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Correction

In JFQ 44 (1st Quarter 2007), Major Stacy Bathrick, USA, Public Affairs Officer for Special Operations Command, Pacific, was not credited for her contribution to Major General David P. Fridovich, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Krawchuk, USA, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach.” Major Bathrick provided background and research for this article.
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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

ABOUT THE COVERS

The front cover depicts F–16 taking off from Aviano Air Base, Italy (U.S. Air Force/Sisaach L. Freem an); Soldiers conducting antiterrorist training in Bulgaria (U.S. Army Europe/Gary L. Kieffer); USS Monterey arriving in Greece to join Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (U.S. Navy/Paul Farley); and C–130 dropping humanitarian aid to flood victims in Kenya (U.S. Navy/Robert Palomares) [background] nighttime view of USEUCOM area of responsibility. The table of contents shows U.S. Marines training with People’s Liberation Army Navy marines in China (U.S. Marine Corps/Jeremy J. Harper); Sailor training local customs agents in East Timur (U.S. Navy/Don Bray); Thai soldiers in urban terrain training, Exercise Cobra Gold 2006 (4th Combat Camera Squadron/Effen Lopez); Indonesian peacekeepers departing for UN Lebanon Force in Lebanon (4th Combat Camera Squadron/John M. Foster). The back cover shows B–2 refueling over Australia during Exercise Green Lightning (U.S. Air Force/Shane A. Cuomo); MV–22 making vertical takeoff from USS Wasp (U.S. Navy/Timothy Remsen); Soldiers securing area near Forward Operating Base Nimic, Iraq, to gather intelligence (U.S. Army/Russell Lee Klika); and U.S. Carl Vinson being upgraded with latest technology while having nuclear fuel replenished (U.S. Navy/Joshua Hammond).

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Strategic Communication in the Department of Defense

A Continuous Process

By FRANK THORP IV

The U.S. military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, coordinate, and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s interests. Changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies, to implement more deliberate and well-developed strategic communication (SC) processes.

Effective communication by the United States must build upon coordinated actions and information at all levels of the U.S. Government in order to maintain credibility and trust. This will be accomplished through an emphasis on accuracy, consistency, veracity, timeliness, and transparency in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building relationships that advance national interests.

With the publishing of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap last September, a watershed event occurred: the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to implement coordination and synchronization of the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s interests.

Not long after this roadmap was approved and promulgated, a concept of operations was developed, coordinated with all applicable parties, approved, and widely distributed. It establishes a proven construct based on operational planning. Whereas the old school of thought placed communication (usually titled public affairs) somewhere near the execution phase, the new school of strategic communication planning identifies those combinations of actions and words that are most likely to produce the desired understanding and actions by key audiences.

SC Philosophy

The strategic communication process is continuous and integrated from the beginning of each operational planning cycle. The SC cycle moves quickly and can repeat itself several times in the course of operational planning. Strategic communication takes Government policy and consistently applies it to what we say and do. When what we say and what we do are not synchronized or are inconsistent with policy, a “Say–Do Gap” is created, our efforts are not maximized, the desired effect is perhaps not achieved, and the disconnect adversely affects our credibility as a military force and as a nation.

Previous dialogue about strategic communication focused on the informational element of national power, and most agreed that this element was the main driver toward SC effects. But in true strategic communication, we acknowledge the interdependency of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements. Strategic communication provides a process to integrate and synchronize the DIME effort, affecting the way we work to achieve desired effects.

Inside the military, we ensure that our roles in the DIME elements are integrated and synchronized internally and that we are prepared to integrate and synchronize those efforts in the interagency and coalition SC process. Through this process, we help the Nation achieve desired effects, either independently or in concert with other nations, intergovernmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations.

Four-Phase Process

Research and Analysis. Information can be collected in advance of serious contemplation of action, but research becomes more deliberate and focused as situational requirements arise. Research is focused on the commander’s intent and desired effects, both of which must shape all phases of the SC process. During this phase, we attempt to understand our audiences and their environment, how they think, what they believe, and how they routinely receive information upon which they trust and act—in other words, what it takes for us to create desired effects. Reachback capabilities may be a key contributor toward optimizing the resources required of a combatant command or joint task force to perform the needed research.

Planning. Desired effects prompt planners to develop courses of action that meet the commander’s intent. Planning includes branches and sequels that seize opportunities and adjust execution as assessments deem necessary. Planning can be done both within the individual lines of operation and
Open Letter to *JFQ* Readers

*Joint Force Quarterly* is mindful that many of its readers have experienced multiple tours of duty in one or more theaters in the war on terror. We want to hear your stories, share your practical insights, and improve the way our government secures national security interests in partnership with allies and nongovernmental organizations. Even when manuscripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, *JFQ* can usually find a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author’s study to outside institutes and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. We ask that authors and research groups continue submitting the broad array of articles and thoughtful critiques unfettered and would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses.

The following are areas of interest that *JFQ* expects to return to frequently, with no submission deadline:

- orchestrating instruments of national power
- coalition operations
- employing the economic instrument of power
- future of naval power
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- industry collaboration for national security
- integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational approaches)
- joint air and space power
- Just War theory
- defending against surprise attack
- proliferation and weapons of mass destruction
- prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries
- military and diplomatic history

The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues:

**June 1, 2007** (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007):
U.S. Pacific Command
Focus on China
SEDCDEF and CJCS Essay Contest Winners

**December 1, 2008**
(Ussue 49, 2nd quarter 2008):
Focus on Air and Space Power
U.S. Special Operations Command

**September 1, 2007**
(Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008):
The Long War
Homeland Defense
U.S. Northern Command

**March 1, 2008**
(Issue 50, 3rd quarter 2008):
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Stability and Security Operations
U.S. Central Command

*JFQ* readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the *So what?* question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

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Joint Doctrine Update

Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

The joint doctrine development community (JDDC) revised or published an unprecedented 25 joint publications in 2006. The efforts of the JDDC, which consists of the Joint Staff, Services, and the combatant commands, should come as no surprise because it has engaged in sustained combat operations in support of the war on terror for over 5 years. During this time period, the JDDC has revised over 96 percent of the publications in the hierarchy.

The revisions of Capstone Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Keystone publications have been the most significant achievements. In the past year, the Chairman approved all of these publications, except for JP 2–0, Intelligence Support, and JP 4–0, Logistics, both due to be completely revised in summer 2007. JP 1 consolidated the previous versions of JP 1 and JP 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces. This publication expanded interagency and multinational aspects of operations, updated joint force characteristics, and reflected portions of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Most notably, JP 1 introduced the term irregular warfare into joint doctrine.

The introduction of irregular warfare posed a unique situation as doctrine and concept were developed nearly simultaneously. The insertion of irregular warfare into joint doctrine will occur through revisions of various joint publications that must discuss irregular warfare activities. The parallel development of the irregular warfare joint operating concept will continue through rigorous experimentation. Lessons learned from experimentation, coupled with capturing best practices from current operations, will have significant impacts on future doctrine. In addition, U.S. Joint Forces Command will assess the need for joint doctrine on counter-insurgency, counterterrorism, and combating terrorism.

Perhaps the most profound changes to joint operations and joint planning doctrine since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 occurred during the recent revisions of JP 3–0, Joint Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Planning. JP 3–0 introduced a new “range of military operations” to encompass military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response contingencies; and major operations and campaigns. Joint operations added three principles (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) to the principles of war and replaced the four-phase model with a six-phase one. This new phasing model incorporated lessons from recent combat operations to change the “decisive operations” phase to the “dominate” phase and to replace “transition” with two new phases: “stabilize” and “enable civil authority.” Furthermore, JP 3–0 covered the systems perspective of the operational environment, the effects-based approach to planning, and effects assessment.

JP 5–0 incorporated the joint operational planning process to complement the joint operational planning and execution system (JOPES). While providing a link to JOPES, it also focuses on military decision-making and operational design between combatant commanders and components or subordinate joint forces.

Finally, the JDDC continues to make significant contributions to the joint force. A recent survey of Joint Staff, combatant command staffs (division and branch heads), and joint professional military education venues found that over 93 percent use joint doctrine in some aspect of their jobs. Over 86 percent reported using joint doctrine at least monthly. Of that percentage, over half use it weekly. Only 3 percent reported being dissatisfied with the quality of information.1 With the number one complaint about joint doctrine being that it is outdated, the JDDC efforts to provide the best possible product will continue in earnest.

For access to joint publications, visit the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System Web site at https://jdeis.js.mil.

Joint Publications Revised
(Calendar Year 2006)
JP 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning
JP 1–04, Legal Support
JP 3–13, Information Planning
JP 3–50, Personnel Operations
JP 3–68, Interagency Coordination
JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations
JP 6–6, Joint Communications System
JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support
JP 3–07.2, Antiterrorism
JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare
JP 3–17, Air Mobility Operations (Ch. 1)
JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations
JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning
JP 2–01.2, Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence Support
JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support
JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats
JP 3–13.4, Military Deception
JP 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Consequence Management
JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations
JP 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations
JP 4–02, Health Service Support
JP 3–0, Joint Operations

Joint Publications Revised
(2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2007)
JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
JP 3–07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
JP 3–16, Multinational Operations
JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment
JP 3–60, Targeting
JP 3–27, Homeland Defense
JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

Joint Publications Projected for Revision
(3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 2007)
JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction
JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations
JP 3–07.4, Joint Counter Drug Operations
JP 4–05.1, Manpower Mobilization/Demobilization
JP 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
JP 3–28, Civil Support
JP 4–0, Joint Logistic Support

NOTE

1 Joint doctrine survey results brief delivered on November 7, 2006, at the 38th Joint Doctrine Working Party. This conference took place at the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Virginia.
To the Editor: Two articles in the last issue of Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 44, 1st quarter 2007), Philip Wasielewski’s “Defining the War on Terror” and Jerry Long’s “Confronting an Army Whose Men Love Death: Osama, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” are a help in understanding the essence of the war on terror, and such an understanding is crucial to winning. But there are some points made by both authors that need further clarification.

For instance, Professor Long states, “The concern is that the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption . . . and its larger war on terror proceed from a serious misreading of Islamic ideology and that U.S. actions may not ameliorate the threat but exacerbate it.” Unfortunately, it is Professor Long who has somewhat misread Islamic ideology. His key contention, based on a comment by Osama bin Laden of 80 years of “humiliation and disgrace,” is that “the context for 9/11 is modern Middle East history, beginning with World War I” and that, to many Muslims, Western (particularly U.S.) actions in that region in the last 80 years primarily caused this humiliation.

A more nuanced reading of bin Laden’s comment traces the “80 years” reference back to the abolition of the Sunni Islamic caliphate by the Republic of Turkey in the early 1920s. This point is confirmed by Professor Long’s own quotation from Mullah Mustapha Kreikar: “There is no difference between this [Iraqi] occupation and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan . . . The resistance is not only a reaction to the American invasion, it is part of the continuous Islamic struggle since the collapse of the caliphate.” Professor Long omitted the next sentence that clarifies what is meant: “All Islamic struggles since then are part of one organised effort to bring back the caliphate.” Bin Laden has also commented repeatedly on the caliphate.

More importantly, a significant number of statements from bin Laden make clear that the timeline he is focused on is not modern history but a much longer period—1,500 years back to the foundation of Islam. For example, bin Laden has stated, “The struggle between us and them [the West], the confrontation and clashing began centuries ago and will continue until judgement day.” The conclusion is clear: the underlying issue for bin Laden is the caliphate, not modern events in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and Bosnia. The question is why.

Professor Long comments that “there is an inherent clash of ideologies and not simply national interests,” but he does not go on to develop this point fully. Part of this ideological clash comes from the concept he identifies as Jahiliyya, the state of ignorance that prevailed before Islam was established, but he does not attribute this concept, as Colonel Wasielewski does, to the Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328).

Based on this concept, Professor Long points out that bin Laden considers all Muslim governments illegitimate. He fails, however, to clarify two important points here: first, al Qaeda views all current Muslim governments—democratic, authoritarian, or highly religious—as totally illegitimate; second, Ibn Taymiyya in the 13th century and then Sayyid Qutb in the 20th century both believed that any state that did not put God wholly at its center was illegitimate. Qutb, probably the most important ideologist for al Qaeda, believed that the separation of religion and state was “hideous schizophrenia” and that this secularism of the Republic of Turkey was an attempt to “exterminate” Islam.

Secularism, therefore, is a crucial factor that makes all current Muslim governments, and all other governments in the world today, illegitimate (Jahili as Professor Long puts it) in the eyes of al Qaeda. It is important to understand this idea because it shows what al Qaeda hates most is what the West is, not what it does. The numbers of Muslims who fully adhere to this ideology are tiny. The vast majority of Muslims, as evidenced by numerous opinion polls and by Pew Global Attitude Surveys, oppose what the Vice President of Indonesia, Yusef Kalla, has described as these “fringe ideological views.”

An accurate analysis of the source of al Qaeda’s ideology is vital to ensuring that the proposed methods of dealing with it are effective. Most scholars would agree that a key reason for Muslim discontent and a foundational explanation for the rise of al Qaeda is their perception of the failure of Islam, relative to its illustrious past and relative to other societies currently. Al Qaeda focuses on the reestablishment of the caliphate because it believes only with such a development will Islam recover its past glories. Muslim scholars who have studied this situation agree that the decline commenced in the 12th century due to internal reasons and not, as is frequently thought, due to the Crusades, Western imperialism, or globalisation.

Many experts, however, would accept that globalisation is an explanatory factor for the rise of al Qaeda itself. Professor Michael Mousseau argues that in the movement from a nonmarket to a market economy, globalisation produced significant disruption in European and now in Islamic and other societies commencing in the mid 19th century. Such can and does lead to a support for terror. Professor Long correctly attributes the impact of the war in Afghanistan as a factor leading to the rise of al Qaeda. My own research would indicate that the Sunni/Shia conflict is the fourth and final part of the explanation for its rise.

Based on this more detailed analysis, it is clear that the solution to this problem is, as with the Cold War, primarily the use of soft power to reverse the relative failure of Islam and to minimise the impact of globalisation on Islamic societies.

Colonel Wasielewski’s article does look at the historic sources of al Qaeda’s ideology, while surprisingly ignoring the impact of Saudi Wahhabism. While he correctly identifies the need to challenge their ideology, I would disagree with some of his suggested actions. Accepting that al Qaeda’s ideology is based on fringe views, Muslims clearly are the only ones who can confront this ideology successfully. This part of the war on terror must be led by Muslim states—particularly the democratic states of Indonesia and Turkey. (It is important to remember here that the majority of Muslims live in Asia, not the Middle East and Persian Gulf.) Some success in this effort is evident already in Indonesia where the majority of activists in the al Qaeda–related movement Jamaah Islamiyah have apparently decided to achieve their aims by nonviolent means.

Fully understanding the source of Muslim grievances, the ideology that al Qaeda espouses, and the extent to which it is a virulent form of Sunni extremism helps to clarify the approach to winning the war on terror and the crucial importance of Muslim states leading that effort, particularly on the key ideological front.

—Richard F. Whelan
Dublin, Ireland

Executive Summary

Today it should be clear that not only is weakness provocative, but the perception of weakness on our part can be provocative as well. A conclusion by our enemies that the United States lacks the will or the resolve to carry out missions that demand sacrifice and demand patience is every bit as dangerous as an imbalance of conventional military power.

—Donald H. Rumsfeld

This Forum’s objective is to present a handful of security cooperation challenges and developments that bear scrutiny and demand resources dedicated elsewhere concurrent with the prosecution of the war on terror. Because the topic of our Special Feature is U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), our original intent was to select Forum articles that detail international relations issues within the USEUCOM area of responsibility. An excellent article, however, submitted by Special Operations Command, Pacific, and featured in the last issue, inspired a followup contribution from a professor at the National War College that deals with Southeast Asia.

In an age of “barbarism emboldened by technology,” it is tempting for military thinkers to view the world through the prism of the terror threat, but older and more conventional points of friction, such as relations with Russia and China, are legion. The ability of the United States to engage effectively the vast panorama of emergent international security issues before they become major problems is difficult at the best of times, but doing so during the course of a long, asymmetric conflict requires the careful orchestration of all instruments of national power, economy of force, and persistence.

Alexis de Tocqueville spoke to this problem in the 19th century with the United States as his point of reference:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all these are advantages that have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.1

The information age has arguably worsened—not improved—the ability of the United States to pursue either quietly or patiently a lengthy, complex strategic purpose, such as that mentioned by de Tocqueville. For numerous reasons, America is at a relative disadvantage in the realm of information operations despite its sophisticated capabilities. In addition to the recognized problem of incentive imbalances and moral consequences in asymmetric war, a costly long-term conflict affords strategic opportunity for spectator states, both friendly and antagonistic. The responsibility of the President of the United States to preserve the lives of U.S. citizens while serving the best long-term interests of the Nation requires the Wisdom of Solomon and the charisma of a great communicator. At stake is public support, the sine qua non for any long-term strategy in a democracy.

On October 24, 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted, “The American people are the center of gravity for our enemies.” Both the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have spoken to the challenge of a long-term, coherent strategy for the war on terror and requisite public support. According to General Peter Schoomaker, “we need to focus on long-term strategy, but not just for Iraq. When people talk about the ends, ways and means of strategy, they usually focus on the ends and the ways—few understand the actual means and the time required to generate those means.” Separately, General James Conway told Marines at Camp Fallujah that he fears there are two timelines at work: “One is how long it is going to take us to do the job,” and the other is “how long the country...
is going to allow us to do the job. And they’re not syncing up.”

An important factor influencing the time and resources dedicated to a strategy is opportunity cost. The U.S. Central Command, for obvious reasons, receives a disproportionate share of forces and resources that would normally be more evenly distributed among the geographic combatant commands for other strategic purposes. Estimating the opportunity costs for the conduct of a generations-long war on terror surely constitutes military art at its most hypothetical. How severe is the strategic risk of paths not taken in global theater security cooperation? Our Forum examines various inputs to this difficult calculus, both current and developing.

In our first Forum installment, Dr. Milan Vego of the Naval War College surveys Russia from the perspective of one who believes that too many U.S. military professionals ceased to study that nation seriously after 1989 and thus are in need of a comprehensive update. The illiberal drift of Russia toward what many consider to be enduring (or in the case of Winston Churchill, inscrutable) national instincts has received much press attention in recent months, and Professor Vego’s essay is purposefully broad. The Army War College Strategic Studies Institute recently noted that “a new, improved Russian military establishment is arising” and that it demands to be taken seriously. Professor Vego predicts that there will be serious tension between Russia and the West in the future and that a serious conflict is not out of the question.

The second Forum contribution was solicited after National Defense University Press published Dr. Marvin Ott’s thought-provoking Strategic Forum No. 222 for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (the Strategic Forum series is available for download at ndupress.ndu.edu). In the last issue of JFQ, Major General David Fridovich and Lieutenant Colonel Fred Krachuk wrote of the need for a comprehensive approach to combating terror in Southeast Asia. Dr. Ott was generous in his willingness to complement the U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific, “indirect approach” with an article providing additional context to the challenge of countering support for terror groups within sovereign countries. The author asserts that the longstanding U.S. regional presence in Southeast Asia lacks a comprehensive security strategy addressing a pervasive sense of Muslim grievance exploited by jihadists. He also argues for a serious treatment of the Chinese strategic challenge in Southeast Asia.

China features even more prominently in our third Forum article, which outlines Sino economic, military, and political activities—especially in the littorals. At a time when the United States is studying the requirement for a geographic combatant command dedicated to Africa, the Chinese are forging deep ties with many African nations to secure access to markets and the continent’s vast natural resources. Colonel Gordon Magenheim argues that U.S. force projection capabilities are heavily dependent on the availability of modern seaports to accommodate the largest classes of commercial shipping. He further speculates that African seaport operators may be reluctant to invite Chinese ire or risk disrupting normal port operations in favor of U.S. interests in times of crisis.

Our final entry in the Forum also includes a maritime focus, in this case the African Gulf of Guinea, which was recently declared a U.S. strategic national interest. The nations located in this region include Nigeria, the largest oil producer in Africa, which sends half of its oil to the United States. Within 13 years, Nigerian oil production is expected to exceed the total oil output of all Persian Gulf countries. Amid the region’s vast wealth are persistent challenges such as disease, corruption, and the drug trade—all of which demand interagency cooperation, not military solutions. For those challenges that do lend themselves to U.S. theater security cooperation, Lieutenant Commander Patrick Paterson argues that the U.S. Navy’s improved littoral capabilities seem ideally suited and prescient. The Gulf of Guinea is a region that Americans will become well acquainted with in the years to come.

In this issue’s Special Feature section, we examine the only geographic combatant command with a wholly forward-based headquarters. USEUCOM interacts with 92 countries, including the 26 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the USEUCOM footprint in Europe is smaller than in the past, the scope of its activities has increased, just as NATO itself is becoming an organization capable of projecting security. General Bantz Craddock leads off our examination of his command and area of responsibility with an interview focused on the challenges that have inspired a new theater strategy. The interview includes a discussion of NATO, the much anticipated U.S. Africa Command, and of course, Afghanistan.

Today there are more than 60 countries working in Afghanistan to promote stability and reconstruction. Of these, 26 NATO and 11 non-NATO countries have military forces on the ground. This is a departure from NATO’s formative years as a “reactive alliance,” where forces were not funded or logistically equipped to operate more than a few hundred miles from home. With more than 50,000 troops engaged in activities on three continents, such as the mission in Afghanistan, member nations have reportedly been dismayed by attendant costs, which under NATO’s “cost fall where they lie” principle, are not evenly distributed. At the NATO Summit in Prague 4 years ago, it was generally agreed that member nations would contribute a minimum of 2 percent of their gross domestic product to national security. Today, only seven countries in the Alliance meet that goal, making this commitment appear less of a floor and more of a ceiling.

Shortly after relinquishing command of U.S. European Command to General Craddock, General James Jones spoke publicly about his experiences as the commander of USEUCOM and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He noted that the resources that our NATO partners invest in national defense are shrinking while their political will to act is increasing. He called this situation “a train wreck waiting to happen.” Similar views were expressed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his farewell address on December 15, 2006: “Ours is . . . a world of many friends and allies, but sadly, realistically, friends and allies with declining defense investment and declining capabilities, and . . . with increasing vulnerabilities. All of which require that the United States of America invest more.”

As an investment of your time, we hope that you find this issue of JFQ thought-provoking. We encourage your feedback, hopefully in the form of manuscripts delineating your lessons learned in joint, integrated operations.

—D.H. Gurney

As the articles in this issue’s Forum highlight, the Iraq war and the war on terror are only two of myriad regional and functional threats that the United States must keep on its radar screen. The complexity of these threats precludes unilateral U.S. solutions and will require partnership—diplomatic, military, or economic—with allies. The United States and Europe barely had time to recalibrate their relationships to post–Cold War realities before September 11, and its aftermath necessitated another shift (in U.S. eyes, at least). Much of the world stood with the United States on September 12; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) surveillance planes and personnel were dispatched to patrol the east coast of the United States. Yet a few months later, NATO forces were left on the sidelines as the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan began, and many European and worldwide allies rejected participation in what they considered a war of choice in Iraq. The following book addresses the subject of how relations derailed, seemingly so quickly, and what might be done to reach a new state of normalcy for a new era.

Sarwar Kashmeri, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Association, took up this topic after attending a conference exploring the European Union’s impact on the transatlantic alliance. His approach was to talk with “eminent people with substantial expertise and hands-on experience in managing various aspects of the alliance and use their expertise to understand better the alliance’s decayed state and to help chart a future for it” (p. xiv). The interlocutors were George H.W. Bush, James A. Baker, Wesley K. Clark, Chuck Hagel, John Major, Hugo Paemen, Ana de Palacio, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Volcker, and Caspar Weinberger.

Kashmeri concludes that the current transatlantic rift over the Iraq war is fundamentally different from ones that have occurred (and been overcome) in the past because the foundation of the post–World War II alliance has eroded to such a point that trying to rebuild on it is futile. One cornerstone of the foundation, Europe itself, has been transformed by the growth and strength of the European Union; unless the United States repositions its alignment with this altered European cornerstone, relating to it as an ally rather than a potential geopolitical rival, the foundation for relations will remain unstable.

A second source of friction is the role of NATO in a post–Cold War world: “The attempt to remake NATO as a global fighting machine makes the divide worse. . . . It is being forced to take on a new mission—operating anywhere in the world—for which it is singularly unqualified” (p. 44). The close connection between NATO and the United Nations, a tie held in high esteem by Europeans but largely disregarded by Americans, is another area of disagreement.

Kashmeri explains his perceptions of the sources of friction well, deftly interspersing his interviewees’ comments to bolster his argument (the rather jolting candor of some comments, considering their sources, is a high point of the book). However, he falls short in recommending actionable ways to recreate the alliance, defaulting in several cases to a series of “Why not?” suggestions that are conceptually broad but practically weak (“why not reenergize NATO by using it to forge a consensus on new rules of engagement? . . . Who knows where this exercise will take the erstwhile alliance?”) (p. 97). Who knows, indeed.

—L. Yambrick
Reynolds’ first-draft history of Marine Corps participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is intended as a framework for understanding how Marines coped with the challenges of their mission in 2002 and 2003: defeating Saddam’s regime and its supporters and liberating the Iraqi people. Reynolds and his colleagues from the United States Marine Corps History and Museums Division collected an impressive amount of data from varied sources to present the story. Like most services’ official historians, Reynolds appears to wage a battle to pull together a factual and informative narrative while avoiding exaggerated praise for Marine exploits. Nevertheless, his book raises several critical issues, particularly as it juxtaposes the Corps leaders’ confident approach to combat in Iraq with their distress for postcombat stabilization and security operations (SASO) and as it reveals the Iraqi conflict’s implications for the U.S. military in preparing to fight socially complex and adaptive adversaries in the future.

Operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 appeared to validate the organizational, planning, and operational flexibility of Marine Air Ground Task Forces claimed by Marine Corps planners. However, encounters with Taliban elements during Operation Anaconda in spring 2002 exposed systemic flaws in U.S. planning, decisionmaking, and warfare methods at all levels. The Pentagon’s excessive concern with troop levels and deployments to Afghanistan, coupled with the U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) inadequate assessment of its mission, drove warfighters toward an operational solution insufficient for achieving the desired strategic endstates. Operation Anaconda should have reinforced to military planners how uncertainty and chance on the battlefield can overcome accepted doctrinal procedures and technological advances. The disputed issues in Afghanistan, chief among them a clear understanding of the differentiation between desired military effects and campaign endstates, would appear again during the march to war with Iraq in 2003.

Reynolds details I Marine Expeditionary Force’s (I MEF’s) efforts to align its operations and objectives to fit the USCENTCOM campaign plan’s “shock and awe” rubric. Yet he does not address the most critical issue in the planning of this or any campaign: how senior leaders choose the effects their forces’ actions would have against an adversary and ensuring those potential effects are consistent with achieving the nation’s endstates. Reynolds describes USCENTCOM’s approach to its adversary as more forensic than anticipatory and molded by technicians with templates rather than by a realistic assessment of why and how an enemy might adapt its actions.

Reynolds recounts Marine officers complaining about the need for synchronization between air and ground operations and expressing their uneasiness with an input-based, procedural approach to war as exemplified by the Air Force’s Air Tasking Order process. During OIF Phase III—decisive offensive operations—Marine combat units easily raced north from Kuwait and “liberated” Iraqi cities and towns as far away as Tikrit. But did prewar modeling, simulations, and wargames do nothing toward predicting or assessing the impact of USCENTCOM’s “war-winning actions” on the Iraqis’ complex political, economic, and social systems? If so, Reynolds does not account for how U.S. military officers found themselves facing an enemy they were not prepared to deal with in a country whose culture they did not understand. Rather, he implies that senior civilian leaders relied too much on information from the naive Iraqi expatriate elite and made grossly erroneous assumptions about the Iraqis, their security forces, and the state of Iraq’s economic and industrial infrastructure.

Still, it is hard to comprehend how USCENTCOM components overlooked the SASO mission during the campaign planning to the degree that Reynolds outlines. In prewar estimates, stability operations should have been proposed to last at least until the Iraqis or a coalition entity stood up a functioning government and reestablished the rule of law. There were opportunities during the rehearsals and preparations for the campaign to identify what kinds of interagency help commanders would need in conducting SASO missions. To test their validity, USCENTCOM and its components could have had independent experts review and challenge the assumptions the commands made during the preparations for war and the immediate postwar period. Whether the DOD Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs was stillborn, or its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority, was “amateurish” does not absolve military officers from planning and training for SASO as thoroughly as they would for combat.

Thus, despite sparse planning for postcombat missions, in mid-April I MEF received orders to undertake stability operations in Iraq. Reynolds describes the Marines’ view of SASO as strictly the Army’s business. Corps leaders felt it was time to leave “the sandbox” to “recoc” for the next war. But where were the Marines planning to go when they “recoced”? Were the Corps’ views on SASO in Iraq legitimate and credible given the strategic circumstances? In what other region were the risks to U.S. national security higher, in terms of the likelihood of severe consequences? Then, as now, are there other threats to America’s strategic goals, or to the country’s international credibility, as immediate and as great as the threat of failure to stabilize and secure Iraq? In subsequent versions of this history, Reynolds should examine whether the rapid redeployment of a substantial number of Marines to the United States impacted I MEF ability to provide security and contributed somehow to the rise of the Sunni insurgency or the expansion of the Shiite-backed militias.

Researching and writing history should not be viewed as an exercise to validate the status quo; well-written histories prompt questions and act as catalysts for change. Current Marine operations in Iraq, and particularly those in 2004 and 2005, are fueling questions about the training, equipping, and combat organization of the service.

Notwithstanding his benevolent view of Marine operations in Iraq, Reynolds provides a service by developing a richer context for the continuing debate surrounding prewar strategic assumptions, the cultural dimensions of war, transformational initiatives, and concepts and doctrine for dealing with insurgencies. JFQ

BOOK REVIEWS

H ave the principles of war changed? Does the very notion of such principles have any relevance in the 21st century? These are the questions addressed by Rethinking the Principles of War, a product of a project begun in 2002 that was sponsored by the U.S. Office of Force Transformation and U.S. Navy. This book does not pretend to offer definitive pronouncements on these basic issues; as the preface states, it does not give “a prescription. . . . We are still asking questions” (p. xvi). The people asking the questions are an impressive group of some 30 thinkers, both civilian and military, drawn mainly but not entirely from the United States. Their 29 articles are loosely grouped into 5 parts, dealing with the concept of an American way of war, operational arts in conventional warfare, operational arts in irregular warfare, postconflict and stability operations, and intelligence. The inclusion of work by scholars such as Colin S. Gray, Jon T. Sumida, Milan N. Vego, Wesley K. Wark, and many others provides an impressive and stimulating, if occasionally uneven, collection. All the authors have interesting things to say, and some individual articles are of excellent quality. The editor, Anthony D. McIvor, is a defense and security analyst and editor of the American Intelligence Journal and is one of the progenitors of the Rethinking project.

The term principles of war is not without its problems because, as Antulio J. Echevarria convincingly demonstrates, the current Anglo-American selections are principles of battle, not war. They concentrate on the military defeat of the enemy, rather than holistically embracing political, social, and economic factors as well. Indeed, some of the most significant aspects of this book are the suggestions of new principles for various facets of conflict. Mary H. Kaldor, for example, proposes some “principles for the use of the military in human security operations” (p. 388). She gives primacy to human rights, which, in their emphasis on the rule of law, are not far away from the thinking traditionally employed in British counterinsurgency and peace support operations. Keith J. Mashack and Sean Tytler, in their valuable piece “Refocusing Intelligence,” set out what seems at first glance to be blinding glimpses of the obvious—that intelligence agencies should develop “a culture of stewardship rather than ownership” (p. 541), for instance—but history shows that these basic principles do need to be restated.

Parts of the book are an assessment of where we have come from as much as where we are going, and as such, military historians will find much of value. It should also be required reading for military professionals and scholars concerned with current defense issues, as it pushes forward the debate on the future of warfare. But after finishing the book, I was confirmed in my view that less has changed than some pundits would have us believe. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had much in common with other successful conventional maneuver campaigns of the past. The technology, while more advanced, was used essentially to do things better, rather than to do new things. The situation since the fall of Saddam has had much in common with earlier unsuccessful (or, to be more generous, partially successful) postconflict operations, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies. Looking to the future, new threats such as cyberwar undoubtedly will complicate matters, but whether they will bring about a fundamental transformation in warfare is extremely doubtful. Frank G. Hoffman correctly suggests in his article that in addition to Clausewitz, two other commentators “have much to offer today’s student of war” (p. 315): the 19th-century British writer on colonial warfare, Charles Callwell, and the writer and practitioner of guerrilla warfare, T.E. Lawrence. This is perhaps an obvious suggestion. Less obvious and more intriguing is Robert H. Leonard’s recommendation that the career of Robert Clive, an effective ruler of British India in the 18th century, is worthy of study by modern military and political leaders. Clive was, as Leonard points out, a practitioner of grand strategy “who viewed the military as only one of his tools—albeit an important one” (p. 222). The careful study of history, not to provide crude “lessons” but rather “approximate precedents,” as the British naval historian Andrew Gordon describes them, is a key theme that emerges from this volume.

In my view, the emphasis on whether the traditional principles of war remain fit for purpose is misplaced. They fairly obviously continue to provide commonsense guidance for the conduct of battles and campaigns, but not, as this volume demonstrates, the higher direction of war in all its facets. Neither does a search for novelty take us very far. What is really needed is a concentration on what we might describe as the fundamentals of war that have remained constant for centuries. At one level, this is as straightforward as working out what political goal is to be achieved and how to achieve it, and ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to do so. At another level, it involves absorbing the hard-won lessons of previous campaigns, such as that a successful counterinsurgency requires a political as well as a military dimension. All this requires intensive and objective study of past wars and campaigns. Some of the articles in this collection provide models of how this should be done. As a minor complaint, there are a few annoying errors that suggest that proofreading could have been tightened up—Gold-Water Nicolas instead of Goldwater-Nichols is the worst. JFQ
Most observers, even critics of the Bush administration, would acknowledge that the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. President George W. Bush developed a personal relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that resembled the close partnerships American Presidents often develop with their British counterparts. The United States and Japan are so closely aligned in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea that Kim Jong-Il has blasted Japan as America’s “51st state,” and Japanese forces have served alongside their American and coalition partners in dangerous (if still carefully proscribed) missions in Iraq and the Indian Ocean. Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a Koizumi protégé and has clearly signaled his intention to continue strengthening U.S.-Japan security ties.

There was a time, however, when most observers predicted that the United States and Japan would steadily move apart. In the early to mid-1990s, the relationship was plagued by heightened trade friction, confusion about missions with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and inattention from senior officials on both sides of the Pacific who saw maintenance of the alliance as work for junior officials at best, and as a burden at worst. This drift in the alliance ended with a series of crises from 1994 to 1996, including near-conflict with North Korea over its nuclear programs, aggressive Chinese missile tests against Taiwan, and a backlash against U.S. bases that swept Japan after three U.S. Servicemen raped a young girl on Okinawa. In 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye prevailed upon the White House to “reaffirm” and “redefine” the alliance for a new era, and in April 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto issued a joint security declaration that set in motion enhanced cooperation in intelligence, operational planning, and logistics that laid the groundwork for the close Bush-Koizumi partnership in the war on terror.

Will this partnership last? Part of the answer lies in understanding its foundations and the phoenix-like resurgence of the alliance over the past decade. Political science has not always been useful in this regard, with many works focused on isolating specific variables such as “culture”—using the alliance history to test theories rather than generating theories to explain how the alliance evolved and where it is going. On the Japanese side, the ultimate insider’s account is Yoichi Funabashi’s Alliance Adrift (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), which provides a Bob Woodward-style, blow-by-blow account of the pivotal shift in alliance relations from 1994 to 1996.

Although highly regarded and authoritative, Funabashi’s book is not grounded in theory or prescriptive in any way, which is why Fumio Ota’s new volume is a welcome contribution. Ota used the insider’s perspective gained as Japan’s defense attaché in Washington from 1996 to 1999 to produce a theoretically grounded dissertation at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. This book is his dissertation updated to reflect his experiences as a top policy and intelligence official in Japan’s Defense Agency.

Ota does not predict conclusively that the U.S.-Japan alliance will last, but he gives a Japanese strategist’s argument for why it should last if both nations maintain a clear focus on their national interests. To explain why the partnership was strengthened in the late 1990s in spite of the end of the Soviet threat, he considers the possibilities of simple bureaucratic inertia, a response to China or North Korea, bandwagoning with the United States, or even common values. Ota, a hard-core realist, concludes that the alliance has flourished even after the Cold War because of three factors: its indispensability to regional stability, growing interdependence between the United States and Japan, and globalization—all of which spread Japan’s security consciousness and appreciation for the alliance well beyond Asia.

These structural explanations work well. Ota draws on his operational background to describe how both militaries organized to maintain regional stability in this period, using specific case studies on ballistic missile defense, defense guidelines, and introduction of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement. And while interdependence sounds similar to a liberal institutional explanation for alliances, Ota is really describing how the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) worked to share the risk and try to make the U.S. military more reliant on Japan—a realist explanation that Thucydides would understand. Smaller states in alliance with larger ones always face a dilemma between entrapment by the larger state or abandonment if they do not cooperate enough. Ota demonstrates how the JSDF strove to make themselves indispensable to the U.S. side in order to empower Japan within the alliance and escape either unwilling entrapment in U.S. security policy or abandonment by Washington. Ota is justifiably proud of the growing proficiency of the JSDF, and his arguments reveal the growing realism and confidence of its commanders.

Ota ends by speculating on what might weaken the alliance: a U.S. shift to China, a crisis over bases, or a failure by Japan to measure up in a crisis because of constitutional or legal constraints. Ota gives specific operation examples of how these scenarios could damage the alliance.

I would have liked more attention to the specific action-reaction effect of the North Korean nuclear crisis or China’s military buildup to understand specifically how the external structural environment shapes alliance behavior (since stability is an awfully broad concept for a realist to use). I would also have liked more attention to values, since there is a growing convergence of how Japan and the United States view the role of democracy and rule of law in the international system and vis-à-vis China. Both of these elements would have helped explain not only whether the alliance can or should survive, but also how strong and vibrant it will actually be.

On the whole, however, Vice Admiral Ota has provided a readable and useful contemporary history of the U.S.-Japan alliance that offers important insights and recommendations, particularly for those in the United States who want to understand Japanese strategic thinking on this critical relationship. JFQ
A
uthors John Fishel and Max Manwaring have spent the past two decades studying insurgencies. From their early days with U.S. Southern Command’s Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD), through the researching and writing of 10 books and numerous journal articles, they have refined their theories on internal conflict to identify the means by which the United States can best assist a threatened government in overcoming an insurgency. Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, the latest step in that evolution, encapsulates years of thinking on this timely subject.

From a quantitative factor analysis of 43 post–World War II insurgencies involving a Western power, Fishel and Manwaring identify seven strategic dimensions that are part of successful counterinsurgency strategies. These critical factors, collectively known as the SWORD model, are unity of effort, host government legitimacy, degree of outside support for insurgents, support actions of the intervening power, military actions of the intervening power, the host government’s military actions, and actions versus subversion. Successful counterinsurgencies feature positive action in all seven dimensions (for example, reducing outside support for the insurgents while simultaneously enhancing host-government legitimacy). Further qualitative research by the authors not only confirms the importance of these strategic factors but also identifies their relevance to other forms of low-intensity conflict, such as peacekeeping, combating terrorism, and counternarcotics operations—which Fishel and Manwaring refer to collectively as “uncomfortable wars.”

Through the SWORD model, the authors provide an important reminder that, particularly in the current security environment, victory is not simply the product of winning a series of military engagements with the enemy. Victory is brought about by the unified application of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power, in conjunction with military force. By emphasizing the importance of the psychological, social, political, and economic aspects of warfare, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited provides a theory of conflict that includes what historian Michael Howard famously called “the forgotten dimensions of strategy.”

Without adequate attention to these dimensions, a “small war” is likely to end poorly, despite the operational or technological advantages of the state involved.

Although the authors argue that all seven strategic dimensions must be accounted for in a successful strategy, their relative importance depends on the type of conflict. For example, in a counterinsurgency campaign, the “support actions of the intervening power” is one of the best predictors of success or failure, while in a peacekeeping operation, “unity of effort” plays that role. Nevertheless, a government’s legitimacy is the single factor with the greatest weight across all types of uncomfortable wars.

At the core of many threats facing the international community—whether transnational terrorist groups, narcotics traffickers, guerrilla bands, or Islamic extremists—is a violent challenge to an incumbent government’s “moral right to govern.” The failure of weak or incompetent governments to provide economic opportunity, political participation, or basic security for their population feeds discontent that such groups can exploit for their own nefarious purposes. As a result, Fishel and Manwaring contend, when supporting an ally in a small war, the U.S. Government needs to ensure that all efforts and actions undertaken by Americans and the host nation contribute to the maintenance and expansion of that nation’s ability to govern its territory and people with legitimacy. To this end, they advocate that U.S. foreign policy move beyond a mere focus on the spread of democracy to a pragmatic Wilsonian concept that emphasizes the long-term pursuit of responsible and competent government in regions of the world likely to serve as sources of instability. In carrying out such a strategy, they argue, the United States should serve as a facilitator, helping allied states achieve their “legitimacy” ends with means that they already possess rather than benevolently bestowing gifts of aid. The authors contend that “in the long term, the people and government of a fragile, failing, or failed state must save themselves from themselves” (p. 68).

While legitimacy plays a central role in winning “uncomfortable wars,” the other six factors of the SWORD model must not be neglected. Fishel and Manwaring frequently remind readers that once discontent and grievance evolve into armed rebellion, reform and development alone will not be enough to put the genie back in the bottle. Contrary to those who believe that an exclusive focus on “root causes” can defeat terrorism and insurgency, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited demonstrates that violent internal groups can be defeated only by “a superior organization, a holistic and unified strategy designed to promulgate deeper and more fundamental reforms, and carefully applied deadly force” (p. 44).

Not limiting themselves to counterinsurgency concerns, Fishel and Manwaring explore the applicability of the SWORD model to peace operations, homeland defense, and the war on drugs through case studies and examples, taking a broad world view throughout. In addition to such high-profile cases as the United States in Vietnam, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the 1990 Gulf War, and Italy’s counterterrorism campaign of the 1970s and 1980s, they examine the insurgencies in El Salvador and Peru, Colombia’s decades-long internal turmoil, and Operation Just Cause in Panama.

As with any work of the breadth and depth of Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, some quibbles can be raised. The basic presentation of the SWORD model could be enhanced by inclusion of the statistical analyses and case studies used to derive it; this would allow an independent assessment of the data that underpins the model’s seven strategic dimensions. Also, it seems strange that, in a book on “small wars,” the 1991 Gulf War (a mid-intensity conventional conflict) is used to illustrate a successful example of unity of effort.

These minor points aside, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited is a significant work that speaks directly to challenges presently faced by the United States. It is worthy of being read multiple times, with new insight gained with each reading. Given the importance of the SWORD model for contemporary conflicts and U.S. military doctrine, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited belongs on the bookshelf of anyone interested in military strategy, low-intensity conflict, security assistance, or U.S. foreign policy in the global war on terror.

Reviewed by
WALTER LADWIG

Walter Ladwig is pursuing a PhD at Merton College, Oxford, where his research focuses on the training of Indigenous security forces for counterinsurgency.
New Books from NDU Press

In the Same Light as Slavery:
Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus

Edited by Joseph McMillan
In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus is an attempt to diagnose the reasons for this lack of progress and suggest more productive ways of approaching this complex problem. The volume includes essays by nine leading experts from a variety of disciplines, each approaching the challenge from a different perspective:

- Mark Tessler (University of Michigan) on what the polls actually say about Muslim views on terrorism
- Steven Simon (Council on Foreign Relations) on the roots of anti-American attitudes
- Christine Fair (U.S. Institute of Peace) on where people in the Islamic world get their information
- Caroline Ziemke (Institute for Defense Analyses) on the social factors that foster support for terrorism
- Kumar Ramakrishna (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) on the relationship between educational styles and susceptibility to radicalism
- Scott Atran (CNRS Paris) on the way conflicting cultural frameworks complicate the struggle against terrorism
- Hady Amr and Peter W. Singer (Brookings Institution) on how America could restore its good name in the Islamic world.
- Joseph McMillan (Institute of National Strategic Studies) on the way ahead

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Seeing the Elephant:
The U.S. Role in Global Security

by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

What is the current state of the global security system, and where is it headed? What challenges and opportunities do we face, and what dangers are emerging? How will various regions of the world be affected? How can the United States best act to help shape the future while protecting its security, interests, and values? How can the United States deal with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction?

Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security, an intellectual history of U.S. national security thinking since the fall of the Soviet Union, is an attempt to see the evolving international security system and America’s role in it through the eyes of more than 50 perceptive authors who have analyzed key aspects of the unfolding post–Cold War drama. These experts include Graham Allison, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wesley K. Clark, Tommy Franks, Thomas L. Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, John Keegan, Paul M. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Michael E. O’Hanlon, Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, and Martin van Creveld. Its premise is that, like the blind men in the Buddhist fable who each feels a different part of an elephant, these authors and their assessments, taken together, can give us a better view of where the world is headed.

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Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. —Winston Churchill

Russia is again the subject of serious concern in the West. After a steady decline in its fortunes in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Russia is aggressively flexing its economic and political muscles. Its economy is on the upswing, largely due to the steadily rising prices of oil and natural gas. Russia’s military is still a shadow of its Soviet predecessor; however, the current military weaknesses will not last forever. Sooner, rather than later, Russia will restore its military might. Moscow is already trying to restore its power and influence in much of Eurasia. It has moved ever closer to China and to some major European powers to counter what it sees as the “hegemony” of the United States. Resurgent Russia will probably be neither the friend nor the enemy of the West, but a largely independent and highly unpredictable factor in international politics.

Putin’s Regime

For many Russians, the collapse of the Soviet Union was nothing short of a catastrophe: the country fragmented and lost its world power status. The Russian economy collapsed, and free-market excesses, rampant inflation, and loss of both jobs and the social security net ensued. The era of the first democratically elected Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, left a bitter taste in many Russian mouths.

In 1999, Vladimir Putin, an obscure former KGB agent and chief of that organization’s successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), was appointed as prime minister and a year later replaced Yeltsin as Russia’s president. Since then, Putin has been highly successful in concentrating all power in himself and his office. He has achieved Soviet-style stability through essentially eliminating or neutralizing all alternative centers of power and has sidelined any potential challengers. Putin also broke the influence of the Russian oligarchs who dominated the economy under Yeltsin in the 1990s. Despite his clear authoritarian bent and increasingly undemocratic actions, Putin is highly popular in Russia. His approval rating is about 70 percent, and some 40 percent of Russians think that Putin is the most successful leader since 1917—more successful, in fact, than Stalin or Brezhnev.

Under Putin, Russian state institutions have been reduced to a series of parallel transmission belts. The parliament (Duma) is without much power or authority. Its upper house consists of a collection of nobodies who blindly follow the Kremlin’s instructions. Putin’s party, Unified Russia, has a two-thirds majority in the Duma’s lower house. This ensures that any law proposed by Putin’s government is passed without much debate. The opposition in the Duma is essentially deprived of active participation in the legislative process.

In December 2004, Putin’s government passed a law that abolished direct elections for all 89 regional governors, and the Kremlin is now considering doing the same for city mayors. All governors and members of the Duma’s upper house are now appointed rather than elected. The governors have to submit their mandates to the Federation Council. Although appointed by Putin, their power is limited because their work is monitored by nonconstitutional representatives.

Since 2004, Putin’s government has gradually tightened election rules, practically eliminating the concept of free elections. No new political parties exist or can be started unless approved by the Kremlin. It is also no longer possible for independent candidates to be elected to the Duma. The new election bill envisages a ban on creating a “negative image” of a political opponent. This, in fact, means that one cannot criticize incumbents without the risk of violating the law. Another provision of the bill eliminates the minimum percentage turnout requirements for an election to be valid.

Russia today is ruled by active or former members of the secret service and military. In essence, the secret service finally took power in a “silent” coup d’état. After Putin took office, FSB influence and power steadily increased and expanded into many areas. Putin’s government used the events of September 11 in the United States as a pretext to justify many of the unconstitutional measures conducted by the FSB. In 2003, Putin directed the secret service to take control of the border guard troops. The service also assumed some of the powers of the former Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, which was responsible for electronic

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Russia today is ruled by active or former members of the secret service and military.

Russia today occupies 138th place, just ahead of Belarus, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba.

The state-controlled oil company, Gazprom, bought some of the country’s largest newspapers, such as Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda. It is also the majority stockholder of the two most important television stations and a former culture radio station. Smaller papers are routinely harassed by the tax police and intimidated by false charges of fire protection violations or poor working conditions. Journalist unions are controlled by the state and Putin himself. In today’s Russia, it is hard to find a paper that is truly independent. Russian journalists who have tried to report on the Russian army’s actions in Chechnya or who attempt to investigate corruption among state officials or organized crime are subject to great physical danger. Since 1991, about 260 Russian journalists have been murdered. Only in 21 cases have the perpetrators been identified.

