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Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address below or by email to JFQ1@ndu.edu “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu.
Farewell to the Editor

Two years ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, transferred a colonel from his personal staff to National Defense University (NDU) to assume duties as Editor of Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ). During the course of his research in advance of assuming these duties, Colonel Merrick Krause, USAF, learned that on June 18, 1992, General Colin Powell received a briefing concerning an initiative to reinforce the “joint culture” of the U.S. Armed Forces. In that meeting, General Powell expressed his clear preference for a security journal modeled on the Marine Corps Gazette and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The Chairman directed that the journal should be laid out and formatted with appropriate devices and a cover “catchy enough for people to grab it.” He also directed that the journal should be crafted for a specific audience: “the flight line.” The Chairman further elaborated that the new journal should speak “to the whole military leadership population, not just the political-military types.”

In issuing his marching orders to Colonel Krause, General Myers emphasized that JFQ should expand its look beyond effective joint teamwork and encourage greater understanding between the military and its interagency partners. To the same degree that the Armed Forces have benefited from joint education and training, other Federal agencies can increase understanding and efficiency through integrated training and operations, key tenets indispensable in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Informed by this guidance, Colonel Krause lost no time in communicating his vision to his new team.

Colonel Krause reported for duty at NDU Press in October 2004 and found a professional but underutilized staff in need of focus and teamwork and an organization in need of an effective business model. Without hesitation, he reorganized the staff and let them know that their ideas mattered in recrafting not only Joint Force Quarterly but also the way that the organization went about its work. Colonel Krause dedicated himself to conceiving, writing, and revising (for months on end) what now has become an impressive staff reorganization that keeps the journal “on target, on time.” His innovative leadership also broke ground by allowing the press to work with outside publishers to ensure that the important work done at NDU in the fields of national security strategy and national military strategy, among many others, reaches a much wider audience.

But Colonel Krause did more than establish business practices and metrics. He brought something to the press that had long been missing: teambuilding. Staff meetings became debate forums, not only in regard to the work at hand but also in regard to issues that faced the U.S. military and the Nation every day. Political differences within the office were celebrated. Thoughts and opinions were welcomed. The staff became more comfortable, professional, and dedicated to the mission, and the corporate culture changed tremendously. Indeed, Colonel Krause’s ability to lead others is uncanny. He is not one to say what people want to hear but what they need to hear in order to get the job done. At times, tempers flared, but at the end of the day, we all had smiles on our faces and produced a journal that looks as impressive as it reads. With Colonel Krause came pride and confidence in all work taken on. We thank him earnestly for that inspiration.

With this issue of JFQ, a far more efficient and business-oriented staff wishes to veto Colonel Krause’s desire for a quiet departure by expressing its heartfelt appreciation and gratitude for a job exceptionally well done. We also seek to establish Colonel Krause as the journal’s first Editor Emeritus, an honor tailored to reinforce the respect that we harbor for this natural leader and to emphasize our hope that he will continue a professional relationship with this journal for years to come. Colonel Krause may be retiring from the U.S. Air Force, but he is not retiring from service to this country in the national security arena. We wish Merrick fair winds and following seas as he continues his career “providing for the common defense” in the Department of Homeland Security.

—NDU Press Staff
JFQ Dialogue

Open Letter to JFQ Readers

Joint Force Quarterly is mindful that many of its readers have experienced multiple tours of duty in one or more theaters in the war on terror. We want to hear your stories, share your practical insights, and improve the way our government secures national security interests in partnership with allies and nongovernmental organizations. Even when manuscripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, JFQ can usually find a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author’s study to outside institutes and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. We ask that authors and research groups continue submitting the broad array of articles and thoughtful critiques unfettered and would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses.

The following are areas of interest to which JFQ expects to return frequently, with no submission deadline:

- orchestrating instruments of national power
- coalition operations
- employing the economic instrument of power
- future of naval power
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- industry collaboration for national security
- integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational approaches) joint air and space power
- Just War theory
- defending against surprise attack
- proliferation and weapons of mass destruction
- prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries
- military and diplomatic history

The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues:

March 1, 2007 (Issue 46, 3rd quarter 2007):
Intelligence and Technology
U.S. Strategic Command

June 1, 2007 (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007):
U.S. Pacific Command
Focus on China
SECDEF and CJCS Essay Contest Winners

September 1, 2007 (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008):
The Long War
Stability and Security Operations

December 1, 2007 (Issue 49, 2nd quarter 2008):
Homeland Defense
U.S. Northern Command

JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
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Letter to the Editor

To the Editor: I recently completed an 18-month tour of duty in Iraq, where I served at a logistics site, with a Special Forces A Team, with a maneuver battalion, and as a personal interpreter and cultural advisor to the commander of Task Force Freedom, a two-star command. This variety of jobs was possible due to my fluency in Arabic and familiarity with Arabic culture. I wanted to share some insights from my experience in Iraq in order to help deploying units, or those already there, better understand what we are doing right and what we can do better.

After 3 years in Iraq, it is clear that the coalition forces’ main mission has switched primarily from leading the fight against the growing insurgency to preparing the new Iraqi security forces to assume the counterinsurgency fight. It is a demanding and complicated mission to execute since it not only requires the coalition commander’s expertise, professionalism, and support, but also depends tremendously on our Iraqi counterparts’ will, dedication to their military, and their loyalty to Iraq itself. Therefore, during the first few months in country, coalition commanders should spend ample time interfacing with their Iraqi counterparts to build trust and confidence and to assess their loyalty, leadership, skills, and readiness level.

During the first few months, coalition commanders should seize every invitation for lunch, dinner, or simply a cup of tea or coffee with their Iraqi counterparts in order to build a bridge of trust and confidence. These meetings should go beyond lunches and dinners. Consider organizing joint activities such as soccer, group runs, picnics, and social gatherings; these activities create opportunities to understand how your counterparts think and work. Complete the cultural diversity training; it is a valuable tool for anyone working with Arabic culture. I wanted to share some insights from my experience in Iraq in order to help deploying units, or those already there, better understand what we are doing right and what we can do better.

The loyalty of our Iraqi security counterpart is something that local coalition commanders need to monitor closely because disloyalty can be a significant detriment to the
**Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4**

**China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools**

Economic imperatives and strategic challenges are leading China to expand its international activities into different regions of the world. In this paper, Dr. Phillip C. Saunders analyzes the rationale and drivers for China’s increased global activism; examines the tools China is employing and how they are being used; assesses the empirical evidence about priorities and patterns in China’s global activities; and considers whether these activities reflect an underlying strategic design. The paper concludes with an overview of likely future developments and an assessment of the implications for the United States. (Available from NDU Press only)

**Strategic Forum 222**

**Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?**

Transnational and geopolitical challenges are shaping the security environment in Southeast Asia. Rapid economic change, actual and potential disease epidemics, and a growing sense of shared interest and grievance among Islamic populations are among the region’s main transnational concerns. In its most extreme form, Islamist sentiment has manifested itself in jihadist movements, including some with connections to al Qaeda. (Available from NDU Press only)

**Strategic Forum 223**

**China, Russia, and the Balance of Power in Central Asia**

China and Russia increasingly seek to offset U.S. influence in Central Asia through enhanced cooperation conducted under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While its impact is often exaggerated, the SCO does offer certain benefits to the states of the region, as well as to Moscow and Beijing, that the United States can ill afford to ignore. (Available from NDU Press only)

**Strategic Forum 224**

**Combating Opium in Afghanistan**

Opium continues to pose one of the most serious threats to stability and good governance in Afghanistan. Proceeds and protection fees from trafficking are funneled to terrorist and insurgent groups, including the Taliban and al Qaeda. Insurgents have successfully leveraged poppy eradication efforts to increase popular resistance to both the government in Kabul and the presence of coalition forces. Despite major increases in counternarcotics programs and resources over the past year, production has shot up 59 percent. (Available from NDU Press only)

In their offices. Kurdish senior officers will often have a Kurdish flag and a picture of either Mustafa Barzani or Jalal Talabani (prominent Kurdish leaders of different political parties) in their offices.

Mustafa Barzani or Jalal Talabani (prominent Kurdish members of the new Iraqi security force) have a Kurdish flag and a picture of either Mustafa Barzani or Jalal Talabani (prominent Kurdish leaders of different political parties) in their offices.

It was almost impossible to meet a Kurdish member of the new Iraqi security forces who did not owe his loyalty to a specific political party, tribe, or personal agenda. Sometimes, even units in the Iraqi security forces secretly conduct operations under the banner of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or Kurdistan Democratic Party. This is especially true in the north, where the majority of the security forces are Kurds.

A large number of Kurdish commanders continue to draw a paycheck from Iraq and another from the Kurdistan government, since they are still considered to be part of the Peshmerga forces. In some cases, the heads of political parties in the north reprimanded battalion, brigade, or division commanders because they had taken corrective actions against their subordinate commanders who followed the party agenda. Weak leadership and politicians’ involvement in the Iraqi military outside of the chain of command can have a tremendous influence on the soldiers’ loyalty and organization readiness.

Similar situations have been reported in the south, where Iraqi soldiers display pictures of the scholar Muqtada Al Sadr on their weapons and patrol vehicles. The
Ministry of Interior forces, along with Shia death squads (the Badr and Mehdi brigades), openly conduct operations that target Sunni officials, Sunni scholars, and air force pilots who participated in the Iraq-Iran war. These acts are Shia retribution for long-term Sunni domination under Saddam Hussein.

Today, the new Iraqi security forces recruitment, promotion, and assignments are not based on merit, military education, or qualification, but instead rely more on the political party with which the soldier is affiliated. This approach results in recruiting and promoting soldiers and commanders who are weak. It also slows down training and coalition efforts.

During my time in Iraq and through my long conversations with the Iraqis, I discovered that if you are not Kurdish, it is very hard to get a job in today’s northern Iraqi forces, and in case you do get to apply, the administrative office in the Ministry of Defense may not process your application. Also, you may end up serving for months without getting paid, and of course you can only do that for so long before finding another way to provide for your family.

Sometimes Iraqi commanders with limited leadership ability used their command for personal gain and influence. Moreover, they failed to establish an effective command and control system over their organization despite repeated coaching and clear directives from their coalition forces partners. These leaders continued their military assignments without any action taken against them because they were affiliated with one of the strong political parties in Iraq. This is counter to the coalition forces initiatives for training and operations.

Local coalition commanders cannot rely solely on the Iraqi Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior to train and equip the new Iraqi army. Both ministries face budget constraints, corruption, sectarian differences, favoritism, lack of accountability, and nationalism. Local coalition commanders should take the initiative to train their Iraqi counterparts even if it is not part of their mission.

An approach that was very successful in northern Iraq (in the Tigris River valley south of Mosul) was the creation of a basic training course for both army and police forces. New Iraqi recruits learned basic marksmanship, first aid, close-quarter combat, map reading, checkpoint procedures, dismounted patrolling, military decision-making processes, prisoner interaction, and physical training. Also, coalition commanders founded a noncommissioned officer academy for advanced training. These early initiatives allowed both the coalition and their Iraqi counterparts to meld effectively and make both forces feel more comfortable during combined operations.

When Iraqi security forces are involved in gathering intelligence, planning operations, and leading operations, we find not only evidence but also insurgents that we were never able to get ourselves. This does not mean that the coalition forces do not have the capability to carry out these tasks alone but simply shows how much the Iraqis can contribute to the success of the fight because of their knowledge of the language, terrain, people, and culture. There were rumors that sometimes the Iraqi security forces were not fully complying with the Geneva Conventions—this is something that continues to be the focus of our trainers in both basic and advanced training.

The involvement of the Iraqi counterparts in the early stages of operation planning through execution allows them to understand how to conduct military operations better, why we conduct them the way we do, and the importance of each phase in the success of the overall mission. This is true whether it is gathering and analyzing intelligence, creating the mission operations order, planning the logistics side of the mission, or writing an after action report.

Involvement also allows coalition force commanders to monitor their counterparts’ progress closely since they spend more time with them than before. The combined intelligence phase (gathering and analyzing intelligence) is always critical to the coalition commander’s decisionmaking process. Joint discussions with counterparts, along with separate engagement with the sheiks or mokhtars of the area, allow the commander either to decide whether a combined operation is required or to allow the sheik, mokhtar, or imam to deal with the problem or convince a suspect to turn himself in for questioning.

The local coalition commander needs to know what is going on since there are many opportunities for graft and abuse. Since Iraq’s new government is busy fighting sectarian divisions and corruption within its ministries, a large number of Iraqi commanders continue to use their command position for financial gain. This costs the Iraqis and the coalition forces millions of dollars every month—money that could provide more uniforms, vehicles, and equipment for the Iraqi security forces. Two particular cases come to mind.

First, there have been numerous situations where Iraqi commanders in both the police and army claimed that their companies, battalions, or brigades have a greater number of soldiers than they really have in order to draw more money from the coalition or the ministry. Investigations conducted by the Defense and Interior ministries revealed thousands of fake names with some of them belonging to babies, children, and the elderly. The challenge is that no actions have been taken to correct the issue.

Second, due to the lack of tight judicial controls, there is the potential for false arrest and subsequent release after payment of a bribe. Furthermore, terrorists may be able to buy their way out of prison if control systems are not closely monitored.

During my tour in Iraq, I was able to work closely with numerous coalition commanders. The most successful ones were those who were aware of what went on in their areas of operation and what went on behind the scenes with their Iraqi counterparts. Today’s violence is not only the result of insurgents, but it is also a result of sectarian differences, corruption, loyalties, bad politics, and weak leadership. Therefore, local commanders need to be fully aware of what goes on around them in order to keep stability in their areas.

—Sergeant Mounir Elkhamri, USA
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Executive Summary

The two focus areas in this issue of Joint Force Quarterly are highly complementary. In the Forum, we explore lessons learned in the war on terror, and in the Special Feature section, the spotlight is on U.S. Joint Forces Command—a combatant command uniquely organized to ensure that the lessons learned by joint forces are not too severe. In addition to the excellent lineup of articles addressing both areas, JFQ has interviewed key leaders to provide broader coverage of the issues, pursuant to our mandate for continuing education in joint, integrated operations.

The war on terror is really a war on intolerance, and in this struggle the enemy targets the public will to resist and persevere. Success against movements opposed to personal freedom depends upon diplomatic, informational, and economic achievements because, as one of our authors points out, the struggle is very much one for words and ideas. To counter an enemy that seeks to justify the murder of innocents and all manner of criminal activity, our employment and understanding of legitimate force, military restraint, and cultural nuance are critical. Victory depends on U.S. ability to anticipate the behavior of a learning, adaptive enemy in the face of our simultaneous innovation, transformation, and success. To do this, public patience is critical, leaving little room for error.

The Forum begins with the insights of the Honorable Thomas O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Secretary O’Connell gives a detailed overview of his responsibilities before addressing Department of Defense reorganization to optimize for success in the war on terror. He goes on to outline the changes that he hopes to see in joint professional military education and to underline the high morale of the force, buttressed by the public’s support and commitment to this effort. If you read no other portion of this interview, read the Secretary’s answer to our final question.

Philip Wasielewski continues the Forum with an analysis of the war on terror inspired by the Clausewitzian admonition to understand, with precision, the nature of a prosecuted war. For those who have not studied the cultural roots of this conflict, Colonel Wasielewski traces the modern employment of terror from anarchism to al Qaeda in a very readable fashion. He concludes with three implications of his study for our evolving security strategy.

The next essay is a counterpoint to Secretary O’Connell’s assertion that there is no need for a unified commander (other than the President) in the war on terror. Kevin Stringer argues that unity of command demands a supreme military commander and makes his case in the context of global non-state terrorist networks and the risk of U.S. inefficiency, opportunity cost, and campaign incoherence. Dr. Stringer supports his assessment with three historical case studies that reveal the “pitfalls associated with commands structured for political reasons.” Is the return of a five-star billet necessary to preserve unity of command?

Our fourth Forum entry is a fascinating report from U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific, and its success in a theater of the war on terror that attracts few headlines. It addresses the question that General Pace posed to students at the National Defense University in December 2005: “How do we fight an enemy inside of countries with whom we are not at war?” General David Fridovich and Colonel Fred Krawchuk recommend an “indirect approach” to this situation.

The fifth installment is a provocative piece that makes the case for a new Service component as a natural evolutionary development following the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command as a combatant command. D. Robert Worley explains that the archaic notion of Services with primacy in warfare tied to the elements of land, sea, and air generates fundamental inefficiencies that are intolerable in the present conflict. Moreover, the skills, techniques, procedures, and experience critical to the conduct of small or decentralized wars are neglected or institutionally marginalized by Services focused on conflicts of greater severity. Dr. Worley challenges the viability of entrenched Service roles and recommends a comprehensive solution.

Our final lesson learned in this Forum is a timely exploration of the routes that our enemies may attempt to exploit in their expressed desire to deliver weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) on American soil. History, tradition, and practical experience have established legal precedent for the interdiction of WMD by land and sea, but aerial interdiction remains a thorny challenge that neither joint nor Service doctrine adequately addresses. Colonel J. Wesley Moore emphasizes that U.S. weakness in this necessary aspect of counter-WMD doctrine must be dealt with now, to help the world community inhibit proliferators more effectively.

A few words are in order concerning JFQ’s third change of command. All leaders bring to an organization a fresh perspective, and as a longtime reader and contributor, I have mine. As do our forces in the war on terror, the journal must learn and adapt to support our readership as adroitly as they themselves serve this great nation against threats to liberty. In this endeavor, we introduce for the first time additional content available only on our Web site in a format suitable for local reproduction and distribution. JFQ has always received excellent manuscripts that were not selected for publication because they either were too technical or spoke to a narrow readership. Henceforth, we are expanding our contents to include articles that are only viewable at ndupress.ndu.edu.

Beyond the Forum and Special Feature, readers will find essays truly worth their time, reflection, and feedback. I would like to call special attention to the final article in this issue by the celebrated historian Max Boot. Mr. Boot has been very generous to those of us in the profession of arms, lecturing at most major military schools and serving on the U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group. Our Recall installment is an excerpt from his new book, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History*. JFQ

---D.H. Gurney

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### CALL for Entries

#### THE 2007 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STRATEGIC ESSAY COMPETITION

For over a quarter of a century, the Chairman has challenged students at the Nation’s senior war colleges to think and write creatively about national security issues in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. National Defense University (NDU) Press will host the 26th annual competition on May 22–23, 2007, and judges from the participating colleges will select the winning essays—"the best of the best."

This year’s competition is open to joint professional military education students from all intermediate, advanced, and senior Service and joint schools, plus the Joint Forces Staff College. There are two categories: research essay and strategy article.

Start planning now. The deadline for nominated papers to be submitted to NDU Press via parent institutions is April 17, 2007.

**Winners Published in JFQ**

NDU Press will publish the 2007 winners as a Special Feature in the 4th quarter issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* (October 2007).

In addition, competition essays have made the grade in their own colleges, and NDU Press will consider all entries for publication in future issues of the journal.

*For detailed information, visit [www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm).*

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The Chairman’s Strategic Essay Contest is conducted by NDU Press with the generous financial support of the NDU Foundation. The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit 501 (c)(3) organization established in 1982 to support and enhance the mission and goals of National Defense University, America’s preeminent institution for military, civilian, and diplomatic national security education, research, outreach, and strategic studies. The main campus is located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC.
Long before September 11, scores of authors and scholars were tilling the fertile ground of the struggle against terror that has been dubbed the Long War. Several offerings of new scholarship, plus one from the distant past, are suggested for additional reading on this issue’s Forum topic.

**Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves**
by Brian Michael Jenkins
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006
222 pp. $19.95

Brian Jenkins began RAND’s terrorism research program in 1972 after serving in the Vietnam War in the Special Forces, and he is now senior advisor to the president of RAND. In *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves*, he has synthesized his shorter writings on terrorism from the past 6 years into a single volume that assesses the current situation, delves into the need for a deeper understanding of the terrorists and their motivations, prescribes a new set of strategic principles to guide our efforts in the Long War, and addresses how the Nation can strengthen itself. Jenkins is prone to the use of sweeping aphorisms (“Armied force alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological. . . .”) However, his careful explication of those aphorisms, combined with a willingness to take on some of the shibboleths of the past 5 years (“fighting them there instead of here,” the color-coded alert system) and a level-headed reminder to keep the terrorist threat in perspective, make for thought-provoking reading. Two appendices chronicle selected terror attacks since 9/11 and planned attacks that were thwarted or otherwise not realized.

**Is Iraq Another Vietnam?**
by Robert K. Brigham
New York: Public Affairs, 2006
207 pp. $24.00

Arguments will rage for years over whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a distraction from the Long War or an integral part of it. With the Iraq conflict entering its fourth year, some observers contend that it increasingly resembles another controversial conflict from U.S. history. In *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* Robert K. Brigham, a professor of history and international relations at Vassar College, cites evidence to both refute and support that contention. Distinctions, of which Brigham says there are an “overwhelming number,” include the size and scope of the wars, the transition from insurgency to war in one case and from war to insurgency in the other, and presence or absence of insurgency leadership and backing. But he contends that “three similarities may be more important to the outcome in Iraq and the long-term future of U.S. foreign relations”: the absence of a political corollary to U.S. military power, declining public support, and the challenge to American beliefs about the use of power. Brigham concludes that this third similarity presents the greatest danger: an “Iraq syndrome,” resembling the turn away from war and interventionism after the Vietnam conflict, could prevent a future President from using force when it is legitimately needed to protect national security.

**“How a Free People Conduct a Long War: A Chapter from English History”**
by Charles J. Stillé
Philadelphia: William S. and Alfred Martien, 1863
University of Michigan Historical Reprint Series, 2005
42 pp. $11.99
ISBN: 141819705X

Finally, some pages from history offer an interesting reminder that ours is hardly the first society to face a threat to our way of life requiring a response of indefinite duration. In 1863, Charles J. Stillé, a lawyer and historian, authored this short treatise in which he culls the English campaigns of the Peninsular War (1808–1814) during the Napoleonic wars for lessons on how the Union could prevail during the Civil War. Parallels between either of the wars and the current U.S. situation are tenuous at best, but the Duke of Wellington’s words to his officers could apply as well to the Long War as they did to Waterloo: “Hard pounding, this, gentlemen, but we’ll see who can pound the longest.”

—L. Yambrick
After 9/11, the transformation of the U.S. national security environment occurred largely through the emergence of new nonstate-based global security threats: the appearance of international terrorist networks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the recurrent phenomenon of failed states, the spread of transnational criminal organizations, and the advent of information warfare. As a result, decisionmakers, policymakers, diplomats, military leaders, and academics have all turned their attention to the subject of nonstate actors and, particularly, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs).

However, much of this focus on nonstate actors has been limited to one type: terrorists. A search on the Amazon.com Web site reveals almost 2,000 items for terrorism, and a similar search on Google.com produces over 81,500,000 hits. Many of the other new threats are as significant as terrorist threats, if not more so. For example, the continuing crisis in Darfur, which has drawn the attention of the world, involves both a failed state and other VNSAs, but not terrorists. Accordingly, studies that address the broad range of threats are more helpful than those with narrower focal points.

One such study is Warlords Rising, in which Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer establish a framework for understanding VNSAs in the present security environment. The authors claim that their approach, grounded in open systems theory, frames violent nonstate actors (or violent systems) “in such a way that it is relatively easy to translate important qualitative insights into the behavior of the system into quantitative models and simulations which can be used to stress-test ideas and to flesh out such foundational work” (p. 19). The design of the framework is to improve understanding of VNSAs in order to affect their development and performance.

The authors’ framework functions on the interrelated environmental, organizational, and internal operating levels. The environmental level looks at the conditions and dynamics that shape VNSA formation and development. The organizational level examines the holistic characteristics and relationships that enable VNSAs to prosper, adapt, and achieve goals. Lastly, the internal operating level focuses attention on the organization’s functions and their contributions to overall performance during periods of uncontested growth and in the context of a turbulent environment. The open systems methodology, then, is a universal framework for understanding a global problem set—that of violent nonstate actors.

The second part of the study looks at the utility of traditional approaches of deterrence and warfighting, but in light of the insights gained by open systems analysis. The result is an elevated methodology, then, is a universal framework for understanding VNSAs. The danger of this basis is that analysts neither get deep enough into those fields, nor have the actual mastery to complete the analysis. The authors do recognize the limitations of their work—specifically in that murky area of practical action. Translating theory into practice is always difficult, for no matter how much analysis occurs, other factors, planned and unplanned, will come into play in the real world. These factors upset the analysis, strategy, and corresponding actions of policymakers.

As former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan noted, while states remain the key players in the international system, nonstate actors will have a more significant role in the years ahead. Being able to understand them through detailed and developed analysis and in terms of practical action will be critical tasks for future decisionmakers and their staffs.

Warlords Rising is an excellent addition to the toolboxes of scholars, policymakers, and decisionmakers and their respective staffs. Perhaps the best endorsement of any text is its adoption in the classroom, which I have done for my own class on emerging security threats. Based on initial student response, I encourage others, both in and out of the classroom, to adopt this text too.
Historically, most wars have been conducted by coalitions fighting to achieve common military goals, yet the minor partners of these associations tend to go unrecognized. Even today, most Americans would be challenged to name any state, other than the United Kingdom, that is serving with the U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. In these, as in most campaigns, the military efforts of smaller partners are usually either merged with the performance of the dominant state or ignored altogether. Certainly that is the case of the Axis powers in World War II. Germany has dominated the literature, with only an occasional mention of Italian military operations, especially in regard to the war in North Africa. Other partners, such as Hungary and Romania, are all but disregarded by writers, and the specific details of their ordeal are known only to the most specialized students of the conflict.

Richard L. DiNardo, a professor at the Marine Corps University and author of several works on Adolf Hitler’s military forces, explores this relatively unknown aspect of the war in Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse. The book’s primary focus is on Germany’s effectiveness as a senior coalition partner. By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, four governments actively supported Germany in the field: Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Finland. DiNardo dismisses the Tripartite Pact with Japan as an agreement with little consequence in the European conflict, as Japan fought a parallel war with different aims, and its military activity had no effect on Germany’s military undertakings. As DiNardo points out, Prussia’s and Germany’s histories of coalition warfare were extensive, although not very instructive. Prussia fought as part of coalitions in both the Seven Years’ and Napoleonic Wars, experiences soon forgotten by military professionals. The Great War of 1914 saw the Second Reich fighting alongside of, and gaining a wealth of experience from its partnership with, Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Yet by the time Hitler assumed power, the German General Staff had essentially forgotten past lessons, no longer making them the subject of either military education or intellectual debate.

Although his chapters are chronologically arranged, DiNardo investigates the Nazi relationship with three different components of the coalition: Italy, the major ally; Finland, which fought a parallel war in the north; and the feuding duo of Hungary and Romania. Italy was Germany’s most important and troublesome partner. DiNardo devotes a major portion of the text to examining this relationship, especially in North Africa and the Balkans, and during Operation Barbarossa. While most readers are aware of Italian operations in the first two theaters, the Italian contribution to the war against the Soviet Union is somewhat obscure. The scale of Mussolini’s commitment was somewhat surprising, with 75,000 dead and missing after Stalingrad alone. Not only did Italy contribute important forces on land, but also the Italian navy supplied 10 torpedo boats and several submarines to a flotilla on the Black Sea. This force—according to DiNardo, part of the most successful German-led coalition operation of the war—defeated Soviet efforts to support their operations on the Crimean Peninsula.

DiNardo does an excellent job of explaining the dynamics of the German-Finnish relationship and how the Finns maintained their independence in the process. Hitler needed the Scandinavian state because of nickel mines at Petsamo, and the Finns needed German help to regain the lands lost to the Soviets in the 1939 war. Because it mastered this complicated relationship, Finland refrained from enraging Stalin during hostilities and was the only border nation not to host Soviet occupation troops at the end of the war.

Probably the most interesting aspect of this story is the participation of Hungarian and Romanian forces. DiNardo traces the countries’ history back to the Treaty of Trianon in 1919, the provisions of which took about 70 percent of Hungarian territory and distributed it to its neighbors, primarily Romania. As a result, the states hated each other, and German commanders had to watch both contingents to ensure that they did not pull out of the war to fight between themselves.

DiNardo’s bottom line is that the German management of the coalition was generally aimless. The efforts of the various players were uncoordinated, and Hitler never convened a conference of his allies. Although the Wehrmacht, especially early in the war, had excellent equipment, little of it found its way to the partners. While there were bright spots in coalition cooperation, such as Italian efforts on the Black Sea and Romanian air defense at Ploesti, it was generally ineffective.

This book does have its limitations. DiNardo expects readers to have a working knowledge of the war and the key campaigns, as the book is not a study of strategy, operations, or tactics. In addition, some readers may be disappointed by the absence of significant discussion of other contingents such as the Spanish Blue Legion, Slovakian or Bulgarian units, or forces from occupied Europe or the liberated regions of Eastern Europe, such as Latvia and Estonia. DiNardo focuses on those powers that were essential combatants in Germany’s coalition warfare. With this minor caveat, readers will find Germany and the Axis Powers an excellent read from beginning to end, full of insights into an unfamiliar side of World War II. JFQ
Robert Cassidy, who has served as a Special Operations Forces battalion commander and authored a book on peacekeeping (Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War, Praeger, 2004), examines the problems that major powers face in dealing with modern counterinsurgency. He focuses on how national military cultures affect nations’ approaches to dealing with asymmetric warfare and provides three case studies as a base of analysis: the United States, Britain, and Russia.

Cassidy is on solid ground in his highly critical analysis of the U.S. military in its understanding of modern counterinsurgency. He argues that despite extensive experience with counterinsurgency, the U.S. military is generally indifferent to such warfare because of a traditional intellectual preference for big conventional wars, in which advantages in resources and technology give the Nation an unquestioned edge. Cassidy is spot on in his critique that the U.S. military leadership since Vietnam has generally resisted trying to understand the very different requirements of fighting unconventional enemies. This approach, which has its roots deep within U.S. military tradition, forces planners to relearn many of the basic principles that should have been learned through the counterinsurgency operations of the past. There is nothing really new in this analysis, as many authors have discussed the Armed Forces’ lack of basic understanding of counterinsurgency since they became engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Still, it is important to keep hammering the point home, as the U.S. military needs to fundamentally alter its view of counterinsurgency if it wants to succeed in these operations.

In discussing the cultures of militaries with which he does not have personal experience, the author is much weaker. In examining London’s response to counterinsurgency issues, Cassidy correctly points out that the British military takes the study of counterinsurgency much more seriously than does the U.S. military (Northern Ireland made sure of that). But all too often, the author buys into the popular myths concerning Britain’s special competence in counterinsurgency. For example, he emphasizes that since the massacre at Amritsar in 1919, the British have employed the principle of minimum force in countering insurgents. In fact, many British counterinsurgency efforts have been marred by excessive force and major human rights violations. The operations in Malaya and Cyprus saw numerous incidents of brutality, and the excessive force the British used in Cyprus worked powerfully to turn popular opinion against retaining the island as a colony. Several recent major works have exposed the horrendous behavior of British forces in suppressing the insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s, in which the violence against the native population is reminiscent of the French approach in Algeria. For some good revisionist history and a needed corrective, Caroline Elkins’ Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London: Pimlico, 2005) offers a counterpoint to the view of the “softer” British approach to counterinsurgency.

The author reviews the problems the Russian military has had in fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Because Cassidy does not read Russian, he is unable to access primary sources and thus must rely on secondary sources in English and French. He points out that the Soviets and Russians have employed an overly conventional approach. But the failure to develop an integrated counterinsurgency doctrine lies less within the military culture than within the strategic reality of the Russian state. Despite vast natural resources and an educated population, centuries of incompetent and autocratic rule have made Russia a third-world state in which the government has expended the national wealth in creating a huge military establishment. Simply put, the Soviets, and now the Russians, have only one tool in the box to fight insurgents. Unlike the major Western powers, which learned the importance of employing civic action and economic development programs to win over the population, the Russians have no resources but the military to conduct the fight and consequently have nothing positive to offer disgruntled populations.

The last chapter is the best, for there Cassidy provides an overview of some of the most effective tactics employed by major and minor powers in combating insurgencies since World War II. Tactics include the creation of special units of ex-insurgents to fight insurgents, a method employed effectively by the Rhodesians in their war, and by the French in Algeria.

In general, the book is a good effort but brings little in the way of new information or original discussion to the table. Parts are useful additions to the ongoing debate on counterinsurgency, but the book should not make it to the top of any reading lists on the subject. JFQ

Dr. James S. Corum is a Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
JFQ: For those who are not familiar with the breadth and depth of your duties, could you speak to your mission and responsibilities?

Secretary O’Connell: Title 10, Section 138 of the U.S. Code requires my position to provide civilian oversight of special operations activities of the Department of Defense [DOD]. As a principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters, I am responsible for ensuring that our Special Operations Forces [SOF] of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and now Marines are appropriately tasked and employed and that senior policymakers, to include our interagency partners, understand SOF capabilities as well as their limitations. I provide policy oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] programs and am dedicated to ensuring our elements continue to be the best trained, best equipped, most flexible, and effective fighting force available to our country. I consult closely with General Doug Brown, the commander of USSOCOM, on a wide range of special operations policy issues. I am also an executive member and co-chair of USSOCOM’s board of directors, the command’s executive resource body.

In the interagency arena, I, along with selected members of the Joint Staff, serve as the Defense Department’s representation on the Counter-Terrorism Security Group, the National Security Council staff body that considers national counterterrorism issues and potential responses. This oversight, advisory, interagency response, and consultation effort helps us shape a SOF program and budget that stresses force readiness and sustainability and provides sufficient force structure to meet the demands of the geographic combatant commanders and General Brown in his role as the supported commander in the global war on terrorism.

My office also works with other DOD components to institutionalize our capabilities for stability operations, which involve such tasks as providing basic security, humanitarian assistance, and essential services, as well as rule of law and governance in failed or at-risk states of strategic importance. The recent issue of a new DOD Directive on Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations underscores the importance that DOD attaches to this mission. The department must be prepared to fill critical gaps in stability operations when civilian partners are not available or when the security situation precludes civilian involvement. We are concurrently working with a range of partners, within the U.S. Government and among international and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], as well as host nation counterparts, to bolster the capacity of civilian providers to satisfy these fundamental social requirements, which are critical to achieving long-term security in the current environment.

The recent passage of Sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006 provides the department with new latitude. Both sections recognize the need for the Department of Defense to operate in close coordination with the Department of State on matters related to building partnership capacity and to provide DOD support for reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance for foreign nations. Both Sections 1206 and 1207 authorize expenditures to support these two
programs that provide the ability for other nations to counter threats against their government, to provide support to global efforts to combat terrorism, and to create those forces that serve to deny terrorists the ability to recruit, train, and plan their operations.

Finally, I oversee the department’s counter-narcotics mission. This is a two-pronged mission. The first mission is to detect and monitor aerial and maritime drug trafficking within the transit zone. To do this, we use DOD systems and work with nations in or near global smuggling routes to gather information on narcotics networks. We analyze the information and collate it with other sources of information available to the department and provide it to U.S. and foreign security forces to disrupt the networks.

The second mission is to train and equip U.S. and foreign security forces to build capacity to disrupt narcotics networks. This mission area fits neatly in the low-intensity conflict spectrum of activities and is critical to achieving long-term stability in the current strategic environment. The ties between narcotics traffickers, terrorist groups, and insurgent groups are clear; they assist each other in financing operations and in smuggling activities involving people and contraband, and are clearly networked to pose a threat to the security of the United States and to the stability and security of many countries in the world. Significant recent seizures and arrests conducted by the Drug Enforcement Agency and Coast Guard were assisted by Defense Department assets and activities, including the Joint Interagency Task Force–South at Key West, Florida.

**JFQ: We have been heavily engaged in the global war on terror or Long War for over 5 years now. Has the Secretary’s mandate changed in the 3 years since you assumed your duties? Have your personal goals for this tour of duty altered?**

Secretary O’Connell: The phrase Long War can be somewhat misleading. The strategy and tactics used by terrorist and insurgent groups along with criminals have existed for some period, and they certainly started well before the events of September 11, 2001. The significant change over a period of years has been the extent of networking and support between different groups, which has increased the difficulty of dealing with them. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld understands the need to address an entire network structure along with the underlying conditions that provide either active or passive support to terrorists and insurgents. The Department of Defense now has almost every activity working issues related to the war on terror: the Joint Staff, all combatant commands, the Services, defense agencies, and the DOD staff. This issue has transcended the original SO/LIC [Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict] charter. The proposed reorganization of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will likely reflect an entirely new construct for dealing with the war on terror.

My personal goals have not changed since assuming my duties over 3 years ago. What was evident to me at the time was the need for increased cooperation within the Department of Defense, within the interagency community, and with our partners both domestically and overseas. We have helped to improve the level of cooperation with all of those elements. Cooperation is absolutely essential to make progress against terrorists and insurgents who are much more transnational in their approach and networking than ever before. Another personal goal that I still hold and have not wavered from is to ensure that the forces available to us are used in the best manner possible. More often than not, this means thinking in nontraditional terms to ensure that we are able to address problems in a cross-cutting fashion whenever possible. One simple example is the leverage from our work in counter-narcotics that helps attack terrorist finances and their means of smuggling contraband.

A third personal goal that I still hold from the day I took my oath is to ensure that our SOF, our civilian work force, and their families are given credit for their service to the Nation and that they are treated with dignity and respect. I always learn a great deal when I listen to them. They can be brutally candid and that can actually lead to powerful forces for change and improvement. One of the four SOF truths is that humans are more important than hardware. If nothing else, I hope that my legacy will be that I believed in and supported the human element in SOF.

**JFQ: The enemy in the war on terror uses a number of techniques to prevent the United States and its allies from bringing their superior technology and conventional forces to bear on them: they collocate with civilians and religious structures, target innocents, torture and murder captives, and commit suicide. Pundits say that we, just as the British did in the Revolutionary War, constrain ourselves with rules that will spell our defeat. Why are they wrong?**

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Secretary O’Connell: As I previously stated, the term Long War can be misleading and open to misinterpretation. We do have a single unified commander for war. That person is the Commander in Chief. He exercises his leadership through the development of national strategies and tasks all the elements of the executive branch to contribute their part through the issuance of Presidential directives and Executive orders.

Our nation has been served well through separation of powers along with the attendant system of checks and balances. As it pertains to terrorism, dealing with networked terrorists means that we must consider regional as well as individual nation-state concerns as we attack the network. This requires an extended interagency approach that may emphasize diplomacy in one location, law enforcement elsewhere, and military intervention in another. USSOCOM took the lead in developing plans to address military operations to synchronize the war on terror. These plans also involved DOD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and others including our interagency partners. These classified plans clearly recognize the need for an interagency effort to prosecute the war on terror. Synchronization of effort between the combatant commands on any issue breaks new ground. I am satisfied that USSOCOM has worked diligently and effectively with the other combatant commands and the Joint Staff to develop a methodology to synchronize the war on terror. In due course, USSOCOM will have to develop an interagency approach, and I believe they are already there.

JFQ: Is terrorism today really low-intensity conflict? If so, does WMD proliferation not threaten to make it high intensity?

Secretary O’Connell: Terrorism is a tactic or a method that is eminently suited for use by individuals or small groups. When conducted in this manner, terrorism is low-intensity conflict as it falls short of warfare with another nation-state. Terrorist use of WMD still would fall into the category of low-intensity conflict, although the results might cause a large number of deaths and have other impacts on our infrastructure or government. The use of WMD would be elevated to a high-intensity conflict—that is, war against one or more nations—when another nation or nations sponsor the use of WMD by a terrorist group or use it against another nation.

JFQ: Would you like to see any changes in joint professional military education [JPME] emphasis for developing military professionals prompted by the war on terror?

Secretary O’Connell: I very definitely would like to see changes. I commend the Joint Staff and the Services for reviewing what needs to be done and for directing ongoing modifications to JPME. In short, more education is needed on the phenomena of terrorism and insurgency, on future threats and how to deal with them, and how a joint, combined, coalition, and interagency approach to these threats can provide a way ahead. We need to educate our leaders better in different approaches to terrorism and insurgency and to demonstrate how they can blend coalition efforts with our own forces. The use of civil affairs, information operations, to include psychological operations, and building partner capacity are important subjects embodied in counterinsurgency operations. In conjunction with USSOCOM, we have worked to ensure that education, not just training, remains a significant priority. The Joint Special Operations University has expanded its offerings to address shortcomings and has actively reached out to the senior Service schools to increase education on these types of subjects.

My office also oversees the Regional Counterterrorist Fellowship Program, which seeks to develop an international network of counterterrorist practitioners through a variety of educational offerings. Since the beginning of the program a few years ago, over 7,500 foreign military and governmental...
officials have participated in its offerings. We clearly recognize the fact that coalition efforts are more critical to a successful strategy than are unilateral operations.

**JFQ:** In the war on terror, everybody seems to be a Monday morning quarterback. Some of our allies pay lip service and then row gently in the opposite direction for parochial interests. Few learn of our greatest successes, and pundits seem outraged only on the enemy’s behalf. How is morale in this environment, and is this not increasingly reminiscent of public disenchantment during Vietnam?

**Secretary O’Connell:** We certainly have had our share of Monday morning quarterbacking, but there has also been a very strong and significant body of people who support our efforts against insurgency and terrorism. Often, their efforts to learn lessons, to adapt, and to improve are construed to mean that they are against our efforts. That is unfortunate, and I urge my staff to be open-minded and to accept constructive criticism.

With respect to our allies, we can easily forget that they may not have the resources to sustain efforts. We also sometimes forget that democratic countries have the right to determine their own paths. We often fail to see how other nations continue to support efforts to quell insurgency and terrorism. Here are three short examples: the United Arab Emirates has done excellent work in providing troops to Afghanistan along with sponsoring reconstruction efforts in that country, Lebanon, and other locations. France and Canada are fighting alongside our troops in Afghanistan. Japan pushed the legal limits of their constitution by placing troops in Iraq.

As for morale, there is absolutely no comparison between Vietnam and what is happening today. Our troops are challenged with a high operations tempo and repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. There are psychological stresses associated with that tempo. However, their morale is still high. In part, this is attributable to the dedication found in our all-volunteer force. In addition, I know of numerous efforts where the American public is very quietly supporting our troops and their families in many ways. The polls show that the public is still behind our military, unlike Vietnam, and that the extent of antiwar sentiment is far less than what was seen in Vietnam. There is an amazing support network among the American people that operates largely below the radar screen and out of the media spotlight. To see an example, go to www.americasupportsyou.com. One of the high honors of holding this office involves attending SOF funerals at Arlington. When you look into the eyes of survivors and listen to their words, you detect no sense of quitting. In fact, there is an inspiring sense of wanting to get the job done. Morale is very high.

Dealing with many disparate and complex issues that require a large number of governmental agencies, different countries, numerous private companies, and NGOs to achieve our goals. Warfare is inherently inefficient because the environment is difficult to control and is subject to the vagaries of human interaction. Whereas we can attain a high level of efficiency and coordination in a controlled environment, such as the manufacturing sector, we cannot expect the same degree of coordination and efficiency in warfare. Nonetheless, one of the attributes displayed since 9/11 is the ability to work toward better coordination of effort. We have made good progress, but we should not accept the status quo and should seek continual improvement. Another key element is the absolute ability of U.S. personnel to innovate when it comes to combat. I am continually amazed at their creative approach to very tough situations. No other armed forces in the world can match their creativeness.

There are other efforts not only within DOD but also at the interagency and international levels to improve coordination. A few examples are the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the Atlantic Alliance efforts in Afghanistan.

**JFQ:** The President has observed that “the United States will not wait to be attacked again, but will go after the terrorists where they live.” Why is it that we have yet to see USSOCOM leading an effort as a supported combatant command?

**Secretary O’Connell:** There are elements of USSOCOM that have been supported by forces assigned to another combatant command. Some are classified missions. In addition, USSOCOM and the Joint Staff have worked diligently on a series of Executive orders that have been coordinated with the other combatant commands and signed by Secretary Rumsfeld. These are also classified. There seem to be any examples of joint or interagency efforts as coordinated as possible?

**Secretary O’Connell:** Numerous Federal agencies, allies, and partners in industry are working unique aspects of the war on terror. Are these disparate efforts as coordinated as possible?

**Secretary O’Connell:** Of course not. There is always room for improvement when it comes to coordination of effort. We are
powerful military definition. The nature of the conflict we are involved in today extends across combatant command geographic boundaries and involves numerous small operations. These operations are frequently clandestine in nature and are not visible to the public. They are occurring, they are succeeding, and USSOCOM is being supported as necessary. The President and Secretary of Defense have characterized the nature of the Islamic threat we face. I fully agree with them. The dark vision of tyranny shared by a few fanatics has boiled over across the world. The strategy of overseas engagement is bold and correct. USSOCOM will have much more to do over the next decades.

**JFQ:** "The most intractable safe havens for terrorists tend to exist along international borders in Asia, Africa, and South America where there is ineffective governance," according to a fact sheet issued by the State Department. Should we feel obligated to observe sovereign borders when the host nation is ineffective?

**Secretary O’Connell:** The President has stated, "Nations that harbor or support terrorists are equally guilty as the terrorists, and will be held to account." America does have ways to assist nations that have had historical success. They range from urging international participation, such as peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, unilateral aid from the United States to a particular country, assistance in training and equipping their security forces, to softer options such as the use of civil projects to increase popular support for the existing government. All of these options respect sovereignty. In some cases, there may be great difficulty in providing direct help to a failing or failed state. Somalia is an example. Our attention in that type of situation may well swing toward containment of a conflict within that country’s borders and to stem the spillover into surrounding nations.

**JFQ:** What is the greatest challenge on your near-term agenda?

**Secretary O’Connell:** Other than getting my wife to finish the remodeling of our home in Maine that is over budget and behind schedule, I want to build a DOD team that is capable of supporting the department across a wide range of issues. The SO/LIC staff has worked extremely hard to develop new authorities. Now we have to use them wisely to advance our capabilities to defend the Nation and eliminate our enemies.

**JFQ:** We often see the President jogging with injured veterans and Secretary Rumsfeld visiting recuperating Servicemembers at Bethesda and Walter Reed. What special moments have come your way in the present conflict?

**Secretary O’Connell:** As I mentioned earlier, I have had the high honor to join USSOCOM flag and general officers in paying tribute to our fallen SOF personnel during Arlington funerals. On one recent occasion, I watched about 300 members of the 5th Special Forces Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, attend the Arlington funeral of a fallen member. This was a special occasion, as the deceased Special Forces noncommissioned officer was what we call an “X-ray” or a "walk-on" to the Green Beret family. A Sudanese native, this young man received his college degree from a prestigious west coast university and decided to enlist with Army Special Forces. After completing all his training, this Arabic-speaking Muslim served with the 5th Special Forces Group in Iraq, where he was killed in action during an assault on a terrorist position. The sight of so many Special Forces Soldiers standing in spit-shined boots and green berets interspersed among Muslim mourners at Arlington as they raised their hands in prayer struck me as a uniquely American military moment. I wanted to be able to tell Americans and my DOD colleagues what this moment signified. I just wish I had the skill and perspective to do so. JFQ
On September 11, 2001, America was attacked not by a nation-state but by a nonstate group. Now the Nation is involved in a war on terror—but what type of war is it? Although America has used military force against nonstate groups, such as Pancho Villa’s troops in 1916 and Jean LaFitte’s pirates in the early 19th century, it has never considered such operations a “war.”

Defining the type of war we are engaged in means also defining our goals. If the policy goal is the destruction of all terrorist groups with global reach, will the war on terror thus be a series of counterinsurgency campaigns, a war of covert actions, or a series of preventative wars? Properly defining the war on terror follows the Clausewitzian dictum, “The supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

Who are we fighting, and what is their nature? What kind of war is the “war on terror,” and what is its nature? And what are the implications for future U.S. security strategy? This article attempts to answer these questions by providing an overview of terrorism. It then delves into the specific threat from Sunni Islamic extremism and describes its ideological basis and goals. Next, it looks at al Qaeda. Based on these analyses, the article concludes with plausible answers to the foregoing questions and possible implications for national security strategy.

Terrorism: The Idea and the Deed

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, which is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. This definition is crucial for creating a framework in which to answer questions of what type of war we are fighting and what policy goals it should achieve. The DOD definition makes a direct connection between terrorist acts and specific goals, which is important in linking terrorism to policy and therefore giving political context. When one reviews this political context, it becomes clear that terrorism is not a modern phenomenon.

The Travels of Marco PoI tells of the Old Man of the Mountain, who kept a stable of assassins and dispatched them to murder neighboring princes who might be at odds with him, using calculated violence to inculcate fear for political purpose. This centuries-old example shows that politically motivated terrorism may be as old as politics.

Modern terrorism, however, has been a weapon of the weak in their attempt to bring down the strong. The first modern terrorist movement, known as anarchism, arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Anarchism was inspired by a utopian idea that revolted against the inequalities of the early capitalist period. According to Barbara Tuchman, anarchists believed that property was “the monarch of all evil,” and if it were eliminated, “no man could again live off the labor of another and human nature would be released to seek its natural level of justice among men.” Since owners would not release their property voluntarily, only a revolution could...
topple the structure and install a “new social order of utter equality and no authority.” The only thing wanting for the masses to arise and fulfill this idea was a spark—an act—to show them the way. The anarchist’s task was to awaken the masses by propaganda of word and of deed (an attack against a major symbol of the current order that would one day flash the signal for revolt).

During this period, several world leaders were assassinated in the name of the deed. There was no real leadership; rejection of all authority doomed anarchism since the movement opposed the concept of organization it needed to reach its goals. Moreover, there was no leadership hierarchy between the (usually well-born) philosophers of the idea and the (usually poverty-stricken) perpetrators. Social reforms and police action killed the movement by the end of the century. Its energy morphed into trade unionism in the Western democracies, while its energy was funneled into Vladimir Lenin’s revolution of 1917 in Russia. But the movement established itself as the first worldwide terrorism phenomenon of nonstate actors using targeted violence to fulfill political goals.

Many national liberation movements in the post–World War II environment used terrorism as a tactic to gain political goals of independence. Examples include the Israeli Stern Gang bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946, the Mau Mau use of terror against European farmers in Kenya in the 1950s, and the deeds of Palestinian and Provisional Irish Republican Army operatives. Other groups used terrorism to pursue ideological goals, however ephemeral, such as the Japanese Red Army and the Italian Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s.

What all these groups—Jewish, Catholic, Muslim, atheist, African, European, Asian, Middle Eastern, nihilist, religious, nationalist, or socialist—had in common was their calculated use of unlawful violence to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that were generally political, religious, or ideological. Terrorism is thus an old tactic that transcends race, creed, and nation and adapts to almost any type of religious, political, or ideological goal.

To understand this phenomenon, we must review the different types of organized terrorism—mainly those used by religious militants, more specifically al Qaeda. Jessica Stern identifies three organizational models religious militants use: inspirational leaders and their followers, lone-wolf avengers, and commanders and their cadres.

According to Stern, inspirational leaders and their followers use moral suasion rather than cash to influence their followers, appealing to higher-order deficiency needs, including the desire to be part of a community and gain recognition for one’s achievements. They inspire “leaderless resisters” and lone-wolf avengers rather than cadres. They run networks, or virtual networks, rather than bureaucracies, and they encourage franchises. Inspirational leaders rarely break the law themselves. Stern cites a violent segment of the anti-abortion movement in the United States where leaders use Web sites not only to identify and target doctors but also to inspire others to acts of violence against them. The inspirational leaders model is also a good description of the 19th-century anarchist movement.

Lone-wolf avengers are similar to followers of inspirational leaders, but instead of acting on a higher calling from a leader, they are often directed by internally based pathologies, frustrations, or impulses. Lone wolves often develop their own ideologies, combining personal vendettas with religious or political grievances. The Washington, DC, area sniper John Allen Mohammed, Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, and Mir Aimal Kansi, who attacked employees of the Central Intelligence Agency outside its headquarters in 1993, are examples. Although these were domestic cases, this model has potential for a future wave of international terrorism.

