was time for a routine reassignment for my ROK army aide. A new aide, an ROK army lieutenant colonel, began work right away. After a few weeks he was observed rifling through some in-boxes in the outer office, obviously searching for information. We had him checked and it turned out he was a DSC officer and had been making secret reports on his observations. Afterward we made certain that all office correspondence and sensitive conversations were shielded from him and that no important discussions were held in the official sedan or the command helicopter when he was present.

Tactical seminars on Korean defense

I held several lengthy discussions with the key American military leaders in Korea to obtain their sensing of the situation and how we should redirect the military’s attention toward security matters. Included in these discussions were my level-headed deputy, Lieutenant General Evan Rosencrans, USAF; Major General Robert Kingston, USA, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division; Major General Kenneth Dohleman, USA,
Wickham served as the senior American officer in Korea during 1979 and 1980. He commanded four distinct organizations which encompassed every aspect of alliance, coalition, joint, and service component command. That framework continues to this day and includes:

- **Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.** In response to the invasion of South Korea, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 84 naming the United States as executive agent for military operations. During the height of the conflict the command included forces from 22 nations. Despite the Korean Armistice Agreement, which was signed in July 1953 by U.N. Command (UNC) and the Chinese-North Korean Command, the resolution and the U.S. command responsibilities remained unchanged. In 1955, UNC headquarters were relocated from Tokyo to Seoul.

- **United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command.** A combined operational planning staff was developed in 1968 as an adjunct to multinational, joint, and service commands that already existed. By 1971 the staff had evolved into an integrated field army headquarters. In 1978, as a result of bilateral agreement for the planned withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces, the headquarters was formally reorganized as a combined staff. The ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) became an integrated combined warfighting headquarters, controlling both U.S. and ROK forces in the theater of operations. The withdrawal of American forces was put on hold in 1979 and then canceled in 1981; however, the CFC command structure stayed in place. Today, throughout the command, binational Manning is apparent: if the position of chief of a staff is Korean, the deputy is an American officer, and vice versa. This structure exists in component commands as well as headquarters. Currently, CFC includes over 600,000 active duty personnel.

- **Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.** At the outbreak of the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur served as Commander in Chief, Far East, which included all land, sea, and air forces located in the western Pacific area of Far East Command with headquarters in Japan. In 1954, the command was redesignated Headquarters, Armed Forces Far East/Eighth Army (Rear). In the reorganization of the Pacific Armed Forces in 1957, Far East Command and Armed Forces Far East stood down. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was formed in Seoul to coordinate planning among U.S. component commands and exercises operational control of assigned forces as directed by commander in chief, Pacific. Today USFK also coordinates U.S. military assistance to South Korean forces, functions as defense representative in Korea, and oversees U.S. government administrative coordination. Its component commands are Eighth U.S. Army, U.S. Air Forces Korea, U.S. Air Forces Korea, and U.S. Marine Forces Korea, and U.S. Special Operations Command Korea.

- **Commander, Eighth U.S. Army.** Originally deployed to the Pacific area in 1944, Eighth Army provided most of the ground forces for the occupation of Japan following World War II. In 1950 it deployed to Korea for the defense of the Pusan perimeter, the counterattack after the Inchon landings, the offensive in North Korea, and the reestablishment of the demilitarized zone. In 1954 its headquarters were combined with U.S. Army Forces Far East as a major command. This headquarters was moved to Seoul in 1955. Later redesignated as Eighth U.S. Army, the command is the Army component of USFK with 36,000 soldiers including the 2nd Infantry Division.

Nearly all of us agreed that the ROK military needed to be less absorbed with intrigue in Seoul and more with professional matters. I was struck, however, by the fact that Forrester was less troubled than the others by what he observed in the ROK military. He insisted that he had not sensed any undue concerns about the intrigues in Seoul and that the senior ROK officers he had daily contact with were not overly alarmed by Chun’s actions. In fact, he believed that many of them strongly supported Chun. He implied that the United States should be more understanding of the situation.
Gene’s views surprised me. I knew that two of his corps commanders, Yu Hak-san and newly designated corps commander Kim Yoon-ho, were participants in “the 12/12 Incident.” Yu had been much more directly involved than Kim, but both were part of Chun’s clique. Gene undoubtedly was being barraged with daily justifications about why Chun and his group had acted as they did and why they could be trusted. Still I was both- ered and shortly afterward shared Gene’s views with Bill Gleztein. He was equally surprised.

The result of these meetings with my U.S. leaders was an idea for CFC to hold “tactical seminars” over several months at each army corps and tactical air wing and at the naval base at Chinhae. Forrester wholeheartedly agreed and suggested that the seminars should begin in his command in early 1980. The stated purpose was to review our war plans and identify areas that needed improvement. An equally important purpose was to get the ROK military to “face north,” to become focused on their war plans and our preparations for war.

We decided to start with Lieutenant General Kim Yoon-ho’s corps, which occupied a key defensive position in the CFA area of operations. Kim was the Infantry School commander who had been recruited by Chun after the night of the 12th and had just been promoted to three stars. He had a reputation for professional competence, and his experience heading up the Infantry School meant that he should be conversant in the newest military doctrine. We wanted to use Kim first in hopes that he could set an impressive example for the other corps commanders. He did, although there was some criticism among the Korean officers because he conducted a fast-paced seminar completely in English and acted like an overbearing tactical instructor.

The seminars unfolded even better than we hoped. The first day of each began with a terrain walk to study the ground of the battle. The second day focused on how to fight. The seminars improved as we moved among the corps, tactical air wings, and the naval base. The audiences grew as junior officers began to see the seminars as opportunities to acquire greater professional knowledge. The discussions were frank and informal.

One of the last corps seminars was conducted by Lieutenant General Chung Ho-young, one of Chun’s core group. After a few minutes of broader discussion, Chung suggested that the current war plan was seriously flawed because it
it could take up to two months to bring in enough reinforcements to mount a counteroffensive
to bring in enough ammunition and troop reinforcements to mount a continuous counteroffensive. Chung felt that was too long. In a very forceful presentation around tactical maps in the CFA conference room, he proposed that CFC go on the offensive within several weeks of a North Korean attack and not wait for reinforcements. Capitalizing on existing ammunition reserves in Korea, the CFC counteroffensive would be designed to break the momentum of the North's attack by seizing a pocket of high, defensive ground just north of the DMZ.

It was a good point and the CFC plan was eventually altered to accommodate a variant of the option suggested by Chung.

Discussions with the Minister of Defense
Shortly thereafter, I met with the new Minister of Defense, Chu Yong-bok, at the Ministry of National Defense. The entrance still showed the evidence of gunfire from the night of the coup, although workmen were busily replacing tiles and glass doors. In an unusual courtesy Chu met me at the entrance. He was short, affable, and energetic and spoke some English, although like many, he understood it better than he spoke it. Chu had been the ROK air force chief of staff for five years, an unusually long time and an indication that President Park held him in high favor.

It was a lengthy discussion, and Chu smoked continuously, lighting each cigarette with the discarded one. I took that as a sign that he was anxious and noted a tape recorder in operation, even though the interpreter, Mr. Han, was making copious notes.

I began by congratulating him on his appointment. I noted that he enjoyed a fine reputation among U.S. officials for his superb leadership of the ROK air force. He laughed and recounted some humorous “war stories” of his long service in uniform, a career that began when Japan still occupied Korea. I told him that Minister Rho and I had developed a very close relationship, that we had always been frank with one another, and that frankness was essential if we were to achieve a better understanding of each other’s positions on complex issues. As I was telling him I looked forward to establishing a similar relationship with him, he quickly interrupted to say we should meet every week, perhaps even at breakfast or lunch.