Russia is more open to the outside world than the Soviet Union was. However, the old Soviet-style fears are returning. People who question the Kremlin’s policies are increasingly targeted for retaliation on a list circulated on Web sites of shadow ultranationalist groups. In 2006, the Duma passed a law against “political extremism” that is essentially directed against human rights activists who criticize Putin’s government.

Freedom of religion is formally guaranteed in Russia. Yet the government has adopted regulations that require religious organizations to give local departments of justice annual confirmation of their ongoing activities. The Russian Orthodox Church is apparently favored by Putin’s government; Putin has made several symbolic appearances with the head of the Orthodox Church and some other religious leaders. At the same time, conditions have deteriorated for minority religious groups at the regional and local level in some areas, and the restrictive law on freedom of conscience and religion continues to disadvantage many minority religious groups considered “nontraditional.”

After taking office in 1999, Putin announced a so-called dictatorship of the law. The common sentiment in the West is that Putin may have cracked down on freedoms...
the Kremlin, but at least he has ensured order and stability. But the truth is that there is far less law and order in Putin’s Russia than existed in Yeltsin’s “chaotic” and corrupt regime.

The culture of illegality prevails in Russia. The mafia controls a sizable chunk of the national economy. There are an estimated 100,000 mafiosi, divided into 8,000 groups, organized into about 50 “brigades,” rooted in Russian territory. The mafia is either controlled, infiltrated, or in secret alliance with former or active members of the secret police. Violent crime is especially high. For example, from January to October 2006, there were 3,655 murders and attempted murders. Some 500 to 800 contract murders are committed each year in Russia. Many of the victims have been critics of Putin, as was the journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was brutally gunned down in broad daylight in October 2006. Most murder cases are never solved; reasons for this include the widespread and deep corruption of the Russian authorities and the poor salaries and inadequate technical equipment of the police.

Soviet Nostalgia

The majority of Russians seem to have a deep nostalgia for the Soviet era. Reportedly, about two-thirds of Russians are sorry that the Soviet Union collapsed. In April 2005, Putin said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes of the 20th century.

Putin’s regime uses a strange mix of tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet symbols. Soldiers dressed in early 19th-century uniforms carry the national flag and presidential standard. Putin brought back many imperial Russian symbols. He also restored the Soviet-era national anthem, statues and memorials dedicated to Soviet heroes, the Soviet red flag (banned by Yeltsin), and traditional military medals. The myth of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) is back. Stalin is honored as the “great wartime leader.” Volgograd is planning to erect a statue of Stalin alongside those of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. There are also efforts to change Volgograd’s name to Stalingrad. Both Stalin and Brezhnev are heroes on Russian television. The disastrous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is now considered a “struggle against terrorism.” The Russian state media are full of propaganda that runs along the same lines as that of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, Putin’s government never came to terms with the atrocities of the Soviet era. A textbook on Stalin’s purges and his role in the war was banned from Russian schools. Gradually, all references to the tragic events during the Soviet era have been removed from high school textbooks.

Economic Turnaround

One of the great success stories of today’s Russia is steady economic growth. In general, the Russian economy is in good shape: The country is considered a good financial risk, and there is little chance of a financial crisis in the near future. During Putin’s era, economic growth has averaged 6 percent annually, and the average salary has increased 10 percent each year. For 2005, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at $766 billion. In August 2006, Russia paid all its Soviet-era debts early to Western countries—some $22 billion.

The gas and oil sectors combined account for 25 percent of Russia’s GDP. Russia is the world’s biggest producer of natural gas (40 percent of the world’s reserves) and ranks in the top three or four in terms of oil deposits (estimated at 100 billion barrels). The 92 percent rise in petroleum prices in the last 3 years has helped the Kremlin expand its hard currency reserves by more than 65 percent, to about $280 billion in 2006, or more than the reserves of the entire Euro zone. However, the Russian energy infrastructure is becoming increasingly obsolete. For example, half the Russian pipelines are more than 25 years old, and about 80 percent of the equipment used by the oil industry is outdated. Some 75 percent of the country’s proven reserves of oil and natural gas are already in production. Moreover, the country’s oil reserves are expected to run dry in 25 years.

Putin’s government embarked on the process of obtaining control of the main sectors of the Russian economy. It gave a virtual monopoly to the two largest state companies in the oil sector, Gazprom and Rosneft. The state’s share of total oil production has increased from 16 percent in 2000 to almost 40 percent today. In late November 2006, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development criticized the Russian government for its expansion into key economic sectors and raised concern about the seemingly insatiable appetite of Gazprom. Also, despite agreements already signed, the Kremlin has selectively applied environmental laws to ease out Western companies from participating in the development of new and potentially profitable oil fields on the island of Sakhalin.

In addition, Putin’s government has imposed significant limits to foreign investment in Russia by declaring certain sectors of the economy, such as energy, aviation, finances, and media, to be “strategic entities.” The list has been expanded from 17 to 39 branches of the economy. A foreign company, for instance, cannot own more than 50 percent of a Russian company. To obtain a larger share it must have special approval from the Kremlin.

State of the Military

In the 1990s, the extremely poor economic situation in the country led to a drastic downsizing of the Russian armed forces. The situation began its turn for the better only in the last few years, due to the steady boost in Russia’s economic prospects. In 2004 and 2005, official defense expenditures were 418 billion rubles (US$14.93 billion) and 531.06 billion rubles (US$18.96 billion), respectively. In 2006, Russia’s nominal military expenditures were estimated at about 2.5 percent of the country’s GDP. However, if military-related spending in parts of the federal budget other than military expenditures were included, the spending on defense amounted to about 4 percent of GDP. In 2001, approximately 70 percent of the military
budget was assigned to maintenance of the armed forces and only 30 percent to weapons procurement. Currently, 43 percent of the budget is spent on weapons procurement. The plan is to redress that imbalance in order to achieve a 50:50 ratio by 2011. The Russian defense ministry announced that some 237 billion rubles would be spent for developing and producing military equipment in 2006. There will be a 30 percent increase for these purposes in 2007. About 5 trillion rubles will be spent on weapons between 2007 and 2015. The priority in spending will be on strategic nuclear forces.

In 1991, the Soviet armed forces totaled some 3.4 million men, compared to the current force of 1.1 million. The plan is to reduce the armed forces to 1 million. By then, professional sergeants would exceed 50 percent, or 40 percent of the total strength of the armed forces. Currently, only 9 percent of Russia’s youth are drafted into service. The entire army cannot be turned into a professional army because it would cost 4 or 5 percent of GDP. In 2003, available manpower for the armed forces was 36 million. In 2005, about 330,000 young men were brought into the army for 2 years via conscription. The conscription service will be gradually reduced, from the current 2 years to 1 year as of January 1, 2008. This, in turn, will demand more eligible young men out of a population that is rapidly decreasing.

Defense spending is focused on strategic nuclear forces as the prime deterrent against a major power. In 2004, the strategic nuclear forces consisted of about 630 missiles with 18,000 nuclear warheads. This included about 7,800 operational nuclear warheads (4,400 strategic warheads and 3,400 nonstrategic warheads). Currently, there are about 130 SS–19s in service. The Russians announced plans in 2003 to deploy tens of additional SS–19 missiles with hundreds of warheads starting in 2010. The SS–18s will be retained for the next 10 to 15 years. The plan is to keep in service 15 rail-based SS–24s. The force of SS–25s was reduced to 312 in 2004. Modest production of the SS–27 Topol continues. Despite the reduced number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Russians possess a credible nuclear deterrent. Their Topol-M ICBMs can reportedly penetrate any missile defense. The plan is to reduce by about 60 percent the number of ICBM warheads by withdrawing from service the number of SS–18s/SS–19s from 2,000 to about 760 in the next 4 years.

The sea-based nuclear deterrent force consists of 14 submarines: 2 Typhoons, 6 Delta-IVs, and 6 Delta-IIIIs. These fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are deployed with the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In contrast, the Soviets had 62 operational SSBNs in 1990. Three advanced Borey-class SSBNs are under construction. The first of these SSBNs will be delivered in 2008. The third SSBN is scheduled for completion in 2012. Each Borey-class SSBN is armed with 12 SS–N–27 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a range of more than 8,000 kilometers. The Russian SSBNs conducted three deterrent patrols in 2005; two in 2004 and 2003 each; and none in 2002. In contrast, they conducted 61 patrols in 1990.

Russian strategic aviation has in service 94 nuclear-armed bombers (14 Tu–160 Blackjacks, 32 Tu–95 MS6 Bear–H6, 32 Tu–95 MS, and 16 Bear H16). These bombers carry 872 cruise missiles (AS–15a/b LKh-55 air-launched cruise missiles and AS–16 short-range air-to-surface attack missiles) and/or nuclear bombs. Smaller scale production of the Blackjacks resumed in 2004.

The antiballistic missile system around Moscow consists mostly of 100 underground interceptors designed to carry 1 nuclear warhead each. The system known as A–135 consists of 2 layers of interceptors: an outer ring of 4 launchers armed with 32 Gorgon interceptors, each carrying a 1-megaton warhead; and an inner ring of 4 launch complexes with 68 Gazelle interceptors, each carrying one 10-kiloton warhead. In addition, a considerable number of SA–10 Grumble surface-to-air missiles may also have nuclear capability against some ballistic missiles.

Ground forces currently comprise some 321,000 men (including 190,000 conscripts) or about 30 percent of total forces. They are organized into 19 infantry divisions, 10 motor-rifle brigades, 5 tank divisions, 4 airborne divisions, 3 airborne brigades, 3 artillery divisions, and 11 artillery brigades, plus 9 special forces brigades. The army’s greatest problem is a shortage of draftees because of the country’s steadily reduced birth rate over the past 20 years. Another problem is the poor health and lack of education of many draftees. The plan is to replace 50 percent of the current conscript force with professional soldiers by 2008.

The Russian air force was greatly reduced in numbers in the 1990s. The air forces and air defense troops were merged into a single service in 1998. In 2003, the major part of the Russian army’s aviation—mostly helicopters—was transferred to the air force. The 180,000-man air force operates long-range aviation (63 Tu–95, 15 Tu–160 nuclear-capable bombers, and 117 Tu–22M bombers, plus some tankers and training aircraft), 6 combined front-line aviation armies (370 Su-24 tactical bombers and 255 Su-25 ground attack aircraft) and air defense armies (5 MiG–25, 255 MiG–29, 390 Su-27, and 255 MiG–31 fighter/interceptor aircraft), and transport aviation. The service still suffers from a lack of funds, both for procurement and modernization and for pilot training. The number of flight training hours is far below standard levels: it ranges from 20 to 25 hours annually for fighter aviation to 60 hours annually for transport aviation.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many naval vessels were scrapped or laid up because of the shortage of funds. Since 1991, the overall strength of the Russian navy has declined from 450,000 to 155,000 (including 11,000 strategic nuclear forces, 35,000 naval aviation, and 9,500 naval infantry). The number of aircraft fell from 1,666 to 556; submarines from 317 to 61; and surface ships from 967 to 186. Naval bases outside of Russia were evacuated except for Sevastopol, Crimea. Only 66 percent of 170 factories supporting naval shipbuilding remained in the Russian Federation. The supply of spare parts was also disrupted. The lost bases and training facilities are difficult or impossible to replace. The ship construction program was essentially stopped.

The situation began to change for the better in 2000 when new ships were built for the Russian navy. However, the ships are still not built in series, as they were in the past. The Russian navy started to build frigates, corvettes, and small ships for the Caspian Flotilla. There are currently no plans to build destroyers and cruisers. In 2005, however, plans were announced to build a class of four new aircraft carriers in 2013–2014, with initial service to begin in 2017.
Currently, the Russian navy is organized into four fleets: the Baltic Fleet with headquarters in Baltiysk; the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok; the Northern Fleet in Severomorsk; and the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. In addition, the Kaliningrad special region is subordinate to the Baltic Fleet. It consists of ground and coastal forces, with one motor-rialf division and motor-rialf brigade and a fighter aviation regiment. The Caspian Flotilla is based in Astrakhan and Makhachkala. In 2006, the navy’s inventories included—besides SSBNs—22 nuclear-powered submarines (6 nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines and 16 nuclear attack submarines), 22 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 battle cruisers, 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 10 frigates, 8 light frigates, and 23 missile corvettes. Rapid economic growth since 2000 has given Russia a unique opportunity to pursue military reforms. Russia’s military leaders believe that the country needs mobile forces that are appropriately sized, trained, and equipped without burdening the national economy and increasing reliance on contract military personnel. The prerequisites for military reform are not only rapid and stable economic growth but also accelerated growth in high technology and science-intensive industries. However, the improvements in the Russian economy have not been sufficient to meet that objective. The top political leadership apparently cannot decide whether to move toward smaller, conventional, professional, high-tech expeditionary forces or continue with large but conventional forces combined with modernized nuclear strategic forces.

Despite the drastic reduction in their size since 1991, the Russian armed forces have old weapons and equipment. According to some reports, only about 10 to 20 percent of all weapons in the inventories are modern. Funds for upgrading existing and producing new weapons and equipment are in short supply. For example, between 2000 and 2004, the Russian army added only 15 new tanks to its inventory of about 23,000. Production of artillery shells lags considerably. There is an acute shortage of modern munitions in conventional warheads. The Russian air force lacks adequate supplies of various types of aircraft munitions. The absence of practice munitions in the ground forces greatly complicates personnel combat training.

The social status of the Russian military is low. The reduced defense spending in the 1990s caused reductions in salaries and severe shortages of housing and other amenities. Qualified junior officers are in short supply. The morale and motivation of the rank and file are rather low. Some 40 percent of the contract soldiers are reportedly dismissed after only 4 to 5 months of service. In the first half of 2004, 7,300 servicemen, including 800 officers, were convicted of various crimes. There is widespread draft avoidance. Currently, there are an estimated 17,000 draft dodgers. Army efforts to stop abuse and hazing have largely failed, due at least in part to the apathy of poorly paid and housed junior and senior officers. Hazing is also a major cause of draft dodging and the significant increase in suicide rates among draftees. There is a lack of sufficient training, resulting in low combat readiness.

### Influence of Geopolitics

Geopolitics came back with a vengeance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviets, the Russians today do not consider geopolitics a pseudoscience. The enduring and paramount importance of geopolitics in the thinking and policies of the Russian elite cannot be understood without a geographical, demographic, and historical context.

The Russian Federation encompasses a territory of about 6.5 million square miles. It stretches over 10 time zones. Russia’s borders are 43,500 miles long, while the coastline stretches for about 23,620 miles. According to the last census (in 2002), ethnic Russians comprised 145 million (81.5 percent) of the population of the Russian Federation. There are also 100 different ethnic groups. However, the population trend is highly unfavorable for the future of Russia. Due to the combined effects of alcohol abuse, poor health services, and a decreasing fertility rate, the number of ethnic Russians has been reduced by about 900,000 (some sources say 700,000) per year since 1999. In 2004, the average life expectancy in Russia was 64.9 years (58.9 years for males and 72.3 for females) compared to 70.1 years in the Soviet era (in 1987). The national fertility rate is currently estimated at 1.28 children per woman, far below that necessary to maintain the current population of about 143 million.

Alcohol abuse is the cause of one in three deaths in Russia. If the current trends continue, Russia will lose 50 million inhabitants in the next 50 years.

Traditionally, Russians prefer strategic depth for their security. That has been one of the reasons for the continuous expansion of the Russian Empire since Peter the Great. Today’s Russia is the smallest in size since before the reign of Catherine the Great. Ukraine, which had been the heartland of the Russian Empire since the 9th century, is, at least for the time being, lost. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Russia lost the buffer zone between its westernmost border and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in central Europe. One of the most painful consequences of the Soviet collapse has been Russia’s much less favorable access to the Baltic. Russia also lost control over Belarus and Moldova, northern Caucasus, and vast stretches of Central Asia. The attempted secessions of Chechnya, and continuing uncertainties over the Russian control in Dagestan and Tatarstan, indicate that the process of fragmentation may not yet be complete.

Geopolitically, the areas of the greatest importance for Russia are the western Arctic, the Baltic, Ukraine, the Black Sea–Caucasus–Caspian area, Central Asia, and Siberia. The western Arctic region is perhaps one of the most stable geopolitical spaces from Russia’s perspective. Murmansk will become the gateway for crude oil from the Timan–Pechora basins and western Siberia. Siberian hydrocarbon and offshore drilling are increasingly important and valuable.

The Baltic is one of the most critical geopolitical regions for Moscow. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s access to the Baltic was reduced to only the Bay of Kronstadt and Kaliningrad’s enclave. Access to the Baltic is barred by the string of essentially unfriendly (for good reason) Baltic states and Poland. Sweden is politically neutral but geostategically anti-Russian. The Baltic and Europe’s northern seas are becoming a zone of serious strategic Russian interest. Moscow’s policy toward the Baltic states is essentially to delegitimize their right to be independent. On numerous occasions—despite the historical facts—Russian officials, including Putin, have disputed that the Baltic...
states were occupied by Soviet forces in 1940. In Moscow’s view, the Baltic states were annexed but not “occupied”; the annexation of these three independent states was legal because it was carried out in accordance with the formalities of international law that were in effect during World War II. Also, Moscow constantly threatens the Baltic states for real or imaginary repression of Russian minorities there. In the absence of a strong NATO and firm U.S. leadership, the fate of all three Baltic states will be uncertain.

For both Moscow and the West, a major problem is the future of Ukraine as an independent and fully sovereign state. If Russia obtains political control of Ukraine, it would cease to exist as a traditional nation-state but would become part of an empire. The major adverse factor for the future of an independent Ukraine is the rather large Russophile sentiment in the southeastern part of the country.

A major source of friction between Russia and Ukraine is the presence of Russian forces at the naval base in Sevastopol. The agreement to lease the base for the Russian navy was signed in 1997 after a long political and diplomatic dispute between Moscow and Kyiv. The Russian and new Ukrainian navy share facilities at Sevastopol, including headquarters of both the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian navy. The future of the Russian naval presence in Crimea after 2017 is currently uncertain. Putin proposed in October 2006 that Russia should decide alone whether it is more advantageous to build a new naval base on its territory in the area of Novorossiyisk or to continue leasing facilities in Sevastopol. However, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko recently ruled out any extension of the lease of naval base Sevastopol. Moscow and most Russians are convinced that Crimea will be returned to their control one day.

Russia’s policy toward Moldova is aimed toward exerting continuous leverage by keeping it permanently divided and subject at all times to the threat of the secession of Transnistria (a narrow strip of Moldova’s territory east of the Dniester River) backed by Russian arms. Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova in 1991. Its population of about 550,000 is about 60 percent Slavic, while Moldovans are ethnic Romanians. Transnistria does not have a direct land link with Russia. Russia maintains a small contingent of troops there, the so-called 14th Army, with a 1,000-man motor-rifle brigade, plus more than 100 tanks, 215 armored vehicles, and 7 combat helicopters. Moscow also has issued passports to any citizens of Transnistria who asked for them. The Kremlin has declared its independence from Moldova in 1992, despite the commitment Russia gave at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Istanbul in 1999 to do so unconditionally. Moscow portrays the Russian military presence in Transnistria as peacekeeping. Its policy toward Moldova is a clear example of the abiding continuities of Russia’s imperial policy.

In the Black Sea region, geostategic and energy aims are intertwined. Russia controls only part of the Black Sea’s southeastern coastline, but most of the energy transportation and distribution network. The Caucasus is an interface between Europe and Asia where several major powers’ zones of interest overlap. The Transcaucasus is also a transport corridor for energy. Moscow’s meddling and threats are the principal reasons for the almost continuous turmoil and crisis in the Caucasus. Its ultimate aim is to restore its power and influence in the area or at least to cause political and economic difficulties for Western-leaning countries.

Moscow has the most serious problems in its relations with Georgia because of its support for the secessionist movement in Abkhazia and southern Ossetia. Russia also sided with Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over the Berg-Karabech enclave (13.6 percent of Armenia’s territory). After several years of delaying its commitment to withdraw its troops from Georgia, Moscow finally signed an agreement with Tbilisi in March 2006 to withdraw some 3,000 Russian troops from Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and other installations in Georgia. The Russian forces already vacated the base at Akhalkalaki, and the Batumi base is scheduled for closure before the end of 2008. Russia was also obliged under the terms of the OSCE agreement in 1999 to leave the Gudauta base near Tbilisi; however, in the end, the Russians refused to leave.

Moscow’s prospects for restoring its power and influence are the most promising in Central Asia. This is due to the geostrategic isolation of the area, political backwardness of the newly independent states, and their almost complete dependence on Russia for technical help in extracting their large energy resources and exporting these resources to Europe and other markets.

Kazakhstan is Russia’s most important strategic partner. Numerous security agreements were signed between Russia and Kazakhstan, and the Russians maintain a small contingent of military specialists there. In Kyrgyzstan, Russian troops are stationed (since October 2003) at Kant, a former Soviet base near Bishkek. Their official mission is to struggle against terrorism. Some 50 Russian ground attack aircraft (probably Sukhoi Su-25s) are to be based there. Reportedly, there are plans to create a 10,000-man joint force in Central Asia with headquarters most likely at Kant.

Tajikistan has a long tradition of military cooperation with Russia. After the country’s independence, the 201st Division and about 12,000 Russian troops remained in Tajikistan. Currently, about 7,000 troops of the 201st (including about 130 tanks, 315 armored vehicles, 180 pieces of artillery, and several combat aircraft) plus 2,000 Russian advisors are supervising some 13,000 Tajik border troops along the Afghan border. The division was recently transformed into a permanent force subordinate to the Volga-Ural military district in Yekaterinburg. The Russians also operate an air surveillance center at Nurek base. Tajikistan signed an agreement with Russia in October 2004, which should lead to closer economic and security cooperation between the two countries.

Turkmenistan is the least politically connected with Russia of all Central Asian states. Its relations with Russia were cool and occasionally tense in the 1990s. The relations started to improve only after April 2003 when both countries signed an agreement on security and economic cooperation. Turkmen leadership seems to be determined to pursue its current policy of “eternal neutrality,” which seems not to bother the Kremlin.

Prior to 1991, most Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons were produced in Uzbekistan. Afterward, Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia were often tense because of its desire to steer toward a more autonomous policy on security issues. This, in turn, greatly angered Moscow. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined a group of Western-oriented countries dubbed GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), only to leave that organization in 2005. Uzbekistan made a drastic change of policy toward Russia in 2001...
when it joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is dominated by Russia and China. Since spring 2005, Uzbekistan has apparently turned toward building an even closer relationship with Moscow.

Russia’s control of Siberia, a huge and resource-rich territory, is potentially tenuous because of the combination of vast distances and a small population. The distance from Moscow to the easternmost part of Siberia is about 5,600 miles, roughly the same as the distance to Sydney, Australia. Russia shares a 2,670-mile border with an increasingly powerful and affluent China. One day China might well claim the territories on the Amur River that Russia annexed between 1858 and 1860; these territories are equal in size to Germany and France combined. The population of Siberia has been steadily declining, from 8 million in 1991 to 6.5 million today. In the 2002 census, out of 155,000 villages in Siberia, about 13,000 were simply abandoned and 35,000 housed less than 10 inhabitants.23 In contrast, the total population in 3 adjoining Chinese provinces is 107 million. Chinese traders and laborers are more visible in the Russian cities, and the Siberian population buys cheap Chinese apparel. Russian business craves cheap Chinese laborers.

Commonwealth of Independent States

Moscow created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at Almaty, Kazakhstan, in late December 1991. All former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic states, became members of the commonwealth. This organization was established primarily to find a bloodless way of breaking up the Soviet Union. An October 2006 summit of CIS leaders wanted to limit the commonwealth to matters of transport, migration policy, cross-border criminality, and education and culture. Russia and Belarus opposed these limits because it would lead to the breakup of the commonwealth and benefit its enemies. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine want to overcome Russia’s foot-dragging regarding border demarcation, most conspicuously with Ukraine. The proposal is that the final borders should be the same as the administrative borders in the pre-1991 Soviet Union.

In essence, Russian high officials do not accept the current boundaries of the Russian Federation. The Russian unilateralist approach is evident in its imperial attitude and ongoing demands for bases throughout the commonwealth, its obstruction in CIS secessionist conflicts, sudden price increases for oil and natural gas, attempts to obtain controlling share over the energy transportation and distribution system in the “near abroad” states, and politically motivated bans on import of certain goods from these states. Hegemony in the commonwealth is considered by Moscow as essential for restoration of its dominant position in Eurasia regardless of the negative consequences on Russia’s relations with Europe and future integration into a European system.

Russians traditionally prefer a strong leader. Putin’s administration has achieved some tangible successes both internally and abroad. Due to the steady increase of revenues from oil and natural gas, the average Russian’s life is now much better than it was in the 1990s. Also, by centralizing almost all power in his hands, Putin has brought about much-needed stability. In addition, he has restored national pride and made Russia a major power again.

Since Putin took office, a trend has set in toward an increasingly undemocratic and ruthless regime. This should not come as a surprise because the Russian government is essentially in the hands of the former secret agents and military. The presence of too many active and former members of the KGB and its successor, the FSB, is the principal reason for the steady deterioration of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and human rights in Russia. The brutal war in Chechnya is another factor that has led to the worsening of the human rights situation. The old, deep-seated Russian nationalism, hatred of foreigners, and outright racisms are on the rise.

Russia’s military still has not recovered from the drastic downsizing of the 1990s. It is also beset by poor states of combat readiness, low motivation, poor discipline, rampant graft and corruption, and shortages of modern weapons and equipment. However, this situation seems to be changing for the better, as more funds are allocated for modernizing and improving the social status of military personnel. Sooner or later, Russia’s military power will become another powerful tool in the hands of Moscow in dealing not only with pro-Western and independent states in its backyard but also possibly in relations with Europe.

Putin’s policies are clearly aimed toward increasing influence on both the internal and external policies of the former Soviet republics. Moscow is obviously embarked on a policy to restore control over much of the geopolitical space that Russia lost in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.

Russia’s real concern in opposing NATO expansion to include the former Soviet republics, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, is not the threat of “invasion,” but the bringing of democracy and the rule of law into what Moscow sees as its rightful geopolitical space. Russia has good reason for objecting to what it sees as the encroachment of potentially unfriendly states on its doorstep or in its backyard. The West in general should show more sensitivity in its policies toward Russia and the former Soviet republics. The Alliance should reconsider whether Ukraine should be admitted as a new member. Some other security arrangement should be found to ensure continued independence and territorial integrity of that pivotal state. Likewise, Georgia should be offered a special relationship with NATO but not full membership. At the same time, the United States and its allies must make clear to Moscow that it does not have a license to blackmail, pressure, or even extinguish the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and the new independent states in the Caucasus. Under no circumstances should NATO allow Russia’s policy of threats to succeed against the Baltic states.

U.S. and Western high officials should not publicly castigate Moscow for its lack of democratic norms. Such actions are invariably counterproductive for the cause of democracy in Russia. The best way to support Russian democracy is through activities of the elected bodies, such as the U.S. Congress, European parliaments, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and Western media. The United States and its allies should focus on Moscow’s foreign policies, and especially its politically motivated manipulation of energy prices and supplies against the small states in Eurasia. Russia will eventually resort to military threats against these states, unless America and Europe make it clear that there will be serious consequences for mutual relations on a host of issues. The firm and principled stand has the best chances of success in countering the Kremlin’s neo-imperial policies. Moscow traditionally despises weakness and has repeatedly shown healthy respect for the strength and determination of those who stand up to its aggressive polices.

As for the future, it is likely that there will be serious tension between Russia and the West over myriad issues. The possibility of a
serious conflict should not be excluded. But the situation will not resemble that of the Cold War. Russia will be authoritarian and nationalistic, but it will lack any messianic ideology such as Marxism-Leninism. Hence, it will not represent the global and mortal threat to the West that the Soviet Union did. JFQ

NOTES

8 Ibid., 43.
9 "Die neue, alte Grossmacht," 91.
10 Todesurteil aus Moskau, Der Spiegel, December 4, 2006, 128.
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It has long been an article of faith that Islam in Southeast Asia has a moderate, tolerant, live-and-let-live quality that distinguishes it from more doctrinaire varieties prevalent in the Middle East. Prior to 9/11, most experts would have answered “no” if asked whether international terrorist organizations would find favorable conditions for organizing in Southeast Asia. But the discovery of networks affiliated with al Qaeda in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (with advanced planning for a series of massive bombings in Singapore) proved that assessment inaccurate. It soon became clear that the region was vulnerable to penetration by violent Muslim militants for a variety of reasons beyond simply the presence of over 200 million Muslims.

The history of Southeast Asia over the last three decades has been a dramatic march to modernity—economic development, scientific and technological literacy, and social stability. In countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, per capita incomes have quintupled in little more than a generation. Lives have been transformed. Regional institutions, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have given Southeast Asia a cohesion and identity without precedent.

But it is a success story that carries with it a cautionary lesson. The financial crisis of 1997–1998 originated in the region and hit it hard—particularly Indonesia, where the currency and government collapsed. The economic and societal recovery from that crisis is substantially complete, but the lesson of vulnerability remains in the regional psyche. That sense of contingent success is reinforced by two very different challenges to regional security. The first grows out of the emergence of radical Muslim jihadist networks that seek to overthrow the existing political and social order. The second is a more subtle external challenge posed by the growing power and strategic reach of China.

By Marvin C. Ott

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America’s Response?

Transnational Terrorism

It has long been an article of faith that Islam in Southeast Asia has a moderate, tolerant, live-and-let-live quality that distinguishes it from more doctrinaire varieties prevalent in the Middle East. Prior to 9/11, most experts would have answered “no” if asked whether international terrorist organizations would find favorable conditions for organizing in Southeast Asia. But the discovery of networks affiliated with al Qaeda in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (with advanced planning for a series of massive bombings in Singapore) proved that assessment inaccurate. It soon became clear that the region was vulnerable to penetration by violent Muslim militants for a variety of reasons beyond simply the presence of over 200 million Muslims.
First, the geography of the Muslim areas, with their sprawling archipelagos and unmilitarized borders, created a certain irreducible exposure. Second, the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia weakened police, military, and intelligence agencies—the first line of defense against terrorist penetration. Third, devout Muslims, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, saw themselves marginalized by secular (Indonesian) or Christian (Filipino) governments. This produced a sense of victimization that meshed with the message from Osama bin Laden and others. Fourth, money from the Persian Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) has flowed into Southeast Asia, propagating a strict, doctrinaire version of Islam through schools and mosques. Finally, the mujahideen war against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan had a galvanic effect. No one knows how many young Muslim men left Southeast Asia to join the mujahideen; it may have been a few thousand or only a few hundred. But those who went received training in weapons and explosives. They were indoctrinated into a militant jihadist worldview and became part of an international clandestine network of alumni from that victorious struggle. With the war over, many returned to Southeast Asia ripe for recruitment into local terrorist organizations dedicated to the destruction of non-Muslim communities, Western influence, and secular governments.

In the period since 9/11, efforts by law enforcement and intelligence organizations have revealed much that was previously unknown about these organizations. They fall into three types: international terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose agenda includes attacks on U.S. interests and the establishment of a pan-Islamic “caliphate”; social extremists, such as Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, that accept the Islamic “caliphate”; and military groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines and the Pattani National Liberation Front in southern Thailand, that seek a separate Muslim state.

One of the questions affecting the security future of Southeast Asia is whether the predominantly Muslim societies in the region can find a way to neutralize and absorb the militants into a broader, more moderate body politic. The picture is greatly complicated by linkages between groups including JI and al Qaeda, between Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda, and between JI and the MILF. Further difficulties arise from alleged links between elements of the Indonesian military and Laskar Jihad and another similar group, the Islamic Defenders Front. In short, the wiring diagram for terrorism in Southeast Asia would depict interactive networks with multiple agendas.

The most important enabling factor in the growth of these networks is government weakness in Indonesia. The 32-year rule of Suharto precluded the development of a new generation of political leadership and deeply corrupted the instruments of state security—police, intelligence, and military. As a consequence, it has proven very difficult to establish an effective government and security apparatus in post-Suharto Indonesia. The Megawati administration initially reacted to 9/11 and the arrests in Singapore by denying the presence of similar al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Indonesia. The October 2002 bombings in Bali forced Jakarta to acknowledge the reality and at least temporarily silenced overt supporters of the most militant groups. The subsequent police investigation (importantly aided by Australian experts) surprised many by producing a quick string of arrests. Bombings of the Marriott Hotel and Australian embassy in Jakarta and again in Bali in the years since appear to have solidified a view among most Indonesians that JI is a genuine threat—if only because in each case, the vast majority of casualties were Indonesian.

Other governments reacted to 9/11 in different ways. President Gloria Arroyo, backed by a strong majority of public opinion in the Philippines, invited U.S. forces to assist (training, intelligence, and civil affairs) the armed forces of the Philippines in their operations against Abu Sayyaf, a self-declared militant Islamic group with some ties historically to al Qaeda but with a record of largely criminal activity. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad in Malaysia seized the opportunity to rebuild tattered relations with the United States, culminating in a cordial visit to the White House. Both Singapore and Malaysia cooperated closely through police, intelligence, and customs in counterterrorism with U.S. counterparts. By contrast, Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initially tried to stake out a position of neutrality. This produced a strong critical backlash from Thai elites who saw the prime minister’s action as jeopardizing Thailand’s longstanding alliance with the United States. Subsequently, the Thaksin government affirmed its full cooperation in America’s war on terror. At the same time, Thaksin’s autocratic and insensitive initiatives in southern Thailand bear much of the blame for inflaming Muslim opinion in that area.

China: On the March?

The People’s Republic of China is central to any discussion of Southeast Asian politics, economics, and security. China is Asia’s aspirant and, to an increasing extent, real great power. By its geographic centrality, population size, and cultural strength and sophistication, Imperial China often exerted a kind of natural primacy through three millennia of East Asian history. After the humiliation of Western colonial penetration and Japanese military occupation, China has sought to reassert its historical prominence. Mao Zedong’s first words on leading his victorious armies into Beijing were: “China has stood up.” Nevertheless, for most of the following four decades, China was preoccupied with domestic difficulties and disasters (largely self-inflicted) and the daunting demands of economic development. But with the consolidation of the economic reforms of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China finally began its long-delayed and oft-derailed emergence as a modern, powerful state.

China’s growth in power coincides with the contemporary disappearance of the strategic threats—from Russia in the north and west and Japan in the east—that have historically constrained the Middle Kingdom. This has left Beijing with the latitude to assert its ambition—an ambition that has a natural strategic focus.

From China’s perspective, Southeast Asia is attractive, vulnerable, and nearby. There are many phrases in Chinese that characterize the Nanyang (South Seas) as golden lands of opportunity. For three decades, Southeast Asia has been a region of rapidly growing wealth, much of it generated and owned by ethnic Chinese. Even after wholesale despoliation of tropical forests and other natural endowments, the physical resources

Background: U.S. and Thai soldiers prepare to jump from MC-130H over Lop Buri, Thailand, during Exercise Cobra Gold 2006
of Southeast Asia remain impressive. Also, the world’s busiest sea lanes traverse the region. With the exception of Indonesia, individual states that comprise the political map of Southeast Asia are only a fraction of China’s size. The southern border of China abuts Southeast Asia along the northern borders of Burma, Laos, and Vietnam.

It is an axiom of realpolitik that policy and strategy must be based on, in the first instance, the capabilities of other actors—particularly rivals and potential adversaries. While any precise measure of China’s national capabilities will be elusive, the trend and the potential are quite clear. China’s capabilities are multidimensional: economic, military, and, increasingly, diplomatic and political.

Over the last 15 years or so, China’s gross domestic product has grown at annual rates of around 9 percent, with a large swath of the coast from Hainan to Shanghai producing rates significantly higher. This in turn has supported annual double-digit increases in military expenditures. Growing budgets have been broadly committed to a program of military modernization and professionalization, with a heavy emphasis on modern technology and personnel sufficiently educated to use it. Expert observers foresee a Chinese military capable of projecting force on a sustained basis beyond China’s coastal periphery within 10 to 20 years.

The days of rigid, ideologically strident Chinese “diplomacy” have long since been superseded by a cosmopolitan sophistication that would do Chou En-lai proud. Finally, for Southeast Asia, Chinese power has an additional potential dimension: the presence of large (and economically potent) ethnic Chinese populations in almost every major urban center.

Chinese officials have been persistent that China’s intentions toward Southeast Asia are entirely benevolent—nothing other than to join with the region in a common endeavor of economic development and regional peace and security. Beijing has energetically pushed trade and investment ties, including a centerpiece China-ASEAN free trade agreement. Bilateral framework agreements for cooperation on multiple fronts have been negotiated with every Southeast Asian government. Political and diplomatic interactions at all levels have become a regular, even daily, feature of the news. Also, Beijing has made clear its desire to extend cooperation into the security sphere. China has become a primary supplier of economic and military assistance to Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Meanwhile, Chinese officials and scholars seek to allay unease by noting that the traditional tribute system of China’s imperial past was, by Western standards, quite benign.

Can Southeast Asia bank on the non-threatening character of China’s rise? Predictions are always hazardous, but there are several reasons to be cautious.

History strongly suggests that when new great powers arise, the implications for smaller or weaker nations on their periphery are seldom pleasant. Examples include Germany and Central Europe, Japan and East Asia, Russia and Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the United States and Latin America. It remains to be seen whether China is uniquely immune to the temptations of state power.

As Maoism and Marxism have lost their ideological appeal, the Chinese leadership has turned to nationalism to legitimize authoritarian rule. This has included a comprehensive program of state-sponsored patriotism in schools and mass media nurturing a sense of Chinese victimization (“a hundred years of humiliation”) at the hands of the West. In recent years, these powerful emotions have been focused on Taiwan and how the United States and Japan have allegedly stolen China’s national patrimony. Territorial irredentism is a potent political force, and there are growing fears that Beijing, against all sane counsel, could actually resort to force against Taiwan.

In 1992, the Chinese People’s Congress codified in legislation Beijing’s claim that the South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign territory of China. Since the flare-up in the Mischief Reef dispute in the mid-1990s, China has soft-pedaled its claims. But it has not disavowed them and continues to strengthen its outposts in the Spratleys.

Chinese scholars, writing with official sanction, characterize U.S. strategic intentions toward China as “encirclement” and “strangulation.” They identify Southeast Asia as the weak link in this chain and the point where China can break through and defeat attempted American “containment.”

China’s ambitious program for harnessing and exploiting the Mekong River will have the side effect, intended or otherwise, of making downstream states such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam hostage to Chinese decisions concerning water flow. The Mekong is as much the economic lifeblood for these nations as the Nile is for Egypt.

The very agreements and linkages that Beijing cites as evidence of benign intent can also be seen as a web designed to tie these states to China. Contemporary Burma comes close to fitting the profile of a Chinese client state. When Singapore’s deputy prime minister visited Taiwan, a semi-official commentator from Beijing promised that Singapore would pay “a huge price” for such temerity.

What emerges from this picture is a multifaceted strategic challenge to Southeast Asia. Chinese diplomats have worked assiduously and successfully to portray that challenge as opportunity and not threat. Recent public opinion polling shows clear evidence of their success. China registers favorably with publics throughout most of Southeast Asia. This coincides with a precipitous drop in favorable opinions of the United States since the advent of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The durability of these sentiments remains to be seen. What is not in question—or should not be—is that growing Chinese power must be at the center of any security strategy formulated by the Southeast Asian states—and by the United States.

Recent developments in Southeast Asia have created strategic opportunities for China. America’s military center of gravity in the region—Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines—has disappeared. ASEAN, so confident and vibrant in the mid-1990s, saw its coherence and international standing decline precipitously by the end of the decade. The same organization that seemed to face China down after the 1995 Mischief Reef confrontation was mute and ineffective when the issue reappeared in 1998. The near collapse of Indonesia created, in strategic terms, a void where a cornerstone once had been. In short, the balance of power between China and Southeast Asia had shifted in Beijing’s favor. Recently, Chinese officials have been heard on more than one occasion to refer to Southeast Asia (borrowing from Churchill) as “the soft underbelly of Asia.”
What Does China Want?

What exactly does China seek in Asia generally and Southeast Asia specifically? No one outside the Chinese leadership can answer that question with precision; we do not have the minutes of the Standing Committee of the Politburo meetings on this issue. Moreover, different elements of the Chinese government—notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army—have often conveyed rather different impressions to foreign counterparts. To some extent, those differences are no doubt contrived to persuade and obfuscate. But they also may reflect a genuine lack of consensus in the senior leadership. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a series of strategic objectives in general terms with some confidence.

First, China surely prefers a peaceful and prosperous Asia, one that will be a continuing source of the trade and investment that are so critical to modernization. Moreover, such a benign environment will allow China to avoid the trap that the Soviet Union fell into—that is, allowing military expenditures to rise to the point that they undercut the economic and political viability of the state.

Second, China wants a sharp diminution in U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of its military deployments to the region and its encircling (from Beijing’s perspective) chain of bilateral security arrangements with many of China’s neighbors.

Third, China seeks a Japan that is passive, defensive, and strategically neutral—one that has effectively withdrawn from the competition for power and influence in Asia. Almost by definition, such a Japan will resist being an instrument of American strategic designs.

Fourth, China is determined that Taiwan will come under the sovereign jurisdiction of Beijing. (That much is clear; what is less clear is exactly how much real authority, how much actual control, will meet China’s minimum requirements.)

Fifth, China aspires to a day when the South China Sea will become, in effect, a Chinese lake and will be accepted as such internationally. As previously noted, China’s territorial sea law stipulates Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea—and authorizes the use of force to keep foreign naval and research vessels away.1

Sixth, China expects that Southeast Asia will be progressively subordinated to Beijing’s strategic interests. Perhaps the closest analogy would be the assertion, in time, of a kind of Chinese Monroe Doctrine for Southeast Asia. Such a strategy would seek to expel any non-Asian (and Japanese) military presence from the region and create a strategic environment in which Southeast Asian governments understood that they were not to make any major decisions affecting Chinese interests or the region without first consulting, and obtaining the approval of, Beijing. It is with this scenario in mind that several ASEAN governments have watched with concern China’s growing influence in Burma and to a lesser, but significant, extent in Laos and Cambodia.

Whither America?

The United States is a key, even indispensable, factor in the Southeast Asian security equation but is in danger of falling short of its potential and responsibilities. What is missing is a sophisticated understanding of the growing complexities of the security environment and a conscious, comprehensive strategy to deal with them.

After a long period of post-Vietnam inattention, American security planners have rediscovered Southeast Asia as a second front in the war on terror. This has produced a variety of initiatives to strengthen liaison and cooperation with intelligence, police, and customs counterparts in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In Indonesia, congressional restrictions on cooperation with the Indonesian armed forces, due to human rights concerns, have diverted much U.S. security assistance to the police.

The election of retired general Susilo Yuhoyono as president of Indonesia provides Washington with the prospect of a new Indonesian government that can be an effective security partner. Washington took the necessary enabling step by ending longstanding restrictions on military cooperation and assistance. The 2006 bilateral security talks between U.S. and Indonesian defense officials held in Washington were notable for their cordiality and an atmosphere of high expectations.

Meanwhile, the most dramatic consequence of the U.S. focus on terrorism has been the return of American troops to the Philippines—to exercise, train, and assist. Most specifically, U.S. Special Forces have supported operations by the Philippines armed forces against Abu Sayyaf.

The tsunami disaster of December 2004 added an interesting new dimension to the security picture. Four countries—the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, with Singapore serving as a logistics hub—mounted major humanitarian and relief operations using their primarily military assets. This effort was ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment, and remarkably well coordinated and effective. Southeast Asia has never had a true multilateral security mechanism. In this case, four countries from outside the immediate region but with security interests within it demonstrated that they could work together effectively. It gave security planners something to think about.

The other principal role is the primary one played by U.S. forces over the last several decades. As the strongest military power in the region, but one with no territorial designs, U.S. forces have served to buttress regional stability—the necessary precondition for economic growth. Forward-deployed U.S. forces have been the proverbial gendarmes keeping the peace by assuring that neighborhood disputes do not flare out of control and larger...
neighbors are not tempted to impose their interests. In the process, they have assured that sealanes through the region remain open to commercial traffic without danger of interdiction. This broad role will remain vital as the region navigates a period of economic and political uncertainty and adjusts to growing Chinese power. Since the loss of access to naval and air bases in the Philippines, the U.S. military has relied on negotiated access to facilities in a number of Southeast Asian countries—most notably in Singapore, where an aircraft carrier pier to accommodate the Navy has been constructed.

China and militant Islam pose quite different and multidimensional challenges. China’s geopolitical ambitions in Southeast Asia and its challenge to U.S. security interests are not simply, or even primarily, military. They are instead diplomatic, economic, institutional, and cultural, buttressed by the reality of growing power. Southeast Asian governments such as Singapore and, increasingly, Indonesia are responding with a strategy that seeks to “enmesh” China and the United States, along with other external powers (for example, Japan, Korea, India, Russia, and the European Union) in a multifaceted web of connections to Southeast Asia that serve to underwrite the status quo. Institutional manifestations of this effort include the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and Asia-Europe Meeting.

The first East Asia Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 was instructive. Fearing that the event would be “captured” by China, ASEAN engineered additional invitations to India, Australia, and New Zealand. Chinese interest in the conclave, which had been high, clearly diminished with the expanded list of invitees. By contrast, India enthusiastically accepted its invitation to join, in effect, the strategic game in Southeast Asia. The architects of this emerging strategy look to the United States not only for effective guarantees and counterterrorism support but also for a full panoply of soft power initiatives involving trade, investment, public affairs, education, diplomacy, and institution-building.

Soft power is also key for dealing with transnational challenges. We should not delude ourselves into believing we fully understand the sources of terrorism. Some of it seems to be rooted in societal dislocation and economic hardship, particularly as both generate large numbers of underemployed and poorly educated young men who are ambitious, energetic, Islamic, and frustrated. Some of it derives from a pervasive sense in Muslim communities that they are not given the respect by local authorities or foreign governments (especially the United States) that is their due. A viable U.S. counterterrorism strategy must move well beyond police, intelligence, and military programs to help countries such as Indonesia tackle the socioeconomic vulnerabilities that facilitate terrorism. Some of it seems to be understood, more listening, more consulting, and more respect.

What Should Be Done?

The United States has effective policies (for example, counterterrorism) and initiatives (tsunami relief) regarding Southeast Asia, but these do not add up to a security strategy. The jihadist threat must and will be managed by Southeast Asian governments and societal organizations. Beyond counterterrorism assistance, Washington can assist by doing two things: finding multiple ways to convey respect for Islam and Islamic institutions, including greatly enhanced avenues for contact between Americans and Southeast Asian Muslims, and building more robust political/diplomatic ties with the region that convey a message of sustained American interest and support. The latter could and should include U.S. adherence to ASEAN’s founding document, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and an annual U.S.–ASEAN summit.

The recent signing of a U.S.–ASEAN framework document pledging active efforts to strengthen economic ties and work toward a summit is a useful first step. But what is needed most of all is a change in Washington’s tone and attitude—less lecturing, less dictating, more listening, more consulting, and more respect.
China poses a very different kind of challenge, one that is classically geostrategic. Washington has been slow to recognize the significance of that challenge or to take steps to meet it. The following are some proposed initiatives designed to kickstart a process. In general, American strategists should:

- systematically think through U.S. interests, goals, and the challenges/threats to them
- assess U.S. resources and capabilities (including those that come through leveraging security partnerships in the region) relative to interests and threats
- formulate a strategy designed to maximize U.S. interests consistent with resource constraints
- judge the degree to which the United States is willing to accommodate the growth of Chinese power and influence in the region.

Operating from this general background, specific issues will need to be addressed. U.S. planners must:

- clarify U.S. thinking regarding sealanes (Malacca Straits and South China Sea routes) as to their status under international law, U.S. vital interests at stake, and the circumstances in which the United States would act militarily to defend those interests. Provide authoritative prominent statements of the U.S. position to repair the current ambiguity on the public record.
- propose/initiate a security dialogue with each of the Southeast Asia countries to be conducted at whatever level the counterpart government prefers. Make this a true dialogue in which the United States receives as well as transmits. This will be difficult to start with a number of governments (for example, Malaysia) and may begin as a secret interchange among intelligence professionals. But as this dialogue becomes established, it will provide a vehicle for serious consultations regarding regional security issues and potential areas of collaboration. The payoff would come with a meeting of the minds concerning China.
- provide the sinews for a new multilateral security arrangement in Southeast Asia. The tsunami relief effort rapidly took shape as a four-part operation involving Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. Initial potential missions include maritime security (counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and environmental protection) and disaster mitigation and prevention. Any initiatives would have to be carefully vetted with the governments of the region. These four countries have demonstrated the capability to provide critical security services to the region. The fact that China is not included because it currently lacks such capabilities is fortuitous.
- conduct an extended research and analysis effort aimed at understanding the full nature and extent of China’s strategic reach into Southeast Asia. Done properly, this will be a multiyear, perhaps multidecade, effort requiring the development of extensive assets that do not presently exist. For example, China has apparently put in place an extensive program of schools in a number of Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia is one) that has gone almost entirely unnoticed by Western intelligence agencies.
- help think tanks in the region to develop analytical and personnel capabilities. At present, the only Southeast Asian country with a critical mass of world-class security strategists is Singapore. Incipient capabilities exist in Hanoi and Jakarta, and to a degree in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Beijing has taken effective advantage of the lack of strategic sophistication in Southeast Asian capitals. It is in America’s interest to remedy this situation.
- reassess policy toward Burma and consider the consequences for U.S. security interests of continued sanctions that effectively drive the Burmese junta into the arms of China
- assess the strategic implications of China’s drive to harness and develop the Mekong. Private contractors working with the World Bank might be helpful in understanding the full import of what China is doing and possible U.S. counterinitiatives.