The model of commanders and their cadres is hierarchical and is found in many terrorist movements. Commanders recruit cadres based on appeals to a higher cause as well as the more immediate needs of food, shelter, and safety. Rewards and punishments play an important role in the organization. Although many initially join for a higher cause, they may continue their participation for the material benefits, whether they are monetary rewards or a sense of belonging. Lashkar-e Taiba, which recruits young men from the madrassas in Pakistan to fight in Kashmir, is such a group.

Stern describes al Qaeda as the ultimate terror organization and worthy of a model in itself. In her view, it is hierarchical, with cadres, managers, and commanders. Cadres consist of skilled and unskilled labor. According to Stern, al Qaeda has changed its organizational style since 9/11 to counteract the loss of its original leadership and now relies on an ever-shifting network of sympathetic groups and individuals, including the Southwest Asian jihadi groups, franchise
some Muslims began to believe that a return to early Islam—Islam of the sword—could regenerate their society

influence on those who fight the modern-day jihad.

For many Muslims, the Golden Age of their faith was the time of the Prophet Mohammed and his four immediate successors, when Islam spread rapidly throughout the Arabian Peninsula and beyond—before the split between Sunni and Shia and before early Islamic achievements were destroyed by the invading Mongols. Yet the main theoretical foundations are more recent. Al Qaeda’s ideology has its origins in the late 19th-century attempts to modernize faith and society in Egypt. These efforts became known as Salafism to honor the supposedly uncorrupted early Muslim predecessors (salafrs) of today’s Islam. The Salafi strategy is based on two tenets: Islam became decadent because it strayed from the righteous path; and recapturing the glory of the Golden Age requires a return to the authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Mohammed and his companions.

Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani (1839–1897) was the modern-day founder of Salafism. He taught in Cairo and believed that a return to the path led by Mohammed and his original followers could create a spiritual revival of the faith. He also believed that with this spiritual renewal of Muslim society, the Muslim world would soon develop the intellectual equipment to redress the West’s technological and military advantages.

The next Egyptian spiritual thinker to develop these ideas was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949). He sought to unite and mobilize Muslims against the cultural and political domination of the West. When Banna reached an accommodation with King Farouk, however, the more radical members of the movement began searching for other leadership.

One of these former members of the Muslim Brotherhood was Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who developed the theological justification for jihad against other Muslims and the need to remove corrupt Muslim rulers. Before Qutb, one of the most feared concepts in Muslim thinking was fitna, the state of chaos or disunity of two civil wars that tore the Muslim community apart within a half century of the Prophet’s death, resulting in the Shia-Sunni split. According to most Muslim scholars, even a poor Muslim ruler was better than fitna.

Qutb, however, took a line of reasoning that harked back to the days of the Mongol invasions, when it was believed that the Arabs could not wage jihad against the Mongols because the invaders too had accepted Islam. But a contemporary Muslim scholar, Taqi ad-Din Ahmed ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), argued that since the Mongols did not use Islamic sharia law and instead maintained their own tribal laws, they were not really Muslims but apostates and therefore legitimate targets of jihad.

Referring to jahiliyya, the state of barbarism and ignorance that prevailed among the Arabs before Mohammed’s revelations, Qutb argued that modern secular Muslim leaders were illegitimate not only because they did not follow sharia but also because they had reverted to jahiliyya. This reasoning was used to justify opposition to Nasser’s secular policies. Qutb was jailed for his teachings and hung for sedition in 1966.

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, a theologian for an extremist group in Egypt, spread Qutb’s message among those opposed to Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, and his peace policy toward Israel. He wrote a manifesto entitled The Neglected Duty that called for attacks against secular Muslim rulers and developed a strategy for defeating the near enemy (apostate Muslim regimes that had to be attacked and overthrown) before the far enemy (Israel, the United States, and the West in general).

The modern Salafi philosophy was codified by the mid-1970s, but it needed two events to galvanize it into an organization. The first occurrence was the Soviet war with Afghanistan. The second was the failure of Islamic extremists to overthrow the secular Egyptian government. These events sparked the beginning of al Qaeda in its present form.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a broad reaction in the Islamic world. Muslim nation-states supported Western efforts to undermine the incursion both to assist their coreligionists and to protect their geopolitical position from further encroachments. Some Muslim states also used the jihad against the Soviets as a safety valve, sending their own disaffected youths in hopes that they would be more engaged in fighting communism than finding fault with their own societies.
The Afghan commander who invited the first Arab jihadists to fight was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Islamic scholar who studied in Cairo prior to the invasion. To assist the movement of Arabs into Afghanistan, a Palestinian, Sheik Abdallah Azzam, created the Mekhtab al-Khidemat (Service Bureau) to address administrative problems for volunteers and the Bait al-Anser (House of Supporters) to house them. For Azzam, Afghanistan was the first step in a worldwide jihad to recapture lost lands. However, his view of jihad was essentially defensive, arguing for recapture of old Muslim lands but not the conquest of new ones. His assistant was young Osama bin Laden, and the two worked throughout the 1980s supporting the Afghan jihad.

During this time, the efforts of the Egyptian underground movement to overthrow the secular regime of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak failed. The movement split into two groups, Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Islamic Jihad Group. Al-Zawahiri, a medical doctor, was arrested and later exiled to Saudi Arabia. He then moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, and worked with Azzam and bin Laden, treating wounded mujahidin and supporting the Egyptian underground movement to overthrow the secular regime of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak. Azzam disagreed with Faraj's teachings, stating that jihad should not be waged against Muslim rulers with Faraj's teachings, stating that jihad should not be waged against Muslim rulers or Muslim regimes to hitting their erstwhile supporter, the United States. This led to a chain of attacks, from the Kenyan and Tanzanian U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998 to the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and finally to September 11.

**The al Qaeda Mind**

To the popular imagination, the 9/11 hijackers and other al Qaeda members are mentally disturbed—after all, only a depraved mind would hijack a plane to kill innocents and themselves in such a horrific way or would seek weapons of mass destruction to commit even worse horrors—or they are impoverished, single young men with no hope of a future, unaware of the benefits of modern Western society, who were brainwashed in medieval madrassas since infancy.

According to data on 172 known al Qaeda terrorists, none of the assumptions is true. A minuscul number showed only a trace of sociopathic aberration. Actually, antisocial personalities would find it difficult to work in such an organizational structure. Nor were many particularly religious in early life; most attended secular schools. Instead of poor, ignorant, single young men with no knowledge of the West, most were middle- to upper-middle-class, highly educated, married, and middle-aged. Most had traveled to or lived in the West.

What drew most terrorists to the Salafi philosophy was a sense of alienation and loss when they moved into new environments, most often urban and Western...
Once they had selected themselves for involvement, they attempted to join al Qaeda by finding facilitators with access to the global jihad. These contacts provided hubs that interacted between the top leadership of al Qaeda and the three main sources of its cadres (Muslims from Southeast Asia, the core Arab states, and the Maghreb). Once access was established, these volunteers attended training camps. Only the most dedicated were invited for further training and then to participate in missions.

By this method, al Qaeda leadership recruited, vetted, trained, and tested its cadres. The results were seen on September 11, 2001. Instead of crazed lunatics, the enemy was a well-trained and dedicated foe who hated us. What probably surprised America most were the lengths some would go to in the name of ideology.

**What Must Be Done**

The enemy we are fighting is both a terrorist organization and an ideological movement. The original structure has evolved from a hierarchical model to a more adaptable network, functioning via modern communications between its depleted leadership and a pool of cadres facilitated by hubs of organizers in different countries. Coupled with similar Islamic extremist groups, al Qaeda has a diffuse and loose structure coordinating its anti-American operations in Muslim lands, while it still prepares to strike the U.S. homeland again. Its "far enemy" belief structure puts America at the root of all Muslim problems.

The nature of the organization is to attack the far enemy until it is either destroyed or suffers such losses that it will reform and rethink its purpose. The nature of the movement is to foster anger, resentment, and violence against Western civilization and its supporters in the Muslim world, and to seek answers in the past rather than taking an introspective look and developing a viable future to address the real problems found in Muslim society.

**Terrorism** is a tactic that has been practiced by every race and creed for diverse and incompatible political, religious, or ideological reasons. But one cannot wage war against a tactic. One can wage war, however, against terrorists who are animate and therefore susceptible to force. The war on terror may be global, but it is not universal.

Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric of destroying all terrorist groups who have global reach, we cannot destroy the Tamil Tigers and all other terror organizations. That would not only bankrupt this ideology but also fritter away resources from destroying the one group that is specifically dedicated to harming America. To eradicate that most immediate threat, then, the United States must understand al Qaeda and destroy it as an organization and as a movement.

The nature of the war against al Qaeda the organization should be aimed at finding and destroying the hubs that connect the leadership in hiding with the pool of candidates wishing to participate in the jihad, further isolating the leadership by stripping it of communications, eventually capturing it, and turning those prisoners against their former comrades as either informers or propaganda spokesmen. In Afghanistan and Iraq, this would take part in the context of our ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns. In the rest of the world, however, this would be an intelligence officer’s and policeman’s war, sometimes assisted by military special mission groups. This war depends on close cooperation with governments such as Pakistan’s, which will wish to avoid appearing to be puppets of the West. Their fears of overt American involvement in their internal affairs preclude most conventional, and even some unconventional, military options.

**Destruction of al Qaeda** the movement requires:

- neutralizing al Qaeda propaganda and making it irrelevant with the long-term commitment of the diplomatic, informational, intelligence, developmental, educational, and covert action tools of statecraft
- removing emotional sources of inspiration for those who are searching for a cause for self-sacrifice
- keeping close contact with religious leaders, encouraging them to counteract the philosophy of Salafi extremism so Muslims can show other Muslims how harmful and bankrupt this ideology is.

To answer Clausewitz’s question as to the type of war we are embarking on, we must consider the war on terror as both an act of force to compel a group to our will and a struggle to convince civilization of the evil of their intentions. The nature of the struggle will be long term and nuanced. Its future military context should be constrained to specific instances that cannot be solved with other applications of American or international statecraft. It is not a conventional war. And although it involves violence, we should avoid turning it into an open war that could benefit the enemy.

What are the implications for future U.S. security strategy? Graham Fuller suggests a three-part strategy for the war on terror. First is the elimination of the al Qaeda organization and those who support it, such as the Taliban. Second is intensified...
police and intelligence work to deter and block future attacks. Third and most important is attending to sources of grievances in the Muslim world that constitute the soil for terrorism. This is similar to the National Defense Strategy, which provides succinct policy goals: protecting the homeland, countering ideological support for terrorism, and disrupting and attacking terrorist networks. The National Defense Strategy is also correct in stating that victory will not be on the battlefield alone.\(^2\)

There are three major implications for our future security strategy in regard to the war on terror. First, it is a struggle against both a nonstate group and a particular ideology. Pronouncements by senior DOD officials in 2005 trying to define the war on terror as a global struggle against violent extremism were a step in the right direction but were still incomplete. Whatever new catchphrase is used, it must mention the specific Salafi content of the extremism we are fighting, and new strategies of statecraft must work to disconnect this ideology from what sustains it: a sense of alienation brought on by perceived threats to the faith and injustice to Muslim peoples. Therefore, one of the lessons to be learned is to do everything in our power to avoid another war in the Muslim world that could further inflame these perceived threats, however unjustified, while we work to destroy al Qaeda the organization. Otherwise, a future war, no matter how it will be seen in Western eyes or however necessary it may appear to strategists, will provide the renewal that al Qaeda the movement needs, which in turn regenerates the organization.

Second, because of the ideological underpinnings of this struggle, America will have to engage its soft power far more. This is a clash of ideas and beliefs and who can mobilize more support in a part of the world that is critical to American security.

Third, efforts to transform the Muslim world to end the causes that brought us al Qaeda the movement must be left to the Muslim world itself and supported through the many tools of U.S. statecraft, but not with overt military force. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other “near enemies” must reform in their own way, with American assistance and prodding if necessary, but not with American coercion so as to remove the justification for the movement and battle cry that these regimes are American creatures.

We should remember the advice of T.E. Lawrence: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.”\(^3\) JFQ

### Notes

2. Ibid., 88.
6. Ibid., 63–113.
8. Ibid., 269–270.
15. Sageman, 97.
A Supreme Commander for the War on Terror

By KEVIN D. STRINGER

Before September 11, 2001, U.S. defense was centered on fighting regionally focused conventional wars against state opponents such as Iraq and North Korea. After September 11, the defense reality changed to unconventional conflicts on a global scale against primarily nonstate actors. Beginning in late 2005, the term Long War began to appear in security documents such as the National Security Council’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, training, interagency coordination, military culture change, and, particularly, command structures and arrangements. While the functions of command are eternal, the nature of command must evolve in scale and scope, given developments in technology and warfare.

If the United States is truly involved in a war on terror, the Armed Forces must apply doctrinal principles of war that are applicable to any conflict. Chief among these for the Long War is unity of command. Current command arrangements are imprecise or cobbled together and do not fully address the situation at hand. This global “theater” requires a supreme military commander to provide the necessary leadership and coherence for diverse geographic and functional commands. Lack of unity of command leads to inefficiencies, opportunity costs, and a less than holistic approach to a global counterinsurgency.

The correct command structure for a war of large dimensions is crucial. Unfortunately, determining a specific command structure is too often driven by political or Service considerations. History abounds with command arrangements powered by these factors and shows the costs of such an approach.

This article considers the current U.S. military command structure for the war on terror, the nature of the enemy, and the institutional and cultural issues the United States faces to achieve unity of effort and command. It then draws on three historical examples that differ in scale and scope to show the pitfalls associated with commands structured for political reasons. In the end, none of the examples created unity. The article concludes with a vision for how a supreme command for the war on terror can be structured to provide unity of command for the military component of national power.

Current Command Structure

In terms of structure, the war on terror presents the national security establishment with its greatest organizational challenge since 1947. The existing approach is best described as general strategic direction and compartmented execution. National military strategy is the responsibility of the Joint Staff (Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate). The United States has nine unified commands fighting the war on terror; five are regional commands...
with responsibilities for specific geographic areas of operation, and four are functional. Responsibility for the campaign plan is vested in U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The Secretary of Defense expanded the command’s role in 2003 to include leading the Department of Defense (DOD) planning effort and commanding specifically designated operations. Theater strategy is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commanders. USSOCOM, therefore, theoretically provides the lead for operations in this counterinsurgency.

More specifically, USSOCOM has been designated as the supported command to plan, synchronize, and, when directed, execute strategy and operations. The command has stood up the Center for Special Operations to fulfill its planning responsibilities, meaning the commander must lead a global, collaborative planning process, leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise, which results in decentralized execution by both USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks. This structure is less than optimal because it is a collaborative rather than a true command arrangement.

Command problems first appear in planning, with both the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and USSOCOM charged with national and global strategic planning and operations. The NCTC may be tasked with national strategic and operational planning, but it has limited authority and capability. It is an Intelligence Community organization entrusted with integrated strategic and operational planning for diplomacy, information influence, covert action, and military operations. Responsibility for integrated national planning is thus divorced not only from execution but also from detailed operational planning.

A similar problem besets USSOCOM. The command has been mandated with developing detailed global military plans, but it is isolated from non-DOD planners (for example, the Joint Staff represents DOD on the NCTC). USSOCOM’s global planning authority is also circumscribed within DOD by the power wielded by the geographic combatant commanders. Each geographic commander runs his own fieldcom despite USSOCOM being the supported command. Thus, integrated strategy execution remains largely personality dependent. This compact contrasts greatly with a simple and ideal command structure resembling a chain. The top link is the military commander, who directs all the forces involved in an operation. Joint and combined operations place additional demands and complexity on exercising effective command. The minimum level of effectiveness is to ensure unity of command among national armed forces.

The current structure presents challenges to unity of command and raises three questions:

- Who exercises global military unity of command for the war on terror?
- Who connects the holistic needs and actions within this counterinsurgency effort that links nations as diverse as Mali and Nauru, which both confront the terrorist threat in different guises?
- If the military finds itself in a true war, who acts as supreme military commander?

The Enemy

Al Qaeda and its affiliates comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. As the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states:

The United States is . . . engaged in what will be a long war. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, our nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.

This new reality challenges any nation-state, hampered by sovereignty and national borders, to confront a threat that uses the benefits of globalization to transform world politics and economies to its own ends. Using networks that link to other criminals or legitimate business interests, terrorists connect London, New York, Amman, and other frontline locations with obscure venues such as Niue, Nauru, and Togo. They can further distort the economies of industries and countries with illicit trade in weapons, drugs, people, and other traffic to finance their jihad against the West.

This rise of global nonstate terrorist networks is a defining characteristic of the last decade. The enemies are not traditional conventional military forces, but rather distributed multinational and multiethnic networks of terrorists. These networks seek to break the will of nations that have joined the fight alongside the United States by attacking their populations. Terrorist networks use intimidation, propaganda, and indiscriminate violence in an attempt to subjugate the Muslim world under a radical theocratic tyranny. These networks also aim to exhaust the will of those in the Muslim world who oppose them. Terrorist networks seek increasingly deadlier means, including nuclear and biological weapons, to commit mass murder. The organizational
challenge is that while terrorists operate in ever-changing international networks, the counterinsurgent organization remains in a national and stovepiped structure with vertical hierarchies for the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

Furthermore, al Qaeda and its associated movements operate in over 80 countries. They have conducted attacks around the world, killing ordinary people of all faiths and ethnicities. They exploit poorly governed areas, taking sanctuary where states lack the capacity or will to police themselves.15

This Long War against terrorist networks thus extends far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and is characterized by irregular warfare: operations in which the enemy is not a regular military of a nation-state.16 To succeed, the United States must organize its command structures to provide unity of direction and oversight across this global battlefield.

**Unity of Command and Effort**

Two principles of conflict that currently vex the national security establishment are unity of command and unity of effort. More than 5 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, significant organizational deficiencies remain within departments and agencies and across the national security establishment in both planning and execution.17

The lack of unity of effort between government departments is the principal impediment to operational-level interagency integration. Simply put, no one is in overall control.18 General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the overarching problem with interagency integration is found at the operational level.19 Unity of effort may be hard to achieve among the multitude of agencies involved in the war on terror, but at least unity of command for the military component of the Long War is a step in the right direction.

For the military, unity of command is a principle of war: “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.” It is particularly pertinent for the war on terror. As David Galula writes, “Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from the beginning to the end.”20

The U.S. experience in the Cold War still profoundly influences the way DOD is organized and executes its mission. But the Cold War was a struggle between nation-states, requiring state-based responses to most political problems and kinetic responses to most military problems. DOD was optimized for conventional, large-scale warfighting against the regular, uniformed forces of hostile states. Today, warfare is increasingly characterized by intrastate violence rather than conflict between states. Many adversaries are informal networks of nonstate actors that are less vulnerable to Cold War approaches.21 This evolved threat profile and global battlefield require a unity of command that is truly worldwide.

**History Lessons**

The U.S. Civil War, the Pacific theater in World War II, and the second Indochina War provide examples of struggles where the military adopted a unified approach either late or not at all and suffered the organizational and command inefficiencies and consequences for the duration of the conflicts. The war on terror is a unique global campaign, and command generalizations must be extrapolated from these historical cases. Nevertheless, these models provide lessons on how to enhance military command structure.

**U.S. Civil War.** The American Civil War is analogous to the war on terror in that it represented a period of change for the conduct of military operations. The Army was forced to move from a pre-industrial to an industrial age conflict, with large theaters of operation, mass forces, and technological developments of rifled firearms, railroads, and steamships. Similarly, the events of September 11, the opening shot in the war on terror, signaled a shift to postmodern war, where the battlefield is global and adversaries must manage the technology of the Internet, satellite communications, and both high- and low-tech weaponry.

Until President Abraham Lincoln appointed Ulysses S. Grant to lead the overall Union war effort, his armies were riddled with diverging goals, lack of coordination, and ineptitude, and they suffered a number of defeats because of bad generals and an imprecise command structure.

Grant was not the first holder of the office of commander during the Civil War, but a chief difference was that, until his appointment, Lincoln had been authorized to assign a general-in-chief from among the many officers who held the rank of major general. Essentially, this position was more a “first among peers” than a true supreme commander. Illustrative was Major General Henry W. Halleck, whom Lincoln appointed as the commander in chief in 1862, with high hopes of success; but Halleck viewed his role as a military advisor and chief of staff to the President and Secretary of War. He shirked from issuing orders to his “subordinate” commanders and only suggested or recommended strategic or tactical actions.22

With Grant, Congress authorized the permanent rank of lieutenant general, not used since George Washington. This created a single senior officer to command the U.S. armies. Grant brought to the position of general-in-chief an attitude not shared by Halleck. He intended not to advise his subordinates but to issue orders and expect full compliance. In essence, he would exercise true command and only inform the President and the Secretary of War of his actions.23

After his promotion to lieutenant general in 1864, General-in-Chief Grant became commander not of one army, as he had been at Vicksburg, or even three armies, as at Chattanooga, but of all the armies of the United States. Under his charge were 19 military departments and 17 commanders, and his new job was to move all of them in concert toward one goal: the destruction of the Confederacy.24 He sagely decided not to combine his important strategic duties with command of the Army of the Potomac, which would undoubtedly have involved him in intricate and time-consuming detail. Rather, he issued orders through his chief of staff to the commander of the Army of the Potomac, George G. Meade; the commander of the Army of the James, Benjamin F. Butler; the commander of IX Corps, Ambrose E. Burnside; and all the diverse forces operating in Virginia, Tennessee, northern Georgia, the deep South, and far West.25

This unity of command allowed Grant to apply pressure in all theaters of war with the purpose of grinding the Confederate army into defeat. The integration of the different theater generals under one chief provided the synergy and cohesion to defeat the Confederate military. The war on terror is structured as a cooperative arrangement between USSOCOM and the geographic...
combatant commanders, all headed by general officers of equal rank and authority. There is no senior military commander like Grant unifying this arrangement.

**World War II in the Pacific.** The Pacific theater during World War II provides a second example of how not to structure a command for wartime by dividing it into two parts with equal leaders, and creating commands heavily influenced by one Service rather than having a balanced joint culture.

Against the dictates of military doctrine—and against all common sense—the Pacific was divided into two theaters for command. The traditional elements of careerism and doctrinal differences within the Armed Forces combined to produce a monstrosity. As Louis Morton observed, the arrangement “led to duplication of effort and keen competition for the limited supplies of ships, landing craft, and airplanes, and it placed on the Joint Chiefs the heavy burden of decision in matters that could well have been resolved by lesser officials.”

One reason for this division of command (beyond inter-Service rivalry) was the presence of General Douglas MacArthur. Senior to almost all other Army and Navy officers at the time, MacArthur was disliked by the Navy, who would never entrust the fleet to a land general. Therefore, in a Solomon-like decision, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed MacArthur commander of the Southwest Pacific area: Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, Borneo, and all the Netherlands Indies, except the large island of Sumatra, while the Navy was given the remainder of the Pacific Ocean except for the coastal waters of Central and South America. This vast Navy domain was entrusted to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who also remained commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Both MacArthur and Nimitz received orders from the heads of their respective Services, acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had the final say on matters of strategy. That meant that overall direction of operations in the Pacific was in the hands of a committee, and there was no single authority below that level to make decisions for the Pacific theater. Clearly, this structure had implications for strategy development, strategic and operational planning, and resource allocation. While the U.S. military did win in the Pacific, this fragmented command structure created both real and opportunity costs, which resulted in loss of personnel, materiel, and time.

The supported and supporting command arrangements for the war on terror vaguely resemble the organization in the Pacific. Rather than having a single authority for the Long War, the U.S. military works with a collaborative and committee style structure reminiscent of the Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean areas split. Also, the geographic combatant commands and functional commands are still very much Service-branded. Although the evolving nature of military operations requires the United States to break the tradition of linking particular Services with certain unified commands, this major step in improving command selection has not yet occurred. The result is inefficiency, opportunity costs, and a less than holistic approach to addressing a global counterinsurgency.

**Second Indochina War.** Commenting on command and control in Vietnam, Major General George Echardt, USA, stated that “a prerequisite for command and control will be unity of command, to ensure . . . effectiveness of military and advisory activities.” Unfortunately, this requirement was not achieved in Indochina.

In 1962, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was formed as an operational headquarters with the staff elements needed to direct operations. Soon the Army and Air Force began to argue that MACV should be a theater unified command with land, sea, and air components. The Navy opposed such an arrangement and argued that U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) should provide the unified command structure, with the Pacific commander controlling all forces assigned to Vietnam. The result was an incredibly complex command structure. At the top was Pacific Command, the unified command with three components: Pacific Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Army Pacific. MACV was a subunified command, subordinate to Pacific Command, whose commander was responsible for the U.S. war effort in Vietnam, yet USPACOM controlled most of the air campaign against the North. Furthermore, the MACV air component commander did not exercise operational control over B-52s taking part. During most of the conflict, he had no authority over Marine air units based in South Vietnam. The MACV commander had no continuing operational control over 7th Fleet units operating off the coast of North Vietnam, nor did he have authority over South Vietnamese forces.

While General William C. Westmoreland, head of MACV from 1964 to 1968, was commonly regarded as the U.S. commander in Vietnam, his authority was severely limited. The Pacific commander and the commander, U.S. Army, Pacific, were both sandwiched between Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the hierarchy. In addition, Strategic Air Command and 7th Fleet units fell outside Westmoreland’s authority, while his control of the Marine forces was limited by Marine Corps headquarters in Washington. The Pacific commander and Washington, not MACV, ran the air war against North Vietnam. The command structure resembled a particularly confusing wire diagram rather than a chain.

This arrangement soon proved unworkable, and some senior military leaders began to argue for a single, simplified structure. With the war spreading into Laos, new questions about command relations arose. To resolve these matters, the Army recommended that all forces in Vietnam and Thailand be placed under the commander of MACV. The Navy disagreed. After 4 years of discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to change the command structure but simply to realign some forces. Thus, the Americans made life difficult for themselves by failing to ensure unity of command among their own forces, let alone achieving unity with their allies. This analogy serves well for the war on terror: if the military does not have a global unified command, a broader and better interagency unity of effort with similarities to combined operations among allies will be even harder to achieve.
A Supreme Commander

These historical examples point to the need for a supreme commander to provide unity of direction for the military component of the war on terror. The essence of this provocative concept must be evaluated. As in other wars, a supreme military commander would create cohesion and unity of command, vital in addressing the global counterinsurgency. This step is a partial move in improving the unity of effort so critical to the interagency process because it streamlines the command arrangements for the military component of national power. The development of a four- or even five-star commander with staff to run the war on terror would create clear relationships among the geographic combatant commanders, USSOCOM, and other commands and enable a high-level linkage of the global area of operations.

The war on terror is an intelligence and special operations-intensive war. The U.S. system of high command is focused on the regional level, which is of reduced importance in both strategy and operations.31 One command option is to augment USSOCOM and make it a five-star billet. The other is to create a supreme commander, one level higher than the combatant commanders and USSOCOM, and form a staff to execute the war. The Joint Staff and combatant commands would be the donors for this new staff.

Regardless of the option, the profile of this commander would be novel for the U.S. military tradition since he would need to come from the Special Operations community due to the nature of the conflict. Career Special Operators from all Services are the natural candidates for supreme command.

The size and scope of the battlefield have evolved throughout history. Beginning with a football-sized field where a single chieftain could control his tribe during a morning of fighting, the battlefield has expanded to encompass the globe. Yet thanks to the outputs of globalization, primarily technology, one commander could be placed in charge of the U.S. military effort in the war on terror to achieve unity of command. This principle of war enables an integrated and synergistic effort within at least the military component of national security and would lead to greater unity within the interagency process and for future combined operations in the Long War. JFQ


NOTES

5 Vickers.
6 Ibid.
7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 2006), 29.
8 Vickers.
9 Ibid.
13 A good source for understanding these networks is Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005).
15 Ibid., 21.
16 Ibid., 11.
17 Vickers.
19 Jim Garamone, “Agencies Must Coordinate to Win Terror War, Pace Says,” available at <wwwarmedforces.net/Detailcl22356.html>.
21 QDR Report, 43.
22 For a good overview of Henry W. Halleck’s style of command during the Civil War, see John E. Marszałek, Commander of All Lincoln’s Armies: A Life of General Henry W.
Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines, but Southeast Asia has emerged as a quiet yet increasingly crucial front in the Long War. Given the suicide bombings in Bali, the presence of the terrorist groups Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf, and increased anti-Americanism, the need for a continued and comprehensive approach to combating terror in the Pacific is clear. The U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) has been improving ties with regional allies and increasingly applying an indirect approach to address the threat posed by militant groups with connections to al Qaeda.

The Indirect Approach

Addressing threats requires a sophisticated and indirect approach. The Nation cannot simply enter sovereign countries unilaterally and conduct kill-or-capture missions. It must blend host nation capacity-building and other long-term efforts to address root causes, dissuade future terrorists, and reduce recruiting. The 9/11 Commission Report states that the United States must "help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people." To address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, SOCPAC works with host nation partners to help provide security and stability. This method promotes economic development and shapes conditions for good governance and rule of law. Much of the command’s effort consists of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. The primary contribution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in this interagency activity is to organize, train, and assist local security forces. The indirect approach relies heavily on the SOF capability to build host nation defense capacity, provide civil affairs forces to give humanitarian and civic assistance, and offer information operations assets to aid the partner.

The indirect approach demands diplomacy and respect for political sensitivities. SOCPAC focuses on working in close coordination with host nation military and political leadership, law enforcement, and U.S. country teams in the region (to include the U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State Public Diplomacy officials). These stakeholders share the responsibility of capacity-building and leverage each others’ strengths and synchronize efforts. To produce institutional change, host nation partners have to be willing to reform as required. Interagency and multinational will and capacity-building must go hand-in-hand for the indirect approach to succeed.
Success is measured in terms of accomplishments through, by, and with host nation partners. Over time, these partners are building a long-lasting, self-sustaining capability to provide security, develop good governance, attract foreign direct investment, and counter violent ideology. This process is slow, but it achieves lasting results. Part of our commitment is to remain patient and focus on a long-term indirect method that results in self-sustaining host nation partners.

**Relationships**

Besides their long-term benefits, relationships also play a vital role in combating terrorism. SOCPAC members have significant regional experience as well as constructive relationships with other nations’ SOF and conventional force leadership. Frequent deployments, exercises, and exchanges allow U.S. personnel to immerse themselves in the region, build a sociocultural knowledge base, and sustain relationships over an extended period.

Through experience, we know we can succeed only through bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Unilateral actions are neither necessary nor welcome. Partner nations willingly accept the lead in their own countries. Additionally, many nations prefer that the United States maintain a low-visibility presence on their soil. SOF can do this with little external support and low overhead from higher headquarters, which supports the Department of Defense concept of small footprints in the region. This method respects local populaces, increases legitimacy, and improves the American image among host populations.

By working with host nation partners and the country team, SOCPAC creates trust and credibility. Serving in the “advise and assist” role, participants have to be open with each other about the training needs of the security forces, as well as which capabilities they bring that can help build capacity. Developing competent forces on both sides requires candid assessments and dedication as well as clear communication. Participants must not ignore feedback or overreact to training setbacks. Instead, they must continue to assess and adapt training programs, and be aware of which capacities are improving.

Such a focused training cycle produces quantifiable and observable results. Typically, the host nation force performs a capabilities demonstration during a closing ceremony.

Host nation government and senior military officials, as well as the U.S. Ambassador, often attend. The demonstration is visible proof of what the host military gained from U.S. participation. Tangible improvements and demonstrated abilities enhance American credibility with host nation officials and the Ambassador alike.

**Indirect Approach Elements**

Three elements constitute SOCPAC’s indirect approach in the Pacific region: institution-building, capacity-building, and outside factors. These elements influence whom we partner with and the breadth and depth of those relationships. Integrating the parts provides a comprehensive method of helping host nation partners become self-sufficient in defense capabilities:

- **Institution-building.** The broader populations who support terrorist groups are often economically and educationally deprived. The groups use this deprivation in a quid pro quo way (for example, the terrorist group gives a child an education along with radical indoctrination). Finding out how to get there first to give the people a leg up without creating resentment is an important aspect of institution-building. SOF support these efforts to help countries build healthy institutions of security, governance, rule of law, infrastructure, and economic stability.

- **Capacity-building.** U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific, works closely with host nation forces to assess training needs and assist in building a more professional and modernized force that respects human rights. The command ensures that it is operating within the political and legal constraints of the United States and the partner nation before committing to a training program. A comprehensive capacity-building program requires assessments of unit capabilities, cultural awareness of political-military sensitivities, appropriate training programs, expert SOF trainers, and validation of efforts.

- **Outside Factors.** Of course, the war on terror extends beyond the Pacific region. Today, the majority of SOF are deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. This deployment requires that SOCPAC must do more with less. The command must prioritize where personnel go and what they do and ensure that they can manage expectations. Outside factors also include external support of terrorist
Winning in the Pacific

organizations in the form of finance, logistics, equipment, communication networks, and ideology. Close cooperation between host nation forces and U.S. country team officials to help eliminate the lifelines of transnational threats is vital.

For more than 5 years, SOCPAC involvement in the war on terror in the Pacific region has been consistent and ongoing. The command now partners with 10 countries and participates in more than 50 military-to-military events a year. This indirect approach has been a slow and deliberate process that requires commitment to building trust and confidence throughout the region and knowing that the results will not be immediate. This effort is especially well along in key areas.

The Philippines. SOCPAC’s continued contribution to its counterparts in the Philippines exemplifies a successful interagency, multinational indirect approach to combating terror. In the aftermath of 9/11, SOCPAC deployed to the Muslim south of the Philippines for the first time since World War II to assist the military and civilian population in light of the security challenges in Basilan. The rest of Southeast Asia was watching to see if the U.S. military would honor its words with action.

SOCPAC personnel arrived on Basilan Island in January 2002 with the mission of advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), who would then conduct operations against Abu Sayyaf. At the time, Basilan Island was known to the AFP and local population as a terrorist safe haven. The command operated under strict rules of engagement and stayed in the background to ensure that the AFP was up front.

On hitting the ground, SOCPAC personnel assessed the units they would work with and conducted a series of population surveys to learn what the people of Basilan needed to sever their ties with Abu Sayyaf. The islanders’ greatest concerns were roads, water, security, medical care, and education. Addressing those needs meant digging wells and building roads. SOCPAC also worked with its Philippine counterparts to construct piers and an airstrip for AFP operations. The plan was for this infrastructure to be left for the Philippine military and civilian population.

This collaboration helped the command gain the confidence of our counterparts and the population through a variety of engineering, medical, and community outreach projects. The AFP led in setting security conditions that enabled capacity-building efforts. Within months, SOCPAC received additional forces that extended its humanitarian assistance program. Units, working side by side with the Filipinos, began improving schools, hospitals, and mosques. The local population became supportive of the SOCPAC and national military presence, and the AFP increasingly developed trust in the U.S. advise-and-assist role.

After 2 years, the environment no longer fostered terrorist activities on Basilan Island, and Abu Sayyaf left. The AFP had effectively drained the swamp of the underlying conditions favorable to terrorists with U.S. assistance. With the Basilians people now living in a safer environment, the AFP downsized its presence from 15 infantry battalions to 2. By guaranteeing security, the Philippine military allowed teachers and doctors to return, while business and nongovernmental organizations could operate in areas they once shunned. The AFP won back the support of the population and government, producing a long-lasting effect.

Another indicator of success came from the Basilians people, who chose to support the government rather than Abu Sayyaf. The populace saw that the AFP was more powerful and legitimate than the terrorists. The indirect approach of the Basilan model enabled the AFP to provide locals with a stable environment that enabled commerce and quality of life improvements.

Archipelago Region. Due to the transnational nature of terrorist organizations, the archipelago of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia is a key focus of SOCPAC indirect efforts. The approach is similar to that taken in Basilan and has been adapted to the socio-economic and geographic characteristics of the archipelago region. Once stability and good governance are established in the outer islands, nongovernmental and private organizations will more likely operate and commerce will more likely expand.

Initial steps in this region have included slowly and steadily reestablishing ties with the Indonesian military. The command initially engaged with their military through a series of 2-week subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) and post-tsunami civic action projects. After conducting 5 SMEEs and several humanitarian assistance initiatives in 8 months, the Indonesian military approached SOCPAC regarding expanding its role to advise and assist their forces. The SMEEs and civil-military operations set the conditions for continuing the partnership. We have now completed six combined events and several construction projects with the Indonesian military, which have increased the trust between the forces. More events are planned.

SOCPAC has also started achieving stronger military-to-military relationships in Malaysia. Success with Malaysian forces focuses largely on partnering during multinational naval exercises. The world-class training events and professionalism of U.S. forces impressed the Malaysian military, and we gained immensely from their
state-of-the-art training facilities, which assisted SOCPAC efforts to execute realistic training scenarios. Strengthening ties with the three archipelago nations builds a solid foundation for a multilateral indirect approach to transnational security.

**Thailand.** In addition to the archipelago nations, SOCPAC counts on Thailand as an important regional partner. The command has enjoyed a rich relationship with the Thai military for many years. It consistently participates in a variety of combined training and exercises, maintaining extended relationships with some units. This military partnership demonstrates the importance of building on the trust already established with host nations.

The Thai military gives SOCPAC a solid, quiet support. Its leaders have asked for advice and assistance in areas of concern and provide constructive feedback on the indirect approach. Because the relationship is strong, the Thai officers reveal when a specific approach does not work for them and how we might improve, all with complete candor. They are also open to our comments, a sure indicator of a firm relationship formed over time.

**Effects-based Measurement**

In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF strategy and operations in the war on terror in Southeast Asia are the results and changes that ensue. SOCPAC has established an effects-based assessment system that looks closely at its wartime capabilities in the Philippines and Thailand and will continue growing partnerships in Malaysia and Indonesia. SOCPAC, in the end, is an assessment system that looks at the results and changes that ensue. The approach in other Asian nations will be methodical, assessing underlying conditions and host nation units, improving the socioeconomic and security situation at hand, enhancing the legitimacy of local government, and severing ties with terrorists.

In 5 to 10 years, the command will be working with new partner nations while sustaining existing partnerships. We have anchored relationships in the Philippines and Thailand and will continue growing partnerships in Malaysia and Indonesia. SOCPAC will most likely broaden indirect efforts to include working by, through, and with forces in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. The U.S. approach will continue to develop trusting relationships, with host nation partners in the lead. The command will engage these nations in a purposeful manner to ensure that it can build relationships as successfully as it did in Southeast Asia.

As it creates partnerships, the command looks forward to establishing strong links with U.S. Embassies and Asian multilateral security organizations. Diffusing terrorist organizations requires working together to offer alternative ideologies, economic opportunity, safety, different channels for political influence to travel, and ways to strengthen family and cultural ties outside of terrorist movements.

A better understanding of the concerns of stakeholders will aid the search for alternatives to political violence. This requires leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of U.S. and host nation diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement instruments of power in a coordinated and focused effort.

**U.S. Special Operations Forces** are uniquely organized and equipped to win the warfare of the 21st century. Through its actions and tangible results, Special Operations Command, Pacific, has demonstrated that the indirect approach is an effective model for addressing asymmetric threats.

By actively implementing an indirect approach, the command has shaped conditions so that commerce, rule of law, and education can flourish and provide alternatives to violence and despair. Relationships with host nation counterparts have provided a robust exchange of actionable recommendations that promote measurable results. This innovative approach is relevant in an increasingly complex security environment. Working by, through, and with multinational and interagency partners will be critical to continued success in combating terror in the Pacific.

**NOTES**


3. According to Joint Publication 3–07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, foreign internal defense “is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” *Unconventional warfare* builds on the foundation of working by, through, and with indigenous or surrogate forces. Although the military and law enforcement agencies kill, capture, and detain terrorists, these direct action missions should not be at the expense of the “advise and assist” approach that foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare offer as their centerpiece.
Nationally and military leaders failed to recognize the end of the Cold War for what it was: the abrupt ending to a long era of major power conflict and the beginning of an interwar period. Interwar periods are not peaceful, but are characterized by conflict between major and minor powers—small wars—rather than by conflicts between the forces of major powers—major wars.

Small wars are not small in the sense of importance, resources committed, or losses sustained. In scale they are national. Scale of operations is achieved not only through greater numbers but also through headquarters that have the capacity to plan, sustain, and command at the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Conventional forces have those characteristics, but their focus is on major wars, putting small wars at a disadvantage. A common solution is to assign highly-focused Special Operations Forces (SOF) to conventional force commands where they are often poorly utilized. Accordingly, this article proposes establishing a new Special Operations Corps.

The first step toward forming a SOF service was taken in 1987, when the special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations forces of the Services were assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The next step should be assigning the entire operational and administrative U.S. Marine Corps to USSOCOM. This arrangement would immediately bring larger scale to the command, but it would not bring coherency. This article concludes with recommendations for bringing coherency to a Special Operations Corps.

How Did We Get Here?
Prior to World War II, the Departments of War and of the Navy were divided principally by the realities they faced on the threshold of a declared war. The War Department was prepared to mobilize the populace, industrial base, and an army if Congress declared war. The Navy Department was the State Department’s strong arm of coercive diplomacy below the threshold of declared war. The unification that occurred in 1947, however, divided the Services by the elements in which they fought: land, sea, or air. The Navy Department struggled successfully to retain its air force and army. Efforts to achieve jointness since 1947 have been about solving the problems caused by the original sin of division by element. Jointness is a problem, not a solution.

Elemental division is wrong now, and, according to the actions of President Dwight Eisenhower, it has been wrong for a long time. Eisenhower initiated legislation in 1958 with a special message to Congress announcing that warfare by element—land, sea, and air—was over. The Services might be separated by element, but warfare was not.

But the Services remain divided by element. They organize, train, and equip to win in a direct clash with the forces of another great power: an army to defeat an army, a navy to defeat a navy, and an air force to defeat an air force.

The Services have a long history of neglecting critical capabilities that are not central to their conceptions of war. Air
commandos were developed for a "tertiary" World War II theater in China and Burma and were quickly abandoned so the new Air Force could pursue strategic bombardment. Army Rangers were established for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—and just as quickly abandoned after each war so the Army could return to its central idea of war. The Navy neglected all aspects of brown-water operations until Vietnam. Underwater demolition teams were taught small-unit infantry tactics and became sea-air-land teams (SEALs) in 1962. The brown-water force was again neglected as the Navy returned its focus to Soviet blue-water capabilities after Vietnam. The preponderance of forces currently assigned to USSOCOM is composed of orphaned branches within the Services (for example, the Army branches of Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations). Much of the designation of Special Operations Forces was about providing career progression, equipment acquisition authority, and budget protection for military specialties not central to the major-war Services’ conceptions of war. The forces designated as SOF were not selected to constitute a coherent force for a war that had yet to be imagined. They were valuable, but they were hardly sized and shaped for today’s larger-scale operations.

It is often claimed that SOF epitomizes jointness and that the rest of the Armed Forces should follow suit. There are, however, observable rifts within SOF: some lie along Service lines and others between levels of eliteness. Moreover, there is no common entry point for Special Operators.

Marines, in contrast, all undergo the same initial training to become Marines before learning a branch specialty. Every Marine officer leaves the Basic School understanding the role of commander of a rifle platoon, and in boot camp and Infantry training every enlisted Marine learns the role of rifleman in that same platoon. The other Services are trusted to teach the specialized skills of artillery, armor, and aviation, but they are not trusted to build Marines.

USSOCOM has a separate budget line and Service-like acquisition authority but relies heavily on its distinct Army, Navy, and Air Force components for equipment, doctrine, organization, and training. The Marine Corps has a single combat development command and one materiel development command. Both SOF and the Marines prefer to adapt rather than develop equipment. The Marine Corps relies on the Navy for major acquisitions, strategic mobility, and budget. **Mission Intersection**

Direct action is the mission that has come to dominate SOF. Direct actions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensives to seize, destroy, damage, exploit, or recover high-value targets. Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare are missions to train and advise forces to assist friendly governments or oppose unfriendly governments. Special reconnaissance puts eyes on targets, often for extended periods. Sophisticated methods of ingress and egress are common. SOF also conducts combat search and rescue, noncombatant evacuation, and hostage rescue. Many special operations missions are conducted in denied, politically sensitive, or hostile areas. They are often executed with extreme tactical precision designed to produce effects at the operational or strategic level of war.

Marine forces are employed as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) built around battalion-, regiment-, or division-sized ground elements. The Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable, is deployed forward afloat and is prepared for many of the same taskings as SOF. Missions include noncombatant evacuation operations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, hostage rescue, and a variety of direct actions. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade brings forcible entry capability, including amphibious assault, and the basis upon which to build a Marine Expeditionary Force in a process called *compositing*.

In addition to rifle battalions, the Marine Corps brings armor, artillery, engineers, amphibious assault battalions, and strike and transport aircraft. The larger MAGTFs can conduct a wide range of missions suited to a light infantry-based air-ground force. The Marine Expeditionary Force can conduct operations on a larger scale than can SOF.

**Points of Origin**

There are fewer than 50,000 personnel designated as SOF in the U.S. military. The Army provides the majority, including 10,000 in civil affairs and psychological operations, 2,000 Rangers, 1,500 in aviation, and 9,100 in Special Forces. The Navy contributes over 6,000 personnel, and the Air Force another 10,000. The Marine Corps weighs in at just under 175,000. The important characteristics of this collective force, however, are not found in organization charts or end strength. Notable differences include expensive, scarce, and specialized equipment, the selection and training of individuals, the leader-to-led ratio in units, mission area, and headquarters capacities.
Ranger battalions, SEAL teams, and Marine Corps battalions and squadrons make solid starting points for future SOF battalions.

Ranger battalions, SEAL teams, and Marine Corps battalions and squadrons make solid starting points for future SOF battalions. But if a coherent whole is to be achieved by assembling the pieces and transforming the collection, it is worth reviewing the pieces.

Army. The Ranger Regiment is composed of three battalions. Rangers continue to train for airport seizure and, like much of SOF, are focused on direct action. Unlike the rest of SOF, they are capable of company- and battalion-sized operations. The lower Ranger ranks are volunteers from Army airborne units who enter the Ranger Regiment. The typical volunteer is a young man on his first enlistment. He undergoes the 3-week Ranger Indoctrination Program. After 6 to 12 months, he may meet the requirements to attend Ranger School. All selectees are jump-qualified and some are combat swimmers. Most Rangers return to the general population after a 3-year assignment.

Ranger School lasts 10 weeks. Most graduates return to their units in the conventional forces, never to serve in a Ranger unit. The purpose and focus of the school is to develop individual leadership skills that apply throughout the Army, not just in Ranger units. All officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who serve in Ranger units, however, have completed Ranger School. Ranger companies are commonly commanded by majors who have already commanded a company in the conventional force as captains. Rigorously trained young Soldiers led by experienced noncommissioned and commissioned officers constitute a potent formula employed by Rangers and SEALs.

Special Forces (SF) are organized into five Active duty groups, each oriented on a specific region. Two more groups are in the Reserve. The regional orientation allows for concentration on language and culture. Each 1,300-man group has 3 battalions of 3 companies that hold 6 of the standard building blocks of Special Forces, the 12-man operational detachment (A-team). Multiple A-teams can be collected under larger operational detachments B and even C. The A-team conducts foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Moreover, a single A-team can train and advise a battalion of several hundred indigenous forces. Green Berets are also capable of direct action and special reconnaissance.

Special Forces—unlike SEALs, Rangers, and Marines—build exclusively on experienced NCOs. The unique capability provided by SF is a product of difficult selection criteria, rigorous training, and, above all, accumulated experience and maturity. The A-team is generally commanded by a captain seconded by a warrant officer.

Special Forces training lasts well beyond a year. Candidates are subjected to a 3-week assessment of their emotional, psychological, physical, and leadership qualities. Those selected attend the three-phased qualification course. The first phase trains small-unit tactics common to all SF. The second trains troops in one of four occupational specialties, ranging from 13 to 45 weeks. The four specialties are weapons, engineer, medical, and communications. The final phase combines specialists into an A-team for unit training.

The Army provides USSOCOM with a Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) of highly modified light, utility, and transport helicopters organized in four battalions. They are capable of aerial refueling and enhanced with sophisticated electronics to enable low-altitude infiltration and exfiltration. Army aviation, including SOAR, has an important characteristic that distinguishes it from Marine Corps aviation. Most Army pilots are warrant officers who accumulate many years in the cockpit. The Marine Corps relies on commissioned officers who rotate through flight, staff, and command billets, diluting their technical proficiency. The new SOF should retain the
crewmembers have mastered conventional oriented on flight operations. Training for the conventional aircraft. Aircrew training is this scarce equipment is often misused for mundane purposes because SOF lack conventional aircraft.

...
leading to the special operations–capable designation, and then deploy for a 6-month float.

Flight crews from the Army and Air Force do not share a common culture with SOF on the ground. They do share a 17-day SERE school. In contrast, all Marine aircrews attend the same entry training as their infantry counterparts. Marine pilots frequently return to their roots on the ground, serving in MAGTFs of all sizes.

**Destination Points**

Taking the next step toward a SOF service requires changes to administrative and operational command structures in the field. It also calls for unified training and education. The objective is a *coherent* force, with a common culture for the wars of the 21st century.

**Administrative Command.** Force organization for today’s social conflicts requires alignment with people, cultures, and languages rather than with oceans and fleets. The land–region orientation used by Special Forces is more appropriate than the maritime orientation employed by the Fleet Marine Force. While the law specifies a minimum of three Marine divisions, it does not specify their composition. The current three divisions can be divided into five or more with fewer battalions. All forces from all Services assigned to USSOCOM should be organized according to the Army SF regional model.

The internals of the regional special operations group might be organized along the lines of the old Fleet Marine Force with subordinate administrative commands, but there should be no fixed composition. Marine rifle, tank, light armored infantry, amphibious assault, and artillery units, along with Ranger, SF, and SEAL units, would be under a single subordinate administrative command. Army, Air Force, and Marine rotary- and fixed-wing assets would be merged under a single command, replacing the current administrative commands of the Services. Support forces—including communications, intelligence, medical, motor transport, and special boat units—would be included in a third administrative command.

One or more rifle battalions would be manned, trained, and designated as Ranger units. There would be no need for both SEALs and Force Recon. Scarce SOF aircraft would not be used where conventional aircraft would suffice. Assigned forces would live and train together as an integrated land, sea, and air force. Over time, units would be designed not because that is the way the Army, Navy, Marines, or Air Force conceived them, but because the Special Operations Corps shaped them for its own needs. Ranger School would continue to be prerequisite to Ranger unit assignment and to produce leaders throughout the force.

A single service requires a single force development process. The functions and organizations of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps System Development Command, USSOCOM’s equivalents, and the equivalents of the USSOCOM Service component commands would be brought together. The Navy would provide support for major acquisitions (for example, the V–22 Osprey and its variants) as it currently does for the Marine Corps and naval special warfare. Communication interoperability, among other things, would be simplified across ground, rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and combat support systems.

**Operational Command.** A coherent force must be capable of scaling up and down according to the demands of the mission space—scale not only in numbers but also in the ability to plan and command a larger force, potentially including assigned conventional forces. Command of a larger force implies the ability to establish an operational headquarters in a failed state. To achieve larger-scale operations today, it is common to subordinate SOF to conventional forces where they are generally misused or underutilized. Adding more SEAL platoons and A-teams would not change that.

The Marine Corps brings the ability to command a wider range of air-ground forces than SOF can. Today’s joint special operations task force (JSOTF) is a component to a combatant command but doubles as a joint task force headquarters. Education and training, however, are not commensurate with the requirement to command large forces in sustained operations. Command in small wars is relatively flat, relying on widely distributed small units that are given only broad mission guidance. Marines and SOF are more comfortable with this model than are the major-war Services.

Today’s MAGTF headquarters are sized and configured to command a combined arms team based on a battalion, regiment, division, or larger ground force. The appropriate special operations task force (SOTF) headquarters may appear similar to a MAGTF or JSOTF but be neither. It might be as small as an operational detachment B or C designed to command operational detachments. But a larger SOTF must be prepared to command conventional forces if assigned. Regardless of size, it should be stood up as a joint task force to benefit from the legal authorities that obtain. Existing MAGTF headquarters should be converted to that purpose.