Because he had retired from active duty before CFC was created, I explained my roles as CFC commander and senior U.S. military officer. I then reiterated much of what I had told General Lee about our concerns over the December 12 incident and its potential for souring our relationship. Chu listened carefully and smiled often, which struck me as odd but appeared to be a natural part of his manner. He replied, “I am devoted wholeheartedly to reestablishing a firm chain of command system in the military. Throughout my 30 years of service I was dedicated to the principle that military officers should be neutral in political affairs. I will make every effort to assure that this principle is observed in the future.” Laughing, he said he knew how to deal with generals. “Best assured that the generals will behave themselves under my command as minister of national defense!”

Elaborating on his goals, Chu said he fully recognized the threat from North Korea and promised to devote his efforts to improving the readiness and training of the military. As a last thought, he assured me that he had no political ambitions and no objective other than defending the nation.

I passed him a memorandum that reviewed the missions of CFC and listed the ROK units placed under the operational control (OPCON) of CFC by Strategic Directive One. My memo noted that several of those units had been moved without authority during December 12–13, raising serious concerns about the nature of CFC control over the ROK units and the effectiveness of the chain of command. My memo respectfully requested an official explanation. After a quick glance at it, Chu said that this type of incident would not happen again, and he regretted that units were moved without my knowledge.

I noted that any U.S. officer who moved a unit without authority from the legitimate chain of command would be court-martialed. I was surprised to see that the officers involved in the incident of December 12 had either been promoted or moved to positions of increased authority. At that point, Chu became highly agitated and began waving his arms in the air. His earlier joviality was dropped and he began to read from a clutch of notes placed in front of him. He said he wanted to be sure that I had the facts with regard to the December 12 incident. Since assuming the position of minister, he said, he had researched the
incident, to include calling in the generals individually to query them. All of them had said that there was no plot, that the incident was “blown out of all proportion by Chung Sung-hwa’s action to begin shooting at his quarters, and the incident was purely accidental.” Chu then proceeded to read me the same version of the December 12 incident I had heard several times before, emphasizing the spontaneous nature of the generals’ actions. He apologized for going through this formality but insisted that he had to. Then he leaned back and asked for my comments.

I told him I had great respect for his judgment and personal views and that I took note of the explanation he just read. However, I suggested that he must give me some credit for my knowledge of what happened that night and that I could not believe the explanation. I told him I had evidence that the insurgent group had begun plotting as early as November 30, almost two weeks before the incident. Also, as a professional soldier I knew that the nighttime seizure of a number of key installations in and around Seoul by major elements of several divisions could not have been carried out so swiftly and efficiently without advance preparation. It simply was not credible that the events of that night were the result of a spontaneous order sent out after 8 p.m. Chu merely took notes as I spoke.

That first meeting with Chu lasted more than an hour and a half, with many cups of ginseng tea. It was for the most part a friendly discussion until Chu felt obliged to convey almost in rote form the story that the insurgent group wanted portrayed. He left me with the impression that he would have difficulty becoming the strong minister his predecessor was. His word-for-word recitation of the insurgents’ explanation suggested that he was unlikely to be his own man, at least in the beginning, and that while his stated objective was to restore cohesion in the army, he had little idea of how to go about it except by issuing orders. When I pointed out that the sweeping assignment and promotion changes being made in the army could lead to speculation and unrest, he merely nodded and gave his curious smile as he explained that it was necessary to remove Chung’s supporters. He said he had always been suspicious of Chung’s involvement in the assassination. Now that he was the minister and knew all the facts, he was convinced that not only Chung but also the former ROK army commander, General Lee Kun-young, and the former Special Forces commander, Major General Chung Byong-joo, were all implicated in the plot to kill Park.

Not long afterward, a chance meeting between us took place at the CFC headquarters following the honor ceremonies for the new CFC deputy CINC, General Baek Sok-chu, who replaced General Rhu. Chu approached me and asked if we could have a private word in my office. He began by asking—in fact he used the word begging—the United States to accept the fact that the generals had made a gross error with the December 12 incident and we must forget it. We must work on the future. We Koreans are keenly aware of what the United States wants from us. Surprised by his emotional plea, I answered that American security interests were served by maintaining peace and stability on the
peninsula and by improving our mutual capability to deter external aggression. I continued, “At the same time, our long-term interests in the military, economic, and political arenas must be taken fully into account.” Chu agreed, then assured me, “Chun Doo-hwan is a devoted soldier, concerned with combat readiness, and I am confident that no wrongdoing by him will happen again. You should pay no more attention to this matter or be nervous about reoccurrence of this wrongdoing!”

In short, Chu was telling me that the insurgent generals admitted they had made a mistake, promised that it would not be repeated, and asked Americans to put it behind them. Chu said he preferred not to give a formal written response to the memo I had given him concerning the unauthorized movement of units under CFC OPCON, but rather to let his frank oral explanation suffice. I accepted. I knew a written explanation would probably be less frank and that insisting on it would be counterproductive if not insulting. Chu said he appreciated that. Then he told me that he had uncovered some unrest within the military. He and the new army chief of staff, General Lee, had agreed to eliminate 15 major generals who were “talking too much and were not sufficiently concerned with their military duties.” In addition, to placate some senior elements in the army, three major generals would be promoted, but only for a limited two-year term, and then retired. Unrest, of course, had nothing to do with the decisions. Most if not all of the eliminated generals had probably been loyal to General Chung and were being purged. I checked, and the lieutenant general who had visited me with the countercoup proposal was not among the group to be retired, so the plot remained secret.

North Korean infiltrators

It was a dark, bitterly cold early January night when the report came in. A light snow was falling, just enough to obscure visibility. A few kilometers north of the DMZ and slightly east of the truce village at Panmunjom, a team of North Korean paramilitary agents waited until darkness. The two infiltrators had rehearsed for several weeks for this special mission. Their task was to cross the DMZ, infiltrate through combat elements of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and the ROK 1st Infantry Division, and cross the swift, icy Imjin River. They were to make their way to Seoul, where they were to contact agents already in the city, and gather firsthand information on the unusual political and military developments there. The agents had been briefed on the most recent intercepts of ROK military communications, which suggested that there was growing political unrest in Seoul, enough that a number of ROK army units had been placed at a high state of alert and ordered to prepare for domestic instability. Their routes had been carefully chosen to avoid the known locations of ROK army ambush patrols and field police listening posts. These locations had been pinpointed by previous infiltrators and agents. As the night became darker, the agents, clad in black and without any identification, crept into the DMZ. They had been warned that U.S. troops relied on radar and night vision devices to detect unusual activity, so they stuck to the trails used by the abundant wildlife and wound their way through the dense foliage. The frozen ground and wildlife trails also helped the infiltrators avoid the numerous antipersonnel mines still scattered throughout the DMZ from the Korean War.

An alert ambush patrol of U.S. combat troops detected the sounds of movement near them. They were authorized to shoot at any suspected targets and immediately opened up with
small arms and machine guns in the direction of the noise. At the same time, the patrol reported the possible contact to Outpost Oulette, located on a hilltop several hundred meters south of the military demarcation line that marked the center of the DMZ. The other U.S. outpost, Collier, was further south and also on a hilltop and was similarly notified. However, the combination of darkness and light snow prevented any radar or infrared detection from either outpost.

The agents eluded the defenders and within two hours reached the northern bank of the Imjin River near Liberty Bridge, a rusting, single lane military link over the river. Donning wet suits and inflatable vests, they entered the frigid, swiftly flowing water. As they made their way along the southern bank they repeatedly had to climb over wires that spanned the river to interfere with infiltrators and catch debris. An ROK ambush patrol along the bank detected activity in the water and opened fire. In the ensuing confusion both agents escaped again. They continued their journey into Seoul, although it became more difficult because one of them was wounded.

Shortly after dawn I visited the site of the encounter because I wanted to see firsthand just what was going on with infiltration attempts. CFC had been receiving numerous reports of infiltration activity all along the DMZ.