For most of the three decades since the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. security policy has treated Southeast Asia as if it hardly existed. Such benign neglect might be tolerable if the United States did not face formidable strategic challenges to its interests in the region. But it does, and America can ill afford to sleepwalk through the next decade in Southeast Asia. Too much is at stake.

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2. Treaties of this type are typically misunderstood by Americans as primarily legal documents. They are not; instead, they are diplomatic and political expressions of solidarity and mutual support. There is no serious reason for the United States not to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
Chinese Influence
on U.S. Operational Access to African Seaports

By GORDON S. MAGENHEIM

The ability to project American power, except for a forced-entry scenario, across and through existing African commercial seaports in a time of regional crisis may be hampered by the growing economic and political clout of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). American military planners must consider the use of austere seaport sites at alternative coastal locations as well as the use of intermediate staging bases as a means of countering this influence. This article illustrates the extent of China’s influence along coastal Africa and the potential difficulty that this influence might present to U.S. military access to seaports in a time of crisis.

China’s Growth

The PRC has made great strides over the last 25 years through a series of 5-year plans focused on modernization and economic growth. Since 1978, real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown “at an average annual rate of 9.3 percent, making China one of the world’s fastest growing economies.” This growth continues unabated. Since 2000, for instance, China’s portion of the global GDP has been larger than that of the United States and more than half of the three next largest emerging economies (India, Brazil, and Russia) combined.2

Although the Bush administration holds that the PRC will act as “a responsible stakeholder in the world community,” the administration and Pentagon planners remain wary of the long-term strategy of the PRC. Statements such as those made in the early 1990s by Deng Xianpang also reinforce this view. Known as the 24 Character Strategy, Deng’s guidance to members of China’s foreign and security policy apparatus stated that PRC policymakers should “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim leadership; and make some contributions.”

Chinese Objectives in Africa. Following the end of the Cold War, China shifted from developing ideological allies in Africa to securing access to natural resources, commercial ties, and economic influence.4 From the perspective of natural resources, the PRC is keenly interested in obtaining and securing long-term access to African oil and gas, as well as other natural resources, to sustain its economic growth.

Over the last 13 years, this economic growth has moved the PRC from a net exporter of oil to the world’s second-largest importer. It now relies on foreign sources for 40 percent of its demand, and this amount is likely to rise to 80 percent by 2025 if current projections are correct.5 Because its decade-long attempt to diversify energy use through the introduction of natural gas recently failed, the PRC sees oil-rich nations in Africa as likely candidates to meet these expected energy requirements, at least in the near term.

The PRC is also actively pursuing access to other African natural resources such as minerals, metals, and timber. This pursuit often includes funding and constructing infrastructure and selling the heavy equipment necessary to support current or anticipated requirements. Moreover, the PRC is interested in developing current and
future African markets for the sale of Chinese exports. Taken together, these steps will allow China to have access to both raw resources and export markets.

Globalization and the Core-Gap Model. In *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Thomas Barnett categorizes countries and regions from the perspective of globalization. This classification is based on the degree to which a nation (or region) is connected “and can handle the content flows associated with integrating one’s national economy to the global economy.”

Countries able to handle this increasing content flow are designated as Functioning Core states (or simply Core states); countries remaining fundamentally disconnected from globalization are termed the Non-Integrating Gap states (or simply Gap states). Other than South Africa, all of Africa is located within the region identified as the Non-Integrating Gap.

Global Strategic Positioning. This concept integrates a nation’s private and governmental assets with foreign countries (or groups of countries) for the purpose of expanding its own influence, accumulating power, and acquiring resources. This practice has been common throughout history and has allowed predominant powers to extend their regional influence through trade, political, and military alliances. The PRC follows this concept by taking careful, deliberate and well-coordinated action on a global scale to advance relations with strategically positioned countries possessing both the natural resources and influence to support its ascension in the international community and to accelerate the growth of its power and influence on the world stage.

The global strategic positioning concept is consistent with several priorities of the PRC’s foreign policy, such as “economic development; managing security issues around China’s borders; and unfolding plans for China’s rise to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.” The PRC “is forging deep economic, political, and military ties with most of Africa’s 54 countries” in order to secure access to the continent’s vast natural resources. The concept meshes well with Barnett’s Core-Gap model. Taken together, these theories lay the foundation for understanding the objectives of the PRC in establishing itself as a regional influence across the African continent.

The Nature of African Seaports

Seaports act as natural gateways and nodes within international transport networks and serve as corridors for materials and resources. This especially has been true since the advent of modern material handling technologies such as bulk terminals, container ports, and roll-on/roll-off methods of wheeled equipment, which have strengthened the relationship between a seaport and its supporting hinterland.

Africa is unique in that at least for Sub-Saharan Africa, there is “an unusual shortage of natural ports along the coastline.” Consequently, seaport locations, where available, become major points of access into the African continent for both imported goods and exports such as oil and gas, metals, and timber. The general lack of natural seaports along the coast is compounded by “the absence of rivers which are navigable by ocean-going vessels in the interior of the continent.” The result is that only a handful of widely separated commercial seaports are suitable for large volumes of maritime traffic. Large-scale and continued logistical support for any U.S. military operation would require either these sized ports or alternatives.

China’s Influence

Atlantic and Indian Ocean Coasts. Of the six seaports for the Atlantic and Indian Oceans (see table 1), only a single Atlantic Ocean port (Cape Town, South Africa) has sufficient draft for the berthing of vessels classed as large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR). On the Indian

following the Cold War, there was a shift from developing ideological allies in Africa to securing access to natural resources, commercial ties, and economic influence

Ocean, the port of Durban, South Africa, has the largest number (15) of LMSR-sized berths. The port of Mombasa, Kenya, is the remaining LMSR-capable seaport (with a single vessel berthing space) located on the Indian Ocean. The apparent lack of large commercial ports with sufficient room for the placement of LMSR-class vessels along both of these coasts is particularly troubling in that the west coast of Africa is the largest...
Access to African Seaports

Table 1. Operational Summary of African Ports and Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) Capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Berthing Groups</th>
<th>LMSR Equivalent Berths</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft; Niger Delta area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western coast of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Eastern coast of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar Es Salaam</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbera</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kismayu</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assab</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massawa</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safaga</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adabiya</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Dekheila</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengazi</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Insufficient draft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Number of LMSR equivalent berths is based on a planning length of 1,000 feet and a minimum draft of 36 feet.

Table 1 shows the operational summary of African ports and large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) capacities. It highlights the importance of seaports in accessing the Indian Ocean and the role of China in developing these ports.

Oil-producing area on the continent, with Nigeria and Angola as the main producers. Moreover, West Africa is a strategic area for the United States as it provides the nation with 15 percent of its oil imports. This figure is expected to grow to as much as 20 to 25 percent over the coming decade.15

In oil-rich Nigeria, the PRC has undertaken a variety of resource and commercial projects. These include a recent $800 million crude oil sales agreement for the purchase of 30,000 barrels of oil per day for 5 years,16 as well as agreements for the construction of a hydropower station and the rebuilding of the railroad network.17 The effort associated with rebuilding the railroad is key to expanding the transportation network into the neighboring country of Chad, where the PRC is also seeking exploration and development rights along the Nigerian-Chad border.18

The PRC has also expanded its influence in Angola. China recently provided a $2 billion loan as part of a longer-term aid package. In return, it was rewarded with oil exploration rights for a block that Angola had placed on the open market for bids.19

Located at the southern tip of the continent, South Africa sits astride the major maritime trade route between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Although not a key area with regard to petroleum resources, South Africa occupies a strategic location through which a large portion of oil tanker traffic from the Middle East to Europe and North America passes. It also has the largest seaport capacity of all the countries listed in table 1 and is easily accessible to both oceans.

Along the eastern portion of the continent, well north of the South African seaport of Durban, lies the Tanzanian seaport of Dar Es Salaam. Tanzania has been China’s largest aid recipient in Africa, with formal ties having been established in 1961.20 The PRC has cooperated with the government on a variety of non-oil-related projects. Recently, China provided an $11 million loan to Tanzania and Zambia to rehabilitate the Tanzania-Zambia railway, a 1,153-mile route whose original construction was funded by China. This railroad extends from the seaport of Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposa in central Zambia. Although trade between the two countries has been modest, military exchanges and cooperation continue to be an important part of the relationship.21

The PRC established relations with Kenya shortly after its independence in 1963. As with Tanzania, the PRC has developed a broad range of commercial ventures and projects. Kenya is the communications gateway to East Africa and a market of keen interest to the PRC. Recently, the port of Mombasa signed an agreement with China for the sale of crane trucks to increase cargo handling operations. Only recently have both countries agreed to explore for oil and natural gas.

The PRC has provided modest financial support to Somalia, with which it has also had close relationships since 1960. Prior to Somalia’s becoming a failed state in 1991, China had constructed several commercial and public facilities across the country. Current involvement has been limited to political support for the reestablishment of the government.

The role of the PRC in countries with seaports that border the Indian Ocean is limited to commercial trade, along with military and political/educational exchanges, rather than the oil exploration and production activities associated with the Atlantic coastal seaports. Nonetheless, the PRC has established an early toehold in many of the African countries along the Indian Ocean.

Gulf of Aden and Red Sea Coasts. Eight seaports listed in table 1 are located along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea coasts of Africa. Based on information contained in this table, there are no ports capable of receiving LMSR-class vessels along the Gulf of Aden. Two ports, Port Sudan (Sudan) and Adabiya (Egypt), are the only seaports located along the Red Sea coast of Africa that have berths with adequate length and draft to receive LMSRs.

Both Djibouti and Eritrea are small countries strategically located along the northeastern corner of the African continent. The influence of the PRC with Djibouti has been minimal and is limited to construction, student exchanges, and visits by Chinese medical teams, although both Djibouti and the PRC have established agreements on economic and technical cooperation.22
and political contact between Eritrea and the PRC are similar to that between Djibouti and the PRC, although Eritrea expects China to expand its involvement in local industries, to include mining and transportation infrastructure.

Sudan and the PRC have had a long political association since relations were established in 1959. Over the last decade, a strong economic relationship has also developed between the two countries that is focused on petroleum exploration and development, port construction, and electrical power generation and transmission. Sudan provides China with 7 percent of its imported oil, and China controls most of a Darfur oil field (the current site of hostilities between Sudanese forces and Christian rebels in southern Sudan) with minority percentage interests in several other oil fields. Chinese construction interests associated with the China National Petroleum Corporation participated in the construction of a 930-mile pipeline from several oil fields to the Red Sea. Separately, Chinese interests are building a $215 million export tanker terminal at Port Sudan. Another construction project planned by China is a $325 million pipeline to transport water from the Nile to Port Sudan. Clearly, the PRC has invested heavily in a variety of domestic projects in order to ensure its future with regard to Sudanese oil exports. Notably, this access extends to Port Sudan, one of the only seaports along the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea coastline capable of berthing LMSR-class vessels.

The relationship between the PRC and Egypt is also a mature one, dating back to 1956. Trade, political, and educational exchanges are significant. Chinese companies have undertaken a variety of construction projects and continue to sign numerous contracts to include oil and gas sector projects. Egypt is unique among most African countries in that it has large capacity seaports on both the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts.

Meditteranean Sea Coast. The African coast bordering the Mediterranean Sea has eight seaports listed in table 1, half of which are capable of berthing LMSR-class vessels. All four of these ports are located along the Egyptian coast, which makes Egypt a key access point for strategic sealift equipment and materiel into northeastern Africa.

China’s emphasis in Libya has been on developing economic and commercial links in a variety of industries, especially those related to oil and gas exploration and production. Unlike Egypt and Sudan, China was not actively engaged commercially with Libya until 1981. Since that time, the Chinese have been involved in a number of Libyan infrastructure projects and are pursuing additional commercial opportunities. Both Libyan ports listed in table 1 lack the available draft necessary for receiving LMSR-class vessels.

Interaction between the PRC and Tunisia is similar to that with Djibouti and Eritrea, with cooperative agreements dealing with various issues being completed in 2002. Chinese firms have been active in construction planning for local infrastructure projects, to include water supply and sewage projects. As with Libya to the east, Tunisia’s two ports listed in table 1 are incapable of handling LMSR-sized vessels.

Algeria and China have had extensive commercial and political dealings since Algeria’s independence from France in 1958. Both countries entered into a strategic agreement that focuses on oil and gas production, infrastructure development, and telecommunications development. This agreement was preceded by contracts signed in 2002 for the development of a Saharan Desert oil field ($525 million) by the China Petroleum and Chemical Company and in 2003 for the purchase of several Algerian refineries and exploration rights by the China National Petroleum Corporation. China continues to pursue aggressively additional petroleum exploration, development, and distribution throughout Algeria in order to increase its access to oil and gas supplies.

Beijing follows the same pattern of political and economic agreements with African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea as it does for other coastal regions. These agreements offer an avenue for Chinese engagement with poorly developed economies. They begin with the offer of humanitarian assistance and educational exchanges and are followed with infrastructure development (that is, hospital, water and sewage treatment plants, and road and railway construction) and the acquisition and export of natural resources (principally oil and gas).

U.S. Strategic Sealift Power Projection Options

Throughout the 1990s, the United States has decreased its overseas military presence through reducing forces and shifting troops and equipment from bases in Europe and South Korea. With transformation efforts by the Department of Defense under the Bush administration, the reduction in an overseas American presence continues, notwithstanding the effort to establish small and austere bases and facilities (so-called lily pad bases that allow for the fast, flexible, and efficient projection of force) in former Eastern Bloc and other countries. Rather than being a forward deployed force, the U.S. military now requires strategic air- and sealift to project influence and power overseas. Historically, however, approximately 95 percent of all equipment and supplies reach a theater of operations by sealift. Any military operation requiring the projection of a significant American presence into Africa will require the use of a commercial seaport or adjacent secondary/austere ports in a theater of operations.

Characteristics and Capabilities of U.S. Strategic Sealift Vessels. Four conventional ship types are used for the deployment and redeployment of unit equipment:

- breakbulk vessels, which consist of a series of separate cargo holds and are self-sustaining using ship’s gear (on-board booms, cranes, and winches) to conduct lift-on/lift-off operations
- container ships, which carry their entire load in containers that are 20 or 40 feet in length, and are non-self-sustaining (lacking on-board cranes)
- barge carriers, which carry smaller barges that are subsequently unloaded and ferried by tugs to berths where they are discharged by shore-based cranes
- roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, which are designed primarily as vehicle transports that allow the rapid movement and placement of wheeled and tracked equipment by a series of external and internal ramps between decks.

Only fast sealift ships (FSSs) and LMSRs are RO/RO vessels that have the largest amount of available floor space for the placement of equipment. Consequently, these types are preferred for large-scale unit deployments. Table 2 provides summary
planning information regarding the cargo capability of various vessel types. LMSR vessels are capable of transporting a significant amount of equipment—generally four to six times that of an average breakbulk vessel. FSSs have approximately half of the usable cargo capacity of LMSRs but have average service speeds of 27 knots compared to 24 knots for LMSRs.

Both LMSRs and FSSs are capable of deploying both wheeled and tracked equipment adjacent to a berthing area, provided there is sufficient length and draft. Both types of vessels have side or stern ramps that are maneuvered into place, allowing equipment to be driven or towed from the interior of the vessel, across the ramp, and onto the pier for staging and pickup by the owning unit.

Ready access to pier side unloading areas is critical for capitalizing on the strengths of LMSR- and FSS-class vessels (that is, large cargo capacity, self-sustaining capabilities, and quick loading/unloading times). Average discharge times range from 24 to 36 hours; similar discharge times for LMSRs are approximately 24 hours. LMSR vessel discharge rate information from Operation Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom is not currently available but should be similar to that of FSS vessels.

### Table 2. Strategic Sealift Vessel Type Cargo Capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>Average Usable Space (sq. ft.)</th>
<th>Average Total TEU Capacity</th>
<th>Berthing Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Self-Sustaining Container Ship</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>610 to 687 foot length (variable); 18 to 20 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Sustaining Container Ship</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>610 to 687 foot length (variable); 18 to 20 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakbulk</td>
<td>48,625</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>268 to 605 foot length (variable); 18 to 35 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notional Roll-On/Roll-Off</td>
<td>117,668</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>540 to 750 foot length (variable); 18 to 35 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Sealift Ship</td>
<td>152,774</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>946 foot length; 36 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMSR (Conversion)</td>
<td>233,969</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>906 foot length; 34 to 36 foot draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMSR (New Construction)</td>
<td>292,733</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>949 foot length; 35 to 36 foot draft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


LMSR = Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Vessel; TEU = Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit

**Alternative LMSR/FSS Discharge Options.** In the event that access for berthing either an LMSR or FSS is unavailable at an existing commercial seaport, alternative vessel discharge options will be needed. Due to the deep draft of these vessels, equipment discharge will be required from offshore anchorage locations to smaller, shallower draft vessels known as lighters. LMSR/FSS discharge using this method is known as in-the-stream unloading and will increase vessel discharge times. This method may be used across bare beach environments, damaged/sabotaged ports, or in austere ports normally capable of handling smaller cargo vessels.

Of note, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mobility has recognized the current lack of a viable method of using austere port locations for the rapid discharge of heavy/medium forces into a theater and has recommended a research and development program to determine its future feasibility.

The People’s Republic of China has made considerable political progress and strong economic inroads with many African nations, particularly those with abundant natural resources. China has expended and continues to expend considerable time and money to cultivate political and economic access into most of Africa, particularly the coastal countries.

American military planners must confront the reality that access for the largest class of vessels capable of delivering sizeable amounts of equipment and materiel into available African seaports may be denied due to conflict with commercial interests at the port for all but a forced-entry scenario. This may be especially the case in those ports that are actively engaged in commercial ventures with the People’s Republic of China. Seaport operators may be reluctant to allow U.S.-flagged vessels port access if it would disrupt normal port operations or run counter to China’s political goals for the region. *JFQ*

13 Ibid.

14 Table 1 lists seaports located along the coast of Africa and uses information presented in appendix F (Worldwide Port Characteristics) of the Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA), Pamphlet 700–2, Logistics Handbook for Strategic Mobility Planning (Newport News, VA: MTMCTEA, 2002). The number of multiple-vessel berthing groups, which vary in length and available draft, was obtained directly from appendix F for each seaport listed. The number of equivalent large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) vessel berths represents the number of vessels that could be accommodated at a single time given the limitations of length and draft required for an LMSR-sized vessel. For the sake of this article, a minimum planning length of 1,000 feet and a minimum draft of 36 feet were used to determine the number of LMSR-equivalent berths available for a given seaport listed in appendix F.


16 Ibid., 2.

17 Leggett, 1.


19 Ibid., 43.

20 Shinn, 6.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 10.

23 Ibid., 12.


25 MTMCTEA Pamphlet 700–2, 50–52.

Security conditions are deteriorating in one of the most important energy regions in the world. As the United States tries to wean itself from its Middle East oil dependency, areas such as the Gulf of Guinea off the West African coast are emerging as potentially the most important regions on the globe for access to this diminishing resource. The United States has recently declared the Gulf of Guinea an area of strategic national interest and thereby one that could require military intervention to protect its resources. However, it is an area rife with conflict. In fact, the challenges of operating there may prove to be dangerous for the U.S. military.

The Gulf of Guinea region encompasses a dozen African nations. From the north, Ghana borders the tumultuous nations of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Civil wars and ethnic strife in these nations have killed approximately 300,000 in the past 10 years. Continuing south, the region passes through small Togo and Benin, then through the regional hegemon Nigeria, and into Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC) lie just above the southernmost Gulf of Guinea nation, Angola.

These nations are notoriously unstable. United Nations Humanitarian Relief Director Jan Egeland called the recent conflict in DROC “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” Angola was famous as the scene of Africa’s longest conflict, a 27-year civil war that lasted until 2002 and left 500,000 dead. Sao Tome and Principe, a small island nation 200 miles from the coast, sits geographically isolated from the other Gulf of Guinea nations.

The number of waterways along the gulf is enormous. The coastline stretches 1,900 miles from Ghana to Angola, the equivalent of the distance from Nova Scotia to the Straits of Florida. Additionally, there are numerous river systems such as the Niger, Congo, and Ogooue that provide conveyance for much of the area’s commerce. By itself, the Niger Delta, the lowland area where the Niger and Benue Rivers spill into the Gulf of Guinea, is estimated to have 2,000 miles of navigable waterways. The Congo River pours 1.4 million cubic feet of water per second into the Atlantic, second only to the Amazon River in volume. Its final 220 miles spill out of the Congo Basin, a plateau 1,000 feet above sea level in the interior; the drop and volume of water are
Nigeria is the largest U.S. trade partner on the continent, supplying 10 percent of America’s imported oil.

so significant that these final 220 miles carry more hydroelectric potential than all the rivers and lakes in the United States combined.2

The New Persian Gulf?

The energy potential for the Gulf of Guinea region is astonishing. Experts predict that by 2020, oil production will surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf nations: 25 percent of the global production as compared to 22 percent from the Persian Gulf. Not surprisingly, multinational companies recognized this potential 10 years ago. In the late 1990s, oil conglomerates such as Royal Dutch Shell started expanding their operations in the area. By 2000, nearly $50 billion had been invested in oil infrastructure, and an estimated 40,000 personnel were employed by Western oil companies on rigs and refineries.3 The geopolitical repercussions of this discovery are just beginning to be felt; heavy development is expected to continue, especially in light of the export challenges in Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela. Additionally, China’s and India’s economies continue to grow in leaps and bounds, demanding reliable energy sources to feed their industrial machines. In January 2006, China purchased a $2.3 billion share of a Nigerian oil field, its largest investment on the continent to date.

Nigeria is the linchpin in the whole Gulf of Guinea region. An economic giant compared to its neighbors, its economy is second only to South Africa in all of sub-Saharan Africa. A regional hegemon militarily and economically, Nigeria is also the largest oil producer in Africa. Ninety-five percent of its economy is generated from oil revenue. Nigeria is the largest U.S. trade partner on the continent, supplying 10 percent of America’s imported oil. That places it fifth among U.S. oil providers behind Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Nearly half of Nigeria’s oil production goes to the United States. Nigeria is the world’s eighth largest oil exporter.4

Nigeria has many problems, however. Corruption is endemic and institutionalized. From its independence from Britain in 1960 until its first democratic elections in 1998, it was ruled nearly continuously by military autocrats. During this time, the country’s leaders, including strongman General Sani Abacha who remained in power from 1993 until 1998, stole an estimated $400 billion of the country’s funds and secreted it away in overseas accounts.5 Despite its enormous oil wealth, Nigeria has one of the lowest gross domestic products per capita in the area, just above Angola among the Gulf of Guinea nations, and one of the worst income distributions in the world: 80 percent of the generated oil revenue wealth accrues to only 1 percent of the population.6 Transparency International ranks Nigeria as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, and the Economist Intelligence Unit listed the country’s quality of life index as the fourth worst.

The corruption extends from the highest to the lowest points of Nigeria’s government. The president of the Senate was forced to resign after taking bribes to pass an inflated budget. The inspector general of the police force was found guilty of stealing $140 million. He was sentenced to only 6 months in jail. Two admirals were found guilty of stealing and selling oil in the delta and were relieved of their duties.7 In the state of Bayelsa, which produces 30 percent of the country’s oil, the governor has spent $25 million since 2002 on his state mansion, including $8.5 million for two new houses and nearly $6 million on the fence surrounding the buildings.8

Much of the corruption stems from a criminal practice known as “oil bunkering.” Illicit or stolen barrels pull up alongside an oil pipeline in an isolated location (often under cover of darkness), “hot tap” into the pipeline by drilling into it and installing a valve, then make off with thousands of barrels that can be sold on the black market. This reckless practice is as dangerous as it is illegal. Within the last few months, 500 people have died in separate incidents as the siphoned oil accidentally ignited, burning most victims beyond recognition.

An estimated $3 billion in oil is stolen each year from oil companies. Regional strongmen and local politicians permit this behavior in return for kickbacks and protection money from the thieves.9 The stolen funds also provide a source of arms for gangs that operate in the delta.

The inhabitants of the Niger River Delta are fed up with the corruption and complicity. In early 2006, Ijaw tribe members there kidnapped four American citizens and numerous other Western oil company employees, held them for ransom, and called for better distribution of wealth and the liberation of the delta from its tyrannical rulers. The hostages were released after 19 days. One month later, nine foreign contractors working for Willbros Group of Houston—including three Americans and one British citizen—were also kidnapped and held for ransom. Three of them were held for nearly 5 weeks before their release was negotiated. Although secrecy shrouds the case, many believe that the ransom demands were paid by oil companies. In more recent violence, on May 10, 2006, American oil executive Rick Wiginton was murdered while driving through Lagos by an assailant who approached his vehicle on a motorcycle. American hostage Macon Hawkins testified to the determination of the insurgents on his release: “These people are serious, very serious about what they are doing. They are going to fight and they are going to fight to the death.”10

One insurgent group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, has demanded $1.5 billion in cash, the release of two of their jailed leaders, and a presidential promise to address their needs. Armed with rocket-propelled grenade launchers and automatic weapons, the militants have frequently attacked oil company platforms and barges from speedboats along the numerous waterways. Having recently resorted to car bomb attacks, the groups have also threatened to attack international oil tankers operating along West African coastal waters.11 They have vowed to continue the attacks until they have interrupted the country’s daily oil production by 1 million barrels (20 percent of Nigeria’s current 2.5 million barrels per day) or until their demands are met. The militants exceeded their own expectations. As a result of the violence, Royal Dutch Shell shut down production at terminals and oil fields in 2006,
thereby closing the spigot on 25 percent of the country’s daily oil exports. Later that year, Royal Dutch Shell and other oil companies evacuated their employees and families from the region, citing increased violence.

The crippling of the Nigerian oil industry could have disastrous results. Energy experts estimate that if Nigerian exports were completely taken offline, the price of a barrel of oil could skyrocket much higher than during the 2006 crisis when prices hit $75. Without the world’s eighth largest producer—coupled with additional fears about access to oil supplies in Venezuela and the Middle East—prices could quickly reach $110 per barrel and over $4.00 per gallon at U.S. service stations. The National Intelligence Council, in a study of Africa’s problems, has declared the collapse of Nigeria to be “the most important risk facing the continent today.”

In many ways, Nigeria is a microcosm of the rest of the Gulf of Guinea and even the African continent itself. Replete with abundant resources, its productivity is hindered by corrupt officials, regional warlords who put tribal loyalties above national ones, and the escalating violence between religious sects. Foreign investment is driven off by fear of the lawlessness and instability of the nation. Muslim fundamentalists in the north have grown weary of the lack of governance, and 12 states have recently adopted sharia law. Both HIV and AIDS are rampant throughout the land, and the Nigerian military forces, frequent participants in peacekeeping operations in other African nations, have been depleted by the diseases.

Nigeria’s population of 133 million is the largest in Africa, more than all the other gulf nations combined; 1 of every 6 Africans lives there. However, the country is polarized, often violently, between the Muslim north and Christian/Animist south. The Muslims count some 65 million (2½ million more than Iraq), making Nigeria the largest Muslim population on the continent. An estimated 10,000 have died in sectarian violence since 1999, and the recent up roar over the prophet Mohammed cartoons has caused more deaths in Nigeria than any other country in the world.

The violence could get worse before it gets better. President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from the south—legally restricted from running for a third term—has lobbied for a constitutional amendment that would permit him to remain in office. That would lead to countrywide instability promoted by his political opponents and could provoke open rebellion. According to some U.S. officials, the worst-case scenario for America would be the emergence of a northern Muslim general or politician into the presidency, either democratically or through unconstitutional means. The United States could then find itself facing a Muslim population—nearly three times that of Iraq—in control of vast energy resources. Such a situation could result in U.S. military intervention on a much larger scale than in Iraq.

Energy security is not the only problem in the Gulf of Guinea. Fisheries protection, drug smuggling, harbor security, and piracy undermine other commercial interests and scare away foreign investment. The International Maritime Bureau lists the gulf as the second most violent coastline in the world (behind the Somali coastline). Twenty-one acts of piracy were reported there in 2005. Countless others go unreported. Illegal fishing robs an estimated $350 million in revenue from the Gulf of Guinea nations each year.

U.S. Efforts in the Region

The Gulf of Guinea coastline has also become the layover point favored by narcotics smugglers trying to reach the lucrative markets of Europe. In September 2004, a French warship intercepted a Togolese tugboat, Pitea, off the coast of Ghana with more than 2 tons of cocaine worth $50 million. In 2004, Spanish officials seized more than 20 tons of cocaine that had originated in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigerians are the most frequently arrested drug smugglers in Austria (more than double any other nationality) and the second most frequently arrested in Spain.

Protecting maritime commerce and the sealanes is becoming a critical effort of the U.S. Navy, particularly those forces serving under U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. USEUCOM has responsibility for all American forces operating in Europe, Africa, and parts of Central Asia. General Charles Wald, USAF, the former 4-star Deputy Commander of USEUCOM, noted the importance of the waterways in and around the Gulf of Guinea: “Our single greatest challenge is the cooperation and willingness of African coastal nations to see maritime security as a regional problem and to act on known security issues.”

USEUCOM’s maritime strategy is based on higher guidance provided in the White House’s National Maritime Security Strategy, which recognizes the need to protect the oceans and international maritime commerce, the latter of which provides conveyance for 80 percent of the world’s exports. According to this strategy, “The United States, in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforce-
ment capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level.” The national guidance clearly applies to USEUCOM’s efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

These sentiments were further emphasized in 2004 when Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Snyder reported, “Improving African capacities to monitor their coastlines is . . . a critical part of our strategy. We . . . will revive the old African coastal security program, which helps African security forces protect their shores as well as their marine resources.”

This African Coastal Security program was initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs Division, in 1985. Although the program provided necessary equipment, training, and technical advice, it was inadequately funded with only $3 million per year. The program was discontinued in 1995.

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in the Gulf of Guinea. MDA is a broad term that refers to the situational awareness of anything in a nation’s waters or territorial or economic exclusion zone, and anything that could affect the nation’s security, safety, economics, or environment. For instance, MDA includes surveillance networks and coastal radars that could help the Gulf of Guinea nations selectively react to illegal activities in their waters. One such MDA system is the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a commercial shipboard broadcast system that functions much like the Identification Friend or Foe equipment carried by military and commercial aircraft. AIS is capable of transmitting 4,500 data reports per minute and updating every 2 seconds. The cost of an AIS unit, about $4,000 for the network, would be quickly redeemed from the illegal activity it could prevent. The system could enable African coastal naval forces to sort legitimate maritime commerce from the illicit contacts (those not “squawking” a signal), thereby improving MDA and reducing illegal trafficking and piracy. Admiral Harry Ulrich III, commander of Naval Forces Europe, explains, “We do it every day with airplanes and it’s time for us to start thinking about doing the same thing with ships at sea.”

Another useful surveillance tool is the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC), which would enable a nascent African navy to monitor its coastal waters and sortie its forces to interdict illegal activities. Composed of an array of coastal radar systems, this system would allow African coastal nations to detect and track vessels out to 25 nautical miles from the sensor in all weather conditions. Coupled with a naval reaction force, RMAC could impede smuggling, piracy, or illegal fishing in the host nation’s waters.

Establishing cooperative partnerships with African navies is a critical element of the U.S. strategy. The 1,000-ship Navy concept, a phrase first coined by the U.S. Navy’s Vice Admiral John Morgan and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio in 2005, is an essential strategy to enlist the assistance of host-nation forces and relieve pressure on a U.S. military over-extended in Iraq and Afghanistan. The development of partner navies in the Gulf of Guinea would enable countries to combat the myriad maritime challenges on the high seas and in the littorals: piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, oil bunkering, and fisheries violations.

The concept ideally suits the asset-limited Naval Forces Europe, the naval component of U.S. European Command. Said a strategic planner at its headquarters:

“We don’t have the resources to provide maritime security here. We’re not going to be a force in the Gulf of Guinea. But we are looking to increase our involvement right now—not to send ships on patrol but to develop partnerships and develop capacities. If the Navy had more assets, would they send them here? Probably. But our first choice is to use what we have to facilitate training and regional cooperation.”

European partners such as the French and British have a long history of investment and involvement in the region and could contribute to maritime security efforts. Annual exercises such as the West African Training Cruise encourage just that kind of naval cooperation. The cruise, conducted regularly since 1978, consists of a series of bilateral interactions between the U.S. Navy and individual African nations. The 2005 deployment saw the USS Gunston Hall and the USS Swift conduct exercises with navies along the West African and Gulf of Guinea coasts. The training included small boat drills, riverine operations, live-fire exercises, and amphibious raids.

Other Navy ship visits could also help to improve the U.S. reputation among Gulf of Guinea nations. For example, the April 2006 visit of USS Emory S. Land to Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Congo, and...
The Department of Defense is not equipped to stamp out corruption, teach AIDS/HIV prevention, or provide malaria medicines

Angola helped maintain navy-to-navy relations by conducting exercises in leadership development, natural disaster response, medical awareness, and disease prevention. The ship’s Sailors refurbished a high school in Sao Tome, a gesture of goodwill that will advance U.S. interests in this island nation.24

The Navy’s new Riverine Command is aptly suited to deal with problems in areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. Commissioned in Little Creek, Virginia, in January 2006, Riverine Group One (RG–1) will provide a strategic element that has not been used by conventional Navy forces since the Vietnam era. Developed to patrol rivers and coasts, conduct interdiction operations, and engage enemy naval forces, RG–1 tools include high speed (40 knots plus), shallow draft, and lightly armored boats capable of operating day or night. Although RG–1’s assets will not be trained, equipped, and available for deployment for some time, its contribution to a post–Cold War world of regional conflicts will be critical.

U.S. efforts to fix the problems in the Gulf of Guinea will also require an interagency approach. The Department of Defense is not equipped to stamp out corruption, teach AIDS/HIV prevention, or provide malaria medicines. These are tasks better suited for elements such as the World Health Organization, U.S. Department of State, or U.S. Agency for International Development. Regardless, American efforts in the region may be viewed with suspicion.

Likewise, the Gulf of Guinea regional partners must cooperate and collaborate in their efforts to improve maritime security along their coast. Agreements must be developed to permit intelligence-sharing, allow the pursuit of criminals into neighboring waters, and use regional facilities to train partner navies using U.S. and participating European navies.

The channel ahead of the U.S. Navy and its allies in the Gulf of Guinea is narrow and fraught with dangerous cross currents. The investment of effort in the region will be a lengthy and difficult endeavor. However, senior military officials are cautiously optimistic. General James Jones, USMC, former commander of U.S. European Command, stated, “The most recent phenomenon is that the United States now is paying more attention to problems surrounding Africa. And we believe that proactive investment is always cheaper than reactive investment.”29

NOTES

17. Taylor, 33.
JFQ: What do you see as the greatest challenges facing U.S. European Command?

General Craddock: There are numerous challenges. I would not want to rank order them because then it looks like we put some of them at the forefront—but the others at the end of the list are just as important. As in other parts of the world, a major challenge is identifying the threats we face. The nature of security, if you will, has changed. In the past, particularly at EUCOM, there was a very clear mission set, which was defense of the trans-Atlantic alliance: NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Those days are over, obviously, and now there is discussion and debate about defense versus security. NATO has transitioned from a defensive alliance to a security-focused alliance. Obviously, EUCOM has to be an important part of that. I don’t know if that’s a rank order of number one, but it’s pretty high on the challenge list.

Also, the nature of many of the threats that we face today requires us to work closely and in coordination with other government agencies, such as the State Department, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], Health and Human Services, and the Department of Energy.

JFQ: What makes EUCOM different from other combatant commands, and how has it changed since the last time you were in Europe?

General Craddock: On a physical basis, it’s the only one that’s actually headquarters OCONUS [outside the continental United States]. The other commands are either forward-deployed, forward headquarters, or in the continental United States. It’s probably nuanced, there probably doesn’t appear to be much of a difference, but there’s a consideration of host-nation laws, regulations, and agreements that always play into that.

What’s changed? I was last here in 2002, and the very nature of the debate over defense versus security has changed, the nature of the expansion of the EUCOM missions that are associated with that mindset, which is collective security. The change is thinking about assistance to cooperation. Security assistance is an outdated term. I understood this when I was down in SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], and I think that security cooperation, building partner-nation capability, is now more important than ever. The other difference is that whereas, in the past, to a greater extent, the component commands to EUCOM focused on providing capabilities in the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility], now those capabilities are provided worldwide. So I think that also becomes a significant difference from years past.

JFQ: Could you please tell us about EUCOM’s new theater strategy?

General Craddock: It’s not yet approved. We’re working through it, we’re close to being final, but it’s got to go through a few more wickets. I’m very encouraged. The focus is what we call active security, which is not about fighting wars. Instead, the focus is on creating conditions that enhance and encourage stable environments. It’s partnering, it’s building capability, and it’s encouraging our partners for defense reform in those sectors, good governance, and the notion of representative governance.

The key is that the strategy acknowledges equities by the Department of Defense and by European Command, but it builds upon an understanding and a dependence on the interagency community, the other government agencies and departments that have to partner not only with us, but also with each other. This is a collective effort to create success in those types of ventures. The intent is to describe an endstate and then put together a plan that positions us strategically. This plan should...
allow us to work together and then to build partner-nation capability and to build good governance where it may not be, to the extent that, one, they’re satisfied with it, or two, that it fits into a regional cooperative effort.

**JFQ:** There has been a lot of discussion about the possible formation of a new unified command for Africa. Does this reflect the view that Africa has become more important, and if so, how?

**General Craddock:** The conventional wisdom, the common view out there, at least in the government, is that Africa is increasingly to the forefront in our national security interests. There is enormous potential in Africa, and there are significant challenges and problems: political instability, ungoverned or uncontrolled spaces, socioeconomic issues, extremism in its various forms, the age-old smuggling, illicit trafficking, piracy, and then, of course, devastating endemic disease there, HIV/AIDS among those, which has come to the forefront in recent years. So those are challenges and issues that, maybe in days past, did not appear to be significant.

With the recognition of a more globally connected world, I think a greater understanding of humanitarian issues has come about that allows developing nations to chart their own courses better. These nations can do so not only from a security perspective but also from a governance and social focus. Combining all these perspectives should push Africa to the forefront in terms of competing for resources and attention from the U.S. Government. So that’s part of the thinking, that there is indeed a renewed emphasis and focus on what is happening in Africa.

**JFQ:** NATO’s policy is that Afghanistan is its number-one priority. Do you believe the Alliance is following through?

**General Craddock:** Yes, I do believe NATO is answering the call in Afghanistan. Many of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are manned and operated by NATO member nations. The Alliance has some 32,000 forces in Afghanistan across the country, providing security and stability on a daily basis. NATO forces work closely with the Afghan government and local leaders to assist in developing infrastructure, civil and social services needed by the Afghan people. I believe there is recognition that there is not a military solution to correct what ails Afghanistan. The solutions are development, construction, and reconstruction. The security that NATO forces bring to Afghanistan helps to set the conditions to permit the “solution set” to get started.

Over the past few years there’s been an expansion of their authority, an expansion of contributing nations, an expansion of capability, and all that has contributed to an enhanced security condition in much of the country, a sustained security condition in others, and also improved reconstruction and development in parts of the country where the security condition permits that. So there has been a significant military contribution. The political leadership continues to work to maintain adequate troop strength and to convince nations meeting expectations. Generally I would say that’s the case, but obviously there are niche areas that would be farther ahead or judged or assessed as being more transformational than others. First of all is the notion of a collective defense, an alliance for collective defense, versus today’s alliance for collective security. That’s a fundamental shift in concept. There is now a more comprehensive view of security issues and the capabilities that flow from that view anywhere in the world. There have been a lot of transformational efforts, and it’s more than just platforms or systems. The transformation is in how we think about things and how we think about capabilities that will be needed and how then to best develop, either collectively or individually, capabilities to satisfy what we project as the needs of the future.

Now, the platforms issue and the hardware are important; NATO is working now on some enhancements in strategic lift and doing a collective effort there. I think there are 15 nations now that are consorting to buy some strategic lift. The intelligence fusion cell was recently stood up, which is a transformational effort in intelligence, and now that has a NATO look to it. It was a first. I think it was October 2006 when it reached initial operational capability. And that uniquely facilitates collection and distribution of military intelligence, which is essential for NATO operations.

One of the recent transformational initiatives has been the establishing of a NATO SOF [special operations force] capability to strengthen the Alliance’s out-of-area crisis prevention and rapid deployment. So partnering with EUCOM or working also with the Special [Operations] Command to see how we might structure this into a coordination center to build a special operations capability throughout the Alliance is important. That’s one that has significant potential for the future.

Probably the most transformational aspect or program that has been started recently was the NATO Response Force, which reached full operational capability in November 2006 just after the Riga NATO summit. It’s a significant achievement. In the NATO Response Force, there are about 25,000
NATO soldiers—land, air, and sea—that are postured, trained, and certified to respond to a specific set of missions should NATO call.

**JFQ:** The ongoing EUCOM transformation plans call for a significant reduction in the footprint of forward-stationed forces, but some are criticizing them for cutting too deep. In fact, General Jones (General James L. Jones, USMC Ret.) spoke of this on C-SPAN in December concerning the Army component. Are you reassessing the transformation effort?

**General Craddock:** It’s healthy and helpful to reassess all plans routinely. I have seen extraordinarily capable, talented planners put together sensational plans in just about any functional area imaginable. What then occurs is implementation, and the plan moves out—and often, the plan may not survive first contact with whoever will criticize, or derail, or oppose it, whether it’s a wartime or peacetime situation.

Secondly, the fact is that things change, conditions change, and probably more so now in the 21st century than ever before for a variety of reasons. If we compound these situations, the opportunity for plans as constructed to survive over time is diminished significantly. It’s healthy, it’s essential, and it’s an obligation that we routinely go back and look at the assumptions made for the plans and challenge those assumptions—Do they still fit in the current situation, the current condition?—and then review what it is that we’ve chartered, what it is that we’ve been doing, to see if it still makes sense, if it is still effective and efficient.

So that’s a long answer—the answer being “yes”—to a short question. I’m going to review, continually reassess, and look at external conditions as well as internal opportunities. I know there are discussions that the Army may grow in size; some requests have been made. If that’s the case, there may be opportunities to grow the Army, to have that growth reside in the EUCOM AOR. But there has to be a reason for it, and that’s what we’ll look at—we’ll look at the conditions and problem set that we face. There is value in forward-deployed forces. There is enormous value in security cooperation opportunities that build this partner-nation capability. It is very effective to use our forces to partner with, exercise with, and train with other nations so that their capacities can be enhanced. It is efficient when we have the same forces available because we build habitual relationships. And if we have a paucity or we’ve diminished the availability of those habitual forces, we ought to look at that and make some assessments and decide whether or not we have what we need to do that in a manner that is, one, most efficient (I’m a taxpayer, so I don’t want to waste one dollar, just like anybody else) and, second, most effective in terms of building needed capacities so that others can partner with us in any future venture that might call for either the Alliance or a coalition of some other means.

**JFQ:** If formed, will an Africa Command disrupt the strategy?

**General Craddock:** No, I don’t think so. The active security that we’re talking about is designed so that it could be extracted, it could be pulled out of the EUCOM strategy document, and the rest is still valid. It’s not a house of cards where if one card is pulled, then the rest are going to fall. It’s a pretty thoughtful document; I was very impressed with the presentations I’ve received from the group. They’ve done some good thinking on this, both from theoretical and practical aspects. If an Africa Command becomes authorized, sourced, and stood up, we merely have to take the strategy document that we’ve got working down at EUCOM, do some cut-and-paste, and then buff up the edges. I think it will work fine. **JFQ**
The global threats we face pose a looming menace to the international community. This is especially true for the United States and its European partners. The nature of this complex contemporary operating environment highlights the necessity for operations across a broad strategic continuum. The old paradigms of static deterrence are anachronistic when we are faced with a foe that recognizes no national boundaries, shows open contempt for human rights, and refutes international rule of law. However, the United States cannot afford to act alone against these threats. The continuing march of globalization and its resulting multitude of economic, political, and resource linkages means that now, more than any time in history, there is a need to concentrate on alliance-building, coalition operations, and strategic partnerships.

This strategic emphasis is clearly reflected in the President’s National Security Strategy, and answering this call for long-term effect requires us not only to seek opportunities for forging new relationships but also to find ways to enhance present partnerships. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility presents multiple options to do both. However, our longstanding relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offers a unique and timely opportunity both to improve the Alliance’s operational capability and to enhance our collective ability to deal with the new strategic environment. Special Operations is one such capability. As President George W. Bush announced at the November 2006 Riga Summit, there is an opportunity to “launch a NATO Special Operations Forces Initiative that will strengthen the ability of Special Operations personnel from NATO nations to work together on the battlefield.”

**Focusing on NATO**

NATO has proven itself an enduring and vital contributor to the security of post–Cold War Europe and, with the recent inclusion of Afghanistan, the community of nations. Despite its contributions, however, shortfalls and challenges persist that the Alliance must address in order to succeed in this changed strategic environment. As James Appathurai, writing in the NATO Review, notes:

> At the practical level, NATO forces are working together in robust, complex and difficult missions, but the U.S. lead in military technology makes working together difficult for deployed forces. At the political level, the desire among Allies to work together is hamstrung by the growing complexity of doing so. At the strategic level, a growing transatlantic divergence in capabilities can perpetuate both legitimate grievances and unfair stereotypes over burden sharing and influence.

Even though these observations were made in 2002, they remain true today, as NATO continues wrestling with issues such as strategic airlift, enhanced expeditionary capability, command and control integration, interoperability of communications, information-sharing, and, at the political level, restrictive national caveats. While there are ongoing efforts to transform NATO in order to close these capability gaps, such as the recent Strategic Airlift Capability Initiative, the pace of change is dampened by the rapidly evolving threats that the Alliance faces in Afghanistan.

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General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander, U.S. European Command, until December 2006. General Jones submitted this article before relinquishing command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.
and the real potential for NATO deployed operations elsewhere.

Although the majority of Allied operations have been centered on the conventional aspects of military power, today’s convergence of multiple unconventional threats across the strategic continuum requires a new focus on transforming the unconventional aspects of Alliance military capability. Emphasizing the transformation of NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) offers several significant opportunities to improve current and future Alliance capabilities. These include establishing an affordable venue for even smaller nations to make meaningful contributions to the Alliance, expanding NATO capability in conflicts, and increasing future capabilities and capacity.

The transformation of SOF presents the ability to close some capability gaps at more affordable economic and political costs when compared to conventional forces; SOF are, by nature, small in number, easier to deploy quickly, and have much of the modern equipment required to foster better interoperability. In addition, SOF units, consisting of mature, highly trained, and skilled personnel, are designed to accept higher risk missions, resulting in less cumbersome caveats. These factors mean that, for many NATO nations, SOF may represent a more affordable niche contribution, yet one that offers tremendous benefits to succeeding against the enemies we face today and in the future.

On the battlefield, SOF units offer a wide range of options to enhance the joint commander’s ability to influence conflict. From creating synergies with conventional force operations, to conducting SOF-specific missions, to working with indigenous personnel, SOF bring capabilities that belie their small numbers. The most recent evidence of what they can do on the modern battlefield is best demonstrated in Afghanistan.

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, SOF continue to make vital strategic and operational impacts. Through special reconnaissance (SR) efforts, SOF teams work with conventional air and ground units to disrupt adversaries through facilitating kinetic attacks. In conducting their own direct action (DA) missions, SOF continue to capture or kill high-value terrorists and insurgent leaders. Meanwhile, they are conducting multiple foreign internal defense missions, working directly with the security forces of Afghanistan as an essential element in preparing them to assume responsibility for their own national defense. Each of these examples illustrates a similar capability found in draft versions of NATO SOF policy and doctrine. However, despite having this foundation to work from, the majority of SOF contributions in Afghanistan have come through non-NATO coalition efforts.

While there are a few NATO Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) working in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), their ability to make significant gains on ISAF’s conventionally focused design. To improve ISAF ability to assist the Afghan government in establishing a secure environment and promoting reconstruction efforts, the force is organized into five regional commands. This regional model establishes a straightforward means to concentrate security assistance operations and simplify coordination of reconstruction. However, this traditional construct also restricts the ability to achieve centralized SOF command and control, limiting freedom of maneuver and responsiveness for NATO SOTGs to conduct SR, DA, and military assistance (MA) missions across Afghanistan as a whole. A contributing factor to this command and control challenge is the reemergence of the Taliban.

Even as the ISAF focus has been on assisting Afghanistan’s security and stabilization efforts, the fluid security situation caused by the reemergence of the Taliban has placed a new emphasis on dealing with this immediate threat and the direct risk that it poses to ISAF personnel. This has left little time and few resources for reexamining the role of NATO SOF and how they might be leveraged for better strategic and operational gains. Additionally, there is no NATO SOF organization to address this situation.

Although the NATO SOTGs in ISAF are highly capable, and the joint commands do have their own small Special Operations planning staffs, the overall structure of NATO SOF needs a standing entity dedicated to addressing the integration of SOF solutions at both the operational and strategic levels. Transforming SOF is an essential element to expanding this aspect of the Alliance’s combat capability. However, beyond generating effects on the battlefield, a SOF transformational emphasis also has the potential to grow future capability and capacity.