To prevent misuse or underutilization of SOF in the near term, senior Army SOF officers must remain in charge at the higher headquarters. Considerable time will pass before the new common core produces senior leadership with the right education, training, and experience.

**Training and Education.** Coherence requires a career-long training and education system. USSOCOM and the Marine Corps both have school systems that could be merged into a coherent whole. The reality within SOF is that specialization produces different types and degrees of elitism. The new SOF service will have to continue specialization and stratification, but throughout their careers, SOF troops will return to an educational touchstone and circulate through the various organizations, gaining experience and reducing the friction at the seams of stratification. To assure a common culture within SOF, a single entry point is required for both privates and second lieutenants.

Establishing a common entry point is the easy part. The initial training for enlisted personnel would resemble the 4-month Marine Corps bootcamp and the follow-on infantry training. The Marine Corps’ 6-month Basic School would serve as a starting...
point for all officers. Warrant officers would be drawn from the enlisted pool. Both enlisted and officer entry programs would be adapted over time to meet the common needs of the Special Operations Corps. The 3-week jump school would be standard. By this mechanism, all new personnel would be Marine-qualified at the outset.

The Services would continue to provide military occupational skills training (for example, initial flight, artillery, armor, and medical). Within the first year, all new entrants to certain training programs would first be Marine-qualified. Within 2 or 3 years, all flight crew candidates for rotary- and fixed-wing units would be Marine-qualified and would have passed through major-war Services’ training programs before advancing to training on the specialized aircraft and missions of SOF.

A single-service approach would allow resolution of different standards and training programs. The Army and Marine Corps both maintain training programs for category I snipers while SEALs use a different standard. Each Service operates its own medical training. The Navy has specialized training for its corpsmen to operate within the Fleet Marine Force, for Force Recon, and for Navy special warfare. The Army operates its own program for Green Berets and the Air Force for its pararescue jumpers. The Navy could clearly accommodate the medical training requirements for the Special Operations Corps.

The number of candidates completing initial “imprinting” must be both small enough to be affordable and large enough eventually to produce a pool of candidates to fill senior leadership positions, including Special Forces. To address this dilemma, some new accessions should have primary and secondary Service affiliations. To earn Marine qualification, some new accessions of the Services would attend Marine initial training and then return to their primary Services. Those with Marine qualification could serve in the conventional force in scout, reconnaissance, and cavalry units and as liaison to SOF units. They would return to SOF for intermediate and advanced training and education throughout their careers. To meet surge requirements, they could be reassigned from their primary Services to SOF. Most importantly, they would greatly expand the candidate pool for senior service.

There is considerable experience in current SOF that cannot be replaced for a decade or more. None of that experience need be lost. All currently designated Special Operators should remain in place until natural replacement works through the system. Preserving the Army capability is critical because it is the slowest to transform due to the years of experience required for entry, lengthy training and education, and duration of service after qualification. To prevent misuse or underutilization of Special Forces in the near term, senior Army SOF officers must remain in charge at the higher headquarters. Considerable time will pass before the new common core produces senior leadership with the right education, training, and experience.

In 1942, the Royal Marines formed commandos—specialized battalion-sized units—in direct competition with the British army commandos that were later disbanded. A similar process should begin in the United States to create a single service focused on small wars. Moreover, the new Special Operations Corps could help reestablish the strong relationship that once existed between the Department of State and the naval services. The State Department must be restored to its dominant role in foreign policy; it is the appropriate agency to orchestrate all the instruments of national power that are critical in small wars.

It is easy to imagine objections to the above proposals. The major-war Services will cry foul at the loss of their crown jewels, but their objections cannot be taken seriously after the consistent pattern of neglect that eventually forced congressional intervention. Arguments for the Nation’s security needs must prevail over the emotional and parochial. JFQ
Aerial Interdiction of WMD Shipments

By J. Wesley Moore

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by states and nonstate actors is a threat to U.S. interests requiring a multifaceted and integrated response. Presidential policy identifies the breadth of the problem and the range of capabilities needed to ensure that the unthinkable—the actual employment of WMD on U.S. soil—never takes place.

Interdiction is an important aspect of this strategy and aims at preventing the shipment of WMD and related materials to states and organizations of proliferation concern via land, sea, or air. While proliferation by sea represents the greatest danger, it is also the threat most easily addressed through existing authorities and military doctrine. As maritime interdictions succeed, proliferators will likely take to the skies unless an effective aerial interdiction policy is in place.

This article argues that both joint and U.S. Air Force doctrine on combating WMD proliferation are largely outdated, providing little guidance on how interdictions in general, as well as aerial interdictions in particular, will be conducted. The expertise required to perform this mission does not readily translate from any other training in that such interdictions will largely be conducted in support of law enforcement efforts pursuant to highly constrained rules of engagement. Failure to prepare and train for such an eventuality invites disaster. As the world’s premier air and space force, the Air Force must provide leadership in the area of aerial interdiction. Fortunately, it is uniquely up to the challenge.

The Proliferation Threat

WMD proliferation is one of the gravest threats facing the United States and its allies. As the cast of characters seeking access to catastrophic technologies and the means for employing them expands traditional nation-states, the solutions to those threats could accordingly lie beyond the state-centric regimes that have historically characterized the nonproliferation landscape.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) may be a useful step toward such a solution. Not confined by the strictures of a treaty-based organization, PSI participants are free to seek creative and cooperative ways to bring about interdiction. While PSI has borne some fruit in the maritime realm, those successes may prove difficult to replicate in the air. Yet without an equally strong strategy for interdicting WMD shipments by air, maritime successes will only channel proliferation to a more accommodating medium.

Two key aspects of PSI are cooperation among nations within the confines of national legal authorities (generally the national law enforcement authorities of participant states) and strengthening those authorities where necessary. The laws may include criminal nonproliferation statutes, customs and immigration regulations, or any other provisions applying to the shipment of goods.

Past experience has shown that exclusive or even predominant reliance on law enforcement as a means for combating terrorism entailed unnecessary risk. This risk is multiplied in the case of terrorists seeking to acquire and use WMD. This is not to say that law enforcement (to include the kind of cooperative enforcement envisioned under PSI) cannot play an important role in countering proliferation. Logically, the necessary elements for success are:

- a cooperative network of sufficient breadth to cover potential avenues of proliferation
participants with sufficient authority to take effective action

- interfaces and processes that allow for timely collaboration and cooperation

- participants with the means and will to act decisively when circumstances dictate.

Military airpower is uniquely suited to fulfill this fourth criterion, but without the requisite policies and doctrine to train to, efforts will be hampered.

With regard to maritime interdiction, the Navy and Coast Guard have a long history and well-developed doctrine supported by a body of fairly settled law on the conduct of shipboardings. Air interdiction does not have the same historical, doctrinal, or legal underpinnings. Since states typically do not have law enforcement aircraft capable of interdiction, it is imperative that operators, lawyers, and policymakers combine efforts to articulate policies and doctrine for conducting aerial interdictions of WMD and WMD-related shipments. The ability to conduct interdictions in support of law enforcement operations will provide national leadership an additional response option that is less passive than traditional diplomatic overtures but less provocative and escalatory than military force.

The Expanding WMD Problem

For years, states with nuclear ambitions, such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, have exploited gaps in existing nonproliferation regimes not only to circumvent those regimes, but also to use them as legitimating cover for their nuclear weapons programs. As nonnuclear states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), these governments have disguised their weapons programs as the pursuit of peaceful nuclear power technology. Meanwhile, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have begun to seek WMD for their own purposes. Finally, a history of lax enforcement of nonproliferation laws provided fertile ground for the evolution of the A.Q. Khan network, a vast nuclear proliferation enterprise that was willing to sell nuclear technology or turn-key nuclear facilities to the highest bidders.

Recent history has seen positive developments. Foremost is Libya's renunciation of its nuclear program and decision to cooperate more transparently with the International Atomic Energy Agency in dismantling it. To a lesser degree, international pressure on Iran has resulted at least in some gestures of increased cooperation with the agency, although Tehran remains committed to the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps the most worrisome nation on the proliferation landscape is North Korea. After using the NPT as cover for its ambitions for years, Pyongyang withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and announced its intention to pursue nuclear weapons.

In addition to North Korea and Iran, nonstate actors, primarily terrorist organizations, must remain a key focus as proliferators. As the A.Q. Khan network demonstrated on the supply side of the equation, the potential for a nonstate entity to act with virtual impunity within the confines of a weak state is a substantial threat. On the demand side, there can be little doubt that if terrorist organizations can master the technology and obtain the materials, they will not hesitate to use the most destructive weapons as indiscriminately as they have used more traditional ones.

In response to this growing problem, the George W. Bush administration published its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002. That strategy, representing a multifaceted response to the WMD problem, rests on three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. Nonproliferation is designed to prevent proliferation activities and includes such diplomatic regimes as the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Counterproliferation consists of activities intended to interrupt and deter ongoing proliferation efforts and to respond, with force if necessary, to potential WMD employments against the United States. Finally, consequence management consists of actions to be taken in the event of a WMD attack. Clearly, the pillar to which military forces could most directly contribute is counterproliferation. An important element of the U.S. counterproliferation strategy is interdiction. As the strategy states, "We must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations."

The PSI Principles. In 2002, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative as a key for international cooperation in interdicting WMD shipments. The main thrust of PSI, widely described as "an activity, not an organization," is for participants to cooperate (within the bounds of their national legal authorities and international frameworks) to interdict WMD and related materials to states and organizations of concern by land, sea, or air.

Maritime Interdiction. PSI has borne fruit to date, particularly in maritime interdiction. The most widely touted success involved a combined effort by German, Italian, British, and American authorities to interdict a shipment of centrifuge parts destined for Libya on board the German-owned freighter BBC China. This interdiction was credited with ousting the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and solidifying international pressure against Libya to the point that it formally renounced its nuclear program, allowing British and American inspection teams into the country for verification.

While the BBC China incident demonstrated the viability of cooperation when a ship is in the territorial waters of a PSI nation, other arrangements are being made to deal
Aerial Interdiction

with shipments on the high seas, where the state of registry has primary jurisdiction. Most significantly, the United States has entered into shipboarding agreements with Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama, three of the biggest “flag of convenience” states for vessels. In addition, up to 20 other agreements are in various stages of negotiation. They will provide a framework whereby a U.S. ship could intercept and board a suspect vessel registered in one of these flag of convenience states. Combined, ships registered to PSI countries and covered by shipboarding agreements constitute over half of the global shipping fleet, representing a significant tool in combating WMD transport by sea.\(^1\)

Aerial Challenges. With the increased effectiveness of maritime interdiction tools, proliferators may be more likely to take to the skies. While PSI participants have conducted exercises involving shipments by air, they have yet to post the kind of public success story the BBC China interdiction represents in the maritime context. Several factors will make aerial interdiction more challenging.

First, from a legal standpoint, the authorities that would support aerial interdiction are not as steeped in history as law of the sea authorities. While some provisions of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea apply to aircraft, those relating to the “right of visit,” which is the basis for shipboardings, do not clearly address aircraft. Absent language making a provision applicable to aerial operations, “In case of a particular conflict, claims to the analogous application of other law of the sea provisions have to be examined closely, taking into account the respective interests of the parties concerned.” Absent a more definitive legal determination, Air Force operators are likely to be more hesitant than their naval counterparts.

Second, from a physical and political standpoint, aerial interdictions are simply more difficult. Movie depictions of commands traversing zip-lines from a C–130 notwithstanding, the actual boarding of an aircraft could not be accomplished safely. This situation leaves fewer options short of force, which would be highly provocative and seen as illegal by most nations.

Finally, without established doctrine and the accompanying tactics, techniques, procedures, and training, WMD aerial interdiction support will likely be accomplished on an intermittent, as-needed basis. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2060.2 lists interdiction as a subset of counterproliferation, and it tasks the Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop counterproliferation doctrine.\(^2\) Joint Publication 3–40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, mentions PSI and lists interdiction among the counterproliferation tasks under the heading “Conduct Offensive Operations.” But aside from a generic description of interdiction as “operations to track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or stop trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, related materials, technologies, and expertise to/from state and/or nonstate actors of proliferation concern,” no further information is provided about how this mission will be accomplished.

Air Force doctrine provides even less guidance. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–1.8, Counter Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Operations, uses the term denial operations under the heading “proliferation prevention,” but the ensuing discussion jumps from treaty verification and monitoring to counterforce operations, indicating that little thought has been given to the role airpower could play in interdictions not involving actual force.\(^3\) For instance, there is no treatment of the part Air Force planes could play in directing a suspect aircraft to an airfield or as a show of force in support of such a direction communicated from appropriate air traffic control authorities.

Policy Evaluation

Current policy recognizes the need to prevent rogue state or terrorist acquisition of WMD through multiple avenues. The interdiction avenue is important and its operations have proven successful in the maritime domain, the medium most conducive to proliferation. That the aerial domain presents more difficult questions or is not as conducive to proliferation activity, however, does not excuse a failure to pursue aerial interdiction.

Addressing the doctrinal shortfall will not only produce its own benefits but will also force progress on the other fronts. The doctrine development process will provide an ideal forum for addressing the logistic and political difficulties of aerial interdiction. Additionally, input from the operational law community will help assure that doctrine comports with legal requirements so commanders can undertake interdictions fully apprised of political or legal risks. These dangers will likely be managed more effectively if addressed in the thoughtful process of doctrine development rather than in the crisis action planning process.

National Interests. When addressing the WMD question, the national interests at stake are among the most vital. Depending on the scope of his program, an adversary could challenge U.S. peace and stability or even national survival. Additionally, by acting thoughtfully in advance of a crisis, the United States has the opportunity to show leadership in the development of the operational, legal, and diplomatic milieu in which future interdictions will take place. An example of such leadership on the legal front is embodied in the unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, calling on all states to take more effective measures to curb WMD proliferation to
terrorists and nonstate actors. A matching effort on the operational front could lead to similar successes there.

As the sole superpower, the United States is especially vulnerable to asymmetric threats such as WMD. However, a cooperative network of nations dedicated to the principles of nonproliferation is indispensable to obtain the kinds of intelligence needed to identify proliferation networks and bring about interdictions, especially where use of force is not feasible. By developing aerial interdiction doctrine in the open and in dialogue with allies, America will improve its readiness and stimulate international thought by emphasizing that when Washington speaks of aerial interdiction of WMD, it is generally not talking about shooting down aircraft.

By going a step further by having equipped and trained forces ready to perform interdiction operations, the Nation stands to win in two more important respects. First, it will be able, on proper authorization, to provide support to nations that lack indigenous interdiction capabilities. A key center of gravity for terrorist organizations is the absence of a legitimate government capability or willingness to take action to prevent illicit activities. By filling this capability gap, America could enable interdiction where it otherwise would not take place. A nation that refused such assistance could no longer hide behind the excuse of inability, thus exposing itself to increased diplomatic pressure.

The second way the United States would win is by normalizing aerial interdiction operations. Other nations will be more likely to develop their own capabilities if America goes forward prudently. A success story such as the BBC China incident could form a precedent that could convince hesitant nations that such operations can succeed within the bounds of the law and with widespread international support.

Costs. The price of developing a more robust aerial interdiction capability is modest. Doctrinal development could take place within the context of the periodic doctrine review process. With proper training, a mix of existing Navy and Air Force aviation assets could execute interdiction missions. Little logistic support would be required, as these interdictions would generally involve making contact with a civilian aircraft and directing it to land. Clearly, the larger cost lies in the

DOD failure to plan and the Services’ failure to organize, train, and equip. While Coast Guard air assets could leverage their counternarcotic expertise within U.S. territorial waters, only DOD airpower has the global reach necessary to show the leadership that must be exhibited at the forefront of the global counterproliferation effort. The alternative is to rely on individual nations to take action over their own territorial waters. Since even nations with the capability to reach deep into international airspace might lack political will, this would leave the airspace above the high seas virtually uncontested.

Risks. The most significant risk with which every aspect of national WMD policy must be concerned is that a state or nonstate actor of proliferation concern comes to possess these weapons and employs them against U.S. citizens or vital interests. Inaction with regard to any pillar of the WMD strategy increases the likelihood that this risk will become a reality. The countervailing factor associated with an active interdiction policy is that an interdiction will end in embarrassment or an international incident that could set back future interdiction efforts. This factor is magnified when action is taken on an ad hoc basis or without thoughtful preparation.

Few would argue that the risk of a WMD attack can be prudently accepted; therefore, the true questions are whether an active aerial interdiction policy can be effective in preventing or lessening that larger risk and whether the countervailing risks associated with action can be minimized to an acceptable level.

An active aerial interdiction policy could face its greatest challenge over the high seas. While a state’s exclusive sovereignty to act over its own territory and territorial seas is well established, authority for a state other than the nation of registry to act is ambiguous outside of the international crimes of piracy and the slave trade.30 The tack of seeking advance authorization from the flag of convenience states will not readily transfer to air interdictions because strict domestic licensing requirements have virtually eliminated the possibility of a flag of convenience for aircraft.31 Thus, the possibility of covering a substantial portion of the worldwide aircraft fleet with one or two agreements simply does not exist as it does with maritime shipping.

Another potential source of authority would be to pursue the treatment of WMD proliferation as an international crime like piracy or the slave trade. Progress has been made on this front. While UN Security Council resolutions are generally not regarded as legally binding, UNSCR 1540 could at least provide some legitimacy to an interdiction. This will be greatly enhanced in the maritime realm by the recently adopted amendment to the International Maritime Organization’s Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to include proliferation activity as an offense. While the amendment has not been ratified by enough nations to take effect, it is another positive development toward performing aerial interdictions.

Building on a growing international consensus, prior planning must consider how best to conduct aerial interdictions. While the consent of the state of registry is preferable, consideration should be given to what other type of nexus might be sufficient to justify action. Recent amendments to several WMD-related statutes have expanded the jurisdictional bases, but this development has
not been widely publicized. The doctrine development process would allow a chance to explore the limits of this new opportunity and would begin to build the public diplomacy themes and messages needed with future interdiction operations.

**Recommendations**

Air Force counter-WMD doctrine must be revised to reflect the current realities of the threat. Too much has changed since August 2000 for AFDD 2–1.8 to be taken seriously as germane to the present threat. This revision process should be viewed as an opportunity to expand the tools available to national leadership in response to particular proliferation events.

The most significant area for expansion is the part of the force continuum between providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to support treaty verification and conducting counterforce operations against suspect vessels. Realistically, political considerations will almost always preclude the use of force against civil aircraft with the possible exception of another 9/11, where the aircraft themselves are being used as weapons. Thus, for aerial forces to provide a meaningful contribution to the counterproliferation effort, they must develop an unparalleled capability to communicate and enforce orders to divert or land at a particular airfield.

In many ways, this mission is much more complex and difficult than a pure counterforce operation in that it requires great skill and discretion on the part of the intercepting aircrew. This mission is more difficult than a pure counterforce operation in that it requires great skill and discretion on the part of the intercepting aircrew.

To divert or land at a particular airfield.

In the final analysis, no aspect of the fight against WMD can be prudently neglected. Determined adversaries will exploit any perceived weakness in their dogged pursuit of weapons that will provide the kind of shock value on which terrorists and lawless states thrive.

Unlike interdictions at sea, aerial interdictions will provide little margin for error. Because any misstep could undermine international support for the broader counter-WMD effort, the Air Force effort must function at a level of detail that assures nearly flawless execution.

As a particularly affected nation, the United States must provide leadership. Keeping WMD out of the hands of rogue states and terrorist groups is one of the few issues on which a broad international consensus exists with regard to overarching principles. Thus, the international political environment is ripe for a prudent move to take necessary action. JFQ
General Lance L. Smith, USAF, is commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command which is redefining the joint warfighting capability of the U.S. military. In this interview, Smith discusses the importance of integrating military forces with other national agencies to achieve the desired military outcomes.

JFQ: General Pace, just as General Myers before him, speaks frequently about more effective partnering with other Federal agencies, allies, and industry. How does your command promote the coherent integration of U.S. military capabilities with other elements of U.S. and allied power?

General Smith: We focus on bringing other elements of national power into the fight at the operational and strategic level of war—planning, execution, and stabilization and reconstruction. The absence or lateness of such an effort has had an effect in both Afghanistan and Iraq, so we try to bring all of these communities together in a number of ways. We are experimenting with a variety of innovative organizations that show promise, and we invite them to participate in exercises together on their turf and ours. We do this with the State Department, with Homeland Security, and other organizations that conduct exercises. We have pursued the effects-based approach to thinking on most things we do, which, at the operational and strategic levels, is all about harnessing the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power into a common purpose. Sometimes we end up with this great debate over acronyms such as EBO [effects-based operations] and EBAO [effects-based approach to operations], and I hate to attach letters to concepts, but it really is a common sense approach. We know we are not going to win by military power alone. We have to achieve effects on the battlefield, in the battlespace, that involve a whole lot more than just the military.

JFQ: It seems that we are incessantly accused of fighting the last war. The mission of USJFCOM can be fairly interpreted as a mandate to prevent this from happening. The threat seems to have changed dramatically, but our force structure and equipment appear very much the same. Are we keeping pace with the threat, or is this a false metric?

General Smith: First of all, I take some exception to your assumption. The war we are fighting and the tools we are using to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are considerably different than the personnel, equipment, and materials that we started with when I arrived there 3 years ago. The force structure has changed to accommodate the irregular war we are fighting; the training has changed; the tactics, techniques, and procedures have changed; and they continue to evolve to meet this current threat. Beyond that, we continue to look to the future. We are conducting an experiment right now called Urban Resolve 2015 that involves over 1,400 people across the Services, as well as representatives from the interagency community and coalition partners who are looking at how we might fight urban warfare 9 years from now. We are experimenting with technologies and tactics that could be put into the field in an urban arena in 2007, we are experimenting with technologies and tactics that could be put into the field in an urban arena in 2007.


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this. So I don’t believe we are stagnant or trying to fight the last war. Anyway, I don’t know what the last war was—Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom were all different in their own way. We fight the war that we have, and we train to fight the war we think we might have. We are spending a lot of time studying the “fourth-generation warrior” right now, whatever that happens to be. And so as we try to sort out who he is and what he looks like, we try to make sure we stay ahead of the fight and adjust as the enemy changes and adapts.

**JFQ:** Your Web site states that U.S. Joint Forces Command developed the risk assessment process for national leaders. Can you speak about the system that provides leaders with a worldwide perspective on force sourcing solutions?

**General Smith:** I don’t know if we developed it or not, but let me give you an example of how we think we might have. First of all, when we began the current fight, we had an operational plan. We gathered the resources to support the plan, fought the war, and then sent the troops home. Now, through a process where the combatant commander requests specific forces he needs, we get to the business of being the primary joint force provider. Once the request is validated by the Joint Staff, go in and look at the readiness of our forces. We compare them to a given OPLAN [operations plan] and see how current operations or plans affect the capabilities of the combatant commanders to perform their missions, and then risk is assessed against that OPLAN. For instance, if we recommended troops from the Army’s III Corps for Iraq, we see how that impacts the plans for, say, Korea, and then a risk assessment is made. We are able to look at how we might mitigate the risk, so we look at it from our perspective and say, “We can’t give you the 1st Marine Division, but you may get the Army’s 1st Armored Division.”

After we’ve done that, the combatant commander also looks at it and says that course of action is either low, moderate, significant, or high risk to him. This way the Secretary can make an informed decision with the advice of the Chairman.

Once a year, the Chairman, who is responsible for advising the Secretary and the President on military forces, is required to go to the President through the Secretary of Defense and assess the Total Force in order to tell him how we are doing. So there are a lot of ways to assess risk, and it is pretty complex. The Department is currently developing new systems, such as DRRS [Defense Readiness Reporting System], to understand readiness better and gain visibility down to lower levels within the force.

**JFQ:** Your command is focused upon the precise choreography of ground, sea, air, and space-based assets. This requires a very complex command and control architecture. How vulnerable are we to disruptions?

**General Smith:** The question is whether the disruption is from inside or outside the organization, because the complexity of the command and control system itself is an issue. Because we have to be able to operate in an environment where we have allies and multiple Services, the key element in trying to make the command and control system less complex or more robust is to make sure we have a good data strategy. We do not have a great one right now, and we are working on that to try and make sure systems can talk to one another. So we have internal issues with the complexity of the command and control system that operates okay now, but could operate much better. We particularly need to improve our ability to work in a multinational environment.

From a vulnerability perspective, we pay an awful lot of attention to information because of our increased reliance on computers and related technologies, we must have parallel efforts to ensure that data is protected.
assurance. That is an area where U.S. Strategic Command has the lead, and we are working closely with them to make sure we are in step. As we develop new command and control systems, information assurance is integral to how the system is built. Then, of course, the system is continuously monitored to determine if anybody is trying to hack into it. Action can then be taken to strengthen our protections or go after the source of the problem. We also build redundancies into the system; it is not just the bad guys that can affect us—it is the lightning strike and other environmental factors that affect computers and communications that we are all familiar with. So because of our increased reliance on computers and related technologies, we must have parallel efforts to ensure that important data is protected—and we do.

Industry is moving out with new ideas on how to build redundancy into the system: blade technology, for instance, where you have a number of computer banks that back each other up; if one fails, the computer does not dump any more. Since the information is shared across multiple hard drives, you do not lose the data and should not even know there was a problem. That helps protect you in a lot of ways: from yourself, from the environment, and from the enemy.

JFQ: In conversations with military personnel from all Services, it is striking how much better midcareer officers understand innovative constructs such as EBAO and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters than their more senior leaders. How do you keep busy, post-war college leaders up to snuff?

General Smith: In a lot of ways. First of all, I like your premise. It is exactly right. There are a lot of things our younger troops understand, do differently, perceive differently, and act out differently than I might just because of how they grew up and how they think. There is an entirely different culture with regard to the learning process. For instance, I learn by reading the instruction manual. I would never think of operating a new toy without first sitting down and reading the instruction manual; we do that with complex airplanes, too. With most young people today, it does not occur to them to spend weeks studying the instruction manual. The mind learns better graphically than it does by rote memory. So what they do, because they have grown up this way with computers and videogames and a multitude of other technologies, is just turn on the switch, press a button, and see what happens—it locks into their mind. Where we might grasp 30 percent of what we’ve read in the manual, they grasp 60 to 70 percent of what they see. We are trying to figure out just exactly how young people learn today, so we can take advantage of that and adjust our training methods accordingly.

Regarding concepts such as the effects-based approach to operations, they get it, because most of them have been to Iraq or Afghanistan or someplace else where the concept is simply part of how they perform on a daily basis. They clearly understand that there’s a lot more to our business than just breaking things. They must always think about what effect their actions are going to have before they act. Destroying a minaret in a mosque versus shooting the sniper or just going around it altogether are options they must consider. So the effects-based approach to them is natural. When I get into conversations, especially with KEYSTONE [for senior enlisted] and CAPSTONE [for new general officers] and PINNACLE [for 2- and 3-star officers who are going on to be joint task force commanders] students, there is not a great deal of debate about this—good discussion, sure, but clear agreement that this is the way we have to do business.

It is clear to all of them that the battlespace has changed; you have to understand who all the players are and how they are linked, just as we talked about earlier: Where are the centers of power focused? Are we fighting criminals, warlords, drug kingpins, or religious extremists? Where and how is the money moving into and out of the theater? Who is most effectively influencing the people, what are the problems in the city, what is the status of law enforcement? All these things that were not always part of the tactical fight in previous wars are things our troops clearly understand today because they’ve been there, done that, and have the T-shirt. We try to capitalize on this through the lessons learned process conducted by our Joint Center for Operational Analysis by ensuring that all these experiences are captured and included in professional military education, exercises and experiments, and Service and joint training programs.

Additionally, Joint Forces Command conducts mission rehearsals with the headquarters and component staffs prior to any of them going over to the desert or the Horn of Africa. We take the most current knowledge available and share it with these officers and senior leaders and try to give them scenarios to exercise with that they can expect in theater. So the ability to keep the young officers and enlisted folks up to speed on these concepts is really part of the whole exercise and training program.

JFQ: We have been heavily engaged in the Long War for 5 years now. How does USJFCOM improve the ability of the United States and its allies to prevail?
**Smith Interview**

**General Smith:** The command was set up in a very efficient way to deliver and develop the capabilities that troops in the field need. Those who had the vision for JFCOM were pretty smart because many of the engines of transformation and change reside in this command. For instance, we have joint concept development and experimentation, integration and interoperability, joint training, plus primary responsibility for providing forces. This is very powerful.

Since the Joint Center for Operational Analysis is also part of JFCOM, we are able to inform all of our processes with the most current lessons learned out of Iraq and Afghanistan and the various exercises we participate in. We conduct two major exercises with each of the combatant commands every year, plus we participate in most others. So we have many of the pieces needed to take lessons observed and ensure that they become lessons learned. We also have the ability to include lessons learned in our innovation and experimentation program, so we can experiment with alternate ways to conduct operations, mitigate risk, or whatever issue is prominent at the time.

By the way, the process of change does not evolve strictly from lessons learned; it also comes from the good ideas of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines—anybody who wants to make an input into our process has the opportunity to do so.

**JFQ:** As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, can you speak to NATO’s efforts to address the challenges it faces in the Long War?

**General Smith:** First of all, NATO does not necessarily look at what is going on in the world today the same way the United States does, so it is worth noting that the issues for NATO will be somewhat different than the issues for America—or any other individual nation within NATO for that matter. We are all engaged in the global war on terror to varying degrees and with different senses of urgency or concern about the terrorist threat. But as an organization, as an Alliance, NATO understands that there is an enemy out there who wants to harm the West and that we as an Alliance have to work together to defeat them. That is why NATO’s number one operational priority today is Afghanistan, and that is why we, as an Alliance, are in Afghanistan.

At the summit in 2002, NATO committed to change, based primarily on the 1999 Kosovo experience where we found ourselves unable to effectively operate together in several areas. We all found it difficult to deploy even that short distance because we expected to operate from static, robust bases in Europe. The ability to sustain forces outside the immediate area was another issue, as was the ability to talk securely among each other.

We have come an enormous way from there to supporting the operation in Afghanistan and to having a NATO Response Force that is capable of rapid deployment to far reaches of the world. This is significant because I am relatively certain that we could not have gone to Afghanistan 10 to 15 years ago without huge difficulty. So NATO has transformed a great deal; we have had 10 countries join the 16 that made up the Alliance in the early 1990s, and those nations are all transforming, trying

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**JFQ:** Can you also comment on any efforts to mitigate the reported negative trends in interoperability with the United States and speak to your prognosis for the future?

**General Smith:** I wouldn’t say that this is necessarily a trend. It usually arises in the area of command and control. When nations such as ours develop their own secure systems to meet sovereign needs, and then they are introduced into the battlespace, we too often find that they are not compatible. We are working this mostly by going to Web-based systems, and once you get it Web-based, then interoperability becomes much easier, especially if you have a basic data strategy to ensure that you can ultimately connect the two.

Reliability will continue to be a problem. Most nations want to protect their sources in some form or another, but we have made headway. We have an intelligence fusion center now that brings together NATO information in a single place, but we still have national intelligence centers in large numbers in places such as Kosovo and Afghanistan that cannot or do not talk to each other. But there is progress. In fact, if we look at the situation right now, the U.S. future command and control system, the Network-Enabled Command and Control [NECC] system, and the NATO equivalent [NATO Network-Enabled Command, or NNNEC] are both under development simultaneously, and we are trying to structure it so that they can link together. That is one of the real advantages, by the way, of my wearing both a national and NATO hat.

U.S. Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation are working together, trying to ensure that we build all future systems to share data—even from situational awareness tools like full motion video, to communications, to computer software. These have to be able to interact and interoperate together with minimal effort, but it’s not easy. Our job is to try and keep everyone informed sufficiently so that it makes sense to build a Friendly Force Tracker, for instance, that can be seen by all nations, not just one.

**JFQ:** It seems that each geographic combatant command has organized its Standing Joint Force Headquarters differently. Is this a good thing, or should they be more standardized?

**General Smith:** First of all, I would not presume to tell another combatant commander how to do their job that the Secretary has given each of us. So the real issue is whether they have the capability to rapidly respond to a contingency and to establish a joint task force—if that is the chosen method to exercise command—quicker and with more efficiency, and with qualified people, in a better way than we used to be able to. When I was at CENTCOM, it took us a year or longer to fully establish Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan to the point where it had the right command and control systems on board and the right people in both numbers and quality. And then when we went to set up Multinational Force–Iraq, General [George] Casey had some ideas, and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept was one of them. It is worth remembering that he was...
the JFCOM J–7 when that concept was being developed, so he had some experience and blueprints to go by. But even with that, it was not easy to build the organization or get the right people in place.

In this Long War, we do not believe you are going to have time to spend a year setting up a joint headquarters, so how the combatant commanders do that is important. Having said that, it seems reasonable to expect that we would be able to build deployable command and control packages similar in PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command], SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], EUCOM [U.S. European Command], and JFCOM. We would identify and train people ahead of time, so if they were in a joint task force, they could perform their mission anywhere they were assigned. That is where JFCOM has a major role to play: to make sure we support the combatant commanders so that they have the best equipment, the best trained operators, and the standards that allow people to develop common skill sets.

The Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters process works very well, by the way. We used ours in Hurricane Katrina, we used them in Pakistan for the earthquake, and we used them to help set up Task Force Paladin in Afghanistan. They are very effective, and their expertise is much appreciated by the combatant commands that have used them. NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] also used theirs very effectively in Katrina, and other 2- and 3-star headquarters such as 2nd Fleet are really moving out to provide this significant capability to the combatant commanders.

JFQ: Can you explain how experimentation conducted by individual Services is monitored, informed by, or coordinated with efforts conducted by USJFCOM?

General Smith: One of the very positive aspects of our command is that our joint experimentation staff has natural links with the Services and other agencies inside and outside the Defense Department. Everybody is interested in experimenting with the programs they are working on, whether they are concepts or ideas or hardware or software. So the communities are close. Having the J–9 allows us to do that and coordinate and collaborate with the J–9.

So the communities are close. Having the J–9 and the four Service components within JFCOM also helps us understand what the challenges are, what the issues are, and what the Services are experimenting with. Our J–9 has a direct relationship with each of the experimentation agencies throughout the Government. In addition, we have the Joint Technology Exploration Center, or JTEC, which is the vehicle that many of the Services and the combatant commanders use as a backbone for their experimentation efforts.

Each of the Services, when they experiment, also wants some joint element included in their program. If it is the Air Force, they want a joint force maritime command and a joint force land commander. If it is the Army, they want a JFACC [joint force air component commander] and a JFMCC [joint force maritime component commander]. We get directly involved in trying to provide those joint capabilities, so again we are able to help coordinate efforts across the Department and beyond. It is a very collaborative community.

JFQ: We wish to give you an opportunity to tell the U.S. Joint Forces Command story in your own words.

General Smith: Our primary goal is to do what we can to help win the war that we face today while balancing efforts for the future. There are still a lot of people who want to do the West harm and to expand their own ideologies, and there is going to be conflict on the edges for some time to come. We are doing everything we possibly can to help the combatant commanders and our friends and allies succeed.

All of this causes us to reflect very seriously on just exactly what we are doing throughout the command on a daily basis. We have many members of JFCOM with children in the Services and several with sons who have recently been wounded in battle. Our command sergeant major, Mark Ripka, has a son who was recently wounded in Iraq, and the son of our Joint Center for Operational Analysis commander, Brigadier General Jim Barclay, was injured in an IED [improvised explosive device] attack several weeks ago. And there have been a number of others. We feel strongly about doing everything we can to make sure that the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are successful in mission execution and survive whatever they are doing. And we will take all the lessons we gather and make sure we help build a force that continues to improve, so we can be better prepared to engage in future conflicts as well. JFQ
Global Force management

LtG Karl Eikenberry, USA, Combined Forces Commander, Afghanistan, briefs Chairman Pace

U.S Army South (Kaye Richey)

3d Combat Camera Squadron (De-Juan Haley)

1st Marine Division Combat Camera (Andrew D. Young)

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Bryson K. Jones)

GeN John Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command, meets with Seabees of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa in Dikhil, Djibouti

Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Roger S. Duncan)

Left to right: F–16s and F–18s provide quick-strike bombing and close air support for troops on ground; Marines move out for 6-month deployment; B–2 combines long-range bombing ability with stealth technology; C–17s provide strategic airdrop capability.

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower provides Navy and Marine F/A–18 fighters with complementary support; USS Shiloh launches SM–3 as part of Missile Defense Agency test of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense; Abrams main battle tanks returning from readiness exercise.

1st Communications Squadron (Ben Brosa)

U.S. Navy

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Marine Corps

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jacob N. Bailey)

Vulture Team Visual Information (Johancharles Van Boers)

55th Signal Company (Clydell Kinchen)


Left to right:

Gen Peter A. Schoomaker, USA, Commander, U.S. Army South; Air Force Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF; and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Gerald Murray meeting with troops in Southwest Asia; Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Michael Hagee, USMC, receives report on Operation Guardian Tiger, Iraq.

Left: ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, meeting with Navy and Marine officers at Camp Fallujah, Iraq.

Soldiers perform calibration fires with howitzer in Mosul, Iraq.
The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Force Providing

By Michael Ferriter and Jay Burdon

Implementation of the Global Force Management (GFM) construct and associated Joint Force Provider (JFP) has changed the assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces into a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process. GFM/JFP has enabled the team of force providers consisting of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Service components, Service headquarters, and combatant commands to bring to the Secretary of Defense sourcing recommendations from the global pool of available forces and augment those recommendations with assessments of current and future readiness. This enables the Secretary to make proactive, risk-informed force management decisions by integrating the three processes to facilitate alignment of operational forces against known allocation and apportionment requirements in advance of planning and deployment timelines.

The end result of these processes has proven to be timely allocation of those forces and capabilities necessary to execute combatant command missions, timely alignment of forces against future requirements, and informed strategic decisions on the risk associated with allocation decisions while eliminating ad hoc assessments. Additionally, Global Force Management has made significant strides toward developing a network-centric Global Visibility Tool, which will provide the means for all members of the GFM process to access the information necessary to support more timely and accurate force-providing decisionmaking.

To appreciate the contributions of the new Primary Joint Force Providing process, it is important to understand the pre-9/11 force management procedure that formed the basis for the revised JFP construct for both allocation and rotation requirements. Prior to the war on terror, there was little stress on the available forces needed to meet geographic combatant commander requirements. In short, there was virtually no supply-demand problem. Forces were drawn from the three force providers (U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command) that had combatant command authority over the preponderance of Department of Defense (DOD) forces.

Historically, DOD conducted strategic force management through a decentralized process that based decision opportunities for the Secretary of Defense on recommendations from each of the combatant commanders who had combatant command authority over forces. The recommendations were obtained in a redundant and sequential process that proved too slow and segmented for efficient and effective pursuit of the war on terror.

The system’s flaws became apparent during the initial phases of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraq Freedom. As a result, the Secretary called for a single command to be responsible for the force-providing process and directed a review of provider responsibilities within DOD. Because of this review, on June 25, 2004, the Secretary signed the Primary Joint Force Provider Implementing Memorandum, which formally designated the Commander, USJFCOM, as the primary joint force provider for identifying and recommending sourcing solutions from all forces and capabilities (except designated forces sourced by U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

The Joint Force Providing process developed from this direction has focused on the sourcing allocation of forces for both emergent and enduring rotational force requirements for all of the geographic combatant commanders.

How Joint Force Providing Works

Emergent force requirements are executed through the request for forces/capabilities (RFF/C) process, which provides the procedures, roles, missions, and functions to support the sourcing of combatant command requests for capabilities and forces to meet emerging or crisis-based requirements. The process begins when a combatant commander submits an RFF/C to support emerging operational requirements to the Secretary of Defense via the CJCS. The Chairman validates the request by conducting a strategic risk assessment to prioritize the requirement in relation to existing priorities, develop and articulate capability and/or force availability substitution guidance on alternate sourcing strategies (coalition, civilian, or contracted sources), and conduct a legal/policy review.

The Joint Staff also determines whether the requested capability or force sourcing responsibility rests with the primary joint force provider (USJFCOM for all conventional forces), other functional force providers, or another Federal agency. The Joint Staff then develops a draft deployment order and forwards it to the primary JFP.

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components to coordinate with the Service headquarters and other combatant command. Service components to track capabilities and forces in order to assess operational readiness, availability, commitment, and capability substitution options.

U.S. Joint Forces Command uses its component inputs to develop sourcing recommendations from the global force pool to complete the draft deployment order for final coordination with Service headquarters and combatant commands. When required, USJFCOM will coordinate sourcing solutions directly with the combatant commanders who have combatant command of the specific force to resolve any contentious sourcing issues. The role of the primary JFP in this step is to provide a single point of consolidation and staffing to capture operational risk to the combatant command owning the force and any force management, future challenges, or institutional risk to the Service providing the force.

This risk is assessed by the Service Component and/or combatant command providing the force and is communicated to USJFCOM for consolidation and inclusion in the sourcing recommendation. This process allows USJFCOM to recommend global sourcing solutions from all forces, including those assigned to other combatant commanders, those not assigned and retained under control of the Service secretary, and any recommendations concerning use of civilian or contracted assets.

Once the recommendation is received from USJFCOM, the Joint Staff coordinates with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, agencies, Services, or combatant commands to seek their input on any issues that would result in a nonconcurrence or reclamation. The Joint Staff will, as required, convene a GFM board, consisting of flag officer or equivalent representation from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary, combatant commands, and Services to resolve contentious sourcing solutions. The Joint Staff will then forward the solution via the deployment order book to the Secretary. Upon the Secretary’s approval, a formal deployment order is released.

In addition to the emergent force requirements of the geographic combatant commanders, the Armed Forces provide overseas presence through a combination of rotational and forward-based forces, as well as the resources necessary to sustain and maintain them. Forward-based forces are assigned to geographic combatant commands in the assignment tables of the Forces for Unified Commands annex of the GFM document.

Rotational forces are those allocated to a combatant commander to execute tasks in their area of responsibility and are typically deployed for a specified period (generally, 90 days to 6 months). Rotational forces deploy as units, typically sized at the Army or Marine Corps brigade/regimental combat team, air and space expeditionary task force, or carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group level or larger. Rotational force requirements are sourced globally with the rotational force sourcing process, which delineates the roles, missions, and functions to support the sourcing of combatant command rotational force requirements.

The Rotational Force Allocation Plan gives the primary joint force provider, combatant commands, and Services strategic-level planning guidance for rotational allocation of forces for 2 fiscal years. The plan contains the rotational force requirement, the combatant command to which the force is allocated, the operation or mission the force is tasked to support, the nature of the presence requirement (for example, rhythm—periodic, near continuous, or continuous presence), and the size of the rotational force (for example, brigade combat team, expeditionary strike group, or air and space expeditionary task force).

The rotational force allocation process is facilitated by quarterly GFM boards comprised of flag officer or equivalent representation from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. Each year, the October board reviews and prioritizes combatant command rotational requirements for the next 2 years. Following board approval of the rotational requirements, the primary joint force provider develops a draft rotational force schedule and rotational force allocation plan. The January board reviews the draft schedule and allocation plan developed by the primary joint force provider and, on approval, staffs the plan with the Service chiefs and forwards it to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

The April board then reviews the approved rotational force schedule for changes identified subsequent to the Secretary’s approval. Finally, the July board reviews guidance and assumptions developed by the Joint Staff prior to soliciting requirements from the combatant commands in preparation for the next October board. Rotational force schedule changes required between quarterly boards are addressed by either convening an off-cycle board or via the RFF/C process.

Success Story

The success of the joint force provider processes has been both quantitative and qualitative and is directly related to the incredible leadership and teamwork of all involved. Measurable reduction of the time between identification of the requirement by the supported combatant commander and receipt of the force in theater has been the hallmark of the new process. Gaining both time for troop predeployment preparations and decision time for strategic planners has proven critical to the DOD ability to manage force stress at acceptable levels while successfully prosecuting the war on terror.

Since designating USJFCOM as the primary conventional joint force provider, the average predeployment notification/decision time has grown from 3 months for the Operation Iraqi Freedom II rotation to more than 10 months for the Operation Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom 06–08 rotations. Moreover, consolidating joint sourcing recommendations into a single coordinated and collaborative process that includes direct input from senior commanders through the CJCS has produced sourcing solutions more efficiently and brought a better understanding of the risks associated with those solutions.

Meeting the warfighters’ requirements with the most capable, ready, and available force while simultaneously understanding the operational and force structure planning impact of a sourcing decision has been an enabler for several Service transformation strategies, to include the Navy’s carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group surge program and the Army’s Force Generation model and brigade combat team transformation strategy. Execution of these future-focused force structure strategies ensures that we are postured for the Long War. JFQ
Military experimentation has long played a vital role in the search for new ways to gain advantage in war. Whether developing technologies such as the longbow, submarine, or fighter aircraft, or polishing concepts such as Heinz Guderian’s blitzkrieg tactics or the U.S. Navy’s War Plan Orange prior to World War II, well-crafted experimentation in advance of conflict has often made a critical difference.

A broad spectrum of experimental activity continues within the U.S. military and its partner agencies, nations, and alliances. The Services conduct an enormous amount of experimentation on their own while developing new systems and operational concepts. However, the center of gravity of U.S. joint warfare experimentation lies in Suffolk, Virginia, at the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Futures Laboratory (JFL). There, potential key enablers for tomorrow’s joint task force commanders are exposed to experimentation techniques that range from workshops, to limited objective experiments, to complex events conducted within a sophisticated virtual environment that spans the globe.

Part of the Family
The USJFCOM commander is chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with leading the joint concept development and experimentation enterprise. As lead organization for this activity, JFL works closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Services, Department of State and other interagency partners, other nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Command Transformation to provide three principal products: concepts, prototypes, and an integrating environment for joint experimentation.

The JFL’s highest-level concept development involves the family of joint operational concepts (JOCs), which describe how a joint force commander is expected to conduct operations within a military campaign 8 to 20 years in the future. Also, they provide other members of the joint operations concepts family—joint functional concepts and joint integrating concepts—with valuable information.
The Joint Futures Laboratory recently completed revising the Major Combat Operations and the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Joint Operational Concepts and is now developing a new “shaping” Joint Operational Concept in partnership with U.S. European Command. The JOCs all benefit throughout their life cycle from the broad spectrum of experimental activity that occurs across the joint force, including events hosted by the JFL as well as Service Title 10 experiments, such as the Army’s Unified Quest series or the Air Force’s Unified Engagement series.

Subordinate concept and prototype development activities are largely based on the warfighting challenges that combatant commands, Services, and multinational and interagency partners are trying to solve. These challenges are either solicited directly from USJFCOM partners or brought to light by the command’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis. Subordinate concepts, such as the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, are developed and refined through exposure to several levels of experimentation and then positioned for transition into doctrine and training with the assistance of the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center. Prototypes for advanced capabilities, which are focused principally on joint warfare at the operational level, are developed on the JFL campus or drawn together from industry and other government organizations. These prototypes are exposed to experimentation in much the same manner as concepts and are then positioned for transition with the assistance of USJFCOM’s Integration Directorate.

The JFL’s third product is an integrating environment (collectively referred to as Joint Command–Future) that enables replication of large-scale joint command and control activity, linking partners through collaborative tools, models and simulations, core operational expertise, and rigorous experimentation standards. The Joint Command–Future is used for both small-scale experiments to meet focused customer requirements and major events sponsored by USJFCOM. This product is also offered to Service and other partners to enable and bring joint context into their experimentation.

Key to economy of effort within this environment is the robust usage of modeling and simulation, fully interconnected to partners via high-bandwidth experimentation networks. This sophisticated capability includes Joint Semi-Automated Forces, which enable a real-time human-in-the-loop interface with millions of entities fully represented in a high-fidelity, three-dimensional environment that can replicate a real-world location such as Baghdad. Matching the real-time fidelity of Joint Semi-Automated Forces (but in a capacity that is faster than real-time) is the Joint Analysis System. This environment allows the command to study joint- and campaign-level issues in their native setting.

Other modeling and simulation capabilities include a nonkinetic representation known as Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation, which is derived from a system produced by Purdue University. It enables simulation of the impact on local population attitudes, by neighborhood, of actions taken by a commander or other events. JFL is constantly searching for ways to add these tools to joint task force commanders’ capabilities. Joint Semi-Automated Forces have promise as a mission rehearsal tool, and Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation has generated interest as a predictive analysis tool.

**Vital Links**

Experimentation efforts feature several dimensions that determine the allocation of resources to experimental activity within JFL. These include the command level of warfare (strategic, operational, or tactical); the types of solutions under examination (conceptual or prototypical); the degree of transformation represented in a particular solution (incremental, evolutionary, or disruptive); and the temporal frame (near-, mid-, or long-term). The latter is key; USJFCOM has a clear focus on enabling today’s joint warfighter engaged in the Long War. This focus results in a carefully managed balance at JFL between near- and long-term focus.

JFL activity is governed by a disciplined yet agile cycle that begins with prioritizing challenges identified by the combatant commands and other customers, matching unique solutions to those challenges, exposing the challenge-solution set to experimentation, and then transitioning the solutions that work into either doctrine or acquisition. The laboratory works with a constellation of partners, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, multinational military partners and their civilian counterparts, U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, industry, academia, and Federally funded research and development centers. Because some of the most valuable experimentation is happening on the frontlines, JFL’s links with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and a host of liaison officers, including those embedded in the U.S. Central Command area of operations, are vital.

Key transformational issues under examination by the Joint Innovation and Experimentation Enterprise include:

- achieving the Unified Action experiment series, which requires improving methods of rapid planning, coordination, and execution with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental partners and acknowledging that partner departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, will often have the lead in operations to which the joint force will be a contributor
- accelerating speed of command by fusing intelligence and operations to observe in real time, orient continuously, decide rapidly, and act in near-real time
- becoming an interdependent joint force by building fully integrated systems and training to operate as a single force
- enabling strategic communication—synchronizing and unifying timely messages that span the global strategic level to the local tactical level
- enhancing strategic and operational maneuver to deliver agile and sustainable forces quickly through adaptive planning, rapid projection, and joint sustainment.

Solving these challenges will better enable the U.S. military to contribute to defeating the fourth-generation
warrior while improving capability across the spectrum of conflict.

Recent experiments have capitalized on the capabilities inherent in the JFL infrastructure. The scenario for Multinational Experiment 4 (MNE 4) was set in Afghanistan in 2010. The scenario for Urban Resolve 2015 (UR 2015), held from August to October 2006, was set in Baghdad in 2015. Both were designed to narrow existing capability gaps and those the United States and coalition partners could face during combat and post-combat operations.

Multinational Experiment 4 marked a unique technological milestone because participants achieved success through the first use of a global synthetic environment that networked national modeling and simulations systems to support experimentation. It enabled global participants to collaborate on the same operational situation from five sites and six time zones. As host, JFL coordinated teamwork among the nations and participated in the global partnership that evolved from an effects-based approach to operations.

The eight exercise partner countries and NATO came together to develop concepts and capabilities that used EBAO to conduct military, interagency, and multinational operations. Several insights were derived. For example, EBAO cannot rely on military action only, but needs strong interagency participation to achieve national and coalition aims. Moreover, it requires a knowledge base built on the open sharing of information among civilian and military entities of coalition members.

Next in the multinational experimentation series, MNE 5 will continue to build on the lessons learned from MNE 4 and previous experiments and is intended to produce specific products for use by future multinational civil-military coalitions. It will improve methods to conduct rapid planning, coordination, and execution with interagency and multinational partners to create and carry out a unified, comprehensive strategy. It will mature the effects-based approach to multinational operations and supporting concepts to integrate full international capabilities across the spectrum of security issues.

On the Horizon

Urban Resolve 2015 was a robust experiment in which U.S. and coalition forces had to maintain major postcombat stability by quelling insurgent attempts to disrupt the nascent government. The exercise included three human-in-the-loop segments, each focusing on specific operations ranging from battlespace awareness to stability and reconstruction operations. Joint information operations designed to deny adversaries access to information that might thwart urban stability were incorporated as well.