The ROK commander showed me the blood trails and the abandoned swim gear near the river’s edge, an indication that at least one of the agents had been wounded. He was obviously pleased that his soldiers had been alert enough to detect the infiltration, but he was also disappointed that the weather conditions and visibility had hampered their ability to kill or track the agents. He told me that the reports of agent activity in his sector had increased, with several “hot” trails a month. No agents had been captured or killed, although some may have drowned in the river. The highly trained agents were very difficult to detect, and they would either fight to the death or kill themselves to avoid capture.

This incident and many others reported along the DMZ were a matter of growing concern. They indicated that the North Koreans were either trying to improve their intelligence about the political unrest and military dispositions in the South or augmenting their already extensive agent network in preparation for an attack. In addition, our ongoing tunnel detection work had noted an increase in unusual sounds in a number of locations, possibly because of digging. Extensive drilling and acoustic analysis by experts did not discover any new tunnels, but the underground noises continued to alarm us. We had already discovered and destroyed two tunnels carved through solid granite under the DMZ. With a diameter about the size of a standard auto, each was large enough to permit the transit of a regiment of several thousand combat troops within an hour or two.

As the reports continued, we kept CFC forces at a high state of alert and increased our intelligence collection efforts.
General Leonard Fielding Chapman, Jr.  
(1913-2000)  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  

VITA  

Born in Key West, Florida; graduated from University of Florida; Reserve Officers Training Corps (1931–35); basic school (1935–36); 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, Quantico (1936–37); field artillery school (1938); 10th Marines, San Diego (1938–40); gunnery school (1940); commanding officer of Marine detachment on board USS Astoria and fought at Midway and Coral Sea (1940–42); artillery instructor at Quantico (1942); executive officer of artillery section at Marine Corps Schools (1943); served with 1st Marine Division in Pacific (1944); commanded 4th Battalion, 11th Marines (1944–45); secretary of general staff, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (1945–46); executive officer in plans and policies at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1946–49); coordinator, Reserve artillery training unit (1949–50); amphibious warfare school (1950); regimental commander, 12th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (1950–54); commanded Marine Barracks, U.S. Fleet Activities, Japan (1954–56); served as commander of Marine Barracks and director of Marine Corps Institute, Washington (1956–58); commanding general, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (1958–61); assistant chief of staff for logistics (1961–63) and chief of staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1964–67); appointed Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (1967); 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1968–71); died in Fairfax, Virginia.

…It is my duty to support the decisions made by my superiors. But if asked for my opinion, I intend to state the facts and tell the truth, candidly, to answer any questions.  

—From testimony by Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., before the Senate Armed Forces Committee (December 12, 1967)
Organization

CATCHING COLD

Each year the Joint Staff convenes the Conference of Logistics Directors (COLD), which includes the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, logistics directors of the unified commands, senior logisticians from the services, the director of the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Director of Logistics (J-4). Joint Staff, COLD offers an occasion to develop consensus on logistics issues.

The theme for COLD ‘99 was “Focused Logistics: Transforming Information Technology to Accelerate Our Vision.” The Chairman challenged those in attendance to make “focused logistics a reality and an essential enabler of the joint vision.” Presentations by the Joint Staff and subsequent briefings addressed aspects of the conference theme. There also were demonstrations of both the global combat support system/common operating picture and the 72-hour phased force deployment data/transportation coordinator’s automated information for movement system/joint force requirement generator. Of special interest were discussions of the logistics 2010/IT architecture for logistics transformation.

Other items included expeditious site planning, smart card technology updates, customer wait time initiatives, automated information technology initiatives by CNICS, the joint logistics warfighting initiative, joint total asset visibility, and housing, exercise-related construction, and logistics management performance.

COLD ‘00 closely followed the first focused logistics wargame (FLOW ‘99), a six-month flag officer level effort involving the Joint Staff, military departments, Defense Logistics Agency, and warfighting CNICS, and culminated in a week-long wargame hosted by the Navy at Newport. Deficiencies identified by this effort became building blocks for initiatives developed in COLD ‘00.

The attendees agreed on four areas for transformation. The first is eliminating averages as a means of measuring and pursuing customer wait time as the standard for performance by 2001. Time will be measured end-to-end, from when the user identifies a requirement until it is satisfied. Using variance-based metrics, evaluations will focus on each step in the acquisition, requisitioning, and distribution to meet requirements by measuring the different standard deviations of confidence levels. With this means of measurement, DOD can focus on reengineering processes to optimize support to warfighters and ultimately reduce customer wait time.

The second area is creating a time-definite capability by 2002 to guarantee delivery for warfighters by the required date to a 95 percent confidence level. The third area is the continued pursuit of automatic identification technology and automated information systems. This includes incorporating all levels and nodes of distribution and supply in a shared data environment which will provide total asset visibility by 2004. The fourth area is establishing a real-time, actionable, Web-based logistics information environment by the end of 2004. This ability, coupled with DOD process reengineering efforts, will not only link service logistics information systems, but also ensure linkage and relevance with industry as logistics outsourcing is pursued.

COLD ‘01 is to be held on December 4-6, 2000.

NEW DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

In December 1999, the Director, Joint Staff, issued a new joint doctrine development policy in an effort to solve contentious issues early in developing joint publications. It requires a planner-level meeting with representatives of the services, combatant command, and Joint Staff to resolve issues when joint publications miss any first draft, second draft, preliminary coordination, and final coordination milestone deadlines by 30 days. If the issues are resolved, milestones are reset and development continues. If not resolved on the planner level, the lead agent or Joint Staff doctrine sponsor will brief the issue to a meeting of the service deputy operations deputies within 60 days of the milestone. If settled, the milestones are reset and development continues. If not resolved on the planner level, the lead agent or Joint Staff doctrine sponsor will brief the issue to a meeting of the service deputy operations deputies within 60 days of the milestone. If settled, the milestones are reset and development continues. If not resolved the issue, either the lead agent or the doctrine sponsor will brief the issue to a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 120 days of milestone date for final resolution.

For joint publications delayed because of other than contentious issues, either the lead agent or the doctrine sponsor will provide a flag officer memo to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, explaining the reason for the delay and proposing new milestones. If it is determined that contentious issues are involved in the delay, they are handled as described above. If such issues are not involved, milestones are reset and development resumes. The policy went into effect on June 1, 2000.

ONLINE RESEARCH

The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) features a library system encompassing digital technology as well as traditional facilities. The joint digital library system (JDS) is a general purpose storage system and a portal to special electronic library areas dedicated to specific research databases.

Located at the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulations Center in Suffolk, Virginia, JDS provides multi-level resources for U.S. Joint Forces Command. Documents, electronic resources, classified materials, maps, and periodicals are among the items available. Those with accounts can access the following areas: peace operations (military operations other than war and a special legal section), joint experimentation (Joint Vision 2010 and beyond), joint policy and doctrine, consequence management, and the JWFC online catalogue of publications.

The main directory is a commercial, off-the-shelf program with storage, collaborative tools, and automatic HTML rendering in a searchable database. JDS is secured by an encryption key that requires 3.2-series Internet browsers for interoperability. For a password and to access the libraries go to http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/library.html.

JOINTNESS IN THE AIR

Individually approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the articles found in Doctrine Watch are part of the continuing education process developed by the Air Force. Brief, easy-to-read pieces are intended to teach airmen to articulate essentials of joint force organization, command relationships, and aerospace
NEW INITIATIVES

JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES

Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, was approved by the Chair- man in October 1999. It describes capabilities that the service components, U.S. Coast Guard, unified commands, defense agencies, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations can provide to joint forces. It serves as a ready reference for joint force commanders on considerations and options in planning and executing operations.