NATO SOF offers an opportunity to increase military capability both directly and indirectly. An effective transformation of SOF requires improved interaction between NATO members’ Special Forces organizations in areas such as doctrine, training, communications, and interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This allows nations with more advanced Special Operations capability to enhance other member nations’ SOF, even as it opens the possibility to share certain resources, such as training facilities, SOF educational opportunities, and lessons learned.

On a more concrete basis, one essential element of effective interoperability is communications. Currently, there is no standardized communications architecture for NATO SOF. While many nations have robust communications capabilities, there are no established reference points to enable all the SOF partner nations to be fully compatible. One way to address this problem is to establish common requirements for compatibility, secure capability, and modularization. These requirements would be used to develop equipment specifications for future procurement and specialized technical training needs. This standardization is important to ensure operational security and to develop doctrinal templates and TTPs for the full spectrum of SOF missions. Transformation would address this situation by establishing a SOF advocate for technical aspects of equipment specifications and supported NATO SOF TTPs.

In the conduct of special reconnaissance and direct action missions, effective TTPs, facilitated by efficient, secure communications, are essential. Transformation would provide the forum for developing a common reference of such TTPs. These TTPs would begin with establishing NATO SOF standards and setting minimum requirements for SR and DA missions. For example, SR mission baselines would include standard reporting procedures, day/night observation capability, and specific weapons systems and proficiency requirements. In a similar vein, standards for DA missions would outline minimum force

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**today’s convergence of multiple, unconventional threats across the strategic continuum requires transforming the unconventional aspects of Alliance capability**
requirements and capabilities, driving NATO SOF TTPs for objective area infiltration and exfiltration, actions on the objective, site exploitation, and after action reporting procedures for lessons learned.

Additional gains can be realized by emphasizing MA programs. By definition, military assistance is “a broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly or allied forces in peace, crisis, and conflict . . . and may vary from low-level military training or material assistance to the active employment of indigenous forces in the conduct of combat operations.” This characterization provides tremendous flexibility in helping to train and prepare NATO’s partners rapidly in places such as Afghanistan. An aggressive MA program will not only produce synergies on the battlefield but also increase military capability and capacity by building indigenous security forces, freeing SOF and conventional forces for other missions.

MA programs may also be used to assist NATO aspirants in developing and improving their own nascent Special Operations capabilities as a potential contribution to future NATO operations. Beyond creating additional operational capacity, this approach has the added benefits of providing on-the-job training and MA experience for the SOF of current Alliance members, helping to refine MA techniques in preparation for future operations.

**Challenge and Response**

Despite the range of opportunities that a NATO SOF transformation offers—from providing a niche opportunity for some Alliance members, to increasing operational effects and growing capability and capacity—significant organizational obstacles must be overcome. Unlike NATO’s land, maritime, and air components, SOF have no standing organization that provides the unity of effort, focus on interoperability, and common doctrine required to transform. As previously noted, even in today’s ongoing operations, NATO SOF policy and doctrine are only in draft form. Furthermore, and again unlike the other components, there is no designated NATO SOF voice to guide such an effort.

There are two main reasons for these shortfalls. First, the seriousness of the threat and the value of SOF as a viable means to address it have been recognized only recently. Second, historically, SOF have been retained by member nations as prized national assets under strict national control, in many cases uniquely shaped to address specific national security issues. However, the combination of an amorphous, global threat and the often complex, ambiguous nature of the contemporary operating environment mandates changes in this mindset. Despite the ability of SOF to make a difference, it takes significantly longer to develop Special Forces than it takes the enemy to produce new foot soldiers, even as the enemy becomes more and more capable of producing ever-higher levels of destruction.

If we hope to reap the gains SOF can offer, we must begin now. The NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative (NSTI) can accomplish this mission.

**Transformation Blueprint**

As a truly transformational initiative, the NSTI will provide a complete SOF solution set at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Achieving these objectives will not come without a price, not only because of the inherently small force pool of SOF, but also because of the immense value that these elite forces represent at the national level. Therefore, NSTI will not attempt to develop a standing NATO SOF combat force; instead, it will focus on such common areas of interest as proper integration of NATO SOF at the strategic and operational levels, doctrine development and promulgation, interoperability between member nation SOF organizations, and connectivity with NATO conventional forces and other Alliance agencies.

To accomplish all of this, NSTI will consist of three parts: an expansion of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Special Operations Office (SSOO); the creation of a NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC); and the development of a federation of Special Forces training centers. Perhaps most importantly, NSTI will include the appointment of a flag-level SOF officer to lead this initiative and to provide a vital strategic voice for Alliance Special Operations issues.

While the SSOO has been in place for some time, it has been insufficiently manned to address the growing number of SOF issues within SHAPE. Expanding this office represents a significant step in addressing this shortfall, at the same time providing a more robust SHAPE staffing conduit for the centerpiece of NSTI, the NSCC.

The NSCC will be the organizational nexus for NSTI, serving as the home of the flag officer assigned as the NATO SOF advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As the NSCC director, this officer will serve as the direct link between SACEUR and Special Forces organizations across the Alliance, lending SOF-specific strategic advice as NATO’s leading SOF advocate. In this role, the director will fulfill responsibilities similar to those of NATO’s land, maritime, and air component commanders, but without command authority. At the operational level, the director will work
to ensure that the Alliance has sufficient, immediate Special Operations expertise for the development of operational estimates and the conduct of operations. At the same time, the NSCC director will provide flag-officer advice to the three NATO joint commands and serve as a functional liaison to Alliance nations’ SOF leadership. To accomplish these multiple roles, the NSCC will be organized into three main divisions to address specifically many of the shortfalls already discussed.

The NSCC Operational Support Division will play a key part in synchronizing planning efforts, supporting the development of SOF requirements in the force generation process, and providing assistance to the NATO joint commands. Currently, a small number of SOF staff members within the joint commands generate most SOF inputs to the operational planning process. However, the complex, rapidly changing environment suggests more to gain by establishing an organization that the joint commands could turn to for more advanced SOF planning advice. This capability would go far in improving support of ongoing operations, such as ISAF, and will be critical to emerging operations such as those that may fall to the NATO Response Force. Beyond defining SOF operational missions for specific plans, synchronizing such efforts is essential to establish the requirements for gaining appropriate operational capabilities and forces.

The Strategic Concepts and Interoperability Division of the NSCC will be responsible for supporting strategic planning at higher headquarters, producing policy and doctrine, developing common TTPs, and assisting with NATO education programs. In addition, this division will serve as the interface for NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) on NATO SOF issues. While the primary functions of the NSCC are oriented toward operational aspects of NATO, a significant amount of effort for this transformational organization will involve close cooperation with ACT. As lead strategic command “for the continuing transformation of NATO’s military capabilities and for promoting interoperability,” ACT is responsible for NATO’s Joint Warfare Center, education facilities, and most experimentation programs. By joining efforts with appropriate ACT offices, the NSCC will be better equipped to foster interoperability and will have access to a wide range of facilities and resources to support training and exercises.

The NSCC Training and Exercise Division will concentrate on implementing SOF doctrine through NATO exercises and joint training opportunities. This division will also collect and disseminate lessons learned. A major role will be to develop standardized staff training for a NATO Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command. Establishing a universal model for this operational-level SOF headquarters element is an essential step in increasing Alliance capacity to provide a predictable baseline SOF command and control capability for rapid deployment in such rotational force structures as the NATO Response Force. Going hand-in-glove with building a deployable headquarters training regimen is the development of a NATO SOF tactical training program. This will be addressed by establishing a federation of training centers.

An integral aspect of the NSCC, this federation will leverage existing facilities and venues suitable for SOF training. Using multiple extant facilities offered by the nations for periodic training will present significant cost savings over a few dedicated facilities. This approach will leverage in-place resources and national subject matter expertise, providing variations in training and increasing utilization of potentially underutilized facilities. By linking these multiple training centers through NATO’s Web Information Services Environment, it will be possible to develop synergies by synchronizing combined training opportunities and fostering communications across the Alliance SOF community.

Implementing Change

The essential components in successfully realizing the benefits of the NSTI are already in place. With the SSOO manning situation now being addressed, the next step is the establishment of the NSCC. Success can be found here, too: The United States has recently offered to be the Framework Nation for the NSCC, using U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe, as the nucleus for implementation. The key is gaining sufficient support from the nations to make the NSCC a truly multinational organization.

Several nations have already expressed interest in helping to establish the NSCC and being a part of this initiative for the long term. While there are many details to work through, this early enthusiasm bodes well for the future and is in complete accordance with
the multinational vision of the NSCC. While the United States will provide the framework, it will be the Alliance that will shape the future of NATO’s Special Operations capabilities.

In today’s dynamic environment of increasingly challenging threats—violent extremist networks, global terrorism, and failing states—it is more critical than ever to work with our allies and friends. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to be a most valued partner in these struggles. However, the Alliance faces its own unique problem set as it endeavors to transform to become an even more relevant player in this new reality.

A key consideration in assessing the Alliance’s transformational options is the need to balance the “three-legged milk stool” of acceptable economic and political costs, environmental fit of proposed solutions, and ability to make rapid impact in the operational environment. The transformation of Allied Special Operations capability is an ideal opportunity to achieve this balance while making an appreciable and formative difference in the capabilities of the Alliance. The price in both manpower and resources will not be inconsequential. However, it is well worth the effort in bolstering our collective ability to defeat the global threats of today and tomorrow. JFQ
Toward a Horizon of Hope

Considerations for Long-term Stability in Postconflict Situations

By William E. Ward

The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America clearly states our national intent for dealing with regional conflicts through three levels of engagement: “conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.” These levels are necessary to prevent “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.” The strategy also states that “even if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely to be affected over time.” The example given is al Qaeda’s exploitation of the civil war in Afghanistan.

In today’s resource-constrained environment, however, allocating and prioritizing the expenditure of money and manpower toward a new conflict will be difficult. History shows that we have to be prepared to intervene early, with clear goals, authorities, and responsibilities understood by the parties to the conflict and among the international and interagency partners involved. Building those capabilities with minimal resources requires a new way of approaching postconflict scenarios—a way that takes the perspective of the conflict’s many victims and determines how to address their needs, both immediately and in the longer term. The goal is to provide for them a Horizon of Hope, the prospect that tomorrow will be better than today. From that prospect comes a framework from which we can develop plans and capabilities to address the conditions we want to exist as conflicts are resolved and stable institutions of society are established. This framework is applicable to most global postconflict situations.

I start by illustrating three personal examples where our success in instilling that hope varied greatly. These examples include my deployments to Somalia as a brigade commander in 1992 and to Bosnia as commander of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 2002, and my assignment as the U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2005. I show how the common elements of these situations led to the development of a framework that permits better international and interagency coordination for influencing outcomes of future conflicts. Employing such a framework improves our ability not only to respond when necessary but also to secure the aftermath of the conflict so the prospects for lasting stability are enhanced.
Somalia

In the early 1990s, along with many others, I was shocked by the images of the terrible Somali famine prior to Operation Restore Hope, much the same way I was shocked by the images of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. The images did not prepare me for what I saw in person as a brigade commander. Seeing the victims of the famine gave me stark reminders of why we were deployed there: to provide security to allow the international relief efforts to happen. Indeed, Restore Hope was the appropriate name for the operation; at the time, there was no hope, no one standing forward and leading the way to peace. We provided that hope. People by the thousands were fed and given medical treatment.

But providing security was far from enough. The necessary political reforms and institution-building did not happen, leaving the country embroiled in chaos with thugs and warlords controlling the streets and hampering international relief efforts. Consequently, rather than the economic and political foundations for a new Somalia being laid, the thugs became the entrenched political entities. By the time Operation Continue Hope began, we had forfeited the advantage, with the mission coming to an end after the infamous Battle of Mogadishu.

More than a dozen years later, Somalia continues to struggle in search of a way to maintain a transitional government. The environment is far from safe, and there is little incentive for foreign investment.

Bosnia

The story in Bosnia moves in a more positive direction but is still not fully satisfactory. As commander of SFOR, I had the privilege of participating in one of the more successful peacekeeping efforts in history. From 1992 to 1995, Bosnia was embroiled in a war that included genocide and ethnic cleansing, killing a hundred thousand and displacing hundreds of thousands more. Fortunately, the war ended with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords), which provided a base upon which a lasting peace and a new country could be built, including the establishment of political institutions, economic recovery, and an international security force that transitioned into SFOR.

The Dayton Accords made Bosnia’s recovery from the war possible. By the time I took command of SFOR in the fall of 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina had conducted several rounds of national elections without incident, made huge strides in disarming the populace through amnesty programs such as Operation Harvest, and maintained a safe and secure environment with no possibility of renewed hostilities. SFOR implemented the military provisions of the accords with a force representing over a hundred nations.

The Stabilization Force also participated as a Principal along with the numerous international organizations implementing the Dayton Accords’ civil provisions under the auspices of the Office of the High Representative. Other Principals included the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and various United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the Mission in Bosnia and High Commissioner for Refugees. The force was successful in that it provided the safe and secure environment called for in the accords. Consequently, it gradually reduced its size and eventually transferred the mission to the European Union in 2004.

Synchronizing the efforts of the Principals was difficult, with the Office of the High Representative often challenged in leading them to achieve a shared vision. Each agency had its own agenda and mandate, and each had its own problems securing adequate resources for its mission, so the civil reconstruction effort fell short. Demining the Inter-Entity Boundary Line that separated the former warring factions was slow, leaving the region extremely dangerous. Meanwhile, billions of dollars in economic aid were misdirected through corruption, allowing a host of illegal economic activities to spawn. From Dayton through my tenure as SFOR commander, Bosnia’s economy suffered from rampant human trafficking, drugs, piracy of intellectual property, illegal logging and smuggling, and extreme levels of corruption that robbed the state of needed revenues.

But what bothered me most was that the aid that reached the people often missed the mark. It reflected what the donors thought was important, and not what the people needed. One farmer had his home rebuilt through donations after the war. The house was beautiful but did not include access to water. The nearest well was driving distance away, and the farmer could not afford a car. He had to beg for rides to get water. There were also villages where the people still lived in squalor, yet they had a brand new church or mosque. They were resentful that the church or mosque was a higher priority than adequate shelter for their families. I found such situations throughout the country. Not only were these efforts wasteful of time and money, but they also ate away at the credibility of the international community.

SFOR made an honest attempt at fostering unity of effort by developing the Multi-Year Road Map (MYRM) in 2000. The MYRM was a strategic communications tool that established benchmarks toward the full implementation of Dayton’s civil and military provisions. It identified several lines of operation relating to economic development, establishment of good governance, and reorganization of Bosnia’s military and security forces. It proved highly successful in driving SFOR’s activities.

But the MYRM never fully succeeded in creating unity of effort because the road map was developed long after the Dayton Accords’ ratification. A road map implemented by the Principals right after Dayton could have established the necessary authorities and responsibilities to prevent the spread of illegal economic activities and blunt the effects of corruption. Therefore, while Bosnia remains at peace, it continues to have difficulties establishing a solid economic foundation, and its political institutions remain less mature than they should be.

Palestine

Meanwhile, the difficulties in Palestine continue to confound any efforts toward a lasting peace. By all accounts, it should not have gone this way. The Middle East Road Map, the performance-based plan for the establishment of the Palestinian state, was to have resolved the Israeli-Palestine conflict by now. At its inception in mid-2003, the road map offered tremendous promise to the Palestinian people through political reforms, establishment of state institutions such as the security forces, and fair and open elections. These were to be founded as the publication and ratification of a constitution, followed by appointment of state leaders with appropriate authorities. Just as important was the continued encouragement of donor economic support to build a peaceful economy, develop the private sector, and foster a civil society. The road map was supported by a ready and willing interagency and international process.
with resources at its disposal. However, pursuing the road map required Palestinian renunciation of violence against Israel. The long history of conflict would have made this difficult under any circumstances, but the Palestinian Authority’s failure to rein in terrorist activity was only one factor in its inability to achieve the road map’s goals.

During my nearly year-long tenure as the U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2005, the greatest challenge was the inability of the Palestinian population to establish its own civil norms. The Palestinians were generally unsuccessful at building effective institutions or instilling the rule of law in daily life. In June of that year, I reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there were roughly 58,000 Palestinians holding jobs in the state’s disparate security forces, yet only a third of them ever showed up for work. The judicial system, comprising the courts, lawyers, and judges, was undergoing slow reform. There was limited confidence that criminals would be punished for their deeds rather than released back to the streets. The Palestinian Authority’s leader, President Mahmoud Abbas, was working to coalesce the disparate factions under him into a cohesive and effective central government. But that was a hard task confounded by several rogue elements seeking to prevent peaceful coexistence with Israel.

**Losing the Initiative**

Although the situations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine were very different in their history and their impact on the global environment, their stories reflect common threads. We, as national security professionals, will often default to the strategic view. That is, we recognize that no country can rebuild itself alone after experiencing total disaster. The international community must infuse cash, manpower, and other resources to render aid and build the foundations for the country’s rebirth. We also often assert that a country must take responsibility for its own reconstruction. We rightfully respect a nation’s sovereignty and therefore often must trust that its provisional postconflict leaders will use donated resources for the common good.

But the above three situations show that we must look at the micro-level, the perspective of the individual victim. Whenever a war ends, these victims care little about our national strategic aims or those of the international community. They only want answers to basic questions: “What will happen to me? Where will I get food and medical help? How will we care for our children, our sick, and our injured? Who will lead us? Will they help us or try to steal what little we have? What about tomorrow? The day after?” If we take too long and allow others to answer those questions, we lose the initiative.

When initiative is lost, the results are always bad. In Somalia, for instance, the warlords took over the political landscape. In Bosnia, the thugs and criminals became the economic leaders. In Palestine, institutions of good governance, progressive economic activity, and rule of law were lacking. President Abbas’ vision of “one law—one gun” was never realized. If we quickly provide solutions to the problems facing the people, backed by the right resources, the people will lose their fear and embrace hope for peace and security.

That is what establishing a Horizon of Hope is about. The United States and the international community must take the initiative to influence and rectify postconflict situations before they become new fronts in the war on terror. It is having the resources at the ready, much the way we do now for other humanitarian assistance missions and disaster relief operations. It is having the processes, authorities, and responsibilities prearranged to coordinate and deliver adequate aid, security, and reconstruction capabilities in the critical early moments after the war. But most importantly, it is instilling hope in the minds of victims by providing answers to basic questions of survival.

We want to give victims something seemingly miraculous: a long-term view. This is why it is called a Horizon of Hope; the people have a sense of direction, and they believe the peace and stability we initiate are permanent. Clearly visible on the horizon is a future secure from further conflict, of economic recovery and promise, and of a government responsive to their needs. There lies the next generation of the rebuilt country’s citizens: a generation that embraces the rule of law, takes care of its own people, participates in the processes of good governance, and most importantly rejects terrorism and its associated ideologies. Of course, obstacles will litter the path to that horizon, but a hopeful populace will overcome them, knowing that the journey is worth it.

So how can we accomplish this? The horizon is our strategic endstate. What are the ways and means for creating it, and how do we know when we must employ it? We can start by describing how it differs from traditional military planning. Most of the assigned resources for postconflict situations deal with those conflicts that we either initiate or participate in, the so-called Phase Four style of application. In these cases, we already have the initiative. Our mission is to establish peace in the form of our choosing after we have unseated an undesirable politico-military structure or condition. In theory, we have already assessed the requirements to establish a lasting peace and build the foundations for secure and stable governance, allowing for the eventual transition to a (hopefully) democratic government. We have already learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom how difficult Phase Four operations can be.

Consider cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine. Creating the Horizon of Hope would have occurred from a cold start, in the absence of any established war plans. Merely subsuming these types of scenarios in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) process will not work. First, JSCP is a Defense Department tool, while postconflict scenarios of interest require a deeply embedded interagency process to create the necessary national unity of effort. Second, the JSCP is designed for developing deliberate and contingency plans specific to an expected scenario or range of scenarios. It requires significant manpower and time to produce a single plan. The range of potential scenarios that fall under the horizon umbrella is too great and dynamic. A catastrophic war could flare up and dissipate quickly in a location that we did not anticipate. In the war on terror, these wars matter as they provide potential seedbeds of terrorism directed at the United States or its friends. Third, the resulting plans are necessarily reactive, as they require significant formal authorization from either the executive or legislative branches before operations can begin. For the postconflict situations addressed here, that process already cedes the initiative to the enemies of peace. We need a much more flexible and dynamic tool for these scenarios.

**The Road Map**

The good news is that such a tool conceptually exists. Road maps, such as the MYRM in Bosnia and the Middle East Road Map, establish sequences of conditions of progress along a range of functions and...
activities that lead to the desired endstates for the assisted nations. Unlike war plans that direct our own activities to achieve an objective, road maps recommend activities of the supported nation. Thus, they provide war-torn nations with plans and a direction that they themselves should embark upon. Its mechanism is reward-based. Initially, the nation receives significant aid and assistance in providing for its people and permits a high degree of external involvement in its affairs. As the nation progresses, the external community transfers responsibilities and authorities to it. The rewards are greater autonomy for the nation and greater stability, economic development, and security for the people.

Road maps are also useful in informing the reconstruction effort of the types of external assistance required without being too specific or inflexible. This permissiveness allows tailoring the relief effort to meet the needs of the people as the complexities of the postconflict scenario play out, while encouraging international and nongovernmental organizations to participate in a coordinated fashion.

We can readily develop a generalized set of road maps because the goals of postconflict reconstruction do not vary much. In fact, they tend to contain three basic lines of operation—security, economic, and societal—along which the Horizon of Hope must be established. Lasting progress requires balanced and fully synchronized efforts. Progress along the lines will vary, so they should be kept as simple as possible.

Postconflict reconstruction will generally have two distinct phases: initiation and implementation. The initiation phase covers the international community’s first responses to the situation, such as providing basic needs to the people and restoring order. This is the critical phase in which the Horizon of Hope is established. The more situation-dependent implementation phase follows with the deliberate efforts to stabilize, reconstruct, and rebuild the country, concluding with the transition to an effective and stable society. The following describes the three lines of operation by phase.

The security line of operation involves those activities and agencies that provide external and internal security to the nation. These include the military, border patrols, customs services, police, and the judicial system (the courts, lawyers, judges, and prisons). During the initiation phase, the focus is on immediately providing law and order and securing the border, including airports and seaports. Success during initiation instills a sense in the people’s minds that the security forces will not tolerate criminal activity and that streets, marketplaces, and business areas are safe. Dominating the implementation phase is the effort to build the indigenous military and police forces to provide for the nation’s own security. This includes establishing the military under civilian control and providing mechanisms to prevent corruption within the police, especially reprisal activities related to the war. The implementation phase is complete when international forces no longer actively provide security.

The economic line of operation involves those activities and agencies that ensure the basic needs of the people are met and that prepare the society to provide those needs for itself while establishing the foundations of its own economy. At initiation, relief agencies focus on providing crucial supplies and services such as food, water, clothing, and shelter. Also, agencies secure the critical surviving infrastructure such as power grids, transportation networks, farmland, manufacturing, and other elements vital to the early reconstruction of the economy. Initiation further establishes the mechanisms to solicit, receive, and distribute donated resources with a primary objective of preventing the introduction or empowerment of corrupt elements within the populace. The implementation phase involves activities that build the institutions and infrastructure, permitting the nation to feed and care for its own people and provide the conditions under which they can clothe and shelter themselves. The nation also establishes the means to ensure that corrupt practices and illegal economic activities do not take root. At the end of the implementation phase, the nation’s economy is sufficiently self-sustaining that it can seek any further economic assistance on its own through standard international channels.

The societal line of operation is the most complex and situation-specific. It encompasses the necessary activities to establish good governance and a stable and self-sustaining populace free from the threats of renewed conflict. The complexity arises in that the society itself will define its own end-state, which may or may not be inimical to the desires of the international community providing relief. External actors will take the lead at initiation but must step back at implementation and play a supporting role to minimize the risk of creating a dependent or resentful society. There will be points of conflict that must be addressed head on in open forums between the society and relief effort. That will be difficult, just as it was in Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine. But governing this line of operation throughout is expectation management. So long as we give the people hope early, then let them act on that hope in concert with us, the society will progress—and we will get the job done as a team.

War’s Lingering Hazards

The societal line has several components at initiation, each involving close interaction between us and the nation we are helping. The first is the political, with the overarching goal of establishing good leadership for the people and eliminating the bad, such as apprehending war criminals. The challenge is differentiating the two while...
avoiding undesirable power vacuums or creating confusion in the minds of the people. However, a clearly defined and communci-cable standard of good governance, backed by force if necessary, will ensure that those exercising leadership abide by the rule of law.

The second component is environmental. War is damaging to the environment. From pollution to unexploded ordnance to damaged infrastructure, war zones create lingering hazards that have a depressing effect on the public. Cleaning and resetting the environment is important for reestablishing a sense of normalcy in the populace and reducing health risks.

The third component is health, including caring for the sick and injured and preventing the spread of disease. It also includes the dignified handling of those in need. Visions of overcrowded and understaffed treatment centers reflect poorly on the relief effort as chaotic and uncaring. Conversely, an adequately resourced and efficient treatment center paints a powerful and hopeful picture in the minds of everyone, internally and externally. This point cannot be overemphasized.

Finally, there is the informational component, where the international community and the people of the nation establish common understandings of expectations, needs, and the way ahead. This is where the citizens establish their expectations and voice their needs, which the international community translates into action. It is also where the people establish a renewed sense of culture and identity, followed by openness toward reconciliation. This encourages the locals, particularly those formerly on opposite sides of the conflict, to work together.

In the implementation phase, the people form their own society, guided by the international community, and determine how they want to choose their leaders, maintain their environment, care for their sick, create their own societal norms, and establish educational, cultural, and other institutions. We should guide the society to choose norms consonant with international law, but otherwise support their intentions.

Advantages and Concerns

This framework for handling postconflict scenarios offers tremendous advantages. First, the requirements of the initiation phase are fairly standard regardless of the situation. Consequently, there is the potential to assign to U.S. Government agencies the responsibility to provide the necessary capabilities, leading to the assembly of a standing postconflict interagency task force ready to conduct the initiation phase on a moment’s notice.

Second, we can modularize the functions along each line of operation to facilitate the distribution of responsibilities among international agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Modularization permits the establishment of different road maps based on classes of scenarios. Examples include size (differentiating future events on the scale of an Iraq versus a Liberia, for example), political nature (permissive environment versus nonpermissive, such as an active insurgency or presence of potential legitimate government elements versus predominance of war criminals or other undesirables), economic nature (landlocked country versus maritime, available critical natural resources, such as nuclear materials, versus purely agricultural versus drug-oriented), and specific threats to stability (pandemic disease, weapons of mass destruction, human trafficking).

Third, we will be better poised to address scenario-specific issues, such as rules of engagement, national and organizational caveats, and other limitations and constraints on the response force. Fourth, it permits the development of effective coordination tools, such as road maps, that empower the effort to communicate progress internally and externally and to tailor the effort in ways most meaningful to the people.

Some may have concerns about establishing such a framework and developing the associated capabilities. First is the fear that if we lean forward too far, we will assume responsibility for an undue percentage of these missions as they arise. We would expend extraordinary amounts of our own resources and not realize burdensharing. That is a patently false assumption. The international community will be more likely to sign up for postconflict operations with the clear goals, capability requirements, and lines of coordination that the framework would provide. Ambiguity and lack of clarity of purpose drive away potential donors of forces and resources.

Second is the concern that many volunteer relief organizations are fiercely independent and will refuse to participate in any centralized mechanism that coordinates relief activities. This framework does not suggest attempts to control the relief effort centrally but rather to encourage greater coordination and communication. It helps us express our intent and ensure we generate the right capabilities to stabilize and reconstruct the nation according to its needs. Lacking a common language and approach guarantees that no such coordination will occur and that the mission will suffer.

The third concern is the potential for “sticker shock.” The up-front costs of conducting initiation phase operations will appear disproportionately high, especially in comparison to the up-front costs of interventions in Bosnia and Somalia. However, we have already seen what happened in the long run, that cutting corners early meant far longer and more expensive operations than originally planned. Modularizing road map functions leads to efficiencies that reduce the overall cost of operations.

Whatever solution comes about, it must address postwar situations from the perspective of those who have just lost everything to a terrible conflict. It is in our national interest to ensure that they are cared for by the right people. If that does not happen, someone else will do it, and the results may not be to our liking. If we are to win the war on terror, we must take on the challenge of postconflict situations head on and provide the Horizon of Hope that will convince people in strife that there is indeed a path to lasting peace. After all, these are the same people we will eventually want as partners. 

NOTES


2 Ibid., 14.

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By THOMAS P. GALVIN

Proactive peacetime engagement activities reassure allies and partners, promote stability and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict. We base our strategies on the principle that it is much more cost effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop one once it has started.

—USEUCOM Posture Statement 2006

Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset

Ensuring Unity of Effort

For example, ungoverned and misgoverned areas in Africa are providing safe havens for transnational terrorists and organized criminal elements seeking to attack U.S. properties and interests. Armed conflict is severely destabilizing, and often it arises from factors such as poor governance and struggles for power, endemic corruption, limited economic opportunities, longstanding practices and traditions that violate human dignity, and humanitarian problems such as drugs, pandemic disease, HIV/AIDS, severe drought, or famine.

Consequently, the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) play an important role as part of an interagency process led by the Department of State that seeks not only to prevent armed conflict, but also to help nations provide for their own people through good governance and providing basic needs and services. The United States achieves its national interests through unity of effort that ties policy with execution, especially in the political-military arena of interest to the Department of Defense (DOD).

If only things were so simple. Unfortunately, that unity of effort suffers due to a number of factors, many of them internal to the U.S. Government. On one level, the challenges are bureaucratic in nature, including budgetary restrictions, lack of interagency transparency, mismatched authorities and responsibilities, slow responsiveness, and outmoded legislation. The results can include poorly coordinated bilateral efforts that cause the target nations to seek assistance elsewhere or, worse, contribute to its instability. There have been numerous instances where our own well-intentioned laws and bureaucratic processes interfered with our ability to engage other nations, especially the same developing nations whose assistance we seek to cultivate in the war on terror. While the formation of these laws and processes was driven by legitimate concerns, the unintended consequences have had a deleterious effect on U.S. ability to meet fundamental objectives of establishing enduring partnerships. Some of the particular legal or bureaucratic problems have already been repaired, while others are in the process of being fixed.

On a second level is the problem of the overall cultural mindset that relegates TSC and other noncampaign activities—collectively referred to as Phase Zero—to secondary status behind traditional military requirements, such as training, equipping, maintaining, mobilizing, and employing the force. The mindset extends across the U.S. Government, but not without reason. After all, the bread and butter of the military is combat. We remind ourselves of that fact daily as a nation and military at war, and we expect that our fighting forces are fully equipped and ready. This is not to say that anyone considers Phase Zero unimportant. Quite the opposite is true. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) makes it clear that "addressing regional conflicts includes three..."
levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution, conflict intervention, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. However, there is a default tendency to equate the military to warfighting, misbalancing the resources needed for the military’s role in prevention, stabilization, and reconstruction. Thus, it is difficult to resource the total Phase Zero campaign; impacts on Phase Zero considerations are underrepresented as laws and policies are proposed and established. What should be fairly small and simple operations to build partnerships and military capabilities to support U.S. interests become more difficult and complex than necessary.

Perceptions are key during Phase Zero. We may be the world’s lone superpower, but from the perspective of our target nations, we can appear sluggish and difficult to work with. That sends the wrong message not only to longstanding allies, but also to emerging partners, who are just as likely to seek assistance from another nation instead.

**Phase Zero Now**

In the 4th Quarter 2006 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*, General Charles Wald, USAF (Ret.), did an excellent job describing the value and importance of Phase Zero activities at the GCC level, going so far as to describe Phase Zero as a campaign unto itself. He defined the phase as encompassing “all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I [traditional joint campaign]—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place. . . .”[3] He described Phase Zero as “operationalized TSC,” a convergence of TSC activities with information operations and traditional military operations that drives the campaign toward achieving a set of desired strategic effects.

Periods of inactivity, with the exception of the 9/11 period, are common for the GCCs. As defined, the division of responsibilities appears clear; however, the fact is that the GCC responsibilities do not match their authorities. There are three reasons for this. First and foremost is an interagency conflict. While GCCs are responsible for conducting the Phase Zero campaign, State controls most of the resources under Title 22 through the Foreign Assistance Act. Geographic combatant commands may have perfectly sound plans, but the lack of corresponding authorities incurs extensive requirements to request and justify resources with an agency whose priorities may differ. If the GCC had a peer regional authority in State, they could discuss and resolve disputes, but no such regional authority exists. Instead, State allocates resources nationally, which greatly slows the allocation process and is less flexible than needed.

This situation is problematic within USEUCOM, which is responsible for TSC with 92 different countries. Given authorities to match responsibilities, USEUCOM can effectively employ the interagency process to shift resources in response to crises or changes in the strategic environment while ensuring compliance with national policy objectives. The additional steps required to secure (and sometimes resecure) and redirect previously budgeted resources severely inhibits USEUCOM responsiveness and disrupts TSC plans and operations, without particular gain.

The second challenge is the competition for Title 10 resources within DOD. This includes not only seeking adequate resources on an annual fiscal-year basis through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) but also securing forces for specific activities through the Global Force Management (GFM) process. GFM is the current DOD process of assigning, allocating, and apportioning forces to combatant commanders for conducting
military operations. It takes the total available forces and capabilities and applies them against current and anticipated requirements. While Global Force Management was a significant improvement over previous processes, it has a downside in that the Services ultimately control the distribution of resources with the geographic combatant commands lacking direct influence in their allocation. Hence, while the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directs GCCs to develop TSC plans, the commands do not have the authorities or resources to execute them. As with State, the geographic combatant commands and Services may differ greatly in priorities of allocating resources, potentially resulting in the commands’ needs not being met.

The third problem is legislative in nature, as the unintended second- and third-order effects of standing laws or statutes interfere with Phase Zero planning and execution. One example is a provision in Title 10 that restricts the use of U.S. funds to transport foreign forces from one AOR to another. While this enforces the responsibility for GCCs to execute TSC within their AORs, it also restricts the ability to offer, for example, the use of the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany for a combined exercise involving militaries from the U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, or U.S. Pacific Command’s AORs. Another example was the legal prohibition against all use of Federal funds for nations who were signatories to the International Criminal Court but who did not sign a bilateral Article 98 exemption with the United States. The prohibition was clearly established through the lens of traditional military operations as a means of protecting Servicemembers during combat, training, and exercises, but did not consider Phase Zero implications. Between its enactment in January 2003 until its removal in the 2007 NDAA, this restriction took a great deal of flexibility away from the GCCs due to its blanket nature. For example, geographic combatant commands could not offer International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs to key partners in the war on terror. If it had only prohibited activities that would place Servicemembers at risk of arrest and prosecution, the GCC would have retained a range of options to continue engagement.

While all three challenges highlight the inherent difficulties that geographic combatant commands face in meeting their responsibilities, they also highlight the disjointedness of the interagency approach to Phase Zero. Because Phase Zero effects can only be achieved through the concerted efforts of all elements of national power, it requires a strongly synchronized interagency effort. Instead, it is currently a military-led effort that often seems a square peg stuffed into a round hole, with TSC activities culturally viewed as second priority for the military. It should not be assumed that elevating Phase Zero activities would automatically take U.S. forces out of the fight in current operations. Instead, it would improve the calculus of the Government’s efforts to meet the NSS, ensuring that the laws, authorities, responsibilities, and allocation of resources to prevent conflict and build the military capacities of our partners are as effective and efficient as those that mobilize, train, equip, and deploy our own forces for combat. It would ensure that all elements of national power are focused, synchronized, and participating in unison. As a Center for Strategic and International Studies report states, “strategic and operational planning should be done on an interagency basis” to ensure unity of effort.

Phase Zero Campaign Basis

There are two paths reform could take. One is to institute a thorough interagency process on top of the existing bureaucracy to centralize Phase Zero and traditional campaign plan management. The other is to work within the existing system and fix what is possible quickly. We must consider that the processes in place that support Phase Zero are not completely broken. Some reforms have already been instituted that will better facilitate and resource Phase Zero activities, so it seems counterintuitive that a new level of national bureaucracy would improve efficiency or effectiveness rather than complicate matters further. It is better to focus on fixing what is broken and changing the mindset in order to ensure that Phase Zero impacts are considered in the course of doing business.

Before recommending fixes, it is best to recap what the Phase Zero campaign means and where its requirements are derived. The NSS contains numerous references to the need for working with other nations to address common security threats. Consequently, the National Defense Strategy identifies four strategic objectives for the defense establishment to support the NSS:

- securing the United States from direct attack
- securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action
- strengthening alliances and partnerships
- establishing favorable security conditions.

The first objective focuses internally and is achieved largely through the establishment of sufficient U.S. military capability to defeat our enemies, then employing them in such a manner to dissuade and deter our enemies from attacking us. The other three, however, are externally focused and describe...
what we hope to gain from our relationships with other nations.

As a companion document, the DOD releases security cooperation guidance that directs the GCCs’ planning and execution of Theater Security Cooperation within their AORs. The roles of these documents were succinctly described in the 2005 testimony of General James Jones, USMC, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

DOD’s Security Cooperation is an important instrument for executing U.S. defense strategy by building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure. Theater Security Cooperation, an element of DOD Security Cooperation, involves those activities undertaken by the [GCCs] to implement this guidance.10

By nature, pursuing political-military relationships often requires time, trust, and persistence. Developing new military capabilities within the United States is difficult enough, and encouraging such development in other nations can be tough, particularly in postconflict situations or among poorer or weakly governed nations. Time is needed to ensure that capabilities are developed properly and employed in ways consistent with our interests. Also, absent a crisis, access to another nation’s infrastructure usually comes only after our relationship with it has matured. The decision to provide us with such access often comes at a political price to the national leader. Hence, the United States must demonstrate sufficient commitment to that nation to prove that opening access is in its interests as well as ours. Thus, while TSC strategies and their subordinate CCPs are influenced by dynamic diplomatic, informational, and economic relationships between the United States and other nations, achieving the goals and objectives of any TSC strategy requires a degree of consistency and reliability. It is important that other militaries get the message that when the U.S. military commits to an activity, it follows through unless the political situation becomes prohibitive.

Here is where the bureaucratic and legislative hurdles become problems. The mismatch of responsibilities to authorities places undue influence of the diplomatic situation on TSC execution, causing the appearance of unreliability. Furthermore, the unintended consequences of U.S. laws and regulations create inequities that cause us to treat certain countries differently from others. They inhibit the ability to procure resources under certain circumstances that should have no impact on military activities. For TSC strategies to support our national objectives, geographic combatant commands require the flexibility to apply the right resources where and when they are needed and the capability to work for the long term to ensure the solidity of our important military-to-military relationships.

**Recommendations**

Below is a specific list of reforms aimed at improving Phase Zero. Most lie at the interagency level within the executive branch or as legislative reforms. While a couple of the recommendations are internal to DOD, it must be noted that Defense has already taken aggressive action to support this campaign, such as pushing through Phase Zero–related funding efforts in the 2007 NDAA. However, more work needs to be done.

*Expand the Scope and Authorities of the JIACG.* The most important organizational reform relates to the primary interagency vehicle available to the geographic combatant commands, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Joint Publication (JP) 3–08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organizations, and Nongovernmental Organizations Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. I, defines a JIACG as “an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.”11 JP 3–08 identifies the JIACG’s main purpose as to participate in “deliberate, crisis, and transition planning”12 but does not mention a role in Theater Security Cooperation. Consequently, JIACGs are designed to handle the reactive side of the spectrum and not to facilitate proactive conflict-prevention tasks. JIACGs need the skill sets for both operational planning and TSC, as they are the perfect forum to help coordinate TSC activities between the geographic combatant commands and other governmental agencies.

A second problem with the JIACG is that it serves an advisory role primarily,13 with limited decision or execution authorities. To be effective, our interagency partners must empower JIACG members to make decisions and coordinate regional interagency security cooperation activities in a fashion similar to how Offices of Defense Cooperation and Defense Attachés operate within U.S. Embassies.

*Mature the Interagency Process to the Regional Level.* Interagency plans and activities will be more efficient and effective as current initiatives infuse a regional approach to security cooperation, as opposed to strictly bilateral cooperation. This will allow TSC efforts to focus on common interests and threats among nations in a region, acknowledging that national borders are of little consequence to historical tribal loyalties, regional pandemics and humanitarian conditions, and transnational issues such as terrorism. It will also facilitate the development of longer-term engagement plans of 5 to 10 years that would inform the GCC 1- to 2-year focus on CCPs. These should use an effects-based deliberate planning process with concrete measures of effectiveness to facilitate multilateral TSC events and encourage regional security solutions among less-governed areas.

The State Department, which previously worked almost exclusively in a bilateral fashion, is also taking a more regional approach in its transformational diplomacy initiative for much the same reasons in order to deal with challenges that are "transnational and regional in nature," and using regional "collaborations . . . [to] facilitate a more effective approach to building democracy and prosperity, fighting terrorism, disease, and human trafficking.” Clearly, this has potential to enhance the mutual accomplishment of our respective missions in support of national objectives. The challenge is to converge the GCCs’ efforts with those of State’s emerging regional mechanisms, along with the efforts of other interagency processes.

*Tie Country Funding Levels to Regional Goals.* As Theater Security Cooperation should have a regional focus, so too should the resource allocation processes. The current structure built on priority countries may not achieve the desired regional effects, but funding processes that support regional contexts will definitely support our bilateral interests. A new model that directs funds to
regions and countries in support of regional objectives will strengthen the overall regionalized interagency process and achieve better results.

Increase GCC Budgetary Influence and Authority. Geographic combatant commands have insufficient influence over the vast majority of security cooperation funding and have limited discretionary authority. In fiscal year 2005, the State Department controlled 70 percent of TSC (Titles 10 and 22) funding in the USEUCOM AOR. The USEUCOM commander, who is accountable for TSC execution in his AOR, controlled only 3 percent of discretionary TSC funding. Expanding the JIAG or other interagency vehicles is not sufficient to give the flexibility necessary to the GCC to initiate Foreign Military Financing, IMET, and Section 1206 funding requirements with new or emerging partner nations or to address emerging requirements as they arise. The geographic combatant commander needs expanded discretionary funding authority to create efficiencies to accomplish his mandated political-military requirements in his area of responsibility more effectively.

The transformational diplomacy initiative currently underway in the State Department offers great opportunities to correct this problem. By taking a regional approach, State will operate from a perspective similar to the GCCs, which should facilitate handing over discretionary funding authority to the geographic combatant commanders to meet State regional policy objectives. But we need not wait for those relationships to build. With the right authorities, GCCs would make significant progress by executing their existing CCPs.

Add Flexibility to Title 10 and Title 22. While there should be a divide between Titles 10 and 22 that reflects the proper authorities of the Departments of Defense and State, the total lack of flexibility complicates Phase Zero efforts, hamstringing the allocation of the right amount of resources to fund activities that blur traditional military operations and TSC. We need to look at this problem from the perspective of our target countries. They see only one source of assistance: the U.S. Government. Our processes should preserve that perspective. The U.S. Government must find ways to allow Title 10 to fund foreign assistance activities and Title 22 to fund certain types of operations while preserving the overall authorities of the respective departments and informed congressional oversight.

Continue to Expand Section 1206 Authorities. Beginning in 2006, Section 1206 of the NDAA gave the Department of Defense the authority to spend up to $200 million in programs intended to build the capacity of foreign military forces worldwide. That year, the section only granted that authority for two specific purposes: to “conduct counterterrorist operations” and to “participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces are a participant.” Although the fiscal year 2007 act includes extensions to Section 1206 authorities through fiscal year 2008 with the annual authorization raised to $300 million, the purposes for which the funds can be used did not change. This excludes many proactive conflict-prevention activities that seek to enhance internal stability of partner nations by inculcating values such as civilian control over the military.

Supporting good governance, building strong democratic institutions, and developing future capacity for employment on operations as a U.S. partner are what a developing nation needs most. Section 1206 or similar authorities should cover a broader range of TSC activities that support these other vital goals. Also, despite the extension, Section 1206 is still viewed as a temporary program, while the intended effects require a long-term commitment to the target nations. Consonant with other budget authority recommendations above, Section 1206 should become a permanent part of the NDAA.

Eliminate Restrictions on Cross–Combatant Command Funding. Title 10, Section 1051, paragraph (b)(1) expressly limits the use of GCC funds to support a “developing country’s” participation in a TSC activity “only in connection with travel within a unified combatant command’s area of responsibility in which the developing country is located or in connection with travel to Canada or Mexico.” The purpose was to enforce the unified command plan boundaries to reduce the potential for redundant activities. That was acceptable when the AORs were clearly defined and distinct in their orientation. Modern global trends are blending the AORs together, such that even developing nations have interests in other parts of the world. We have interests in ensuring that all our desired partner militaries have at least the opportunity to train and grow together, even if it means offering to send a unit from a drug-ridden sub-Saharan African or Central Asian nation to a worthy counterdrug/counterterrorism exercise in South America. Our prohibition on actions such as this makes absolutely no sense from the perspective of our partner, who has no reason for concern about our unified command plan. Combatant commanders must be able to execute TSC plans across GCC boundaries seamlessly. Doing so requires adjusting this section to provide the necessary spending authorities.

Strengthen Phase Zero Language within the UJTL. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) includes a number of strategic tasks and subtasks that are Phase Zero in nature. However, many of the task names and descriptors could be more strongly linked to their purpose. For example, overarching Strategic National Task 8 is called “Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations.” This name does not reflect what
its subtasks require joint headquarters to do, such as supporting or conducting activities that seek to prevent conflict and build the capacities of other nations. A better task name would be “Foster Conflict Prevention through Multinational and Interagency Cooperation.” Stronger Phase Zero language in the UJTL would result in better Phase Zero language in the combatant command’s Joint Mission Essential Task Lists and therefore better integration of Phase Zero purpose and requirements during resourcing activities.

Other Intra-DOD Reforms. Significant progress has been made to reform DOD internal business practices to integrate myriad TSC strategies, but there is still more to be done. For example, regional centers, such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and the George C. Marshall Center, report to the USEUCOM commander, but they receive their policy direction from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and their funding from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The regional centers would operate far more efficiently and effectively if the geographic combatant commands managed all aspects of operations and resourcing under policy guidance from the policy Under Secretary. Other initiatives such as the Global Force Management Board are still new, and their roles in supporting the TSC needs of GCCs are as yet unclear.

The Vision

These and other individual reforms will only achieve the full effect of establishing unity of effort if there is a common vision of how the interagency plans, conducts, and manages the Phase Zero campaign. Once operationalized into a standing interagency Phase Zero Campaign Plan, it will become easier to translate the NSS into a series of specific objectives geared toward preventing conflict while facilitating DOD responsibilities to plan for, fight, and win the Nation’s war. The campaign plan would establish a common language for the desired strategic effects from Phase Zero activities and help facilitate working with Members of Congress to ensure that future legislation is harmonious with Phase Zero objectives. It would provide a long-term solution to aligning authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities of the GCCs and the emerging regional interagency entities.

The Phase Zero campaign has already proven itself invaluable at the GCC level and directly supports the efforts of our fighting forces. Actionable intelligence, basing and infrastructure, sustainment capabilities, and coalition force commitments come from strong relationships between the United States and its partners. These relationships do not come about quickly but are built over time through a committed GCC effort that supports accomplishment of the key objectives in the NSS. The challenge now is to fix that which inhibits the geographic combatant commands and build the foundations for successful Phase Zero accomplishment in the future.

In the current dynamic global security environment, there are no nations we can afford to ignore. If we want to bring other nations on board as our partners, we have to provide the geographic combatant commanders with the flexible and responsive resources with which to do so efficiently, without undue bureaucratic delays. Otherwise, we may miss opportunities, and could risk having to later expend far greater resources to clean up another regional conflict or another emerging threat to U.S. security. JFQ

NOTES

12 Ibid., II–20.
13 Ibid.
14 The funding for Theater Security Cooperation activities in the USEUCOM area of responsibility for fiscal year 2005 was $484.2 million. Department of State programs including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), IMET, peacekeeping operations, and international narcotics and law enforcement totaled $348 million, or approximately 70 percent of the total. Twenty-seven percent, or $130.2 million, was for DOD programs already earmarked, including the budgets of the Regional Centers for Strategic Studies, the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, humanitarian assistance programs, the Counter Narco Terrorist Program, and various joint combined exercises. This left 3 percent, or $15.9 million, for the GCC’s discretionary use. USEUCOM’s State Partnership Program is a key TSC effort that receives 90 percent of its budget from these funds. These figures do not include a fiscal year 2005 FMF grant to Israel.
17 U.S. Code, Title 10, Sect. 1051.

What comes to mind first when you hear the word European? Perhaps it is one of the great landmarks located on the continent, such as the Roman Coliseum or Parthenon in Athens. Maybe it is the beautiful mountain scenery of the Alps that inspired The Sound of Music or the flatlands dotted with windmills and dikes in Holland. Or perhaps it is the people of the continent and the varied societies they have built over the past 500 years. The skin tones differ from Ireland to Spain, but the people are largely Caucasian. The societies are mostly law-abiding and orderly, although a drive through Copenhagen does not compare to a drive through Naples. There is a balance between city dwellers and rural sites. Quaint but vibrant villages still dot the landscape. The Swiss still maintain a large number of separate languages among their townspeople. Finally, the overall culture is strongly based on Christianity, with churches the centerpiece of many cities and towns, and religious tradition deeply ingrained despite modern secularism.