UR 2015 examined solutions to identify current and future warfighting capability gaps to enhance our ability to operate safely and efficiently in an urban environment. Through dynamic wargaming and subsequent detailed analysis of results, solutions will be offered to enable warfighters to conduct urban stability operations and respond to asymmetrical threats when insurgents employ terrorism to influence the urban landscape.

On the horizon for JFL is the Unified Action series, a 3-year umbrella program in which JFL is working with the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Institute of Peace, the private sector, several multinational partners, multilateral organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Unified Action 2007 will test shared conflict assessment and integrated planning.

The Services are also taking advantage of, and contributing to, joint experimentation through various exercises and activities. The Army’s Unified Quest 2006 in April was designed to determine how the joint force would conduct irregular warfighting beyond 2017. The Trident Warrior exercise, fueled by lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, will test the Navy’s newest communications technologies, focusing on the integration of information shared between civilian and governmental agencies. The Air Force’s Unified Engagement 2006 (UE 06), cosponsored with USJFCOM, explored ways the United States and its partners can create coherent effects across long distances in the Pacific theater to mitigate the significant issues of a fractured state. UE 06 took advantage of the Joint Analysis System simulation to identify potential outcomes to the experiment’s scenarios prior to execution and improve campaign planning.

U.S. Joint Forces Command and JFL continually look for ways to gain greater leverage from transformational activity. Accordingly, a number of vectors for improving joint concept development and experimentation efforts are identified:

- gaining better visibility over the domain of potential solutions to warfighter challenges
- improving linkages among joint experiments across the board
- linking even more closely with Joint Staff processes
- strengthening existing partnerships and leveraging new ones
- placing greater emphasis on transitioning capability solutions that are vetted by experimentation
- folding more experimentation into joint exercises.

The strategic principle governing the Joint Futures Laboratory’s activity is to “generate unique solutions to the joint warfighting problems our customers are trying to solve.” Its dedicated professionals are working on this task every day, building the networked experimentation ability and innovation momentum that will be vital tools for helping the joint community to shape its doctrine and capabilities. JFQ
Joint Capability Development

By Bryon Greenwald

The U.S. Joint Forces Command works the critical command and control seams of joint warfighting where all Services have concerns but none has a compelling reason to do anything about them.

Due to a lack of preplanned, mandatory interoperability, there are significant challenges in executing command and control (C2) of joint forces. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has provided solutions to some of these problems in the past and has recently reorganized its Joint Capability Development Directorate (J–8) to focus even more on integration, interoperability, and development of joint C2 capabilities. This article outlines some root causes of the joint interoperability problem, highlights contributions made by USJFCOM to enhance joint interoperability and integration, and describes the organization and function of the reorganized J–8.

Historically, the Services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps—have been responsible for designing, procuring, fielding, and sustaining their own combat gear. This stovepiped process is part of each Service’s Title 10 responsibility, which works well for Service-specific items. Even in joint command and control, where one would expect problems, this process was sufficient in the era of jointness up to and including Operation Desert Storm, where combat actions were largely deconflicted by space and time, and Service-provided forces did not so much work together as simply stay out of each other’s way.

But beginning with Desert Storm and continuing today, the conduct of warfare has changed dramatically from large force-on-force operations between nations to complex, compressed clashes between state and nonstate actors. This shift from third-generation to fourth-generation warfare has driven combat forces from all Services to work more synchronously together, often side by side, to root out elusive opponents in conflicted urban terrain.

To add to this change the advent of the digital revolution as well as the computerization of combat systems, and the complexity of operations increases significantly. In this environment, merely deconflicting forces no longer provides the joint synergy required to achieve goals. To succeed in fourth-generation warfare, command and control of Service-provided forces must be truly interoperable and interdependent. In this environment, current stovepiped requirements and acquisition processes, based on Service Title 10 responsibilities alone, have failed to produce the interoperability and interdependency necessary to command and control today’s joint forces.

This is not to say that the combat development community has sat idly by over the last decade. Interoperability has improved since Desert Storm, when the digital connectivity between the Services was so bad that a courier had to hand-carry the Joint Force Air Component Command air tasking order in hardcopy out to each Navy carrier. But correcting that shortcoming and others only addressed the most pressing C2 problems found during that war.

Those efforts did nothing to get ahead of the swelling wave of digitization that has hit the joint force and now mandates the need to pass data and voice both U.S. and coalition forces are frustrated by the confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency that hamstring their efforts.

Soldier communicates to Apache helicopter during capture of insurgents in Adhamiyah, Iraq

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army units used on demand from national sensors to joint task force headquarters, between component commands, and on to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines over the last tactical mile. Such are the demands of warfare today. They were foreshadowed in Somalia, where having timely and relevant blue force tracking could have saved lives. These demands are currently scrawled in the sands of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Both U.S. and coalition forces are frustrated by the confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency that hamstring their valiant efforts to crush insurgencies, root out terrorism, and build safe and stable nations.

Despite improvements, there is much work to do, and the Service-centric development of what are inherently joint and interdependent C2 systems will not get the job done. In fact, this Service-centric approach has led to the development of multiple, often redundant capabilities, many fielded on the fly in Iraq and Afghanistan. These capabilities might work well for the unit or Service that fielded them, but they are either incapable of working together effectively with command and control capabilities from other Services in a joint context or so duplicative that they clog bandwidth and reduce capability in a cluttered, constrained environment.

A few examples drive the point home. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army units used...
common operating picture. This complicated not only force tracking and battle command but also critical tactical operations such as clearing fires.

Recently in Iraq, senior commanders and staff complained about hundreds of “homegrown” databases that were not discoverable, searchable, and transparent by those who needed the information. Senior commanders also fretted openly about the spectre of “blue on blue frequency jamming” resulting from the undisciplined use of similar frequencies in close geographic proximity, causing patrols to lose combat capability and potentially bringing unmanned aerial systems crashing to the ground. Perhaps most indicative of the failure of the current process to help the joint warfighter, senior commanders admitted to spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to grow their own information fusion systems because the individual Services and the joint force had done nothing to provide them an interdependent joint C² system that met their specific needs.

This deplorable situation raises questions. First, if warfare today is truly interdependent and joint, but the Services have responsibility only for their own warfighting domain, how does the Department of Defense (DOD) harness the positive aspects of Service-centric programs and develop the joint interoperable and interdependent C² capability that joint task force (JTF) commanders need? Second, what is the best way to bring these joint C² systems to the fight quickly and economically and meet JTF commanders’ requirements? Finally, and more specifically, what organization develops, procures, fields, and sustains combat capability along the critical seams of joint, interdependent warfighting, thread assessments to provide guidance for material and nonmaterial development.

Currently, the J–8 and its subordinate commands are assessing the joint close air support (JCAS) mission thread, analyzing the ability to exchange digital information between joint terminal attack controllers, CAS platforms, and the Theater Air Ground System to develop investment strategies for capabilities across the full measure of JCAS systems to develop investment strategies for legacy equipment that is not fully interoperable. In partnership with U.S. Strategic Command, USJFCOM has drafted the operational concept, extending the C² linkage from the national-strategic down to the operational-tactical levels.

To improve combat effectiveness and reduce fratricide, the Joint Fires Division within the J–8 spearheaded the creation of two governing bodies, the JCAS committee and the Combat Identification–Blue Force Tracking–Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (CID–BFT–JBFSA) executive steering committee, to provide leadership in these critical areas. Shortly after its creation, the JCAS committee attacked one of the more vexing problems noted in current operations: the lack of common training and certification standards for joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) and joint forward air controller (airborne). Working in consultation with the combatant commands and Services, the JCAS committee brokered memoranda of agreement between all parties, outlining firm standards for JTAC and forward air controller (airborne) training and certification. Moreover, a USJFCOM-led team reviewed existing American JTAC school curricula and accredited three new schools (two U.S. and one coalition program in Australia). This action
increased certification opportunities for joint terminal attack controllers by 30 percent, improving interoperability and combat effectiveness while vastly reducing the potential for fratricide.

In January 2006, the newly formed CID–BFT–JBFSA committee accepted an immediate 90-day Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROCS) working group to produce a set of CID–BFT investment recommendations for the Defense Department budget cycle. Fortunately, this committee had the benefit of outstanding joint and coalition work on combat identification conducted through the Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. This display concluded in September 2005 with an exercise in the United Kingdom involving ground and air forces from nine nations and various combat identification technologies. The resulting Coalition Military Utility Assessment formed the basis for joint acquisition recommendations in March 2006 to the U.S. Army–Marine Corps Board and subsequently the JROC. Both organizations approved the recommendations for the current program objective memorandum, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognized the Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration as the best demonstration in fiscal year 2006.

Working in conjunction with U.S. Strategic Command and others, USJFCOM enhanced Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness by leveraging ongoing classified blue force tracking efforts and adding unclassified blue force tracking devices in a cross-domain situational awareness solution. This capability tied several devices together that were not previously visible in one common operating picture.

Linked to this solution are three additional capabilities to pass precision-guided-munition–quality targeting data from the operator in the field to the cockpit via machine interface and data link translation. Using the Digital Precision Strike Suite, the Rapid Attack Information Dissemination Execution Relay, and the Joint Translator/Forwarder, an operator can pass precise target coordinates digitally from the foxhole to the control center and on to the cockpit without fear of human-induced error due to a garbled transmission or transcription error. This combination of new systems greatly reduces both the time it takes to prosecute a target and the potential for air-to-ground fratricide. Several combatant commands have received these capabilities, and USJFCOM has transitioned all of them to Service programs of record for long-term sustainment.

Translating data links is easy, however, compared to providing machine foreign language translation. Working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Army, the J–8 has developed several translation devices used by Servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most common device fielded is the P2 Phraselator, a one-way personal digital assistant capable of translating several languages including Arabic, Pashtun, and Urdu. Also deployed are the Voice Response Translator, a one-way hands-free device, and the Coalition Chat Line Plus, a software application that provides text, document, chat, and instant messaging translation designed to improve coalition command and control.

In response to an urgent request from U.S. Central Command, USJFCOM is working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and contractors to develop a two-way, speech-to-speech device for English-Arabic translation. Several prototypes are being used in Iraq. Having secured DOD funding to establish an Army transition office for language translation, USJFCOM will transition all of these capabilities to the Army Sequoyah program of record in fiscal year 2008 for future development and sustainment.

Despite these advances, one of the more challenging areas facing USJFCOM and the Services involves the rapid creation of joint task force headquarters. Service-based command and control headquarters do not possess the organic joint communications or C2 applications to enable their rapid transformation into a headquarters capable of joint warfighting. To assist in that transition, USJFCOM is leveraging its work in joint architecture engineering to develop a turnkey C2 process to help prospective JTF commanders jumpstart their headquarters using JTF mission template playbooks. This process would identify the personnel, equipment, joint mission essential tasks, networks, and C2 applications necessary to establish a core joint task force capability to accomplish either major combat, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations. Additionally, the command has followed JROC direction to field a deployable joint command and control system to fill critical capability gaps in combatant command deployable C2.

The J–8 also leads the development of the Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC), the principal DOD C2 system.
of the future and the replacement for the Global Command and Control System—Joint and the Service global command and control system family of systems. NECC will provide C2 capabilities to support the National Military Command System, joint force commanders, and Service/functional Components down to unit level through enterprise-based joint architectures, integrated applications, and Web services.

This approach will deliver the modernized C2 capabilities necessary for today’s highly dynamic and constantly changing environment more quickly. It relies on coherent data strategies across all associated communities of interest. To that end, the J–8 leads several governance efforts to achieve commonality and unity of effort across the DOD data community. Working with the Defense Information Systems Agency, U.S. Joint Forces Command will ensure that NECC meets warfighter needs by engaging the Service and combatant commands to assist in developing the system’s requirements. USJFCOM will also provide the critical nonmaterial products and contributions associated with this new joint C2 system. Finally, the command will ask the Services and other combatant commands to participate in a series of realistic integration and interoperability tests prior to spiral fielding of selected capabilities.

The importance of these contributions notwithstanding, the work to date only scratches the surface and, with the exception of NECC, does not get to the core of what it means for capabilities to be “born joint” and not “made joint” after the battle starts. The Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap provides the joint community with a collective azimuth to follow, but does not compel compliance or ensure compatibility out to the last tactical mile. Similarly, the JCAS and CID–BFT–JBPSA committees are coalitions of the willing that do meaningful work; but without the ability to drive solutions to fruition, they operate only at the margin of improvement. Moreover, while the capabilities offered by joint data strategy, joint C2 architectures, and interoperability solutions are a start, much work remains to provide the critical bridge between Service C2 capabilities and true joint command and control.

**Joint Capability Developer**

Building on its previous contributions to joint interoperability and integration, USJFCOM has recently redoubled its efforts and taken up these challenges in two important ways. First, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the command will serve as the DOD C2 portfolio and oversee the development of requirements, programming of resources, and execution of acquisition for a collection of joint C2 efforts. As portfolio manager for these programs, USJFCOM will exercise the requisite authority and work with its Service and DOD partners to conduct the necessary testing and integration of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to meet both Service and combatant command needs and provide a comprehensive and sustainable solution.

Second, U.S. Joint Forces Command has reorganized and refocused internally to enhance the ability of the joint force headquarters to meet its mission needs. Nowhere is this reorganization more apparent than in changes to the J–8 that orient the directorate more toward joint capability development and the integration of command and control systems. Prior to September 1, 2005, the directorate was responsible for developing and validating joint requirements documents, the integration of C2 systems, joint fires issues, and traditional resourcing work, as well as a host of lesser functions.

Since early fall 2005, however, the J–8 has focused almost exclusively on joint capability development. This transformation expands on the directorate’s earlier interoperability and integration duties, but transfers many of the further functions traditionally associated with it to other elements within the command.

Areas the J–8 focuses on include:

- joint C2 portfolio management: supporting the USJFCOM commander in managing the 14 systems/programs in the current portfolio
- C2 challenges and solutions: working with combatant commands, Services, and agencies to determine shortfalls and potential solutions
- capability development: collaborating with combatant commands, Services, and agencies to develop both near- and long-term requirements for C2 systems and other joint capabilities
- joint C2 architectures: providing standards and oversight for joint C2 architecture development to facilitate gap analysis, concept design, and systems compatibility
- joint data strategy: leading community of interest development across a number of C2 and C2-related areas
- C2 transition: conducting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities integration and supervising implementation and transition for C2 capabilities to programs of record
- joint fires policy and doctrine: leading the JCAS, CID–BFT, and fratricide prevention efforts for the joint force
- joint missile defense: serving as the joint warfighter advocate and bridge between national missile defense and tactical air and missile defense
- DOD unit reference number management: advancing the efficient C2/situational awareness Variable Message Format data exchange to ease correlation of position location information, facilitate blue force tracking, and reduce fratricide
- joint fires testing and training: conducting interoperability testing and training in operational environments
- joint systems integration: leading the Department of Defense systems integration effort through interoperability assessments and systems engineering.

As the conduct of warfare has evolved from large-scale operations to smaller, more selective applications of military power, United States Joint Forces Command has adapted to provide greater capability to the joint warfighting headquarters. While retaining its leadership of interoperability and integration, the Joint Capability Development Directorate has reorganized to place more emphasis on enabling joint command and control and associated capabilities from the joint task force headquarters level down to the Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman serving on point. Combined with its management of the capabilities portfolio, the directorate’s new role as the joint capability developer offers the Services and combatant commands a determined partner to work those critical, but largely neglected, command and control seams so necessary to joint warfighting.
The USEUCOM Strategic Effectiveness Process

By WILLIAM E. WARD

This article is a condensed version of General Ward’s original submission. A more technical essay with embedded graphics is highly recommended for operations and plans officers and is available at ndupress.ndu.edu by clicking on JFQ issue 44.

The terms effects-based operations (EBO) and effects-based approach to operations are two of the most controversial topics in modern joint warfighting. A recent article broke the controversy into two camps. Proponents of EBO “seek greater efficiency and less destruction in combat by linking each use of military force, down to the most tactical levels, to overarching, strategic effects or objectives.” But critics argue that it remains “virtually impossible to reliably identify the effects of an operation when facing . . . complex adaptive . . . targets like . . . insurgent groups in Iraq” and that effects-based thinking “can lead to potentially dangerous self-delusion about the capacity to control outcomes.”

In an interview soon after taking charge of U.S. Joint Forces Command, General Lance Smith, USAF, acknowledged that there are “legitimate concerns out there [about] people, including some in Joint Forces Command, that try and make this whole thing too prescriptive . . . I refuse to use a term of ‘EBO’ that means . . . different things to different people.”

General Smith favors the looser term effects-based approach and stated that an effects-based tool “might be most useful on a strategic level at top headquarters, where commanders must integrate military operations with U.S. political and economic objectives.” U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has developed just such a tool: the Strategic Effectiveness Process.

Effects-Based Defined

J.P. Hunerwadel lamented that there are “as many opinions about what [effects-based operations are] as there are people who have written on the subject.” To apply any concept effectively, it is first necessary to establish a workable definition. After examining the broad range of arguments on effects-based operations, USEUCOM planners decided to apply effects-based thinking to enhance (but not replace) the traditional military decisionmaking process by linking objectives to tasks through a set of desired effects on the environment.

While the debate over effects-based operations raged in professional publications, USEUCOM planners and leaders quietly went to work to find the best way to apply effects-based thinking in the real world. The product of their efforts is the command’s Strategic Effectiveness Process, a broad strategic framework for the command that:

- establishes the commander’s desired endstate for the theater, defined by a set of overarching strategic objectives and effects
- prioritizes resource requirements by identifying tasks necessary to achieve the effects and capabilities needed to perform those tasks

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**Objectives and Effects**

As an initial step, the chief of staff convened a planning team comprised of representatives from all directorates of the headquarters, plus all the subordinate headquarters. They operated as a traditional operational planning team, with all stakeholders having a hand in shaping the objectives. After getting feedback from general and flag officers, seven theater strategic objectives were presented and approved by the USEUCOM commander:

1. the Nation and its citizens and interests are secure from attack
2. success across the range of military operations is ensured
3. strategic access and freedom of action are secure
4. terrorist entities are defeated and the environment is unfavorable to terrorism
5. security conditions are conducive to a favorable international order
6. strong alliances and partnerships effectively contend with common challenges
7. transformation leads evolving challenges.

Once the theater strategic objectives were approved, the planning team developed strategic effects describing specific conditions that will lead to accomplishing the objectives. To use more traditional military decisionmaking language, if the objectives represent the commander’s desired endstate for his theater, the effects articulate his intent (how he intends to achieve the endstate). Effects describe the behavior or state of some environmental element (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, or information) and can be measured to determine whether U.S. Government actions are helping achieve the desired effects. Based on the assessments, leaders can then decide whether to stay the course or change course to support the desired effects.

While developing the effects, the commander directed that the team depart from historical effects-based thought processes in one area regarding the effects themselves: he stated that at the theater strategic level, there are key effects to be achieved in the operational environment that are purely within the control of the U.S. Government, such as gaining resource support or influencing force allocation and transformation processes. Objectives 2 (success across the range of military operations is ensured) and 7 (transformation leads evolving challenges) primarily describe conditions of, or actions by, Federal entities (for example, the Services, Congress, and interagency partners). Interestingly, the commander made this decision in 2004 to deviate from the then-commonly accepted definition of an effect. This approach has since been incorporated into new guidance from the Joint Warfighting Center. In the recently published *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, effects are described as being "stated in the form of behaviors and capabilities of systems within the [operational environment]—friendly, neutral, or adversary behavior."77

To support the 7 strategic objectives, the team developed measures of effectiveness (MOE) and strategic theater tasks. The MOE and tasks are essential pieces of effects-based language for planners. Continuing through the process, the team then engendered descriptors for the effects, measures of effectiveness, and theater tasks. The descriptors provide essential effects-based language for planners writing any supporting plan. Figure 1 shows the hierarchy from theater strategic objectives all the way to tactical level tasks.

While the process of developing theater strategic objectives, effects, and tasks was significant, it was not an end in itself. The real benefit to the command (and potentially to other commands) is the way USEUCOM is using these objectives and effects within the Strategic Effectiveness Process to guide planning, prioritize resources and information, and assess effectiveness of command programs as a whole.

**Guide Planning**

In determining the best way to apply effects-based thinking in the command’s area of responsibility (AOR), the team was sensitive to the ongoing controversy over effects-based operations and made a critical recommendation to the commander: USEUCOM should apply its effects-based process at the theater strategic level without mandating a standardized effects-based approach at the operational and tactical levels. In doing so, the

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**USEUCOM planners and leaders quietly went to work to find the best way to apply effects-based thinking in the real world**
team acknowledged that each of the Service components would implement effects-based thinking in accordance with Service-specific guidance because it is not yet joint doctrine.

Instead of directing the components to implement effects-based operations in a rigid, proscribed manner, the command’s strategic objectives and effects provide broad guidance to anyone building a plan for execution within the USEUCOM AOR. They help define the “left and right limits” for any planning efforts, clearly stating the commander’s desired end-state and intent and making it easy for the subordinate or supporting command or agency to produce supporting or complementary plans. The objectives and effects and their descriptors are not written in complicated military jargon, making them easier to use with interagency partners in collaborative planning sessions.

While there is no easy way to inject such a new thought process into an ongoing planning cycle, USEUCOM made progress in a relatively short time by manning the strategic planning team with representatives from all directorates and components. Over time, as the team developed the effects and supporting information, members shared them with the staff and components so all could begin integrating the new language into their own plans. To date, the Strategy, Policy, and Assessments Directorate (J–5) has integrated the new objectives and effects into the Theater Security Cooperation Regional Strategies and Country Campaign Plans, and the USEUCOM Plans and Operations Center (J–3) has done the same with the Counterterrorism Campaign Plan. Both Naval Forces, Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe have begun including USEUCOM’s strategic effects in their plans in the course of normal review/revision timelines.

**Prioritizing Resource Requirements**

This new effects-based process has had a major impact on the development of USEUCOM’s integrated priority listing (IPL) and programming objective memorandums. In a theater such as U.S. European Command, where most activities center on security cooperation, it is challenging to define requirements in a capabilities-based manner. Capabilities needed to fight conventional conflicts are easy to identify: to control airspace, a combatant commander must request air defense forces; to control shipping lanes, he should request surface combatants. But what capabilities should a combatant commander request to train and equip partner-nation security forces or conduct intelligence sharing?

USEUCOM’s standing concept and functional plans do not cover security cooperation activities, and they are not written in enough detail to lead directly to capabilities requirements. Accordingly, planners developed a list of tasks (using plain language) that describe what USEUCOM had to do to achieve the desired strategic effects throughout the theater. Once the tasks were defined, the team linked them to the joint mission essential task list, focusing on tasks at the strategic and operational levels. They also crosswalked the strategic tasks to the joint capabilities areas outlined in the Functional Capabilities Board Process (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01C). Once the list of strategic tasks was complete, the Operations Research Branch (J–8) staff compared all the tasks for each effect against the full list of joint capabilities areas. Then, with the help of the components, they determined which tasks could be performed based on resources in the theater. The planners identified capabilities that were missing but that were required to perform essential tasks supporting the strategic effects and highlighted them as gaps to be included in the IPL development process.

As an example, strategic objective 4 states that “terrorist entities are defeated and the environment is unfavorable to terrorism.” Supporting this objective is strategic effect 4.2. “Partner nations increase their capability to combat terrorism.” Strategic task 4.2.2 states, “Improve [counterterrorism] intelligence capabilities of partner nations.” This task is associated with a number of joint mission essential tasks.

Task 4.2.2 can be performed by any component with the capability to train or equip partner nation counterterrorist intelligence forces. It also requires the capability to provide some counterterrorist intelligence information to partners. USEUCOM planners determined that sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability did not exist in any of the components to accomplish this task throughout the AOR; therefore, the latest IPL reported this capability as a gap requiring
additional resources. The justification for the requirement was clear: it was tied directly and specifically to a theater strategic effect. In addition to supporting USEUCOM IPL inputs, this process aids the components when they seek resources through their parent Service budgeting cycles because it gives them clear justification for requesting a capability (in this case, ISR collection) in support of joint theater strategic objectives.

Prioritize Information

Prioritizing the information presented to the commander is critical in any headquarters, and USEUCOM planners identified a key issue when developing the strategic objectives: some information flowing into the headquarters was relevant to operational decisionmaking—commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). This information was frequently time-sensitive. However, other information was more relevant to strategic decisionmaking and usually less time-sensitive. There was also a danger that information of little current relevance could have strategic significance as the reflection of a trend or emerging issue, while information with little strategic impact might be critical to an ongoing contingency. Both types are important and could drive a commander’s decision, but in different ways and on different timelines.

The strategic theater objectives and theater effects led to a new category of information need—a so-called strategic information requirement—that is used to evaluate data and determine whether it is relevant to a contingency or to overall strategic effectiveness. This requirement is composed of questions that focus on long-lead-time decisions. These questions are answered by analyzing measures of effectiveness through required reporting or independent research by the SOSAs. They might lead only to a decision to begin planning or consultation with interagency partners to develop an integrated diplomatic, information, military, and economic response to this situation before it becomes a crisis. CCIRs, which are fed by more traditional intelligence channels, support current operations and crisis/contingency decisionmaking.

Assess Strategic Effects

The foundation of the ongoing Strategic Effectiveness Process is the Effects Assessment Cell and the process it uses to assess the command’s activities. The cell provides the commander the information to make decisions and shift resources or effort as necessary to support the desired theater effects. If the effects are being achieved, the command is supporting the endstate defined by the strategic objectives. Assessing effectiveness at the strategic level primarily involves pattern recognition. Because the strategic effects are long-time-horizon concepts, it is unrealistic to report them as successful or unsuccessful in a short-term update. The cell analyzes the environment and determines whether the trends in the theater are leading in the right or wrong direction over time. For example, is the statement “Terrorists do not have freedom of action” (effect 4.1) becoming more or less true since the last update? There are two noteworthy aspects of USEUCOM’s effects assessment process: the regional approach do not have freedom of action” for the entire area of responsibility, so the assessment cell conducts its analysis in regional divisions based on theater organization: Western Europe, Southeast Europe (including the Balkans), Eurasia (Russia and former Soviet republics), North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, and East Africa. The cell conducts assessments by region in an annual cycle, presenting updates on two or three regions roughly every other month. The goal is to update the commander on each region twice a year.

As the planning team began examining ways to conduct strategic assessment, members quickly realized that the expertise of the SOSAs was the key to developing the analytical engine of the effects assessment cell. These experts, one each to analyze the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems within the regions of interest, came to USEUCOM as part of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) established in 2004. They performed operational net assessment in support of SJFHQ operations, but lessons learned from multiple exercises showed that it was extremely difficult to perform these assessments full-up on more than one country in the AOR with such a small team—and totally impossible to assess even the most important challenges for all 92 countries.

When the need arose to conduct analyses on a broader scale in support of strategic effects, the deputy commander shifted the Sosa team from the USEUCOM Plans and Operations Center (the command’s SJFHQ) taken to analyze the AOR and use of the SOSAs to conduct assessments.

The regional approach is fairly straightforward. U.S. European Command’s AOR is vast, encompassing 92 countries and a wide variety of cultures and environments, from modern democratic and economic powerhouses to developing former Soviet-bloc nations and the struggling states of sub-Saharan Africa. It is impossible to assess the validity of a statement such as “Terrorists
to the J–8 Operations Research division and tasked them to do the analytical work necessary to drive the strategic effectiveness process.

To accomplish this, the team submits data calls to the components and headquarters directorates, conducts independent research, analyzes the data, and prepares graphic presentations for the headquarters leadership. Through 2005 and 2006, the cell conducted a series of “quick look” assessments of each effect, establishing the baseline from which future deviations will be measured. This required pulling voluminous data from the components, country teams, and other staff directorates.

To ease this process in the future, the Operations Research Branch is developing assessment tools that will rely primarily on other preexisting reporting requirements to provide data to the effects assessment cell, including joint staff war on terror assessments and Office of the Secretary of Defense security cooperation assessments. The vision for the effects assessment is that the process will become more passive as the command’s plans and component plans are written and executed using effects-based methods and language.

Data collection for assessments will then simply involve reviewing routine reports rather than additional data calls. Even if the subordinate actions are not conducted by interagency partners according to effects-based processes, the reports and results from these activities will easily feed the strategic assessment process as long as they are working in some way toward the theater strategic effects. As stated earlier, USEUCOM planners wrote the tasks and measures of effectiveness that support the desired strategic effects in plain English, not military jargon, in order to facilitate application by USEUCOM planners and assessment practices into new command activities in a more proactive manner. The current goal is to use effects-based assessments for all theater strategic activities by early 2007.

The controversy over effects-based operations may rage on, and academics may continue to debate an exact definition. In the meantime, U.S. European Command is moving out, applying an effects-based approach to operations throughout the theater and proving that effects-based thinking is the best methodology for synchronizing the complex and varied elements of national power at work in a geographic combatant command. JFQ

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**NOTES**


2 Ibid.

3 General Lance L. Smith, USAF, quoted in Grossman.

4 Ibid.


6 These include U.S. Army, European Command; Naval Forces, Europe; U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Marine Corps Forces, Europe; and Special Operations Component, U.S. European Command.


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On October 29, 2005, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs (collectively known as the Security Consultative Committee, SCC) capped nearly 3 years of intense discussions about the structure of the most important U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific. They signed the Security Consultative Committee Document, *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.*

This document outlines the strategic foundations for the alliance and provides operational-level guidance to further the partnership in support of the National Security Strategy and the four priority areas outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Following the success of the report, the SCC presented a more detailed roadmap of alliance transformation on May 1, 2006, which reflected several months of consultations at the working level between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Department of State and their Japanese counterparts. This roadmap contained detailed implementation plans to achieve the goals set out in the ATARA Report.

Forces of Regional Instability

Historically, the U.S.-Japan alliance has provided a bulwark against regional instability. Whether through containing communism or providing for free navigation of the seas so commercial shipping could thrive, the United States has always been considered the honest broker in the region and has been called on countless times to provide assistance for disasters, stem the spread of organized crime and illicit activities such as piracy, defend friends and allies from attack, or take action to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Throughout the postwar era, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable to supporting American operations across the theater.

Nevertheless, the threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region persists. Several factors...
have created strategic uncertainty: uneven economic development, unresolved territorial disputes, resource competition, environmental degradation, overpopulation, rising nationalism, great power rivalry, and a sense of history that has left many countries feeling victimized (either from colonialism or aggression in World War II).\(^3\)

Furthermore, the diversity of cultures, languages, religions, and economic and political systems poses enormous challenges to devising a common value system on which to build any type of multilateral security structure. Past efforts at building these types of institutions, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, have floundered, and the incremental progress of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum underscores the continuing reluctance of area nations to commit to large-scale security cooperation. The result has been a security framework centered on bilateral ties and alliances with the United States.

The strategic geography of the Asia-Pacific region also shapes the security environment. The most economically successful countries, Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), lie on the coast or in the littoral. Their growth and survival are tied to the trade that passes over the sea lanes. With the exception of Japan, these nations were too small to develop navies that could protect trade routes and have relied on U.S. naval and air presence to underwrite their security.\(^3\) However, the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean imposes a tyranny of distance that precludes forces in the continental United States from rapidly deploying to the region in a crisis. To maintain an effective military presence in Asia and honor alliance commitments there, Washington must maintain a forward presence to reassure friends and allies of its ability to respond to crises and dissuade others from acting in ways that harm U.S. interests.

**Importance of Japan**

The enduring U.S. interest in the region is to maintain peace and stability so nations can flourish economically, socially, and politically. To this end, Japan is a committed ally and partner. It shares the American commitment to democratic values, free and fair trade, respect for human rights, and rule of law, standing as a counterpoint to those who claim that democracy is both destabilizing and incompatible with Asian values. This shared value system has helped shape Japan’s view of its national interests and provided the foundation for an alliance that has persisted for more than 50 years.

As the world’s second largest economy, Japan has the financial and technological potential to make great contributions to international security. Tokyo already pays $4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S. forces, over 2.5 times what the next closest country remits and half of the total direct and indirect cost-sharing assistance received from all U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Pacific, and Gulf Cooperation Council allies combined in 2003.\(^4\) It also includes funding for an educated and dedicated workforce of Japanese nationals who not only provide labor but who also, as an added benefit, help bridge the linguistic and cultural barriers between the U.S. military and its hosts.

Vast wealth and technological advancement also hold the potential for greater interoperability with U.S. forces. Japan currently has $8 billion of foreign military sales cases open with the United States and spends nearly $1 billion a year on American equipment. As the third largest purchaser of U.S.-made military gear (behind Egypt and Saudi Arabia),\(^3\) Japan purchases, produces, or codevelops at least 28 major weapons systems, such as the F-15 Eagle, Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3, Apache helicopter, and the Aegis Shipboard Air Defense System. Japan was also the first ally to invest heavily in ballistic missile defense (BMD) and will codevelop the next generation of the SM–3 missile and associated radars and fire control systems—all key components of U.S. BMD architecture.

Most importantly, Japan provides bases for stationing and deploying over 50,000 uniformed personnel from all Service components. Its location in the Asian littoral places the U.S. Armed Forces in a position to project power over the ocean trade routes, which are the economic lifeline of the region, and also serves as an access point to South and Southeast Asia, critical regions in the war on terror. A strong American presence acts as a deterrent against those who would upset the status quo through aggression and reassures Japan and other nations who have come to view the U.S. presence in Asia as a stabilizing force.

**Evolution of the Alliance**

One of the greatest strengths of the U.S.-Japan alliance is its continued evolution to meet the challenges of a shifting strategic landscape. World War II left Japan without any military forces and no legal authority to establish a defense capability. This soon changed as events on the Korean Peninsula drove the United States into another war. In 1950, the occupation authorities in Japan recognized the threat to Japanese interests posed by the communist forces on the peninsula and established the National Police
Reserve, which later evolved into the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF).

Since the inception of the SDF, Washington and Tokyo have reached a series of benchmarks, both bilaterally and unilaterally. The countries updated their security relationship in 1960 by signing the current security treaty, which includes the imperatives of defending Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Far East. The U.S. military relationship was further defined in 1978 when the Security Consultative Committee signed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. These principles focused the alliance on the defense of Japan and established a division of labor called the Shield and Spear concept, in which the SDF would defend the homeland (acting as the shield), while the United States would take the fight beyond Japanese territory (the spear). These guidelines opened the door for formal bilateral training and planning.

Japan dispatched its Maritime SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf at the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. This was the first time the SDF was allowed to operate beyond territorial waters and paved the way for participation in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia the following year—and the first time since World War II that Japanese ground troops operated outside the country. Since then, the SDF has continued to contribute to UN efforts by dispatching soldiers to Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda, East Timor, Honduras, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the simmering tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and Japan updated previous agreements on role-sharing by signing the New Defense Guidelines in 1997. These rules marked a shift in focus from the Cold War imperative of defending Japan to a shared commitment to maintaining peace and security in the Far East. Tokyo agreed to provide logistic support and perform search and rescue and maritime inspection operations in rear areas to assist U.S. military operations around Japan. These guidelines also provided for a more robust bilateral coordination mechanism and more detailed bilateral planning.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Tokyo passed the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law in October of that year, permitting the SDF to deploy ships to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

**Shaping the Alliance**

As the United States and Japan entered the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region faced strategic uncertainty. The attacks on the World Trade Center brought nontraditional threats to the forefront, yet traditional military rivalries and historic animosities persisted. North Korea, moreover, continued to defy global norms of nuclear weapons and missile defense and efforts to confront regional threats to the forefront, yet traditional military rivalries and historic animosities persisted. North Korea, moreover, continued to defy the world in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. These developments called for a renewed look at the alliance.

In December 2002, the SCC directed a review of both nations’ defense and security policies. Known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), this study included an analysis of the global security environment; discussion of bilateral roles, missions, capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperation in missile defense and efforts to confront regional challenges. The DPRI process allowed both countries to reaffirm the value of the alliance and reshape it to ensure its relevance for the foreseeable future.

On February 19, 2005, the allies agreed on a set of common strategic objectives, which encompassed a variety of security challenges that threatened regional and global peace and stability. Issues addressed at the SCC level included closer cooperation in missile defense, combating terrorism, and resolving the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Both nations also called for the peaceful resolution of “issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” and encouraged China to improve the transparency of its military affairs. The SCC committed to holding regular consultations to coordinate policies and objectives.

Following this meeting, U.S. and Japanese leaders began a comprehensive review of the roles, missions, and capabilities that each country should pursue in support of common strategic objectives. The results of this study were approved by the SCC on October 29, 2005, and published in the ATARA Report. This document reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to both countries and addressed two fundamental issues: force posture realignment and the roles, missions, and capabilities each side would need to respond to diverse challenges.

**Force Posture Realignment**

American military bases in Japan provide the USPACOM commander with enormous flexibility and strategic access to the Asia-Pacific region. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is the largest American airbase outside of the continental United States, the Navy’s only forward deployed aircraft carrier calls Yokosuka Naval Base home, and one of the Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) is located in Okinawa. Aside from these critical forces, there are more than 80 other military facilities of various sizes.

As important as these bases are, they reflect a force structure designed to address
past threats, not future challenges. Additionally, some were originally in rural areas. Urban sprawling, especially near Tokyo and in Okinawa, eventually brought residential neighborhoods to the front gates. Routine training became an irritant to the alliance in some areas as residents complained of noise and other degradations in the quality of life.

Through the DPRI, the SCC embarked on an ambitious program to create an enduring presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including Guam, reducing the burden on local communities while repositioning U.S. forces to respond better to regional crises. Certain measures were specified:

- The headquarters of III MEF will relocate to Guam. A Marine air-ground task force will remain in Okinawa. Additionally, a Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futemna will be replaced by a new facility at Camp Schwab, thus relocating the majority of tactical aircraft that support III MEF far from urban areas to reduce noise complaints and allay local fears of mishaps. These moves will also allow the Marines to consolidate their forces in northern Okinawa, away from the urbanized south.
- Carrier Air Wing 5, part of the USS Kitty Hawk battlegroup, will relocate to Iwakuni MCAS, moving its jet aircraft out of Tokyo's crowded Kanto Plain. The Kitty Hawk battlegroup will remain forward deployed in Yokosuka, and the Navy will maintain some capability in Atsugi. The Kitty Hawk, the Navy's sole remaining conventionally powered aircraft carrier, will be replaced by the nuclear-powered USS George Washington in 2008.
- U.S. Army Japan at Camp Zama will be transformed into a joint task force–capable, deployable headquarters that is part of the U.S. Army I Corps, providing the USPACOM commander with another forward-deployed, crisis response option in the theater.
- The Air Self-Defense Force will relocate its air defense command headquarters with the headquarters of U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Tokyo, strengthening bilateral ballistic missile defense command and control and shared early warning systems.
- Japan agreed to provide land and facilities in northern Japan to support the deployment of an X-band radar, the first time since 1985 the country has provided space and infrastructure to the U.S. military for a new facility.

**Interoperability**

Interoperability covers the spectrum of military conflict from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level. At the strategic level, it encompasses issues such as crisis management and decisionmaking, intelligence exchange, budgeting, capacities of the defense industrial base, and the legal and policy frameworks that provide a nation’s leaders the authority to mobilize assets in support of national security objectives.

At the operational level, interoperability focuses on cooperation between national military forces and includes such areas as combined or bilateral command and control, combined and interagency planning, basing and force posture, and organizing bilateral or multinational forces to leverage the capabilities that the militaries of each nation possess. At the tactical level, interoperability efforts primarily focus on bilateral and multinational training, where military units practice operating together in a variety of contingencies.

To maintain regional peace and stability, U.S. and allied forces must be postured strategically and linked operationally to dissuade, deter, and, when necessary, defeat threats. Restructuring bases within Japan will better position forces there to respond to contingencies and crises in the region and increase interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. In some cases, such as in Camp Zama and Yokota Air Base, American and SDF units will be collocated, providing unprecedented opportunities to train together and increase interoperability.

Alliance transformation, however, is not limited to real estate. The effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance will ultimately be measured by how the two militaries can achieve common objectives through a variety of regional and global activities, not by the location of U.S. bases within Japan. Defining the roles, missions, and capabilities each force should bring to a contingency, then developing those capabilities through bilateral training, is essential to a more capable alliance. Missile defense, countering WMD proliferation, bilateral training and exercises, and strengthening Tokyo’s role in regional and global affairs are among the most significant issues being addressed.

**Missile Defense**

Protecting the homeland from direct attack is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces and the highest priority of the national defense strategy. U.S. and Japanese efforts at missile defense in Japan form the frontline protection against missiles directed at Japan. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fired a Taepodong missile over Japan unannounced in 1998. This incident, described by North Korea as a failed satellite launch, was a stark reminder that Japan is well
U.S. and Japanese efforts at missile defense in Japan form the frontline protection against missiles directed at both countries from continental Asia

Counterproliferation
Given its history as the only nation ever attacked with nuclear weapons, and having been victimized by domestic terrorists spreading Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, Japan has positioned itself on the diplomatic moral high ground in its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery devices. Its proximity to North Korea, which withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and has a history of proliferating missiles, only intensifies the threat it feels and helps keep nonproliferation at the top of the national agenda.

A key area for U.S.-Japanese cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Japan was one of the first signatories. In October 2004, the SDF led Team Samurai ‘04, an exercise that brought together 22 countries and provided a venue for practicing national crisis management, command and control, and maritime interdiction. Such operations are crucial in increasing the interoperability of nations involved in counterproliferation.

Bilateral Training and Exercises
To ensure the viability of the alliance, U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan must operationalize the strategies established at SCC meetings through a robust program that includes bilateral exercises in Japan, as well as SDF drills and training in the United States and Guam. Tokyo has committed to making changes in training infrastructure, enhancing the value of training, and dispersing training more broadly throughout Japan’s communities.

Each of the U.S. Service components has rigorous bilateral training programs with their Japanese counterparts that reflect their unique mission sets and capabilities. Both the Navy and Air Force require airspace to train tactical aircraft, and the Navy must also conduct field aircraft carrier landing practice. Under the new alliance structure, U.S. pilots may utilize airspace previously used only by Japanese pilots and have access to new Air SDF ground facilities. Airspace around the Kanto Plain and Iwakuni will be adjusted to accommodate the move of the carrier air wing, and Japan renewed its pledge to find a permanent base for Navy pilots to conduct field carrier and night landing practice, replacing the current site at Iwo Jima.

The Ground SDF will collocate its Central Readiness Force (CRF) headquarters with U.S. Army I Corps at Camp Zama. The CRF is a newly created major command in the Ground SDF that has administrative control over all special operations units and the mission of preparing Japanese forces for overseas peacekeeping duties. Positioning the CRF in Camp Zama will increase the training opportunities, liaison, and interoperability between this important headquarters and I Corps. Additionally, the U.S. Army will build a battle-command training center at the nearby Sagami Depot, which will have state-of-the-art computer simulations to enhance the bilateral training and readiness of both I Corps and its counterpart headquarters in the Ground SDF.

At the operational level, the key training that pulls all the elements of the various SCC reports together is the bilateral Exercise Keen Edge, conducted between U.S. Forces, Japan, and the Japan Joint Staff Office. Held every other year, Keen Edge tests the limits of the joint operating systems of U.S. Forces, Japan, in a bilateral, joint, and interagency environment. During the latest exercise in February 2005, 102 officers from the Joint Staff Office participated at Yokota Air Base, and 36 operated out of the Bilateral Coordination Center. Keen Edge both validated the roles, missions, and capabilities described in the ATARA Report and highlighted the work still needed to move the alliance forward. Another exercise is schedule for January 2007 to maintain the momentum and build on lessons learned in previous exercises.

Japan’s Leadership Role
In the postwar era, Japan has grown from a defeated and devastated nation to an economic powerhouse. The rise from the ashes of war was due to a variety of factors: a shared value system with the United States that prioritized democracy, rule of law,
capitalism, and free trade; integration in the global marketplace; and a long era of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. As a beneficiary of the current international system, Japan has an obligation to help provide peace and stability not just in the region but also throughout the world. As its alliance with America matures and SDF capabilities increase, Japan will be able to assume a greater leadership role in the region and contribute more toward a stable international environment.

Tokyo faces tough challenges. A declining birthrate and aging society are predicted to put downward pressure on economic growth for at least the next 10 years, and an unresolved historical legacy undermines its military legitimacy with many, but not all, countries in the region. Myriad laws restricting Japan's use of force, all stemming from interpretations of its constitution, effectively limit the Japanese to exercising soft power (that is, creating policies or programs that attract others due to appeal rather than threats). Within these constraints, however, there are activities that can help Tokyo to exercise regional and global leadership.

Participation in international peacekeeping operations is an example. Since it deployed its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1992, the SDF has proven to be a professional and effective force, albeit in a noncombat role, providing engineer expertise, logistic support, and disaster relief supplies throughout the world. Since then it has supported more peacekeeping and international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations and has over 500 SDF members supporting UN reconstruction in Iraq.

Each time the SDF deploys and brings relief supplies to people who are suffering or otherwise improves the area it deploys to, it gains the moral high ground by refuting arguments that Japan is a revisionist military power. In many ways, its actions in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations reflect national values, and any rational review of Japan's postwar military activities would conclude that the country is a fully democratic nation-state in complete control of its forces and free from the urge of military domination.

The alliance transformation effort under way in Japan will change the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance in ways never thought possible just a decade ago. The momentum established through the Defense Policy Review Initiative process will strengthen what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has described as a “pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific region” as both nations move toward a more mature security partnership in which they field increasingly integrated and balanced alliance capabilities.

Postscript

On October 9, 2006, North Korea attempted to enter the ranks of the nuclear power states by announcing that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Described by Secretary Rice as “provocative” and condemned by nearly all of the world’s leaders, this act served to highlight the volatility of the region as it prompted many of North Korea’s neighbors to reassess their policies regarding the nation. It also underscored the importance of maintaining a strong forward presence in Northeast Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance serves a dual purpose of providing a credible deterrent that Kim Jong Il must consider if he continues to develop a nuclear capability further and reassuring our allies in the region of the continued U.S. commitment to their defense, including coverage under our extended nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, Kim’s provocation further strengthened Japan’s public support for the security alliance that their leaders have supported for more than 45 years. JFQ

NOTES
2 See, for example, Robert G. Sutter, China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006), 26–27.
8 In 1985, the government provided 214 acres for the Haruo housing area near Sasebo Navy Base.

U.S.-Japan Alliance
Becoming an Officer of Consequence

By RONALD E. RATCLIFF

I believe that a general who receives good advice from a subordinate officer should profit by it. . . . In particular, he must not let the source of an idea influence him. Ideas of others can be as valuable as his own and should be judged only by the results they are likely to produce.

—Frederick the Great

Much of the literature about military history and leadership is focused on a few great leaders who rose to meet the martial challenges of their time and place. Often forgotten are the subordinates who enabled these leaders to see their challenges more clearly and who helped them turn their decisions into action, causing the outcomes that established their places in history.

To America’s great fortune, many of the smartest and most service-minded youth opt for military careers; thus, the talent pool from which the Armed Forces draw their senior officers is extraordinarily deep. Those who rise to three- and four-star positions and assume command of armies and fleets constitute less than one-half of one percent of those who serve as military officers.

The vast majority of those who select a military career will achieve more modest positions of rank, responsibility, and authority. Many will earn the privilege of commanding some form of military endeavor, from warfighting to combat support. Most finish their service as commanders and lieutenant colonels, while a smaller number end up as captains and colonels. Despite their more modest ranks, however, almost all leave indelible marks on the senior officers they serve under in one staff or another, and some will help those leaders achieve greatness.

Staff duty has always been part of officers’ careers, yet many find they are ill prepared when the time comes. While selection to most staffs demands superior operational performance and significant warfare expertise, actual staff duty is often focused more on managerial and organizational skills. Frequently, especially for those temporarily assigned to staffs, officers serve in important decisionmaking positions with limited experience or scant operational proficiency in areas for which they are directly responsible. Yet their commanders and staff peers will demand the same high level of performance that has characterized their careers up to that point. While some are not equal to the task, most are, and a few excel.

Those who rise above their peers and gain the ear of the commander become officers of consequence because their commanders value their judgment and seek their counsel when making difficult choices. Achieving that status requires a mix of professional skills and personal traits. This article will focus on those traits and will also draw attention to the special challenges staff officers face when they serve as temporary individual augmentees. It examines

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what commanders expect from their staffs and how they view their subordinates. Finally, it presents a foundational framework that officers reporting to a staff might consider when deciding how best to present their opinions.

The Individual Augmentee

The Long War has created a new form of staff duty, the individual augmentee (IA). An IA is a Servicemember who fills a temporary duty position on a combatant commander’s staff or subordinate staff to augment operations during contingencies or heightened missions in direct support of contingency operations.1 Increasingly, military personnel are finding themselves serving as IAs attached to military staffs in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere in U.S. Central Command.

Such assignments are challenging for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the relative isolation inherent in temporary positions. Unlike most staff officers, the IA is essentially an outsider with little connection to commanders and their staffs. While the number of IA billets emerging from the Long War fluctuates, the positions number in the thousands and range from junior enlisted to senior officer billets. Personnel assigned to IA billets often bring limited experience and meager technical skills and are forced to learn quickly on the job.

While some IA billets require merely warm bodies, others are decisionmaking positions that can have life-or-death impact. The value of IAs, however, is less dependent on their positions or billets than on the professional attributes they bring to the job. Like all staff officers, they are expected to contribute more than mere physical presence and mechanical obedience. Staff officers must be not only industrious, but also professionally curious, constantly searching for new information to provide superiors with fresh perspectives on issues confronting the command.

The Staff Officer’s Role

The role of the staff officer has long been recognized as helping the commander to make the best possible decisions and assuring that they are implemented. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 2000 notes that the staff officer “serves to ease the commander’s workload by furnishing basic information and technical advice by which he or she may arrive at decisions.”2 In providing such support, staff officers are expected to keep the commander apprised of pertinent information, anticipate future needs, and develop, analyze, and compare possible solutions to the challenges faced by the command. Implicit in such tasking is the expectation that staff officers will be candid in their observations and recommendations.

The challenge for all staff officers is to gain the respect and professional regard of their seniors so that their opinions are both heard and considered. The willingness and ability of staff officers, especially if they are junior, to articulate unconventional or unpopular opinions are difficult to come by. First, speaking out requires solid confidence in one’s position, especially if more experienced officers hold a different opinion. Second, one must present a dissenting position in a clear and concise manner that will influence the thinking of a commander through compelling logic. Both require the staff officer to replace strongly held biases with well-informed analysis and astute appreciation of the situation.

While the myth has grown that the commander alone has the fullest vision of the challenges that confront the organization, that is rarely the case. General Omar Bradley addressed the importance of getting the most out his staff. He argued that the problems associated with modern warfare have become so complex that they are beyond the grasp of any one person, no matter how senior or experienced. As a consequence, he asserted that senior commanders have a duty to seek out and nurture staff officers who are willing to speak truth to power: “A leader should encourage the members of his staff to speak up if they think the commander is wrong. He should invite constructive criticism. It is a grave error for the leader to surround himself with ‘yes’ men.”3 He recalled that General George C. Marshall demanded that his staff provide him opposing views and question the advice and counsel being given him by his senior commanders. In Marshall’s words, “Unless I hear all the arguments concerning an action, I am not sure whether I have made the right decision or not.”4

Indeed, the confidence of senior officers, especially those making life-or-death decisions, is earned, not inherited. Individuals who find themselves suddenly thrust into IA billets, as well as those who enjoy a more measured pace into staff positions, would do well to ponder what they must do to establish their reputation as an officer of consequence—one whose views find a ready audience and whose counsel is valued and duly considered. To achieve such professional regard requires a firm grasp of three essential aspects of military service: a well-developed personal and professional ethical framework, a solid hold on formal and dynamic decisionmaking processes, and a sophisticated understanding of risk management.
What Commanders Want

A general on the German General Staff once remarked that staff officers displayed four basic attributes: they were either clever or stupid, and they were either industrious or lazy. While such blunt Teutonic categorizations provide an uncomfortable bit of clarity, they also offer insight into how staff officers are judged. Perhaps a more useful description would differentiate officers who are industrious versus those who just do their job, and those who strive to bring a wide range of professional knowledge versus those who are content to contribute along more narrowly focused lines. As figure 1 shows, staff officers within these parameters fall into one of four quadrants that generally define their roles and how their commanders view them.