In addition to the hard-copy edition, this is the first publication which contains detailed information in a searchable CD-ROM format arranged by universal joint task list (UJTL), specific capability, and word search. The UJTL menu is organized by task and operational capabilities. Subsequent options subdivision major tasks into supporting and enabling tasks (see chapter 5 for a discussion of the CD-ROM functionalities).

Currently, the CD-ROM version of Joint Pub 3-33 consists of nearly 1,500 files. Unlike other joint pubs that are revised on a five-year cycle, the CD-ROM database will be updated every six months.

Lessons Learned

NEW INITIATIVES

There are two important ongoing actions in the joint lessons learned arena. First, the new CJCSI 1150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program, is undergoing final coordinations. It establishes the relationship between the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, and the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) at the Joint Warfighting Center. It also updates requirements for submitting after action reports. They will now be due to JCLL no later than May 1, 2001.

Second, the first annual SOF essay contest sponsored by the SOF Joint Education Council is underway. The first annual SOF essay contest was approved by the Chair- man in April 2000. It will allow unified commands, services, defense agencies, and other participants to help influence the future development of the joint lessons learned program (JLLP). The primary goal is to lay the groundwork for JLLP development by setting goals and requirements and by bringing together the entire lessons learned community. Through briefings and discussions the participants will explore alternatives to current joint after action reports, examine possible evolutions in JLLP, review the revised instruction, and discuss ways of supporting the new joint training information management system (ITIMS).

During the past several months, the JFQ organization has added a new section of the website to include the JFQ lessoned column. The SOF essay contest is available for participants to register their interest to receive updates related to the SOF essay contest. The next SOF essay contest will be due to JCLL by May 1, 2001.
CJCS ESSAY CONTEST

The 19th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition was held on May 18–19, 2000, at the National Defense University. Established by General David C. Jones, USAF, the 9th Chairman, the event challenged students at intermediate and senior colleges to write original essays on aspects of national security strategy. It is open to both resident and nonresident students from all services as well as their civilian classmates. There were five winners in this year’s competition.

First place was won by Major Charles K. Hyde, USAF (College of Naval Command and Staff), for an essay entitled “Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policymakers and Senior Military Officers.”


Finally, third place went to Lieutenant Commander John F. Kirby, USN (College of Naval Command and Staff), for an essay entitled “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function.”

The five winners received a certificate signed by the Chairman and also were presented with a collection of professional military books by the NDU Foundation. The winning essays will be published under the title Essays 2000 by NDU Press.

TRANSFORMATION—A CALL FOR PAPERS

The University of Calgary will host the Society for Military History International Conference at Calgary, Alberta, in May 2001. The announced conference themes are the revolution in military affairs, societies at war, and operational art, which will allow participants to consider the entire field of military history examined in a comparative fashion.

Proposals for papers should be sent no later than November 1, 2000 to Dr. John Festis, SMH 2001 Committee, Department of History, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada; mackie@stratnet.ucalgary.ca.
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Symposia Program
2000–2001

Joint Operations Symposium
“Quadrennial Defense Review 2001: Options and Issues for the Next Administration”
NOVEMBER 8–9, 2000

Topical Symposium
“The Global Century: Globalization, World Politics, and the U.S. Strategic Agenda”
JANUARY 16–17, 2001

Pacific Symposium
MARCH 27–28, 2001

European Symposium
MAY 22–23, 2001

For details and registration information, please contact:
National Defense University
ATTN: Conference Directorate
300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319–5066
Telephone: (202) 685–3857 / DSN 325–3857
Fax: (202) 685–3866 / DSN 325–3866
e-mail: NDU–CONF@ndu.edu
Internet: www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/symposhp.html
This book focuses on a period that begins with the death of President Park in October 1979 which led to the ‘12/12 Incident.’ My account of these events sheds light on how political military policy is formulated within the U.S. Government and, more importantly, on how policy is shaped and executed in the field. For it is the high-level officials in the field who ultimately bear responsibility for the success or failure of American policy. Korea on the Brink is written from the perspective of the military commander entrusted to maintain the armistice and defend Korea, should war occur. My objective was not to present a definitive history of this period, a task that others will eventually achieve. Rather, it was to record and reflect on those significant people and events that I observed as commander of allied forces, who numbered almost half-a-million military personnel. Drawing on contemporaneous notes, messages, and memory, I have sought to faithfully relate the facts as I saw them at the time and have analyzed them in the intervening years.”

—from the preface to Korea on the Brink
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW TERRORISM

A Review Essay
BY MARK J. ROBERTS

Countering the New Terrorism
Edited by Ian O. Lesser
Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1999.
160 pp. $15.00

The New Terrorism and the Arms of Mass Destruction
by Walter Laqueur
330 pp. $28.00

Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism
by John K. Donnelly
256 pp. $29.95
[ISBN 0-7453-1328-0]

A lthough terrorism has been an estab-
lished variety of political violence for
ears, it remains a highly charged phe-
nomenon, largely because—through
media outlets—it enjoys an instanta-
neous global audience. National leaders
often get the news of terrorist events at
the same time as policy analysts, schol-
ars, and journalists who, in turn, give tel-
evion and press interviews that influ-
ence the way in which officialdom reacts to
those events.

Three recent books on terrorism
present the perspectives of the policy
analyst, scholar, and journalist. While
distinct, these views reveal common
views on the current terrorist threat. The
place of Islam in each work is notewor-
thy. All three recognize the expansion of
Islamic networks around the world and
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
tive of Islam as a whole and that many
agree that the extremists are not indica-
Countering the New Terrorism is an insightful and practical volume for those involved in the world of counter-terrorism policy. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction by Walter Laqueur is largely historical in its basic approach and is descriptive rather than prospective. The author, who is widely published on the subject, examines the background of the terrorist trends presented. Advances in technology have made terrorism far more lethal. Though Laqueur doubts that most terrorist groups will use WMD in the near future, he concludes many chapters by pointing out that such weaponry is increasingly available to rogue actors. The author explores the development of WMD, including chemical, biological, nuclear, and cyber-terror threats. Among varied historical examples, he finds that the attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway in 1995 was the first event which provided the world with an appreciation of the magnitude of destruction that even a small group can inflict. Laqueur further notes that Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States cannot account for much of the fissile material in the former Soviet arsenal and considers what might have happened if the bombers of the World Trade Center had used WMD.

“Extending understanding to the terrorist by advocating cultural and moral relativism,” in the words of the author, “is easy in the safety of Western universities, but the perspective of the victimized residents of Algerian and Afghan villages or the inhabitants of Rwanda is likely to be different.” His prognosis is that as long as there are ideological and creedal drive perpetrators, acts of terror will become worse. Terrorism has evolved from limited to “total and indiscriminate warfare” with the goal of killing and maiming as many as possible. What might happen if WMD are employed is chilling.

Although The New Terrorism is a valuable book, it does not proffer recommendations on dealing with terrorism and WMD. Its real utility lies in identifying terrorist trends and providing the background to conduct further research.

Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism by John K. Cooley is the most readable of the books under review. A journalist with years of experience, Cooley knows how to report his story. He describes the “strange love affair which went disastrously wrong,” the U.S. Cold War partnership with “some of the most conservative and fanatical followers of Islam.” Although this book is marred by typographical and factual errors, it helps the reader to understand so-called Afghan terrorist networks because it outlines their origins, development, and ideology.

When Afghanistan was invaded in 1979, the United States worked with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to establish an anticommmunist proxy force. In comparing American and Soviet perspectives after the invasion, Cooley maintains that both sides held a range of mutual misperceptions, leading Washington to initiate a covert plan. Soon money and arms began flowing via Egypt to Pakistan, where mujahedin converged for training. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate insisted on handling training and arms distribution for the Afghan resistance, while appropriating weapons that Cooley alleges later made their way to various conflicts around the world. Young members of mujahedin units organized into self-contained network cells, which served well during the war and survive today. Known as ampus (grapes in Arabic), these cells function interdependently or independently and, like grapes, if some are removed the others can continue operating.

