The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

—Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty
In 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of Europe as a continent facing a return of the Dark Ages with all its cruelty and squalor. Indeed, in the bleak years immediately after World War II, Europe was a patchwork quilt of nations struggling not only for self-determination but in some cases for their very existence. But that time is past—in large part because of the visionary leadership of an alliance which is celebrating its 50th anniversary.

Western Europe is today becoming a tightly woven tapestry of independent states linked by common threads of liberty, prosperity, and the rule of law. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

This is not an easy task, for the Alliance must provide for collective defense while adapting to out-of-area challenges. At the same time, NATO should engage former adversaries and build on its relationships with Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace program as part of a comprehensive architecture for security. All this adds up to an exciting time for the Alliance.

Tomorrow's Challenge
During the Cold War NATO faced a clear threat from the East. The visionaries who crafted the Alliance—such as Charles de Gaulle, Harry Truman, George Marshall, Louis St. Laurent, Alcide de Gasperi, and Ernest Bevin—realized that the United States had to move beyond its historic isolationism and remain engaged in Europe. The founders believed that the future security of both sides of the Atlantic rested on a strong transatlantic commitment, convictions that continue to serve us well today. As NATO undergoes a transformation to meet the challenges of the next century, the core and enduring mission remains collective defense. The principle of mutual security upon which NATO was founded must always guide the Alliance. In the past this meant defending the territorial integrity of its members. That view of collective defense has become insufficient to address more sophisticated dangers. Europe has clearly entered a new security era, and it is simply prudent to observe that NATO must broaden its strategic perspective to protect its member nations from the myriad of complex,

A Word from the Chairman

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(continued on page 4)
Non-Lethal Weaponry: From Tactical to Strategic Applications
by Dennis B. Herbert

Making the Joint Journey
by William A. Owens

Intelligence Education for Joint Warfighting
by A. Denis Clift

Conduit or Cul-de-Sac? Information Flow in Civil-Military Operations
by Michael M. Smith and Melinda Hofstetter

Jointness Begins at Home—Responding to Domestic Incidents
by Alan L. Brown

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer

Doctrine

Mahan’s Blindness and Brilliance: A Review Essay
by Brian R. Sullivan

Reassessing the Lessons of Vietnam, Again: A Book Review
by F.G. Hoffman
A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

(continued from page 1)

Asymmetric threats on the conflict spectrum. These include regional conflicts beyond the territory of the Alliance—out-of-area contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo—and others involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism.

Indeed, the amorphous nature of the current security environment means that future threats will be more difficult to anticipate and counter. While not as menacing as those posed by the Warsaw Pact, these dangers are grave; and the allies must individually and collectively anticipate them and have the courage to deal with them.

Thus in commemorating past success, we must resist the temptation to rest on our laurels. The Alliance of tomorrow must not only defend its enlarged borders but, as President Clinton has stated, “defend against threats to our collective security from beyond those borders—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, and regional conflict.”

Transforming NATO

The Washington Summit of 1999 affirms fifty years of success in safeguarding freedom. It recognizes the rise of new democracies across Europe and the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members. But more important than commemorating past success, the summit provides the ideal venue to discuss and chart the transformation of the Alliance.

This transformation is not without controversy. Some critics speculate that America seeks to shift NATO into a global role, a claim that is unfounded. While Alliance security must consider the global context, NATO is unquestionably a Euro-Atlantic organization for Euro-Atlantic threats. Its proven track record has demonstrated the capability and credibility to provide the framework for enlarging the security envelope that protects Europe.

To meet the challenges ahead, NATO needs new tools. It should reflect a cooperative spirit and an ethos of adaptation and partnership to cope with the new security risks. In this regard, the United States is working closely with its allies to improve NATO flexibility through four major initiatives. Although the Alliance has not yet reached complete consensus on them, it is my hope that we will come to closure in the months ahead.

First, the allies agree that a new Strategic Concept must be developed. The United States believes that this concept must reaffirm the core mission of collective defense but should also put new emphasis on the unpredictable and multidirectional nature of threats such as regional conflict, WMD, and terrorism. In sum, the Strategic
Concept—the first revision since 1990—must reflect the evolving strategic environment.

Second, to complement the Strategic Concept, the Alliance must explore innovative ways to improve its ability to operate together and deal with a new array of threats. Toward this end, the Executive Working Group is forging a Defense Capabilities Initiative, an effort to adapt conventional forces for new missions. It is expected to produce a Common Operational Vision to spur development of both self defense and the ability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, either within NATO territory or outside in areas of fundamental interest. This initiative will stress mobile, sustainable, survivable, and, most importantly, interoperable forces to engage effectively across the full range of missions. This vision should draw on national initiatives to develop and test forces for the future.

Third, NATO must be prepared to cope with a real threat to its people, territory, and forces from WMD and their means of delivery. This is arguably the most significant Article 5 menace members face and one that must be addressed seriously and soon. More than just acknowledging these weapons as a priority, NATO must turn rhetoric into action and create forces and instruments to combat this danger. The WMD Initiative is a step in the right direction. It should enormously improve Alliance efforts to halt the proliferation of WMD and to deter, prevent, and protect against such threats. This initiative will notably complement, not supplant, existing international regimes designed to control proliferation as well as national programs being pursued in this area.