Clearly, commanders desire staff officers characterized by quadrant I. Such individuals are valuable because they not only work diligently, but they also bring a breadth of professional knowledge and inquisitiveness that often produces truly innovative solutions. Not surprisingly, these are the officers of consequence whose opinions are valued even if they run counter to conventional or popular thinking. Individuals who choose to remain narrowly focused on the familiar aspects of their areas or who avoid learning about the more general aspects of joint warfare inhabit quadrants II and III. These officers have the potential to move into quadrant I, given the opportunity or the right motivation. Indeed, as mentors, commanders should push their officers in that direction. Quadrant IV officers, unfortunately, do exist and often find themselves marginalized and quickly reassigned.

While most junior officers would prefer to be viewed as quadrant I officers, most are not, if for no other reason than they lack the experience or professional knowledge to make them effectively industrious. Wisdom is born of experience and the maturity to understand where one's experience is relevant—and when it is not. Professional knowledge, however, is not solely predicated on experience. It depends mostly on one's professional curiosity and willingness to learn through either formal education or personal endeavor, such as reading. One without the other is insufficient. While most junior and midgrade officers have a limited range of experience, their value can be enhanced greatly by the quality and range of their intellect gained and nurtured through education and professional reading.

The IA, depending on grade and experience, has the added challenge of finding meaningful opportunities to demonstrate both professional knowledge and industriousness. In many cases, it falls to the commander and his senior subordinates to provide such opportunities in order to determine what sort of staff officer they have. Some IAs may need to create opportunities themselves, like permanently assigned staff. In either case, doing only what one is told or staying within the narrow confines of one's area of expertise is unlikely to make one a quadrant I officer.

Staking a Position

A staff officer must be willing to speak truth to power, which requires the courage to expose one's ideas to the harsh light of critical examination. To do so effectively, an officer of consequence must bring three essential elements to the discussion (See figure 2):

- a well-defined personal ethical framework that will enable one to hold firm to his convictions despite pressure to conform or compromise
- a definitive personal decisionmaking framework that enables one to identify missing or ignored criteria that are critical to the development and comparison of alternative courses of action
- a clearly understood personal risk management framework that enables one first to appreciate the vagary and ambiguity that cause uncertainty and then to wisely assume or avoid risky situations or actions.

Ethical Frameworks. Ethics are the operationalization of morals. Ethics are not what we profess to do, but what we actually do when confronted with difficult choices. Moral foundations are as diverse as the theories about where they come from (family, religion, or culture). Military service adds its own dimensions to those foundations, sets minimal ethical standards, and then does something many professions do not: it holds individuals accountable for their actions.

While it is often stated that the means never justify the ends, the application of deadly force requires all officers to have a rock-solid personal understanding of exactly where their ethical lines exist. Too often, individuals, especially junior officers, fail to develop their own personal ethical frameworks fully. Failure to identify and ponder ethical issues can become deadly, especially when individuals must make split-second decisions under confusing circumstances. Equally regrettable are instances when a junior officer’s seniors or group acts against his personal ethical standard, and he is unable or unwilling to step forward and hold to his beliefs.

Among the most demanding ethical questions officers face is the choice between honesty and loyalty—when it is right to be...
obedient and when it is wrong. Loyalty in military service is almost always the essential attribute of a trusted subordinate. Yet it is often the subordinate—willing to risk being considered disloyal—who asks the frank question that might give the commander pause to reconsider a decision. The limits of one’s loyalty is a decision that every officer must make, especially one who aspires to being more than a “yes man.”

Decisionmaking Frameworks. Decisionmaking frameworks can be as complex as the formal military decisionmaking process with sophisticated branch and sequent procedures, or as simple as basic rule sets such as “if X happens, I will do Y.” Most decisions are based on sophisticated but informal pattern recognition techniques or well-conceived and formal rule sets derived from experience or education. Occasionally, and too frequently in some commands, decisions are the product of organizational momentum that applies the same set of solutions to any problem. Pattern recognition and experiential bias have their place, but not at the expense of a well-reasoned approach to decisionmaking.

While it is impossible to delineate a comprehensive decisionmaking process that fits every command or instance, all require the decisionmaker to do four fundamental things:

- assess the situation to identify the challenge that must be resolved
- decide what to do
- implement the chosen course of action
- assure that the action is done well and is leading to desired ends.

The quadrant I officer understands not only how decisions are made but also why they are made, and he adds substance to the debate as the choice is being selected.

Risk Management Frameworks. In his reflections about World War II, Admiral Ernest King noted that the ability to assess the risk in a course of action and to choose wisely whether to take the risk was one of most difficult challenges a commander faced. While audacity is an admirable quality in military service, it coexists with its catastrophic cousins, recklessness and foolhardiness. How is one to know the difference? Carl von Clausewitz opined that only the commander’s coup d’oeil was capable of such discernment, which does little for the staff officer who strives to help his commander choose wisely in risky situations. Prudent risk-taking requires an appreciation for the critical uncertainties that surround a situation, an understanding of the likely range of consequences of one’s actions, recognition of a command’s vulnerability to undesirable consequences, and identification of ways to minimize harmful consequences if risky action must be taken.

Developing personal frameworks or models establishes a solid foundation that makes seniors and peers alike confident in the logic of one’s arguments. In a profession that places a premium on individual credibility, one cannot assume that serendipitous or divine inspiration will appear when one is confronted with momentous decisions. As Admiral King noted, knowing when to take risky action requires not only a grasp of the issues at hand but also the moral courage to present a compelling argument, which is the hallmark of an officer of consequence.

The role of staff officers and their importance to a command are ultimately decided by the commander. All staff officers, but especially individual augments, face the onerous challenge of gaining the respect and ear of their superiors. Working hard and bringing professional expertise are seldom enough to establish oneself as an officer of consequence in the eyes of a commander. Equally important is the willingness to challenge the status quo, to stretch the operational envelope, and to take unpopular stands on issues. Such attributes,
The expected future operational environment for military forces will be extremely dynamic. Expanding webs of social, economic, political, military, and information systems will afford opportunity for some regional powers to compete on a broader scale and emerge on the global landscape with considerable influence. While the nature of war will remain a violent clash of wills between states or armed groups pursuing advantageous political ends, the conduct of future warfare will include combinations of conventional and unconventional, kinetic and nonkinetic, and military and nonmilitary actions and operations, all of which add to the increasing complexity of the future security environment.

— Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
August 2005
A n era of dynamic change, constrained resources, and rapid technological advancement continues to confront the Nation. This challenge and the factors quoted above dictate the need for a global perspective of the operational environment and military operations that are fully integrated with other instruments of national power. Such an approach requires innovative thinking and the ability to shape and manage change if America is to retain its worldwide leadership. As the lead agent for the Secretary of Defense for transformation of joint forces to meet these challenges, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) supports the joint community by pursuing a number of transformation-related objectives. One objective being discussed by the Secretary of Defense and other senior leaders in the Department of Defense (DOD) is creating capabilities within an overall framework of shared, knowledge-empowered, effects-based operations (EBO).1

Initial ideas about an effects-based approach did not originate at USJFCOM. Since 2001, the command has focused on testing and refining the concept while seeking the best ways to implement it. This evolution has included Service participation in joint experimentation, discussions with faculty at mid- and senior-level Service and joint schools, observation of effects-related constructs in action at deployed operational headquarters, and engagement with interagency and multinational partners.

This article provides background on an effects-based approach and explains the key elements, highlights their application in current joint operations, and discusses their incorporation in joint doctrine, training, and education. In the interest of providing the “bottom line up front,” an effects-based approach adds value to traditional joint processes in four areas:

- improved unified action among military, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations
- an expanded understanding of the operational environment beyond the traditional military battlespace focus
- an improved joint planning process that uses effects to clarify the desired endstate conditions in terms of the operational environment
- an enhanced joint assessment process that measures effects attainment rather than just task accomplishment.

An Evolving Construct

By 2004, USJFCOM was actively engaged in advancing effects-based operations following a period of concept development and experimentation. Concurrently, many of the joint professional military education (JPME) and Service schools had begun to discuss EBO. The Air Force, on its own initiative, started to incorporate an effects-based approach in its Service doctrine.

Organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq also were using aspects of EBO. To help socialize the ideas and promote a common perspective, the Joint Warfighting Center produced a series of pamphlets on EBO and related constructs. The pamphlets led to a handbook with sufficient techniques and procedures to baseline an effects-based approach to joint operations.

As the handbook took form, the Joint Staff Joint Education and Doctrine Division (J–7) chief convened a forum in January 2005 to gain agreement on the way ahead for effects-related constructs in emerging joint doctrine. The gathering was held at USJFCOM, and all the unified commands and Services were invited. It was a watershed event because stakeholders could discuss their concerns. The outcome was a consensus on how joint doctrine would incorporate effects-related constructs. The consensus was that EBO would be described as an “effects-based approach” and that associated emerging joint doctrine would:

- incorporate a systems approach to understanding the operational environment
- expand combat assessment to provide for measuring progress toward desired effects and operational and strategic objectives
- describe the relationship of effects-based ideas to elements of operational design
- define and/or revise terms key to understanding an effects-based approach to joint operations
- describe how effects are incorporated in the commander’s intent.

The joint and Service representatives explained what their cultures could accept regarding effects-based ideas in joint doctrine. The approach continued to evolve following the forum. The USJFCOM Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (J–9) continued to experiment with an effects-related staff process to be employed in a multinational joint task force headquarters. The command’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters was deployed and teaching effects-based techniques and procedures worldwide, linked closely with the J–7 integration of an effects-based approach to operations in joint training. Linking these efforts, a USJFCOM team was writing a handbook to serve as a bridge for the migration of effects-related ideas into joint doctrine. And Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, Joint Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning, were in revision and were intended to incorporate constructs based on the consensus achieved at the forum.

The Commander’s Handbook

The aim of the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations was to provide the joint community with a common baseline that would fill the void between earlier transformational concepts, varied field practices, and emerging joint doctrine. This initiative considered comments from Services, combatant commands, and other organizations to bring an understanding of various perspectives. The handbook uses the style and language of joint doctrine while reflecting the “best practices” that USJFCOM had observed during interaction with joint and Service organizations involved in actual operations. USJFCOM published the handbook in February 2006.2

Although effects-based ideas continue to be refined, the core aspects of the approach have become commonly recognized within the joint community with the publication of the handbook, the community’s involvement in the revisions of JP 3–0 and JP 5–0, and related joint training and education. It is focused at the theater-strategic and operational levels—on combatant command and joint task force (JTF) headquarters—but can be applied at higher and lower levels as well. Its techniques and procedures complement rather than replace current joint processes. An effects-based approach is used in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), joint operation planning, and joint assessment processes.

Foremost, an effects-based approach is a joint command and staff thinking process...
Joint warfighting center designed to improve unified action. Its object is to harmonize and synchronize military actions with those of other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to achieve unity of effort in joint operation planning and execution. This harmonization is accomplished by greater collaboration in managing ways, means, and ends in an operation. Beginning with national objectives, joint force commanders (JFCs) work with interagency stakeholders to clarify the objectives, roles, and responsibilities of each agency. These objectives are translated into effects—the system behaviors and conditions needed to achieve the objectives. Tasks are assigned and stakeholder actions are integrated with the goal of attaining specific effects on various systems—political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII)—within the operational environment. Unified action at the tactical level is enabled by effects-based techniques and procedures embedded in the joint intelligence, operation planning, and assessment processes.

**Effects and Joint Intelligence**

A crucial application of an effects-based approach resides within the joint intelligence community, which is most likely to be held accountable for creating and maintaining the systems view of the operational environment. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) will expand to JIPOE to more thoroughly capture PMESII aspects of the operational environment: friendly and unaligned, as well as adversary systems (figure 1). This expansion will necessarily involve more input from various agencies, especially from the national intelligence community.

JIPOE uses a system-of-systems analysis (SOSA) that portrays the key elements in the operational environment. These are shown as nodes in key systems along with their functional or behavioral relationships—links—to each other. An effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, set of actions, or another effect. From a systems perspective, a system referred to in the definition is represented by a designated set of nodes and links in the operational environment at any point in time. Therefore, the joint force intelligence directorate understanding of the JFC’s desired effects will help focus the SOSA-enabled JIPOE process. SOSA portrays not only the relationships within systems, but also between systems. Among other purposes, it offers a technique for understanding the enemy’s centers of gravity and a broader perspective of the operational environment to augment the JFC’s planning and assessment processes (figure 2). Like JIPB, time available and access to detailed information determine how completely the JIPOE is developed.

Planning for the employment of military forces occurs at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. An effects-based approach to planning complements the traditional planning process. It seeks to fully integrate military actions with those of the other instruments of national power while clearly coupling tasks to objectives within an assessment framework that supports JFC guidance. Theater-strategic and operational planning translates national and theater-strategic objectives into the JFC’s strategy and ultimately into tactical action by integrating ends, ways, and means between the echelons of command.

Joint operation planning blends two complementary processes. The first is the joint operation planning process (JOPP) (figure 3), an orderly, analytical planning process consisting of logical steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action; select the best course of action (COA); and produce a plan or order. The second process is operational design, the use of various design elements in the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. The JFC and staff use effects and other operational design elements (endstate, center of gravity, etc.) throughout JOPP.

JOPP begins with the JFC’s guidance, continues through mission analysis and COA determination, and produces directives to subordinate commanders. As part of his guidance, the commander may discuss the operational environment in systemic terms.
and provide an initial set of effects to guide the planning process. During this process, effects help planners understand and measure conditions for success. The use of effects is reflected in the steps of JOPP as a way to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks. Combined with a systems perspective, planners can use an understanding of desired and undesired effects to promote unified action with multinational and other agency partners.

Effects are derived from understanding the JIPOE and the JFC’s objectives. They help clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks by describing the conditions (in terms of system behavior) that need to be established or avoided within the operational environment to achieve the desired endstate. This use of effects and a systems perspective can facilitate the joint force’s collaboration with ambassadors and agencies within the operational area early in the planning process.

Throughout the remaining JOPP steps, the JFC and staff further refine their understanding of desired and undesired effects. The accompanying text box contains an example of an objective, two supporting effects, and a task that might be given to a joint force component to attain the second effect. Friendly COAs are developed to attain the effects. These COAs are analyzed, compared, and presented to the JFC for approval together with the staff’s recommendation.

Once the JFC approves a COA, the operation plan or order is developed and published. These plans or orders provide actionable direction by aligning objectives, effects, and tasks. Effects can be reflected in various ways, including the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and annexes.

Planners use elements of operational design throughout the planning process. As a new component of operational design, the effects element impacts other parts. As mentioned earlier, effects are tied to endstates and objectives. Desired effects relate to understanding centers of gravity in systems terms. Effects can be used in conjunction with lines of operations—a technique to depict a logical arrangement of tasks, objectives, and effects as the operation progresses. The JFC and planners also consider effects as they think about decisive points, direct versus indirect approach, and other design elements. Joint Publication 5–0 discusses the relationship between JOPP and operational design.

Assessment of Effects

Assessment measures the effectiveness of unified action. More specifically, it helps the JFC and stakeholders determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. It helps identify opportunities and any need for course corrections. This process involves continuous assessment of joint force performance throughout planning and execution.

JFCs and their staffs, together with other stakeholders, determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning (figure 4). They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis and include those and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design, because these considerations can affect the sequence of actions along lines of operations. They adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure that current and future operations remain aligned with missions and desired endstates. Normally, joint force planners are responsible for developing appropriate measures to determine progress toward attaining effects. Current “best practices” suggest that planners and an effects assessment cell, supported by the battle staff and other stakeholders, are keys to an effective assessment process. Various elements of the JFC staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

The JFC and staff use measures of performance (MOPs) and effectiveness (MOEs) to determine progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. More specifically, MOEs are associated with creating effects and MOPs with task accomplishment. Well-devised measures can help commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. During execution, MOEs and MOPs will drive joint force adaptation. These measures will answer important questions: Are we doing the right things? (effects assessment); Are we doing things right? (task accomplishment); Are we succeeding? (achieving operational and strategic objectives).

Current Operations

Perhaps the most compelling indicator of an idea’s potential value-added is the willingness of people to apply it. Organizations engaged in operations tend to quickly reject ideas that don’t work or that complicate
Although effects-based ideas continue to be refined, the core aspects have become commonly recognized within the joint community.

proven techniques and procedures. Following are three examples of organizations using effects-related constructs in current joint and combined operations.

Both Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC–A) and its subordinate, Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF–76), use effects in their internal planning and their interaction with the U.S. Ambassador and country team. Although focused on a single country, a number of diverse provinces increase the complexity of operations. CFC–A’s development of effects statements has facilitated collaboration with the U.S. Embassy. Likewise, CJTF–76 uses effects in its collaboration with the British-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although ISAF uses its own variation of effects, the differences compared to CJTF–76’s usage are small, and effects essentially facilitate a common language between the two organizations. CJTF–76 also uses lines of operations not only for military tasks and objectives, but also for those related to other systems, such as an objective associated with extending the reach of the central government (the political system in Afghanistan). The use of effects and a systems perspective of the operational environment promote unity of effort among the military, other agencies, and international forces.

U.S. Central Command’s Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, faces a situation different from that in Afghanistan. Its operational area encompasses a number of countries and requires interaction with seven ambassadors and country teams. Much of the task force’s operational focus is on humanitarian assistance. CJTF–HOA interacts with U.S. Central Command headquarters using objectives and effects, and collaborates with the Embassies the same way in the context of their mission performance plans. While success varies among the Embassies, in general the use of effects has facilitated a more inclusive and common view between the military, the Embassies, and other agencies regarding the various organizations’ roles in achieving common objectives.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, both Multinational Force–Iraq and Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) are using a systems perspective, effects in the planning process, and assessment of effects in much the same way as CFC–A and CJTF–76. MNC–I incorporated aspects of an effects-based approach as part of its joint operation planning and execution procedures. Although its efforts preceded the publication of the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations, MNC–I established sound techniques for effects planning and assessment. Moreover, techniques such as those practiced by MNC–I heavily influenced the development of the handbook.

Other Examples

Additional organizations in the Department of Defense, industry, academia, and the multinational arena are using effects-related constructs.

- The U.S. Army is sponsoring a Theater Effects-based Operations (TEBO) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration for U.S. Forces Command Korea to examine specific tools and technology associated with effects-based planning. TEBO’s integration of emerging analysis and decision aiding technologies helps the development of a comprehensive knowledge base of red, blue, and green players within the operational environment, enhances effects-based planning within a joint/combined context, and assesses progress toward the desired end state by measuring attainment of direct and indirect effects to facilitate adaptation of the plan. United Nations Command/Combined Forces Korea/United States Forces Korea has applied effects-based ideas across all its military functions. This was evidenced by Combined Forces Command–Korea’s extensive use of TEBO during Exercise Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration ‘06. Also, in an effort to further combined operations in the Korean theater, the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations has been translated to Hangul.

- U.S. Special Operations Command’s operation plan for the global war on terrorism incorporates effects.

- The U.S. Army War College incorporates effects-related constructs in its Joint Force Land Component Commander’s Course, a supporting handbook, and its Distance Education Course.

- U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Course includes system-of-systems analysis in conjunction with its JIPB instruction.

- The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has adopted an effects-based approach to operations, defining it as “the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve
planned objectives and ultimately the NATO endstate.”

The latest draft of Air Force Doctrine Document 2, *Operations and Organization*, incorporates an effects-based approach to military operations. ³

At its core, an effects-based approach will remain primarily a refinement of how we think about joint operations. The joint community now has an authoritative baseline for this thinking in JPs 3–0 and 5–0. As effects-related constructs mature, members of the joint community will continue collaboration to refine the enabling doctrine, organizations, training, education, and technologies. USJFCOM will help sustain that baseline consistent with its transformation charter and role as the joint force trainer.

The journey from concept development and experimentation to joint community acceptance and application of effects-related constructs is typical of other transformation initiatives. The debate over the past three years has been productive. In one way, it has challenged USJFCOM and other proponents to continue to refine the constructs, simplify explanation of ideas, demonstrate the added value, and recycle ideas that are not yet ready for prime time. But the debate has also challenged the entire joint community to revisit established practices and consider how the community might improve itself rather than merely retaining what has worked in the past.

The journey to fully implementing an effects-based approach will continue as joint doctrine publications under revision expand the overarching constructs described in Joint Publication 3–0; as joint training and education extend their reach to a larger audience; as we field better collaboration, visualization, modeling, and simulation tools; and as organizations in the field using an effects-based approach to operations (including those outside the Department of Defense) continue to validate new ideas in actual operations or identify better ways and means. In the context of transformation, U.S. Joint Forces Command will continue to support these processes with concept development, experimentation, capabilities development, and the professional dialog that is essential to finding better solutions. 

**NOTES**

It is widely recognized that leaders of terrorist organizations come from the ranks of the educated and are mostly driven by extremist ideologies. The foot soldiers of terrorism, however, are often recruited from the deprived masses at the bottom of the socioeconomic and political pyramid. The leaders exploit impoverished and hopeless environments and circumstances to attract the large numbers of people needed to advance their agendas.

Recently, the U.S. Army War College hosted a conference on the underlying conditions of terrorism and the military role in addressing these conditions. The participants agreed that the U.S. military has been successful in its efforts to attack and disrupt key terrorist organizations since 9/11; however, these organizations are able to replenish their ranks faster than we can reduce them because “poverty and inequality still prevail in many parts of the Muslim world with high illiteracy rates, lack of human development, and poor infrastructure.” Moreover, the “center of gravity for war and terror are the populations that can provide sanctuaries, safe havens, and/or recruitment for terrorists.” These conditions are pervasive throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

According to Asian Development Bank statistics, for example:

- The Asia-Pacific region is home to two-thirds of the world’s poor.
- Nearly 1.9 billion people in the region live on less than US$2 a day.
- At least 30 percent of the population in countries such as Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam still live in extreme poverty.
- A conservative estimate of Asian unemployment is 500 million, and 245 million new workers are expected to enter the labor markets over the next decade.
- Millions of Muslim boys in Asia are coming of age and creating a “youth bulge.” When governments are not able to deliver a vision of hope, mutual respect, and opportunity, these young men end up desperate, frustrated, and humiliated. These are ripe conditions for religious extremism, which can provide a perversely attractive escape from the grinding hopelessness and despair.

According to Lieutenant General Wallace Gregson, former commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, the decisive terrain of the war on terror is the vast majority of people not directly involved, but whose support, either willing or coerced, is necessary to insur-
The imperative to provide economic benefits to ordinary Iraqis is not born out of some vague humanitarian impulse. U.S. military officials [in Iraq] emphasize, but one that directly affects the security of the country and the viability of the government.7

Although Basilan has made great strides in achieving better economic conditions in recent years, poverty and lack of opportunity are still pervasive. Therefore, our long-term counterterrorism efforts by, through, and with the government of the Philippines must focus on creating sustainable socioeconomic conditions on Basilan island.

Applying Principles of War
To put this concept in terms of a principle of war, this is equivalent to conducting an exploitative offensive operation following a successful attack. Exploitation takes advantage of tactical opportunities gained by the initiative. It pressures the enemy and compounds his disorganization.8

Creating sustainable socioeconomic conditions should be viewed as an exploitative offensive operation. We conduct this type of operation by shaping, changing, and maintaining the popular support for the armed forces of the Philippines and its government on Basilan. How do we maintain long-term popular support for our cause— that is, how do we deny popular support for the terrorist organizations? We do so by encouraging socioeconomic development that creates jobs, opportunities, and alternatives to violent extremism.

Network of Stakeholders
The U.S. military alone does not have the skills or resources to create sustainable socioeconomic development. This type of operation requires an extensive network of stakeholders: the host-nation government (including the military), local populace, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private sector, academia, and the U.S. Government (including the military). To attract all the necessary stakeholders, we need to activate the interagency process because the core competency needed for this phase lies in other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

However, the Department of Defense (DOD) should and could be a proactive member of this interagency team.

Building this nontraditional network of stakeholders with varying interests and organizational cultures will be an arduous task. Therefore, all interagency players, including the military, must think and act outside the box. The Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap published in May 2006 directed DOD to develop a long-term, focused approach to build and increase the capacity for the international partners to deny sanctu- ary to terrorists and to separate terrorists from populations by utilizing all instruments of national power. To do so, DOD was authorized to partner and cooperate with:

- other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government
- state and local governments
- allies, coalition members, host nations, and other nations
- multinational corporations
- nongovernmental organizations
- the private sector.

Leveraging the Private Sector
DOD does not have to look far to reach into the private sector. The U.S. military employs thousands of Reserve and Guard citizen-Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who work in the private sector. Many of them hold significant decisionmaking positions with multinational corporations and regional and small firms. Many have valuable skills in such fields as public relations, marketing, business development, supply-chain management, finance, economics, agribusiness, and investment banking. We need to tap into not only this wealth of skills from these citizen-Soldiers, but also their relationship with the business community. They can open many doors to the business community as we develop the nontraditional network and partnerships.

The story of Lieutenant Colonel Allen McCormick, USAR, demonstrates the power of our Reserve and Guard members as invalu-
Beyond Economics

While this article focuses primarily on the sustainable economic development and partnering with the private sector, it is not suggesting that this approach is a universal solution. The purpose is to bring attention to the importance of the economic element in shaping and changing the environment as we prosecute the war on terror. Other strategic elements—diplomatic, informational, and military—cannot be dismissed. An economic development can begin to occur only when basic security and physical needs are met. Efforts toward improved infrastructure (such as transportation systems, power, water, and telecommunications), developed human/social capital (health care and education), and good governance (to include sound macroeconomic policies) are the prerequisites for a continuous and sustained economic development. Enduring development strategies require equity, populace participation, and ecological preservation. Therefore, the capabilities and interests of other stakeholders, in addition to the military and the private sector, are still needed to develop and maintain the foundation for sustainable economic development.

To initiate this process of engagement with the various stakeholders, a series of meetings may be warranted. These gatherings should facilitate an environment for these diverse organizations to explore and understand each other’s organizational goals, capabilities, and requirements. By holding them, we hope to overcome organization-level cultural biases, build trust, and develop working relationships to generate synergy among the participating organizations. The military role within the network would be to facilitate the gatherings, point out the areas that are most vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and provide assessments of the security situation in specific locations, such as the island of Basilan. A unified vision and situational awareness among the participants would be the expected outcome from these gatherings.

In addition to sponsoring the meetings, we need to attend private sector roundtables, such as AACSB annual meetings, Business Executives for National Security board meetings, conferences sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Business, FLOW (a grass-roots global network of entrepreneurs practicing conscientious capitalism for sustainable peace) networking events, and the Global Microcredit Summit. We need to let the private sector know that the U.S. Government and international community need their business expertise in creating products, services, and jobs for those who are at the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid. By doing so, they can create hope and opportunities for the populace as well as additional markets for their products and services. The byproduct is creating environments inhospitable to violence and terrorism.

Beyond the Basilan Model

The success of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines has been attributed to the Basilan model, which built host-nation capacity, met basic physical needs of the local populace, enhanced Filipino government legitimacy and control, and disrupted insurgent safe havens. The emphasis on civil-military operations resulted in improved infrastructure, increased availability of water, and secured mobility for commerce. Therefore, this model was extremely effective in winning back public support and improving security in Basilan by reducing terrorist strongholds. It also laid the cornerstone for the beginning of social and economic prog-
economic development can begin to occur only when basic security and physical needs are met

Forum, which was a meeting of the Philippines Consultative Group and other stakeholders. The forum addressed development issues and other factors, such as instability, weak infrastructure, an inefficient financial sector, corruption, large bureaucracy, and extensive national debt. The group recognized that the private sector accounted for 86 percent of gross domestic product and is responsible for the majority of job creation. Accordingly, it is the key to sustainable economic development.

We should leverage the Asian Development Bank’s ongoing efforts and synchronize our plans, programs, and activities with them and facilitate the further expansion of the stakeholders’ network. We should also leverage its expertise, interests, goals, and resources toward creating sustainable social and economic progress in Basilan. That island and the Philippines in general could be the next success story in the same line as Ireland, which was one of the poorest countries in Europe 15 years ago. Evidence shows that the unprecedented economic growth there had significant impact on reducing violence in Northern Ireland, which was considered the most violent region of Northern Europe for the previous 40 years. In 20 years (1986 to 2006), unemployment declined from 17.6 percent to 4.5 percent. 

Ireland’s steady economic growth was led by private sector businesses. It is crucial that we expose a critical mass of international business sector players to Basilan. As always with new startup investments and companies, the risk is extremely high, so the failure rate could be high also. Therefore, attracting a critical mass of private sector players, maintaining the network, and preserving their interests are the keys to netting a handful of successful new ventures and a steady stream of new investments.

A Horizontal World

A big challenge for the U.S. military would be to overcome its need for control. It is embedded in our organizational DNA to want to run things because military organizations are traditionally hierarchical and have a top-down structure. We must recognize that the military will be unable to exercise any control over the actions of its nonmilitary partners. We have to inspire them into collaborating with us. Hierarchical relationships are dissolving and more horizontal and collaborative ones are emerging within businesses, governments, and many organizations across the spectrum.

Therefore, success depends on how well we are able to influence and persuade them to help us. This can only be accomplished if we truly take the time and effort to understand their requirements, interests, and concerns. This is where we could leverage our Reserve and Guard members of the Armed Forces.

2 Statement by Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia.  
4 Felipe and Hasan.  

Representatives of the United Nations, USAID, and other agencies meet onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln to coordinate aid to Aceh, Indonesia, after tsunami disaster
Geospatial Intelligence
The New Intelligence Discipline

By RICHARD E. BARROWMAN

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) uses geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) daily in a variety of applications and methods, including modeling and simulations to support concept development and experimentation such as the Urban Resolve and the Multi-National Experiments. It also has a role in training support for mission rehearsal exercises for deploying forces and geographic combatant commander–driven scenarios based on current or emerging situations. Additionally, GEOINT is used to support the Joint Warfare Analysis Center with various nodal analysis models, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency with evacuation charts, and both the Joint Warfighting Center and Standing Joint Force Headquarters with joint task force training and preparation. This list is by no means the limit to which GEOINT affects what is done within USJFCOM and how it impacts the job of joint transformation. It is but a sample of what GEOINT is capable of when applied correctly, and therein lies the rub.

The term geospatial intelligence made its formal debut along with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), formerly known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, on November 24, 2003. The term also became one of the most important expressions from a perspective of visualizing and understanding today’s battlespace. Yet geospatial intelligence remains widely misunderstood in the joint lexicon. So what exactly is geospatial intelligence, why does anyone need to know, and how does it affect what warfighters do and how they do it?

This article will clarify what geospatial intelligence is. It will introduce related terms and address current and emerging doctrine. It will discuss how GEOINT is currently used and applied to the joint task force as well as standing commands, whether functional or service-specific. It will identify the present geospatial intelligence picture and discuss how it could look in the future. Finally, it will look at a few scenarios within the USJFCOM and how GEOINT is being applied to develop new concepts, integrate them within the current structure, and help train the warfighter engaged in today’s operations.

Defining Geospatial Intelligence
Arriving at a definition of geospatial intelligence and understanding it are two separate matters. That is not because it is difficult to comprehend or even use, but because it is already pervasive in so much of what we do that we fail to recognize the obvious. Operational warfighters are providing GEOINT at a rate too quick to gather, analyze, configure, disseminate, store, and maintain; planners are using it for planning every branch and sequel;
through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials

- **geospatial information**: data that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the earth, including the statistical data derived.

In short, GEOINT includes but is not limited to data ranging from the ultraviolet through the microwave portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. It embraces information derived from the analysis of imagery and geospatial data. And it also includes information technically derived from processing and exploiting spatial and temporal data, which provides the location and time information to conduct three-dimensional (spatial, specifically elevation) and four-dimensional (temporal) analysis.

The term and idea of GEOINT were created due to advances in technology and the creative use of these advances. Many and commanders are asking for it on a daily, hourly, and even minute-by-minute basis.

**Geospatial intelligence** is defined as the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. It consists of three elements:

- **imagery**: a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired
- **imagery intelligence**: the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived

will remember the days of layers of acetate hung on the mosaic paper maps taped to the wall. Innovation and initiative, coupled with technology, have turned that into a digital display using geospatial intelligence as the source of the visualization. GEOINT was created to describe and encompass elements that were disparate. Combining these elements is the source of GEOINT’s power.

The most common locations for geospatial intelligence are the Common Operational Picture and Common Relevant Operational Picture. The map or image on the big screen in the front of the Joint Operations Center, as well as the layers that can be toggled on and off, are GEOINT. These layers of data, such as Blue Force Tracker, significant activities, or other aspects of the battlespace the commander directs, may be geospatially enabled and provide more than a static one-time view. Additionally, the terrain relief details provided when conducting a fly-through in Falcon View are also GEOINT. In many circumstances, the PowerPoint slides used in briefings contain data points derived from GEOINT. Anyone who has participated in an exercise, experiment, or modeling and simulation event has used it. Geospatial intelligence tells the computer where roads are, how tall buildings are, what slope the land is, and other features warfighters take for granted.

Geospatial intelligence finds its foundation in National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Publication 1, *GEOINT Basic Doctrine*. Pub 1 discusses the Title 10, U.S. Code definition of geospatial intelligence, the functional management role NGA plays, the various systems included, and the National System of Geospatial Intelligence (NSG), which is one of the main bodies that provide policies and activities necessary to integrate GEOINT into the combatant commands (COCOMs), Services, and agencies. It is a high-level guidebook providing the overview. Joint Publication (JP) 2–03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, on the other hand, provides fundamental principles and guidance for GEOINT in joint operations. It is focused more specifically on the Armed Forces and how they integrate with multinational and interagency operations. JP 2–03 is more detailed than Pub 1 and includes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the application of GEOINT. It is formatted around the discipline, data, process, and products associated with GEOINT. While each Service, as well as the various commands and agencies, possess additional doctrine, standard operating procedures, and instructions, Pub 1 and JP 2–03 remain the foundation.

**GEOINT and U.S Joint Forces Command**

The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency as the GEOINT functional

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**SPECIAL FEATURE**

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*Italian army warrant officer sets up satellite dish, Exercise Combined Endeavor*

*Airman adjusts communications modem on lightweight, multiband satellite terminal, Exercise Bushwacker*
manager, and the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force integrator, have acted to extend the National System of Geospatial Intelligence to the lowest tactical level and to bring GEOINT from that level back to the NSG for updating products and data bases and use by all GEOINT customers. This partnership between NGA and USJFCOM is titled Joint GEOINT Activity (JGA), and it emphasizes collaboration vertically throughout all echelons from strategic to tactical as well as horizontally with all members of the NSG. The NSG is the combination of technologies, policies, capabilities, doctrine, activities, people, data, and communities needed to produce GEOINT. It consists of COCOMs, Services, agencies, and other partner organizations. The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency serves as the functional manager. JGA informs the NSG and receives guidance and direction based on input from the members. The current objectives of JGA are:

- bringing the Services and commands together to seek common, joint capability for the provision of GEOINT to the last tactical mile
- defining specific requirements and operations capabilities for this support
- developing an architecture and concept of operations that connect the NSG with currently unavailable or incompatible service systems and processes
- defining joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the management and application of GEOINT at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war
- acting as advocate for resources to implement these concepts.

To accomplish these objectives, JGA organized into five lines of operation (LOs) across USJFCOM staff codes to ensure inclusiveness and leverage the command’s expertise residing in the staff. These LOs and their respective staff codes of responsibility include Requirements (J–8); Procedures (J–7); Plans, Programs, and Policy (JTC–1); Architecture (J–6); and Standards (J–8). The command lead for this effort is the Strategic Initiatives Office delegated to J–29. In addition to JGA forming these LOs, Joint Pub 2–03 directs the formation of a Geospatial Cell within the commands to properly manage geospatial activities. J–28 is the GEOINT functional manager for USJFCOM.

Concept of Operations

The bottom line purpose of GEOINT is to support the decisionmaker, which is challenging due to the lack of understanding at various levels, to include the command level, on where, when, and how to apply guidance and intent with regard to GEOINT. This disconnect usually exists between the users and producers, and removing it begins with understanding the basic steps required to transform raw data, which is usually derived from NGA, into the understanding required by decisionmakers.

Data is obtained to answer the “so what” of the commander’s guidance and intent and commander’s critical information requirements. This raw data is aggregated into information through management (organization and discipline) by gathering it into systems, analysis, processing, and exploitation. This information is provided to senior-level staff members who place it within the context of their experience, and it becomes knowledge. Once fused into knowledge, over time and within a spatial context, gives the commander the understanding required to make effective decisions.

To enable this process of transformation, a concept of operation (CONOP) must be applied to GEOINT within the command. It may vary slightly based on factors such as how people are organized to support the sharing of what they know, and how decisionmaking is supported (battle rhythm and linkage of the products and decision in the various boards, centers, and cells throughout the organization). It will also vary from the operational level to the tactical level, as the tactical level is less formal and may involve only two or three individuals. The Joint Warfighter Integrated GEOINT CONOP is the JGA document that addresses these issues. A Joint Task Force GEOINT Cell normally performs many of these operations.

The first step of CONOP is to define the requirements, which usually happens in the military decisionmaking process as part of a Joint Planning Group or another operations planning team. The GEOINT subject matter expert should be included in the planning process not just as an afterthought for the intelligence planner, but as an actual member of the team from the GEOINT Cell, Terrain Team, or other asset organic to the command. Just as the varied staff officers develop, coordinate, and formulate plans during the process, the GEOINT expert can provide planning aids as well as decisionmaking aids for briefings. The expert needs to completely understand the commander’s guidance and intent rather than be told to produce certain products. The other place where GEOINT requirements are defined is on the Joint Operations Center floor. If no expert is there, chances are the battle captain/major cannot provide the best visualization of the battlespace or environment. Finally, GEOINT capabilities must reside in the intelligence section of the staff, allowing them to use the command’s systems and integrate with the other intelligence disciplines to define specific requirements and help shape overall situational awareness. The JTF GEOINT Cell will provide processes for defining data. Required content, resolution, accuracy, and currency in the form of metadata search criteria document requirements to support decisionmaking about alternative courses of action to meet the requirement.

Now that it is known what is needed, how is it obtained? The easy answer often appears to be to task collection assets rather
than searching a number of disparate databases the customer may or may not be aware of. This may be the most time-consuming course of action. Rather than starting out fresh, it is possible the image or data is already out there. Discovering where and with whom is the real challenge. This is addressed later but is a critical second step. It is the GEOINT Cell that enables the joint warfighter to make a decision on the most cost-effective approach for meeting the requirement within specified timelines.

Once the data is found, can it be used? Did it come in the right format? There are many visualization and analysis tools today. Unfortunately, some are proprietary and only work with specific data types. If the user has found what he is looking for but cannot use it, the data must be converted to the right format. The GEOINT Cell helps with the determination, and additional assets such as the Terrain Detachments or Intelligence Sections can usually convert the data, but it takes time and, depending on the software, may reduce data functionality. For example, some transformations require the data to be converted from “smart” to “dumb” to be displayed, defeating the purpose of using digital versus hardcopy products.

The fourth step is to actually use and share the data. The ultimate objective is to enable the joint warfighter to use superior GEOINT to plan, decide, act, and monitor. This includes shared awareness of the operational environment with regard to numerical, spatial, and temporal aspects. It is also ensuring that data is available to not just the collector or processor, but also to subordinate, superior, and peer organizations so they can gain the same level of awareness. One has only to consider the common in Common Operational Picture. If only one command has it, it is not very common.

Finally, the data should be kept current and relevant. As changes and updates are received, GEOINT must be continuously validated for accuracy and consistency. A map printed yesterday, but with outdated data, is of little value. Providing a true picture includes currency, allowing decisionmakers to consider the risks based on the age of the data.

The Current Picture

The application of geospatial intelligence is as varied as the people using it. Each command has applied different resources and processes and, therefore, has experienced varying levels of success and frustration. For JGA to gather a big picture of the current state of GEOINT within the community, it was necessary to survey the varied commands and discuss with each how GEOINT has been applied and where they have experienced triumphs and defeats. It is easy to form opinions of the current state of GEOINT from personal experiences; however, that leads to anecdotal discovery and not empirical data. A broad understanding and application of GEOINT must come from the community, not from a few war stories. To gain this level of understanding, USJFCOM and NGA surveyed U.S. Northern, U.S. Pacific, U.S. Special Operations, and U.S. European Commands. The results were generally predictable; however, there were a few surprises, some confirmations, and various practices that may be shared amongst the partnering members of the NSG.

Personnel with GEOINT experience were targeted for the site survey and were from the operational and tactical levels, as the goal was to interview personnel who collect, produce, analyze, visualize, manage, maintain, or disseminate GEOINT. The survey engaged a mix of supervisor and worker levels within cross-functional areas across the COCOMs and components (not only intelligence) to gain a broader foundation. While the formal survey has concluded, continued input from the field force is still collected as azimuth checks and to evaluate the implementation of the best practices. The preliminary findings center on a number of factors, including doctrine, training, personnel, organization, data issues, and multi-level security and release policies.

Doctrine. Limited joint GEOINT doctrine exists, and most of the commands rely on various TTPs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to fill this void. The users find ways to get the job done, creating procedures that are not incorporated into doctrine. The SOPs that supplement doctrine are frequently outdated. Additionally, information sharing is not adequately addressed in procedures, and there are shortfalls in GEOINT standards that cause implementation inconsistencies (for example, metadata tagging) and compliance and enforcement issues.

Training. Limited mission-related GEOINT training is available to the COCOMs/ JTF that obliges the commands to rely on specific theater experience that may not apply across all situations. There is also a general lack of knowledge of available capabilities and various GEOINT repository databases and how to access them. This forces a heavy reliance on NGA support teams for on-site and reachback support that, while welcomed, dissuade training of internal experts.

Personnel and Organization. There is a perception of insufficient GEOINT organization within the commands and billets at both the junior and senior levels. Additionally, where billets were identified, they were not supported, and gaps existed in filling military Joint Table of Distribution geospatial information and Services officer positions.

Data Issues. GEOINT from military sources (vice NGA) often provide the coverage and timeliness required by operations, but the holdings are on separate architectures and domains, and no single system or tool exists to discover and obtain data. In addition to the single site data storage issue, inconsistent use of metadata standards makes it difficult to determine validity and relevance, which, when coupled with the inconsistent use of metadata fields, requires extra data manipulation. Finally, there is no integrated requirements/ production management system to clearly articulate what is needed.

Multi-Level Security and Releasability Policies. Much unclassified data resides in secure but not necessarily in unclassified systems. Too often, data is overclassified. Classification policies are not understood, resulting in inconsistent application as well as execution procedures not established to properly implement existing policy. This complicates multinational coalition, nongovernmental organization, and host nation information sharing.
The Way Ahead

The findings make it clear that technology is not the long pole in the tent. In fact, it is ironic that the U.S. Armed Forces list some data management issues as issues when North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, according to a recent article in ElSharp, are worried about the United States pulling so far ahead they will be unable to operate. Since the conclusion is that technology is not the primary factor for challenges, the application of what is known and done becomes the focal point. It goes back to the fact that while GEOINT is pervasive in all security and defense activities, we do not have our arms around it; therefore, it lacks structure and purpose. The number of collection platforms and sensors has exploded in recent years. More and more data is available, at a higher intensity, around the clock, and in a wide array of formats. JGA’s intent is to understand existing capabilities to collect, fuse, and share GEOINT (both up and down echelon) at the theater/JTF level. JGA is doing that by:

- seeking joint capability for provision of GEOINT to tactical level and back
- defining joint requirements
- developing and integrating standards
- developing joint architecture and CONOPs
- experimenting, demonstrating, and integrating joint solutions.

USJFCOM is helping shape emerging doctrine, specifically in Joint Publication 2–03, to use a GEOINT Cell to manage the process within a headquarters. While present doctrine does not dictate who should be in the Cell, it provides some guidance on personnel and functions. The fact that using a cell in lieu of other methods is indicated alludes to the importance of performing these functions. A cell is a group of personnel with specific skills who are listed together on the manning document to accomplish key functions. This GEOINT Cell acts in lieu of a working group, which is an action officer-level body that meets to provide recommendations to boards. The boards are bodies of personnel empowered to make decisions in regard to key staff functions. So by its nature, the GEOINT Cell is a permanent organization staffed by specific skill sets to perform a broad array of functions within the geospatial intelligence arena. As mentioned earlier, the JGA membership essentially functions as the USJFCOM GEOINT Cell. How does this apply to the COCOM survey? Following are potential actions for each area identified earlier.

**Doctrine.** Users rely on limited GEOINT experience or the advice of experts rather than doctrine/SOPs. There should be smaller, quicker, and regular revisions of doctrine, standardizing the framework of CONOPs, and sharing the TTPs and SOPs within commands to pursue common or compatible joint procedures. Also, a single definitive source and process for identifying requirements and discovering and obtaining all forms of GEOINT data should be established.

**Training.** Theater and tactical users require greater knowledge of the multiple GEOINT tools and processes and rely too heavily on deployed NGA resources. Training on the mission applications and limitations of GEOINT data should be increased along with the various tools while developing mission-related joint training to build internal expertise.

**Personnel and Organization.** There is a shortage of billets within the organization and lack of emphasis on filling identified GEOINT billets. Training opportunities at military and government agency levels should be increased while Manning authorizations are reviewed and updated to reflect current GEOINT requirements.

**Data Issues.** Researching and obtaining GEOINT is a time-intensive process because the knowledge of data sources (how to use and obtain the data) is limited, and both who will be able to satisfy data requirements and the timeframe are uncertain. People, processes, and tools must be enabled to discover and obtain data from all sources through increased awareness of current architecture and future revisions. Additionally, the need exists to extend the influence of data standards beyond national organizations and into lower echelons of users.

**Multi-Level Security and Releasability Policies.** Users must check multiple domains and Web sites, utilizing different tools and processes, to discover and obtain GEOINT; therefore, GEOINT needed to support missions does not reach tactical users. Also, release decisions are inconsistently interpreted, and procedures should be increased and broadened to address ambiguity in releasability policy and establish process for quickly sanitizing sensitive data.

United States Joint Forces Command’s geospatial intelligence is used throughout the J-codes: in J–9 for concept development and experimentation, J–7 for training, and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center for nodal analysis. The command’s modeling and simulation is built around geospatial intelligence and uses it in a number of ways, including draping imagery over three-dimensional models, creating fly-/drive-throughs, and even using temporal analyses based on traffic at various times of the day. The training arena uses geospatial intelligence to deploy scenarios for other combatant commands and joint task forces. There are numerous additional examples of how geospatial intelligence may be applied to provide realism, save money and time, and provide value to the Warfighter. United States Joint Forces Command is continuing to look to the future to ensure that transformation efforts are leveraging geospatial intelligence and that these are being integrated into existing and future systems. Geospatial intelligence is a true combat multiplier when applied correctly. It is as valuable as any other intelligence discipline and provides a level of understanding previously unobtainable. It incorporates new concepts, developing technology, and emerging practices and integrates many facets of today’s missions. Key takeaways are commanders’ use of geospatial intelligence capabilities within their organizations and providing guidance and intent in the same manner as other disciplines. At the same time, staff officials manage geospatial intelligence and support its Cell. Finally, everyone understands the basic concepts of geospatial intelligence and how these capabilities may be applied. JFQ
On the morning of October 8, 2005, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale struck the North West Frontier Province/Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) region of Pakistan 63 miles north of Islamabad, creating a multifaceted humanitarian emergency necessitating an immediate worldwide response. The earthquake left nearly 74,000 dead, 70,000 injured, and 2.8 million displaced or homeless. Since the buildings were primarily constructed of brick and cinder block, the quake literally shook them to pieces. Some 80 percent of structures collapsed in Muzaffarabad, the capital of AJK province. Due to the hour, most people were indoors and were crushed or trapped under the rubble. The inaccessible terrain, the near-destruction of all medical facilities and roads to the area, the approach of winter, and the demographics characterized by subsistence-level agriculture presented intense challenges to relief operations.

The U.S. response to its ally was instantaneous. Rear Admiral Michael LeFever, USN, Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 1, was immediately appointed by General John Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), to head Joint Task Force Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DAC PAK). The admiral and an initial assessment team of medical, engineering, and logistic personnel were in Islamabad within 48 hours. For the next 6 months, a coalition force with a peak strength of over 1,200 personnel conducted the largest and longest relief effort in U.S. military history.

During the course of relief efforts, helicopters (primarily CH–47 Chinooks) flew more than 5,200 sorties, carrying almost 17,000 passengers, 3,751 of whom were casualties. They delivered more than 14,000 tons of humanitarian aid supplies, up to 200 tons per day. Two field hospitals, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) from Germany and Combined Medical Relief Team 3 deployed from Okinawa, Japan, treated over 35,000 patients and administered 20,000 vaccinations. Navy SEABEES brought the engineering capability to clear 50,000 cubic yards of rubble from roads so trucks could deliver supplies. Many members of the first SEABEE unit to respond, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 out of Gulfport, Mississippi, had recently lost homes due to Hurricane Katrina. Because of that experience,
they brought useful insight to the relief/reconstruction effort. Following the natural disasters of the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia in December 2004 and Hurricane Katrina the month before the earthquake, the U.S. military once again found itself centrally engaged in a familiar if rather new role conducting hurricane assistance/disaster relief operations.

Admiral LeFever discovered early on that the ability to respond quickly, adapt regionally, and coordinate and communicate between disparate agencies was vital. In assessing a full range of lessons learned, several major elements contributed to success:

- the military’s capacity for speed and effectiveness
- adaptive procedures including on-scene, empowered command and control
- the ability to coordinate the response to a dynamic and evolving situation among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities in addition to international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
- creating a “semi-permissive” environment
- the prominence of strategic public affairs/public diplomacy and the way they enhanced U.S. goals in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

**Speed and Effectiveness**

Of foremost importance to initial relief operations was the capacity to deploy rapidly and effectively. The military, a “9/11 force,” was able not only to respond quickly but to stabilize the situation so the governments of Pakistan and other nations, along with the NGOs, could conduct long-term relief and reconstruction programs. The military simply possessed unique assets designed for crisis situations and rapid movements, such as field hospitals, engineering/construction crews, and security capabilities.

The portability and capacity of these military assets were vital to the timeliness of the response. Admiral LeFever and the assessment team, along with a 23-person Contingency Response Group, established a base of operations at Chaklala Air Base outside Islamabad. Within 72 hours, helicopters from Afghanistan began conducting relief flights to the affected area. By late October, the 212th MASH was on the ground in Muzaffarabad and fully capable in an area where all other medical facilities were destroyed. The rapidity of this initial response significantly mitigated the “secondary disaster” of disease caused by the destruction of sanitary and medical infrastructure.

A major factor in mission success was the relationship with the host nation military. The Pakistani army had considerable expertise in military management and doctrine surrounding complex humanitarian emergencies, and the U.S./coalition forces were able to integrate with them and serve as an enabling agent. The Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, the Department of Defense liaison to the Pakistani military, had established relationships that allowed it and DAC PAK to immediately integrate into the Pakistani army’s procedures, assisting where necessary. This enabled resources to be allocated effectively and efficiently.

A less quantifiable effect of a rapid initial military response was the sense of order it brought to affected areas. The Pakistani army quickly penetrated the devastated area to establish command and control, maintain order, interdict crime, secure landing zones, establish a communication and logistic network, and reassure people that help was on the way.

Furthermore, in conjunction with U.S. forces, the host army provided the capability and expertise to control and coordinate efforts during a developing situation. The element of adaptability, especially in command and control, was vital.

**Dynamic Command and Control**

U.S. Central Command Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) allowed DAC PAK flexibility and authority on the ground; Admiral LeFever had command and control of all U.S. forces flowing into theater to support the disaster. In a complex humanitarian disaster like the South Asia earthquake, an empowered on-scene commander directing the evolving situation was critical.