With the gift of hindsight, Cooley states that the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations failed to foresee how the anti-Soviet proxy war would lead to a worldwide terrorist backlash. He criticizes these errors in judgment and blames them for creating the networks. Though providing a useful account of the events leading to the predicament posed by mujahedin, Unholy Wars offers no solutions on how to defeat terrorist networks. Unfortunately, the author’s biases detract from an otherwise important narrative on the origins of international terrorist networks.

In examining the new terrorism, all three books demonstrate that the threat has evolved and requires innovative strategies to counter it. Each is a valuable source for practitioners and students, but only Countering the New Terrorism offers recommendations for developing a counterterrorist strategy. However, any strategy would benefit from the policy, academic, and media perspectives found in these books. The critical issue is whether the United States and its allies can keep pace with emerging trends in terrorism and respond with proactive rather than reactive measures.
Although much has been written about the Navy Gulf War on the ground and in the air, the naval side of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm has been publicly chronicled only recently. Two new works analyzes the conduct of the operations, laying bare the shortcomings of the Navy and the other services, and examine theater joint command and control.

Sword and Shield: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War is written by Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller, both members of the Naval Historical Center. Highly readable and profusely illustrated, it is a must for students of the war and military professionals with an interest in joint operations. It draws on hundreds of official reports, command histories, lessons learned, archival materials, personal communications, and oral interviews. The book offers a comprehensive survey of events leading to the conflict, operations conducted afloat and ashore by the Navy and Marine Corps, and regional developments in the aftermath of the war.

After introducing the strategic and operational orientation of the Navy in the final years of the Cold War, including the influence of maritime strategy and the conduct of operations largely independent of the other services, the author describe the Navy presence in the Persian Gulf since 1949 and the diplomatic events which resulted in the invasion of Kuwait. Curiously, movement of maritime prepositioning ships from Diego Garcia and Guam was considered as a deterrent against an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, but it was not ordered because of a desire to “avoid an ill-considered use of force.” This failure can be attributed to oversight by planners at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the first week of the war, and perhaps to the fact that the ships at Diego Garcia and Guam belonged to U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Command. The ships were not ordered to sail until August 8, 1990, a delay of six days after the invasion of Kuwait; the first of them did not land their cargo—a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)—until August 15. Thus the United States missed an opportunity to put ground forces into Saudi Arabia earlier to reinforce a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division that had already been dispatched. That delay could have been fatal had Iraq moved south and captured al-Jubayl and ad-Dammam, the principal ports for the subsequent buildup and sustenance of the war. Indeed, the initial task assigned to the Marines on marrying up with their equipment was to block any Iraqi attempt to capture al-Jubayl.

The first half of Sword and Shield details actions during Desert Shield. The authors cover the initial actions in selecting the commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Henry Mazz (who was relieved in a normal rotation on December 1 by Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur) to lead the naval forces in the Gulf, superseding a Hawaii-based one-star admiral as naval component commander (COMNAVCENT). These officers established a theater command structure for carrier battle forces operating in the Red Sea, North Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf, as well as for maritime intercept operations, amphibious forces, mine countermeasure elements, air defense, surface operations, logistics, and the bridge of ships which delivered 95 percent of the materials for the war effort.

By August 7, USS Independence in the North Arabian Sea and USS Eisenhower in the Red Sea were close enough to launch carrier aircraft in support of the airfields and arriving forces. They were critical in defending Saudi Arabia because the initial tactical aircraft deployed by the Air Force were short of spare parts, base support, fuel, and air-to-ground munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. Iraqi ground forces could only be stopped by airpower, and offshore naval air with air-to-ground munitions had the preponderance of that capability, although the carriers were short of precision-guided munitions. I
The decision by Admiral Mauz to remain afloat in the Seventh Fleet flagged the Persian Gulf War and analyzed related issues.

Desert Shield at Sea leads the reader through the buildup and preparation phase, including initial planning for joint operations to defend Saudi Arabia and redress the occupation of Kuwait. The author thoroughly details the international maritime intercept operations that were begun almost immediately. Using a loose cooperative command arrangement, naval forces successfully enforced the embargo against Iraq, although participating nations often had differing rules of engagement. Indeed, the authorization for a U.S. warship to use disabling force to halt an evading vessel was so tightly held that consent from the National Command Authorities was required. Eventually the need was overcome when Britain devised a means of verifying their identity. While visual range without a second electronic means of firing on friendly aircraft, aerial intelligence prompted the Navy to operate four carriers in the Persian Gulf, however, were not required to enter over-water operations into ATOs and chose to act more independently, presenting integration problems for orders when the air war began in January.

Navy-Air Force friction also arose over the allocation of tankers for naval aircraft and rules of engagement promulgated by JFACC. In the former case the Navy suspected that priority for aerial refueling was assigned to the Air Force before the air war. Carriers in the Persian Gulf, however, were not required to enter over-water operations into ATOs and to act more independently, presenting integration problems for orders when the air war began in January.

The Navy had neither the air planning representation at U.S. Central Command, Air Forces (CENTAF) headquarters nor satellite connectivity to readily adapt to the centralized ATO concept. Moreover, naval doctrine called for decentralized air warfare planning aboard each carrier, which was at odds with the centralized system used by the Air Force. The Navy also thought the 72-hour ATO planning requirement too inflexible for strike and strike operations. The Red Sea carrier battle force, which depended on Air Force tanker allocations for its missions over naval aircraft. Even though Washington committed six carriers to the sea carrier battle force, which depended on Air Force tanker allocations for its missions over naval aircraft, even though Washington committed six carriers to the war, Air Force tanker allocations would only support two carriers in the Red Sea and two in the North Arabian Sea. This prompted the Navy to operate four carriers in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf to reduce the need for Air Force missions over naval aircraft. Even though the Navy became adept at integrating its operations into ATOs and chose to act more independently, presenting integration problems for orders when the air war began in January.

Navy-Air Force friction also arose over the allocation of tankers for naval aircraft and rules of engagement promulgated by JFACC. In the former case the Navy suspected that priority for aerial refueling was assigned to the Air Force before the air war. Carriers in the Persian Gulf, however, were not required to enter over-water operations into ATOs and chose to act more independently, presenting integration problems for orders when the air war began in January.
Navy fighters did not and were thus pre-
cluded from filling choice air defense
assignments.

Finally, differences in the mechani-
cal means used in Navy and Air Force
aircraft refueling and the Navy need for
JP-5 fuel for carrier safety instead of more
volatile Air Force JP-8 caused interservice
friction. The Navy is credited, however,
with planning and conducting a large
portion of the suppression of enemy air
defense missions that enabled safe entry
and operations of strike packages over
enemy air space. In addition, after initial
high level reservations, Tomahawks were
used to strike heavily defended targets
such as Baghdad in daylight while F-117s
did the same at night, bringing the con-
flict home to the Iraqis without respite
and at minimum risk. This was joint war-
fare at its best.

Pokrant divides the narrative in
Desert Storm at Sea by mission areas, giv-
ing detailed and critical accounts of
naval operations as planned and carried
out. A 17,000-strong amphibious force
was assembled and three landing sites
selected, none with good topography or
landing conditions. Some commentators
thought an amphibious operation was
especially dismissed in Washington as
early as October and later in planning
conferences in Riyadh when the CINC
expressed concerns about heavy casual-
ties. The author argues that the idea was
yet again discarded at a conference in
Iraq in February 1991 when mineweeping,
pre-assault preparations, gunfire support
requirements, and assault were thor-
oughly briefed and the complexities of
requirements, and assault were thor-
oughly briefed and the complexities of
assault were thoroughly briefed and the complexities of amphibious operations were laid out.