But there is no denying that Europe is changing. The foundations of the continent’s sociopolitical structures and culture will still exist in 2030, but a number of trends from the past few decades point to a continent that is becoming heavily urbanized, modernized, and blended. Young Europeans are moving out of the towns and into the cities for economic opportunities and vibrancy. They are being joined by significant and growing minority populations of Asians, Middle Easterners, and especially Africans, with Muslim communities growing the fastest.

One reason Europe is changing is that Africa is changing. Overall, Africa is experiencing a population boom unlike anything seen in modern history due to the successful efforts by the international community to reduce infant and child mortality. This is producing a large youth population that, at current rates, will cause the population of sub-Saharan Africa to increase by half by 2025.

By THOMAS P. GALVIN

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one reason Europe is changing is that Africa is changing

Where the Trends Lead

Much work is being done to look into the future, but more is needed. For example, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has maintained a marvellous living document that describes the 2030 joint operating environment from a global perspective. However, because it is focused on a world view, it does not go into great detail about the future of the European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). While there appears to be a consensus on the broad nature of the threats, how these people will blend and assimilate against the backdrop of a quarter-century of globalization will best determine what capabilities the United States will need to deal with them.

The document focuses rightfully on future characteristics of military operations and therefore the capabilities that the U.S. defense establishment requires to win future wars. However, it pays little or no attention to requirements for theater security cooperation and other preventative Phase Zero activities that involve the interagency community. This is an unfortunate flaw in the document, as security cooperation activities ranging from military-to-military cooperation, education and training, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and others are important in maintaining what it assumes away: U.S. leadership in the world.

While the joint operating environment document discusses an exhaustive range of trends, this article focuses on three areas that make a particular impact on the changing face of Europe and Africa—demographics, resources, and effects of globalization—and the implications these areas have for the U.S. military.

Of the three areas, demographic trends carry the greatest impact. Immigration is a hot issue on both sides of the Atlantic. It affects the United States and Europe differently, though neither is happy with illegal movements. Our culture of assimilation in the pursuit of the American dream has fostered a wide range of immigrant success stories. Moreover, numerous ethnic minority communities are generally satisfied with their lot and therefore do not cause trouble. Finally, there are essentially no restrictions to moving about within the United States.

In Europe, the situation is more complicated. Migrant movements, both inter- and intracontinental, stand against the desire of many indigenous Europeans to maintain their national and cultural identities. Their minority communities, including an intra-continental diaspora, do not have the same opportunities to assimilate. Americans have a greater tendency to intermarry among ethnic groups, while minorities in Europe are more likely to marry within their own ethnicity, including arranged marriages, thus reinforcing separation from the majority. This is particularly true of some sectors of Europe’s fast-growing Muslim population. This leaves some relegated to a second-class status, subject to xenophobic backlash from their neighbors, and quietly becoming an angry group. Yet the migrants still emigrate because of the economic opportunities.

Indeed, the migrants are coming, and Europe is not in a good position to stop them. Europeans need the migrants to keep their economies going despite their own declining birth rates, and Africa has the young population to provide the labor. Africa’s overall population is expected to double from 2000’s figure by 2025, compared with Europe’s indigenous population, which will decrease slightly. This is fueling a major migration across the Mediterranean, from northern Africa to southern Europe. While some are migrating legally to escape chaos, corruption, or criminal activities back home, increasing numbers are migrating illegally as the result of human trafficking.

Both continents are rapidly urbanizing, following a global trend that will see over three-fifths of the world’s populations living in cities by 2030, but the growth in Africa is particularly steep. In the next 10 years alone, 40 African cities will rise above the half-million barrier, 10 of those breaking 1 million. Much of the population growth will occur in less developed countries that are not prepared to handle it. Nigeria (25 percent increase in population by 2015), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (35 percent), and Uganda (45 percent) are three examples of poorly governed or conflict torn nations that will experience such growth. Meanwhile, African nations lag behind the Europeans in providing access to the global information infrastructure and therefore the ability to join the world economic community. Europe’s already densely populated cities will see an increase from the current 72 percent to 78 percent of its total population by 2030.

Some parts of the AOR will see sharp reductions in indigenous populations over the next generation. Two regions that seem particularly vulnerable are Central and Eastern Europe and southern Africa. Decline in the former is due primarily to low birth rates. Of the 10 nations with the lowest birth rates in the world, 8 are in this region. Many of these countries are landlocked, such as Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Moldova. The region also includes the almost-landlocked countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as Poland and Ukraine. Compounding the problem for these nations are their roles as sources of emigrants to Western European countries, particularly Ukraine, which further hastens the overall population decline. Though its birth rates are higher, Russia is also experiencing long-term population decline, especially outside its most populous regions in the southwest. This trend is countered by increases in Chinese immigration, both legal and illegal, into production areas east of the Urals. The overall result is that the future rural landscapes of Europe may be filled with ghost towns.

Southern Africa, on the other hand, will see its population growth reduced due to a more destructive cause: AIDS. Currently, percentages of adults aged 15 to 45 infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus range from almost 19 percent to 33 percent among Africa’s six southernmost nations. The raw numbers are staggering now: 24.5 million infected in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 14.1 million in the rest of the world. Awareness of AIDS and its detrimental impacts on African societies will fuel the pursuit of a cure, but short of finding one,
many of the infected may remain sequestered from the global society at large and be left to die in place.

The changes in demographics will cause equally dramatic shifts in the demands for fundamental resources: food, water, and waste management, among others. While the amount of food produced globally is theoretically sufficient to prevent starvation now, by 2030 land degradation, soil erosion, and desertification will reduce arable land. Hastily developing locations in the USEUCOM AOR moving toward modernized agriculture are at risk. Potable water is a different matter. The competition for water for human consumption and agriculture is outstripping natural supplies. Many developing nations, especially in Africa, do not have the political or social structures to manage their river systems and ground water sources, particularly as their populations grow. At least one estimate suggests that half of the world’s population in 2025 will not have adequate safe drinking water. Meanwhile, waste and pollution are already significant urban problems that population increases will exacerbate.

Modern cities throughout the AOR will also face infrastructural and economic challenges as they cope with this growth. Lack of adequate housing, a shortage of education programs for the young, inadequate health care services and providers, and insufficient transportation networks will be among the problems these cities will face. Health care will be the greatest problem, as now there is a deficiency of 4 million health care workers, and the existing care population is improperly distributed against the demand. This gap in services will widen.

Access to global information technologies that might provide economic opportunities for the young and disadvantaged will also remain unequal. While those in developed and developing areas will have more opportunities to gain regular access to modern and future information technologies, significant parts of the population (including those within developed areas) will be shut out. This is more likely to aggravate current economic disparities than create new ones. As a result of these and other factors, the denizens of underdeveloped locations will probably define progress as things getting worse rather than better.

The third area of interest, impacts of globalization, concerns a broad range of functions under which the societies of the future will operate. Two trends that will shape the security environment in Europe and Africa are the misuse of information technology and the rise of key entities that rival the powers of the nation-state.

Technology should continue to advance in leaps and bounds, with the Internet and its related technologies taking ever-broader roles in the daily activities of ordinary citizens. However, while these technologies benefit the global economy and facilitate greater global social interaction, they also provide a tremendous conduit for criminal activity, such as identity theft, intellectual property infringements, encouragement of illicit sexual or violent behaviors, and hacking or other forms of information warfare. The criminal justice systems of developed countries are already poorly equipped to deal with this domain of crime, the scope of which can be devastating to legitimate business. The Internet as a tool of free speech also has its downsides. Transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have been effective in using it to spread their ideology, plan training and operations, recruit, and communicate with the public while avoiding physical detection. The problems are too pervasive for governments to intervene via controls or censorship, and security technologies are hard pressed to keep up.

Globalization will cause shifts in the political landscape, as the number of significant political and economic entities that are not nation-states is increasing. These include transnational corporations (TNCs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and big cities. Some TNCs are already extremely powerful entities. For example, if Wal-Mart were a nation-state, it would have the 22nd largest gross domestic product in the world, roughly that of Austria. As TNCs grow rapidly and invest in the developing world, they can catalyze development and stability where nation-state–based programs do not succeed. But while TNCs will engage in social issues and other acts of so-called corporate citizenship, the bottom line will still drive their decisions. Thus, social concerns left wanting by nation-states will fall in the domain of NGOs, which will have the resources, manpower, and will to tackle the world’s toughest problems through the charity of the global community. However, not all NGO activities will be welcome, as shown in examples of Islamic charities funding terrorist groups.

The growing size and power of cities in Europe and Africa will disrupt the predominant order of nation-states. Large cities from different nations will forge greater peer-to-peer cooperation to address common economic, political, and security threats that differ vastly from the problems found elsewhere in their respective countries. This teamwork can extend to providing resources for disaster relief, such as that given by New York City to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The downside is further reinforce-
ment of the separation between the cities and other areas. In countries whose capital is also the lone large metropolis, governments will contend with perceptions of paying attention exclusively to the capital, where TNCs and NGOs are most likely to reside, and none to rural areas. Security and other services such as police, fire, medical care, customs, immigration, border patrol, consequence management, and emergency command and control will be heavily concentrated in the capital, with rural areas getting reduced services. Ungoverned or misgoverned areas may expand rather than contract, leading to poorly patrolled borders and inviting even greater mass migration. Transnational criminal and insurgent groups will seek safe havens in abandoned rural areas to establish operations for moving drugs, trafficking humans, or preparing for terrorist activities.

Nexus of Instability

How will this play out in the USEUCOM AOR? It will differ greatly by region, but overall, nation-states will experience greater pressure to do more to provide stability, security, and the basic needs of their people. Western Europe will likely cope, as will parts of Eurasia and Africa, but the stresses of an urbanized environment will create conditions in 2030 that will generate threats to peace. These threats will increasingly be unconventional as urban areas facilitate hard-to-detect, small-scale, terrorist-style activities at far lower cost and effort than generating conventional threats, although the latter will remain. The following five conditions could spark urban conflict in the future:

- increased competition for critical resources, especially water
- difficult conditions within emerging metropolises
- potential for mass panic, particularly from terrorism and disease
- growing ungoverned or misgoverned areas as populations shift
- general stress from dense populations

The Adversary in 2030

It is easy to cast people driven to violence as a result of tough living conditions in a mold because there is an expectation in civil society that they should overcome their challenges. Individual actors are dismissed as having mental or emotional illnesses that make them unable to cope and thus prone to violent action. Moreover, latent racism or other prejudices might lead some to believe that certain ethnicities or followers of certain religions are driven to violence. However, the above five conditions will not discriminate. They will cut across all classes, races, and religions. The dwindling majorities will be just as uneasy and fearful as the marginalized minorities. Why and how they will band together and act are the key questions that will lead us to the best approaches to securing and maintaining peace.

The adversary will want to act against those who imposed the undesirable conditions upon them, real or perceived. Hence, conventional avenues such as joining the national armed forces will not resonate because even when the evils are being blamed on a distant nation-state (such as the United States), it is the symbolic local manifestations of that state that will draw attention (such as nearby American TNCs or Embassies). Unconventional, surreptitious activities are also easier for conventional adversaries to perform, so terrorism will continue to be the tactic of choice, although the motivations and methods will differ greatly.

There are at least five different groups of actors that pose a threat to security, and each interacts differently with the external world. The first three have been part of the strategic environment for some time. Anarchists use violence against political targets in response to real or perceived injustice. State-sponsored terrorist groups advance a national political agenda or assert national power. Traditionally employed by states against other states, this form of terrorism may prove attractive for some states to check the power of meddling TNCs and NGOs, even if they are not present within the state. Separatist groups will endeavor to create geographically separate entities such as new ethnically or ideologically pure states. Some will pursue their goals by force, but others will be nonviolent groups desiring to create and enforce protective enclaves within a society. Pressure by the state to conform could spark violence. These three types of groups are well-understood threats that can be dealt with using current military and law enforcement capabilities.

The other two, however, require responses with new or transformed capabilities. The greatest threat comes from the rejectionists, who will actively seek to destroy or overthrow the political system and supplant it with their own ideological form. Currently, there is one clear and present instance of this variety, the caliphatist threat of a transnational movement to establish global domination under an Islamist regime. Its adherence to a jihadist ideology and the strict application of sharia law make this movement unappealable and unconcerned with the use of excessive violence, such as employment of weapons of mass destruction or wanton killing of innocents. Because al Qaeda has successfully conducted attacks and effectively employed the Internet to pursue its ideology, attract recruits, and enable operations, it is conceivable that other rejectionist movements may arise that use similar methods to pursue an alternative ideology.

The fifth group is the nihilists. These will be the most unpredictable and are growing increasingly dangerous. Under the hardened conditions of 2030, individual actors will be more prevalent, reacting when provoked, and occasionally combining to form mass disturbances. Many will be otherwise peaceful members of the society who simply become overwhelmed and act out their hostility. Others will be opportunists who will use the cover of ongoing disturbances to steal or vandalize. Small groups could serve as provocateurs or form alliances with other groups such as rejectionists. But nihilists may not initially be part of any movement. By definition, they just want to commit violence. Yet once they have acted without consequence, they will find it easy to join larger violent groups or movements.

Available to these actors in the global environment of 2030 will be a wide range of strategic enablers that will help them plan and conduct operations, recruit and train, and communicate with the public. At the root of these enablers lies the general condition of governance under stress that creates a permissive environment for the actors. This environment permits holes and seams in national or local security such as weakened borders, under-resourced police forces, or bureaucratic infighting over authorities and responsibilities. It generates corruption that permits the
growth of illegal economic activities and organized crime from drugs to arms to trafficking in people. It allows TNCs, NGOs, and other major entities to engage in illegal or unethical practices (such as financing terrorism) unchecked. Finally, it allows problems to fester just below the level of societal response. Each of these enablers provides ways, means, and opportunities for terrorist groups of all sorts to operate, along with access to the populations of potential recruits.

**Needed Capabilities**

Winning a global campaign for good governance requires combating the nexus of rejectionist ideologies, the harsh conditions that spawn nihilists, and the array of enablers in the strategic environment. To do so requires all elements of national power working together proactively on several fronts to achieve several goals. One front is accelerating growth of civil society under the rule of law to counter the effects of exploding population growth, mass migration, and socioeconomic issues. Another is developing broader avenues to apply elements of national power beyond the nation-state apparatus, which includes all political actors such as TNCs, NGOs, cities, and others, to resolve issues that contribute to the flashpoints that the reactionists exploit (such as distribution of key resources). Achieving these goals requires the right grand strategy, operationalized through the interagency process in which the U.S. military will play an active role.

One grand strategic idea that appears consistent with these goals is the Cooperative Security approach. This method describes an interdependent world order that recognizes how globalization problems require globalized solutions. American interests are transnational. Conflict prevention and intervention serve to contain unrest to a localized area and keep it from sparking conflict elsewhere. Counterproliferation of arms and WMD is important. But rather than deferring national interests to international organizations, collective security could be achieved through a network of partnerships among the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, African Union, and other key regional organizations. International organizations such as the United Nations would play a role where others fail.

Consequently, the U.S. military will see even greater emphasis on theater security cooperation activities to achieve the objectives of conflict prevention and conventional training and readiness. Other nations will need the capacity to conduct urban operations, supported by highly responsive intelligence. Regional organizations will need similar capacities to mobilize when nation-states require assistance. Roles and responsibilities among nation-states, TNCs, and NGOs must be consistent and actionable. Interoperability among all these efforts is vital and is fostered through direct personal contact among peers. Thus, activities that build relationships between U.S. Servicemembers and those of other nations or entities will be important in building a unified response capability against threats to peace.

The U.S. military will need to devote considerable resources toward consequence management capabilities. The concentration of European and African populaces in the cities brings with it the potential for national collapse as the result of a disaster. Consequently, the U.S. military will see even greater emphasis on theater security cooperation activities to achieve the objectives of conflict prevention and conventional training and readiness. Other nations will need the capacity to conduct urban operations, supported by highly responsive intelligence. Regional organizations will need similar capacities to mobilize when nation-states require assistance. Roles and responsibilities among nation-states, TNCs, and NGOs must be consistent and actionable. Interoperability among all these efforts is vital and is fostered through direct personal contact among peers. Thus, activities that build relationships between U.S. Servicemembers and those of other nations or entities will be important in building a unified response capability against threats to peace.

The U.S. military will need to devote considerable resources toward consequence management capabilities. The concentration of European and African populaces in the cities brings with it the potential for national collapse as the result of a disaster. Stabilizing a situation and providing humanitarian assistance rapidly will be increasingly important to prevent situational deterioration due to panic and opportunism. Hybrid military and police capabilities, perhaps similar to the gendarmes of other nations, would be useful in instilling order quickly in such chaotic situations. Technological advancements such as robots that can decontaminate areas affected by chemical, biological, or radiological weapons will be important. Scanners capable of diagnosing life-threatening injuries in victims instantaneously will greatly assist doctors in providing care during mass casualty situations. Making these and other capabilities portable in briefcases and distributing them widely around the AOR will go a long way toward establishing goodwill and building confidence within nervous societies.

A crucial part of the campaign will surround the process of developing rules of engagement that address the new realities. What is permissible and what is forbidden in terms of intelligence gathering, protections of privacy, relationships between or convergence of military and law enforcement capabilities, the laws of war and authorities to engage, handling of violent juveniles, etc., will be important subjects of debate, from both the legal and cultural perspectives. These also represent seams that our adversaries will exploit. These seams must be closed, so that our security forces have the authorities and responsibilities to vigorously pursue the enemies of peace while upholding the rules of law and civil society.

Finally, transparency and strong information operations are necessary to win the campaign of good governance. These are not confined to nation-states, as it is also in the best interests of TNCs, NGOs, and other entities that have stakes in maintaining long-term global stability. To check the threat of nihilist violence, populaces must remain convinced that there are avenues to resolve grievances other than breaking the order of civil society. The rule of law must remain supreme. In the information-heavy environment of the future, values and ethics will be crucial to maintaining civil society, building trust between the people and their governmental institutions, and diffusing the sparks of conflict. The U.S. military is well suited for this role as an example of good citizenship and good stewardship of the public trust.

Looking into the future, especially beyond a whole generation, is hard business. Applying the conclusions is equally difficult when one is attempting to develop requirements and capabilities to address that future. While the USJFCOM joint operating environment document builds a framework for explaining a range of threats and defining the requisite future combat capabilities for the U.S. military, it does not address the whole story of Europe and Africa in 2030. That story will be a battle for good governance over highly concentrated populations that will not resemble today’s Europeans and Africans. In Europe particularly, there will be tremendous stresses and strains on these societies that will challenge governmental ability to maintain stability. Getting the answers right requires putting aside what the people of these two continents look like now and understanding how the faces of Europe and Africa will look then.
NOTES


2 See U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint Operating Environment 2006 (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, September 2006), 46, available at <www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/joe_040906.doc>: “The United States aversion to casualties appears to have become ingrained in the new American Way of War. In some ways, emphasis on interagency operations, maneuver warfare, rapid decision, [information operations], precision fires, and other applications of power is a result of the desire to preserve American lives.”


18 Ibid.


Improving
Military-to-Military
Relations with Russia

By CHRISTOPHER T. HOLINGER

During the Cold War, the sight of soldiers wearing the uniform of the Red Army marching through the fields near Grafenwoehr, Germany, would have been most unsettling for members of the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division. In 1988, if you had suggested to a sergeant in U.S. Army Europe that he could ride in a Russian infantry fighting vehicle in exchange for giving a Russian soldier a ride in a Bradley, he would have reported you to counterintelligence officers or the closest military police unit. No 6th Fleet Sailor in the late 1980s would have ever expected to see the inside of the Soviet navy base at Novorossiysk or to spend much time in the Soviet lake that is the Black Sea.

Fortunately, times have changed, and the military-to-military (mil-to-mil) relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation has grown to the point where all of the events mentioned have either happened or are scheduled to happen soon. In Exercise Torgau ’05, U.S. Army Europe Soldiers traveled to a Russian training facility in the Moscow military district and enjoyed nearly a week of staff and small unit tactical training, to include vehicle and weapons familiarization. Then the whole exercise moved to the U.S. training area at Grafenwoehr for similar familiarization with American weapons and vehicles. USS Elrod recently completed a port call in Novorossiysk, and in February and April 2006, USS Porter cruised the Black Sea, conducting port calls and engagement with the navies of several Black Sea nations.

Despite frequent political ups and downs between the United States and Russia, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) remains on the lookout for new opportunities for cooperation. Indeed, developing a robust mil-to-mil relationship will make it easier for our forces to operate together in the tactical arena of the war on terror. Also, it should lead to better cooperation in the political realm as strategic leaders in the security services of both countries begin to see more areas of convergent national interests.

Relations Since 1991

U.S.-Russian mil-to-mil contacts started simply in the early years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initial efforts focused on building individual relationships and transparency, overcoming the barriers to trust that had built up over years of staring at each other across the Fulda Gap. There were many successes, most of the early ones spearheaded by USEUR. In 1994, the first bilateral peacekeeping exercise involving U.S. and Russian forces was held in Totskoye, Russia. Exercise Peacekeeper ’94 included Soldiers and vehicles from the 3rd Infantry Division (then still based in Germany) deploying to Russia to train with the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division. From that exercise, a tactics, techniques, and procedures guide was produced that enabled the integration of Russian forces into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

However, any relationship between two former rivals is fraught with difficulty, and there were plenty of bumps in the road. During Operation Allied Force, when NATO aircraft waged a bombing campaign against Serbia to expel Serb forces from Kosovo, the Russians announced that their forces in Bosnia would no longer take orders from the U.S. commanders in the region; they cut off several other military contacts and even expelled a number of U.S. diplomats from Moscow. In the endgame of Allied Force, as NATO troops entered Kosovo, the political and military maneuvering over the Pristina airfield and Russian efforts to establish their own sector...
led General Wesley Clark, USA, to remark, “NATO has been deceived or misled by about everyone in the Russian government,” which nearly led to a military confrontation between NATO and Russian troops.

Despite these episodes, there have been many instances of mil-to-mil cooperation, and our efforts have slowly grown beyond mere transparency and relationship-building to developing true interoperability. Army events such as Exercise Torgau ’05 (named for the city on the Elbe River where U.S. and Soviet forces linked up late in World War II) have built on the success of the Peacekeeper series of exercises in the 1990s to develop a true cooperative operational capability between the U.S. and Russian armies, and the addition in recent years of naval exercises such as Northern Eagle has expanded this success beyond land forces.1

Even though recent events have led to a few setbacks, such as the postponement of the 2006 iteration of the Torgau exercises to allow for passage of Russian legislation consistent with Russian and U.S. policies regarding such large events, the USEUCOM staff continues to strive for momentum in the mil-to-mil arena with Russia’s armed forces, in support of overall U.S. Government policy regarding engagement with Russia. Such relationships are difficult to start, and if momentum is lost, they are even more difficult to restart.

Current Strategic Guidance

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) identifies Russia as one of the “main centers of global power,” the only individual country identified in this way. Several principles drive our national strategy in dealing with these centers. The NSS states that these relations “must be set in their proper context” (that is, regionally, globally) and “supported by appropriate institutions,” whether they exist already or need to be created. The NSS also states that our interests with nations in these centers of global power are influenced “by states’ treatment of their own citizens . . . [since] states that are governed well are most inclined to behave well.”2 Finally, the NSS adds that we should “seek to influence the calculations” by which other states make their choices, even while we do not seek to dictate choices to them.

To place our relationship with Russia in its proper regional and global context, we must pay significant attention to the former Soviet republics that are now independent states surrounding the Russian Federation. USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Outside the USEUCOM AOR, but certainly within its area of interest, are the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. When combined with China, another of Russia’s neighbors with significant influence both globally and regionally, we see one of the major challenges to successful engagement with Russia: these states with significant regional stakes are scattered among three regional combatant commands: USEUCOM, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

How to overcome this challenge is clear, although not easy, and it is the first important element of the operational-level application of concepts articulated in the NSS: the combatant command staffs must eliminate the seams among them through regular and frequent collaboration and coordination. USEUCOM’s bilateral mil-to-mil activities with the Eurasian republics represent a major Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) priority, and issues such as security cooperation in the Caspian Basin lead to the right kind of regular cooperation with USCENTCOM. Annual TSC conferences hosted by each of the combatant commands with reciprocal invitations between the staffs help to eliminate the seams and to ensure that U.S. mil-to-mil activities with all the states that border Russia are coordinated to some degree, or at least that everyone is aware of what is going on elsewhere.

Representatives from other combatant commands and the Joint Staff also participate in USEUCOM’s discussions with the Russian Federation to work out the U.S.-Russia Interoperability Work Plan, the annual agreement on mil-to-mil activities between the two countries. By involving all the combatant commands whose AORs touch Russia and the Joint Staff in developing this crucial plan, we are better able to eliminate seams in Department of Defense efforts.

There are two other important aspects of USEUCOM’s actions in the Eurasia region that have a profound impact on the U.S. mil-to-mil relationship with Russia: Euro-Atlantic integration (via NATO and Partnership for Peace), and capacity-building activities within the former Soviet republics. Several of the former Soviet republics in USEUCOM’s AOR are NATO aspirants, and by helping with defense reform1 and other aspects of individual Partnership Action Plans, USEUCOM can facilitate countries such as Ukraine and Georgia eventually joining the Alliance. Capacity-building activities with nations such as Georgia also bring the countries closer to NATO, and they demonstrate their desire to cooperate with the United States and NATO by sending troops to participate in coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These activities frequently put us at odds with what the Russians see as their interests in the region, and USEUCOM seeks to diffuse this tension through the use of multilateral events to bring the Russians together with their neighbors in search of common ground. Partnership for Peace and “in the spirit of Partnership for Peace” exercises are a large part of this effort, with events such as Baltic Operations and Combined Endeavor bringing the Russians together with new NATO members and aspirants to work on areas of common interest, such as maritime security and command and control modernization.
multilateral activities will allow us to assure both Russia and its neighbors that they have common interests and dissuade them from provoking each other.
access and information exchange breed transparency and trust, which promote coordination and ultimately cooperation. Cooperation leads to success in both exercises and operations, and success, in turn, creates a desire for more exchanges, exercises, and operational cooperation. Reinforcing success has long been part of both U.S. and Russian doctrine.

While our components execute the tactical-level events of the work plan, USEUCOM must look for areas of convergence with Russia. Simultaneously, we must help Moscow and its neighbors find similar shared national security interests. The best place to start searching for these commonalities is the five anchor points for NATO left by General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), former USEUCOM Commander and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). During his final year as SACEUR, General Jones regularly espoused these anchor points as issues that could help move NATO from common defense to collective security in the 21st century. They are equally applicable as potential areas of convergence between the United States and Russia:

- transnational terrorism (and the convergence of this threat with organized crime)
- security, stability, and reconstruction (SSR) in postconflict environments
- critical infrastructure security
- energy security
- weapons of mass destruction proliferation and consequence management.13

Each of these anchor points presents a unique set of opportunities for mil-to-mil cooperation. Counterterrorism is an obvious area for convergence. The 2002 Moscow theater crisis and the 2004 Beslan school attack show that Russia faces an even more immediate threat from terrorism in its homeland than does the United States. In the SSR arena, Russia has capacity far beyond many other nations. Where and when the political situation is conducive, the United States and Russia could bring considerable resources to bear to help a nation struggling to emerge from a conflict. Critical infrastructure is a national issue when the infrastructure in question lies entirely within a nation’s borders, but international cooperation is beneficial in safeguarding trade via international land, sea, and air lines of communication.

Energy security (ensuring the flow of energy resources from the source to the consumer) is a combination of infrastructure security and diversity of sources, and, as a major producer/exporter of energy, it is in Russia’s interest to ensure that its exported products reach customers safely. Finally, stopping nonstate actors or rogue states from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and preparing to deal with the consequences if they use them are clearly in the interests of both the United States and Russia. There has already been a great deal of cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the counterproliferation arena, and these actions have also involved many of the former Soviet republics—a regional success story if ever there was one.

Regional security cooperation talks could be a useful vehicle for USEUCOM, along with the other combatant commands that border Russia, to seek areas of convergence first with Russia’s neighbors and ultimately with Russia itself. As we have done with some success in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea regions, USEUCOM can bring the security services of several nations in the region together to work out cooperative solutions to problems related to any of the anchor points or to find other areas where our interests converge.

If these anchor points serve as the foundation for NATO’s growth and transformation and also help to guide the U.S. relationship with Russia, we will find ourselves with more opportunities for military cooperation between NATO, Russia, and Russia’s neighbors. This could have a positive impact on our broader political relationship with Russia, which has been trending somewhat negatively of late. A healthy mil-to-mil relationship could go a long way in reversing this trend and helping us avoid a larger conflict later. JFQ

NOTES

2 Ibid., 392.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Jones, statement.

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Trading Places
How and Why National Security Roles Are Changing

By JOSEPH A. GATTUSO

A bite dog pursues contractor in protective gear to tackle and hold the subject until his handler gives release command, Operation Iraqi Freedom

The public sector is served by individuals with superb strategic vision, extensive experience, and a desire to serve the Nation. Yet it finds itself unable to actualize the vision; it is frustratingly unable to execute strategic plans tactically, due primarily to the increasingly complex international environment, the speed with which information is disseminated (thus diffusing power), and the rapid deterioration of historical factors that have traditionally legitimized nations, such as the ability to control national capital and culture and to secure the homeland.

Conditions are such that the private sector is, in many respects, better suited to respond to emerging national security requirements than the public sector. While this assertion causes consternation in many areas of the public sector, there are compelling practical reasons why the public sector should leverage the strengths of the private side to solve increasingly intractable national security issues.

What follows is particularly pertinent for U.S. public sector leadership in the national security arena. The work of public sector leadership is changing, and America’s continued predominance depends on the ability of U.S. public sector leadership to comprehend America’s fundamental strategic and constitutional changes and adjust to them rapidly.

The work of public sector leadership in the future will be to design, create, and, with wisdom, constrain market spaces in which the work of the world will be accomplished. National security issues are being decided in the private arena. The public sector must realize that, for all but the largest regional or global conflicts, the private sector will probably be better suited as the operative agent for tactical execution of national security policy.

This article also applies to private sector leadership—that is, to those responsible for shaping strategies, cultures, and directions of private sector firms now operating in market spaces that support national security efforts. The scope of responsibility for private sector leadership is broadening, and the truly responsible private institution will be concerned with more than bottom-line corporate profits. The responsible corporation will recognize that intangible but essential public goods—compassion, empathy, justice, truth, and the concept of self-sacrifice—will only be sustained in our society through an insistence on diligent application of these qualities in their people, programs, and policies.

In a world where most of the work must be done with market-based solutions, it is the private sector that will carry the burden of ensuring that the substance of our society does not degenerate to a set of characteristics that only encompass economic concerns. Life is not comprised solely of the single-minded pursuit of economic security. The private sector must live this truth; the public sector must ensure that they do.

Emerging Nature of Governance

The state has been changing its nature throughout history. Each type of state forms around a particular legitimizing basis—an idea that it uses as a rule set to retain legitimacy in the eyes of those it governs. Legitimate authority comes from the ability of that government’s constitutional structure to execute the tasks that spring from that legitimizing concept. Doing so fulfills the expectations of the governed.

An earlier form of governance was the state-nation (1770–1870), which had as its legitimizing basis the idea that it uses as a rule set to retain legitimacy in the eyes of those it governs. Legitimate authority comes from the ability of that government’s constitutional structure to execute the tasks that spring from that legitimizing concept. Doing so fulfills the expectations of the governed.

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welfare of every individual. This is the form of governance with which most are familiar. In the nation-state, a collection of individuals gives the governing entity power to govern; in turn, the governing entity agrees to ensure the material well-being of the governed.

As did the state-nation before it, the nation-state form of governance is rapidly losing its legitimacy because it can no longer execute its fundamental purpose: to assure the material well-being and security of those it governs.

There are many reasons for this erosion of the nation-state's ability to keep its people either safe or prosperous: the ubiquitous nature of information; the ease with which money, culture, and disease cross national borders; the increase in transnational threats such as famine, migration, environmental problems, and weapons of mass destruction; a globalized economy eroding middle-tier wages; and the concept that human rights transcend a nation's sovereignty and that human values are best determined by the calculus of apportioned economic advantage. The nation-state form of governance is disappearing, and a new form is emerging.

This new kind of governance is known as a market-state, described fully in Philip Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. Where the nation-state derived its legitimacy from an agreement to provide for the material well-being of its constituents, the market-state derives its legitimacy from an agreement that it will maximize opportunity for its citizens.

While both forms of the state strive for material well-being, the nation-state did so by regulating morality via policy and law. The market-state, on the other hand, attempts to enable material well-being by ensuring the appropriate incentives are in place—an approach devoid of any effort to regulate social mores. The market-state is ideal when multiculturalism is essential; it does well in a society seeking relativistic morality, operating with economically based ethics. Moreover, the market-state solves problems by creating markets that are specifically designed to extrude needed solutions.

The shift to a market-state form of governance has serious implications, however. While the market-state is more adept at handling transnational problems, it cannot produce those intangible public goods—such as social qualities of compassion, justice, love of truth, empathy, selflessness, and honor associated with sacrificing for the public good—necessary for community and the proper development of human virtue. When there is no intangible idea to which humans can attach beyond that of simply increased material gain or opportunity to obtain better material conditions (translate both to power), then society and the people shrivel, waste away, and die—or become monsters.

But make no mistake—what we should or should not have is, at the moment, not the question. This is the way the world is moving, due to forces beyond any individual or any nation’s control. The market-state is emerging, and what remains is only to determine ways to ensure we have the public goods that will enable society to function without losing the richness of life and the knowledge of what it means to be essentially human. At the same time, however, market-state public sector leaders must ensure that society possesses the ability to deal with emerging national security issues more successfully than did the defunct nation-state form of governance.

**Emerging Nature of National Security**

There is a new definition for national security. Since any idea or awareness of national identity has been subsumed largely by a creeping obsession with material wealth, any concern for the security of some outdated concept once known as “a nation” has long since vanished. Today, the populace equates national security directly with individual economic prosperity and personal safety. Americans view national security as primarily centered in and having to do with quality of life in the private sector—specifically, their portion of the private sector.

This new concept of national security, coupled with the changing nature of the international environment, has rendered the public sector entities responsible for national security almost incapable of directly addressing the pressing national security issues.

Because of computers, communications, and weapons of mass destruction, the enemies of our civilization live in the private sector. They express their anger and frustration in the private sector, against private citizens, and against our civil infrastructure, most of which is now in the hands of the private sector.

When attacking those in the public sector—for instance, attacks against coalition soldiers in Iraq—they attack while swimming in Mao’s private sector sea. They do not attack on a conventional battlefield in ranks with tanks; they shoot from houses, rooftops, or alley, or they fire mortars from the midst of martyr-minded women and children, all within the private sector. If Iran or North Korea attacks us, do we seriously think they will attack our military? National security has been removed from the unambiguous, ordered realm of governments and thrown squarely into the bitter, bloody, goldfish-bowl arena of the private sector.

For example, within hours of a surgical Israeli airstrike, Hezbollah knows which families need blankets, food, power, water, or medical attention and supplies. Hezbollah faithful are on the ground immediately, distributing $100 bills to families (in the private sector) who have suffered loss or damage. Hezbollah will race in with dead bodies of women and children in an ambulance, demolish the structure to make it appear as though there was wanton destruction, remove the bodies from the ambulance, place them dramatically in the rubble, invite the media in to film the scene, and then gather their grisly props and race to another media opportunity. The world gasps.

The logic is inescapable. If the fight for national security has been displaced into the private sector arena, then government must ensure that it has the capability to fight in that arena. Yet how does the ungainly public sector...
become nimble enough to fight in the private sector arena?

With significant hesitation, most market-state nations, the United States and Britain as the main examples, have decided that they will conduct a proxy fight, using private sector elements to outsource the fight against their private sector enemies. Times have changed: assuring national security requires fighting for it in the private sector, with the force most suited to that battlespace.

There are two main issues with the private sector: accountability and motivation. Under what authority are these private sector firms conducting their activities? Who or what gives these companies the right to arbitrate elements of national policy when those elements involve armed force? Who voted for these corporations? The answer is straightforward: The American people, via their elected representatives, directed the Departments of Defense, State, or Homeland Security to create a market space in which national security requirements of the people of the United States (as determined by those same elected representatives) could best be addressed by private sector firms in an open, competitive market arena. The provision of these services is to be in accordance with the laws, policies, procedures, and regulations established by Congress and their appointed government representatives and executive agents.

Market-state entities are operating according to their (new) nature. Elected representatives of the people have made a market in which solutions to national security issues are the products, and an enterprising, entrepreneurial, ambitious, patriotic private sector has responded to provide those products and services. This, too, is in accordance with today’s new type of governance. So why the problem?

The problem is one of context: no one appears to be uneasy with a Department of Defense uniformed warrior using armed force at the clear and specific direction of the U.S. Government. Yet if the warrior is employed by a private company, great consternation is evoked. This comes from thinking that the public sector must still function with the nation-state model.

What is the difference between the warrior in a uniform getting paid by Uncle Sam, subject to the rules of engagement, and a host of U.S. Government agency rules and regulations, subject to the laws of the United States? In the market-state, the difference is very little. The root of the problem is how some people view the role of the public sector; they expect it to function as a nation-state while the public sector itself is discovering that to survive it must operate with market-state principles, products, timelines, and efficiencies.

There is also the issue of motivation. When the uniformed Soldier goes home for the day and takes off his uniform, does he suddenly become a private citizen? Are Soldiers any less defenders of liberty when they wear civilian clothes?

Some claim that Soldiers wearing the Nation’s uniform are not fighting for money. Be assured, every Soldier is paid a salary, with medical benefits and a good retirement plan. But it is true that they are not fighting for money, if one considers more deeply the Soldier’s motivations. The warrior’s motivations do not spring from, nor are they attached to, the source of a warrior’s paycheck. Typically, those whose primary motivation is money do not decide to endure physical, mental, and emotional privation; the possibility of violent, random, explosive death, or dismemberment; or the smoking enmity of thousands
of people on a daily basis. The critical point is that warriors’ motivations—which are elemental parts of the warrior nature—do not change when they transfer from the public to the private sector.

A great concern to public sector leadership in the market-state era is who will fight the wars of the market-state. When there is no national identity, when there is no uniting social concept of nationhood, when the uniform does not mean what it meant in the nation-state era, then who will defend the markets, the malls, the businesses, and the way of life Americans have come to expect? Can public sector leadership afford to disregard a body of warriors with the appropriate motivation ready to defend the public’s way of life, adept at living, working, and moving in the private sector arena—that same arena where the preponderance of the Nation’s enemies live?

**Shift in National Security Roles**

The market-state will use different tools to solve its problems, survive, and flourish. This is why the market-state needs to utilize the private sector now in ways that it did not when we had a nation-state.

We know that the increasing complexities of our world are generating national security problems ideally suited for market-based solutions. We also know that the emerging form of governance is oriented toward market-based solutions, which emerge from specifically crafted market spaces with unique design constraints. And, finally, we know that the market-state will be unable to secure the public goods so essential for humanity. The fundamental question then becomes how might public sector leadership structure national security market spaces to produce solutions to national security problems, while at the same time ensuring society maintains a high degree of essential public goods.

Maybe the answer is for public sector leadership to pay more attention to ensuring that its private sector surrogates have the proper motivation. In the days when national identities still existed, warriors fought for nations; their uniforms represented the nation for which they fought, and when the war was over they set aside the uniform and once again became productive citizens.

Consider that the warrior in this new era may be motivated by something that is not attached to the uniform—maybe it is something that does not disappear when the warrior steps across a thin border into civilian life. Maybe that which motivates warriors to do what they do has little to do with the size or source of their paycheck and everything to do with the ultimate purpose and characteristics of their activity. Consider that maybe the true warriors—the professional, altruistically motivated warriors for whom the profession of battling evil is a calling—are warriors regardless of the sector in which they serve. If what they do is altruistic, if it serves or benefits their fellow man, if it defends the defenseless, protects the innocent, and pursues and punishes the guilty, then it will be an acceptable occupation. The public sector must find ways to leverage this national resource, regardless of the sector in which these warriors serve.

If men and women no longer have a concept of a nation, then the only other honorable honorable mindset capable of sustaining the necessary moral force to endure the privation of conflict is this idea of righteous opposition to injustice and evil. The difference is motivation—the difference is in the heart.

The market-state will need private sector warriors to survive. It is motivation that should define those in whose hands we place the responsibility for our national security. It should be a main role of public sector leadership to design ways to ascertain private sector motivations and then ensure accountability to those motivational principles. As we see how much more effective the private sector will be in today’s conflicts, a national priority for public sector leadership should be to ensure that those working in key private sector areas possess the morality, ethics, value systems, and requisite motivation the Nation wants and needs in its society and citizens.

What are our responsibilities? What are our imperatives? What must we accomplish to adjust to this new form of governance, these new national securities, this shift in national security roles?

To answer these questions, the public sector must craft well-designed national security market spaces in which private sector organizations can function to create market successes, which are also solutions to complex national security problems. The public sector must also insist on adherence to the values, morality, and ethics that it wants upheld as a condition of operation in these markets. Left to itself, the market will ignore these essential social elements.

The public sector, then, still has a crucial role to play in the future—not only in support of national security, but in maintaining and nourishing the qualities that make and keep us human.

The public sector must recognize that the nature and scope of governance have changed; that the level of expectations held by those governed has changed; and that the quality and quantity of public goods must somehow be maintained even in a market-state era. The public sector must work more closely with the private sector to accomplish key national security priorities. The public sector should act with speed and resolve to hold its private sector partners to account and to insist that they operate within clearly outlined and specific guidelines, with appropriate and edifying motivations. The public sector must not abdicate its role as society’s guiding hand in the age of markets.

The private sector, acting in support of national security, must maintain the strictest measures of accountability, uphold the highest standards of integrity, and embody the value systems, mores, and ethics required to sustain the welfare of the nation. The private sector must act with more than simply a concern for the bottom line. It must act with a greater degree of morality and ethics than ever before, because the public sector structures that were once in place to ensure that society maintained these key elements are rapidly dissipating. The private sector must be the last bastion of values, ethics, and morals. Private sector warriors who support national security must embody the characteristics that comprise a good society. JFQ

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**NOTE**

Islamist terrorism has received a great deal of scrutiny recently, but many researchers have failed to include the historical and theological dimensions of Islam in their analyses. This has led to counterterrorism policies that focus on specific groups, such as al Qaeda, rather than on the sociocultural phenomenon of jihad. If America had followed a similar policy in December 1941, the Nation would have declared war on Vice Admiral Nagumo’s Pearl Harbor Striking Force rather than on the imperial government of Japan.

To wage America’s war on terror effectively, Islamist terrorism must be conceptualized as part of a worldwide movement of jihad—a phenomenon that Western governments and scholars failed or refused to acknowledge until the attacks of September 11. Jihad has evolved into new forms as war itself has changed. Jihad has become the epitome of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), a point on the spectrum of war that includes terrorism, propaganda, infiltration and sabotage, guerrilla war, insurgency, and conventional warfare.

Jihad is a global movement occurring everywhere there are Muslim populations. It has been present through all of Islamic history. Islamist terrorism is merely one part of jihad, or struggle, to bring the entire world under the dominion of Islamic law and to restore the Islamic Caliphate.

Definitions

A review of the literature concerning terrorism reveals that terrorism itself is difficult to define. While clear, objective definitions of terrorism are easy to develop, simple definitions get complicated by two main factors. First, every terrorist commits his actions in support of a cause that many others also support, and people find it difficult to acknowledge that actions taken in support of their pet cause could be terrorist acts. Second, governments and media outlets consistently apply, misapply, or refuse to apply the term terrorism based on political factors.

Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change... Terrorism is specially designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack.”

The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”

Both of these definitions share critical elements, including the use or threatened use of force; attacks against primary targets with the intent of causing fear in secondary targets; and a goal of changing government or government policies. Terrorism is a tactic, a method of applying violence. It is one of many methods of using violence to change behavior, some of which are legal and some of which are not.

Various attempts have been made to develop typologies of terrorism, and Reuven Paz argues that any typology must include Islamist terrorism as a distinct division. Similarly, David Rapoport argues that modern terrorism has gone through evolutionary phases and that the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989 initiated a “fourth wave” of terrorism based on religion. He emphasizes that “Islam produced the most active and potentially appealing religious groups.”

According to Bard O’Neill, “The essence of guerrilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will.” One thing that distinguishes guerrilla warfare from terrorism is that “its primary targets are the government’s armed forces, police, or their superior units, and in some cases, key economic targets, rather than unarmed civilians.”

According to Hoffman, guerrilla soldiers “operate as a military unit, attack enemy forces, and seize and hold territory (even if only ephemerally during daylight hours), while also exercising some form of sovereignty either over territory or population.” Martha Crenshaw explains the difference as one of legitimacy: if the perpetrators use military methods, or attack military targets, or have a realistic chance of military success, they are not terrorists. Guerrilla warfare is one type of asymmetric
warfare. It is also closely related to, and often confused with, insurgency warfare.

An insurgency is “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling groups consciously use political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.” Insurgency is typically an asymmetric conflict because of the distribution of resources between the ruling powers and their opposition. But this is not always the case. Insurgencies can include guerrilla operations, terrorism, electoral mobilization, passive resistance, or, occasionally, conventional warfare. Guerrilla conflict is insurgency, but insurgency is not necessarily guerrilla conflict.

Asymmetric warfare “describes a military situation in which two belligerents of unequal strength interact and take advantage of their respective strengths and weaknesses.” The essence of asymmetric warfare is that there are two unequal groups in conflict. They can be nations, ethnic groups, tribes, or any other recognizable body of people. If one group is modern and industrial with a professional military and the other is not, they are fighting asymmetric warfare.

Fourth-generation warfare occurs when a militarily disadvantaged belligerent seeks “to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental concept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat great economic and military power.” Fourth-generation warfare is designed to “ensure political rather than military success.” Another new development is that in 4GW, “fighting will not be limited to nation-state relationships. Rather, opposing factions will be divided by race, religion, or class.”

Fourth-generation warfare and asymmetric warfare are similar and overlapping concepts. Fourth-generation warfare is asymmetric, but asymmetric warfare is not necessarily fourth generation. Asymmetric warfare has existed since the first band of Homo erectus made clubs with which to strike those without them, but 4GW began to evolve with the development of modern communications, transportation, and weapons technologies.

Global Jihad

Various authors have discussed the existence of a global jihad movement. Quintan Wiktorowicz, for example, argues for the reality of a global Salafist jihad but fails to extend his analysis to other Islamic sects. Fidel Sendagorta expands on this idea, contending that “we face not a string of isolated small groups but a transnational community of activists indoctrinated via the Internet, whose leaders are intent on Islam’s ideological hegemony worldwide—in other words, a global-scale insurgency that uses religious resources to serve a political strategy.” Like Wiktorowicz, however, he limits the players by referring to “three main groups . . . linked to state Islam, which is controlled by government in the countries of origin; salafists; and movements operating under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Crenshaw also describes a worldwide “civil war,” or reaction to American foreign policy, but fails to address the

Damage from suicide bomber in Musayib, Iraq, that killed 60 civilians and destroyed several vehicles and shops
theological underpinnings of this movement.

The existence of a global jihadist movement using 4GW to spread Islam around the world can be demonstrated by examining the:

- continuum of conflict in Islam
- theological basis of jihad
- omnipresence of jihad
- concatenation of Islamist organizations.

**Continuum of Conflict in Islam.** The U.S. Army conceptualizes warfare as part of a spectrum of violence. As part of this spectrum, war includes conventional war, guerrilla war, terrorism, infiltration and sabotage, and media war, or propaganda. Fourth-generation warfare incorporates all of these forms of conflict, as does the global jihad.

Muslim armies have fought those of non-Muslims in modern times, most notably in World War I, the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the Gulf War of 1991. Muslim leaders took their people to war for standard economic and political reasons, but how did they motivate their troops? Why did individual Muslims soldiers fight?

In November 1913, the last Caliph of Islam “proclaimed a jihad, or Holy War, calling on all Muslims in British, Russian, and French territories to rise up and smite the Infidel.” The Khedive of Egypt immediately backed the Caliph, calling on all Egyptians to rebel against British rule in the name of Allah. These calls to jihad ultimately led to the complete destruction of the Ottoman Empire by Western armies and an end to the almost 1,300-year-old Caliphate.

The story of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973 is one of repeated and stunningly complete defeats of Muslim armies on conventional battlefields. Arab nations were incapable of producing modern weaponry, so their leaders either purchased arms or were supplied with arms as foreign aid. These same leaders incited their peoples with calls to jihad. Muslim nations combined forces so that multiple armies simultaneously attacked Israel, yet despite their numerical advantages they proved incapable of achieving victory.

During the Gulf War of 1991, leaders of both Iraq and Kuwait declared jihad against the other. When U.S. and coalition troops prepared to drive the Iraqi occupiers from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein called for jihad to rid Saudi Arabia of the American infidel. Osama bin Laden would echo the call to jihad for the same reasons a decade later. When the coalition attacked, however, the Iraqi military (the fourth-largest in the world) was driven into submission almost instantly.