Unlike the tsunami or Hurricane Katrina, where the nature and extent of the destruction were immediately apparent, the remote terrain of Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province hid the magnitude of the disaster for days. As late as October 11, the figure of 18,000 dead was believed too high, but the final number would total almost 74,000. In such an inaccessible, opaque situation, it is vital to have the decisionmaker on the ground.

DAC PAK brought command and control ideas and concepts to the disaster response and established procedures for air operations. In the initial effort, over 80 aircraft operated with no air traffic control, altitude separation, or—before the Pakistani military established control on the ground—regulation of landing zones. Crowds swarmed toward the helicopters, which then had to hover and push out supplies.

Also, Pakistan’s Chaklala Air Force Base—joined to Islamabad International and the only airfield that could service the disaster area—quickly became overwhelmed. Aid/relief workers were arriving from all over the world and assembling, creating a hub of activity with no command infrastructure. The U.S. Air Force 24th Air Expeditionary
DAC PAK enjoyed a consistently positive relationship with Pakistan’s government, military, and NGOs on a tactical, operational, and strategic level. It supported the military by offering help in capacity and logistics, for example, loading and unloading helicopters and setting up pallet yards. “We set a new world standard for how the military works with everyone else to respond to a complex humanitarian emergency,” said Ambassador Crocker.

The initial emergency relief operation set the stage for a transition to long-term reconstruction and for USAID and NGO projects such as cash-for-work, the rebuilding of permanent structures, and delivering seeds and fertilizer so the agrarian population could sow crops in the spring. The USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) operated seamlessly with the military assets.

The success of the relief effort was due in part to the ability to quickly and efficaciously build a team among nations, agencies, and branches of the military (Expeditionary Strike Group 1, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Task Forces Griffin and Eagle, and individual augmentees). The experience and competency of personnel were the keys to this monumental team building. It was critical to have experienced people with the wisdom and maturity to crystallize into an effective group under pressure in a short time. “It’s people who make systems work,” said Admiral LeFever.

**Humanitarian Operations in an Unsettled Region**

Unique to this relief effort were challenges germane to the AOR. The relief effort managed risk to personnel in a semi-permissive environment. DAC PAK ensured the right size and combination of people and allowed no excess, due to security concerns in the earthquake-affected region. The North West Frontier Province is an uncertain zone in a volatile part of the world. Conflicts from Afghanistan and between tribes have bled through the Khyber Pass, and enemies of the United States have been able to achieve sanctuary in contentious, ungoverned areas that are only nominally part of the state of Pakistan.

DAC PAK balanced force protection concerns with the humanitarian nature of the mission by having security provided by Pakistani military assets, primarily the army rangers, who worked with U.S. personnel in
areas such as Muzaffarabad and Shinkiari. This served to protect the forces without misrepresenting the humanitarian assistance mission.

Communication Strategy

Prior to the October earthquake, and largely because of the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, most Pakistanis viewed the United States with uneasiness. A State Department poll in the spring of 2005 indicated that nearly half of the country had either a “poor or very poor opinion” of the United States. As a result, immediately implementing and maintaining an aggressive, well-coordinated communications strategy was essential to the relief operation.

Two public affairs teams from U.S. Joint Forces Command’s newly established Joint Public Affairs Support Element deployed to Islamabad and led a communications effort that included not only the element’s military public affairs officers, but public diplomacy and public affairs professionals from the U.S. Embassy, USAID, and various NGOs. Throughout the 6-month operation, the communication strategy centered on one primary theme: the U.S. commitment to helping the people of Pakistan.

True to that principle, U.S. and coalition Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, and Marines constantly delivered an image of relief and friendship. The most visible symbol of this effort served a region that had never benefited from this type of sophisticated medical care. A last MASH still stands in Muzaffarabad, a gift to Pakistan worth $4.5 million. And after removing 2,300 truck loads of rubble and constructing dozens of shelters for schools and families, the SEABEEs did the same, giving their Pakistani military counterparts equipment worth $2.5 million.

These and other concrete examples of U.S. support and friendship were communicated daily to Pakistani newspapers and television stations by the U.S. Disaster Assistance Center and U.S. Embassy to ensure that the entire public, not just those in the earthquake affected areas, understood America’s commitment to assisting them. Pakistani reporters and photographers routinely flew in U.S. helicopters delivering aid, as did other international and U.S. media representatives. And Ambassador Crocker, Admiral LeFever, and Bill Berger, head of the U.S. DART team for USAID, conducted regular press conferences to further articulate the U.S. Government’s involvement.

In November, the larger strategic implications of the operation began to become evident when the A.C. Neilson group released the results of a poll showing the number of Pakistanis who had a “favorable opinion of the United States” had grown from 23 percent to 46 percent. By the spring, a State Department poll conducted from late January to early February showed that number rising to 55 percent. In a region that has become the focal point for the global war on terrorism and fight against radical Islamic extremism, these numbers were significant. But they were never the central focus of the operation.

“You don’t go into something like this thinking about what impact it will have on your image,” said Admiral LeFever. “You go into it focusing on doing the right thing to help people.”

The earthquake relief effort in Pakistan created a remarkable construct: a relationship between states and peoples significantly improved at every level of society. Flexibility and the ability to quickly build a team from vastly different organizations were the characteristics that enabled mission success. The “soft infrastructure” composed of interpersonal relationships and in-country connections was invaluable. The humanitarian assistance to the people of northern Pakistan set the example for interagency and international cooperation in the face of a complex humanitarian disaster and furthered U.S. goals in the area of operations by facilitating favorable interactions between U.S. personnel and the inhabitants of the region.
Press articles citing concerns of disgruntled general officers. Media reports portray a brusque Secretary of Defense who ignores sound military advice and treats officers disrespectfully. U.S. troops fighting and dying overseas for a strategy whose endgame is decades away from resolution. Domestic support for a war beginning to wane. Congress threatening to hold hearings on how a war is conducted.

The year of the events above was 1966, not 2006. Yet while Iraq and the Long War are not the same as Vietnam and the threat of communism, questions arise in both contexts regarding military professionalism. What is the role of senior military officers in determining the policy of the United States? To what extent should civilians with little or no military campaign experience dictate operations? What should be the reaction of senior military leaders to encroachment into military operational and even tactical matters? And when, if ever, should these leaders resign in the face of a bad policy? This article attempts to answer these questions.

Trends in Political-Military Operations

Although the questions are timeless, the answers should reflect several trends that appeared after the Cold War and that have accelerated since September 11, 2001. The U.S. Government considers itself at war, probably for decades or more. The Department of Defense has transitioned away from a threat-based planning process in the face of uncertain contingencies, uncertain resources, and uncertain futures. The new capabilities-based process requires the military to possess the ability to win in "full spectrum operations," from low-end counterinsurgency to high-end major operations.

The U.S. military has been given the resources and mandate to influence events far beyond fighting and winning wars. It is expected to shape, assuage, deter, and, in accomplishing these missions, employ a variety of means, some of which have more to do with practicing civics than firing a machinegun. More expectations may be coming with the increased importance of homeland security. Finally, the respect for the U.S. military by Americans continues to outshine that for all other American institutions.

The implications of these trends for military professionalism are profound. The military's resources, hierarchy, culture, and operational code enable it to deploy large numbers of people and amounts of equipment for long periods, making it an exceptional tool for the executive branch. The respect for the military, compounded by a wartime footing and a 24/7 news cycle, magnifies the importance of senior military leaders. Taken together, these two trends increase the military's potential use in the foreign policy arena as well as in influencing domestic opinion about that policy. At the same time, the nature of the Long War calls into question the notion of a separation between the military and civilian spheres of responsibility. Before giving answers to the fundamental questions posed above, consideration must be given first to what, if any, line separates policy from military strategy and the responsibilities of civil authorities from those of the military.

The Intersection of Policy and Military Strategy

Popular models of civil-military relations posit two spheres of influence, one labeled civilian and one labeled military. Some suggest that military professionalism is at its highest when the intersection of these spheres is as small as possible. The problem with this thesis is that the intersection is redrawn for every administration or even for different situations within an administration. Presidential philosophy, the experience of aides, the threat to be addressed, the interests to be weighed, the military options available—each of these factors and more affect how the executive branch chooses to draw the line between policy and strategy.

As many writers have pointed out, military strategy takes its shape from the clash of arms in the service of the policies of the state. Civilians guide the grand strategy or policy, not only in the use of force but also by defining objectives, setting constraints, providing resources, and bolstering domestic support. Since military strategy will influence, and in turn be influenced by, these considerations, there can be no such thing as a purely military opinion on any question of policy. Indeed, with the creation of the combatant commands and their staffs, the military can engage on dramatic foreign policy initiatives, occasionally at cross-purposes with civilian control.

The U.S. military has expanded its role to operational, political, diplomatic, and economic means. Does this mean the military should take a more active role in executing (and even determining) aspects of policy? Should policymakers also intrude more deeply into operational and even tactical matters in order to shape the military response? While both trends seem...
pronounced today, there are still roles and missions that are uniquely military and those that are not. Few statesmen would believe that they could take the lead of a strike fighter mission to destroy a bridge, and few senior officers would feel comfortable negotiating with a country over economic aid.

Of course, these simple examples fail to indicate the nuances of most foreign policy decisions undertaken by the Executive. But they serve as a useful reminder that the difference between policy, grand strategy, and military strategy has never been distinct, and proponents of either “the civilians interfere overmuch” or “the military is asked to do too much” can find plenty of case histories to support their thinking. Regardless, our enemies in the Long War may not have physical infrastructure to be attacked, may not have organizations that can be penetrated, and may in fact consist more of forces (such as poverty, resource conflict, or anti-Americanism) than physical actors. In spite of all of these murky waters, a foundation for military professionalism may be readily found in the text of the military officer oath of office.

Tension in the Oath of Office

Although the words are familiar, this behavioral bellwether for the Long War bears repeating, with some emphasis on the first and fourth clauses: “Having been appointed an officer, I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.”

The first clause of the oath binds the military officer to obligations regarding civilian authority. One must serve the Congress in support of its Article I powers concerning organizing and equipping for defense of the state and serve the President in support of his Article II powers as Commander in Chief. The former article primarily concerns what may be called military administration (that is, training, recruiting, standards of conduct, and organizing the military), while the latter is primarily concerned with executing foreign policy. Both branches share, more or less, the authority to commit forces in combat.

By invoking the Constitution, the first clause compels loyalty to the President and Congress as they exercise their powers. However, the obligations of fidelity may be overridden by appealing to the last clause, to an inability to “well and faithfully discharge” the duty of the officer. The oath is silent on precisely who judges how well and how faithfully, but fealty solely to the President and the Congress cannot be the only measure of professional conduct. Congress can and does prescribe aspects of the faithful discharge of duties by passing laws concerning military conduct and by specifying particular duties for senior officers. The Executive, moreover, through formal and informal means, can describe what he considers “faithfulness” in his senior officers.

The last clause of the oath invites, indeed requires, officers to consult their own conscience, ethics, and sense of honor in carrying out duties under the first clause. It is not difficult to imagine cases where the two clauses will be in tension, where loyalty to the Commander in Chief may conflict with the ability to fulfill military duty.

In the Long War, this tension is exacerbated. The policy may be clear, but the variety and scope of the missions that the military may be asked to carry out—and the degree to which they are involved in the decision-making—cannot be anticipated. Finally, ever-present electoral politics mean that the military faces difficult choices about when and how to support any “strategic communications” game plan presented by either the White House or Congress.

Tests of Military Professionalism

The lack of an operative distinction between policy and strategy, the political-military trends already noted, and the tension demanded by the oath of office lead to three normative tests regarding military professionalism:

- Interactive: The U.S. military leadership is highly professional in that it provides advice, unpolluted by domestic political considerations, to civilians. The interaction between civilian and military leaders determines whether and how that advice is given. (The definition of unpolluted is decided by the military leader; who else can judge?)
- Institutional: The U.S. military is highly professional in that it has built its internal institutions to be flexible in the face of shifting demands
where frank advice is given, whether welcome or not, military professionalism is at its height

for its involvement in the civilian sphere or for civilian involvement in the military sphere.

Individual: A senior U.S. military officer is highly professional in that he admits the tension implicit in his oath and conducts himself accordingly, up to and including resigning his commission.

Test 1: Providing Sound Military Advice in Private and Public. When civilian members of the executive branch debate grand strategy to address foreign policy concerns, they usually seek military advice, both by custom and by law. Uncertainty dominates any discussion of the capability and intent of an enemy, the depth of an alliance, the outcome of engagements, the risks of an operation, and, in general, the debate of costs and benefits of any particular course of action. In the face of these challenges, objective debate over options for the commitment of forces in wartime and a supporting strategy for those forces is critical. An objective debate centers on the ways, ends, means, and costs for the protection or advancement of American interests. Such an objective debate differs from a political debate, which may take these factors into account, but is inevitably shaped by the Constitution’s “invitation to struggle” or by the more prosaic power struggles between Democrats and Republicans.

Two forms of domestic political debate over grand strategy may take place in the public realm. High political debate concerns the branches of Government and their shared powers. In this realm of debate, the power of the President to use the military or conduct foreign policy in a given fashion occasionally gives rise to some type of congressional attempt to curb his power. An example of a high political debate is the enforcement or constitutionality of the War Powers Act of 1973. On the other hand, low political debate is used by differing political parties to undermine support for the other. The less united the American population is around a policy, the more quickly the political debates will fuse, where high political debate quickly devolves into low. Unfortunately, both political forms rely on the same type of argumentation found in objective debate. Public arguments for or against a policy will be couched in language similar to that used in private.

Moreover, there will be a strong temptation by political actors to lionize or demonize anyone debating objectively in public, by pointing to that speech as support for their position. Given the standing and trust of the Armed Forces, senior military leaders are most prized by either side and thus most likely to see their comments used for domestic political purposes—in a word, polluted by the nature of the public debate. If such pollution diminishes the debate, and if the officer cannot control who uses his words for what purpose, the only recourse is to be silent in the public sphere. Only in private can the objective debate take place without politicization or the perception of military politicization.

The degree to which a military leader expresses his disagreement privately with statesmen, however, is an even better direct measure of military professionalism. To the extent that civilian authority allows and even encourages such disagreement, particularly in the early stages of policy formulation, it is also increasing military professionalism. Quarreling over strategy means that the civilian leader must be learning and that he is overcoming one more deadly sin of the policymaker: ignorance of military capability, limitations, and range of outcomes. Argument and constructive conflict often bring education.

The military leader who does not hesitate to say, “I’ve heard what you said, Mr. President, and I must say I don’t agree with you at all” while standing in the Oval Office exemplifies the professionalism for this first test. He displays his commitment both to the first and last clauses of the oath of office. Additionally, his advice must range over all matters that are within the military sphere, as it is presently defined by the civilian leadership. Where such frank advice is given, whether welcome or not, military professionalism is at its height.

In the public realm, the situation is exactly reversed, since candid advice cannot be given without political consequences that affect professional standing. To offer a negative judgment publicly on a policy while it is being debated, and certainly after it has been decided, is possibly insubordinate and undermines the first clause of the officer’s oath. However, to offer a positive comment publicly seems to make the military an advocate, regardless of professional judgment.

One possible alternative presents itself, which does not require the military leader to enter the political debate, but still allows him to remain true to his oath. It lies in reminding listeners that the military does not decide foreign policy and that it should not opine on this policy once decided; it merely carries it out to the best of its ability.

Every time a senior officer speaks in public about policy, he damages military professionalism. Perhaps dire circumstances exist that require public advocacy or criticism, but damage to military professionalism still occurs. The least harmful path is to present in public verifiable facts, avoid predictions, and make the mildest and most unassailable of military judgments. During times of relative peace, this is the course most often chosen by senior leaders in discussions of foreign policy with Congress or the media. However, questions about the use of force, the benefits of using force, the strategies employed, and the ultimate costs in blood and treasure are highly charged judgments. During wartime, then, especially in wars of long duration, the political nature of the debate becomes unavoidable. When the military is held in high regard, the pressure on it to make public statements either for or against the policy will grow. The military leader’s ability to resist such pressure is the clearest demonstration of military professionalism.

This prescription regarding public military advice on foreign policy and the commitment of forces overseas is of course quite different from the one concerning Congress’ role in regard to force structure, military organization, procurement, and similar matters. Here, the senior officer’s oath forces a different response that nearly always brings him in conflict with the Executive. It is not the professional’s job to defend the extramilitary considerations that may dominate the President’s budget; he must provide his expert judgment enabling Congress to raise and support the Armed Forces. Budget exercises in the executive branch involve negotiating conflicting priorities. However, the Constitution demands that it cannot be left solely to the
Executive’s discretion whether the military is funded too much, too little, or just right. Senior military officers are compelled by their oath to offer a professional opinion of the means needed to meet the strategy demanded. It should be both a surprise and a concern if their judgment neatly matched the Executive’s opinion in budget cycle after budget cycle.

Test 2: Building Flexible Institutions. It is a poor policymaker who does not seek to exert the highest degree of control possible in the application of any instrument of national power. He comes to the debate perhaps naively believing that since the smallest tactical engagement may have strategic effect, he must be involved to the greatest extent possible. The temptation of advanced surveillance technologies and the rapid dissemination of battlefield mistakes make it inevitable that such encroachment occurs.

Because of this uncertainty in what will be required in the way of advice, and to what extent the civilian may “interfere” in operations, a high degree of professionalism requires the military to build many and varied institutions. In the face of a potential demand for a fusionist role, a highly professional military must respond. The Armed Forces should provide schools that train leaders who can supply a broad range of policy advice and who can operate in realms outside of traditional military excellence. Promotions must be based not only on demonstrated operational mastery but also on a talent for civil governance or institutionbuilding. Doctrine should embrace major combat operations, as well as economic development, police training, and financial and judicial reform.

A more difficult case for flexible institutions as a measure of professionalism occurs when civilian leaders are perceived as interfering in traditional military operations. For example, the Executive may want to exercise control over where and when a single aircraft launches a single missile against a single target. Civil authorities often may wish to dictate constraints on troop levels, materiel supplies, or the tempo of a military engagement. The professional military must act to create a culture, doctrine, concepts, and institutions that accept this need with equanimity, rather than chafe at it in indignation.

The senior officer may be uncomfortable with the line that circumscribes his responsibilities—either it gives him too little power (for example, senior civilians selecting targeting aimspoints), too much control (the debate over the use of the military in homeland security), or too many functions (use of the military for nationbuilding). Nevertheless, the military would be less professional to the extent that it might fail to embrace these additional roles and missions enthusiastically, once they are demanded by the civilian authorities.

Test 3: Willingness to Resign. The choice to resign is the only public recourse of protest to policy. It serves as the sole counterweight to the first test, which charged that military officers should neither advocate nor criticize a policy in public. This test provides redress in the case of unacceptable policy (in the eyes of the officer), but the conditions required are sufficiently arduous that resignation should be rare.

Obedience to command authority is the hallmark of the platoon leader, mission leader, and division commander. But the oath of office requires more difficult choices on the most senior flag officers, who advise and ultimately implement the direction of the civilian authority. This test is not about egregious constitutional violations or unlawful or immoral orders. Instead, the question is whether there are circumstances that could arise out of policy debates involving the use of the military that might cause a flag officer to resign.

When to Step Down

The readiness of the general officer corps to reevaluate the choice of resignation in the face of policy decisions is the most direct measurement of military professionalism. The oath of office is the azimuth for when and how to make this choice. Since the oath commands devotion first to the civilian authorities and then invites the officer to balance that allegiance against his personal judgment, the senior officer must consider something other than obedience when it appears the last clause of his oath is about to be violated. At some point, this tension must be released, and the officer should resign.

No other course is available. Direct disobedience would be an unthinkable breach of the Commander-in-Chief clause. The officer could also choose to speak out publicly and force the President to relieve him, but that fails the first test proposed above. Another option is to obey but undermine. Many tools are available to the increasingly savvy senior officer corps—implementing slowly, leaking to the press, awaiting a “better time” to push their view, or urging other bureaucratic actors to the fore in an attempt to sway policy. This choice suggests an officer who is sufficiently aggrieved to complain privately, but not so distressed that he wishes to put a lifetime career investment on the line. But such a choice smacks of moral frailty, so this choice fails the test of faithful discharge of duty. At the point of the breach, the senior military officer has but one option, which is to resign.

Under what circumstances is resignation warranted? If and only if three conditions are met should the senior officer override the constitutional imperative of loyalty to civilian authority and resign.

First, the military officer believes the policymaker has incorrectly drawn the line between the civilian and military sphere. In private, disagreements can and must occur over where to draw the line between
policy and military strategy. Many reasons exist for increasing encroachment on what are traditional military spheres: the advent of technology that allows more control, a concern for casualties, a desire to use the military as a social experiment petri dish, promoting an ideology that uses the military to remake other societies, or the likelihood of media beaming the inevitable deaths of innocents in tactical situations worldwide and thus having a strategic impact. These reasons and others have made the traditional military function increasingly subject to the intrusion of civilian officials. The military professional, with growing disenchantment, may have seen the line drawn ever further into what he perceives as his realm. While the civilian has the unquestioned right to decide where the line is drawn, the military professional has some responsibility to judge whether the line has gone too far.

However, this judgment alone is not sufficient for resignation. Many historical examples exist of commanders chafing at their perception of overly intrusive civilian control. In foreign policy, many things are uncertain, and this is even more true in war. Military leaders should have studied enough history to know that this intrusion has proven right at least as often as wrong. The modern commander who argues that he needs thousands more troops for an assault, for example, should be reminded of George B. McClellan’s caution—and that if Lincoln had not acted to remove the general from duty, the Union may have been lost.

Regional combatant commanders now exert enormous diplomatic, informational, and political levers of power, implementing (and sometimes making) U.S. foreign policy for large swaths of the world, treading in waters not traditionally thought to be in the military realm. Especially in wartime and in an uncertain world, the civilian leader may need to expand or contract the military realm. He may judge the general officer corps too hidebound by the status quo on how best to implement their responsibilities. More importantly, the general officer knows from history that this may be the case, so meeting this condition alone fails to provide sufficient impetus to resign.

Second, the senior officer has often provided his negative opinion of the policy, yet the policy continues. This is a most difficult condition to meet; here the officer must cross the threshold of substituting his judgment for that of the elected representative of the people. There are significant obstacles that the senior military officer navigates as he contemplates resignation: he chooses to resign because he believes he can no longer faithfully discharge his duties; his counsel is no longer valued and continued service could be detrimental to his profession; the policy is, in the officer’s judgment, also unsound. The people elect the President, and the flag officer must be extraordinarily reluctant about substituting his judgment of the President’s policies and their effect for the wisdom of the electorate. Any foreign policy has risks, costs, and benefits that are outside the purview of the military professional, and the decisionmaker will often view their cumulative effect differently.

But failure to involve senior military professionals in policy discussions may constitute a breach of this condition. Senior officers could be left out of the debate, unable to discharge their professional obligations according to their oath, especially if they are offering strong disagreement. Commanders may not be invited to discussions concerning their areas of responsibility, or policy may be decided without even soliciting military advice. Adherence to the oath demands that military advice be heard if policy debates involve the use of force.

Third, the policymaker seeks to shirk or shift responsibility for where he has drawn the line between strategy and policy. Even though the civilian and military spheres sometimes possess a large intersection at the highest levels of the government, this does not mean that it is not useful for civilian policymakers to pretend otherwise. Public references by civilians, particularly when forces are engaged in combat, sometimes suggest that the field commander simply sets forth the military strategy, requests the number of troops needed, the level of logistical support required, the funding and equipment to be procured—and the statesman meets the request. This is a useful fiction for the public in maintaining the impression of military objectivity.

All three of these conditions must be met simultaneously for the military officer to resign. To meet only the first would make resignation too dependent on personalities and therefore damage faith in an apolitical military. To meet only the first and second would make resignation too common and undermine the ability of the Executive to count on sustained military leadership in execution. The third condition provides the tipping point. This is when the military institution itself is not being used to advance foreign policy but to shield elected officials from domestic political harm.

Both the trends in the U.S. political-military environment and the lack of an operative distinction between policy and strategy demand a more rigorous definition of military professionalism for the Long War. Senior military leaders should respond more forcefully in private in regard to how they shape foreign policy, while avoiding either criticism or advocacy in public. They should build cultures and institutions that can supply superb expertise and background, ranging from the purely military to civil-military operations—and be accepting of whichever roles civilian authorities demand. Finally, they should resign more often in the face of poor policy decisions and attempts at scapegoating by civilian leaders. These normative tests of military professionalism remain rooted in that deeply personal vow taken by every commissioned officer in the oath of office. JFQ
Between 1991 and 2001, life became more complex for those addressing the issue of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense of military forces. Prior to 1991, only warring superpowers were expected to use NBC weapons during major combat operations, and nations needed both NBC defense capabilities and nuclear and chemical weapons with which to threaten retaliation. The possibility that U.S. forces might be exposed to such weapons was a known factor but not a constant concern or high priority at the operational or tactical levels. NBC meant “No Body Cares” to those who thought Soviet threats of using chemical or biological (CB) weapons on the battlefield would be countered at the strategic level, obviating much of the need for NBC defense training and large stocks of defense gear.

The first Gulf War changed the calculus. Despite clear indications in the mid-1980s that other nations were developing unconventional weapons, the U.S. military was caught unprepared for the possibility of chemical or biological warfare. The Armed Forces got a pass on CB defenses in 1991, but dodging the bullet that time did not inspire confidence. Following the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated work on a counterproliferation concept for responding to a nonnuclear nation-state that might use CB weapons as an “asymmetric” measure against U.S. military operations. NBC defense was renamed “passive defense,” probably by an Air Force advocate of Cold War doctrine when counterforce, active defense, and passive (civil) defense were terms of art in discussing response options to Soviet strategic nuclear strikes.

While concepts and definitions were being furiously debated, Aum Shinrikyo developed the nerve agent sarin in its own laboratories (notably, without any nation-state assistance). In March 1995, cult...
members left containers of sarin in several subway cars in Tokyo, causing 12 deaths and nearly 1,000 casualties (most later recovered). This has been the only successful chemical attack by terrorists since they began looking to unconventional hazards as weapons 30 years earlier. Similarly, there was only one successful biological terrorist attack between 1965 and 2001: the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cult’s use of salmonella to sicken more than 700 people in Oregon in 1984.

Responding to the attack in Japan (and without any indications as to a terrorist CB threat within or targeted against the United States), the Federal Government mandated a nationwide emergency responder training program and the creation of a military rapid reaction force and National Guard civil support teams for responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events.

**A Surprise in the Mail**

In the fall of 2001, the Nation faced an unknown assailant who was mailing anthrax-laden letters to media outlets and congressional offices. Simultaneously, White House officials debated the rationale and processes for invading Iraq and stopping what they termed a *nexus of terrorism* and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In December 2002, the White House released the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, detailing plans to counter both nation-states armed with unconventional weapons and terrorist groups those nations might arm. Combining the military’s response to traditional battlefield threats of NBC weapons with the Federal Government’s response to overseas and domestic terrorist CBRN capabilities was deliberate, in part due to the George W. Bush administration’s belief that terrorists would get their materials from “rogue nations” with WMD programs. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld designated U.S. Strategic Command to “integrate and coordinate” all combating WMD functions for DOD in January 2005.

Finally, a plan was neatly wrapped up in one nice package, right?

*Wrong.* The anthrax letters catalyzed actions to deploy BioWatch, a system of expensive, time-consuming, and not entirely reliable air samplers in more than a dozen cities to warn of potential biological warfare agent exposure. It was hardly a promise of blanket protection, but rather a knee-jerk reaction to a poorly diagnosed challenge. The WMD Civil Support Team program floundered between 1998 and 2001, as critics demanded to know how a 22-person military team, arriving with minimal equipment 4 hours or more after an event, would offer any real benefit to the local response in the face of a CBRN terrorist attack. Each state was to receive 1 team, without any analysis of where the 55 teams would optimally serve the Nation in terms of high and low threat areas.

The criticism was muted after 2001, although nothing had changed in the scope of the teams’ ability, timeliness, or locations. In the fall of 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD[P]) initiated a “pick-up game” to develop a WMD exploitation task force designed to roll up Iraq’s WMD program while the conflict unfolded, a completely new and untested military concept.

In April 2003, OSD[P] recommended that DOD oblige more than a billion dollars in antiterrorism funds to emplace specific CB defense capabilities at 200 U.S. military installations and facilities, although the Services saw CBRN terrorism as a low priority threat to their bases.

As the U.S.-led coalition tore through Iraq in 2003, it became clear that there was no active WMD program there, and indeed, only a few chemical munitions manufactured prior to 1991 were found. Despite the efforts of a specialized military unit expressly dedicated to exploiting WMD-related sites and a Central Intelligence Agency–sponsored Iraq Survey Group, as David Kay would tell Congress later, “We were almost all wrong.”

On the home front, the White House released a national biodefense strategy for homeland security, focusing nearly all its efforts on anthrax and smallpox threats and requiring years and billions of dollars to execute. U.S. Strategic Command’s new combating WMD responsibilities, previously limited to nuclear global strike topics, have yet to be deconflicted with U.S. Northern Command’s homeland security responsibilities and U.S. Special Operations Command’s counterterrorism responsibilities. Despite all indications that the nature of the unconventional weapons threat has significantly changed since 1995, few have changed their attitudes. Most still focus on both terrorist- and second-power nation-state WMD threats as if each attack was a massive Soviet-style chemical-filled Scud missile barrage against a European airbase. Nothing reflects this more than the *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (NMS) and debates between the combating terrorism, homeland security, and combating WMD communities—three different groups addressing the common threat of CBRN hazards.

**Too Many Players**

The NMS identifies how the military is to carry out its responsibilities within the scope of the national strategy. It acknowledges that “the global WMD threat has grown more complex, diverse, and has broadened from a focus on state threats to one that includes both state and nonstate actors.” It offers “an active strategy to counter transnational terror networks, rogue nations, and aggressive states that possess or are working to acquire WMD.” It identifies eight mission areas that fall into the three major topics of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management (see figure). That is to say, the NMS offers the traditional counterproliferation approach designed for a military battlefield. It does not fit when applied against a mission to counter and respond to the threat of overseas and domestic terrorist WMD incidents. Yet DOD officials still try to apply passive defense.
equipment and concepts to antiterrorism and civil support missions, resulting in the confused and inefficient execution seen to date.

**Combating WMD Military Mission Areas**

The term weapons of mass destruction overwhelmingly floods the NMS, to our detriment. When politicians and military analysts talk about the threat of WMD in China, India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan, 9 times out of 10, what they really mean is nuclear weapons. When White House officials talked about Iraq’s WMD program in 2002, they noted how “we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” When President Bush and Senator John Kerry were questioned about the issue of terrorist WMD incidents during the Presidential debate in 2004, both stressed the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Intelligence Community offers “WMD program” assessments that fall short in addressing CB weapons effectiveness and adversarial nations’ intent to use these systems, while offering vague and unclear estimates on how terrorists might develop and employ improvised CBRN hazards against noncombatants. The term WMD unnecessarily complicates this strategy by equating CB weapons to nuclear weapons, and at the same time, equating terrorist capabilities with those of nation-states.

The debate between the antiterrorism community and the CBRN defense community has been particularly acrimonious since 2002. While there are few indications that any terrorist group (with the possible exception of al Qaeda) has any real capability or intent to use CBRN hazards against noncombatants, the antiterrorism community has pushed the term CBRNE (including the threat of high-yield explosives) in nearly all top defense policy and concepts issues. The 2002 and 2005 versions of the Universal Joint Task List saw an unprecedented change: the national task formerly known as “strategic deterrence of WMD” became “manage strategic deterrence of CBRNE weapons.” This is not an isolated case. In many defense memos coming out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) addressing both counterproliferation and antiterrorism issues, the term CBRNE has been repeated, with its use often attributed to the influence of OSD(1) staffers.

This is not merely an issue of semantics. While the Bush administration’s focus on the war on terror is well known, how the military addresses the terrorist CBRN threat is very unlike how it addresses the threat of NBC weapons on the battlefield. These two missions require different concepts of operation, equipment, and specialists. While there is a jointly funded OSD program for the research and development of CBRN defense equipment and concepts, there is no joint program addressing the research and development of counterexplosives measures. Notwithstanding a joint publication on antiterrorism, each Service and combatant command and perhaps every installation commander has a unique antiterrorism concept of operations. Even antiterrorism experts admit that the overwhelming majority of priorities address conventional terrorism rather than CBRN terrorism. Yet the antiterrorism community has been far more successful in pushing its term CBRNE, continuing to confuse all involved on exactly who is in charge and what defense capabilities are required to address terrorist CBRN incidents and battlefield NBC weapons effects.

The antiterrorism community has recognized lately that the term WMD is unique as a descriptor for mass casualty events, and not all terrorist CBRN incidents will cause mass casualties. As a result, we have seen the term weapons of mass effects (WME) emerge to reflect a two-fold concept. WME refers to those CBRNE weapons as well as other asymmetrical weapons that may rely more on disruptive impacts than destructive kinetic effects. This might include cyber-threats as well as other nonlethal, disruptive attacks on the public or government. Under this view, WMD are a subset of WME, even though they may create more casualties and destruction.7 What we are seeing here is a stubborn desire to meld the two concepts of combating terrorism and combating WMD together—by force if necessary—even though the fit is not perfect.

Over the past 3 years, the antiterrorism community has been trying to craft a national security Presidential directive for combating terrorism that identifies Federal Government responsibilities within the context of the White House’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, but continued infighting has prevented the smooth formation of such a document. Developing the interagency roles for the Defense Department is increasingly important in combating both terrorism and WMD. In the meantime, combatant commands are trying to figure out whether addressing the threat of terrorist WMD is a responsibility of the combating terrorism staff or the combating WMD staff or both. It has been suggested that an annex for combating terrorist WMD will become part of combating terrorism and combating WMD plans, dividing responsibilities for specific functions between the two.

People tend to focus on the technical nature of CBRN hazards and the need for specialized equipment and training, when instead they should understand that the operational requirements under which military units, specialized units supporting emergency responders, and antiterrorism planners operate require unique and focused capabilities. DoD would rather develop dual-use military units than expensive, single-focus response forces. As a result, Federal agencies argue over jurisdictions and resources, while state and local communities panic over the idea that al Qaeda terrorists are walking across the U.S. border with nuclear weapons.
Weapons and dirty bombs strapped to their backs. Instead of arguing about terminology and concepts, we should accept the fact that each community has a distinct, tailored mission, specific funding limitations, and different policies that guide its efforts (see table).

Instead of developing different but complementary concepts and equipment, each community is trying to execute multiple missions with the same set of generic equipment. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, executes the BioWatch program by doling out air monitors and detection kits to major cities as if it were a military division on the battlefield. Is it feasible to monitor the air for biological weapons agents across the Nation for the next decade? The Department of Defense wants to develop CBRN defense equipment that addresses both military requirements and domestic response missions by adopting guidelines from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Is it reasonable to expect warfighters to be held to occupational safety health standards on the battlefield? Military installations are receiving expensive, complex CB defense equipment meant for a battlefield saturated with CB warfare agents, although they cannot afford to run the equipment throughout the year. Is it necessary for every installation to have the full capability of CBRN defense equipment like a military unit? Everyone argues over the equipment standards, concepts of operation, and who is in charge of developing and executing the plans because, to them, it is all the same NBC defense “stuff.” Something must change.

Appreciating Mission Uniqueness

First, understanding that there are three distinct scenarios with fundamentally different threats is key to ensuring that U.S. forces can execute all three mission areas (see table). Unless Russia or China starts another Cold War with the United States, nuclear weapons remain the only real WMD threat. Any other nation using chemical or biological weapons cannot hope to develop, stockpile, and use the quantities of CB warfare agents against U.S. forces necessary to create mass casualties (unless noncombatants are targeted), given modern counterproliferation strategies and advanced protective equipment.

Similarly, terrorists (in particular those with political agendas) do not have catastrophic dreams of killing millions of U.S. citizens and simultaneously attacking multiple cities with massive amounts of anthrax and smallpox. It is much more likely that they will execute small-scale individual attacks using less toxic (but more available) industrial chemicals, commercial radioactive material, or homegrown toxins to kill a handful of individuals while panicking thousands. And certainly dirty bombs are not the same as improvised nuclear devices, as much as people fail to distinguish between them. We must either change or lose the WMD label.

Also, we should understand that there are differing users and requirements for the three military mission areas. Military CB defense equipment is expensive and designed to be used by specialists in high-threat situations during relatively limited periods of engagement, where one has a good idea of where the enemy is and what he has in the way of agents and delivery systems. Military commanders expect the whole range of equipment (detectors, protective gear, medical countermeasures, decontaminants) to diminish the impact of CB weapons and ensure the success of the mission. The equipment and concepts of operation are developed to provide a minimal to moderate level of protection to the troops, while emphasizing the ability to complete the mission. Antiterrorism efforts at a military installation must continue throughout the year, addressing protection of noncombatants and combatants alike. Because antiterrorism funding is limited, installation commanders must address the more probable (conventional) threats first. Given shortages of trained personnel, limited funding, and large noncombatant populations, it may be that an installation can only afford manual detectors and protective equipment for its on-base responders. Concepts such as “shelter-in-place” and evacuation may be the desired protection for the general population instead of issuing masks and medical countermeasures to everyone. That is basic risk management.

Units that might deploy to a national security event or respond to a no-notice terrorist incident—the WMD Civil Support Teams, Marine Corps’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, the Army’s 22nd Support Command (CBRNE), and other units—need a blend of military and civilian equipment. They assist in the analysis of unknown supertoxic materials and recommend actions, while supporting first responders who must work under stringent occupational safety standards. Yet they also have wartime missions to support the combatant commands in the areas of CBRN sample analysis, WMD elimination, and consequence...
This would reflect the reality of developing countermeasures to terrorist CBRN hazards as well as military weapons systems. We ought to retain the term NBC defense (or passive defense) to discuss those specific actions required for forces to operate in a battlefield environment where the adversary is using weapons characterized by their capability to produce mass casualties through nuclear, biological, or chemical means. We need to acknowledge that military NBC weapons are a unique and more deadly threat than terrorist CBRN hazards. And we ought to at least change the term WMD to reflect what the term mass casualties really means and understand that other technologies, such as directed energy, nanotechnology, and certain high-yield explosives, can cause mass casualties. WMD should not be limited to the definition of “CBRN weapons and their means of delivery.” Similarly, politicians and military analysts should not use the term when all they really mean to address is a nuclear weapons issue.

The mid-to-late 1990s saw the distinct intersection of an evolving threat, military technology innovations, and the opportunity to change concepts of operation in the realm of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. This nexus of opportunity came unnoticed and quietly within the military community and climax in 2002, but the wrong analyses were promulgated and the wrong conclusions were drawn. The term weapons of mass destruction is no longer useful for developing concepts and materiel specific to combat operations, force protection, or homeland security. It has become a nebulous political phrase designed more for stimulating emotion than dialogue. We may not be able to rid ourselves of the term, but we must begin using it in a way that is not constrained by decades-old concepts and a limited set of technologies.

While people claim that combating weapons of mass destruction is a top defense priority, the focus is nearly uniformly on the nuclear missile threat and not on the lesser threat of tactical chemical/biological warfare. As a result, only a small community, primarily acquisition focused, is actively addressing CBRN defense issues. These individuals are particularly susceptible to using a passive defense “hammer” on every CBRN defense “nail”—and that approach is not working.

The public expects the Federal Government to protect it from CBRN terrorism and the troops from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This requires rational analysis and distinct courses of action that complement each other, rather than one general approach that attempts to be a multipurpose tool for all.

JFQ
In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter assess the work of the Evans-Sahnoun Commission, appointed by the Canadian government and inspired by an appeal from United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. In responding to the threat of Osama bin Laden and global terrorism, the commission has urged nations to adopt a new doctrine: “the duty to protect.” Feinstein and Slaughter propose a corollary: “the duty to prevent.” Along with others, the authors claim that “the biggest problem with the Bush preemption strategy may be that it does not go far enough.”

No one denies the threat of an aberrant form of Islam or the danger of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of rogue regimes or nonstate actors. Moreover, there is no moral equivalence between the violence of militants and U.S. actions taken against al Qaeda and other terrorists; the United States is fully justified in defending itself. The concern is that the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption, especially as implemented in Iraq, and its larger war on terror proceed from a serious misreading of Islamic ideology and that U.S. actions may not ameliorate the threat but exacerbate it.

This article contends that the elaboration and execution of current national security policy, and the specific rhetoric used to articulate that policy, have had an unintended result: they have served to validate radical ideology and sharpen its fervor, enlarge the number of volunteers to Osama’s cause, alienate many in the Arab and Islamic publics, and extend the battlefield on which America and its narrowing scope of allies must fight.

**Background**

In 634 CE, before the critical battle with the Persians at Mada’in, Khalid ibn al-Walid, commander of the outnumbered Arab army, sent his foe this summons: “In the name of God, the All-Compassionate, the Merciful... enter into our faith [lest we come with] a people who love death just as you love life.”

Almost 14 centuries later, an al Qaeda statement appeared just after the 9/11 attacks: “The Americans should know that... there are thousands of the Islamic nation’s youths who are eager to die just as the Americans are eager to live.” Such is the unconventional army that the United States now confronts—an army whose men love death.

**By JERRY M. LONG**
Osama, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy

The ideology that saw violent instantiation in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon did not come from nowhere. Rather, these attacks represented a selective appropriation of both the history of the Prophet Mohammed and the early caliphs and a doctrine of jihad and warring camps elaborated especially during the time of the Abbasids. This doctrine postulates that the world divides into opposed factions, the dar al-Islam, the house of Islam, and the dar al-harb, the house of war. The enmity between the two is perennial, and at best there can be only sulh, a temporary truce. There cannot be salaam, a lasting peace.

Osama and others have revived this dichotomy. Broadly espoused by Islamists, the conflict is not political as much as metaphysical. There is an inherent clash of ideologies and not simply national interests. The real war is that of faith with unbelief, iyyaan and kufr. In so describing the world, Osama draws particularly on the writings of the Egyptian fundamentalist Sayyid Qutb, hanged by the government in 1966 for treason. Qutb’s key concepts can be found in his culminating work, Milestones:

- All societies in the world today are jahili, in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance. It is incumbent on Islam to oppose these tyrannical jahili societies and seek to implement Islamic law. There must be an “Islamic world revolution.”
- Between the two camps of dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb, there is no negotiation, only continued warfare.
- Primary responsibility for this continued warfare falls on “the vanguard,” a cadre of faithful who “initiate this revival of Islam . . . and then keep going, marching through the vast ocean of jahiliyya, which encompasses the entire world.” Not incidentally, the idea of a vanguard is one that Osama bin Laden specifically employed. In his October 2001 statement, Osama declared, “God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America.”

But why would Osama readopt this classic two-camp doctrine? We must turn to history, and it is Osama who suggests a date in his communiqué 3 weeks after September 11. There he declares that the Islamic umma had, for more than 80 years, tasted “humiliation and disgrace, [seen] its sons killed and their blood spilled, [and] its sanctuaries destroyed.” From Osama’s view, the context for 9/11 is modern Middle East history, beginning with World War I. This large history could be viewed as a metanarrative, the overarching story by which other stories (and, in particular, U.S. words and actions) are interpreted. In this narrative, the history of the region is filled with the depredations of the British, then the United States. The litany is lengthy, beginning when the British made contradictory promises to the Arabs and the Zionists even as they conducted secret talks with the French to control Arab and Zionist lands. The betrayal continued. The British blocked the aims of Arab nationalism, while at the same time permitting the Jewish immigration to Palestine, culminating in the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. The rest of the century is read largely in that light, especially after the disaster of 1967, when Israel defeated an Arab coalition and took control of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. According to this narrative, the Zionists continue to usurp the lands and rights of the Palestinians using weapons and funding from the West. For its part, the West continues to operate through its outpost, Israel, to secure access to the vast oil reserves of the Persian Gulf and ensure its hegemony in the region. Furthermore, the West has managed to coopt wealthy Arab states in a treacherous quid pro quo.

For Osama, an especially critical moment in this narration of 20th-century history came in 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The war was important for two reasons. First, the two-camps doctrine had been largely quiescent, at most employed within a state. Such was the case in Egypt in clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and the government, whose leaders were supposedly Muslims. But now the doctrine was adduced to the extreme, being especially pertinent in the battle against the “atheist Russians.” The war between the mujahidin and the Soviets perfectly fit the model of conflict between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. In the scope of this battle, belief against unbelief, the doctrine was not only validated but also operationalized.

But the most critical moment came after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Osama was not prepared to enlist on the side of Iraq’s Machiavelli despite Saddam’s religious appeals. Indeed, when Osama learned of the invasion, he went to the Saudi monarchy to offer aid, but the monarchy declined. According to Prince Turki Al Faisal, the Saudi chief of intelligence, “I saw radical changes in his personality as he changed from a calm, peaceful, and gentle man interested in helping Muslims into a person who believed that he would be able to amass and command an army to liberate Kuwait.” Most provocative to Osama was that the monarchy would turn to the non-Muslim West for protection and for the liberation of Kuwait.

And the West stayed, despite the promises of the United States and the Saudis that foreign troops would remain no longer than necessary. This last point, that culturally alien, non-Islamic forces would stay in the Gulf long after the war, is especially troublesome. For Osama and others, this was not merely political humiliation. American policy proved extremely provocative to the Islamists: the continued large, visible presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula was a juggernaut of the house of war into the house of peace. Where America had operated through agents, it now manifested its evil presence on sacred
lands. It is little surprise, then, that in February 1998, Osama declared in a joint fatwa:

The Arabian Peninsula has never . . . been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts . . . for over 7 years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula . . . we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [of Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [in Mecca] from their grip and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam.12

On September 11, 2001, 19 men responded to that fatwa and struck a blow at people of Pakistan, reminding them that Afghanistan had been the first line of defense for Islam against Russia 20 years previously. Now, Pakistan had that honor. More importantly, Osama used classical doctrine to reply to President Bush. This was one of the perennial (khalidah) battles of Islam, an explicit classical notion. And the battle of this age was against the “crusader-Jewish operation, led by the chief crusader Bush under the banner of the cross.”13

The expected assault on Afghanistan began 2 weeks later. The immediate al Qaeda response was again couched in classical Islamic terms.15

This was an “all-out crusader war” that pitted the forces of “infidelity and faith” against each other. As with the February 1998 fatwa that called for killing Americans everywhere possible, this also called for jihad, making it an individual duty.16

After the United States lobbied for some resolution that would grant it international legitimacy, the next al Qaeda statement broadened its attack to include the United Nations.17

But Osama’s real vituperation focused on Arab leaders who, by cooperating with the coalition, had become unbelievers. This was an important technical point,14 for it legitimized any future attacks on such leaders. Moreover, those Arabs who looked to solve regional tragedies through the international body were hypocrites who had double-crossed (khaadâ’â) God and His messenger.

Iraq and the War on Terror

With respect to an American rhetoric that dichotomized the two camps, President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address is arguably the most important statement. There, the President reflected on U.S. action in Afghanistan during the preceding 4 months, calling it a success that had “rallied a great coalition . . . [and] saved a people.”

But he staked a strong position beyond the mountains of Afghanistan, saying the United States must carry the war to nation-states, not just the Taliban, because the terrorists “view the entire world as a battlefield.” America now had the opportunity to take the lead in the “history of liberty,” waging war that pitted freedom and dignity against tyranny and death.

But war against whom? Calling repeatedly for preemptive action, the President adduced the administration’s best known metaphor: he called for decisive action against an “axis of evil.” Most importantly, that meant Iraq.

To strike Iraq was to strike a blow against Osama, and terrorism more broadly. In a word, 9/11 and the continued threat of terrorism furnished a just cause for war against Iraq. President Bush made the link explicit in September 2002 in his address to the United Nations General Assembly.19 To take action in Iraq would be both a “moral cause” and “strategic goal.” It would also battle the terrorists in their “war against civilization.” Furthermore, U.S. actions in
Iraq could help foster democratic regimes in Afghanistan and Palestine that would “inspire reforms throughout the Muslim world.”

Al Qaeda responded in an audio statement several weeks after President Bush’s September address.20 Ayman al-Zawahiri warned of U.S. plans for attacking Iraq and that U.S. objectives went “far beyond Iraq to reach the Arab and Islamic world [to support] its aims to destroy any effective military power next to Israel.” At the same time, al Jazeera carried a message purporting to be from Osama.21 The message addressed the American public and contained the Islamic da’wa, an appeal to convert to Islam. Osama reminded his audience of the “lesson” of the Washington and New York attacks and warned of the administration’s plan to “attack and partition the Islamic world.”

Once again, one should note the sensibilities of regional elites in the midst of the rhetorical and physical war between al Qaeda and Washington. Arab leaders were less than confident in light of potential action against Iraq. In an Arab League summit meeting in March 2002 in Beirut,22 leaders reached some rapprochement with Iraq, declaring that an attack on that country would be an attack on all. Not surprisingly, Iraq, sitting under the American sword of Damocles, made concessions to gain the support. But more significant than Iraq’s malleability was the implicit issue for participants: American intervention could prove more dangerous to the existing Arab order than a contained Saddam. Where the visit of Vice President Richard Cheney several weeks earlier had failed to win support for U.S. action, at this meeting, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah publicly embraced Izzat Ibrahim, a senior member of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council. The post-conference comment of George Hawatmeh, editor of Jordan’s daily al-Rai, is pertinent: “The Saudis are basically sending a message to the Americans to solve the Palestinian question. . . . Take care of the Palestinian problem, the mother of all problems, and we will solve the rest in our way. We will take care of Iraq.”

The Arab League took the same position again a year later. Meeting in Cairo in March 2003 when the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” began its attack on Iraq, the League condemned the “aggression.”23 With the exception of Kuwait, it unanimously adopted a resolution calling on Arab states to take no action “damaging to the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.” Saudi Arabia was more explicit. Crown Prince Abdullah declared, “The Kingdom will not participate in any way in the war on brotherly Iraq. . . . We strongly reject any blow to Iraq’s unity, independence, and its security and the country’s military occupation.”

Nevertheless, the war was executed. Al-Nidaa, the al Qaeda Web site, posted a message immediately following the collapse of the Saddam regime.24 Guerrilla warfare, it stated, would be “the most effective method for the materially weak against the strong.” It had proven workable against French “crusader colonialism” in Algeria, as well as against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam. Now retaliation could directly attack either Americans or those regarded as their “agents.”

Others joined in the call for warfare against the new crusaders, using the same dichotomous terminology Osama favored. Mullah Mustapha Kreikar, founder of Ansar al-Islam operating in northern Iraq, asserted, “There is no difference between this occupation and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. . . . The resistance is not only a reaction to the American invasion, it is part of the continuous Islamic struggle since the collapse of the caliphate.” And Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar called for jihad, joined by 600 other Muslim clerics. “There are only two camps left in the world today. One is Islam, which is a religion of peace, and the other symbol is Bush, who is a symbol of terror and hatred.”25

While the comments of Kreikar and Omar may be regarded as opportunistic, those of al-Zawahiri days after the Riyadh and Casablanca attacks in May are of more concern.26 Addressing Muslims, al-Zawahiri warned that dividing Iraq was but America’s first step. Next would come Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. In response, Muslims should attack both embassies and companies of Western countries and not allow Westerners to live in their states. Al-Zawahiri then addressed those in Iraq: “O Iraqi people, we defeated those crusaders several times before and expelled them. . . . Your mujahid brothers are tracking your enemies and lying in wait for them.”

What was unfolding was the thorough validation of radical ideology, the idea of inveterate conflict between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. The Bush administration had maintained that, apart from toppling Saddam and ridding the country of weapons of mass destruction, the campaign was part of the larger strategy of carrying the battle to the frontline of the war on terror. Yet the administration could assert Iraq to be the frontline only on the (now discredited) supposition of al Qaeda–Iraq cooperation.27 In fact, the opposite was true: not only did operational cooperation between the Iraqi dictator and Osama not exist, but the war in Iraq also corroborated Islamists’ thinking and created a new front on which the United States must fight. Radicals read U.S. actions against Iraq as part of a larger strategy to take over other states in the region. They would respond
by enlarging their scope of attacks against the United States, its allies, and those Arab leaders whom al Qaeda accused of being agents of the West. Put another way, the United States did not carry the battle to the frontline of terrorism when it waged war on Iraq. Rather, it created new battlelines on which its already attenuated forces would have to fight.