Nevertheless the Navy was ordered to
prepare an assault if a seaward flanking
attack was required to relieve pressure on
the Marines or fast moving forces needed
a logistics lifeline. The plan to demon-
strate considerable amphibious capability
was understood by few, although the
only two Iraqi aircraft that ventured
out to threaten Navy ships were downed
by Saudi fighters.

In the second chapters of Desert
Storm at Sea ("Observations on Jointness"
and "What the Navy Can Do to Be More
Joint"), Pokrant states that many of the
coordination, attitudinal, equipment, and
interoperability problems faced in the
Persian Gulf War have been resolved.
However, he also notes that more needs
to be done in developing interoperable
systems, ensuring that naval officers seek
benefit from joint duty assignments,
creating trust between the services, devel-
oping joint tactics and doctrine, and
managing large scale contingencies.

In his biography of Eisenhower,
Geoffrey Perret provides a comprehen-
sive examination of the soldier-statesman
based on a diverse combination of pri-
mary sources, memoirs, and secondary
scholarly studies. It is a well-crafted mix
of the personal and official that touches
on much that is familiar but also offers
fresh insights into a remarkable life.

The author begins with a fine por-
trait of Dwight Eisenhower as a youth in
Abilene, Texas, around the turn of the
century. There is the well-known tale of
the highly competitive Eisenhower
brothers growing up on the poor side of
town. But Perret delves below the sur-
facer, looking at the fierce competition
between Ike and his oldest brother,
Edgar, as well as the truly deep friendship
between Ike and Milton, the youngest
brother, an intellectual and temperamen-
tal link that sustained Eisenhower
throughout his life.

Then there is Ike's relationship with
his parents. A succinct, well-etched
description of the stable, tough, and eter-
nally optimistic Ida explains his life-long
devotion to his mother. The author also
makes a compelling though more tenu-
sive case for the long shadow of the
father, whose resort to the lash he associ-
ates with Dwight's emotional stiffness
and difficulty in expressing his feelings
to his wife and surviving son.

The account of Eisenhower's career
as a cadet at West Point and officer dur-
ing the interwar years also covers familiar
territory. Perret retells the story against
the backdrop of the Army and embelli-
ishes it with insights into Eisenhower's
character and development. Contrary to
the popular belief, Ike emerges consist-
tently at the top of his profession at this
time and as working hard to remain in
that position. By the end of World War II
he was the highest ranking officer among
the field of the suppression of enemy air
defense missions that enabled safe entry
and operations of strike packages over
enemy air space. In addition, after initial
high level reservations, Tomahawks were
used to strike heavily defended targets
such as Baghdad in daylight while F-117s
did the same at night, bringing the con-
flict home to the Iraqis without respite
and at minimum risk. This was joint war-
fare at its best.

Pokrant divides the narrative in
Desert Storm at Sea by mission areas, giv-
ing detailed and critical accounts of
naval operations as planned and carried
out. A 17,000-strong amphibious force
was assembled and three landing sites
selected, none with good topography or
landing conditions. Some commentators
thought an amphibious operation was
especially dismissed in Washington as
early as October and later in planning
conferences in Riyadh when the CINC
expressed concerns about heavy casual-
ties. The author argues that the idea was
yet again discarded at a conference in
Iraq in February 1991 when mineweeping,
pre-assault preparations, gunfire support
requirements, and assault were thor-
oughly briefed and the complexities of
requirements, and assault were thoroughly briefed and the complexities of amphibious operations were laid out.

Nevertheless the Navy was ordered to
prepare an assault if a seaward flanking
attack was required to relieve pressure on
the Marines or fast moving forces needed
a logistics lifeline. The plan to demon-
strate considerable amphibious capability
was understood by few, although the
only two Iraqi aircraft that ventured
out to threaten Navy ships were downed
by Saudi fighters.

In the second chapters of Desert
Storm at Sea ("Observations on Jointness"
and "What the Navy Can Do to Be More
Joint"), Pokrant states that many of the
doc, attitudinal, equipment, and
interoperability problems faced in the
Persian Gulf War have been resolved.
However, he also notes that more needs
to be done in developing interoperable
systems, ensuring that naval officers seek
benefit from joint duty assignments,
creating trust between the services, devel-
oping joint tactics and doctrine, and
managing large scale contingencies.

In his biography of Eisenhower,
Geoffrey Perret provides a comprehen-
sive examination of the soldier-statesman
based on a diverse combination of pri-
mary sources, memoirs, and secondary
scholarly studies. It is a well-crafted mix
of the personal and official that touches
on much that is familiar but also offers
fresh insights into a remarkable life.

The author begins with a fine por-
trait of Dwight Eisenhower as a youth in
Abilene, Texas, around the turn of the
century. There is the well-known tale of
the highly competitive Eisenhower
brothers growing up on the poor side of
town. But Perret delves below the sur-
facer, looking at the fierce competition
between Ike and his oldest brother,
Edgar, as well as the truly deep friendship
between Ike and Milton, the youngest
brother, an intellectual and temperamen-
tal link that sustained Eisenhower
throughout his life.

Then there is Ike's relationship with
his parents. A succinct, well-etched
description of the stable, tough, and eter-
nally optimistic Ida explains his life-long
devotion to his mother. The author also
makes a compelling though more tenu-
sive case for the long shadow of the
father, whose resort to the lash he associ-
ates with Dwight's emotional stiffness
and difficulty in expressing his feelings
to his wife and surviving son.

The account of Eisenhower's career
as a cadet at West Point and officer dur-
ing the interwar years also covers familiar
territory. Perret retells the story against
the backdrop of the Army and embelli-
ishes it with insights into Eisenhower's
character and development. Contrary to
the popular belief, Ike emerges consist-
tently at the top of his profession at this
time and as working hard to remain in
that position. By the end of World War II
he was the highest ranking officer among
the
his class from the U.S. Military Academy and the only one to be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. His performance throughout the interwar period brought assignments of greater responsibility and attracted a succession of influential mentors, from Fox Conner and John Pershing to Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall. Conner was particularly important in expanding Eisenhower's horizon and fostering his proven love of reading with the works of Plato, Cicero, Clausewitz, and The Federalist Papers.

Three years after parting from Conner, Ike was graduated at the top of his class from both the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. As a result, when Eisenhower reported to the War Plans Division at the War Department in 1941, he was known and respected. Marshall's reorganization of the War Department had great implications for the future relationship of the Chief of Staff and his protégé; as he moved up the command ladder, the new organization ensured that he would not operate in the field independently from the Chief of Staff as Pershing had during World War I.

Perret skillfully shows how, as Conner predicted, internal struggles with allies could consume as much time and energy as the enemy for a combined commander. This was particularly the case with regard to the British high command, which had its own outlook on organization and strategy. In the author's view, Ike generally came out on top in most Allied debates, particularly those involving Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery. Along the way, there are insightful descriptions and analyses of both major actors and key strategic events. Walter (“Beetle”) Smith, for instance, the tough, acerbic, and absolutely essential chief of staff for Eisenhower’s organization, is depicted in his “mythos/men to duodenal ulcers.” And Ike’s failure in Tunisia in December 1942 is juxtaposed with the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in February 1943 as Adolf Hitler, always incapable of prioritizing strategic choices, diverted troops and planes to North Africa. Finally, there is Eisenhower at his best leading up to Overlord, insisting on controlling air assets to bomb the French transportation network and ready to take complete responsibility if the cross channel operation should fail.