The lesson of these conflicts is clear: modern Muslim armies are incapable of competing with Western armies on a conventional battlefield. The reasons for this inability are less clear and involve questions of education, authority, motivation, economics, and corruption, but there are few Western military leaders today who consider Muslim conventional forces a viable threat. Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, have demonstrated the ability of Muslim societies to field effective guerrilla and insurgent forces.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the call for jihad went out around the world. Muslims from every continent responded, sending money and young men to Pakistan and then on to Afghanistan to fight. For 10 long years, peasants on foot or on horseback fought against the largest and most heavily equipped army in the world, and eventually emerged victorious as the Soviet Union withdrew its troops. In the eyes of the mujahideen, or holy warriors, they had not only driven the superpower out of Afghanistan but also directly caused the breakup of the Soviet Union.

In 2003, American forces again rolled over the Iraqi army. Only 41 days elapsed between America’s invasion of Iraqi territory and President George W. Bush’s declaration of an “end to major combat operations.” Now, after 3 years of insurgent warfare and over 3,000 dead U.S. troops, American citizens are beginning to question the ability to defeat the subsequent insurgency. One of the main goals of 4GW is to cause the enemy to doubt its ability to win. It is also worth noting that another goal of insurgency is to cause political leaders to weigh the impact of war on their careers.

Sabotage is an element of almost all forms of warfare but is particularly connected with various subsets of asymmetric war. Infiltration is the act of covertly moving individuals or small units into enemy-controlled territory or even into the enemy’s military, which opens “widened possibilities for ... attack by saboteurs, terrorists, and special forces units, given easier transport and more effective, compact weapons, even if they do not possess weapons of mass destruction.”

Examples of jihadist infiltration and sabotage can be found in both law...
enforcement and military organizations. For example, FBI special agent Gamal Abdel-Hafiz refused to record secret conversations with a suspect under investigation in a terrorism case in 1998 and was accused of doing so again in another terrorism investigation in 2002, telling his superiors that “a Muslim does not record another Muslim.” Sergeant Hasan Akbar, USA, was deployed with his unit in early 2003, and on the eve of battle against Iraq destroyed his camp’s power generator, threw three fragmentation grenades into tents occupied by his officers, and then fired into tents occupied by his fellow Soldiers. He killed 1 and wounded 15. He stated at the time, “You guys are coming into our countries, and you’re going to rape our women and kill our children.”

These are but two of a far larger number of incidents in which Muslims have placed their loyalty to Islam above their loyalty to America and have sabotaged legal or military efforts to oppose Islamic jihad.

Propaganda is a carefully calculated and designed series of messages “that attempts to change the target’s perceptions, cognition, and behavior in ways that further the objective of the propagandist.” Propaganda is designed to convince Westerners that:

- Jihad has nothing to do with war.
- Any Muslim arrested on terrorism charges is a victim of unconstitutional profiling and is not guilty.
- All religions produce terrorism, so Islam is no different from Christianity.
- There is a moral equivalence between the deliberate targeting of children and military operations against enemy forces.
- All antiterrorism efforts are unconstitutional or racist.

The primary jihadist propagandists in the United States are the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Most of their propaganda falls under the Islamic strategy of Taqqiya, or “deception” (Hadith Sahih Bukhari, Book 52:267–270). Many other forms of propaganda are taken directly from the al Qaeda manual.

An example of the propaganda issued by Islamist organizations when a jihadist is arrested, convicted, or deported over terrorism charges can be found in the case of Ali al Timimi. In April 2005, al Timimi, a native-born American citizen, was found guilty in a U.S. district court of actively recruiting Muslims to travel to Afghanistan, join the Taliban, and wage war against the United States. Witnesses testified that on September 16, 2001, he held a meeting in his home where he disconnected his telephone and closed the blinds on every window and told his followers how to get to Afghanistan. The Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation’s executive director “said that Timimi’s conviction ‘bodes ill’ for the First Amendment” and that “the bar for what constitutes free speech has shifted since the September 11 attacks. . . . Timimi was a victim of that change.” The executive director of the Shaker El Sayed Mosque said, “Ali never opened a weapon or fired a shot. . . . What kind of country are we turning the United States into today?”

The ultimate goal of Islamist propaganda, of course, is to convince the West that there is no global jihad movement, there is no “holy war” in Islam, and Islam is inherently a peaceful religion. The violence perpetrated daily wherever there are Muslims is purely coincidental and completely unrelated to Islam, and even to mention such things is an example of prejudice against Muslims.

Theological Basis of Jihad. A particularly troubling aspect of Islam that most people raised in Western secular society have great difficulty accepting is that, unlike other major religions, Islam not only approves of but also requires war. We find this hard to accept largely because of an arrogant form of ethnocentrism that makes us believe that everyone in the world wants to be a middle-class American. We assume that everyone wants freedom, democracy, peace, and dialogue, that everyone is willing to negotiate and compromise, and that everyone believes in religious freedom. We are in many ways reliving the days of Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” and find it almost incomprehensible that there are millions of people in the world who, if given a free election, would vote for a totalitarian theocratic regime.

Yet both history and current events tell us that this is exactly what we are facing. In Islamic cosmology, all the Earth is divided into two regions, the House of Islam and the House of War. The House of Islam includes all lands ruled by sharia, or Islamic law; the House of War includes those lands yet to be subdued.

The primary textual source of authority in Islam is the Koran, the revealed messages from Allah to Mohammed. Additional authority is derived from various Hadiths, or stories written about Mohammed and the founding of Islam by his immediate followers. Mohammed’s life is of particular interest to Muslims because he is viewed as the perfect man, and all Muslims are encouraged to follow his example. Clerics in Islam are rigorously trained in Koranic literature and interpretations and are authorized to issue fatwas, or judgments, about the meanings of various passages. An examination of the Koran and Hadiths, the life of Mohammed, and the edicts of Islamic clerics both past and present reveals the centrality of war and jihad to Islam.

The Koran was “revealed” to Mohammed by Allah over a period of years and contains numerous contradictions. For example, parts of the Koran instruct Muslims to honor Jews and Christians as “People of the Book,” and in fact Muslims were initially required to pray facing Jerusalem in honor of their alleged shared heritage. During the years that these passages were written, Mohammed was attempting to convert three tribes of Medina Jews to Islam. When the tribes refused to follow him, Mohammed forced two of them into exile and ordered the massacre of the third. Passages in the Koran written during this period are markedly different from the earlier ones: “Fight those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, who do not forbid that which Allah and His Messenger have forbidden, nor follow the Religion of Truth, out of those who have been given the Book, until they pay the tax in acknowledgement of superiority and they are in a state of submission” (9:29).

How do Muslims reconcile such obvious contradictions? They do so through the concept of abrogation. Allah’s plan for Mohammed and humanity was revealed gradually, in steps, so anything that contradicts an earlier message was sent to replace that earlier message. When two passages differ, the latter is to be obeyed (2:106).

How should a Muslim treat non-Muslims? “O Prophet, fight hard against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be firm against them. And their abode is hell, and evil is their destination” (9:73).
“Muhammad is God’s Apostle. Those who follow him are ruthless to the unbelievers but merciful to one another” (48:29).

“And fight them until there is no more disbelief, and the worship will all be for Allah alone” (8:39). “When the Sacred Months have passed, then kill the unbelievers wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in each and every ambush” (9:5). “Let not the believers take the disbelievers for friends rather than believers. And whoever does this has no connection with Allah” (3:28).

What about a Muslim’s fellow monotheists, Christians and Jews? At first they were treated well, but when they did not convert to Islam en masse Mohammad’s opinion of them severely changed: “Abasement will be their lot wherever they are found, except under a covenant with Allah and a covenant with men, and they shall incur the wrath of Allah, and humiliation will be made to cling to them. This is because they disbelieved in the messages of Allah” (3:112). “Hast thou not seen those to whom a portion of the Book was given? . . . Those are they whom Allah has cursed” (5:51-52). And yet one more: “They desire that you should disbelieve as they have disbelieved, so that you might be [all] alike; therefore take not from among them friends until they fly their homes in Allah’s way; but if they turn back, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them, and take not from among them a friend or a helper” (4:89).

The Hadiths are even clearer: “Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You will fight with the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones. The stones will (betray them) saying, O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him’” (Hadith Sahih Bukhari 4:52:176).

When Muslims are not talking to non-Muslims, though, what do Muslim scholars and their followers say to each other? The Al-Azhar University is Islam’s highest seat of learning. One of its graduates, Yusuf Qaradawi, has become one of the most influential Sunni clerics today. According to Qaradawi, “Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror and a victor after being expelled from it twice,” and Islam should recapture its “former Islamic colonies in Spain, southern Italy, Sicily, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean Islands.” A leading Muslim cleric in England, Abu Hamza, told his followers that “We ask Muslims to bleed the enemies of Allah anywhere by any means. You can’t do it by a nuclear weapon, you have to do it by kitchen knife, no other solution. You can’t do it by chemical weapons, you have to do it by poison,” and that “every court is a target.”

At the 2006 pilgrimage to Mount Arafat in Saudi Arabia, the grand mufti Sheikh Abdul-Aziz al-Sheikh told the pilgrims from all over the world that “there is a war against our creed, against our culture under the pretext of fighting terrorism. We should stand firm and united in protecting our religion. . . . Islam’s helper” (4:89).

By the latter half of the 9th century, Muslim rule had extended well into India in the east and south down the coast of east Africa. In the 11th century, Muslim armies took control of parts of China, captured territory from the Byzantines, and extended their control south and west over most of the Saharan tribes in Africa and north into Bulgaria.

By the 16th century, Muslim armies finally took Constantinople and established the Ottoman Empire, capturing what would become Bosnia and Serbia in the process. The invasion of Europe from the east was stopped by force “at the gates of Vienna.”

But what about today? Have the days of Muslim military conquest ended? Certainly, the days of huge Islamic armies spilling out of Arabia are over, but only because Muslim societies lack the cultural, technological, and industrial sophistication to equip such armies. Muslim militancy continues, however, in ever-evolving forms. Examples of 4GW are found everywhere Muslims live in proximity to non-Muslims. There is no need to examine events in the Middle East or Kashmir to see examples of the global jihad.

For example, jihad is waged on many 4GW fronts in Canada. Canadian and British police recently arrested Mohammad Momin Khawaja, a Canadian citizen of Pakistani heritage, for training Muslims in bomb-building, money laundering, and smuggling so they could conduct terrorism operations in Britain. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian who had resided in Canada for 5 years and served as an al Qaeda bombmaker and forger, was arrested while attempting to smuggle explosives into the United States to blow up Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the “millennium.”

In South America, the notorious tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay has become a haven for Islamic militants, providing security, training, and access to weaponry. The Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires were attacked by Muslims in 1992 and 1994.

The British have their share of Islamic jihad as well. In July 2005, Muslim terrorists conducted a multiple bombing attack in London and attempted another 2 weeks later. The second attack failed only because the terrorists did not build effective detonators for their explosives. London has also been recognized as a major center

Allah’s plan for humanity was revealed in steps, so anything that contradicts an earlier message was sent to replace that earlier message.

Omnipresence of Islam. The story of Islam is a tale of war, from the first days of Mohammed through expansion across North Africa, the subcontinent, and even into Europe from both east and west. Islamic military expansion is not simply an historic tale, however, but continues today on every populated continent and in every nation with a substantial Muslim population. Less than a year after Mohammed’s death, his successor Abu Bakr began military expansion: “At the battle of al-Aqraba the Muslims defeated a rival tribal confederation and extended their power over eastern Arabia.” Shortly thereafter, Muslim armies burst forth onto the world scene. Within 20 years they had conquered Persia and most of North Africa and threatened the Byzantines.

Despite the false but generally accepted assertion that the Crusades were Europe’s first war with Islam, the reality is that in 714 Muslim armies invaded, conquering most of Spain by the 730s and pushing into the Frankish Kingdom until their defeat at the Battle of Tours in 732. In the east, Muslim armies captured Afghanistan, the southern half of the Caspian Sea, and the eastern side of the Aral Sea.

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for recruiting for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Europe and is home to imams who live on British welfare while preaching the violent overthrow of British society.

The 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands exposed the surprising extent of jihad there. Van Gogh made a film about the oppression of women in Islam and was stabbed and shot to death on a public street by a Muslim. Since then there have been hundreds of death threats and several attacks against newspaper editors, politicians, artists, and anyone willing to speak publicly against terrorism. Police have foiled terrorist attacks and uncovered multiple links between Dutch Muslims and al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Muslims in Sydney, Australia, have been joining the ranks of al Qaeda and traveling to Iraq to wage jihad. In December 2005, Muslims incited riots, assaults, and massive vandalism near the beaches. A prominent Australian imam, Wassim Doureihi, is on record stating that he is “a Muslim first and an Australian second” and that the goal of his organization is to establish a worldwide Caliphate. Australian Muslims have attempted to attack a nuclear power plant and assassinate the Australian prime minister.

The bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002 brought the jihad of Abu Bakar Bashir and his Jemaah Islamiyah to the world’s attention. Jemaah Islamiyah, however, is but one of several jihadist organizations operating in Indonesia; others include the Front Pembela Islam (or Defenders of Islam) and the Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors) Islamic militia. Most of Southeast Asia, in fact, has become a battleground between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Russia, too, has had ongoing conflict with Muslim jihadists. In Moscow, Muslim terrorists took more than 800 theatergoers hostage in a standoff that eventually left 150 dead. In Beslan, Muslims captured a school and wired it with explosives, eventually killing almost 350, including 186 children.

In Africa, Muslims are slaughtering Animists by the thousands in Darfur, Sudan provided Osama bin Laden a safe haven for years, and Somalia has been submerged in anarchy because of infighting between jihadist militias and Muslim warlords.

Jihad is thus a worldwide phenomenon, striking on every continent except Antarctica and in every nation with a substantial Muslim population. Muslim jihadists are killing non-Muslims and even Muslims of differing sects everywhere they are capable of launching attacks. Even China has experienced over 250 Islamic terror attacks since the mid-1980s.

Concatenation of Islamist Organizations. Perhaps the biggest mistake of most analysts when examining jihadists is to focus on individual organizations such as al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Hezbollah—thus missing the larger movement from which the groups spring. While these are separate and distinct organizations, their leaders frequently cooperate and their rank-and-file often drift from group to group as opportunities arise. The concatenation of the organizations within the jihadist movement can be observed in the intricate, transnational networks that demonstrate the pan-Islamic and global nature of jihad.

For example, one of CAIR’s senior employees, Ismail Royer, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the Kashmir terrorist group Lashkar e-Taiba, helping Muslims attend a terrorist training facility in Pakistan, and participating in the so-called Virginian jihad group. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. His attorney, Stanley Cohen,
also represents Hamas. CAIR’s director of community relations, Bassem Khafagi, was arrested on terrorism financing charges, pleaded guilty to visa and bank fraud, and was deported to Egypt. A business partner of Khafagi’s, Rafil Dhaifir, was convicted in 2005 of illegally sending money to support the Iraqi insurgency.26 A cofounder of CAIR’s Texas chapter, Ghassan Elashi, was also on the board of directors of the Holy Land Foundation, a false charity and front for Hamas. He was convicted of making false statements on export declarations, dealing in the property of a terrorist organization, conspiracy, and money laundering.27

Such intricate networks can be seen in other areas as well. For example, al Qaeda–linked organizations are operating in the United States, the Philippines, Spain, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, Uzbekistan, India, Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Gaza. Everywhere one examines a “militant” Islamist group, one finds links to others, which are linked with still others. Some organizations have become so interconnected that they are almost indistinguishable.

To fight today’s international terrorism, we must fight jihad. To fight jihad, we must understand Islam, and to understand Islam, we must first put away our own ethnocentric view of religion and values and try to comprehend a culture in which women bear and raise children just so they can become suicide bombers and kill Jews.28 We must also recognize that Islamist terrorism is more accurately understood as the product of the history of Islam than as the product of the history of terrorism.

As the new century begins, Islam’s war against the West continues. This conflict, a fourth-generation form of war, is different from all others in the American experience. Somewhere in the world today, Muslims are conducting each and every form of 4GW. In doing so they are not falling prey to “hijackers” of Islam or a small minority of extremists; they are obeying the central tenets of their religion as laid down in the Koran and the Hadiths and practiced by Mohammed himself. They are continuing a tradition of nearly 14 centuries and are doing so on every populated continent on Earth. The orthodox wage jihad, and it is the small minority who seek, at great personal risk, to reform and modernize their religion and their cultures.

The carnage caused by suicide bombers should not distract counterterrorism professionals and policymakers from the entire movement. America is engaged in a war against an enemy with no recognizable government or territory, a war initiated centuries ago, and a war that has taken on new forms and new fronts as the evolution of warfare continues. JFQ

Islam’s war against the West continues, a fourth-generation form of war different from all others in the American experience

NOTES


6 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Herndon, VA: Brassey’s, 1990), 25.

7 Ibid., 26.

8 Hoffman, 41.


10 O’Neill, 13.


13 Ibid.


19 Ibid., 67.

20 White, 13.


Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting

By John Patch

Targeting in the good old days was relatively simple. Physical, technological, and informational limitations meant that most bombs missed their targets. Warfighters shrugged off inevitable misses, and the media did not play up unintended civilian deaths. Even as recently as Operation Desert Storm, warriors and statesmen did not confront today’s combination of complex weapon systems, amorphous nonstate adversaries, restrictive rules of engagement, and the real-time impact of ubiquitous press coverage. The contemporary potential strategic impact of a single errant munition simply was not a factor.

Indeed, no foe can beat the modern-day American military machine in combined arms warfare, yet this machine is subject to strategic targeting vulnerabilities that military and policy leaders would do well to appreciate. Indeed, to succeed in joint warfare, commanders and staff must understand both the critical need for effective joint targeting and its inherent limitations. Notwithstanding the most precise and capable weaponry ever, any targeting effort absent coherent strategy or executed outside the art and rules of war can spell campaign defeat—even amidst tactical successes.

In analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the war on terror, the varied methodologies employed across Services, components, headquarters, and intelligence centers demonstrate several challenging obstacles to achieving the aims of joint targeting: efficiency, effectiveness, and strategic success.

Doctrinal Problems

Ample joint and Service targeting/fires doctrine currently exists, but no single document or compendium establishes universal standards or integrates proven concepts and methods across Services or at the different levels of warfare. In addition, not all warfighters follow or are even aware of joint doctrine (ostensibly the U.S. military benchmark), and Joint Staff directives do not necessarily shape combatant command targeting efforts. Joint doctrine also focuses almost exclusively on air-to-ground munitions, while Service publications concentrate on indigenous weapons systems, platforms, and tactics/techniques/procedures (TTPs). Army targeting doctrine, for instance, centers on field artillery and establishes a methodology dissimilar to the joint targeting cycle.

Similarly, terminology differences across Services and between operators and intelligence analysts create confusion: high-value target means completely different things in different targeting/fires publications. Extant doctrine also fails to address adequately the post-9/11 lessons, such as the limitations of U.S. heavy weapons in urban warfare—demonstrated vividly in Army and Marine operations in Najaf and Fallujah.

The myriad publications spend far too little time emphasizing the most important aspects of the targeting cycle, the crucial first and last phases. Excessive focus on weapon selection, mission planning, and execution occurs while target categories, critical nodes, and individual targets are developed often before strategic objectives are even identified.
If distilling the varied Service and joint targeting doctrine becomes too hard, then it will not be followed, especially in the high-tempo combat environment. Doctrine must balance change and continuity as dynamic warfare environments emerge. In the end, applied operational art (not doctrine alone) must stress the critical importance of asking the two key questions associated with the first and last steps: Is this a valid target in keeping with the commander’s intent, U.S. national security strategy, and American values? Was the desired effect achieved, and did it contribute to the strategy?

**Minimal Joint TTPs**

The various Services and warfare communities develop and use different targeting systems and TTPs and do not train enough toward joint operations, which occasionally translates into ineffective and inefficient targeting/fires in combat. Furthermore, Service and joint “train and equip” headquarters do not effectively incorporate real world lessons into predeployment training and force structure/equipping. No military or civilian body at a level above the Department of Defense (DOD) enforces targeting TTP standards. For instance, the Joint Targeting School (JTS), while an ideal forum for reinforcing common doctrine and TTPs, is not truly joint. Despite the “purple” JTS staff, Navy and Marine personnel are the main attendees. Some Army fires personnel do attend, but Air Force targeting instruction focuses on a separate curriculum across the country—attended by few, if any, Army, Navy, or Marine personnel.

Another example is the inconsistent use of the modernized integrated database (MIDB) across the Services, combatant commands, and interagency community. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), for instance, uses MIDB as the authoritative source of registered mensurated aim points, whereas other combatant commands do not. The Services also use at least three separate systems to derive mensurated coordinates—each with separate funding, training, and hardware/software. One need only imagine the result of imprecise coordinates for a 2,000-pound joint direct attack munition (JDAM) in an urban center to emphasize the importance of common

**publications spend too little time emphasizing the most important aspects of the targeting cycle, the crucial first and last phases**

mensuration joint TTPs. While the Joint Staff provides targeting oversight, it does not have true enforcement powers, the authority to set standards outside DOD, or the personnel to staff a contingency joint targeting organization. The semiannual Joint Staff Military Targeting Committee is not enough.

**Targeting Mission Creep**

Traditional targeteer trade-craft revolves around a narrow area of expertise: kinetic ordnance, typically delivered by aircraft. Since 9/11, some Service/joint task force staffs morphed targeting/fires cells into effects-based (EB) entities simply by expanding missions and requirements outside kinetics, often without the requisite training or capabilities. While nonkinetic fires and other EB efforts are important developments within defense transformation and a critical component of any strategy, attempting to turn targeteers into “EB warriors” is inherently unwise. It is like asking a psychiatrist to conduct dental work.

Furthermore, EB organization leaders often have not attended basic targeting and fires training alongside other EB curricula. The JDAM is but one tool in the effects arsenal, but expert advice on delivering one efficiently and effectively is inherently the targeteers’ responsibility. Foisting nascent and arcane mission areas on targeteers will only distract them from their already complex and specialized work.

**Service Legacies**

Almost 20 years after Goldwater-Nichols, pervasive Service legacies that hinder efficient and effective targeting endure. Separate procurement, development, and fielding of target acquisition systems and munitions—some of which are incompatible with other Services—remain a barrier to successful joint targeting. Furthermore, dissimilar aircraft, weapons, targeting systems, and predeployment training result in operational forces learning about inter-Service dichotomies only amidst the melee of real world combat.

Legacy single-Service targeting practices promote parochialisms that inhibit joint fires. In components where one Service is predominant (such as the Air Force at the Coalition Forces Air Component Command [CFACC]), Service legacy systems and perspectives hold sway over targeting and fires. Moreover, the Air Force closely guards its ground-based link to air support via the Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) cadre, ensuring that nuances of airpower remain an arcane art to most Soldiers. Service legacies exacerbate competing joint priorities and rivalries—at extremes manifested by motivation for sole Service recognition. Repeat general/flag officer allegations of divergent component targeting/fires priorities amid combat operations provide historical examples. Subjective postconflict munitions effectiveness assessments due to Service biases are another.

**Few Qualified Targeteers**

Some personnel serve in targets billets without essential training and operational experience, becoming targeteers overnight. Targeting itself also means different things to different Services and warfare communities. A Special Forces targeteer may be an expert at fixed-wing gunship fire support, wall breaching, and time-sensitive targeting during small-scale operations but may have zero ability to develop and employ a targeting strategy against an adversary integrated air defense system. Similarly, JTACs may be qualified to call in precision weapons from Air Force aircraft to support troops in contact but may have little understanding of joint targeting principles or may not have ever accomplished a collateral damage estimate. Warfighters at all levels should apply scrutiny to those calling themselves targeteers. A true targeteer should ideally have attended JTS (or the Air Force equivalent), have a proven operational targeting record, and demonstrate proficiency in joint/Service targeting systems/software applications and weaponeering fundamentals. Targeting cell leaders should also have completed joint professional military education and be able leaders and managers of large organizations under real world crisis operational temps. The art and science of targeting revolves around mastery of highly specialized areas, such as the law of armed conflict, weapons physics/delivery parameters and fusing, statistics, target development/nodal analysis, all-source intelligence fusion, and geodesy. Of note, an especially dire shortage of qualified battle damage assessment (BDA) analysts exists; BDA efforts are often doomed to failure, and few targeteers seek to specialize in it. Finally, a weaponeer is not a targeteer, whereas tar-
geteers typically master the fundamentals of weaponeering. True targeteers are rare, high-demand, low-density assets. Many operators are surprised at the expansive targeteer training and qualifications; it truly is, and should remain, a career specialty.

**Overreliance on Technology**

Quantum leap technological advances have vastly improved the fidelity and rapidity of target prosecution. Compressed timelines associated with fleeting high-value targets, however, drastically reduce the ability to make objective assessments of all data for informed recommendations to commanders. A pilot, for example, identifies an antiaircraft artillery piece via a targeting pod and seeks permission to drop immediately, deeming the piece a threat to friendly aircraft. Current electro-optical/infrared targeting pods allow aircrew to discern potential targets not identifiable only a few years ago; headquarters can even receive still images of the “threat.” Suddenly, the commander himself is virtually on the trigger, more empowered to grant prompt weapons release.

What is sometimes missing, however, is the targeteer, who can pinpoint target location, give a confidence level to target identification, and provide situational context (that is, assess threat, collateral damage estimate, military advantage, and probability of destruction based on weapon/delivery platform). If an antiaircraft artillery piece was within a civilian neighborhood and the only weapon available was a 2,000-pound JDAM, or if target data came from a pilot who is unfamiliar with the terrain and threat from a single pass at 20,000 feet at 500 knots, what might the consequences be? Visual data, no matter how obtained, is still “single source” information. A sufficiently informed commander might deem the threat not so dire that munitions should be employed without due diligence. Herein lies the critical value-added input of the targeteer.

Other advances in targeting command control, such as the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System8 and secure voice over Internet protocol telephony, vastly enhance connectivity and awareness among joint headquarters and the interagency community, but more knowledge available to more people does not necessarily translate into more informed decisionmaking. Targeting technology absent the targeteer is inherently dangerous when considering the potential consequences of a bad drop.

**Poor Operations-Intelligence Integration**

Joint planners cannot effectively perform the intelligence/targeting cycle steps when operations centers fail to integrate targeteers. While targeteers are sometimes guilty of stovepiped analysis behind the “green door,” operators also occasionally exclude targeteers from planning/decision circles and risk uninformed decisions. A recurring real world example is the “broken” combat assessment phase of campaign targeting, when coherent BDA becomes impossible because the next weapon release typically receives the weight of intelligence and operational effort, not the last one(s). While the warrior ethos clearly has a place in combat units, ignoring targeting recommendations because of a lack of understanding or respect for the importance of this often inglorious, detailed targeting “nug-work” can chance collateral damage, fratricide, or even mission failure. Dropping a weapon is tactical; targeting is not.

Warfighters obviously direct targeting/fires cells, but few can actually claim themselves to be qualified targeteers. Many have pulled the trigger or released countless weapons in combat, but few seem to appreciate the nuances and rigor of a targeting cycle properly applied at all levels of warfare. Targeting truly has esoteric aspects typically absent from most general and flag officer career paths or specialties. Take, for example, aim point mensuration: few warfighters fully understood the fact that JTAC-derived coordinates may work effectively in Iraq but would put weapons far off target at elevation in Afghanistan.

When nontargeteers advise general and flag officers on targeting, a recipe for operational miscalculation exists. Sadly, it is rare to witness staff challenging flawed general/flag officer targeting assumptions or related operational decisions. Careerism and either intimidation from, or loyalty to, seniors should not be the guiding force behind operational targeting and fires: neither noble intent nor “asking forgiveness vice permission” represents targeting due diligence. The best targeteers are sometimes those willing to disagree ardentely with the boss. Neither rank nor combat experience inherently conveys a complete understanding of targeting. Hubris is a dangerous alternative to sound targeting.

**Poor Interagency Cooperation**

Notwithstanding the post-9/11 national mandate for better collaboration and cooperation, stovepipes and enmities persist between DOD and the interagency community. Even the accidental 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade has not served to institute procedures to prevent strategically significant targeting errors. Currently, interagency coordination is occurring most optimally at the operational level via Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs)9 and tactically at deployed task forces (JIATFs). Yet these entities have proven transitory, with a relatively narrow mission focus; the larger targeting/fires communities have not adopted effective JIACG/JIATF joint TTPs. Furthermore, the alphabet soup of targeting-related agencies serves different masters and suffers from the typical bureaucratic ills that limit collaboration.10 Multiple, disparate interagency/DOD targeting cells have different roles, missions, and levels of operational expertise. Repeat postconflict lessons learned since Operation Desert Storm continue to highlight this obstacle.

Unfortunately, because of the preceding factors, what typically happens with the standup of a new JTF staff (and even standing task force staff rotations) is that well-intentioned initiatives drive targeting/fires cell TTPs, not institutional expertise. Wasted resources and redundant efforts to reinvent targeting with operational ad hocery are the result.11 In fairness, warriors run targeting/fires cells, and they answer to other warriors with stars. Task force staffs, however, typically do not have a core of fully qualified targeteers/joint fires personnel and recurring headquarters/unit rotations simply overextend the small joint targeteer cadre. The ad hoc approach might also involve adopting conventional targeting and fires doctrine/TTPs (that is, those needed during the combat phase of operations) at a point in the conflict when it is neither effective nor appropriate. (Phase IV operations in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are good examples.)
From this discussion, several recommendations are obvious; a few have been reflected in some fashion in every lessons learned assessment since Operation Desert Storm. Naval, joint, and policy decisionmakers should consider them in the post-9/11 strategic environment:

- Combine all Service targeting/fires courses at JTS under U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).
- Establish a rigorous qualification process with Joint Staff oversight for all joint targeting/fires cadre; adopt USCENTCOM best practices as the model and mandate targeting personnel qualification standards across all combatant commands and Services.
- Organizationally, keep targeting cells intact under larger EB umbrella staffs.
- Establish or maintain existing Service targeting and fires career specialties, with requisite promotion potential to O-6/E-9; vouchsafe the targeting specialty.
- Establish an executive targeting/fires curriculum taught in the Capstone course, with a focus on real-world targeting errors and consequences.
- Combine relevant joint and Service doctrine into a “Targeting Bible,” with sections applicable to each level of warfare and sufficient attention to BDA.
- Establish a National Targeting and Fires Center under Joint Staff auspices to consolidate and enforce targeting/fires joint TTPs, with authoritative representation from the joint operations, intelligence, legal, and interagency communities—with targeting standards enforcement authority.
- Consolidate the best aspects of Service legacy targeting systems into a single targeting systems package, such as the Joint Targeting Toolbox, with Joint Staff authority to enforce inter-Service standardization.
- Establish and monitor predeployment joint targeting measures of effectiveness under USJFCOM.
- Establish Joint Staff oversight of a career joint combat assessment specially designation and mandatory Service quotas. Naturally, strategic success entails achievement of clearly articulated political-military objectives and operational success accomplished at an acceptable cost, while maintaining the integrity of Western humanitarian and warfare principles. Efficient and effective joint targeting supports strategic success, which is achievable with the requisite emphasis. As weapons system capabilities increase exponentially, decisionmakers would do well to ensure that joint targeting cadre, systems, and joint TTPs are established and sustained. The art and science of targeting as a discipline has four key goals: hitting the right target for the right reason, at the right time and place, and with the right weapon. This implicitly brings human intellectual judgment into the equation, a critical element within the contemporary DOD “cognitive transformation” effort.

Targeteers fundamentally appreciate that ordnance and hardware alone will not win wars—that “weapons on target” is not an end in itself. DOD must address the obstacles above to create the conditions in which joint targeting efficiency and effectiveness can become integral to the American way of war. America could wield its military supremacy for naught absent coherent, enlightened strategy; weapons brandished by uninformed commanders are better left in the armory. JFQ

4 Headquarters USMC, “Concepts and Programs 2005, Chapter 4: Current Operations and Lessons Learned,” 222. See also Chuck Harrison, “How Joint Are We and Can We Be Better?” Joint

NOTES

5 That is, generated aim point coordinates that are sufficiently accurate for weapons guided by global positioning systems.
6 U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is championing the development of a standing joint force contingency headquarters, but the extent of targeting/fires systems capability and personnel expertise is limited.
9 Automated Deep Operations Coordination System is a joint mission management software application with tools and interfaces for horizontal and vertical integration across battlespace functional areas, such as joint time-sensitive targeting. See <www.gdc4s.com/content/detail.cfm?item=34425bd6-6226-4f5a-991c-ccc9f4c12d9>.
11 For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Director of Central Intelligence, J2T, Joint Technical Coordinating Group—Munitions Effectiveness, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Joint Warfare Analysis Center, among others.
14 The recent USJFCOM establishment of the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team is a step in the right direction, but neither incorporates all aspects of targeting nor possesses enforced powers.
Iraq and the AC–130
Gunships Unleashed

By R O B E R T J . S E I F E R T

Slayer 74, an AC–130U side-firing gunship, was en route to Fallujah, Iraq, on October 5, 2003, to work with a joint terminal air controller (JTAC) from the 82d Airborne Division on a routine countermortar mission. Approximately 5 minutes from Fallujah, the pilot, equipped with night-vision goggles, noticed surface-to-surface fire through the small window by his left foot. He immediately rolled into a 20-degree left bank and talked his infrared and all low light level television (TV) sensor operators onto the tracers. In less than 30 seconds, they had identified stationary U.S. military vehicles and several suspicious individuals fleeing the area.

Already in contact with the JTAC for the upcoming mission, the gunship navigator notified him of the likely insurgent attack, the precise coordinates of the attack, and the fact that the gunship was tracking the fleeing individuals in an unpopulated area. Within 2 minutes, an attack was confirmed on friendly forces at the location passed by the gunship, and Slayer was cleared to engage the enemy force. Only seconds away from being hit with a 105-millimeter (mm) warhead, the fleeing insurgents joined several personnel and their vehicle, prompting a request for further guidance from the JTAC. The JTAC Army commander said to hold fire and to track the car while he assembled both a helicopter and ground quick-reaction force. Wanting maximum time on station for the compound assaults, the gunship departed for aerial refueling, leaving the A–10s and OH–58s on scene. Returning in less than 30 minutes from the KC–135 and now with 4 hours of playtime, Slayer provided armed escort to the two quick-reaction forces and covered the armed assault of the four insurgent houses over the next 3 hours. Those assaults resulted in 15 insurgents captured, 4 anticoalition houses identified and exploited, and 12 rocket-propelled grenades and AK–47s recovered from the suspicious box that Slayer witnessed the insurgents burying. The infrared operator actually walked the troopers to the location of the box and told them where to start digging.

Although a relatively minor setback to the insurgent cause in Iraq, this defeat at the hands of the AC–130 was undoubtedly devastating in the psychological effect of an apparently all-knowing American force able to strike with speed, precision, and minimum force. More importantly, it provoked the AC–130 pilot, the present author, to begin questioning what Carl von Clausewitz would likely call the “routine methods” of gunship employment at the highest level.

The purpose of this paper is to save American lives and improve the chances of a successful outcome in Iraq. Costly and demoralizing attacks continue unabated against coalition and Iraqi ground forces. Working hard to support these forces are AC–130 gunships and crews. They fly every night in Iraq but rarely identify a single insurgent due to the inefficient manner in which they are requested by the Army and employed by the Air Force. This article shows how a simple yet fundamental change in AC–130 employment can kill or capture more insurgents, save friendly lives, and improve prospects for coalition success.

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defeat at the hands of the AC–130 was undoubtedly devastating in the psychological effect of an apparently all-knowing American force able to strike with speed, precision, and minimum force

Present Employment

Close air support is the present mission of the AC–130 in Iraq. Night after night, at least one AC–130 launches to fulfill one or more air support requests (ASRs). The ASRs are prioritized and approved by the Joint Special Operations Air Component, which is the air component of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component commander who exercises operational control of the AC–130. The organizations supported are often individual Special Operations Forces (SOF) units with the remainder of AC–130 support going to conventional Army, Marine, and coalition regiments and brigades. The SOF teams usually have a defined operation for the AC–130 to support, and the conventional units usually have the AC–130 searching for insurgents in its individual brigade or regiment area of operations. A typical mission has the AC–130 supporting a single brigade’s ASRs followed by aerial refueling and another 2 hours with another brigade or SOF team. While well intentioned, this method of employment does not fully exploit the great potential of the AC–130 to hunt and kill insurgents, nor does it benefit from lessons learned in aerial conflict over the past 60 years.

Field Manual 100–20. In North Africa, in the early months of World War II, ground commanders insisted on dedicated defensive umbrellas, which Airmen derisively labeled as “penny packets.” This misuse of offensive-minded Airmen and their aircraft was partially responsible for the significant Allied losses at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in 1943 and contributed to the publication of War Department Field Manual (FM) 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power. Signed into doctrine by General of the Army George C. Marshall, it has been called the most striking policy statement in Air Force history. Besides stating that ground and air forces were coequal, this doctrinal watershed demanded the centralized command of air forces, which has been accepted by ground and air forces after years of vigorous debate.

Today’s AC–130 defensive umbrella of individual ground units resembles the penny packets of the North African desert. Present gunship employment methods require individual ground units to submit an ASR that details the time, location, and reason for the requested support. If approved, the gunship shows up on time for the appointed duration. It is a convenient way to employ the gunship, but a comparison of the highly effective sortie at the beginning of this article and the ineffective sortie synopsis that follows should help to explain the need for a review of present gunship employment.

Tasked to Al Hayy. Ten months after finding and helping to capture the 15 insurgents and their weapons cache while en route to their assigned mission, a subsequent sortie sent the author to support a ground unit in Al Hayy for approximately 5 hours, with an aerial refueling in the middle. The second uprising of the Mahdi militia was in full swing in southern Iraq, and the crew was optimistic that an opportunity to engage insurgents would present itself. Unfortunately, 15 minutes after arrival on station, it was obvious to the crew that the chance of engaging insurgents in Al Hayy was slim to none. The two visual sensors and pilots (equipped with night-vision goggles) had searched the town for activity, located the friendly positions, and received a situation report from the JTAC that revealed an absence of observed insurgent activity and no plans for friendly offensive operations. With no option but to stay and wait for the scheduled tanker rendezvous time, the infrared and TV sensor operators repeatedly searched the town for anything remotely interesting that could be passed from the navigator to the local tactical air controller.

The trip to the tanker and the subsequent aerial refueling were uneventful until the return leg to Al Hayy, which happened to pass just north of the city of Najaf. Najaf was the location and inspiration of the August uprising but was without a gunship due to either a failure to submit a support request or a determination that the Najaf ground force commander’s need was not as compelling as those units in Al Hayy and Fallujah. Be that as it may, the crew swung into action when the copilot spotted significant surface-to-surface fire in the city, which surely indicated that the Marines in Najaf were under attack.

Having worked with the Marines there previously, it took less than a minute to get their JTAC on the radio and inform him of the gunship crew’s situational awareness and nearby location. The JTAC confirmed that he had troops in contact and asked for immediate
issue tethered to a single ground unit and waiting to fire at what they thought was a fire-breath the first gunships that they were ordered not in South Vietnam, “Spooky” had defended Squadron. Within the first year of operation Vietnam War and before the AC–130 was technique for Iraq's gunships. Early in the Past Employments of the most violent months of the insurgency. five sorties, even though August 2004 was one not engage a single insurgent on any of the “supporting” quiescent ASRs. The crew did tanks. Adding to the frustration was the fact home and landed with 3 hours of fuel in the activity at Al Hayy, the gunship was ordered to the same JTAC clearing medical evacuation its current mission. The author kept the fre town of Al Hayy to complete its assigned mission. The gunship assigned to Fallujah, 30 minutes away, would be diverted to support the Marines as it was almost complete with its current mission. The author kept the frequency open with the Marines, hoping for a change in tasking, but the last call heard was the same JTAC clearing medical evacuation helicopters into his airspace to pick up the very Marines that the pilot and copilot had witnessed being attacked. Due to the continued lack of insurgent activity at Al Hayy, the gunship was ordered home and landed with 3 hours of fuel in the tanks. Adding to the frustration was the fact that this sortie was the fourth night in a row “supporting” quiescent ASRs. The crew did not engage a single insurgent on any of the five sorties, even though August 2004 was one of the most violent months of the insurgency. Past Employments Gunships on Call. History supports the consideration of a different employment technique for Iraq’s gunships. Early in the Vietnam War and before the AC–130 was born, the AC–47 gunship arrived in-theater with what was then the 4th Air Commando Squadron. Within the first year of operation in South Vietnam, “Spooky” had defended 500 outposts and in a single 90-day period claimed to have broken up 166 enemy night attacks. Allegedly, the enemy was so afraid of the first gunships that they were ordered not to fire at what they thought was a fire-breathing beast that might become even angrier. The gunships in 1966 did not accomplish this feat or earn this reputation by being tethered to a single ground unit and waiting for it to be attacked, but rather by being on call for whichever outpost needed them most. Every outpost was in contact with higher headquarters, and as soon as an outpost was attacked, an AC–47 was diverted to its position. To guarantee a particular outpost was never attacked would have required a dedicated gunship all night, but necessity detailed it to a centralized location, on call for any unit experiencing an insurgent attack (an employment more in line with the intent of FM 100–20). Lieutenant General Julian Ewell, USA, commander of II Field Force, Vietnam, between April 1969 and April 1970, stressed the morale effects that the gunships had for an infantryman: “It gave him a lot of assurance and security to know that if he got in a tight spot, a gunship would be there in fifteen or twenty minutes and start hosing off the countryside.” General Ewell did not say that the gunship was reassuring overhead, but rather that it was reassuring knowing that it could be there in “15 or 20 minutes” if needed. The infantryman in Iraq does not have the same assurance because the AC–130 is trammeled to a single ground unit for a prescribed period that is usually determined the day prior—a fundamental violation of the doctrine of centralized control. The Ho Chi Minh Trail. As the Vietnam War progressed and the unique and effective abilities of the gunship became apparent, the Air Force created the more capable AC–130 gunship and began to use it in the interdiction role. AC–130s were specifically used to roam the Ho Chi Minh Trail hunting for trucks under the thick jungle canopy that were carrying supplies needed by the guerrillas in the South. To show the effectiveness of the AC–130 compared to conventional attack aircraft, one only has to look at the number of truck kills per sortie. Trucks moved most easily in the winter months, and in the winter of 1971–1972, AC–130s killed or damaged 8.3 trucks per sortie compared to fighter-bombers, which averaged 0.29 trucks killed or damaged per sortie. Allegedly, North Vietnamese truck drivers were actually handcuffed to their vehicles to keep them from abandoning their trucks at the first sign of an AC–130. So what does killing trucks in the jungles of Vietnam have to do with killing insurgents in Iraq? Both trucks and insurgents are fleeting and difficult-to-kill targets, yet the earliest version of the AC–130 excelled at killing trucks and their drivers. It did so in a disproportionate manner to any other asset and could do the same against the insurgents in Iraq. The AC–130s that killed over 10,000 trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail were not tied to one Army unit but rather were tasked to kill trucks. Task the present-day and much improved AC–130 to hunt insurgents rather than provide 2-hour blocks of individual unit overwatch, and one can expect the same awe-inspiring results as the Vietnam-era gunships. General Henry “Hap” Arnold’s words are as relevant to the gunships over Iraq as they were to the B–17s, P–47s, and P–51s of World War II: “Offense is the essence of airpower.” Time-sensitive Targeting of Insurgents. There are more recent examples of AC–130s being used flexibly versus the present inefficient overwatch of individual ground units for prescribed periods. The Air Force realized its lack of success in preventing Scud attacks on Israeli population centers in the first Gulf War and created a combined air and ground force to neutralize the Scud threat in the second Gulf War. Both air and ground forces had assigned areas to search and were ready to execute highly refined and practiced procedures designed to kill Scuds quickly, along with their support equipment and personnel. All air and ground assets were focused on preventing Scud launches, and there was a prioritized list of targets, with a raised Scud (that is, ready to launch) at the top of the list. Whether detected by ground, air, or space platforms, the nearest attack aircraft was immediately pushed by command and control from its assigned search area to destroy the target. The Air Force conducted three exercises at Nellis Air Force Base before the war to practice these procedures and helped ensure zero Scud attacks on Israel. The Sunni Triangle is
much smaller than the western Iraqi desert, and the continuing attacks and loss of lives in Iraq are having a strategic impact. Taking a similar plan and a comparable focus in stopping insurgent attacks is definitely a course of action long overdue.

**Proposed Employment**

**Gunships on Call Again.**

Today’s AC–130 is far more effective than the AC–47s of yesteryear. Able to hunt, cover the critical minutes of offensive operations, and simultaneously be on call, only two gunships would be required each night in the Sunni Triangle. Helping to find the insurgents are the JTACs, who should be in close contact with every one of their ground units and in constant contact with either the gunship or the Air Support Operations Center. At a minimum, the AC–130 checks in with each brigade JTAC on the AC–130 frequency as it sequentially passes through each brigade’s area of operations during the course of an evening. It passes on any interesting information and requests the latest intelligence. With the range of the gunship radio, the aircraft is in continuous contact with several brigades at once. This allows near-immediate targeting of insurgents as they make contact with coalition forces. This nightly patrol and single frequency also allow both SOF and conventional units to count on gunship coverage for time-sensitive raids requiring immediate execution. Present employment methods require several hours notice to guarantee gunship coverage of a SOF or conventional raid.

For those units out of gunship radio range, the ASOC would take their insurgent “point-outs” as they can now, but under the author’s plan, they would always pass them to the gunship on either the dedicated gunship or a dedicated long-range frequency. JTACs would clear by the JTAC and his ground force commander. It can do this because of its precise fire, low-yield munitions and ability to communicate and confer simultaneously with every level of theater Army, Air Force, Marine, and SOF command and control.

While immediate fire on the insurgents is often preferred, certain situations will require further analysis and preparation. The AC–130, with 4 hours of loiter time and the ability to refuel in air, can wait for a ground or heliborne quick-reaction force to be mustered to assist with the situation. These forces should be ready to move immediately, knowing the well-practiced ability of the AC–130 to vector small ground units to the target area quickly and safely. Once on scene, the quick-reaction force uses the situational awareness and precise firepower of the gunship to help assess the situation and neutralize the enemy, if required.

**Out of Our OODA Loop**

Presently, the insurgents are deep in our OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act)—that is, our decision cycle—which helps to explain our lack of success in defeating them. Their civilian dress allows them to observe us at will and orient themselves to ensure maximum chance of success. They decide to attack when coalition forces are most vulnerable and usually depart before any coalition advantage in firepower or personnel can be brought to bear. Thus, it is just as the insurgent OODA loop is complete that coalition forces begin to run their loop: “Did anyone observe where that fire came from? Will there be more? Should we orient ourselves offensively or defensively? Do we decide to stay or run? Do we request an Army quick-reaction force or Air Force close air support, or can we attack the enemy ourselves?” Again, this all occurs after the insurgent OODA loop is complete, and their goal of yet another brazen attack on coalition forces has been met.

The proposed tactics would change the coalition OODA loop in the following manner: We have observed the enemy and know he often strikes anywhere in the Triangle—and the attack will be quick. Let us orient two
Gunships Unleashed

**Center of Gravity**

Strategists yearn for a center of gravity to attack in order to crush the insurgency, and many claim there is none. They fail to see that the center of gravity is the individual insurgent and the location of his attack. For it is at that location alone, and only for a brief time, that the insurgent we struggle to define is an irrefutable enemy and a definable target. Strategists and tacticians both must look at each insurgent attack in the same light as our grandfathers looked at Germany’s war industry. Unlike during World War II, there are only minutes to plan and strike, requiring that a plan already be in place. Focus the same effort in striking this fleeting center of gravity as was used on the centers of gravity in World War II and coalition results are sure to improve.

When discussing centers of gravity in an insurgency, the civilian population is rightly considered one as well. Unlike other centers, though, it must be struck with legitimacy. The AC–130 tasked to strike insurgents in the act with individual 40mm rounds does a much better job of this than some of the present tactics that often hurt more than help the coalition cause.

**Implementation**

The Air Force, and specifically the AC–130, is working hard in Iraq but has yet to reach its full potential in helping to defeat the insurgency. Whether we measure insurgents killed per sortie flown or jet fuel burned, the Air Force will run out of sorties and fuel before Iraq runs out of insurgents, if present tactics are continued. A simple yet fundamental change in AC–130 tactics is needed and could start immediately with zero increase in aircraft and personnel. The change required can be easily explained by highlighting what the ground and air forces must do, respectively.

**Ground Forces.** The ground forces must stop demanding dedicated coverage of individual units for specified periods, except for the most unusual circumstances. Rather, they must ask for two AC–130s on patrol and on call for the night and ensure that every brigade JTAC is on frequency with the forces under him. JTACs must also pass updated enemy activity and anticipated friendly operations to allow the gunship crews to optimize their routing in order to be overhead as much as possible. When attacked by insurgents, ground forces should continue to react as they have been trained, but with one small exception: Troops in contact must report the insurgent activity whether they believe they can handle the situation or not. Finally, ground forces must have a standing helicopter and ground quick-reaction force ready to respond to situations where the culpability of insurgents is in doubt and where collateral damage is a concern.