The al Qaeda audiotape that surfaced in October 2003 underscored that Islamists would respond to the war in Iraq by expanding the battle area even further. Osama declared that America had become stuck in the quagmire (mustanqad) of Iraq. Then he warned that those who participated in the tyrannical war—Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Spain—would face retaliation. The coming months saw validation of the threats. In November, al Qaeda again struck Western compounds ("crusader settlements") in Riyadh, killing 17 and wounding over 100. The Madrid commuter train bombings in March 2004 fulfilled threats to attack Spain, killing over 200 and wounding 7 times that number.

Where Next in the War on Terror?

For the past several years, the United States has engaged in three types of war. Victory is clear in only one. The conventional war against Iraq falls in the win column. The unconventional war against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan may still be won, but only over time and at great expense. The war against al Qaeda and its franchises is far more uncertain, and the results thus far—pronouncements from the administration notwithstanding—are not encouraging. The examples in the preceding sections show two critical findings. First, al Qaeda pronouncements and praxis respond directly to U.S. pronouncements and actions. Second, from the perspective of al Qaeda, the ideology of inveterate struggle with the house of war has been validated. Thus, the war on terror, while enjoying some physical victories, has exacerbated the threat by authenticating al Qaeda ideology.

What should the United States do? Many others have advocated the obvious: taking a more even-handed approach to ameliorating the Israel-Palestinian conflict. But what other pragmatic steps, in light of al Qaeda ideology, might be implemented? Five suggestions follow.

Recognize Deep History at Work. During the Cairo Conference in 1921, Winston Churchill and T.E. Lawrence toured Palestine. Caught in an anti-Zionist demonstration, the future British Prime Minister was wary: "I say, Lawrence, are these people dangerous? They don't seem too pleased to see us." Many in the region still are not pleased 85 years later. Arabs are making neither a disingenuous nor an empty charge when they complain of Western interference over the last century. One need look no further than Iraq's unnatural borders. Sir Anthony Parsons, a long-time British diplomat in the Middle East, observed, "Woodrow Wilson had disappeared ... and there wasn't much rubbish about self-determination. We, the British, cobbled Iraq together. It was always an artificial state; it had nothing to do with the people who lived there."

When Osama stated that the region had experienced "humiliation and disgrace" for over 80 years, he appealed to a broadly shared history in which the West was complicit. It behooves the United States to recognize that what we say and do in the region will always be interpreted against that history. Washington cannot altogether avoid a negative reading of its intentions and actions, but it must develop policies that take full account of Arab sensibilities about Middle East history. To speak, for instance, of a "crusade" against the Islamists is a serious misstep.

No New Contracts. Writing in late 1990, Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett described Arab reaction to America's sudden discovery of human rights abuses in Iraq. The United States had ignored those abuses as it supported Iraq in its war with Iran. But when oil was at stake, it took the high moral ground of defending Kuwait against the brutalities of the Saddam regime. This about-face, the Slugletts wrote, struck the Arab public as an "almost indecently narrow self-interest." The same still holds. The current practice of awarding contracts to American and British firms as a kind of war booty sends the worst signal to Arabs and others. It vitiates our claim that our action in Iraq proceeds simply from a disinterested desire to spread democracy.

Moreover, in the larger war on terror, it validates the al Qaeda claim, in the minds of many, that our presence in the region is tantamount to economic colonialism.

Adopt a More Subtle Approach through Coalition Building. Robert McNamara made an observation pertinent to our war in Iraq: "We are the strongest nation in the world today. I do not believe we should ever apply that economic, political, or military power unilaterally. ... If we can't persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause—better reexamine our reasoning." Forming coalitions is difficult, but with the threat of al Qaeda it is essential. In the present instance, a broad coalition is not simply a means of cost-sharing. It serves as a tool of delegitimation by complicating the otherwise neat categories of "dark al-Islam/dar al-harb" and the trifection of enemies headed by the United States. A broad coalition would lower an American profile, certainly a more subtle approach. Instead, we established the "coalition of the willing," which was quite different, for it lacked many important allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and virtually all the Arab countries. The coalition of the willing raised the American profile and validated al Qaeda claims of U.S. hegemony.

Recognize the Attitude Continuum. Classic revolutionary cell doctrine recognizes an inner core of membership, the true believers who will sacrifice all for the party or cause. Around it are concentric circles of sympathizers with varying levels of commitment. Beyond the sympathizers are the neutral or undecided. Finally, there are those who are opposed to the doctrine of the revolutionary core. A pragmatic U.S. policy would recognize that we have no way of changing the minds of the true believers in al Qaeda's revolutionary core. Similarly, there are those who unequivocally reject al Qaeda's doctrine and actions, and there is no need to persuade them. The challenge for U.S. policy is to persuade the many who fall between the ends of the continuum, and force will avail little in that task.

The United States is losing in the struggle for those in the middle. A policy shift that emphasizes a just and lasting accord between Israel and Palestine, promotes development of human capital in the Arab world, and alleviates suffering in poorer countries will do far more for long-term American interests than conducting military incursions in axis of evil countries or bombing Tora Bora.
We can attack al Qaeda directly when warranted and feasible, but the critical answer to al Qaeda and its franchises is to enfeeble them by delegitimating them. This is the appropriate adaptation of George Kennan’s call over 50 years ago for the “adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.”7 If, in concert with Arab and Islamic governments, we win the middle, we can reduce al Qaeda’s recruitment pool and funding sources while at the same time robbing it of legitimacy. A prudential policy should aim at building an ever-enlarging circle of Arabs and Muslims who have fewer reasons to distrust us and greater cause to repudiate Osama as perverting Islam.

Adopt Less Categorical Language. A Senator from Ohio offered this ebullient view of U.S.-effected regime change overseas:

God has not been preparing the English speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation. . . . No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish a system where chaos reigns. . . . He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.5

These remarks are not current, for they were spoken by Albert Beveridge addressing the question of the Philippines a century ago; but they are perennial. From John Winthrop’s “city on a hill” speech to President Bush’s State of the Union addresses, Americans have drawn themselves in larger than life images, often with categorical language. Seldom has political language been as important as it now.

While the United States must act to ameliorate threats of terrorism, it must also develop a foreign policy at once more nuanced and more balanced. It is crucial that in the self-portrait we present the international community, we forswear categorical, dichotomous language. Although such language may reassure Americans, it legitimates the claims of our opponents. The habit will be hard to break, but break it we must, for the army whose men love death will be deterred neither by the threat of cruise missiles nor political rhetoric. And in this war of words, Arab and Islamic publics are listening intently.

NOTES

6 Ibid., 66–69.
7 Ibid., 9.
8 The statement appeared in The Jordan Times online, October 8, 2001.
9 Ibid.
11 The Jordan Times, November 8, 2001, carried the remarks.
12 The fatwa is available at <www.library.cornell.edu/colden/mideast/wif.htm>.
14 In Arabic, the terms crusade and crusader are taken directly from the word for cross: sa’lub. Crusaders were so named because the cross was emblazoned on mail, shield, and banner. Cross, crusade, and Christian are thus linked, and Islamists make much of this in their two-camp rhetoric.
16 In classical doctrine, this was a fardh ‘ayn, meaning everyone without exception must respond.
18 This jurisprudential move is called takfeer: to declare someone guilty of unbelief. Many Islamists have resorted to it.
21 British Broadcasting Corporation, October 6, 2002.
24 Middle East Media Research Institute, Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project, no. 493, April 11, 2003.
26 British Broadcasting Corporation, May 21, 2003, Broadcast on al Jazeera days after the attacks, the text itself does not indicate when it was made. Al-Zawahiri references the war in Iraq but not the May attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca.
27 A key finding of the 9/11 Commission is that there was no operational link between al Qaeda and Iraq.
32 Errol Morris, documentary, The Fog of War.

Afghan, Canadian, and U.S. forces search Tora Bora to gather intelligence during Operation Tora
The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) training mission completed by First U.S. Army in April 2006 was a joint Service effort to meet a requirement from the combatant commander to support goals in Afghanistan. The 12 PRT commanders—6 Navy commanders and 6 Air Force lieutenant colonels—coalesced a disparate group of Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen in little more than a month and trained them for a mission unlike any in the military. Their achievement demonstrates four imperatives for future joint force decisions:

- leverage the incredible agility of our Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen
- apply the concept of joint tactical manning to more of our forces
- extend this joint manning concept to the interagency realm to harness the Nation’s talent from all sectors of government.
- sustain our investment in developing the world’s finest leaders

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created to extend the reach of the Afghan government outside Kabul, encouraging international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in the remotest areas. Varying from several dozen to nearly 100 members, these teams monitor, assess, and report on developments in the regions. They assist local Afghan leaders and officials in establishing and maintaining an effective and responsible government structure that meets the needs of the citizens and supports the goals of the central government. Of the 23 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, 12 are American-led. The others are provided by coalition forces and the International Security and Assistance Force.

The first PRT was established in Gardez in November 2002. The program then expanded to other provinces. Although a U.S. Army civil affairs team provides many of the key personnel for the teams, the mission exceeds the pure civil affairs scope. The PRTs incorporate other technical specialists, such as police advisors, information operators, civil engineers, and explosive ordnance disposal experts. A team commander must be capable of synchronizing numerous activities toward the regional campaign plan. Since there are no PRTs in the permanent force structure, each team fielded in theater must be created from smaller elements and individuals.

From 2002 to 2005, American PRTs were gathered from forces already in


Afghanistan. While expedient, this method was hampered by varying tour lengths, with members arriving or departing every few weeks. The personnel turbulence detracted from team cohesion and continuity of operations.

By 2005, it was evident that PRTs were effective and essential to achieving the U.S. strategic endstate in Afghanistan. With coaching and mentoring, local Afghan officials were demonstrating the aptitude for maintaining reliable and accountable government structures that were responsive to the citizens’ needs. Cohesive PRTs trained prior to deployment promised to accelerate the establishment of civil government throughout the country.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams vary in size but share the same major components. Each has a command section comprising a commander (either a Navy commander or an Air Force lieutenant colonel) and a noncommissioned officer in charge. The commander is assisted by a combat service support section that handles logistics, a force protection platoon, a civil affairs team, a civil-military operations center, and a special staff that provides technical expertise in engineering and police functions.

There were reports of friction with non-governmental organizations during the early stages of PRT operations. Like NGO efforts, early PRT operations were related to humanitarian assistance. This friction is being abated by better preparation and experience in the field. The NGO community subscribes to the guiding principles of neutrality (not using aid to further a political standpoint), impartiality (providing assistance based on need alone), and independence (not viewing agencies as instruments of government policy). PRTs adopt none of those attributes but are explicitly working to extend the reach of the central government and provide resources in concert with the coalition strategy of enhancing security and governance. Clearly, they are uniformed instruments of government.

Despite these differences, there are ample opportunities for the two communities to synchronize efforts, allowing them to achieve their goals while putting their resources to the best uses without overlap. With their robust force protection resources, PRTs are best suited to enter nonpermissive regions that NGOs avoid due to insecurity. As conditions improve and NGOs increase their involvement, PRTs can shift emphasis to projects that are inappropriate or beyond the scope of NGOs. The PRTs essentially work themselves out of a job as the local government becomes more capable, security improves, and NGOs take on more of the reconstruction.

Preparation
Training for the PRT mission progressed in five phases: force protection platoon training, team leader training, main body training, a final collective exercise, and instruction for the commanders at the National Defense University. The first element to arrive was the 1st Battalion, 102nd Infantry (1–102nd), from the Connecticut Army National Guard. This unit was tasked to provide 12 rifle platoons to form the basis of the force protection element for each PRT. Additionally, the battalion headquarters would execute other missions in support of maneuver operations once in theater. This unit arrived after conducting extensive coordination and a predeployment site survey with a brigade from the 10th Mountain Division (Fort Drum, New York) that would eventually serve as its higher headquarters in theater. The PRT commanders arrived in late January 2006, along with select staff. The remainder of the main body arrived in late February.

The 1–102nd training was planned and conducted by a training support battalion stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, composed of 58 infantry and armor officers and senior noncommissioned officers. This and similar battalions were originally tasked with training support to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units during their monthly inactive duty training assemblies and annual training. Since 2001, the battalions have been the lead trainers of mobilized Army Reserve units preparing to deploy in support of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) requirements. The training plan started with individual skills and marksmanship and progressed through fire team drills, as well as squad- and platoon-level collective exercises. This plan was crafted so the security force platoons would complete their platoon-level collective events, then integrate with the remainder of the PRTs to assist their preparation.

On January 7, 2006, the 1–102nd main body arrived at Fort Bragg and went directly to an austere forward operating base in the training area. Theater immersion is the first U.S. Army training strategy for rapidly building combat-ready formations led by competent and confident leaders. Theater immersion places units in the sort of environment
they will encounter in combat. With few amenities and distractions, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen learn how to sustain themselves and operate in the field. This experience also provides an outstanding leadership environment that stresses the chain of command and builds cohesion among members. Leaders quickly learn the strengths and weaknesses of their subordinates and build teamwork when executing the endless security and maintenance responsibilities of the forward operating base.

With security force training under way, the training support brigade focused on planning and coordinating instruction for the remainder of the teams. The many unique training requirements for the PRT mission added to the standard requirements for any unit deploying to fulfill a USCENTCOM land component mission. Examples include classes in Afghan government structure and a civil-military operations overview. The Request for Forces specified an extensive list of unique training requirements to enable the teams to perform their mission on arrival. As the trainers conducted their mission analysis, they identified training tasks the teams needed to achieve the endstate of being competent in the required skills, confident in their ability to perform them in a combat environment, committed to the mission, and disciplined to do the right thing without supervisors present.

After administrative processing, the 12 commanders began training in all the tasks that their main body members would encounter. This approach had several benefits: the commanders could master the skills before performing them in front of subordinates, the trainers could gain an appreciation for the degree of familiarity the Sailors and Airmen had with each subject, and, most importantly, the commanders could have the flexibility to address their unique issues without missing a training event once the main body arrived.

The commanders also participated in officer professional development sessions in the evenings. Many sessions aimed to provide an elementary understanding of topics relevant to team success. Examples included fair election procedures, NGO perspectives, interacting with Special Forces, Afghan culture, contracting procedures, veterinary operations, construction project inspection techniques, and seminars with recently returned PRT leaders.

The arrival of the Navy and Air Force main body elements marked a transition in training. The commanders shifted focus from personal preparation to team leadership. Most Sailors and Airmen rapidly adapted to their new environment. A few were initially overwhelmed by their new living arrangements, mission, and regimen. The time available to complete training was short even by wartime standards. For units this size, a 60-day training period prior to deployment is ideal.

Roles and Relationships

The PRT organization added challenges not typically encountered in normal post-mobilization training. First, each team consisted of multiple Service branches: six were Navy/Army, five were Air Force/Army, and one was Navy/Air Force/Army. While the Services have been jointly staffing headquarters for decades, mixing Services at the tactical level presents different concerns as well as unexpected benefits. One issue is that the Services’ enlisted professional education systems generally provide less orientation to other Services’ operations and cultures than the officer education systems. Additionally, fewer enlisted personnel have worked closely with their counterparts from other Services. These factors combined to create a clash of cultures when the teams were first formed. Simply communicating was problematic. A Sailor’s directions using shipboard terminology was puzzling to Soldiers, just as a Soldier’s reference to “latrines, bunks, and MREs [meals, ready to eat]” often required explanation. Despite jargon obstacles, the teams quickly adopted common terms.

The most significant trial of the varying cultures concerned the roles and relationships of officers and enlisted personnel. These differences, spanning the careers of the PRT members and rooted in generations of Service culture, had the potential to derail team readiness. Training was the nexus of cultures. Each branch had strikingly different norms for instructors, mixture of attendees, roles of leaders during training, and feedback mechanisms. Those who attended formal schools with other Service personnel may have downplayed these differences, but they remained a

since the Navy and Air Force were committing their forces to a nontraditional ground mission, the Army trainers placed heavy emphasis on battlefield survival skills
teams at the forward operating base handled simulated mortar attacks, demonstrations at entry control points, and medical emergencies.

friction point during collective tactical training in an all-ranks environment. The leadership skills of the team commanders proved the essential element in overcoming these difficulties. The commanders communicated issues to the trainers and jointly developed solutions that enabled all involved to focus on mission readiness rather than Service differences.

Next, the Army mixed its three components in each team—Active, Reserve, and National Guard. The Navy also sourced the mission from both its Active and Reserve Components. The Army and Navy Reservists brought a wealth of civilian-acquired skills that were particularly valuable to the PRT mission, such as law enforcement, construction management, and other public works and local government experience.

Also, the main body portions of the teams were sourced as individuals. On a typical team, two or three junior enlisted Sailors or Airmen might have been previously assigned to the same base, but the remainder were sourced from installations around the world.

Finally, the civil affairs (CA) teams were drawn from the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve. A small number had previous CA training and experience, while the others came from conventional branch backgrounds, such as infantry, armor, and field artillery. Their only knowledge of CA operations was gained in the 25-day mobilization civil affairs course they received after arrival at the mobilization station. Many of these Soldiers had left Active service and had no intention of continuing their Reserve careers. They were involuntarily recalled to Active duty since they still had an obligation. To their credit, they rapidly accepted their responsibility and became invaluable members of their teams.

Since the Navy and Air Force were committing their forces to a nontraditional ground mission, the Army trainers placed heavy emphasis on battlefield survival skills. Many team members arrived with limited small weapons experience. The First U.S. Army Small Arms Readiness Group sent instructors to Fort Bragg to assist with marksmanship training. Using the latest-generation training devices, these instructors helped instill confidence and competence with the individual weapons.

Improvised explosive device scenarios received the heaviest emphasis. Using the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures from the theater, the PRTs were repeatedly exposed to simulated explosions. The teams conducted after-action reviews following each incident to improve detection, deterrence, and reaction skills until the appropriate responses became intuitive.

Like the security force training plan, the PRT main body plan began with individual-level tasks to bring everyone to a common baseline. These tasks are collectively termed the warrior tasks and drills and encompass selected marksmanship tasks, communication skills, urban operations tactics, movement techniques, first aid, and other battlefield survival skills.

Following the training on the warrior tasks, the teams were organized into four groups of three PRTs. These groups were arranged geographically, so teams that might work together in Afghanistan could establish relationships prior to deployment. These groups rotated through four 5-day training blocks. The ground assault convoy block focused on a collective task required every time a PRT departed its forward operating base and culminated in a live-fire exercise. The second block provided individual training in tactical vehicle driving, combat lifesaver procedures, and communications. The third included additional marksmanship training, while the fourth provided collective instruction on security and stability operations tasks, such as entry control point operations, hasty traffic control points, and base defense.

To assist with language training and provide practice using interpreters, a Pashtu linguist was embedded with each team. These interpreters had more value than anticipated. Some were born in the province where their PRT was deployed and provided recommendations on interacting with local leaders and officials. One helped his commander memorize an opening speech when first meeting village elders. The interpreters lived with their teams in the barracks and forward operating bases and accompanied them to all training.

The final collective exercise, similar to an Army Training and Evaluation Program,
was the most challenging to prepare. None of the training support battalion instructors had participated in a PRT. To mitigate this experience shortfall, the instructors conducted one video teleconference and one teleconference with Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF–76) and Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan early in the training program to gather information on the most important collective tasks.

In March 2006, the former CJTF–76 director of civil-military operations, Lieutenant Colonel John Harney, USA, traveled to Fort Bragg and assisted. His experience with the PRTs over the past year proved invaluable. He met with the commanders and many teams to answer questions about the mission and coach them on techniques to increase their effectiveness in the provinces.

The collective exercise commenced with a brigade operations order, briefback, and rehearsal. Following precombat checks and inspections, each PRT deployed to one of two forward operating bases and prepared for its first mission. The missions ran the scope of operations the team would likely execute. One scenario involved a simulated meeting with a provincial governor. Another simulated a ribbon-cutting ceremony with a number of surprise developments. A third involved investigating an illegal police checkpoint. All movements throughout the training area were conducted tactically, and each convoy met with a variety of unexpected explosive devices. The remaining teams back at the forward operating base handled simulated mortar attacks, demonstrations at entry control points, and medical emergencies to reinforce previously taught skills. Experienced officers from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command provided feedback to their CA teams.

For the final week, the commanders traveled to Washington, DC, to attend a pilot PRT commander’s course at the National Defense University. They received briefings at the strategic and operational levels and met teammates from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The commanders and their teams deployed soon after the course.

**Training Insights**

Our Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen are incredibly agile. They can adjust to changing requirements, environments, and responsibilities faster and better than any organization on Earth. Our structure should exploit this strength by demolishing barriers and routinely intermixing personnel into joint tactical teams.

The key to sustaining agility is leadership. We must continue to teach, coach, and mentor leaders. This is an expensive and time-consuming effort that defies quantitative measurement. The Navy and Air Force officers selected for this mission are top-notch. Using the motto of First U.S. Army, their ability to “see first, understand first, and act first” enabled them to resolve day-to-day challenges, while building their teams into cohesive, proactive organizations capable of handling any mission. Many of the commanders had no ground operations experience, but they were ready by the end of their 2-month preparation.

Integrating Services and components at the tactical level vastly expands capabilities. We have seen first hand the impact a few experienced Soldiers can have on a larger organization’s ability to conduct ground operations. The same can be done in the naval and air domains. We foresee a day when Service-specific institutional structures are retained but many field forces are jointly manned. These forces—whether combat organizations, logistic outfits, or intelligence units—become globally deployable assets to any ground, sea, or air element in any location. We must use our incredibly talented force to its utmost capability.

The final threshold of jointness is toppling walls between governmental agencies. Today, Federal agencies resemble the Army bureau system at the turn of the 19th century. We remain a government of stovepipes that can occasionally synchronize efforts despite intense institutional pressure to covert resources, techniques, and turf. While this first iteration of Provincial Reconstruction Team training accomplished the joint military training requirement, the teams would have been even better prepared with the full participation of other civilian agencies capable of assisting these provincial governments.

The Armed Forces are among the oldest institutions of the Federal Government and have long and proud traditions. If we can get the Services working together, we can bring the civilian agencies into the mix as well. Victory in this war—and in future wars—requires the seamless integration of all national resources. 

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The following are areas of interest to which JFQ expects to return frequently, with no submission deadline:

- adaptive planning and execution
- coalition operations
- employing the economic instrument of power
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- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
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- integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational approaches)
- joint air and space power
- Just War theory
- maneuver warfare
- proliferation and weapons of mass destruction
- prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries
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The Military Health System(s)  
Separate But Equal

By DAVID A. LANE

in the last 50 years, the benefit component had consumed an increasing proportion of Military Health System resources

Joint operations are the baseline of all future military activities. Yet the Services continue to operate their own health care systems that, at best, cooperate with each other in providing benefit and readiness missions to eligible patients during peace and war. Despite numerous recommendations for organizational change to improve resource efficiency and operational responsiveness, the Military Health System (MHS) structure has evolved little since World War II. The Services operate relatively separate but equal deployable medical systems to support deployed combat forces.

As called for in Joint Vision 2020, current resource shortages and threats in the security environment demand revolutionary innovations. By leveraging existing transformation efforts and creating a unified U.S. Medical Command—headed by a four-star medical force commander with subordinate Service and TRICARE components—the MHS can achieve the resource efficiency and operational flexibility needed to change both how it provides force health protection to combat forces and brings all players together to carry out its benefit and readiness missions.

The Missions
The MHS is one of the largest and most complex health care organizations in the United States. Its mission is "to enhance DOD [Department of Defense] and our nation's security by providing health support for the full range of military operations and sustaining the health of all those entrusted to our care." In operating its network of 76 hospitals and more than 500 medical and dental clinics, the MHS is a $28 billion annual enterprise that cares for almost 9 million patients, including nearly 1.5 million uniformed personnel.

There are two parts to the MHS health support mission: the readiness and benefit components. The readiness component, or force health protection, includes fit and healthy force maintenance, casualty prevention, and casualty care management. In operational settings, force health protection provides health service support (HSS) to combatant commanders during wartime military operations and other ventures, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and training. The benefit component involves delivering a full spectrum of preventive and restorative medical care to active and retired members of the Armed Forces, their families, and other eligible beneficiaries.

In the last 50 years, the benefit component (also called the peacetime mission) has consumed an increasing proportion of MHS resources. In 1955, for example, Active duty personnel comprised 45 percent of beneficiaries, dependents 44 percent, and eligible retirees 11 percent. In fiscal year 2005, the Government Accountability Office predicted that these same personnel will constitute just 18 percent of the nearly 9 million beneficiaries, and their family members an additional 26 percent. Eligible retirees, meanwhile, will comprise 55 percent of patients.

Critics of the MHS note that this demographic shift means that considerably more resources must be devoted to the benefit mission at the expense of the readiness mission, prompting some to argue that the benefit mission should be civilianized on the assumption that caring for family members and retirees is not a core Department of Defense competency. In contrast, the medical leadership believes the two missions are inextricably linked. They insist that the benefit mission helps the MHS recruit and retain talented personnel who otherwise might be disinclined to volunteer for service in military medicine and who, in carrying out peacetime medical duties, maintain military members at optimum health while simultaneously preserving essential clinical skills for the wartime readiness mission. In the words of one former Surgeon General of the Navy, "Readiness is the real benefit derived from the benefit mission." Few would disagree, however, that the readiness component is the raison d'être for the MHS and "determines the minimum number of Active duty medical personnel required by each Service."
Organizations

The MHS is organized and resourced to carry out its two missions, and more resources are being allocated for delivering the benefit mission in traditional health care settings (hospitals and clinics) than for the readiness mission. The benefit mission is financed by the Defense Health Program (DHP), a single $21.4 billion budget appropriation that covers the operating and maintenance costs of health care in military hospitals and clinics, as well as care purchased from the civilian sector through regional, managed-care support contracts under DOD's TRICARE program. The DHP is administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs through the TRICARE Management Activity, which disperses funds to hospitals and clinics via the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Assistant Secretary does not exercise command and control authority over the Surgeons General. Nor does this office pay the personnel costs for the more than 180,000 Active duty medical people staffing the Army, Navy, and Air Force treatment facilities. Those responsibilities rest with the individual Service chiefs.

The organizational structure of the present hospital system predates World War II, when each Service provided its own health care. In the intervening 60 years, cooperation in delivering the peacetime benefit mission has improved considerably, largely due to pressure to contain costs applied at various times by the executive branch, Congress, or the Services themselves. During this time, no fewer than 15 federally sponsored studies and numerous scholarly reports have examined the MHS organization, with the overwhelming majority calling for a unified medical command and only 3 preferring the present structure.

In response, DOD has adopted some changes but kept the basic structure. Changes include establishing a central office to oversee health care operations, implementing a uniform tri-Service managed care health plan, consolidating most budget resources under the DHP, and establishing the TRICARE Management Activity to govern the business side of the MHS. While these efforts have enhanced inter-Service cooperation, they have by no means created jointness among the medical departments. This “cooperation without jointness” with respect to the benefit mission is best illustrated in geographic areas where two or more Services have medical treatment facilities, such as in Washington, DC, or San Antonio, Texas.

The MHS operates three medical centers in the Washington, DC, area: Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Air Force's Malcolm Grow Medical Center, and the National Naval Medical Center. Until recently, the three Services had enough resources to operate the centers autonomously, resulting in overlapping capabilities and excess capacity. In response to the budgetary constraints of recent years and the impact of regional support contracts under TRICARE, the three medical centers have entered into numerous agreements to share personnel, space, and equipment, and have combined several graduate medical education programs. They have also parceled out specialized clinical services, such as inpatient maternity care and child and adolescent mental health. Nonetheless, as the Government Accountability Office noted in its 1999 report on DOD's need for a tri-Service strategy for determining and allocating medical resources among MTFs:

While the agreements appear beneficial, they are mostly ad hoc and the results are not well documented. . . . A recent DOD effort to further consolidate . . . medical centers met with major disagreements about what care should be provided where. As a result, the effort was put on hold and the centers continue to operate independently.

Similar cooperative agreements are in place between the Air Force's Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio and its cross-town counterpart, Brooke Army Medical Center, where DOD directed the merger of the obstetrics-gynecology and pediatric departments in 1995. The two centers subsequently signed a letter of agreement combining their graduate medical education programs under a common academic leadership to form the San Antonio Uniformed Services Health Education Consortium.

Despite the many bi- and multilateral sharing agreements in locations where facilities from two or more Services are in close proximity, individual treatment facilities continue to operate as independent hospitals, and in most cases gains made by one institution are interpreted as losses by the others.

HSS for Deployed Forces

In addition to its international network of medical facilities—which function as civilian hospitals and clinics, including the maintenance of quality accreditation by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations—the MHS includes operational medical units that provide HSS for deployed forces. These units range in complexity and capability from a simple battalion aid station in the field or sickbay aboard ship providing first aid and initial stabilization of casualties, to a deployable 500-bed fleet/field hospital or 1,000-bed hospital ship with advanced capabilities such as critical/intensive care units and neurosurgery. Operational HSS is resourced almost exclusively by the individual Services, with manpower and money provided by the Service chiefs to both line and medical units via administrative chains of command.

Present doctrine includes five echelons of casualty care. In general, all Level I and some Level II care is provided by medical
Department for having persistent problems with medical command and control and for outdated plans that lacked sufficient joint input and execution. The report specifically noted that the operation plans “did not plan for integrated support and, instead, tasked each of the Service components to provide medical care for only their own forces.” In addition, the Inspector General observed that the Services’ DEPMEDS platforms lacked sufficient mobility, transportation, and employment guidance to support warfighting doctrine.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, a series of “Medical Readiness Strategic Plans” was used as the blueprint for overcoming the medical readiness shortfalls identified in the Inspector General’s report. Using the plans as guidance, the Army, Navy, and Air Force medical departments independently focused on making their DEPMEDS platforms more modular, agile, and adaptable, striving to develop an information network that would give operational medical forces a common operating picture. Although they generally succeeded in improving the weight, cube, and maneuverability of DEPMEDS assets by the start of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in 2001–2003, the issues of medical command and control and integrating medical support across the Services remained largely unchanged from the first Gulf War. They may have gotten worse.

In addition, in their spring 2004 testimonies before congressional committees concerned with military medicine, each of the Services’ Surgeons General praised the often heroic achievements of their medical departments during the operations. Absent, however, was testimony illustrating how HSS doctrine had changed since Operation Desert Storm to make the MHS a more effective, integrated, and joint team.

The low casualty rates from the latest conflicts have prompted some observers to question the need for resource-intensive deployable medical assets.
Ribbon-cutting marks transformation of Keesler Hospital, Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, from outpatient clinic to fully functional hospital

U.S. Air Force (Cecilio Ricardo, Jr.)

U.S. Air Force (Cecilio Ricardo, Jr.)

Marines undergo physical therapy

More recently, the low casualty rates from the latest conflicts have prompted some observers to question the need for such resource-intensive deployable medical assets in the first place. This uncertainty, along with newer clinical strategies for the stabilization and en route care of casualties, and innovative new and planned warfighting concepts such as sea-basing and ship-to-objective maneuvers, put new pressure on medical departments to reduce further the size of their individual HSS “footprints.”

The Government Accountability Office and RAND Corporation have separately reported that the tradition of independence by the Services has been the biggest obstacle to the medical departments developing a joint approach to delivering health care. Still, throughout military medicine there are scattered examples of jointness that illustrate the integration called for in Joint Vision 2020, such as the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute. The medical and support staffs of these commands are tri-Service in composition and resourced collectively by the Services or centrally by DOD. For the most part, however, the Army, Navy, and Air Force continue to operate their own semi-independent health care systems that arguably cooperate as much as possible under the existing structure, while concurrently operating somewhat as peer competitors for exactly the same wartime readiness and peacetime benefit missions.

In response to periodic criticisms of the status quo, DOD has first opted to grant and then increase central authority under the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs both to manage costs in delivering the benefit mission and to react to operational lessons learned in supporting the readiness mission. This approach seems to be inadequate given the current threats both to resources and the security environment. How then can the MHS achieve the desired endstate and become fully joint intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically, as called for in Joint Vision 2020? The answer lies in the current strategy of DOD transformation.

Transformation Recommendations

Under the present hierarchy, the MHS has many masters—or it has none. Military medicine needs a unified medical command to change the outlook of the medical departments and of the Services toward the MHS, enabling it to transform from a confederation of autonomous medical departments into a truly joint medical force. A U.S. Medical Command (USMEDCOM), as the new organization might be called, would be a functional combatant command along the lines of the U.S. Transportation and Special Operations Commands. The commander would be a four-star flag/general medical corps officer with consolidated accountability, responsibility, and authority to execute both the benefit and readiness health care missions.

USMEDCOM could be structured in a number of ways, each with strengths and weaknesses concerning resource efficiency and operational flexibility. In one recent study of reorganizing the MHS, for example, researchers at RAND described three potential models: a joint command with Service components, a joint command with readiness and TRICARE components, and a joint command with Service and TRICARE components.

The first option, a joint command with Service components, mirrors the organizational structure of present combatant commands, including U.S. Special Operations Command. This arrangement would resemble the present MHS structure except that it would assign overall responsibility to a single military medical commander. This structure would strengthen the organizational and doctrinal jointness of the MHS but have little impact on the technical and operational aspects since the Army, Navy, and Air Force medical departments would remain intellectually aligned with their parent Services. In addition, the health affairs Assistant Secretary would continue to oversee the benefit mission through the TRICARE Management Activity.

The next option, a joint command with readiness and TRICARE components, presents a radical departure from the organization of today’s MHS. Under this model, operational medical units would report to USMEDCOM via a joint medical readiness component command, whereas medical treatment facilities and contractors supporting the benefit mission would report via a TRICARE component command. This structure could strengthen the medical department’s operational and doctrinal jointness. Because the benefit and readiness missions must share medical personnel, competition for resources may increase between the two. As discussed earlier, the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have repeatedly asserted that the two missions are vitally linked and mutually supporting.

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Organizationally separating them would risk undermining technical and intellectual jointness.

The organizational structure for USMEDCOM that holds the most promise for effectively transforming the MHS into the desired integrated team is a unified command with both Service and TRICARE components. This structure would maintain traditional line-medical relationships at the operational and tactical levels through Service component medical commands, each headed by a medical flag/general officer from that Service.

The proposed organizational structure would enhance operational and doctrinal jointness though a simpler centralized command and control relationship between USMEDCOM and the Service medical departments. At the same time, USMEDCOM would improve technical and intellectual jointness through the clinical synergy between the benefit and readiness missions, as advanced by the Surgeons General. This structure would consolidate accountability and authority in a functional medical combatant commander with the responsibility and resources for both the readiness and benefit missions.

Specific strategic- and operational-level examples where this alignment might improve the status quo include overcoming the previously cited “Service independence” with regard to delivery of the peacetime mission, and scrapping the “separate but equal” doctrine with regard to the operational HSS force structure.

The capstone strategic planning documents for the Department of Defense—the National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2001, and Joint Vision 2020—stress that joint operations will be the hallmark of all future military activities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff writes:

The integration of core competencies provided by the individual Services is essential to the joint team, and the employment of the capabilities of the Total Force (Active, Reserve, Guard, and civilian members) increases the options for the commander and complicates the choices of our opponents. To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.10

The Department of Defense must leverage current transformation efforts to create a unified medical command—the U.S. Medical Command—to integrate the Military Health System culturally and form the desired joint medical team. JFQ

NOTES


3 Vice Admiral James Zimble, USN (Ret.), correspondence with author, October 7, 2004.

4 Defense Health Care, 4.


6 Defense Health Care, 18–22.


Picked Last
Women and Terrorism

By ALISA STACK-O’CONNOR

Scholars date the genesis of modern terrorism to the People’s Will in Russia in the late 1800s.1 If terrorism’s Garden of Eden was indeed Russia, then Vera Zasulich was Eve. On January 24, 1878, Zasulich shot the Governor General of St. Petersburg. She was arrested and tried for attempted murder. Although this was not her first arrest—she had been in prison, banished, and under police supervision since 1869 for her political activities—two prosecutors refused to try her for the shooting.2 She was ultimately acquitted and left Russia, but remained involved in the revolutionary movement, writing for two Marxist publications.

Although times have changed since Zasulich was active, in examining how and why terrorist groups employ women, many things remain the same. For example, in prerevolutionary Russia, women were less likely to be arrested, and when they were, they were not taken seriously3 or were forgiven, as was Zasulich. While her colleagues admired her act of violence, they had less respect for her intellect, reflecting a typical assumption that women act out of emotion rather than a rational political program.4

Women’s roles in Russian revolutionary groups increased when the number of men available for political activism was reduced by the Russo-Japanese War and security measures.5 These women had the reputation of personal, rather than ideological, dedication to the cause, leading to the belief that they were more willing to die than their male comrades.

These observations reflect a profound ambivalence about women and political
Violence. This article examines Chechen, Palestinian, and Tamil terrorist groups to discover how and why such groups employ women. Three themes about women's entry into and roles in these groups emerge:

- Terrorist attacks by women have unique propaganda value.
- Women have to fight for their right to fight.
- Groups overcome cultural resistance to women's involvement when tactics require it or they face a shortage of males.

There is little written about female terrorists. Most works on female violence look at women as victims, not perpetrators. Recent high-profile attacks involving female perpetrators—such as the 2004 Beslan hostage-taking and the April 2006 attack on Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, head of the Sri Lankan army—have sparked some academic and policy interest in the subject. The few works on female terrorism tend to focus on women's motivations for violence. This article, however, examines the groups' motivations for employing women. Additionally, it offers proposals for policymakers to consider in combating terrorism.

Most works on female violence look at women as victims, not perpetrators.

**Female Terrorism as Propaganda**

Terrorism has been called "propaganda of the deed." When women do the deed, the story often becomes more about women than terrorism. This dynamic is particularly evident in the Russian-Chechen conflict. Until the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka theater in Moscow in October 2002, Chechen women were viewed primarily as victims of the Russian-Chechen wars. In the theater seizure, they emerged in the Russian and Western press as vicious, sympathetic, strong, fanatical, foolish, and weak, often in the same portrayal.

Two images come to the fore in media reporting on Chechen female terrorists. First, there is the "black widow," a suicide bomber who is driven to terrorism after the deaths of the men in her life. Second, there is the "zombie," who is forced or tricked into terrorism by Chechen men. Although the Chechen groups did not coin the terms black widow and zombie to describe their female members, their leaders, such as the recently killed Shamil Basayev, have played up the black widow image, emphasizing victimization. The zombie image is generally used by the Russian government and media to discredit the Chechen insurgent and terrorist groups.

The zombies tend to receive more sensational press coverage. The best example of a zombie is Zarema Muzhikhoeva. On July 9, 2003, Muzhikhoeva failed to set off her bomb at a Moscow cafe. She was arrested and has been in custody ever since. The Russian Federal Security Service released some of its interviews with her and also allowed a televised interview. Some of Muzhikhoeva's statements contradict each other. However, her basic life story stays fairly constant: she was married in her teens and had a child. Her husband died fighting the Russians, and she and her child then became the responsibility of her husband's family. Desperate either to escape servitude to her in-laws or avoid marrying her brother-in-law, Muzhikhoeva ran away, leaving her child. When she could not find work, she borrowed money. When she could not repay her debt, she felt driven to become a suicide bomber. According to Muzhikhoeva's account, she went to a terrorist camp in the mountains of Chechnya in March 2003, where Arabs provided instruction on fighting and Islam. She reported being beaten for dressing inappropriately and having sex with the camp leader. She also reported that other women in the camp were raped, beaten, and drugged. After a month of training, she was sent to Moscow to conduct an attack. Zombie stories such as Muzhikhoeva's are attention-grabbing, benefiting Chechen objectives, and explain away women's violence, benefiting the Russian government.

Although the zombie depiction is less flattering to individual women than the black widow stereotype, both have similar effects on the public inside and outside of Russia. The Chechens gained much attention and some sympathy from terrorist attacks by women. In a July 2003 survey, the Public Opinion Foundation of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion found that 84 percent of Russians surveyed believed female suicide bombers were controlled by someone else (zombies); only 3 percent believed the women acted independently. Similarly, Western authors have blamed Russian actions for forcing women into terrorism. In contrast, there is little writing about the desperation of men who have lost wives, mothers, and sisters...
to excuse or explain the Chechen call to arms. Women terrorists serve a uniquely feminine role in propaganda by playing the victims even when they are the perpetrators.

Female Palestinian suicide bombers have been depicted in much the same way as the zombies and black widows. As in the Russian case, the Israeli government has not hesitated to use women's personal stories to discredit them and the movements they worked for. Palestinian groups, unlike their Chechen counterparts, have been more active in using women's stories for the group's benefit. Ayat Akhras, for example, an 18-year-old female, blew herself up outside a Jerusalem supermarket on March 3, 2002, in an attack claimed by Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. Her attack illustrates the propaganda value of female terrorists in shaming Arab men into action. In her martyr video, she states, "I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone; it is an intifadeh until victory."

In both the Palestinian and Chechen cases, the propaganda effect of women's attacks does not appear to be a factor in group planning; rather, it is an externality provided by the media. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), on the other hand, have been highly successful in employing women in propaganda. The LTTE allows active female fighters to meet with the press, publishes books about its female guerrillas (the Freedom Birds), makes films about them, and holds public events to commemorate them. It is also careful to separate the group's guerrilla and terrorist activities. Unlike the Chechen and Palestinian groups, the LTTE does not acknowledge suicide attacks. Instead, it promotes the Freedom Birds, showing them as equal to male fighters and liberated from cultural oppression through fighting for the organization.

In all three cases, the media coverage of terrorist events differs based on whether a male or female conducts the act. Media coverage of a female terrorist tends to focus on the woman's nonpolitical motivations (for example, promiscuity), her vulnerability to recruitment because of her personal life (for example, death of a male family member), and her basically peaceful and nurturing character. The coverage of male terrorists, on the other hand, generally focuses on the act committed. As terrorists need media attention to spread their message, the unique portrayals of females are one of the important factors in women's employment in terrorist attacks.

With the exception of the LTTE, it seems male terrorists and insurgent leaders are unaware of the propaganda benefits of female attacks; however, whether they plan for it or not, the media create it for free. Because terrorist leaders may not recognize the propaganda value, it cannot by itself explain why terrorists would want to use women. For most groups, the sympathy or increased attention is an externality realized only after women are involved in the group and its violence.

**Fighting to Fight**

Like women entering legitimate militaries and the labor force in general, females have to demonstrate great determination in gaining access to terrorist groups. In the Palestinian, Chechen, and Tamil cases, they have asked for active roles in political violence before groups invite them to take part. This trend is most evident in the Palestinian case, particularly in Leila Khaled’s story. Denied a fighter’s role in the Arab Nationalist Movement and then Fatah, Khaled kept searching for a group that would allow her to fight until the Popular Front for the Liberation for Palestine (PFLP) put her into guerrilla training. She hijacked aircraft in 1969 and 1970 for the PFLP, eventually becoming active in the group's leadership. She garnered international media attention after her foiled 1970 hijacking landed her in jail in the United Kingdom. The attention to Chechen women more than 30 years later, the media focused on Khaled’s beauty and youth, not her politics.

Her fame and involvement in the political leadership and tactical operations of the PFLP are not typical of women participating in Palestinian militancy. Most were involved in support roles and on the fringe of groups. In addition to a male cultural aversion to bringing women into militant groups, social demands such as raising children have made participation difficult. Great individual effort has been required to overcome cultural barriers. The PFLP recognized Khaled’s popular appeal and promoted her and her story to gain attention, legitimacy, and support, but it was her initiative that brought her to the organization.

In the years since Khaled’s hijackings, women’s involvement in Palestinian terrorism has been either inconsistent or invisible. Even after proving their success as hijackers, bombers, and cover for men, women have to remind terrorist leaders of their tactical usefulness. It has been especially difficult for them to find active fighting roles in Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Potential female suicide bombers have been turned down by Hamas but have kept searching until secular organizations accepted them. Despite the tactical and propaganda benefits demonstrated by secular female suicide bombers in 2002, Hamas and PIJ struggled to reconcile conservative beliefs with evolving terrorist tactics. By 2003, however, PIJ believed the operational gains outweighed the social costs and began actively recruiting women for suicide bombings. Leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah explained the ideological and organizational adjustments the group had to make to accommodate female suicide bombers:

*The Shari'ah or religious judgment also deems that if there are sufficient numbers of men to carry out jihad, it is not preferable for women to carry out the jihad. The reason is to keep the woman away from any kind of harm. . . . Every operation is scrutinized and if the female . . . might be taken prisoner or face harm . . . it would not be preferable for the woman to carry out the operation. But if the Mujahidin estimate that the operation would not be fit for or carried out except by a woman because of the circumstances of disguise and reaching the target necessitate it, then we would not object.*

Similarly, Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, founder of Hamas, stated that his organization did not need women in its jihad because "The woman is the second defense line in the resistance of the occupation." Religiously based terrorists are often thought to be irrational and fanatical in their devotion to violence. Both Shallah’s and Yassin’s statements,
However, show rational and practical approaches. Men are preferred if available. But if only a woman can get to a target, then a woman should be used.

Tamil women faced similar barriers in the LTTE. While the group credits its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, for including females, both supporters and detractors acknowledge that women were asking to fight, and were fighting for other Tamil groups, before the LTTE began training them for combat in 1984. The Freedom Birds were organized as a result of group needs and women’s initiative. Once in the organization, Freedom Birds say they must prove themselves continually. In most cases, there must be a practical reason for terrorist groups to decide to use women in political violence. Female demands for operational roles are insufficient to overcome cultural practices, even among groups such as the PFLP and LTTE that claim women’s liberation as part of their cause.

Overcoming Cultural Resistance

One reason women must fight for involvement in politics and violence is that, in many societies, women’s roles are limited to wife and mother. The LTTE is an example of this reality. It took the group 12 years to admit women into fighting roles, and it had difficulty determining how to incorporate them. The group is one of the few terrorist/insurgent bodies in the world with explicit rules on cadres’ romantic lives and when they can marry. It also experimented with how to train women and employ them in combat. The difficulty of deciding whether the Freedom Birds should cut their hair to help them fight is emblematic of the tension the group faces between the necessity of having women directly involved in political violence and preservation of the Tamil culture. At each turn, the LTTE had to weigh how decisions not to employ women in attacks are shaped by culture, but cultural prohibitions can be overcome by practical requirements using females in combat and terrorism would affect the group’s discipline, ability to fight, and public support. Its decisions were a result of trial and error. Necessity appears to help terrorist leaders overcome biases about women. A shortage of male volunteers may have encouraged Palestinian, Chechen, and Tamil groups to involve women in attacks. Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable population statistics for the areas in conflict, it is hard to prove that one of the elements in an organization’s decision is a shortage of men. However, in these cases, the number of men available for terrorist operations has been reduced by outward labor migration, a lack of male volunteers, and arrests, harassment, and investigations of men.

Women, on the other hand, can be left in conflict zones and can move between cities without generating suspicion from security services. For example, in the 1980s, the Sri Lankan government targeted Tamil males between the ages of 14 and 40 for interrogation and detention. In 1986, when women began fighting in the Freedom Birds, the government detained about 3,000 Tamil men. Additionally, males were targets for recruitment, interrogation, and detention by competing Tamil groups. Consequently, many males fled the country.

Target assessment may also have helped terrorist leaders overcome cultural biases. For instance, on January 14, 2004, Reem al-Reyashi detonated a suicide bomb at a border crossing in Jerusalem. After the attack, Sheikh Yassin stated that Hamas decided to use a female attacker due to the increasing operational difficulties of getting men to their targets. Even in traditional societies, women’s household duties place them in markets and other public places, allowing them to blend with daily life. They have more flexibility in their dress than men. These factors make them less noticeable and less threatening to security services.

In the Palestinian, Chechen, and Tamil cases, terrorist groups did not begin their activities with women in operational roles. Women became involved only when men were unavailable, in part because of states’ security measures. The interaction and learning that occur between terrorist groups and states are important to understanding terrorist actions, particularly why groups would want women.

State Responses

Decisions not to employ women in attacks are shaped by culture, but cultural prohibitions can be overcome by practical requirements. The leaders of Hamas, PIJ, and the LTTE have been explicit in explaining that women are employed when the target necessitates it. As noted above, men tend to be the preferred option for these groups, and women are usually employed when there are not sufficient men for operations or males cannot reach the targets. These factors—manpower and access to targets—are influenced by state actions.

With all three groups, it is impossible with present data to show direct cause and effect between specific state actions and terrorists’ decisions to use women. For example, in the 3 months prior to Wafa Idris’ January 2002 suicide bombing in Jerusalem, there were at least 13 major terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings inside Israel by male Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah members. There was no change in Israeli security practices that prevented male terrorists from reaching targets and thus forcing Al Aqsa to employ women. Yet it is likely that state actions and policies to combat terrorism had an influence on groups’ decisions to change their practices. Indeed, Hamas and PIJ are explicit about picking the right person based on assessment of targets.

Security services’ expectations, and occasionally official “profiles” of terrorists, made it easy for governments to focus on men, which may have encouraged groups to employ women. Early in each conflict, states expected terrorists to be young and male. Women were not part of the profile despite evidence of their involvement in all three conflicts. Mirror imaging (assuming the adversary’s behavior is the same as one’s own)
may be partly to blame for states’ ignoring the possibility of female terrorists. When the terror campaigns began, these governments did not regularly include significant numbers of women in operational roles in the military, police, intelligence, and other government jobs. They may have assumed that terrorists would act similarly.

States also viewed the cultures from which their adversaries came as so repressive toward women that terrorists would not allow their involvement. The infrequency of female attacks and the invisibility of women in groups could have reinforced these assumptions.

At some point in each conflict, however, states’ expectations and assumptions changed. In the Russian-Chechen conflict, Chechen men between the ages of 16 and 60 have been the targets of detention and interrogation. As in Sri Lanka, Russian forces took control of villages to “cleanse” them by removing the young men for interrogations, from which many did not return. Unlike Sri Lanka and Israel, Russia has taken steps aimed specifically at female terrorists, most notably expanding cleansing operations to include them. According to one estimate, about 100 women have disappeared in Chechnya since the 2002 Dubrovka hostage-taking. In 2003, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a directive to search women in headscarves and other traditional Muslim clothing.

Moscow has not been insensitive to the possibility that targeting women may produce more terrorists of both genders, and its response has taken into account the unique propaganda value of women. In statements explaining why females are targeted, Russian officials emphasize that Chechen groups prey on women in mourning to make them “zombies.” With this argument, detentions are meant to protect both Chechen women from becoming zombies and Russian society from the zombies. Federal Security Service officials also claimed that use of women in attacks indicated that the terrorist groups were defeated.

Chechen terrorists’ use of women may represent some success by Russian security services in decreasing the number of men available to the groups and their ability to reach targets. Furthermore, the government, through its influence over the media, has been able to take advantage of the unique propaganda tools that female terrorists offer in its strategy to defeat Chechen terrorism.

Israel has also taken advantage of women’s particular propaganda value for counterterrorism. The Foreign Ministry has published reports on female suicide bombers, emphasizing the terrorists groups’ desire to exploit vulnerable women. The government has published descriptions of both successful and unsuccessful suicide bombers to illustrate the women’s personal problems and how male terrorists took advantage of them. Perhaps most important for this study, Israel stopped profiling individuals and started profiling circumstances—that is, looking for anomalies in behavior or situations as an indication of a terrorist attack rather than trying to identify a person or the type of person who could be a terrorist.

*The lesson is not only to add women to an existing profile, but also to recognize the diversity of the threat*

The government has also tried to balance the need to conduct searches while not further inflaming Palestinian anger by touching Palestinian women. As a partial solution, Israel has included female soldiers and police officers at checkpoints and in interrogations. Because not every checkpoint can be covered, technologies such as X-ray wands have been used.