These triumphs are balanced by Perret’s objectivity. He notes the flaws in Ike’s strategic assessment in War Plans Division, to include the initial opposition to a buildup of forces in Britain for a cross channel invasion. And there is Eisenhower’s tendency to remain loyal to undeserving friends such as Mark Clark, who never lost his own “gigantic view of the Clark role in history.” Similarly, Ike was capable of monumental misjudgments, none more critical than when he passed over able men to choose Lloyd Fredendall as a key unit commander in North Africa. Even after Fredendall suffered serious defeats, Eisenhower supported his subordinate and recommended him for a third star. Only after General Harold Alexander brought the matter to his attention—“I’m sure you must have better men than that”—did Ike remove Fredendall.

Perret also depicts the Eisenhower administration with equal balance. Contrary to earlier analysis, Ike is revealed as an activist President initially bent on overhauling and modernizing the anti-Communist organization that he inherited at the White House. “If I’d had a staff like this during the war,” he said, “we’d have lost it.” The result was the establishment of a staff secretariat and the appointment of a decisive chief of staff in Sherman Adams, who was so blunt and tactless that, according to the author, he “made Beetle Smith look like an honor graduate of charm school.” At the same time, Eisenhower began to use the National Security Council on a regular basis and was the first to name an assistant to the President for national security affairs, a post of increasing prominence in subsequent years. Most importantly, Eisenhower translated his fundamental belief that economic solvency was a basic component of national security into a new strategy. The author details how Ike organized different task forces to examine and brief alternative security strategies. After one all-day session of such briefings, George Kennan observed that the President had “asserted his intellectual ascendency over every man in the room.” It resulted in a move away from a strategic focus on maximum danger in NSC 68 toward nuclear deterrence in NSC 162/2.

Eisenhower’s involvement in foreign affairs is documented, from the crises over Quemoy and Matsu (“those damned little offshore islands”), Suez and the invasion of Lebanon, to the U–2 policy that undermined the Paris Summit. In these events Eisenhower did not hold his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in nearly as much regard as Dulles held himself. For Perret, Dulles is closer to a professor who impresses his students than to a cold warrior ready to make decisions.

At the same time, even in emphasizing an activist President in domestic and foreign affairs, this biographer does not lose an objective touch. In the civil rights arena, there was little room for maneuver, but the Eisenhower administration could have done more. And the President’s refusal to sign the Geneva Accords after Dien Bien Phu had far-reaching implications that Perret sees as the visceral antithesis of McCarthyism, a stance that did not alter even when Senator Joe McCarthy self-destructed on national television. “I think I’ll just let [McCarthy] kill himself,” the President commented.

In sum, the author has produced a sweeping yet compact account of a complex personality. Behind the infectious grin that endeared him to generations of Americans was a steely intelligence and driving ambition. There is an element of luck in such a career. But overall, Eisenhower made his own luck and rose above the level of events throughout his life. “There was in his mind and spirit,” Perret concludes, “a force that was nearly always bigger than his circumstances.”
A Book Review

BY ROBERT A. DOUGHTY

Napoleon on the Art of War
Edited by Jay Luvaas
288 pp. $25.00

Jay Luvaas has searched for statements by Napoleon on war for most of his professional career, leading him to comb libraries and collections and sort through thousands of documents and publications. This obsession came to the review’s attention in the early 1970s when Luvaas was a visiting professor in the Department of History at West Point. Our discussions twenty-five years later when he served on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College revealed that little had changed with regard to this quest. His delight in recounting Napoleon’s contributions to the operational level of war is unforgettable. Through the years Luvaas has never wavered in believing that all officers should study the ideas of a commander who could so profoundly motivate his soldiers whether on the verge of spectacular victories or the precipice of crushing defeats.

In these days of the new world order, the new paradigm, and the new economy, some may wonder why Luvaas or anyone else consumed by preoccupation with cyberwarfare or how wars are fought, but they always are the result of calculation. Any plan is only as strong as the execution of it. In this context, the art of war is grounded in the science of preparation. Napoleon, the art of war was grounded in the science of preparation.

In technical terms, Napoleon was a master of his profession. Whether commenting on the advantages of forming infantry in two ranks or the challenges of occupying conquered territory, he had a command of technical details on everything from platoon tactics to national military strategy. When it came to organizational detail, he displayed impressive knowledge, not only of artillery and other weaponry, but of tactical units, particularly in organizing, equipping, and employing a corps. His brilliance is also apparent in his commentary about theorists such as Guibert or commanders like Alexander the Great. Rarely has any military leader had such a remarkable proficiency in every aspect of the art of war.

One reason for Napoleon’s success was that he understood human nature, particularly the motivation and constitution of soldiers. His grasp is evident in quotations from a leader who never heard a radio, much less touched a computer. The answer becomes obvious to readers of Napoleon the Art of War, for Bonaparte understood not only how war was waged but also the essential role of humans in that enterprise. In addition, Napoleon was a master at shaping forces to obtain the maximum benefit from soldiers, technology, and logistics. He knew that “in war only the commander understands the importance of certain things, and he alone, through his will and superior insight, conquers and surmounts all difficulties. An army is nothing without the head.”

Napoleon’s insights into what makes people tick are apparent in his ideas on conducting an occupation: “As a general rule, it is a political principle to create a good impression of your benevolence after having demonstrated you can be severe with troublemakers.” Furthermore, he knew too well that success as a commander depended on soldiers having a greater will to fight than their opponents.

But the most interesting of Napoleon’s statements concern the art of war and address the timeless problem of gaining victory and avoiding defeat. “In war it is necessary to have sound and precise ideas. It is with safe and well-conceived plans that we win wars.” And, he continued, “With a great general there is never a continuity of great actions which can be attributed to chance and good luck; they always are the result of calculation and genius.” Bonaparte also asserted, “In war nothing is accomplished except through calculation. Anything that is not profoundly meditated in its details will produce no result.”

In addition, he commented, “The art of war is a simple art and everything depends upon execution: there is nothing vague, everything is common sense, and nothing about it is ideologiocal.” As many historians attest, he achieved several important victories through an ability to innovate on the battlefield, but innovation was always rooted in meticulous planning and energetic execution. For Napoleon, the art of war was grounded in the science of preparation.

In the final analysis, this book is a must for all professionals concerned with the challenges of waging war, and we are indebted to Jay Luvaas for working so many years to make it available. Although Napoleon’s words were recorded two centuries ago, they remain valid now. Even those contemplating the depths of cyberspace may learn from his thoughts. Technology, terrain, and the swirling currents of history have changed how wars are fought, but they always have been and always will be fought by human beings.

To enable readers to grasp “the importance of certain things” and the potential of the “head” in an army, Luvaas has divided his book into ten chapters, each focused on a topic such as military education, strategy, or the army in the field. He connects the quotations in a narrative, succinctly capturing the essence of Napoleon’s thought. The result is a marvelous volume that reads as if it were written by Bonaparte himself.

In technical terms, Napoleon was a master of his profession. Whether commenting on the advantages of forming infantry in two ranks or the challenges of occupying conquered territory, he had a command of technical details on everything from platoon tactics to national military strategy. When it came to organizational detail, he displayed impressive knowledge, not only of artillery and other weaponry, but of tactical units, particularly in organizing, equipping, and employing a corps. His brilliance is also apparent in his commentary about theorists such as Guibert or commanders like Alexander the Great. Rarely has any military leader had such a remarkable proficiency in every aspect of the art of war.

One reason for Napoleon’s success was that he understood human nature, particularly the motivation and constitution of soldiers. His grasp is evident in quotations from a leader who never heard a radio, much less touched a computer. The answer becomes obvious to readers of Napoleon the Art of War, for Bonaparte understood not only how war was waged but also the essential role of humans in that enterprise. In addition, Napoleon was a master at shaping forces to obtain the maximum benefit from soldiers, technology, and logistics. He knew that “in war only the commander understands the importance of certain things, and he alone, through his will and superior insight, conquers and surmounts all difficulties. An army is nothing without the head.”