**Air Forces.** The Air Force must focus on finding and neutralizing insurgents in conjunction with the ground forces. Committing two AC–130s and available fighters and unmanned aerial systems to hunt for insurgents each night on a scheduled gunship frequency ensures that the majority of invaluable and limited AC–130 time is spent hunting, checking in with JTACs, and killing and capturing insurgents. Presently, gunships spend the majority of their time in transit to the Triangle and flying over a relatively small number of individual units for periods much longer than required or effective. As AC–130 crews and aircraft are limited, the Air Force must ensure that each crew has a maximum 12-hour crew day, which allows it to fly every other night and show at the same time each afternoon. This type of schedule ensures that well-rested crews are not forced to exceed their monthly flying hours limit, as they routinely do now.

**Infrastructure, Command, and Control.** The infrastructure already exists for those units out of touch with the AC–130 but wanting to point out insurgents. The ASOC is in place and already tasked to support ground forces needing help from air forces. The only difference would be how much more often the ground forces call and how rapidly the air forces respond. Command and control is also already in place, and personnel at some locations could be reduced by eliminating the prioritization of preplanned and immediate ASRs every night. Unlike the present system, the proposed command and control plan is simple, flexible, and fast reacting. The aircraft commander and crew determine their effectiveness at each target location and decide how long to stay by comparing the effectiveness of what they are presently doing versus hunting for insurgents, maneuvering friendly ground forces overhead, or responding to an insurgent point out from the ASOC or individual JTACs.

The final justification for implementation of this AC–130 plan is that it could start tomorrow. ASRs could provide the callsign and location of every brigade and regimental JTAC and would include their list of likely insurgent locations and offensive operations for the evening. All ASRs would be supported with the amount of time and effort determined by present enemy activity and offensive operations in progress versus yesterday’s enemy activity and anticipated operations. All JTACs would be on a single frequency, and as the gunship checks in with each,

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*AC-47 flies mission over South Vietnam*
the crew could emphasize the importance of immediate notification of any insurgent activity and the readiness of their unit’s quick-reaction force to respond.

Finally, we should challenge aircrews to find as much insurgent activity as possible and strive to set a record for how many and how often each JTAC can be contacted in a single sortie. The lethality of the process is easily measured and improved first by measuring how fast the gunship gets word of insurgent activity and second by how fast it arrives on scene. Finally, we should measure AC–130 success by insurgents killed and captured rather than ASRs supported, and we should not stop improving the process until the last American warfighter leaves a free and stable Iraq. JFQ

NOTES

1 The author flew all AC–130U sorties referenced in this article.
3 The author flew his first Iraq AC–130 combat mission on March 21, 2003, and his final one on August 30, 2004. He has approximately 45 combat sorties in support of ground forces in Iraq. Much of the background information in this article comes from personal experience in 7 years of flying AC–130s and from conversations with other crew members returning from the Iraqi theater. Because the war in Iraq is ongoing, it must be realized that AC–130 tactics, techniques, and procedures there are evolving, and some information in this article might be outdated.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
10 The author participated in one of the exercises at Nellis Air Force Base in January 2004 and flew several AC–130 combat missions searching for Scuds in western Iraq in the first weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Adaptive Planning

By ROBERT M. KLEIN

On December 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved the Adaptive Planning (AP) Roadmap and directed its “expeditious implementation.” This act represented a significant shift in the way the Department of Defense (DOD) thinks about military planning. The impetus for change was a recognition that the accelerating pace and complexity of military operations require that the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders have the ability to respond quickly to new threats and challenges.

Adaptive Planning is the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. It occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires the regular involvement of senior leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options that can be adapted to defeat or deter an adversary to achieve national objectives. At full maturity, AP will form the backbone of a joint adaptive system supporting the development and execution of plans, preserving the best characteristics of present-day contingency and crisis planning with a common process.

The need to overhaul the DOD planning and execution system becomes more evident when it is viewed against the backdrop of history. Planning today is a late 19th-century concept born out of the German general staff system. It thus seems fitting that a discussion about transforming the planning process begins with the history of the Schlieffen Plan.

A Fatal Assumption

From a strategic and military perspective, the Schlieffen Plan represented an imaginative solution to Germany’s strategic challenge of being sandwiched between a vengeful France and a hostile Russia. Moreover, it offered the real prospect of using strategic maneuver to overcome technological advances in firepower and the lethality of warfare between 1870 and 1914. Named for its author, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, the plan called for rapid mobilization and the swift defeat of France with a holding action against Russia.

But the plan’s key assumption, that Germany could mobilize before France or Russia, proved its fatal flaw. Mobilization was tied to such precise timetables that once the trains began to roll, any attempt to stop them would cause mass disruption—a potentially lethal decision if the corresponding enemy troop trains continued to the frontiers.

Contingent on Germany’s ability to mobilize quickly, the plan backed political decisionmakers into a corner by limiting options and time to negotiate. Moreover, the event of either French or Russian mobilization was tantamount to a German declaration of war on both nations. The Schlieffen Plan and equivalent schemes of the other great powers comprised a classic example of game theory,

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Not Your Great Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan

BG Mark T. Kimmitt, USA, chief military spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, and Dan Senor, Coalition Information Center director, brief press on handover of responsibilities to the Iraqi government.
The outbreak of war in 1914 is the most tragic example of government’s helpless
insistence that they be alone), General Franks
Command. In a private session (Rumsfeld
Tommy Franks, commander, U.S. Central
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
more evident than in the events leading up to
required more options. This reality was never
the demands of political decisionmakers who
nal assumptions and largely unresponsive to
time-consuming process, bound by the origi
contingency planning remained a flawed,
improvements (in areas such as mobilization
1910s. Despite these and other institutional
and transportation planning), modern plan
ners failed to address the dilemmas that had
plagued all contingency plans since the incep
of the Schlieffen Plan. Most critically,
contingency planning remained a flawed,
time-consuming process, bound by the origi
ual assumptions and largely unresponsive to
the demands of political decisionmakers who
required more options. This reality was never
more evident than in the events leading up to
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

On November 26, 2001, Secretary
Rumsfeld flew to Tampa to see General
Tommy Franks, commander, U.S. Central
Command. In a private session (Rumsfeld
insisted that they be alone), General Franks
on December 4, Rumsfeld
demanded alternatives and out-of-the-box
thinking. How would the plan be executed
on short notice versus an extended timeline?
What was the shortest period required to
deliver enough forces to accomplish the
mission? What if the President was willing
to accept more risk? Despite obvious flaws,
OPLAN 1003 was the only one on the shelf if
the President decided to go to war with Iraq
immediately. A complete rewrite of a contin
gency plan would take months.²

The Mandate

from the months-long planning prior
to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it became evident
that a complete overhaul would be required to
transform the DOD industrial age planning
military option that bound
political decisionmaking in time-constrained
situations.

This setting was disturbingly similar
to what happened with the Schlieffen Plan in
1914 (see figures 1 and 2). Clearly, contingency
plans needed to incorporate more and better
options and sufficient branches and sequels
that readily lent themselves to rapid and
regular updating to support crisis planning
and execution.³

Compounding the problem, joint plan
ning has been largely sequential, requiring
iterative collocation of planners from senior
and subordinate organizations. Because
authoritative data have been compartmented
and are not readily accessible for planning, course of action development remains a prolonged process, necessitating requirements identification and feasibility analyses (operational, logistic, and transportation) late in the planning process, causing time-consuming adjustments and extending development timelines even further.

Also, interagency involvement generally occurs late in plan development. Operation Plans Annex V, which addresses interagency coordination, is typically written after approval of the base plan. Despite advances in information technology, joint planners remained stuck in the 20th century, having few tools to enable work in parallel across echelons in a virtual environment with access to key planning data.

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy tasked the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans in August 2003 to work with the Joint Staff to create a successor to current planning processes. Specifically, he sought an approach that would considerably shorten the time it takes to produce plans and to create plans that can be adapted to a constantly changing strategic landscape. The result was Adaptive Planning.

**Adaptive Planning Vision**

The 2005 Contingency Planning Guidance directed combatant commanders to develop designated, priority contingency plans using the AP approach. Transforming contingency planning requires modernizing the way DOD thinks about and develops its processes, products, people, and technology for planning. This transformation does not entail complete elimination of current processes. Rather, it requires a mixture of new and existing capabilities. The Department of Defense must preserve the best characteristics of current processes and systems and apply them in unprecedented ways.

AP allows combatant commanders to produce plans more quickly and adaptively and of higher quality. Rapid planning and greater efficiency are achieved through combining multiple stovepiped processes into one common AP process that includes:

- clear strategic guidance and iterative dialogue
- integrated interagency and coalition planning
- embedded intelligence planning
- living plans
- parallel planning in a network-centric, collaborative environment.

The end result is that Adaptive Planning for any single strategy implies that resource requirements are dynamically allocated and risk is continuously balanced against other plans and operations.

Clear Strategic Guidance and Iterative Dialogue. AP combines the best characteristics of contingency, crisis action planning, and execution into a single integrated process. Strategic guidance is the first step in the four-stage planning process, which also includes concept development, plan development, and plan assessment. Each step includes as many in-progress reviews (IPRs) by the Secretary as necessary to complete the plan. Although these steps are generally sequential, they may overlap in the interest of accelerating the overall process.

AP speeds the procedure by providing more detailed and focused initial guidance in the DOD planning documents: contingency planning guidance, joint strategic capabilities plan, and strategic guidance statements. Strategic guidance also includes interagency guidance, intelligence assessments, and other direction from the Secretary during IPRs. At the combatant command level, planning begins with the receipt of strategic guidance and lasts through final plan approval into a continuous plan-assessment cycle. Ultimately, AP envisions streamlined strategic guidance that feeds war planning through regular updates over a network-centric, collaborative environment.

Adaptive Planning reviews represent a departure from the previous planning processes, both in frequency and form. The intent is senior leader involvement throughout the process, including periodic reviews once the plan is complete. The initial IPRs focus largely on solidifying guidance, agreeing on the framework assumptions and planning factors, establishing a common understanding of the adversary and his intentions, and producing an approved combatant commander mission statement.

Subsequent IPRs may revisit, refine, modify, or amend these outcomes as required. Additionally, they will address risks, courses of action, implementing actions, and other key factors. Timely reviews and IPRs ensure that the plan remains relevant to the situation and the Secretary’s intent as plans are rapidly modified throughout development and execution. Figure 3 illustrates how IPRs are integrated throughout the AP process.

Under AP, planning will be expedited by guidance that specifies the level of detail required for each situation. The amount of detail needed is tied to the plan’s importance and likelihood of execution. This helps combatant commanders manage planning in the near term. There are four levels of plans under AP. Level 1 requires the least detail, level 4 the most. Strategic guidance in the contingency planning guidance and the joint strategic capabilities plan will identify the level to produce. However, the Secretary may increase or decrease the level of detail required in response to changed circumstances, changes in a plan’s assumptions, or a combatant commander’s recommendation. The Secretary and the combatant commander confer during IPRs on the nature and
Detailed planning needed, including branches and options to be developed.

**Integrated Interagency and Coalition Planning.** The past decade of complex operations, from Somalia to Iraq, has demonstrated that strategic success requires unity of effort not only from the military but also from the U.S. Government and coalition partners. Time and again, the United States and its partners have come short of fully integrating the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other dimensions of power into a coherent strategy. One factor that has contributed to this poor performance is lack of a unified approach to planning. AP recognizes that interagency and coalition considerations are intrinsic rather than optional and need to be integrated early in the process rather than as an afterthought once the military plan is complete.

To this end, the combatant commander may seek approval and guidance from the Secretary to conduct interagency and coalition planning and coordination. The goal is to ensure that interagency and coalition capabilities, objectives, and endstates are considered up front in the process. This holistic approach to planning ensures that the correct national or coalition instruments are employed to match the desired ends. As part of the planning process, and with approval of the Secretary, the combatant commander may present his plan's Annex V (Interagency Coordination) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff Annex V Working Group for transmittal to the National Security Council for managed interagency staffing and plan development. In advance of authorization for formal transmittal of Annex V, the commander may request interagency consultation on approved Annex V elements by the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff Working Group. Concurrently, the combatant commander may present his plan for multinational involvement.

**Integrated Intelligence Planning.** Intelligence campaign planning provides a methodology for synchronizing, integrating, and managing all available combatant command and national intelligence capabilities with combatant command planning and operations. Throughout the planning process, the combatant command J2, in coordination with the Joint Staff J2 and U.S. Strategic Command, will continue leading DOD through the intelligence campaign planning process, which develops the intelligence tasks required to achieve the combatant commander's desired effects of the operational objectives. Additionally, the process will focus on developing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strategy and synchronize the requisite intelligence support. Because the intelligence campaign plan is directly linked to contingency planning, changes in the global strategic environment continually feed plan development and assessment.

**Embedded Options.** AP features an increased number of options, as well as branches and sequels (along with associated decision points and decision criteria), in order to provide the President, Secretary, and combatant commanders with increased execution flexibility that anticipates and rapidly adapts. Such embedded options make plans more dynamic.

The term *embedded options* conveys the idea that branches and sequels, in at least outline fashion, are identified and developed as an integral part of the base plan courses of action. Branches and sequels traditionally have been developed toward the end of the process, often after the base plan is completed. Under AP, embedded branches and sequels will form an integral part of base plan design and development. As AP matures, technology will enable combatant command planners to develop an extensive menu of such branches and options rapidly, well beyond what has previously been practicable. Base plans may eventually become a "menu of options" to execute based on exigent circumstances.

**Living Plans.** What distinguishes current planning from AP is that the latter does not allow ideas to sit on the shelf. The final step, plan assessment, represents a "living" environment in which plans are refined, adapted, terminated, or executed (referred to as RATE-ing a plan). At full maturity, AP will produce network-centric living plans. A living plan is maintained within a collaborative, virtual environment and is updated routinely to reflect changes in intelligence assessments, readiness, Global Force Management, transportation availability, guidance, assumptions, and the strategic environment. Both automatic and manually evaluated triggers linked to real-time sources will alert leaders and planners to changes in critical conditions that warrant a reevaluation of a plan’s relevancy, feasibility, and risk. Top-priority plans and ideas designated in the contingency planning guidance require review at least every 6 months. As a result, living plans provide a solid foundation for transition to crisis planning. Additionally, military and political leaders are better able to gauge and mitigate risk across multiple plans and better comprehend the collateral impacts of execution and changed circumstances.

**Parallel Planning in a Network-Centric, Collaborative Environment.** The development of a network-centric information architecture provides an opportunity to modernize the contingency planning process. Plans, planning tools, and pertinent databases will be linked in a network-centric environment, whose architecture will enable collaboration among widely separated planners at all command echelons, promoting a better grasp of the operational environment and more effective parallel planning. Authoritative internal and external databases will be linked to promote the timely exchange of information based on appropriate access rules. New planning tools will be developed to allow this.

Adaptive Planning for any single plan implies a mission-based readiness system and dynamic force management and logistic systems integrated by a common suite of automated planning tools. This requires that the defense readiness and Global Force Management processes operate across multiple plans and operations to allocate resources and balance risk.

Both identifying and sourcing requirements are necessary to determine force, transportation, and logistic feasibility. Approved courses of action must often be adapted to render them feasible, causing delays in the process. Automated collaborative tools will allow planners to develop these options, determine their feasibility, and incorporate them into the concept of the operation, rather than developing them after the base plan and select annexes are completed. Analysis includes wargaming, operational modeling, and initial feasibility assessments. Joint wargaming tools will allow planners to visualize the plan to analyze the operational feasibility, risk, and sustainability of courses of action. In AP, feasibility analysis occurs much earlier in the process than previously possible. The capabilities to conduct detailed assessments
in a matter of days rather than months are a significant leap forward.

By leveraging emerging technologies and developing initiatives, DOD can create an integrated planning architecture in which data is shared seamlessly among users, applications, and platforms. At present, the combatant commands and Services use a variety of tools for planning that have near-term utility in supporting AP. Tools that could be rapidly developed and acquired constitute an area of special interest. The result will be a compressed decisionmaking cycle with an enhanced understanding of how decisions affect campaigns.

As part of spiral development, combatant commands are currently using the AP process to build several of the Nation’s highest priority war plans. Nevertheless, at full maturity, Adaptive Planning envisions transparency between contingency and crisis action planning enabled by integrating readiness with Global Force Management processes that dynamically allocate resources and balance risks across multiple plans and operations. The implementation of Adaptive Planning requires spiral development through three stages: initiation, implementation, and integration. This approach will enable the Department of Defense to begin Adaptive Planning immediately for selected priority plans, learn from that, and evolve to a mature process. Requirements for every successive stage—each providing planners with a more sophisticated capability—will depend on stakeholder feedback and technology maturation.

For a relatively modest investment, Adaptive Planning may have a significant strategic impact, creating situations in which the President, Secretary of Defense, and other senior leaders play a central role by selecting from multiple, viable options adaptable to a variety of circumstances. Gone are the days of outdated, single option, off-the-shelf plans of the Schlieffen and OPLAN 1003 variety. As the fluid strategic situation unfolds, emplaced triggers will alert planners to the need for modifications or revisions to keep plans relevant based on further strategic guidance, continuous intelligence assessment of threat assumptions, rapid force/logistic management processes, and mission-based readiness systems. The confluence of these capabilities represents a quantum leap that will finally allow the planning community to break the bounds of the Schlieffen Plan and enter the 21st century. JFQ

NOTES

1 This article borrows heavily from the Adaptive Planning Roadmap (December 13, 2005).
5 Branches and sequels provide the commander with alternatives and follow-on options beyond the basic plan and should similarly have entry and exit criteria.
7 Adaptive Planning has combined seven categories—doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities—into four: processes, products, people, and technology.
Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint Operations

By ARTHUR F. HUBER, GARY CARLBERG, PRINCE GILLIARD, and L. DAVID MARQUET

As in combat involving weapons whose lethal effects can result in friendly casualties, electronic warfare (EW) is no less immune to the deleterious effects of fratricide. While the problem of fratricide involving projectile weapons continues to plague modern armies due to advances in velocity and lethality, it is becoming a growing issue for those who conduct EW. More and more systems—both weapons and purely commercial devices—are vying for their place in an increasingly crowded frequency spectrum. There is growing pressure to transfer previously reserved military frequency bands to the public domain and low tolerance for interference of any kind outside of assigned operating bands. Exacerbating this situation is the rush to field emitters of various kinds without proper vetting through the spectrum certification process. Something must be done soon to manage and deconflict the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum better if EW is to remain a weapon that warfighters can wield with acceptable confidence to yield desired effects.

The “Cocktail of Electromagnetic Confusion”

On one occasion I was on orbit conducting jamming operations, and we knew an EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft was in the area putting out [psychological operations] broadcasts to Iraqi troops. But we didn’t know the frequencies or the times when it was operating. A linguist misidentified a broadcast, we targeted it and we ended up jamming it. We discovered the mistake only after we landed.

—Chris Bakke, EC-130H Compass Call crewmember in Operation Desert Storm

As evidenced in the anecdote above, the problem of EW fratricide is one that exists even in operations involving the most modern equipment and well-trained, professional crews. Although this example comes from Operation Desert Storm, the problem has recently become highlighted through the experiences of warfighters in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. According to Lieutenant General Walter Buchanan, former chief of Ninth Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, “This is the first time that you and I have seen electronic fratricide reach the point that it has. . . . When you take a look at data links and the number of jammers in place and all the radios we have out there, [deconflicting] becomes a very difficult problem.”

To help understand the extent and seriousness of this issue, we explore two of the primary characteristics driving current problems: management of the electromagnetic spectrum and emitter proliferation in a dynamic battlespace.

Management of the Spectrum. The EM spectrum stretches from a frequency of 0 for direct electrical current to 1,022 hertz characteristic of cosmic rays. The radio frequency (RF) portion of the spectrum extends from about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz. Those who wish to operate within the RF spectrum must
obtain frequency certifications from sanctioned national and international authorities. Unfortunately, when it comes to spectrum allocations and management, “the United States is unique among nations in that it lacks a national spectrum policy.” Thus, U.S. interests are not pursued in a coherent and harmonious manner.\(^5\)

Moreover, U.S. frequency allocations within the RF spectrum are not necessarily mirrored around the globe.\(^6\) This has led to many difficulties, including refusal to allow some U.S. systems to operate within foreign national borders.\(^7\) Lastly, while the frequency certification process provides the first line of defense in deconflicting users of the RF spectrum, in the rush to field new systems, it frequently happens that insufficient attention is given to this requirement. This can result in systems that either are incompatible with other systems already fielded or lack the flexibility to permit negotiation in and around a crowded spectrum. This incompatibility manifests itself in inadvertent infringement on authorized users and in restrictions that preclude parallel operations.\(^8\)

**Threat Ubiquity and the Dynamic Battlespace.** Perhaps no single current circumstance highlights the difficulties of EW deconfliction more than U.S. activities to negate the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While some IEDs employ triggering mechanisms that do not depend on the RF spectrum, many others do and all have elicited a massive effort on the part of the United States to counter them. This effort was funded at over $3 billion in fiscal year 2006,\(^9\) and approximately $378 million has been spent on the purchase of electronic jammers to counter IEDs since 2003.\(^10\) Despite our best efforts, progress has been limited. The following excerpt from *Newsweek* provides some insight into this problem:

The Warlock is a jamming device used to hunt up and down radio frequencies searching for signals that could detonate a bomb. The Army has worked heroically with the makers to upgrade the short range and limited capability of the Warlock. But in the field, competing technologies kept getting in the way. The Army uses a radio (called SINCGARS) that also hops around frequencies. The radio frequently interfered with the Warlock jammer. Unable to communicate, troops began turning off their jammers—thereby exposing themselves to IEDs—\(^11\)

The difficulties confronting jamming systems such as the Warlock start with the variety and ubiquity of radio-controlled IEDs. These devices have used command detonation mechanisms adapted from remote control toys, electronic keychains, garage door openers, radios, walkie-talkies, cell phones, satellite phones, and long-range cordless phones.\(^12\) U.S. countermeasures have had some success at neutralizing radio-controlled IEDs by inhibiting detonation or causing premature detonation. The problem is that with so many IEDs employed by the enemy, on occasion these countermeasures inadvertently have been responsible for instances of fratricide resulting in death and injuries to friendly personnel. Additionally, the very proliferation of the jammers themselves has compounded the problem of EW coordination and deconfliction. Systems such as Electronic Jammer Against Bombs developed by Israel and procured for Poland’s forces in Iraq further demonstrate that the problem is complicated by the need for interoperability with coalition systems.\(^13\) The introduction of airborne assets, such as the EC–130H Compass Call\(^14\) and EA–6B Prowler,\(^15\) can exacerbate the problem by operating at altitudes where jamming signals are dispersed over wide areas.\(^16\)

In concert with the proliferation of emitters on the battlefield has been the changing dynamics of the battlespace itself. Operations are now more rapid in tempo and nonlinear in nature. Coupled with this acceleration is the fact that combat entails a contest between two thinking entities that adapt to evolving circumstances. The result is a battlespace whose dynamics put a premium on the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act, as portrayed in Colonel John Boyd’s classic loop...
Deconfliction by the Book

Having outlined the issues with EW deconfliction, we now move to how warfighters manage it in accordance with doctrine. As described by Joint Publication 3–51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare*, frequency management is normally accomplished for a geographic combatant command by a Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO). Through this office, the supported combatant commander establishes procedures, authorizes frequency use, and controls spectrum resources by military forces under his command. The spectrum management process accomplished by the JFMO staff includes such tasks as developing and distributing spectrum-use plans, preparing and updating the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL), exercising frequency allotment and assignment authority, anticipating and resolving potential or actual spectrum interference and conflicts, and coordinating military spectrum use with international and host-nation authorities.

Doctrinally, EW is categorized as an integral part of information operations (IO), so EW planners are normally assigned to an IO cell. This cell is responsible for developing and implementing strategies that exploit the full value of IO resources when integrated and synchronized properly. The EW officer (EWO) is the principal staff EW planner and is critical to the planning and coordination of the frequency spectrum. Typically assigned to the operations staff or IO cell, the EWO is responsible for planning, synchronizing, coordinating, and deconflicting EW actions. The EWO’s influence is primarily exercised through the EW Coordination Center, an ad hoc staff coordination element often formed to facilitate the EW coordination function. Furthermore, as electronic warfare is considered a form of fire (that is, weapons employment), the EWO normally works closely with the fire support coordinator to integrate EW efforts with other supporting fire missions. Additional responsibilities range from supervising EW planning efforts and the preparation of EW appendices in operations plans to monitoring the execution of EW in ongoing activities.

A number of tools and organizational entities have been created to assist the electronic warfare officer, such as databases, planning process aids, and visualization models. In terms of support organizations, the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is perhaps the most important insofar as its mission is “to ensure the Department of Defense’s . . . effective use of the EM spectrum in support of national security and military objectives.” This organization “serves as the [Defense Department] center of excellence for EM spectrum management matters in support of the combatant commands, Military Departments, and Defense agencies in planning, acquisition, training, and operations.” In this capacity, the JSC manages the Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution program that addresses those interference incidents that cannot be resolved at the unified, sub-list through the IO cell to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, a group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions.¹⁸

Freeing Up the Jam

We now consider various ideas to address the EW deconfliction problem. These improvements can be grouped into five major categories:

- developing a national spectrum policy
- applying the joint strategic planning process to spectrum management
- adhering with greater discipline to doctrine and being more creative within its confines
- inserting relevant technological improvements
- holding acquisition efforts accountable for fulfilling frequency certification requirements and conducting proper systems testing.

Develop a National Policy. A national policy for spectrum management would serve foremost to balance U.S. security and safety requirements better with new commercial uses of the frequency spectrum. It would work to ensure that the military’s spectrum interests are advanced in order to meet the burgeoning requirements stemming from the imperative to achieve information dominance in modern combat. It would account for both domestic and international environments, as well as government and commercial considerations. Primarily, this will require new mechanisms to promote unity of effort between the Department of State (responsible for international spectrum allocation negotiations), the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (charged with Federal Government allocations), and the Federal Communications Commission (which administers non-Federal Government and civil/commercial uses). It will also require a single, articulate, and consistent voice at international forums, such as the International Telecommunications Union and World Radiocommunication Conference, that govern international spectrum allocations.

Apply the Joint Planning Process. A critical shortcoming in the U.S. approach to managing spectrum, including its use for
EW, is that we do not treat it as a resource that needs to be subjected to the same extensive planning, direction, and guidance as other constrained resources in our joint strategic planning process. To understand this assertion, we must first describe how spectrum support is provided today. War fighting staffs currently assign frequencies and deconflict operations, relying heavily on spectrum management support provided by the JSC, which resides under the Defense Information Systems Agency. The JSC enjoys an excellent reputation for the support that it provides to warfighters and has a good history of responsiveness to combat needs. In essence, the JSC provides a service analogous to the Defense Logistics Agency insofar as the JSC delivers a commodity—that is, workable frequency assignments—much as the logistics agency provides parts and supplies.

If the military were to change its outlook regarding spectrum management and to view it less as a logistics commodity and more as a force resource, it could improve management by giving spectrum the required priority and visibility. From this perspective, spectrum would be treated not as a spare or consumable but more like equipment and personnel. If the joint strategic planning process embraced spectrum as such, then it could be managed assertively in all types of planning, execution, and across all phases of military efforts. Accordingly, the joint planning system might evolve along the following lines:

- Assign spectrum to the geographic combatant commands for use during peacetime through the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum, issued by the Secretary of Defense.
- Apportion spectrum to the geographic combatant commands for use in developing operational plans through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Allocate spectrum to the geographic combatant commands for use in actual operations.

To round out this perspective, it is important to note the Services would retain their traditional functions to “organize, train, and equip,” so the force planning portion of the strategic planning process would remain essentially the same. However, on the operations planning and force employment sides of the equation, the changes could be profound. Assuming a proper matching of forces to spectrum requirements, some of these changes might include:

- Proactive identification of potential and actual theater spectrum conflicts that stem from differing national frequency allocations within a combatant commander’s area of responsibility
- Preconflict reservation of spectrum blocks for selected systems, thereby motivating other systems to be reprogrammed ahead of time for deconfliction
- Detailed planning for spectrum order of battle (in time and space as a function of battlefield evolution and adversary responses)
- Institution of a frequency tasking order (FTO) to enable enhanced situational awareness and tracking of spectrum use in order to manage frequency assignments dynamically for individual emitters
- Better identification of shortfalls for translation into acquisition requirements by the combatant commanders through their integrated priority lists and mission need statements.

Of all the changes noted above, perhaps none gives moment for pause as much as the idea for development of an FTO. Were it actually implemented, it would appear to lend itself to automated frequency conflict identification and possibly a great measure of automated deconfliction as well. The immediate challenge in any such proposal would be addressing the sheer volume of emitters across all force components since it could potentially include multiple systems at the level of the individual Soldier, never mind those embedded in all platforms across the entire battlespace. Furthermore, it would have to address a much more dynamic environment in terms of the number of changes likely required during both planning and operations execution. In principle, these challenges could be overcome, but we recognize a great deal of work must be done to assess all the requirements, develop accompanying compatible processes across a diverse joint force, and design workable solutions that are cost-effective and user-friendly. The multidimensional nature of the requirement (for example, number of emitters, their capabilities, mission cycle times, associated processes at differing echelons) clearly makes development and implementation of the FTO a complex challenge.

Adhere with Discipline and Creativity to Doctrine. The third proposal essentially calls for disciplined adherence to doctrinal precepts for frequency management. Regrettably, the record reflects flawed and inconsistent application of these precepts. Lapses have occurred in the coordination among the entities that implement the frequency management process, from planning phases through frequency assignment and operations. There are instances in which JRFIs were violated or ignored. In some cases, analyses made of the EW environment were incorrect because they relied on incomplete or obsolete data.19

Other lapses include neglect of the standup and continued grooming of EW
Coordination Centers on combatant commander and task force staffs. Sometimes those assigned to conduct EW planning were inadequately trained or lacked sufficient expertise in the EW profession. Rotation policies have also served to aggravate the problem. Short rotation periods have inhibited development of tactical proficiency, while extended tours have burned out personnel. Failures to ensure that replacements were put in place in a timely manner meant that there was no effective hand-off of duties, and as a result spin-up times were lengthened. A classic example of this problem was recently experienced in Enduring Freedom by Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF–76). Although the CJTF–76 had developed a highly effective Joint Fires Board (JFB) that was able to deconflict EW, when the EWO rotated out and new counter-IED systems were introduced into the operational area, there was no longer an experienced expert able to engage a process to deconflict EW activities. The unfortunate result was EW fratricide involving Blue Force Tracker systems, vehicle-to-vehicle convoy radios, ground-based and mobile counter-IED equipment, and civilian airport operations.

Of all our proposals, preventing lapses in adherence to proven processes would appear the first order of business. One action would be to ensure the EW Coordination Center is formed and manned prior to and during all phases of a campaign. Furthermore, emphasis should be placed on delineating and training personnel on how the coordination center morphs in character and function as a campaign proceeds. Another role would be to reinforce guidance to combat forces that the JRFL is to be consulted and deconflicted in time or space if one knew when and where they are or will be transmitting and then account for the transmission in operational planning and execution. Accordingly, enhancing such databases and associated tools to implement just-in-time deconfliction could assist significantly in avoiding fratricide events.

Those involved today in the management of the frequency spectrum—including deconfliction processes—rely on a number of standard tools. A key tool is SPECTRUM XXI. While capable, one of the limitations of SPECTRUM XXI is that it does not permit making frequency assignments for time slots shorter than 24 hours. To achieve this capability, EW staff officers and operators need networked access to the global information grid to give them timely information and support analyses to assure deconfliction. While improved spectrum support to crisis planning is required, electronic warfare officers and operators are more concerned with the real-time provision of tactical level data and coordination. Such a requirement implies “spectrum on demand” capability enabling dynamic frequency reassignment.

A replacement for SPECTRUM XXI under consideration is the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS). This system promises “full integration of network and spectrum management on the global information grid to provide complete spectrum situational awareness.” Plans are to assess the potential for this tool in a joint capability technology demonstration entitled the Coalition Joint Spectrum Management Planning Tool. If GEMSIS or a tool is an ongoing task that requires rigor and timeliness. The requirement for rigor comes into play with regard to the constant efforts necessary to add new emitters to databases of the frequency environment and to ensure that parametrics properly describe emission characteristics. The requirement for timeliness is perhaps even more relevant in today’s circumstances insofar as it may not be a lack of knowledge of the emitter population that inhibits deconfliction, as much as it is knowing who is actually up and transmitting at any given point in space and time. Thus, while it may be possible to know that two types of emitters may interfere with each other, in principle these emitters could be deconflicted in time or space if one knew when and where they are or will be transmitting and then account for the transmission in operational planning and execution.

one action would be to ensure the Electronic Warfare Coordination Center is formed and manned prior to and during all phases of a campaign.
similar to it eventually does become available and is properly networked, it could provide the foundation for a capability to deconflict EW operations in real time.

Advancements in electronic system capabilities—such as expanded transmission bands, frequency agility, programmability, and “precision”—also promise to bolster the ability to deconflict EW operations. A straightforward example is to enable a radio to transmit across a wider range of spectrum to improve the likelihood that a subset of frequencies that it can operate over will be clear and available for assignment. Such approaches are constrained in several respects to include cost, packaging, and spectrum availability, so alternatives beyond frequency bandwidth and operating region have become important.

One advanced feature is programmability, both user-selectable and software-based. In the world of radio-controlled IED jammers, for example, the Bombjammer family of systems offers a model permitting operator selection of the desired jamming frequencies, dwell time, frequency windows, and output power. Software reprogramming was once restricted to mission data files that solely reflected the most current intelligence on threat system parameters, but now enables changing operating frequencies (once fixed by hardware), varying modulation types, and controlling power transmission levels (which affect range). The advent of digitally modulated waveforms permits multi-user access within the same frequency range and channel sharing via multiplexing. “Smart” systems can now “sniff” the spectrum for open frequencies and dynamically control frequency assignment.25

Just as precision-guided munitions have helped limit fratricide and collateral damage, precision EW can do likewise. Precision EW takes on several forms to include very “clean” signals (that is, waveforms distinguished by few, if any, unintended spurious characteristics) and transmissions at exact frequencies (that is, with little bleed into adjacent bands). Another form of precision EW has become possible with the introduction of advanced electronically steered arrays possessing transmit antenna patterns exhibiting highly directional “pencil” beams. Such designs enable placing jamming energy precisely where desired (that is, into targeted receivers) with little energy dispersion. Although this puts a premium on geolocation of targeted receivers, it does serve to limit inadvertent interference with other friendly systems.

Account for Frequency Certification and Conduct Testing. The fifth and last proposal is another imperative for process discipline. The acquisition enterprise normally follows a prescribed set of steps involving a series of gated reviews and approvals to ensure development programs result in products that meet warfighter needs, are cost-effective, and can be sustained. Unfortunately, the record shows some developmental and upgrade programs fail properly to apply for and receive certification for the frequency bands in which they design their systems to operate—resulting in systems that interfere with those already fielded. For example, a 1998 Defense Inspector General audit report counted almost 90 systems deployed to various theaters without proper frequency certification and host-nation approval.26

The process that should be followed is one that is dictated by Federal and Defense Department regulations, is facilitated through the Defense Spectrum Office and is performed as a compliance check. When the potential for unintended interference or confusion within our own operations—hence, the imperative to deconflict—exists, the imperative to deconflict.

We have seen in the trends of the last few decades that modern combat is becoming more complex, networked, and integrated through systems of systems. In the arena of electronic warfare, our response has evidenced enough sophistication to recognize these trends and to take measures to address them. We organize ourselves to manage warfighting as efficiently and as presciently as possible. We conceptualize and codify doctrine to guide our planning and execution of combat operations. We push technology to give us better management tools and better performing weapons. But where we often fail is in consistent and universal followthrough.

If we are to slay the demon of EW fratricide—that is, stop being our own electronic enemy—we must not only understand these trends and develop answers to them, but also be ruthless in our followthrough.

a 1998 audit report counted almost 90 systems deployed to various theaters without proper frequency certification and host-nation approval

Deconflicting Electronic Warfare
When we know from doctrine and experience that instituting a EW Coordination Center or Joint Fires Board enables and optimizes deconfliction, it is not acceptable to allow such entities to be stood down or undermanned when it will put lives and missions at risk. When we have proven through hard lessons learned and creative innovation which processes work and which do not, we cannot fail to institute best practices. When we transform our forces into those that put a premium on the timely prosecution of the kill chain and we do not likewise transform the supporting structures that enable us to manage the very spectrum such a force is founded upon, then we have evidenced a lack of resolution.

The problem of electronic warfare fratricide is a growing issue. Proliferating systems, rapidly procured and fielded, are making for an increasingly crowded spectrum. Our freedom to operate is jeopardized. As our adversaries learn to get the most from their asymmetric strategies and close the gap with us technologically, our edge in combat will increasingly rely on our singular competencies in integration and operational excellence. We have the tools in hand or in development to maintain these trump cards as asymmetries of our own. Let us not prove wanting in our willingness and resolution to take advantage of them. JFQ

NOTES

2 David A. Fulghum, a writer with Aviation Week & Space Technology, coined this phrase.
6 Peters, 56.
8 Captain Mike Murphy, USN, Joint Spectrum Center briefing, “Spectrum: Critical to the Warfighter,” May 24, 2006, slide 12.
16 Fulghum, 32.
17 The following discussion is a summary of salient points and includes passages from Joint Publication 3–51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/pj3_51.pdf>.
21 Ibid., 37.
24 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Budget Project Justification (R2a Exhibit) PE 0603648DBZ—Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, February 2006; Murphy, slides 15, 16.
27 Report of the DSB Task Force, slides 5, 7, 9, 43, 44.

Strategic Forum 225

Can Deterrence Be Tailored?

Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War–era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security environment of the 21st century. The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced military competitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction, and nonstate terrorist networks—while assuring allies and discrediting potential competitors. (Available from NDU Press only)
Much of today’s innovation in warfare involves space-enabled technologies, such as precision weapons using global positioning system information, missile defense systems designed to engage enemy missiles in the lowest regions of outer space, and information operations utilizing orbiting satellites. Indeed, space-enabled technologies play a pivotal role within U.S. national security strategy, which has led some to conclude that the United States is more dependent on space than any other nation.¹

As executive agent for space issues within the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force is responsible for overseeing military space operations and requirements.² Choosing the Air Force for this role seems reasonable; for decades, space systems have been declared “high-flying air forces.”³ Unfortunately, many professionals within the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have long assumed that the sea Services have little to contribute regarding the formulation of space strategy. Yet nothing could be further from the truth.

The sea Services already support the warfighter through space-enabled technologies. This support includes the activities and

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**Space Strategy: A Call to Arms for the Sea Services**

*By John J. Klein*

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organizations of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Naval Network and Space Operations Command, Naval Center for Space Technology, Space Research and Design Center at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Coast Guard Navigation Center. While these contributions are noteworthy, the sea Services’ contribution toward the development of military space strategy has been scant to date.

This situation is understandable. Maritime and space operations seem to have little in common at the tactical level of war, while the similarities between air and space operations are readily apparent to even the novice military tactician. Air and space are adjoining environments, and, consequently, they share many of the same required technologies for operation. These similarities in technologies are especially apparent between very high, fast-flying aircraft and current spacecraft. The environment of operations and available technology shape military tactics; therefore, air and space operations are comparable at the tactical level of war. But the story is different when it comes to the strategic level.

As with tactics, military strategy is influenced by the environment in which operations are conducted, yet it is also shaped by those national interests within the operational environment. Therefore, to formulate space strategy properly, it is necessary to understand both the environment of operations and the national interests within it. The environment of outer space encompasses distant “bases,” or hubs of operations, separated along lines of communication, as exemplified by satellites in orbit and communication relay stations on Earth continually passing data and information back and forth. The list of national interests for a space-faring nation includes using space for economic gain; protecting peace and security; ensuring access to lines of communication that may be shared with a potential adversary; impacting an enemy’s economic, commercial, or military interests; maintaining forward presence; projecting power; deterring an aggressor through offensive or defensive means; and working with all the military Services to achieve common national objectives.

To those in the sea Services, this list of strategy-shaping national interests should look familiar, for they are also the list of strategic interests pertaining to the maritime domain. Broadly considered, even the operational environments of space and the sea have similarities, since both deal with bases and hubs along dispersed lines of communication. Because the national interests within the maritime and space domains are strikingly similar, the strategic-level considerations for operating at sea and in space will be similar too. As a result, the sea Services have centuries of maritime experience for considering and shaping future space strategy.

**Lessons from the Sea Services**

Although the national interests within the maritime and space domains are remarkably similar, space is not the sea. These radically different environments—along with the required technology to operate within them—dictate that the tactics, techniques, and procedures in each medium of warfare will be distinctly different. Therefore, a maritime-inspired space strategy merely serves as a strategic springboard for considering those military operations enabled by space technologies or those from, into, and through space. Nevertheless, maritime strategy can provide specific insights into topics such as the value of space, a balanced approach to space strategy, and the nature of space warfare.

**Value of Space.** Space-based assets are inextricably linked to today’s global economy. International conglomerates provide worldwide telecommunication services, and orbiting satellites are used extensively for commercial transactions between financial institutions and small businesses. Because space is used for economic gain, many countries view such space-reliant commerce as a means of enhancing national power. Toward this end, various space powers have employed international agreements and diplomatic haranguing to advocate their own agendas for using and accessing space. These advocating efforts have ranged from altruistically ensuring the equitable use of space by all nations to selfishly gaining the most advantageous orbital locations or operating frequencies. Since space affects national power, space strategy must correctly discern the value of space and the preferred methods of protecting one’s interests in it.

Based on the precedent of maritime strategy, the inherent value of space is as a means of communication. Space communications include the movement of personnel, spacecraft, equipment, military effects, data, and information, and maintaining such access and use is paramount. If a potential adversary is able to deny one’s access to space, economic or military disaster could result. Consequently, space-reliant nations may protect and defend their interests in space, and this may include the use of force.

Furthermore, one’s access to and use of space are enabled by celestial lines of communication. Generally stated, celestial lines of communication are those from, into, and through space. Since a space-faring nation’s access to and use of space are vital, the primary objective of space strategy is to protect and defend one’s own lines, while limiting the enemy’s ability to use his. As with maritime communications, lines of communication in space often run parallel to an adversary’s and may at times even be shared with him. Because of this, an adversary’s space communications frequently cannot be attacked without affecting one’s own. By ensuring access to “lines of passage and communication” in space, a nation can better protect its various diplomatic, informational, military, and economic endeavors.

**A Balanced Space Strategy.** Since force is a legitimate option for protecting national interests in space, space strategy must help determine the proper method of using it. As with maritime strategy, space strategy must always directly support a nation’s overall military strategy. Consequently, space systems and assets must operate in concert with other military forces on land, at sea, and in the air. While space systems may engage a hostile enemy to achieve solely military ends, they can also achieve economic ends that impact an adversary’s long-term warfighting capability. Such economic actions can negatively impact those revenues gained through space-reliant commerce and trade, which otherwise might have been used to fund future military operations. Contrary to the popular sentiment of some “space power” advocates—yet based on centuries of naval warfare experience—military space operations alone can seldom determine a war’s outcome. Thus, most successful military strategies require the combined and effective employment of land, sea, air, and space assets.

When the use of force is warranted and decisive action is called for, space strategy must address the best method of achieving either political or military ends, while also ensuring one’s access to celestial lines of communication. To achieve these goals, a proper space strategy demands a balanced approach to both offensive and defensive strategies. From the time-honored strategies of land and naval warfare, it is recognized that...
offensive strategy is the more “effective” form of warfare and defensive strategy is the “stronger” form. Since both offensive and defensive strategies have inherent strengths and weaknesses, the strategic planner must effectively and efficiently integrate these two strategies into an overall war plan.

Offensive space strategy is called for when political or military objectives necessitate wresting or acquiring something from the adversary. This may include gaining access to contested lines of communication or achieving a strategic advantage. Since offensive strategy is the more effective form of warfare, it should usually be attempted by a stronger space power against a less capable one. A force executing an offensive strategy and looking for a decisive victory, however, will likely not find it because an adversary will usually move assets or take defensive measures when attack is imminent. A purely offensive strategy does not guarantee eventual success, and a haphazard application of offensive strategy often leads to military disaster. On the other hand, defensive strategy is called for when objectives necessitate preventing the enemy from acquiring something and often enables an inferior force to achieve notable results. If this same inferior force undertook offensive operations against a superior foe, it would likely meet its own destruction. For this reason, the sophomoric adage “the best defense is a good offense” is in fact the strategy of the foolhardily. Defensive strategy incorporates an attitude of alert expectation and does so from a position with strategic advantage. For less capable space powers, adopting a defensive strategy will help protect national interests, ensure access to vital celestial lines of communication, and achieve modest political objectives.

Ultimately, however, offensive and defensive strategies mutually support one another. Offensive operations are frequently needed to make positive gains and bring about the enemy’s eventual capitulation. Yet defensive operations protect the very lines of communication that make offensive operations possible. Furthermore, defensive strategies frequently require fewer forces and assets when compared to offensive strategy, so defensive operations in some regions facilitate the concentration of forces or effects to support offensive operations in other regions. The goal of space strategy is not only to defeat a hostile enemy through offensive means but also to protect vulnerable and potentially shared lines of communication at the same time. Therefore, both offensive and defensive strategies are necessary ingredients in any sound space strategy.

**Nature of Space Warfare.** Centuries of maritime experience provide lessons regarding modern warfare using space technologies. Since the primary purpose of space strategy is to ensure one’s access to the celestial lines of communication most vital to national interests, those nations that can ensure access are able to exercise command of space. For those less capable nations who are denied access to lines of communication in space or whose technological capability is insufficient to launch space vehicles into orbit, outer space effectively becomes an obstacle. A historical understanding of maritime strategy reveals that by making space a barrier to an adversary, a nation can better control the escalation of hostilities and minimize the most devastating enemy counterattacks from, into, or through space.

Moreover, the experience of the sea Services hints at the true nature of space warfare. Some advocates have claimed that employing space-based systems in modern warfare obviates the need for those defensive strategies meant to handle friction and uncertainty. This view, however, is incorrect. History has shown that ambiguity, miscalculation, incompetence, and chance are all ingredients during hostilities. It should not be expected that warfare employing space-based technologies would be any different in this regard. Despite the many advantages of space-based systems and assets, such technology will not eliminate friction and uncertainty, but may at times only reduce it. With the technological advancement of one belligerent, the other belligerent is likely to find a counter to such advancement. This is the natural progression of warfare.

**Implications**

A maritime-inspired space strategy has lessons for both warfighters and policymakers. As indicated, the primary purpose of space strategy is to ensure one's access to celestial lines of communication during times of peace or war. Therefore, strategies and measures that provide self-defense against offensive attack, harden space systems against electromagnetic damage, or incorporate redundant systems are all suitable methods of supporting this strategy of ensuring access to and use of space. Unlike the common interpretation of current space power strategy, defensive strategy is just as effective as offensive strategy in protecting one’s ability to use space, and, in some instances, defensive methods may be even more effective. The lesson learned is that defensive strategy can confer a similar degree of space superiority, as compared to that degree normally attained through offensive means. As a result, any purported space strategy having an inordinate focus on the application of force or the role of weapons is an unbalanced and ill-considered strategy.

Since space strategy is intended to ensure access to and use of celestial lines of communication, a means of doing so is needed. In maritime strategy, this is the job of the naval cruiser, which in the classical sense is a vessel of sufficient range and endurance to protect distant and dispersed sea lines of communication. Because maritime and space operations share similar strategic interests, a functional equivalent to the naval cruiser is needed to protect and defend one's interests in space. As in the maritime domain, vital lines of communication in space are dispersed in some locations but are concentrated in others. Consequently, space strategy demands the protection of the most expansive celestial lines of communication and also the most congested, such as those at chokepoints.

The key to properly understanding space strategy is realizing that celestial lines of communication include users and systems on land, at sea, and in the air. For this reason, a sound space strategy must also incorporate land, sea, and air assets to protect a nation’s access to space. Both space-based and terrestrial-based assets should, therefore, be employed when executing either offensive or defensive space strategies. Since space strategy must address protecting and defending access to and use of space, space-based weapons systems that perform purely offensive missions, while failing to protect one’s access to space, are only of secondary importance.

Perhaps the most immediate need is for naval professionals to appreciate the fact that their Services’ maritime experience provides insight into warfare employing space technologies. What was old is new again. Therefore,
those in the sea Services must embrace and study naval history to learn practical lessons for the future and make valuable contributions in formulating today’s military strategy. This necessitates a general appreciation of formal education opportunities, such as those provided at the war colleges. While naval professionals do in fact learn through operational deployments, when it comes to formulating strategy and discerning the principles of war, only careful study and thoughtful deliberations bring strategic enlightenment.

Because the U.S. Navy has the largest proportional share of personnel among the sea Services, it needs to be more proactive in defining and shaping space strategy. In particular, the Navy should stand up a dedicated center at its Naval War College to study, develop, and debate future U.S. space strategy. While the Navy provides valuable input into space system requirements, its role in formulating space strategy has been minimal so far. Thus, the sea Services need a dedicated center of study for thinking about our nation’s naval history and discerning the implications for the future of space-enabled warfare.