Sri Lanka has taken a similar approach in confronting female terrorists. As in Israel, it includes women in the police and military. Again, there are not enough women to cover all security checkpoints. Sri Lanka has been willing to negotiate with the Tamil Tigers and maintain ceasefire agreements. Unlike Israel, however, the government does not control all its territory. The LTTE effectively runs many communities in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, complicating counterinsurgency operations. In all these cases, efforts by governments can gain from sympathetic media portrayals of women terrorists, governments can use groups’ ambivalence about female members to state advantage. Israel and Russia use stories of socially marginal women being exploited by men to discredit terrorist groups and explain away female violence. By making the women anomalies in the public mind, states reinforce the idea that they are in control and the public need not fear. These stories could be further exploited to delegitimize and fracture terrorist groups. The LTTE’s policies on members’ sexual behavior show the difficulty some groups have integrating women. Using propaganda about the group’s sexual practices, as in Russia, can both discredit the group and exacerbate mistrust between members.

Finally, the decision by a group to employ women may be a signal that there is no standard terrorist. The Israeli approach of looking for anomalies in situations is time- and personnel-intensive but offers more promise than attempting to describe all possible individuals who could be terrorists.

**Policy Implications**

The actions of the three states are important for understanding terrorists’ decisions about the use of women in terrorism and for combating terrorism. First, as in studies of serial killers that drew only on male murderers, studies of individual terrorists have focused only on male terrorists. This emphasis, combined with assumptions about the female nature, created a popular and sometimes official profile of terrorists as young and male. Women’s repeated involvement should be a signal that there is no standard terrorist. The first lesson Russia, Israel, and Sri Lanka have learned from female terrorism was that women represented a threat. The lesson is not only to add women to an existing profile, as Russia has, but also to recognize the diversity of the threat. The Israeli approach of looking for anomalies in situations is time- and personnel-intensive but offers more promise than attempting to describe all possible individuals who could be terrorists.

Second, just as groups can gain from sympathetic media portrayals of women terrorists, governments can use groups’ ambivalence about female members to state advantage. Israel and Russia use stories of socially marginal women being exploited by men to discredit terrorist groups and explain away female violence. By making the women anomalies in the public mind, states reinforce the idea that they are in control and the public need not fear. These stories could be further exploited to delegitimize and fracture terrorist groups. The LTTE’s policies on members’ sexual behavior show the difficulty some groups have integrating women. Using propaganda about the group’s sexual practices, as in Russia, can both discredit the group and exacerbate mistrust between members.

Finally, the decision by a group to employ women may be a signal that the state’s efforts to combat terrorism are having an effect. The LTTE as well as Palestinian and Chechen groups turned to women only when they had to. If that is true with other groups, evidence of the use of women by terrorists may open more policy choices to a government—such as negotiations or incentives to individuals to renounce terrorism—because the group is weakened.

Female participation offers both states and terrorist groups unique options. However,
policymakers should be realistic; women remain the minority. While their roles may be limited, women are important elements of groups and should not be overlooked. Wives know where their husbands are and with whom they meet. Mothers teach their children violence. Sisters, girlfriends, and female comrades enable men to get to their targets. Female terrorists likely know and do more than some security forces or terrorist groups give them credit for.

After al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001, much has been made of terrorists’ ability to innovate. Just as states and publics must be wary of underestimating terrorists, they must be cautious of deifying them. The employment of women by terrorist groups in Chechnya, Israel and the Occupied Territories, and Sri Lanka is an example of the limits of terrorists’ thinking. Like states, these groups are bound by cultural expectations, demographics, public support, and the international context. Their limited use of women illustrates their strengths and shortcomings. Further exploration of this topic may provide greater insights for governments in combating terrorism.

Notes


4 Porter, 15–17.


8 See, for example, Genevieve Sheehan, “Rebel Republic,” Harvard International Review 25, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 14.


13 Rajan Hoole et al., The Broken Palmyra (Claremont, CA: The Sri Lankan Studies Institute, 1988), 308.


15 By 2002, an estimated 500,000 people had fled Sri Lanka, and about 600,000 were internally displaced. Miranda Allison, “Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” Civil Wars 6, no. 4 (Winter 2003), 38.


The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report heralded a “paradigm shift in force planning,” announcing that “the new defense strategy is built around the concept of shifting to a ‘capabilities-based’ approach to defense.” Since then, the 2005 National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR have reaffirmed this approach, and major changes in processes and organizations have been undertaken throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) to implement capabilities-based planning (CBP).

In light of such prominent endorsements of CBP and the bureaucratic upheaval it has wrought, it is remarkable that no official definition of the concept exists. But there are probably as many phone numbers as there are definitions in the Pentagon and debate continues over just what the concept is, as well as whether it is appropriate or even feasible as a framework for defense planning and decisionmaking. The persistence of these debates raises fundamental questions: What is CBP? Is DOD in the midst of a revolution in force planning, or is CBP a hollow concept destined only to proliferate PowerPoint slides?

This article argues that CBP is neither revolutionary nor hollow but is rather a label for a few simple ideas that could generate significant improvements in DOD management. It’s successful implementation will depend on a more precise understanding of goals and limitations than has been articulated to date. This article aims to separate what is essential about CBP from what is not and identify the challenges to its implementation.

A Simple Concept

Capabilities-based planning traces its roots to the days immediately following the Cold War, as defense planners began to think about the implications of a radically altered security environment. The concept at that time rested on two basic and related principles that endure today. First, the diversity of the U.S. military’s mission set has expanded since the Cold War. Second, forces should be planned to optimize their output, not their input. In other words, the Department of Defense ought to manage and organize people and weapons systems as a means of mitigating national security risk rather than as an end in itself.

The first of these principles was truly new for DOD planning, which for decades had focused overwhelmingly on the Soviet military threat. The second was not new at all. It was embedded in traditional mission analysis frameworks and precisely matches...
the principles of modern management and analytical practices that were brought to the Pentagon in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the complexity of the post–Cold War security environment breathed new life into these time-worn ideas. For all its danger, the Cold War provided a measure of stability that inhered not only in political relations but also in force planning. The translation of strategic objectives into conventional force structure was a process that had become relatively well understood and exhaustively analyzed. With the collapse of this strategic clarity, and an austere fiscal environment in tow, it was natural for defense planners to turn back to these reliable principles of analysis and resource allocation.

The concept of CBP solidified and gained influence among defense intellectuals over the 1990s. Perhaps its most mature and important explication can be found in Paul Davis’s 2002 monograph, which defines capabilities-based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework.” To a significant degree, in other words, CBP means simply institutionalizing common sense. But this is not a trivial task. As DOD has discovered, when it comes to implementation of simple concepts, the devil is in the details.

An Elusive Concept

The elaboration of capabilities-based planning over the course of its bureaucratic history has been somewhat uneven. Even the language announcing CBP’s arrival in official policy in the 2001 QDR left considerable room for debate over its precise meaning, asserting that the concept:

reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or nonstate actor will pose threats to vital U.S. interests . . . decades from now. It is possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ. . . . A capabilities-based model . . . broadens the strategic perspective.

Here the emphasis is on increased uncertainty about the future and, as a way of compensating, a proposal to focus on enemy capabilities rather than enemy identities. The report goes on to say that a capabilities-based approach also “requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.” The vision, then, is not only about broadening our view of adversaries’ capabilities, but also of our own capabilities. So on which “capabilities” is CBP based, ours or theirs? Or both?

Another source of confusion has been the ambiguity of the word capability. In common usage as well as in DOD processes, the word is used interchangeably to refer to objectives (for example, taking a hill), the tasks that need to be accomplished in support of that objective (fire and maneuver), and the wherewithal to conduct those tasks (an infantry company). Which can be properly characterized as a capability? In fact all can, but this flexibility of usage wreaks havoc on a system meant to be “capabilities-based.”

Recognizing this stumbling block, DOD set out in the summer of 2004 to create a universal definition of capability to provide an anchor for the conduct of CBP. The result of this effort provides a good measure of the difficulty involved in negotiating the meaning of CBP. The definition agreed on, and still in use today, states that capability is “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.” For an effort aimed at clarification, this must be the lexicographical equivalent of destroying a village to save it.

Ambiguity, however, has not resulted in inaction. To the contrary, organizations throughout DOD have launched new initiatives aimed at implementing CBP. For example, the influential Aldridge Study, which was the basis for major revisions to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, identified, evaluated, and developed “capabilities” as the focus of its final report. Also, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have launched the Analytic Agenda, dedicated to creating a diverse set of planning scenarios and associated databases. The joint requirements generation process has been realigned around the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, and each of the Services has constructed staff processes and organizations dedicated to CBP.

As of this writing, a cross-functional Institutional Reform and Governance team is exploring ways to realign DOD acquisition and management structures around “capability portfolios,” and the Joint Staff is drafting a codification of how various planning processes relate under a common CBP framework. In some sense, and to some degree, most organizations in DOD are “doing” capabilities-based planning. Indeed, a great deal of valuable work continues to be conducted in each of these areas.

The problem with CBP is not with the quantity or quality of the activity, but rather with its coherence from a strategic perspective. Lost in the proliferation of CBP activities is clarity about the ideas that gave birth to it in the first place and a vision of how to relate it to good decisionmaking.

Four Key Principles

Capabilities-based planning is perhaps best thought of not as a concept but as a
collection of four simple principles. These principles are not the only measures of merit for a planning or management system. Some principles, such as managing toward outputs rather than inputs and considering needs and costs simultaneously, are fundamental to reaching the goals of any organization. The four described here are not only fundamental to good management but also are peculiar to the context of defense planning. The promise of CBP will be fully realized if, and only if, Pentagon planning takes them to heart.

**Broaden the Range of Missions for Which Forces Are Prepared.** This notion is the most commonly asserted and firmly entrenched principle related to CBP. Invoking the strategic uncertainty of the post–Cold War world is now routine, and DOD has recognized for several years the importance of designing forces for conflicts beyond major conventional campaigns. In one sense, the post-9/11 world has vindicated this emphasis on uncertainty in defense planning. Even 5 years ago, who would have envisioned the particular mix of demands now facing the U.S. military? In another sense, the post-9/11 world has given rise to a new vision of the future security environment framed by a generational struggle against terrorists and Islamic radicals. So, while threats may be more diverse than during the Cold War, it is not clear that uncertainty has grown. To the extent that DOD needs to be prepared for a wider range of threats than during the Cold War, this insight may come less from an appreciation for uncertainty than simply from recognition of the status quo.

Regardless of which of these viewpoints is taken, the implications for planning are the same: DOD needs to diversify the missions it analyzes so the future force will be flexible enough to respond to different kinds of challenges and security environments. This principle, as noted, is widely accepted in DOD, and a great deal of progress has already been made in broadening the apertures of analytical and planning processes.

**Make the Joint Perspective Predominant in All Planning and Programming Activities.** If a history were written of U.S. defense planning during the past 25 years, a major theme would be the advancement of the joint perspective over the Service perspective in the planning and operation of military forces. The centerpiece of this story is the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, but the task continues of ensuring that the military both fights and is designed according to a holistic understanding of objectives and resources rather than four separate Service views. CBP represents another avenue for pursuing this important effort.

One example of progress is the establishment of the Analytic Agenda, which generates authoritative DOD-wide scenarios and databases. A critical goal of the Analytic Agenda is to develop approved sets of scenarios that can serve as the basis for assessing asset configuration and production decisions and for analyzing different force growth and posture options. A key challenge here is to ensure that the scenarios are broad and deep within the range of likely events. While it may be impossible to fully prepare the military to handle every eventuality, it is possible to provide a good range of alternative future developments for assessing the effect of capability improvements and force structure changes. A second critical area of progress is the improvement of metric development and oversight. The ongoing improvements to the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the establishment of the Analytic Agenda have been positively impacted by a better understanding of the limitations of metrics. It is now possible to develop metrics that are more aligned with broader strategic objectives and are better able to capture the level of risk.

**Use Risk as a Strategic Measure of Effectiveness.** If a planning system measures success by its output, what is the output of the Department of Defense? Strictly speaking, DOD contributions to national security are too numerous to reduce to a few metrics. Indeed, this complexity accounts in large part for the difficulty of reliably assessing major decisions and capability tradeoffs according to their impact on strategy. But there is one metric that is cited throughout strategic planning documents as the key to discriminating among alternative strategic choices: risk. Just as corporate strategy is about maximizing profits, national security strategy is about mitigating risk.

Measures of effectiveness at tactical and technical levels are highly developed and understood in the defense analytic community. In comparing alternative tactical aircraft systems, for example, performance measures such as probability of kill, radar cross-section, range, and payload provide good bases for assessment and choice. At the operational level, comparing the relative effectiveness of alternative force packages for a broader mission (for instance, Special Operations Forces versus naval fires for neutralizing a given target set) is more difficult. However, we can still fairly readily develop metrics such as total target value destroyed, number of casualties, or enemy rate of fire. But how can we assess a tradeoff between homeland defense capabilities and major combat operations capabilities? Ultimately, the only basis for comparison across such broad missions is the impact of strategic decisions on the risk facing the Nation.

While the 2001 QDR established a DOD-wide risk framework, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an annual assessment of risk to the military’s operational plans, strategic risk assessment remains a relatively immature process. DOD must develop a common framework for assessment, or else senior leaders must continue to rely on shifting and poorly integrated baselines for their most critical judgments about national priorities. Indeed, this complexity accounts in large part for the difficulty of reliably assessing major decisions and capability tradeoffs according to their impact on strategy. But there is one metric that is cited throughout strategic planning documents as the key to discriminating among alternative strategic choices: risk. Just as corporate strategy is about maximizing profits, national security strategy is about mitigating risk.

**Shift the Requirements Generation Process away from a Platform/System-centric Focus.** The final key principle of CBP is that capabilities development should reallocate some attention from platforms and systems to nonmateriel aspects of capabilities. The best solution to every problem is not always in more powerful engines, smaller circular...
error probables, or faster network connections. Capabilities also grow out of innovative concepts of operations, new types of training and skill sets, and streamlined business processes. Previous requirements generation processes were not completely insensitive to these issues, but nevertheless, raising the profile of the nonmateriel elements of the full range of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities) resources is another key imperative for CBP.

Challenges

The key principles are simple enough and seem relatively uncontroversial. So what is so hard about CBP? If these principles truly represent the essence of capabilities-based planning, why has implementation been so halting and fraught with confusion and disagreement?

The implementation of capabilities-based planning has struggled with several challenges. A few are comparatively minor and may be overcome with more clarification from DOD leaders regarding their intent for CBP. Others are more systemic and demand ongoing attention from defense leaders.

The simpler obstacles facing CBP essentially amount to myths or misunderstandings about ideas that have developed over recent years. The first is the confusion over the relationship between CBP and threat-based planning. It is often stated that the CBP framework supersedes or otherwise replaces threat-based planning. That is simply false.

Even if the strategic threat environment is less predictable than during the Cold War, it does not follow that specific scenarios are no longer appropriate bases for force planning. What does follow is that the number and diversity of specific threat scenarios used for force planning must be expanded, and a premium must be placed on forces that are flexible enough to adapt and respond to multiple threat types or conditions. Far from being replaced by CBP, specific threat scenarios remain integral to defining requirements for force planning.

Another lingering misperception is that conducting CBP means not talking about military needs in terms of programs. This notion is a misapplication of the essential concept of managing a system by its outputs rather than inputs. It is true that a rational planning process ought to identify needs first in terms of missions, tasks, and standards of performance—and only after that in terms of alternative combinations of resources. However, that does not suggest that capabilities can be assessed in the abstract or mixed and matched with infinite flexibility to perform various missions. On the contrary, analysis and decisionmaking will always depend on a concrete appreciation for the way capabilities are instantiated by programs, as well as by the full range of available resources.

Capabilities-based planning also faces challenges that will require more concerted effort to overcome. Four loom largest: one is conceptual, two managerial, and the last organizational.

CBP’s main conceptual challenge is the same one that has bedeviled analysts and programmers for decades: many military assets, including both systems and people, have capabilities relevant to multiple mission areas. The problem this creates is that input costs have complex, even unpredictable, relationships to output values. This is a serious issue for an analytical framework built around cost effectiveness. How should a Predator’s costs, for example, be allocated between its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission and its strike mission? Should part of that cost be allocated to the deterrence mission as well? What about the cost of a Special Forces Soldier, who could conceivably be engaged in direct action, information operations, humanitarian assistance, and intelligence-gathering within a single day? Such allocation rules are tricky even in the most constrained analytical contexts, but their difficulty is magnified by the broadened scope of missions and variability demanded by CBP.

This challenge is closely related to one of CBP’s main managerial challenges: bringing to bear sufficient analytical capacity and capability. The broadened, diversified scope of missions now targeted for serious analysis by DOD is creating new analytical frontiers in terms of quantity and quality. Reflecting uncertainty translates into considerations of not only more scenarios but also more variability within scenarios. Additionally, enhancing the joint perspective in analysis entails comparative assessment of a broader range of capability options for any given mission. All of this translates into greater demand for analysis.

The variety of analyses in demand has also expanded. The growing importance of asymmetric warfare, information operations, human intelligence, and interagency operations, to name a few, all contribute to a need for new analytical tools and methods. Traditional attrition-based
Adaptive Planning efforts within a common strategic framework.

Perhaps the most significant challenge facing CBP is organizational incentives. The President and Secretary of Defense dictate strategy. Combatant commanders execute missions, while the military Services generate budgets and maintain the preponderance of DOD analytical capacity. It is no secret that this division of labor can impede viewing problems through a joint lens. This judgment was one of the principal findings of the Aldridge Study, and of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols defense reform panel as well.\(^6\)

The importance of inter-Service politics in forming the defense budget is also evident in the striking stability of Service budget shares throughout very different security and fiscal environments over the past few decades. There are sound arguments for keeping the Service responsibilities as they are, including maintenance of strong domain expertise, the value of competition in developing concepts and technologies, and the centrality of Service tradition and culture to operational effectiveness.

Nevertheless, in the current system, only the Secretary of Defense has the authority to adjudicate disputes between the Services over budgets, but there is a limit to how much time, knowledge, and political capital a Secretary can afford to expend on a given issue. In theory, a larger, more robust staff in the Secretary’s office could help. Some fear that civilian analysts may not have the operational expertise to make good decisions on military requirements.

On the other hand, military officers serving in joint billets are handicapped in their ability to adjudicate Service disputes because their careers remain dependent on approval from their Service chains of command and because the Joint Staff has no significant authority over the Services.

So a fundamental tension remains. CBP demands that the translation of strategy into military capabilities be conducted in a joint framework, but military resources are developed and funded almost entirely by the Services. Managing this tension will likely be the most significant challenge facing CBP.

Building and enacting a comprehensive plan for implementing capabilities-based planning will take great and sustained effort. The good news is that much of the necessary work is already well under way throughout the Department of Defense and its planning community. Any such plan would benefit from a single concise statement of guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding their vision for capabilities-based planning. This guidance has been notably absent to date.

The important principles that have been advanced under the banner of capabilities-based planning are both simple and sensible. That is not to deny the complexities of institutionalizing them or to ignore the superheated political environment in which defense planning and programming inevitably occur. These conditions will persist largely independent of which framework is used to govern strategic planning. Rather, the hope behind these comments is that more clarity of purpose with regard to implementing capabilities-based planning will help leaders to think less about managing bureaucratic processes and more about managing the risks facing national security. JFQ

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**NOTES**


4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, May 11, 2005, GL–5.


By Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan

One of the most common complaints from national security practitioners and analysts is that the interagency process is broken. Getting various U.S. Government agencies to pursue common and coherent policies is a perennial problem. Two decades ago, similar criticisms were made about the lack of military jointness—poor coordination and communication between the Services during operations. Fixing this problem took a groundbreaking piece of legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which changed defense structures that had remained unaltered since the National Security Act of 1947.

Today, after 20 years of work, jointness is an integral part of U.S. military operations, even though each step of the reform process met with bureaucratic resentment and occasional efforts at sabotage. Redirecting the interagency process to produce consistent, coherent national policy that all Government agencies follow for stability and reconstruction operations will be no less difficult. This challenge requires a new round of institutional reforms and, more importantly, new interagency leaders with the skills and knowledge to break down bureaucratic stovepipes.

As the interagency process has become increasingly involved in postconflict stabilization and reconstruction in the past decade, its shortcomings have become more apparent. Though some reforms have been adopted in the past 2 years, they have already proven insufficient. Transforming the process may seem like a dry exercise in drawing wiring diagrams, but the stakes are far higher than those of a normal bureaucratic squabble. When agencies pursue uncoordinated strategies during major combat, stability, or reconstruction operations, the consequences can be severe—including wasted resources, unachieved objectives, reduced public support, and unnecessary loss of lives.

Examples of poor interagency cooperation abound in recent U.S. operations. In Afghanistan, for instance, the process of building an international coalition was hampered by the different approaches of the Departments of State and Defense. Diplomats sought broadly based international support to include as many partners as possible in Operation Enduring Freedom. Military planners, on the other hand, focused on military effectiveness and wanted only militarily significant, rather than symbolic, coalition contributions. Both objectives were reasonable, but the failure to coordinate them into a single national policy meant that potential members received mixed signals, depending on which U.S. official they were talking to. This lack of unity led to diplomatic frustration and resentment and to allied reluctance to participate in stabilization efforts after the fall of the Taliban.

The consequences of poor interagency coordination are even more obvious and consequential in Iraq. An interagency planning process did exist before Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the lead agency for postwar reconstruction was named only 8 weeks before major combat operations commenced. That was hardly enough time to coordinate plans and stands in stark contrast to the 15 months devoted to planning combat operations in Iraq or the several years of occupation planning that preceded the conquest of Japan and Germany during World War II.1

The failure to coordinate civilian and military efforts had tremendous consequences during the occupation of Iraq. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, USA, the senior military officer in theater, met often but never established procedures for anything more than ad hoc policy coordination.2 The delays that occurred meant that the CPA lacked a significant presence outside Baghdad for many months, and military commanders were forced to fill that void by developing uncoordinated policies on governance and other civilian matters within their areas of operations.

This dynamic made the CPA’s task even more challenging, since it had to reconcile varying, and in some cases contradictory, policies into a single coherent policy. The failure to establish coordinated national policy, including planning for the massively complex task of postconflict stabilization and reconstruction both before Operation Iraqi Freedom and during the subsequent occupation, contributed immeasurably to the widespread chaos, delays, and civil frustration that enabled the insurgency to take root. That
insurgency has already cost over $350 billion and claimed the lives of more than 2,800 U.S. military personnel and tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians.¹

**Recent Reform Efforts**

The Iraq experience has sparked a flurry of reforms designed to improve the U.S. capacity to conduct stability operations. The two most notable changes are interrelated: the establishment of a new office within the Department of State and the subsequent Presidential directive designating the office as the lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction. Less than 2 years after their adoption, however, it is becoming clear that both measures have notable weaknesses and are insufficient.

In July 2004, the Department of State created a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Its mission is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”² Ambassador Carlos Pascual, named the first coordinator, focused the office on planning and preparing for future contingencies rather than becoming involved in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.³ The office’s more notable activities in its first 2 years have been limited to publishing an Essential Task Matrix, publishing lessons learned reports, creating a draft planning framework, and developing a database of deployable civilians.

In December 2005, the George W. Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44. It designates the State Department as the lead agency for all U.S. stabilization and reconstruction activities and gives S/CRS numerous responsibilities in assisting the Secretary of State in fulfilling that mission. It also establishes a Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, a formal interagency coordination mechanism to be co-chaired by the head of S/CRS and a member of the National Security Council (NSC) staff.

NSPD 44 contains notable ambiguities and omissions, such as not identifying clear lines of authority between military and civilian leaders during actual operations. Yet the most important problem is that S/CRS simply does not have the capacity to execute its responsibilities. Moreover, the office has neither the resources nor the political support to fulfill its mission. Its permanent staff remains smaller than envisaged and includes no interagency representation. Furthermore, its budget has repeatedly been scaled back by Congress, and it lacks the bureaucratic clout to coordinate policy within the State Department, much less within the broader interagency process.

The Department of Defense does support centralizing stabilization and reconstruction missions in State and has provided funds and temporary personnel, but these additional resources have not significantly increased S/CRS functional capacity. Indeed, some have speculated that Ambassador Pascual announced his resignation after serving only 14 months because of frustration over the lack of support.

In short, despite original hopes for S/CRS, it is too weak to become an effective interagency lead for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and the causes of its weakness seem unlikely to be rectified soon. It is faced with limited interagency authority, resources, and capabilities. That said, the office still has an important role within the State Department, helping to coordinate the often-conflicting policies of the different regional and functional bureaus, but its window of opportunity to establish itself as a strong and effective interagency coordinator has already closed. A new approach is needed to ensure effective interagency coordination for prevention, reconstruction, and stabilization missions.

**Putting the NSC Back in Charge**

The National Security Council is the only U.S. Government structure capable of executing this complex interagency task. Any other existing agency is bound to be insufficient because of the inevitable bureaucratic frictions, clashes among organizational missions and cultures, and absence of enforceable directive authority. In contrast, the NSC is designed to sit above the individual agencies and is already tasked with integrating differing perspectives into coherent national policy. That suits it ideally for the mission at hand.

We propose creating a new structure, called the Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell (PRSC), within the NSC. The PRSC would integrate and synchronize cross-departmental capabilities and provide a comprehensive approach to national strategy, thus largely negating the departmental stovepipes and the parochial, piecemeal approach to crisis management and prevention. Its director would report to the National Security Advisor.

The heart of the PRSC would consist of current S/CRS personnel authorizations and resources transferred directly from the Departments of State and Defense. It would be a flat, streamlined organization with 10 to 15 core members, who would be permanent employees of the NSC rather than details from other agencies. The cell would have directive authority over supporting interagency departments in policy development and strategic planning and execution of crisis management, conflict, and postconflict operations. While individual departments or agencies would be designated as operational and tactical leads for execution purposes, policy oversight and strategic directive authority would remain firmly embedded with PRSC.

The standing cell would have responsibility for oversight and planning of the functions as laid out in the accompanying figure. The director would be limited to a small, agile staff. Along with a deputy and executive officer, there would be three divisions, focused respectively on strategic planning, crisis management and prevention, and coalition building. Although each division would have its own staff of three or four personnel, the interrelated nature of their tasks would require close coordination, integration, and information-sharing. In addition, each division would have planning, networking, and coordination responsibility with relevant governmental departments and agencies. Division cells would receive additional temporary
manning only as the director and the National Security Advisor deemed necessary based on operational surge requirements. The strategic planning division would pull together intelligence on potential conflicts around the world, recommend and coordinate options for planning, and ensure that changes to plans, doctrine, and operations are quickly made to capture lessons learned through contingency planning efforts. The crisis management and prevention division would be responsible for predicting and averting conflicts and responding to those that emerge. It would also bring together elements of support to coordinate and expedite measured responses. Finally, the coalition-building division would focus on fashioning capabilities and relationships with possible future partners. In addition, it would coordinate with interagency partners and Congress, as well as provide U.S. public information and education programs on its activities.

Developing True Interagency Leaders

The PRSC is a necessary first step toward effective interagency coordination for prevention, reconstruction, and stabilization missions, but it is not sufficient on its own. True interagency leaders are needed who can focus on integrating the many elements of national power into coherent policy rather than representing the interests of their home agencies. Leadership starts at the top. Since the PRSC director exists to execute the vision of the President, he or she must be able and willing to challenge the parochial interests of individual agencies instead of settling for diluted compromises and consensus. Although previous departmental experience would certainly be helpful, the director must be chosen based on vision and leadership skills rather than simply on seniority. The director would also require an annual budget sufficient to meet mission requirements. As PRSC’s responsibility and credibility grow, some funding previously earmarked for defense and foreign affairs activities, as well as other department budgets, would need to be transferred to the cell to cover increasing operational costs and reflect the shift of interagency responsibility.

The PRSC staff, like the director, must be dedicated first and foremost to the interagency mission. The cell would not be an organization of detailers, serving at the whim of, and still loyal to, their home departments. Just as Special Operations Forces possess unique characteristics within single branches of the military, PRSC personnel need capabilities not found within individual Government agencies, including:

- crisis management experience
- networking and strong people skills
- negotiating skills
- planning experience at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
- self-defense and small arms experience
- critical language skills
- rapid deployment ability
- security and intelligence skills.

PRSC personnel should expect to serve a minimum of 5 years before rotating to new assignments, so they can develop a depth of expertise in their functional areas and in the bureaucratic processes of multiple agencies. Furthermore, they should expect to be deployed to nonpermissive environments, sometimes on short notice, where they could be embedded with combat or security forces that are in harm’s way. Because PRSC personnel would possess unusual qualifications and would operate in a high-tempo, often high-stress environment, significant bonuses and specialized pay would be required to ensure retention. Ongoing training would be required to see that personnel are exposed to a wide variety of crisis situations. Some training would involve exercises and simulations, which would help the team develop specific contingency plans.

The current interagency process has proven ineffective in addressing the complex prevention, reconstruction, and stabilization challenges of the 21st century. Recent reforms have been unsuccessful in breaking the departmental stovepipes and bureaucratic inertia that ultimately undermine national security. The proposed Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell would sit above existing departments and agencies and draw its authority directly from the National Security Council and ultimately the President. It is designed to be agile, flat, and flexible. Perhaps most importantly, its multidisciplinary staff would provide the broad range of talents and skills required to address crisis management from prevention to postconflict stabilization and reconstruction.

NOTES

1 For more on the prewar planning process in Iraq, see Nora Bensahel, “Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (June 2006), 453–473.

2 Interviews with Coalition Provisional Authority and Combined Joint Task Force–7 officials. See also Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: Penguin, 2006).

3 Estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths since March 19, 2003, range from 20,600 to 98,200, due to the unreliability of the data and whether deaths resulting from crime should be included. See The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, August 17, 2006, 4 and 10, available at <www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>.


5 See Joint Force Quarterly 42 (3rd quarter 2006) for an interview with Ambassador Carlos Pascual. [Ed.]
What the Past Teaches about the Future

By MAX BOOT

Many of the innovations on the horizon in fields such as robotics, directed energy, computers, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology have the potential to change the nature of warfare radically and with it the nature of the international system. While the United States has been dominant so far in the information age, there is no guarantee that its streak will continue. A challenger, whether a rival state such as China or even a nonstate group such as al Qaeda, could use new (or, in the case of nuclear weapons, not so new) ways of war to alter the balance of power. Cheap to produce and easy to disseminate, germs, chemicals, and cyberviruses are particularly well suited for the weak to use against the strong. If any of these become common and effective tools of warfare, especially terrorist warfare, the United States and its allies could be in deep trouble.

History is full of superpowers failing to take advantage of important revolutions in military affairs (RMAs): the Mongols missed the gunpowder revolution; the Chinese, Turks, and Indians missed the industrial revolution; the French and British missed major parts of the second industrial revolution; and the Soviets missed the information revolution. The warning that appears at the bottom of mutual fund advertisements applies to geopolitics: past performance is no guarantee of future returns. The end can come with shocking suddenness, even after a long streak of good fortune.

Perhaps especially after a long streak of good fortune. The longer you are on top, the more natural it seems, and the less thinkable it is that anyone will displace you. Complacency can seep in, especially if, as with the United States, you enjoy power without peer or precedent.

Israel discovered the dangers of primacy in 1973 when it almost lost the Yom Kippur War to Egyptian and Syrian forces that it had handily defeated just 6 years before. The Israelis were caught off guard by new antitank and antiaircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union—a taste of what the information age had in store. In hindsight, the ability of the Egyptians and Syrians to bounce back from their humiliation in the Six-Day War should not have been so surprising. Defeat has often been a spur to innovation, from the Prussians’ humiliation in the Napoleonic wars, to the German humiliation in World War I, to the American humiliation in Vietnam. In the case of Japan in 1853, it did not take actual defeat but the mere threat of it, made explicit by the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s “black ships,” to catalyze wide-ranging reforms. Out of all these setbacks were born new ways of fighting that led once-vanquished forces to victory on future battlefields.

It is much less common to see dominant powers innovating. More typical is the case of the Ottoman Empire, which mastered only one major military revolution—gunpowder—and then only in its early years. In their heyday in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Turks’ gun-wielding armies and fleets carved out and defended a vast empire encompassing Asia Minor, North Africa, and the Balkans. By the 18th century, however, their glorious record of martial triumphs had become a major obstacle to making the innovations

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necessary to keep up with European competitors. The Sublime Porte’s modernization was so belated and half-hearted that by the 19th century, the onetime scourge of Christendom had become known as the “Sick Man of Europe.” Early success set up the Turks, as so many others, for later defeat.

Uncontrollable Creativity

History does not offer a blueprint of how the process of military innovation occurs. There is no single model that covers all cases. As James Q. Wilson notes:

Not only do innovations differ so greatly in character that trying to find one theory to explain them all is like trying to find one medical theory to explain all diseases, but innovations are so heavily dependent on executive interests and beliefs as to make the chance appearance of a change-oriented personality enormously important in explaining change. It is not easy to build a useful social science theory out of “chance appearances.”

To the limited extent that we can generalize about 500 years of history, it seems fair to say that the most radical innovations come from outside of formal military structures. There are recent exceptions, such as the atomic bomb, satellite, and stealth airplane, but most of the key inventions that changed the face of battle since the Middle Ages were the products of individual inventors operating more or less on their own, geniuses such as Robert Fulton, Hiram Maxim, Johann Nikolaus von Dreyse, and Guglielmo Marconi. Some had military applications in mind; most did not. For instance, the casting techniques that made cannons more effective in the 15th century were originally developed to make church bells.

Dissemination and Nullification

Moreover, few if any technologies, much less scientific concepts, will remain the property of one country for long. France matched the Prussian needle gun less than 4 years after the battle of Königgrätz; Germany matched the British Dreadnought 2 years after its unveiling; the Soviet Union matched the U.S. atomic bomb 4 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is a truism that new technology, if effective, tends to disseminate quickly. One exception is that technology was slow to move from the West to the rest of the world in the latter years of the gunpowder age and during the first industrial age—from about 1700 to 1900. This created a yawning imbalance of power, which allowed Europeans to conquer much of the world on the cheap. But by the mid-20th century, the balance had righted itself, and Asians and Africans in possession of modern weaponry were able to win their independence from European states weakened by two world wars and the collapse of assumptions of racial superiority. Some analysts may discount the importance of technology in determining the outcomes of battles, but there is no getting around the central importance of advanced weaponry in the rise of the West.

The process of technological dissemination and nullification has speeded up since the rise in the mid-19th century of such major arms manufacturers as Krupp, Winchester, and Armstrong, which were happy to sell to just about anyone. Thus, German troops were killed during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 by Chinese soldiers firing Mauser rifles and Krupp artillery pieces. Contemporary arms manufacturers, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, operate under greater export restrictions but still seek to market the latest technology around the world.

Even more pervasive today are firms that sell dual-use devices such as computers, night-vision goggles, and global positioning system trackers that have military and civil applications. Thanks to their success, many of America’s key information age advantages are rapidly passing into the hands of friends and foes alike. This is part of a longer-term trend: the Westernization of the world, which increasingly puts the peoples of Asia, the Americas, and Africa on a par, economically as well as militarily, with those of Europe.

As important as technological nullification is psychological nullification. The first
time an army faces a major new weapon—the needle gun at Königgrätz, the machinegun at Omdurman, the tank in Poland and France, the smart bomb in the Gulf War—it is likely to be caught off guard. The resulting panic can be as damaging as the physical effects of the weapon. The next time, however, the other side is likely to be less impressed. Thus, the coalition bombing campaign of Iraq in 2003 did not induce the same “shock and awe” as its predecessor in 1991. Having been bombed more or less continuously for a decade, Iraqis had become inured to the effect of precision munitions. The speed and ferocity of the U.S. armored advance, by contrast, came as a surprise.

The way to gain a military advantage, therefore, is not necessarily to be the first to produce a new tool or weapon. It is to figure out better than anyone else how to utilize a widely available tool or weapon.

**Strategy and Innovation**

Culture, geography, politics, and other factors greatly affect how receptive a military is to proposed changes. Especially important is a country’s strategic situation—a combination of its location, fears, and ambitions. Geography is not destiny, or else it would be impossible to explain why Britain was a naval power for centuries while Japan—an island nation off the coast of a major continent—was not. Or why Prussia, rather than another nearby state such as Saxony or Bavaria, became a great power starting in the 18th century. Or why Sweden rose from obscurity to prominence in the 17th century and then fell back into obscurity in the 18th century—all without changing its geographic position. But even though it is only one factor among many, geography has clearly influenced which nations are more receptive to which military revolutions.

Germany, for instance, became a leader in utilizing Panzers because it planned to fight a fast-moving land war against numerous enemies on its frontiers. The Nazis did nothing to develop aircraft carriers or four-engine bombers because they did not think they needed them against their continental rivals. The United States was the mirror image: it led the way in the development of long-range bombers and aircraft carriers because it expected to fight a naval and air war against enemies far removed from its borders, but it did little to develop tank units because it did not expect to fight a major land war. Such expectations may turn out to be ill founded (Germany could have used B-17s; the United States could have used Tiger tanks), but they powerfully affect the decisions made about allocating scarce resources.

It helps to have relatively few scenarios to prepare for. Germany in the interwar years had the luxury of preparing only for a land war in Europe, whereas Britain had to prepare not only for that contingency but also for naval wars in the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as for imperial policing in its colonies. The United States had the advantage of focusing on a single foe after the Vietnam War. The concepts and technologies created to fight the Red Army just happened to be perfectly suited to battling the Iraqi army.

Today, the Nation faces a much bigger challenge because it has many potential foes, ranging from nonstate actors (al Qaeda and its ilk) to medium-sized powers (Iran, North Korea, and Syria) and a rising great power (China). Because America has chosen to be strong in every sphere of combat (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), in every type of warfare (from peacekeeping to high-intensity conflict), and in every corner of the globe, it faces pressure to invest and innovate in many fields at once, or else to rein in its ambitions.

**A Democratic Advantage?**

Western states have been the most successful military innovators over the past 500 years. There was something about Western Europe (and its overseas offspring) that made it much more dynamic and open to change than other civilizations. Having a relatively liberal political and intellectual climate helps create an atmosphere in which innovation can flourish. The Soviet Union’s lack of freedom ultimately sabotaged its attempts to keep pace in the information age, just as the lack of freedom in Spain and France made it difficult for them to keep pace in a naval arms race with first the Netherlands and then Britain.

But we should be wary of simple-minded democratic triumphalism. History has offered many examples of autocratic states that proved more adept than their democratic rivals at exploiting military revolutions. The success of the Prussian/German armed forces between 1864 and 1942 and the Japanese between 1895 and 1942 shows how well even autocratic systems can innovate. All that is required is some openness to change, a commitment to meritocracy, and an ability to examine one’s own mistakes critically—all disciplines in which the illiberal German general staff excelled. In fact, most democracies, which tend to be less militaristic than autocracies, face a disadvantage in capitalizing on military innovations because they are less generous to their armed forces in peacetime, a problem that plagued all Western nations during the 1930s.\(^5\)

Nor is there much evidence that soldiers fight better for a democracy than for a dictatorship.\(^1\) Man for man, the Wehrmacht was probably the most formidable fighting force in the world until at least 1943, if not later. German soldiers were even known for showing more initiative than those of democratic France, Britain, and America.\(^6\) Meanwhile, Soviet troops stoically endured privations and casualties far beyond anything suffered by their Western allies. North Vietnam is another modern state that fielded superb armies despite a notable democracy deficit. In any case, the differences between the armies of dictatorships and those of democracies are less significant than they may appear at first blush. Even the most liberal states must employ command-and-control methods, and even the most autocratic must pay attention to troop morale and allow for individual initiative.\(^7\)

But if democracies do not have an advantage in creating formidable war machines, they seem to have an intrinsic edge in figuring out how to use them. Autocracies tend to run amok because of a lack of internal checks and balances. Philip II, Gustavus Adolphus, Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler, and the Japanese leaders of the early 20th century all built superb militaries but led their nations into ruinous wars. (So did Saddam Hussein with his less impressive but nevertheless formidable army.) These autocrats had no sense of limits, and no other politician was strong enough to stop them. Their tactics may have been superb, but their grand strategy was poor, the best examples being Napoleon’s and Hitler’s foolish invasions of Russia. Democracies sometimes overreach too (witness the Boer, Algerian, and Vietnam wars), but they tend to avoid the worst traps because they have a more consensus style of decisionmaking.
Building Better Bureaucracies

The key to successful innovation, whether for a dictatorship or a democracy, is having an effective bureaucracy. America’s secret weapon today is not the stealth airplane or the Predator, but the agency that was responsible for their development (and much else), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Ever since its forerunner was set up during the Sputnik crisis in 1958, DARPA has shown how a government agency can push the frontiers of innovation by allocating grants to universities, think tanks, and private companies for high-risk ventures.

To the limited extent that innovation can be systematized, DARPA has done it. Other nations trying to compete with America are hobbled by not spending as much as the agency does on research and development. But spending is not enough. If it were, the European Union, whose collective defense budget is two-thirds the size of America’s and which has more soldiers under arms, would be closer to the United States in military capabilities. The problem is that most European spending is unfocused, duplicative, and inefficient, whereas DARPA has been smart about allocating its $2 billion annual budget.

In lieu of the right bureaucratic structures, the possession of modern weaponry is of dubious utility, as states from 18th-century India to the 20th-century Middle East have found out. The Arab nations are particularly egregious in this regard: their record of military futility since 1945 comes despite having access to copious stocks of modern arms from such suppliers as France and the Soviet Union. No matter how great the Arab preponderance in men and materiel has been—against Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, their advantage in 1986–1987 after Muammar Qadhafi tried to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. In each path has risks and tradeoffs. Paying for larger standing forces can make it easier to respond to today’s threats; cutting force strength and using the savings to pay for high-tech hardware can make it easier to respond to tomorrow’s threats. It would be nice to be able to do everything at once. But no one, including the Pentagon, has enough money for that.

History indicates that the wisest course is to feel one’s way along with careful study, radical experimentation, and free-wheeling wargames. Paradoxically, revolutionary transformation often can be achieved in evolutionary increments.11 The Germans did not shift their entire army to Panzer divisions in the interwar years. In 1939–1940, only about 10 percent of German forces were composed of armoured units, and the Wehrmacht had more ponies than Panzers, but this was enough to produce breakthroughs from Poland to France. Likewise, British Field Marshal H.H. Kitchener did not have many machineguns when he confronted Sudanese jihadists at Omdurman, but the few he had produced...
The Armed Forces would do even better in the process of innovation if they were willing to stage more realistic wargames in which adversaries could use unconventional tactics instead of fighting the way American generals and admirals prefer. They would also be helped if defense spending could be allocated according to a rational judgment of strategic priorities, not based on the political muscle of major defense contractors and their allies on Capitol Hill. That, however, seems unlikely to change as long as America remains a democracy.

Silent Sputnik?

Many experts note that U.S. hegemony might be endangered by the Nation’s failure to produce more math, science, and engineering graduates. The United States has made up for this shortfall in the past by importing smart people from abroad (38 percent of those holding doctorates in science and engineering are foreign-born). But that has become harder in the wake of post-9/11 visa restrictions and booming economies in China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, all major sources of American scientific and engineering talent who discourage immigration. If China can keep more of its geniuses at home, it will be easier for Beijing to challenge U.S. power. Some scientists warn that the United States is facing a “silent Sputnik” crisis that could imperil its leadership.

Remedying this looming shortfall will probably require more funding for math, science, and engineering education. It will be even more expensive to translate the resulting ideas into actual military programs. It does not necessarily take a great deal of money to innovate: breakthroughs such as blitzkrieg and carrier warfare emerged out of paltry military budgets in the interwar years. But it does take a huge investment to bring inventions to fruition, especially today, when each new weapons system costs several times more than its predecessor. It also costs a lot to field high-quality Soldiers able to cope with the complexity of modern war. The annual cost for each member of the U.S. Armed Forces more than doubled in constant terms over the past 30 years—from $125,000 per person in 1970 to $264,000 in 2003.

Despite the fervent hopes of some transformation advocates, there is no way to increase military power significantly while cutting costs. Today, even more than in the 15th century, more military capability requires “money, more money, and again more money.” With America facing budget deficits and looming bills for social welfare programs, questions inevitably arise about whether it can afford to keep spending so much on defense. Or should it rely on its economic and cultural “soft power”?

Why RMAs Matter

History is driven by many factors, but in academia’s rush to focus on economics, race, class, sexuality, geography, germs, culture, or other influences, it would be foolish and short-sighted to overlook the impact of military prowess and especially aptitude in taking advantage of major shifts in warfighting. Of course, a country’s success, or lack thereof, in harnessing change cannot be divorced from such underlying factors as its economic health, scientific sophistication, educational...

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system, or political stability. But, contrary to Napoleon's belief, God is not necessarily "on the side of the big battalions." Even large and wealthy countries often lose wars and head into long-term decline through a lack of military skill.

Indeed, while some states translate riches into military power, as America did in the early 20th century, other states have translated military power into riches, as when England sent its navy to conquer colonies and carve out trade routes and Prussia sent its army to overrun neighboring German principalities. Some states are drained by war, but many attain Gustavus Adolphus' ideal of making war "pay for itself"—a feat achieved most recently by the United States when it succeeded in making its allies foot most of the bill for liberating Kuwait in 1991.

The ongoing proliferation of destructive technology means that the link between economic and military power is more tenuous than ever. Al Qaeda, whose entire budget could not buy a single F–22, can inflict devastating damage on the world's richest country. Advances in biological warfare and cyberwar promise to put even more destructive potential into the hands of ever smaller groups—as does the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Imagine the devastating consequences of a megaterrorist attack. Not only could millions die but international travel and commerce—the lifeblood of the global economy—could be severely disrupted as well. Such a scenario reveals the falsity of economic determinist arguments, which counsel that military strength is unimportant and that it is feasible to stint on military preparedness in order to strengthen the economy. On the contrary, there can be no long-term prosperity without security. The entire world today depends, no matter how begrudgingly or unwittingly, on the protection provided by the United States, whose military keeps air and sea lines open, safeguards energy supplies, and deters most cross-border aggression.

Dreamers can convince themselves that military power no longer matters, that economic interdependence has consigned war to the dustbin of history, and that a country need only wield soft power, but history has delivered a stark rebuke to such wishful thinking. The attacks of September 11, 2001, put an end to a decade of talk about the "end of history," a "strategic pause," the inexorable flow of "globalization," and the "peace dividend." The incidence of war may have declined for the moment, but great dangers still loom. Santayana had it right: "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

**Fighting Wildcats and Rodents**

Technological advance will not change the essential nature of war. Fighting will never be an antiseptic engineering exercise. It will always be a bloody business subject to chance and uncertainty in which the will of one nation or subnational group will be pitted against another, and the winner will be the one that can inflict and absorb more punishment than the other side. But the way punishment gets inflicted has been changing for 500 years, and it will continue to change in strange and unpredictable ways.

In assessing the future conduct of conflict, most analysts fall into one of two camps. One stresses the dangers of terrorists and guerrillas who use cheap, simple weapons such as the AK–47, machete, or explosives. The other stresses the danger of high-tech weapons such as cruise missiles and killer satellites proliferating around the world and into the hands of states such as China and North Korea. The former school (associated with ground-combat arms) underscores the need for better warriors, the latter school (associated with air and naval forces) the need for better machines. The reality is that both high- and low-intensity threats are real and that more superlative people as well as first-rate equipment are needed to counter them.

Today, the United States is much further along in figuring out how to tame the Republican Guard than al Qaeda, and it needs to place more emphasis on making up for its deficiencies in irregular warfare rather than simply enhancing its already substantial lead in conventional warfare. While the information revolution has decreased the number of weapons and soldiers needed to defeat a conventional adversary, occupation duty and nation-building—the prerequisites for turning a battlefield triumph into a long-term political victory—continue to demand lots of old-fashioned infantry. Therefore, the United States and its allies would be mistaken to seriously stint on force size in order to procure more high-tech systems.

But that does not mean that America can simply ignore the dangers of major warfighting or the dictates of technological change. That was the mistake Britain made before 1914 and again before 1939. The British had the world's best "small war" force—an army well trained and equipped for fighting bandits and guerrillas—but it was ludicrously insufficient to deter German aggression or defeat Germany once a world war broke out. That mistake, symbolized by deficiencies in tanks and aircraft carriers, hastened the end of Pax Britannica.

Today, the possibility of conventional interstate war is lower than at any time in 500 years, but it has not disappeared altogether. Because Americans and other citizens of Western democracies no longer seem willing to suffer the same level of casualties experienced by their ancestors, their militaries must be able to defeat adversaries at scant cost in lives. That argues for keeping the qualitative edge that America gained in the information age, an edge that cannot be preserved by standing still. It will be necessary to keep...
almost useless against adversaries clever enough to avoid presenting obvious targets for precision-guided munitions. To fight and win future wars, which may resemble a series of terrorist attacks or hit-and-run raids more than traditional force-on-force armored, aerial, or naval engagements, will require reorganizing conventional militaries to emphasize such skills as cultural awareness, foreign language knowledge, information operations, civil affairs, and human intelligence. It will also require cutting away the bureaucratic fat to turn bloated industrial age hierarchies into lean information age networks capable of utilizing the full potential of high-tech weapons and highly trained soldiers.

Whether the United States is ready for such challenges will determine whether it can keep its position as the lone superpower or the world will see another power shift. The course of future history will turn on the outcome. JFQ

NOTES


2 Ralph Rotte and Christoph M. Schmidt argue that “technology is . . . a negligible factor” in determining the outcome of battles. But they base this conclusion on an analysis of a database that seems to consist mainly of battles between industrialized nations. Certainly technology was not “negligible” in determining the outcome at Omdurman or lots of other imperial clashes. See Rotte and Schmidt, On the Production of Victory: Empirical Determinants of Battlefield Success in Modern War, IZA Discussion Paper No. 491 (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, May 2002), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=314204>.


5 Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 4, argue that “democracies’ emphasis on individuals and their concomitant rights and privileges produces better leaders and soldiers more willing to take the initiative on the battlefield.” But Risa Brooks, in “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?” International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003), 149–191, points out many flaws in their argument.


7 George Orwell made this point: “Discipline, for instance, is ultimately the same in all armies. Orders have to be obeyed and enforced by punishment if necessary, the relationship of officer and man has to be the relationship of superior and inferior.” See Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, ed., The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell (Boston: Nonpareil Books, 2000), vol. 2, My Country Right or Left, 1940–1943, 250. Of course, discipline and punishment are usually far harsher in the armies of authoritarian states than in those of democracies.


9 John Mitchell, quoted in Rosen, 2.

10 Qiao Liang and Wang Ziangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), 32.


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CALL for Entries

FIRST Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Contest

The September 11, 2001, attacks and the global war on terror challenge the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of Defense, to innovate and transform the way in which the Nation addresses near-term concerns while maintaining focus on long-term security challenges from a full spectrum of potential competitors.

The Department of Defense is going through the largest transformation since its inception. The Department seeks to build upon its strong foundation of defense transformation by taking and bringing in lessons learned beyond the walls of the Pentagon to the broader national security community. To this end, National Defense University will host the First Secretary of Defense Transformation Essay Contest to inspire critical and innovative thinking on how to adapt national security institutions to meet current and future challenges.

The purpose of this competition is to stimulate new approaches to U.S. Government transformation from a broad spectrum of civilian and military students. Essays should address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices and provide creative, feasible ideas on how to transform our national security institutions.

Winning essays will be published by NDU Press as a “Special Feature” in the fourth quarter issue of Joint Force Quarterly. Authors of the first, second, and third place essays will be recognized by the Secretary of Defense and awarded cash prizes and certificates of recognition. If conditions permit, winners may meet with the Secretary for personal congratulations and photographs. All finalists’ papers in each category will be evaluated for future publication in JFQ. This is a joint, interagency writing contest; papers must meet rigorous academic standards.

Competitors may write on any aspect of U.S. Government transformation—addressing the coherent employment of the political, military, economic, and informational instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. Essays with a joint, interagency, or integrated operations emphasis, as well as those addressing nontraditional security issues, are encouraged.

Full details, including deadlines, eligibility, and judging criteria can be found at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm

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