Napoleon’s insights into what makes people tick are apparent in his ideas on conducting an occupation: “As a general rule, it is a political principle to create a good impression of your benevolence after having demonstrated you can be severe with troublemakers.” Furthermore, he knew too well that success as a commander depended on soldiers having a greater will to fight than their opponents.

But the most interesting of Napoleon’s statements concern the art of war and address the timeless problem of gaining victory and avoiding defeat. “In war it is necessary to have sound and precise ideas. It is with safe and well-conceived plans that we win wars.” And, he continued, “With a great general there is never a continuity of great actions which can be attributed to chance and good luck; they always are the result of calculation and genius.” Bonaparte also asserted, “In war nothing is accomplished except through calculation. Anything that is not profoundly meditated in its details will produce no result.”

In addition, he commented, “The art of war is a simple art and everything depends upon execution: there is nothing vague, everything is common sense, and nothing about it is ideological.” As many historians attest, he achieved several important victories through an ability to innovate on the battlefield, but innovation was always rooted in meticulous planning and energetic execution. For Napoleon, the art of war was grounded in the science of preparation.

In the final analysis, this book is a must for all professionals concerned with the challenges of waging war, and we are indebted to Jay Luvaas for working so many years to make it available. Although Napoleon’s words were recorded two centuries ago, they remain valid now. Even those contemplating the depths of cyberspace may learn from his thoughts. Technology, terrain, and the swirling currents of history have changed how wars are fought, but they always have been and always will be fought by human beings.

To enable readers to grasp “the importance of certain things” and the potential of the “head” in an army, Luvaas has divided his book into ten chapters, each focused on a topic such as military education, strategy, or the army in the field. He connects the quotations in a narrative, succinctly capturing the essence of Napoleon’s thought. The result is a marvelous volume that reads as if it were written by Bonaparte himself.

In technical terms, Napoleon was a master of his profession. Whether commenting on the advantages of forming infantry in two ranks or the challenges of occupying conquered territory, he had a command of technical details on everything from platoon tactics to national military strategy. When it came to organizational detail, he displayed impressive knowledge, not only of artillery and other weaponry, but of tactical units, particularly in organizing, equipping, and employing a corps. His brilliance is also apparent in his commentary about theorists such as Guibert or commanders like Alexander the Great. Rarely has any military leader had such a remarkable proficiency in every aspect of the art of war.

One reason for Napoleon’s success was that he understood human nature, particularly the motivation and constitution of soldiers. His grasp is evident in quotations from a leader who never heard a radio, much less touched a computer. The answer becomes obvious to readers of Napoleon the Art of War, for Bonaparte understood not only how war was waged but also the essential role of humans in that enterprise. In addition, Napoleon was a master at shaping forces to obtain the maximum benefit from soldiers, technology, and logistics. He knew that “in war only the commander understands the importance of certain things, and he alone, through his will and superior insight, conquers and surmounts all difficulties. An army is nothing without the head.”

Napoleon’s insights into what makes people tick are apparent in his ideas on conducting an occupation: “As a general rule, it is a political principle to create a good impression of your benevolence after having demonstrated you can be severe with troublemakers.” Furthermore, he knew too well that success as a commander depended on soldiers having a greater will to fight than their opponents.

But the most interesting of Napoleon’s statements concern the art of war and address the timeless problem of gaining victory and avoiding defeat. “In war it is necessary to have sound and precise ideas. It is with safe and well-conceived plans that we win wars.” And, he continued, “With a great general there is never a continuity of great actions which can be attributed to chance and good luck; they always are the result of calculation and genius.” Bonaparte also asserted, “In war nothing is accomplished except through calculation. Anything that is not profoundly meditated in its details will produce no result.”

In addition, he commented, “The art of war is a simple art and everything depends upon execution: there is nothing vague, everything is common sense, and nothing about it is ideological.” As many historians attest, he achieved several important victories through an ability to innovate on the battlefield, but innovation was always rooted in meticulous planning and energetic execution. For Napoleon, the art of war was grounded in the science of preparation.

In the final analysis, this book is a must for all professionals concerned with the challenges of waging war, and we are indebted to Jay Luvaas for working so many years to make it available. Although Napoleon’s words were recorded two centuries ago, they remain valid now. Even those contemplating the depths of cyberspace may learn from his thoughts. Technology, terrain, and the swirling currents of history have changed how wars are fought, but they always have been and always will be fought by human beings.
A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Individuals and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make their requirements known through service channels. Individuals and organizations interested in receiving the Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896.

To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex, Washington, D.C. 20380; request by Fax at (703) 614–2951/DSN 224–2951.

For all other distribution requests within the Defense Department, the Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and other activities. Changes in shipping instructions should be communicated to the Editor (see schedule below).

SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office. To order for one year, c/o Joint Force Quarterly, JFQ on the order and mail with a check for $25.00 ($31.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or Fax the order to: (202) 512–2233.

Individual copies may be purchased through GPO bookstores nationwide for $12.75 each.

DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff and Joint Activities</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Commands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Space Command</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College (both resident and nonresident programs)</td>
<td>1,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War College</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College (both resident and nonresident programs)</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps War College and Marine Corps Command and Staff College</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War College</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including the School of Advanced Airpower Studies)</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All unsolicited manuscripts are reviewed, a process which may take two to three months. To facilitate review, provide two copies of the manuscript together with a brief summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should always be used. Both the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. All manuscripts should be paginated. If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disk will not be returned unless requested).

JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally returned to authors for review.

Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected for publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or employees of the Federal Government are forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of articles submitted by service members or U.S. Government employees.

Information on the submission of contributions is available by contacting (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NMO–4655–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Rm. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066.

CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as from both defense analysts and academic specialists from this country and abroad, including foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for contributions, but manuscripts of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters, commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. Unsolicited book reviews are generally not accepted for publication.

All submissions to JFQ must be accompanied by a covering letter which states that the manuscript has not been previously published and is not being submitted simultaneously to any other journal. In addition, the letter must include the author’s full name (including military grade, service component, and assignment if applicable), a complete postal address (with zip code), and a work telephone number. Neither facsimile nor e-mail manuscripts will be accepted as formal submissions.

All unsolicited manuscripts are reviewed, a process which may take two to three months. To facilitate review, provide two copies of the manuscript together with a brief summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should always be used. Both the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. All manuscripts should be paginated. If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disk will not be returned unless requested).

JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally returned to authors for review.

Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected for publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or employees of the Federal Government are forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of articles submitted by service members or U.S. Government employees.

Information on the submission of contributions is available by contacting (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NMO–4655–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Rm. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066.

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Individuals and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make their requirements known through command channels. Any corrections in shipping instructions for service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

Amer.—Contact the installation publications control officer (listing Misc. Publication 71–1) or write: U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, ATTN: Customer Service, 1660 Woodson Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63114–6181, or call (314) 263–7305/DSN 683–7305 (extension 288); or order via Stamps or the Internet [http://www.usappol.hoffman.army.mil].

Navy.—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance (Code 3432.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be sent by Fax to (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UFC, and full address).


Air Force.—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (indicate issue number)” to the base publications distribution office to establish unit requirement through the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896.

Coast Guard.—Contact Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, ATTN: Defense Operations Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591–9991.

In addition to service channels, bulk distribution is made directly to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and other activities. Changes in shipping instructions should be communicated to the Editor (see schedule below).

SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office. To order for one year, c/o Joint Force Quarterly, JFQ on the order and mail with a check for $25.00 ($31.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or Fax the order to: (202) 512–2233.

Individual copies may be purchased through GPO bookstores nationwide for $12.75 each.
transformation—an international perspective

plus

comparative approaches to interwar innovation,
a report on joint experimentation,
Joint Vision 2020,
and more in the Summer 2000 issue of JFQ