**Call to Arms**

It should never be assumed that since space strategy is a relatively new concept, the rules and lessons of the past do not apply. Space is just another medium to be exploited for military advantage, not a panacea for achieving a quick and easy victory. Because space strategy has striking similarities to maritime strategy, it can glean lessons from hundreds of years of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard experience to apply to activities from, into, and through space. Based on a rich heritage of defending those same strategic interests that we currently have in space, the sea Services are eminently qualified both to consider and develop space strategy.

This is not to diminish the contributions of the Air Force to date. The United States is currently the premier space power, mostly due to the efforts of that Service. Yet the designation of the Air Force as executive agent for space issues within the Department of Defense does not preclude the sea Services from participating in the space strategy debate. In fact, the same policy designating the Air Force as executive agent also directs each of the Services to make valuable contributions in formulating space strategy.

There is plenty of room at the space strategy table for the sea Services. It is time that they own up to their naval heritage and realize that they have a duty to help shape future space strategy. For those in the sea Services, now is the time to speak up and be heard. 

**NOTES**


8. Colonel Peter Zwack, USA, first defined the term *celestial lines of communication* while conducting research as a Mahan Scholar at the Naval War College in 2003.

9. The term *lines of passage and communication* is used by Corbett to describe lines of communications at sea. See Corbett, 316.

10. “Space power” was adapted from the “air power” strategy of air warfare, whose early dogma claimed the nation that wins the opening air war is “practically certain to win the whole war.” See William “Billy” Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New York: Dutton, 1921), xix. See also S.W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 1962), 20: “[R]arely, if ever, have [wars] been decided by sea power alone.”


12. Corbett writes that caution must be used when deciding in favor of offensive operations; otherwise, naval assets may be thrown away on “ill-considered offensives.” Corbett, xxviii.

13. Chokepoints pertaining to space communications include those hubs or systems used as uplinks, downlinks, and crosslinks.

Cyberterrorism conjures images of infrastructure failures, economic disasters, and even large-scale loss of life. It also receives a great deal of coverage in the press. While the threat of cyberterrorism is real, the hype surrounding the issue often outpaces the magnitude of the threat. In addition, the term itself deflects attention from a more mundane but equally serious problem: terrorist organizations effectively using the Internet to stymie U.S. efforts to win the Long War.

The Internet enables terrorist groups to operate as either highly decentralized franchises or freelancers. Similar to information age businesses, these groups use the Internet to create a brand image, market themselves, recruit followers, raise capital, identify partners and suppliers, provide training materials, and even manage operations. As a result, these groups have become more numerous, agile, and well coordinated, all of which make them harder to stop. Furthermore, these groups have become expert at using the Internet to manipulate both public opinion and media coverage in ways that undermine American interests. In short, rather than attacking the Internet, terrorists are using it to survive and thrive.

This article examines why the Internet is so useful for terrorist organizations. It then considers how terrorists use the Internet for strategic advantage and why the threat of cyberterrorism may be overstated in many cases. The article concludes with a set of observations and recommendations.

Why the Internet?

The Internet has five characteristics that make it an ideal tool for terrorist organizations. First, it enables rapid communications. People can hold conversations in real time using instant messaging or Web forums. Instructions, intelligence information, and even funds can be sent and received in seconds via email. Second, Internet use is a low-cost proposition. Terrorist organizations can now affordably duplicate many of the capabilities needed by modern militaries, governmental organizations, and businesses: a communications infrastructure, intelligence-gathering operation, training system, and media-savvy public affairs presence. Third, the ubiquity of the Internet means that small terrorist groups can have a global cyber presence that rivals that of much larger organizations. Terrorists not only can communicate with each other from almost anywhere in the world, but they also can create a Web site that is viewed by millions and possibly even examined daily by media outlets for news stories. Fourth, the growth in bandwidth combined with development of new software has enabled unsophisticated users to develop and disseminate complex information via the Internet. For example, in December 2004, "a militant Islamic chat room posted a twenty-six-minute video clip with instructions on how to assemble a suicide bomb vest, along with a taped demonstration of its use on a model of a bus filled with passengers." Finally, modern encryption technologies allow Internet users to surf the Web, transfer funds, and communicate anonymously—a serious (though not insurmountable) impediment to intelligence and law enforcement organizations trying to find, track, and catch terrorists. To achieve anonymity, terrorists can download various types of easy-to-use computer security software (some of which is commercial and

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some of which is freely available) or register for anonymous email accounts from providers such as Yahoo! or Hotmail.

Internet as Strategic Tool

The combination of characteristics described above makes the Internet a valued strategic asset for terrorists. In fact, one could argue that the Internet, along with other modern communications technologies, is a sine qua non of the modern global extremist movements. Successful terrorism requires the transformation of interested outsiders into dedicated insiders. Once someone has become an insider, less intense but still continuous interactions are required to maintain the needed level of commitment to the cause.

Before the advent of advanced communications technologies, this process was entirely based on face-to-face interactions, which limited the scope of a given group. However, the Internet allows groups to create and identify dedicated insiders—and to maintain fervor in those already dedicated to the cause—on a global scale. Advanced technologies also allow the extremists to deliver well-coordinated propaganda campaigns that increase the levels of support among the general public, which in turn allows terrorists to operate freely in these societies. For example, one of al Qaeda's goals is to use the Internet to create "resistance blockades" in order to prevent Western ideas from "furthering corrupting Islamic institutions, organizations, and ideas." One technique they use is to distribute Internet browsers that have been designed to filter out content from undesirable sources (for example, Western media) without the users' knowledge.

In summary, the development and proliferation of the Internet have enabled the rise of loose, decentralized networks of terrorists all working toward a common goal. In the words of one expert, "it is the strategic—not operational—objectives of the jihadi movement's use of technology that engenders the most enduring and lethal threat to the United States over the long term." Cyberterrorism?

It is evident that terrorist groups are extremely effective in using the Internet to further their missions. Are they also using, or planning to use, the Internet to launch a major cyber attack on the United States? We do not know, but there are a number of factors that suggest the answer to this question is no. Terrorism, by definition, is focused on obtaining desired political or social outcomes through the use of tactics that instill fear and horror in target populations. Cyberterror can be defined as:

- a computer based attack on the Internet
- intended to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious, or ideological.
- The attack should be sufficiently destructive or disruptive to generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, extended power outages, plane crashes, water contamination, or major economic losses would be examples... Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.8

History shows that the vast majority of cyber attacks, even viruses that cause billions of dollars of damage to an economy, are not going to cause the levels of fear desired by most terrorists. In comparison, using physical means to create terror is fairly easy and quite effective. Put in these terms, it is not surprising that terrorists prefer to inflict damage with physical means and then use the Internet to magnify the results of their handiwork. Indeed, while there is clear evidence that terrorists have used the Internet to gather intelligence and coordinate efforts to launch physical attacks against various infrastructure targets, there has not been a single documented incidence of cyberterrorism against the U.S. Government.

One could argue that terrorists would use the Internet to attack cyber assets that control physical systems, thereby creating horrific physical effects via cyber means. The most likely scenario of this type is an attack on the control systems that manage parts of the Nation's infrastructure (for example, dams, trains, and powerplants). The consequences of an attack of this kind would be serious, so this threat deserves attention. However, the actual likelihood of such an attack is unknown; different analyses have reached different conclusions.9

Two things are certain: successfully launching such an attack would not be easy, and the consequences are difficult to predict due to the incredible complexity and interdependence of critical infrastructures. Given a choice of conducting either a cyber attack whose consequences are unknown (and which may not have the desired effect even if it does work) or a physical attack that is almost certain to cause graphic deaths that will create fear, it is understandable why terrorists have (so far) chosen the latter.

Observations

Terrorists use the Internet to harm U.S. national security, but not by attacking infrastructure or military assets directly. Instead, terrorists use the Internet to improve their operational effectiveness while simultaneously undermining our military and diplomatic efforts to win the war of ideas. There is little doubt that they are doing both things well. While there is a possibility that they may use the Internet to launch a cyberterror attack against American targets, this threat falls under the broad umbrella of critical infrastructure protection—a topic that is getting a great deal of attention at all levels of government.10 This issue is not addressed here. Rather, the focus rests on the other two uses of the Internet—issues that are equally important but often receive comparatively less focus, energy, and resources.

Terrorist Operational Effectiveness. The Internet enables terrorist organizations to operate as virtual transnational organizations. They can use it to raise funds, recruit, train, command and control, gather intelligence, and share information. Clearly, it is in the U.S. interest to either disrupt or undermine these activities. The good news is that relying on the Internet is a double-edged sword for terrorist organizations: despite the many benefits associated with using the Internet as their main intelligence, command
and control, and communications system, this approach carries a few liabilities. Terrorist reliance on Web sites and discussion forums allows outsiders to monitor their methods and track trends. For example, there are groups such as the SITE Institute that focus on monitoring terrorist Web sites and providing information to a wide range of interested parties, including elements within the U.S. Government. Reliance on the Internet also creates the opportunity for outsiders to pose as insiders in order to provide misinformation or simply to create doubt among the terrorists about whom they can trust.

To that end, the United States should make every effort to infiltrate extremist virtual communities in order to gather intelligence and begin planting the seeds of mistrust that can disable terrorist cells. We presume that governmental activities of this kind are under way. Surprisingly, nongovernmental organizations appear to contribute to these efforts as well. For example, individual citizens have infiltrated terrorist networks via chat rooms and then worked with governmental agencies to bring about several arrests.

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As important as it is for the United States to improve its own communications efforts, a key part of countering extremist misinformation and propaganda is to have messages come from a variety of sources—preferably some of them local. For example, it is critical for the United States to promote the views of well-respected Muslim clerics, who counter the claims made by Islamic terrorists and extremists. Such efforts have been undertaken by the government of Saudi Arabia, but American efforts in this area have been lacking. In effect, the Nation should do everything possible to enable moderate Muslims to develop a strong, vibrant, and responsive Internet and media presence of their own.

Terrorists use the Internet to harm U.S. national security interests, but not by conducting large-scale cyber attacks. Instead, they use the Internet to boost their relative power to plan and conduct physical attacks, spread their ideology, manipulate the public and media, recruit and train new terrorists, raise funds, gather information on potential targets, and control operations. If these activities can be curtailed, then the viability of the terrorist groups themselves may be put into question. To that end, the United States needs to focus more resources into two areas: countering the operational effectiveness associated with terrorist use of the Internet, and undermining Internet-based terrorist influence operations. If it can successfully meet these two challenges, the United States will make significant progress toward winning the Long War.

NOTES

1. See Statement of Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.


This process, and the impact of the Internet upon it, are described in Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 158–161.

4. The recruiting process is usually not entirely done in cyberspace. At some point, face-to-face meetings are used to assess the level of commitment of potential members. See Sageman, 163.


For example, see Blaine Harden, “In Montana, Casting a Web for Terrorists,” The Washington Post, June 4, 2006, A3.

For example, see Abdul Hameed Bakier, “The Evolution of Jihadi Electronic Counter-Measures,” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 17 (September 8, 2006).

See <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/
Much has changed in the 50 years since Samuel Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. The prospect of a large standing army in peacetime is no longer viewed as an aberration but as the normal state of affairs. Furthermore, this force is no longer conscript-based, but totally professional; Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are all volunteers, adequately paid, and many serve full careers through retirement.

Despite the shift away from a manpower system based on civilian-soldiers serving short enlistments, the officer corps is not viewed as a threat to society. In fact, the military is frequently listed as one of the most trustworthy institutions in the country. Although this is the product of the officer corps’ and society’s acceptance of Huntington’s argument, his model remains trapped in time; it does not allow for adaptation of the officer corps as the world changes. In addition, Huntington’s model does not account for Service differences and inter-Service rivalry since it treats the Services as monolithic. It also does not explain why the Air Force added the concept of fighting in cyberspace to its mission statement in December 2005.

It is important to have a working model of profession for the officer corps because neither society nor the officer corps is enamored with the implications of the alternatives. Modern states monopolize organized violence and delegate this function to restricted groups. Since these groups perform a vital function and must remain obedient to the state, using bureaucratic politics or business models to explain or normalize their behavior runs the risk of indicating that bureaucratic or business grounds might be sufficient justification to alter this subordination to the state and/or society. The professional perspective, on the other hand, reinforces the contractual nature between the profession and society.

Furthermore, studies of the military based on bureaucratic perspectives meet with minimal acceptance in military circles. For example, Air Force officers do not see themselves as bureaucrats engaged in daily struggles to gain a bit more political power or resources here, while defending against Army or Navy encroachments there. Although some higher-level staff jobs certainly deal with Congress, the Department of Defense bureaucracy, and contentious issues of inter-Service rivalry, the focus of officer corps is war: preparing for war, conducting war, and making life and death decisions under battle conditions. The officer corps sees itself as a profession, not a bureaucracy. It is a calling. Officers do not join the military for personal gain or to amass political power, and their tenures in senior leadership positions are too short to enable them to wield any power that they might gain. Instead, many would say that officers are part of the traditional profession of arms, whose members have taken on the obligation of defending the Nation.

That profession develops new fields of expertise to maintain its relevancy in the face of the changing character and nature of warfare, and the officer corps’ composition changes as its expertise changes. The primary motivations for these changes are the responsibilities inherent in the

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profession’s contract with society. The general public perceives itself to have a stake in the officer corps’ composition, and this is more than an abstract or passing interest. A failure of the officer corps to defend the state would have major repercussions. Consequently, major adjustments in professional expertise require society’s acceptance in the form of an award of jurisdiction over a specific competency to one or more professions.

We begin with the traditional works on concepts of profession within the military—Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier*—to establish the foundation of military officership as a profession. We then turn to Andrew Abbott’s *The System of Professions*, paying particular attention to his major concept that professions are dynamic, competitive, and evolving in a world of changing jurisdictions. The resulting descriptive model of profession provides a new perspective for studying the evolution, or transformation, within the individual Service officer corps, inter-Service competition, as well as changing concepts of war and combatants.

**Samuel Huntington**

*The Soldier and the State* is the classic beginning for discussions on the issue of profession and the post–World War II military. Huntington’s book was first published in 1957, 10 years into the history of the independent Air Force. It would not be a stretch to say that all officers are familiar with Huntington’s definition of a profession involving expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, and that the military’s expertise is the management of violence. The division of profession into three points appears almost tailor-made to match traditional military briefing techniques used at places such as the Service academies and in the various levels of professional military education. No American military officer would disagree with Huntington’s statement that “the modern officer corps is a professional body, and the modern military officer is a professional man.”

Huntington’s three points provide a good structural basis for the descriptive model on officership as a profession. *Expertise* is the profession’s peculiar knowledge and skill. It is what the profession knows, teaches, and thinks that it can do. *Responsibility* captures both a sense of higher calling in the rather nebulous ideal of defending the Nation by forfeiting one’s life if necessary as well as an agreement of sorts to provide that service if called upon. It is why the profession does what it does. *Corporateness* concerns who makes up the profession and how the member and profession as a whole are regul
The officer corps and profession

Air Force officer prepares launch of Atlas launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

The essence of Janowitz’s argument is manifest in his characterization of officers as one of three types: the heroic leader, who embodies “traditionalism and glory”; the military manager, who is “concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war”; and the military technologist, or technical specialist. However, Janowitz also writes that the “military technologist is not a scientist, or for that matter an engineer; basically he is a military manager, with a fund of technical knowledge and a quality for dramatizing the need for technological progress.” This means that Janowitz actually only has two archetypes—the heroic leader and the military manager.

Janowitz admits that his distinction between heroic leaders and military managers is harder to discern in the Air Force than in the other Services since the new technology of the airplane can arguably be placed under both categories. On the one hand, at least in the first half of the 20th century, only a heroic type would dare take wing in a flimsy flying machine, facing death by accident as much as by enemy action. On the other hand, embracing the airplane as a technological innovation that brings new efficiencies to industrial-age warfare is clearly managerial by Janowitz’s description. As far as flying airplanes, Janowitz casts his lot under heroic leadership. He then asserts that the Air Force has the highest

adaptation of Huntington forward to see what insights a study of Janowitz might add.

Morris Janowitz

In The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Janowitz analyzes social and political changes in the U.S. Army’s and the Department of the Navy’s highest-ranking career officers over roughly the first half of the 20th century. He also includes Air Force officers as a group of interest, but a large part of that Service’s history is still entwined with the Army during the period of his study. Janowitz uses the concept of profession as a tool to analyze changes in the U.S. military officer corps. He does not provide a three-bullet-point definition of profession and, in fact, treats it more as a way to categorize officers as a specific group of interest. Janowitz focuses on the changing social makeup of the officer corps, specifically its evolution from a homogenous, somewhat aloof and pseudo-aristocratic social group to a diverse collection that is more representative of American society. In fact, the Air Force leads the other Services in terms of the transition to this new officer corps.

Janowitz is primarily concerned with what he sees as clear implications for civil-military relations in this evolution, and he makes several points that are relevant to the model. First, he presents two officer archetypes that exemplify the divide he sees growing in the officer corps. In addition, he works through several supporting hypotheses with examples that often illustrate large differences between the individuals’ officer corps. In the end, it is clear that Janowitz’s overarching premise is that the change in the social and political makeup of military officers is changing the nature of the profession. The profession is not static, but in flux.

Figure 1. Huntington as the Basis of the Descriptive Model

Corporateness

Expertise

Responsibility

Figure 2. Janowitz-Type Modifications

Huntington as the Basis of the Descriptive Model

Corporateness

Expertise

Responsibility

Figure 3. Completed Descriptive Model

Visionary

Corporateness

Responsibility

Heroic

Expertise

Responsible

Responsibility

Army

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concentrations of heroic leaders in the general officer ranks. Furthermore, without explanation, he states that this heroic style is most apparent in bombers, which also has the highest prestige in that Service. Air Force military managers are more associated with tactical air forces and air transport, both of which are heavily involved in joint operations.

Janowitz’s main emphasis in 1960 was that the military manager was on the ascendancy, and the heroic leader was fast disappearing. The Air Force bomber pilot was a last bastion of the heroic leader, but he, too, was no doubt destined to transition to civilian style management techniques. This article borrows Janowitz’s idea of the competition between the two prototypes but modifies the archetypes slightly. Today, the case can be made that the archetypical heroic leader lives on in the form of the combat pilot.

However, the Air Force heroic warrior archetype is not particularly authoritarian, aristocratic, or against technology. He is also not automatically a “leader.” He is, however, tradition-bound in the sense that he would stand by the axiom, “The job of the Air Force is to fly and fight, and don’t you forget it!” He has a sense of responsibility to the Nation, but this ethos is flavored by his perceptions of the Air Force officer corps’ expertise and sense of corporateness. To him, the Air Force officer’s expertise is the delivery of weapons from manned aircraft. This formulation already shows a separation from the Air Force’s initial basis of independence, strategic bombing, and an acceptance of technological innovation on the part of the heroic warrior. In addition, he naturally sees the composition of the Air Force officer corps as paralleling the expertise. He expects pilots to predominate in both quantity and quality in terms of manning senior, key, and combat-critical positions.

Janowitz contrasted the heroic warrior with the military manager. However, this study uses the terms visionary and warrior instead of manager for a variety of reasons. First of all, within the military profession, manager has negative connotations. Whereas officers lead people, a storekeeper manages his inventory, the organizational man manages various undifferentiated projects, and a bureaucrat manages a robotic bureaucracy. Second, because the Air Force simultaneously uses two different but overlapping systems for organization and leadership/management, the terms leader, manager, command, and control/management can quickly become hopelessly confused. Finally, in the Air Force, vision, as evidenced by both pilots and other officers, is the counter to the heroic traditionalist, although both were critical to the Air Force’s independence.

By the time the Air Force became independent in 1947, its primary justification—indepen dent, massed, and heroic strategic bombing raids—was already a piece of history, or at best a practice whose days were plainly numbered in the face of atomic bombs, long-range ballistic missiles, radar, and other technologies and innovations. As Janowitz noted:

"Despite the ascendance of air power, the typical Air Force colonel or general had the least consistent self-image. Air Force traditions are not powerful enough to offset the realization that, in the not too distant future, heroic fighters and military managers will be outnumbered by military engineers. Air Force officers were fully aware, but reluctant to admit, that more of a "leadership" role would reside in the Army and in the Navy."
Consequently, the descriptive model now looks similar to figure 2. The newly added outer ring depicts the two archetypes of heroic warrior (teal blue) and visionary warrior (purple), broken out into each of Huntington’s pillars. The red arrows in the outer ring indicate the tension between the heroic warrior and visionary warrior archetypes in the areas of expertise and corporateness. Expertise tends to be dominated by the visionary archetype, as illustrated by the longstanding involvement with a variety of missile types, the growing influence of command and control systems in the profession, the recent introduction of unmanned combat aircraft, and the addition of cyberspace to the mission statement. Technology has a large impact on expertise. The concept of corporateness is most heavily dominated by the heroic archetype since a range of things—from uniforms and pilot wings, to education, promotions, and discussions as to whether non-pilots are really members of the profession or are fit to command—fall in this bailiwick. Responsibility is depicted as equal between the archetypes since both see the obligation in similar terms; there is no struggle over the pillar of responsibility.

Andrew Abbott

Andrew Abbott, in *The System of Professions*, changes the focus of the study of professions from the analysis of organizational structures of existing professions to an analysis of the work that the professions actually do. This shift leads to different perspectives on how professions are created, exist, evolve, and sometimes decline. Through the examination of professions’ work, it quickly becomes evident that many professions are actually doing similar things. In fact, they are often competing with each other in a particular line of work. In Abbott’s terms, they are contending for jurisdiction.

Society does not come up with the labels and then create professions to handle them. As knowledge, technology, and culture change, professions develop or move to cover the emerging voids. Voids may also develop when a profession moves to cover a new jurisdiction and either leaves its old jurisdiction, or is no longer in a position to control it. Professions may also create the perception that there is a void. There is obviously a strong similarity to business marketing concepts. In any case, professions play a role in the labeling process, which in turn affects which profession gets to handle the problem. This is a key part of Abbott’s concept of jurisdiction:

*But to perform skilled acts and justify them cognitively is not yet to hold jurisdiction. In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights; jurisdiction has not only a culture, but also a social structure. These claimed rights may include absolute monopoly of practices and of public payments, rights of self-discipline and of unconstrained employment, control of professional training, of recruitment, and of licensing, to mention only a few... The claims also depend on the profession’s own desires; not all professions aim for domination of practice in all their jurisdictions.*

This simple example indicates that the competition can become quite complex because definitions of the work itself, the jurisdiction, and who or what actually forms the profession itself are in flux. In addition, professions may arrive at compromises and share jurisdiction, as occurs between psychiatrists and psychologists.

Although Abbott does not delve at any length into the military as a profession, his work provides a catalyst for further exploration of the military profession. Although he sometimes treats the military in toto as a profession, he does imply at points that each Service is an individual profession. Abbott opens the possibility of acknowledging that the equipment, training, and doctrine differ greatly from Service to Service, which results in different perspectives on war and how to wage it. Each Service has its own sense of corporateness, with uniforms, traditions, promotions, education systems, bases, and so forth. Although there is a joint Department of Defense umbrella over all the Services, it does make sense to use Abbott’s work on competition between professions to explore differences between the Services. After all, they are in competition for funding, recruits, status, and perspectives on how best to defend the Nation. The Services have specific competencies or missions, which are essentially jurisdictions that they try to monopolize. Consequently, the model herein treats the Air Force officer corps as a profession in its own right.

Abbott uses “the very loose definition that professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases.” The term abstract knowledge mirrors Huntington’s concept of professional knowledge. The skill required of a professional is more than a simple physical ability or a routinized process. It involves thinking and applying the professional knowledge to new situations. A surgeon requires some hand-eye coordination, but what makes medicine a profession is the ability to use medical knowledge and skills in reaching a diagnosis and treating the patient and modifying the diagnosis or treatment if needed. As the use of computer-assisted lasers and robotics increases, the doctor’s knowledge and skill are still recognized as what merits professional status. Therefore, in Huntington’s terms, Abbott includes corporateness and expertise in his definition, but he completely
excludes ideas of social responsibility. He ignores responsibility because by making the work his emphasis, occupations such as the auto mechanic and the medical doctor turn out to be quite similar at a certain level of abstraction in terms of diagnosing, inferring, and treating a problem.

Most people would reject the comparison's implication that mechanics are a profession with the same status as medical doctors. They would quickly run through a structure similar to Huntington's and point out that mechanics lack a broad-based education, have a minimal sense of corporateness, and no social responsibility. The counters are that a doctor's broad-based education does not contribute to most diagnoses and that the medical corporateness has been used to create the illusion of social responsibility in the doctor's case. The doctor has professional status partly because traditional professions are associated with higher socioeconomic levels of society. As Abbott and many others who study professions point out, there is a darker version of profession. That is, it can be argued that, first, professions actually define social needs that traditional professions are part of the profession. That is, it can be argued that, first, professions actually define social needs that match their services; second, the leadership of a professional organization can dominate the membership instead of relying on a collegial organizational style; and, third, professions essentially create economic monopolies over specific services that tend to be beyond state or market controls.

Abbott points out that the concept of professions can become twisted in the workplace. If a professional is incompetent, or there is too much professional work in an organization, the organizational imperative may require a nonprofessional to pick up the slack. Workplace assimilation occurs when nonprofessionals pick up an abridged version of the profession's knowledge system through on-the-job experience or training. The military offers numerous examples, especially with the overlap of senior noncommissioned officers and junior officers. In fact, the case can be made that noncommissioned officers are part of the profession.

Finally, Abbott points out that professions often set high barriers to entry, requiring extensive education and exams, for example. This tends to keep the profession small in terms of members but higher in terms of quality standards. In addition, it keeps the profession monopolistic. However, such a profession runs into problems when demand for its work cannot be met; it may then lose its jurisdiction. In such a profession, however, the only ways to increase output are to lower the entry standards or let subordinate professions grow to take up the slack. However, Abbott cautions that this has only been successful in the medical arena. Elsewhere, the profession does not adapt or cannot quickly modify its requirements, so other professions or formerly subordinate professions jump into the void and win jurisdiction.

The Army Air Corps' heavy reliance on the Aviation Cadet Program is arguably a successful case of lowering entry standards to increase output, and the Air Force's eventual independence from the Army could be portrayed as a case of a subordinate profession growing to take up the slack. In addition, the historically increasing percentages of nonpilot Air Force officers and general officers can be portrayed as the changing of Air Force officer corps entry standards in order to meet increased demand for its professional work. In the end, Abbott's concept unveils jurisdictional struggles between professions and is a useful addition to the model. The completed descriptive model is shown in figure 3. The dark blue arrow indicates the struggle between the Air Force officer corps and outside groups for jurisdiction in areas in which the officer corps believes it has or wants to have expertise or jurisdiction. In areas that the officer corps believes it has expertise but no jurisdiction, it is seeking jurisdiction or attempting to create public awareness that a new jurisdiction has been created that it
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should fill. If the officer corps already has jurisdiction in an area, it must defend that claim against competitors. For simplicity, the diagram does not show the outside groups, but they would be represented as other spheres in a three-dimensional space. As soap bubbles, as the professions compete, the personnel and missions at the peripheries may become entwined, and the dominant profession may totally absorb the other. Conversely, as was the case with the Air Force officer corps, a bubble might develop within an existing profession’s bubble, and then pop off, forming its own bubble. It is also possible for the bubbles to remain intact and share a jurisdiction or for a new profession’s bubble to seemingly pop out of nowhere—that is, to come from a nonprofession, with personnel and expertise to fill a new jurisdiction.

Why Does It Matter?

The Air Force officer corps, like each of the Service officer corps, considers itself a special breed within the military profession. In the Air Force case, the culture is that of Airmen and airpower, which is believed to be beyond the capacities of mere earth-bound mortals to understand or to participate in. This dichotomy is not based in a sense of bureaucratic politics but on a conviction that the Air Force officer corps’ visionary sense of its particular expertise is the best way to win wars and defend the Nation. The Air Force officer corps has had difficulty articulating this point of view because it is trapped to an extent in the conception that the military profession is a single, static, multi-Service entity. This model eliminates the problem and yields interesting perspectives.

On a broader scale, this model of profession explains the transformation of the Air Force officer corps, its expertise, and potentially its jurisdiction. As new technologies emerged and world events unfolded, the Air Force’s missions and the officer corps’ expertise began to change. The concept of airpower began to shift from an airplane-centric view as it absorbed tertiary supporting areas. New technologies for aircraft and weapons meant fewer aircraft were needed to accomplish more tasks. Aircraft and weapons technology also began to shift the locus of decisionmaking out of the cockpit. As quality began to substitute for quantity, it became more important to have centralized control over these fewer aircraft. In addition, targeting and planning required more intelligence support. Furthermore, the growth of command and control systems led to the need to counter enemy command and control.

Matters such as the use of space for communications, navigation, and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, information, and cyber warfare, that were initially developed to manage, lead, assist, or protect aircraft performing airpower missions, began to eclipse aircraft in importance. The term airpower was contorted in all sorts of ways and no longer fits. The Air Force officer corps is still very much about flying and airpower, but that is no longer its primary focus. Over time, it has developed command and control (C2); communications systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in order to support and manage the organization’s application of violence, while simultaneously opening the door to further visionary forms of warfare, such as cyber and information warfare and effects-based operations. Communications systems, C2, ISR, and visionary forms of warfare were born out of airpower but break out of the currently medium-defined box of jurisdictions and go beyond airpower and incorporate space, the electronic ether, counter—command and control, and cyber and information warfare—hence the Air Force’s incorporation of cyberspace in its mission statement in December 2005.

Transformation in technology also led to a transformation of the officer corps. As technology reduced the required workforce and shifted the locus of decisionmaking authority to higher, more centralized levels, it became clear that the old way of doing business was fast coming to a close and that new career paths would be needed for the new decisionmakers. Consequently, the Air Force has instituted a new officer career development plan. However, pilots remain overrepresented in the general officer ranks because of past structural factors that stem largely from strategies that the officer corps employed in its struggle to establish itself as a new profession, independent of the Army officer corps.

In fact, this has masked the dramatic changes in the Air Force officer corps’ expertise, composition, and jurisdiction. In the meantime, the Air Force officer corps reassures society that the profession is continuing to meet its obligations to defend the Nation with airpower, while simultaneously seeking a grant of monopolistic jurisdiction over C2, communications systems, ISR, and visionary forms of warfare, as in cyberspace. Communications systems, C2, and ISR are important because they form the backbone of all Air Force operations today—nothing can be done without them—and visionary forms of warfare are important because they may replace manned flying operations tomorrow.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 21.
3 Ibid., 164.
4 Ibid., 161.
7 Ibid., 59.
8 Ibid., 8.
9 Ibid., 84.
The night was clear and the air stable. We could see the SS *Mayaguez* resting barely a mile to the north. We were at 7,500 feet in a lazy orbit to the left in an old 573, a trusty AC–130H. She was in fine shape; none of her complex systems was at less-than-optimum condition. The copilot was holding the speed perfectly, and the autopilot was maintaining altitude. It was a piece of cake to keep the plane on geometry (that is, to keep the aircraft in coordinated flight with the guns pointed directly at the target). All the guns were ready, and our crew was eager to shoot. I gazed sideways through my heads-up display and could see the muzzle flashes of the gun below. Located on the northeastern beach at Koh Tang, the gun’s tracers were arcing far beneath us. I knew that we would obliterate it with the first shot from our 105mm Howitzer. Our navigator was desperately begging Cricket¹ for permission to open fire.

The Context

In the spring of 1975, the United States had suffered some of the most humiliating experiences in its existence. Only months before, our prisoners had been released in North Vietnam. Our forces had withdrawn, and just a couple of weeks before the *Mayaguez* was captured by the Khmer Rouge, both Saigon and Phnom Penh had fallen to communist forces. Only months earlier, President Richard Nixon resigned in the face of what seemed certain impeachment. President Gerald Ford had assumed the office without being elected. Many thought the rest of the world was wallowing in the notion that America, defeated and humiliated by a third-rate power, had become a helpless giant.

It was just at that moment, on the afternoon of May 12, 1975, that the communist Cambodians, exuberant in the wake of their recent victory over their U.S.-sponsored enemies, grabbed the SS *Mayaguez*. This merchant ship was proceeding through international waters, carrying exchange merchandise. It was headed northwestward toward a destination in southern Thailand. The *Mayaguez* was not a big ship, but it was under the American flag with a crew of 39 people of various nationalities, including American citizens.

The *Mayaguez* managed to get off an SOS before being captured, but the Khmers...
took the ship without any casualties and brought it to anchor near Puolo Wai Island. The SOS was relayed to Washington in short order, and that evening a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion located the *Mayaguez* at the island. On Tuesday, May 13, the ship was reported under way, presumably headed for the Cambodian mainland port of Kompong Som about 90 miles to the northeast. This aggravated fears in Washington because it recalled the experience of the USS *Pueblo* 7 years earlier. The latter had been brought into a North Korean port before forces could be marshaled to stop it. Once taken to the interior, the chances of rescuing a crew with military force were much diminished.

Captain Charles Miller, skipper of the *Mayaguez*, managed to dissuade the Khmers from going into Kompong Som with the claim that his radar was out and that he could not safely bring the ship in without it. Thus, the Khmers decided to bring it to anchor off the north end of Koh Tang, an island closer to the mainland but still well outside 12 miles and under disputed ownership.

There were still three U.S. Air Force fighter wings in Thailand, and on May 13, they were ordered to monitor the *Mayaguez* and attempt to prevent further movement of the ship and the crew. This included direction to stop waterborne traffic both ways between the mainland and the island. They managed this well, sinking three Cambodian gunboats and damaging four others. However, they could not stop a captive Thai fishing boat from moving to Kompong Som on that same day. A 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) A-7 pilot reported seeing Caucasians on its deck during low passes. Many shots were fired across the bow, and riot control agents were dropped. The Thai crew was in favor of returning to Koh Tang, but the Khmer guards persisted. Aircraft followed the boat, but the rules of engagement prohibited going inside 12 miles of the coast, so the pilots lost track of the boat in the haze. Jets were monitoring the situation at Koh Tang during the day with the help of tankers, and the 388th TFW AC-130s with their radars, low-light televisions, and infrared sensors continued the work through the night of May 13.

### The Planning

The work continued after dawn on May 14 while deliberations were going on in Washington, Hawaii, and Thailand. As always, information was in short supply, and the planners had to fill gaps in their knowledge with assumptions. Unhappily, perhaps, there were more planners than information. The President, National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs of Staff were working in Washington. The authority in Thailand was the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG/2AF) commander, Lieutenant General John J. Burns, USAF, at Nakhon Phanom. He sent the commander of the subordinate 17th Air Division to the coastal base at U-Tapao to serve as the on-scene commander there. He also tried to get authority to go directly to the National Military Command Center in Washington for orders, bypassing the regional commander at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in Hawaii. But the USPACOM commander would have none of that. Thus, the USSAG commander had no Army, Navy, or Marine units under his command. Neither the C-141s all over the Pacific, nor the B–52s at Guam, nor the KC–135 tankers there or at U-Tapao were under his direction. However, the long distance communications then had advanced to the point where he could instantly speak with USPACOM or the National Military Command Center.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff under General David Jones, USAF, were getting forces rolling well before the plan took shape. The Navy was ordered to find and monitor the ship with its patrol aircraft. A thousand Marines flew from Okinawa to U-Tapao via Air Force C–141s, and B–52s at Guam went on alert. The Air Force units in Thailand hurried down to Koh Tang to keep track of the situation. Helicopters from all over Thailand converged to muster at U-Tapao. The USS *Coral Sea*, an attack carrier, was near Australia. The carrier changed course for the Gulf of Siam and steamed toward the trouble as fast as possible. The amphibious carrier USS *Hancock*, in port at Subic Bay in the Philippines, likewise set out with its Marines and helicopters with all possible haste. The surface warships USS *Holt* and USS *Wilson* were closer to the action and sped on without delay. Twelve Sailors and merchant mariners also flew out of Subic for U-Tapao in case their expertise was necessary to sail the *Mayaguez* away after recovery. The State Department attempted to contact the Cambodians through the Chinese and to make approaches to the United Nations for assistance.

During this time, I was the operations officer of the 16th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) equipped with the AC–130s. Our job was to be ready to maintain surveillance and halt waterborne traffic through the night—with no idea how many nights might be involved. The squadron commander flew down to Koh Tang through Tuesday night, so I was left in charge of assuring that we had enough rested crews on alert and ready airplanes to maintain watch all night, every night. It took over an hour to fly down to Koh Tang, and each aircraft could remain on the scene for about 4 hours before coming back. None of our latest airplanes was equipped with external tanks. Neither the AC–130 nor AC–130H was capable of aerial refueling. Moreover, the older AC–130s did not have the endurance of the AC–130H, even when configured with external tanks. The gunship was, therefore, a limited resource and would have to be conserved if it was to be the sole source of surveillance and firepower in the hours of darkness.

On Wednesday, I knew, or thought I knew, from the intelligence brought back by our A–7 pilot that the *Mayaguez* crew was...
not on Koh Tang. But this was not so clear back in Washington. There, the thought had arisen that only a part of the crew was gone and the rest might still be on the island. Also, there were wildly varying estimates as to the Khmer strength there. The landing Marines thought they would meet only token resistance. The communications between the higher commands and the Marines at U-Tapao were not adequate, and some of the things known to USSAG were not passed on to them. Lieutenant Colonel Randall Austin, USMC, was designated to command the landing force. He commandeered an Army U–21 to fly down to Koh Tang for visual reconnaissance but was not allowed to go below 6,000 feet, so he could learn little. In Washington, there was urgency about it all. Some have said it was because of the memory of the Pueblo capture; others have argued that President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had the need to show the rest of the world that the United States was not a paper tiger—that the Nation still could be relied upon as a formidable partner. Moreover, the argument went, Kim Il-Sung in North Korea needed to be sent a message; some were afraid that he would take advantage of our tempoary weakness by aggressive moves in the Korean Peninsula.

The option of bombing the mainland with B–52s was soon rejected as overkill. Gradually, a plan was maturing to land Marines on Koh Tang to rescue the prisoners while at the same time bombing Kompong Som with tactical airpower from carriers. The political leadership wanted to know if it could be done on Wednesday, May 14. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly against this plan as being too hasty. Later, some in the media claimed that the administration was unwilling to give diplomacy a chance because it might deprive it of a fleeting opportunity to prove that the United States was not weak. But the military leaders argued that they could not be ready that early—in fact, they wanted to delay the landings and the bombing until Friday, May 16.

The resulting compromise was that the helicopters gathered at U-Tapao would carry the Marines to Koh Tang at first light on Thursday, May 15. One of the special operations helicopters from Nakon Phanom had crashed, killing 18 security policemen and 5 crewmembers, so there were only 11 operational choppers left. Three of these were to be used for a Mayaguez boarding party. The remaining eight would simultaneously land the first wave of Marines on Koh Tang. The Coral Sea by then was to be close enough to launch an attack wave to bomb the airfield at Kompong Som just as the Marines were landing. No prelanding bombardment was permitted for fear that part of the Mayaguez crew was still on the island. Air Force assets were to be overhead, however, to deliver close air support after the Marines were ashore. They could not be used for operations against the mainland because that would be a violation of Thai national sovereignty, which was stressed enough with the operations at U-Tapao.

The Execution

I never did get to fire a shot on that Wednesday night. Enemy fire was consistently coming up at us from the beach at the north-eastern cove of Koh Tang. Cricket refused permission to return fire and ordered us to leave the area. So old 573 sped off northward to spread the alarm about the antiaircraft fire coming up at Koh Tang’s northeastern cove. There had been no surface traffic during our midnight watch, but we informed the debriefing intelligence officer of the exact location of the enemy gun and wearily went to bed during the early hours of Thursday morning. By 0600, I was back in the squadron trying to make sure that we had crews and aircraft lined up for the midnight rides of May 15.

The three choppers taking Marines to the USS Holf quickly did their jobs. They then returned to U-Tapao to prepare for the second wave of landings on Koh Tang. The landing force of eight helicopters was not so fortunate. The insertion began on both eastern and western beaches at 0609 on May 15. According to Captain Miller of the Mayaguez, at about the same time that day, 0620, and many miles away, he and his crew, along with the Thai captive crewmen, were put back aboard the fishing boat for the trip back to their own ship—without Khmer escorts.

The guns on the eastern beach had a better shot at the low-level inbound helicopters than they had at old 573 the night before. Almost immediately, two of the choppers were shot down on the approach. Fifteen Airmen, Marines, and Sailors died at that point. Some did survive, however, and they struggled out of the water and headed for the tree line to get some cover from the heavy fire. Unhappily, their standard radios for controlling close air support were lost in the surf, and it was not easy to organize air support without them. Soon, though, some communication with the aircraft above was set up using a survival radio on guard frequency.

The landings on the western beach were not as bad but still were no picnic. The opposition was so fierce that Colonel Austin’s command group was not landed on the proper beach but many yards to the south and out of contact with the main group. After several approaches, the choppers were able to offload their Marines safely. Another helicopter was lost in this operation. It took heavy fire but was able to fly away from the beach a bit, and the pilot ditched the helicopter at sea. Part of the crew was rescued. No one at Koh Tang had any knowledge that the Mayaguez crew had already been released. Austin still thought that his mission was to sweep the island to find the crew, but his isolated position and
the fierce opposition prevented him from reuniting the three fragments of his force.

Meanwhile, the Cambodians had made a radio broadcast in their own language at about the time of the initial landings. They had declared that they were going to release the ship (with no mention of the crew). Not long after, there were air reports of the fishing boat proceeding toward the island with white flags flying. The Coral Sea was still some miles away but close enough to be launching its first wave of attacks. The uncertainties made President Ford put a temporary hold on the mainland attacks, but by the time he decided to go ahead, the Navy aircraft were so low on fuel that they had to jettison their bombs into the sea and return to their ship. The second attack wave was launched and hit targets as ordered, as did the third wave—both after the Mayaguez crew had been released.

Once President Ford had confirmed that both ship and crew had been recovered safely, he ordered the withdrawal. Only three flyable helicopters had made it back to U-Tapao, but two more had come out of maintenance the interim. They all loaded up Marines and quickly turned around for Koh Tang. En route, after President Ford ordered the withdrawal, those five choppers were ordered back to U-Tapao with their Marines. However, when Colonel Austin discovered this, he protested and asked that the second wave be delivered as planned. He still did not know the Mayaguez crew had been recovered and believed that he had to sweep the island. By the time the second wave arrived, the close air support was working a bit better, and though the opposition was still fierce, they were able to get their Marines ashore without loss of more aircraft or men. It was only at this time that Austin discovered from the incoming wave that his mission was canceled and that the task now was to make a safe withdrawal.

The Withdrawal

Gradually, the Marines, now with somewhat better air support directed by forward air controllers in OV–10s, were able to consolidate their forces on the western beach and to set up some reasonable defenses. However, the outbound trip was not promising. There were so few choppers left for the work that it appeared the landing force might have to stay on the beach until the next day—which would mean that the 16th SOS would have to supply an air umbrella of its AC–130s over them through yet another complete night. During the morning, Cricket had ordered one of its gunships to tarry in the area and then to go into U-Tapao for refueling and return to Koh Tang. It did vital work supplying precise close air support when the enemy was so close to the Marines that bombs could not be used. However, there were no fresh crews at U-Tapao, and the delay in the return of the airplane and crew so disrupted the flow that we would have been hard pressed to keep up constant air cover through the night of May 15. Happily, that was not necessary because of the timely arrival of the USS Coral Sea.

The presence of the ship eliminated the time-consuming round trip to U-Tapao for the H–53s and even provided the maintenance and refueling help to keep them in commission. One chopper had a fuel line shot out, and the aircraft crew, assisted by ship’s personnel, jury-rigged a repair out of rubber hose. On another extraction, an Air Force junior officer decided that the trip to the Coral Sea was too far, so he decided to offload his Marines through the front door while hovering, as the USS Holt helipad was too small for an H–53 landing. In so doing, though, he was able to shorten the turnaround to save more lives. On the very last extraction, while his pilot was hovering with the tail ramp over the beach, an Air Force technical sergeant, Wayne Fisk, decided on one last sweep on foot around the western beach in search of any Marines who might be still there. He found two, and the last men seen on the island scammed back aboard the last flight from Koh Tang. It was over.

Unhappily, a Marine machinegun crew had been isolated to the south of the lodgment and three of them were indeed left behind—all three killed by the Khmers, and their names are the last ones entered on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington.

The Aftermath

Some Thais, especially the political leaders, were unhappy with the United States. There was no delaying the redeployment of our older AC–130As. That we got them all out on time was a minor miracle. For the rest, the operations went on as normal. At first, in the exuberance of the moment, the word that came down from on high was that everyone who flew in the episode would get an air medal, and those who fired their weapons a distinguished flying cross. Still using typewriters, that kept a bunch of folks out of trouble for 3 weeks; there were 14 members on each crew and the total mounted up. But the chest-thumping quickly disappeared. As soon as the word came down that a General Accounting Office team was to visit us and the other air units in Thailand on an investigation of the incident, all those medal recommendations were junked and only air medals were to go to the crews who fired their weapons.

What caused the Khmers to release the crew? That is still unresolved. It could have been their intention all along, as with the crews of other ships that they had detained in the preceding days. It might have been because the local commander at sea acted without orders, and he was countermanded as soon as the senior leadership in Cambodia learned what he had done. It might have been that the Khmer leaders were properly dissuaded by the sinking of the gunboats and the display of airpower prior to the Marine landings. Because the Cambodians announced their intention to release at the time of the landings, which was done within the next 20 minutes, they could not yet have known of the assault. Thus, they were not coerced by the landings. As the crew was released long after the first bomb fell on Kompong Som, the attacks on the mainland could not have persuaded them. It is highly unlikely that they knew of the B–52s on alert at Guam, so it is equally unlikely that they were the cause of the release. Moreover, the decisionmakers probably did not know of the inbound USS Hancock with its impressive load of Marines, rotary-wing gunships, and additional troop-carrying choppers. However, maybe they did realize that they had stung a giant and that dire things would be possible if they did not act quickly.

Did U.S. action properly impress the rest of the world as to the Nation’s capability and will? There were many declarations in the media that said so, but most of them were in America. Even at the time, many overseas reporters scoffed. As always, there
were arguments on both sides among foreign nations. That the United States was able to marshal such forces on such short notice may have impressed some as to the dangers of being an adversary and the benefits of friendship. Others also argued that the United States is irrationally quick on the trigger, and that may have induced caution in potential adversaries. Some sympathized with Cambodia on the territorial waters claims. 11

Since President Ford was not elected, there was a good deal of domestic discontent at the time, and some were arguing that he was insufficiently “Presidential” to manage the affairs of a great country. 12 After the initial euphoria, the opposition soon began to find fault. They argued that the whole thing was an overreaction for the purpose of political campaigning. Also, when the victims in the helicopter crash were added to the 18 who died on Koh Tang, the total came to 41—more than the number of people who had been rescued. Henry Kissinger had been criticized as saying that the lives of the Mayaguez crew members were secondary considerations, which raised a storm of protest. 13 The argument went that he was so power hungry that impressing foreign adversaries was more important than life itself. It was soon known that General Jones and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been arguing for a delay until Friday. That added force to the argument that haste makes waste and that lives would not have been lost at all on Koh Tang had that advice been accepted. To claim that President Ford lost the election of 1976 because of the incident would certainly be an oversimplification, as there were many other factors involved.

At that stage of the game, strategic communications had advanced to the point where micromanagement was a real problem. Cricket could communicate directly with the Pentagon and USPACOM, passing information to them from old 573, but there was a breakdown in local communications in that Marine Corps commanders on scene were often out of touch with higher headquarters, even those at U-Tapao.

The command and control relationships were not well defined in advance, and decisions were often made at the higher levels between Nakhon Phom and Washington without the knowledge of the ground commanders at the scene.

The AC–130s had frequently trained with the HH–53s and A–7s in simulated rescue exercises, practicing on-scene command and control and close air support. However, there had been no training at all in conjunction with the Marines, nor any practice of assault landing operations. Nor had there been any training with the Navy. Because all the personnel in the air units in Thailand had been on 1-year tours, such experience and training were highly perishable. This was also the case with the Marines on Okinawa, who were on tours of limited duration.

As the Bay of Pigs, the Son Tay Raids, and the Pueblo crisis before the Mayaguez suggested, if something can go wrong, it will—even when there is time for detailed planning and rehearsal. Five years after the Mayaguez incident, Desert One went down in the attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages. It did not do any more than the Mayaguez case to recommend the efficiency of U.S. joint operations. It was not really in the same category because it was a preplanned event, but like President Ford, President Jimmy Carter was to pay the political price for the shortfalls. Both events were factors in the genesis of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and subsequent joint operations do seem to have improved. JFQ

NOTES

1 Cricket was the call sign for an airborne command and control center built into a C–130 that could loiter in a battle area for long periods, providing direction and control for the lethal aircraft.


5 Gerald R. Ford, The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford: A Time to Heal (New York: Berkley, 1979), 272, claimed that he rejected the B–52 attacks in favor of carrier bombing because he thought the latter would be more surgical and proportionate to desired results.


8 Those lost were PFC Gary L. Hall, USMC, Lance Corporal Joseph N. Hargrove, USMC, and Private Danny G. Marshall, USMC.


10 Hamm, 551.


13 Shawcross, 687.