Finally, the United States fully supports efforts to strengthen European defense capabilities through the European Security and Defense Identity. I trust that in the coming months the Alliance will complete the initiatives agreed upon in Berlin in 1996 on separable but not separate forces and NATO asset-sharing with the Western European Union. Such an identity within the framework of the Alliance will enhance the security of Europe and help NATO to meet tomorrow’s challenges.

To the Future

NATO is at a fork in the road. At a similar juncture in America’s past, Abraham Lincoln reminded his countrymen that they could not escape history and that succeeding generations would remember them with honor or dishonor, depending on the path they chose. The central lesson of this century is that when Europe and North America act together, they advance their collective interests and values more effectively than they could separately. When they fail to do so, stalemate and crisis often result and the tapestry of liberty, prosperity, and the rule of law unravels.

The security architecture of the next century should therefore be shaped by the commitment of our leaders to act together, defend NATO borders, and prepare for threats which originate from beyond those borders. The Alliance must always recognize that international order and stability in many regions necessitate resolve and imaginative leadership. To provide that NATO must possess a clear strategic vision and common operating procedure to navigate the turbulence ahead. Thus NATO must be prepared to deal with uncertainties. It must maintain its relevance by ensuring that it is ready for the next battle, and not the last. In many ways, the greatest risks lie in complacency and self-congratulation. We cannot afford either—on either side of the Atlantic.

Fifty years ago President Truman stated that if the Alliance “had existed in 1914 and 1939, supported by the nations who are represented here today . . . [it] would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars.” His words are a powerful testimony of the transatlantic commitment. They also warn of the dangers awaiting us should we doubt the continued relevance of NATO or the need to transform it to meet changing security dynamics.

NATO has a bright future, but only if it displays courage, imagination, and determination by remaining pertinent to the international security environment. Just as our forbearers grappled with the aftermath of World War II by developing a strategic framework to keep the peace, current leaders have an obligation to restructure the Alliance for the next century. Let us not shrink from this duty, but rather embrace it.

HENRY H. SHELT ON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Henry H. Shelton
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Celebrating and Cerebrating the Success of the Alliance

The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington, D.C.
April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty...
Can the Atlantic Alliance handle the items on the agenda of the Washington Summit? Can it enlarge as well as adopt a new Strategic Concept and a long-term defense reform plan for a new era? Can it forge sensible policies for threats that arise outside its borders? Can it pursue both an eastern and a southern strategy? Can it preserve the transatlantic bond even as Europeans pursue their own identity? Can it act wisely not only at the summit but afterwards to implement new policies?

While critics may doubt the ability of NATO to master such a new and demanding agenda, events over the four decades of the Cold War offer reassurance. The Alliance faced challenges and met them, however imperfectly. Its wise actions and strength in times of turmoil are a key reason the West won the Cold War. If the past is prologue, it can rise to the occasion again.

Richard L. Kugler is a distinguished research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and author of *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War*. 

By RICHARD L. KUGLER
The Alliance has the resources to succeed. It possesses not only great wealth and military strength but political assets. Its prospects are enhanced by U.S. leadership, European cooperation, and its own institutions. Its continued success lies in harnessing these assets to forge policies that achieve security while maintaining cohesion. History demonstrates that this can be done through coalition planning and by keeping one eye on policy and the other on consensus.

Troubled Origins

Because NATO stands as the greatest peacetime alliance in history, its troubled origins are easily forgotten. It began as a hollow shell and became a great defense alliance through hard work, patience, and change on the part of its members. The Washington Treaty that created it was not signed until 1949, two years after the Cold War erupted. Because initially there was no consensus for a truly military pact, the organization was formed as a political alliance although its mission was protection against the Soviet military threat.

The idea behind the Alliance was sound: to commit the United States to European security while joining the nations of Western Europe together under American leadership. The Washington Treaty called on NATO to function as a true collective defense alliance rather than a loose security pact like the failed League of Nations. Its members committed to each other’s security. If one was attacked, the others were to come to its defense. Despite brave words the Alliance had only political organs for high-level consultation at the outset. It lacked an integrated military command and a coherent strategy. Its force posture, which included nine divisions and 450 combat aircraft, could not protect the borders of central Europe. NATO forces were not equipped or deployed to operate together. West Germany—the focal point of growing confrontation with the Soviets—stood outside the Alliance and could not defend itself. The northern and southern flanks were vulnerable to direct invasion and political encroachment.

Crisis finally brought NATO to life, a recurring pattern in later years. The Korean War and explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb moved the Alliance to remedy its weakness. After increasing defense spending, Truman sent large forces to Europe, expanding Army strength from one to five divisions—350,000 men. An integrated NATO command was formed with General Eisenhower as supreme commander and Field Marshall Montgomery as deputy. Coordinated plans were adopted to defend the region and to dispatch U.S. reinforcements in emergencies. With prodding from Washington Western European nations agreed to build up their forces. The Lisbon Accord of 1952 laid plans for 54 divisions to defend central Europe and another 42 to protect the northern and southern flanks. The plan was slated to take a decade, but by 1953 NATO posture had doubled and the all-important military infrastructure was taking shape.

After lengthy debate Germany was admitted in 1955. Bonn promised to build a large army and air force that would be put under NATO command. Although the notion of a unified European army was rejected, there was agreement on using national forces for integrated defense. The Paris Accord committed the United States, Britain, and France to station assets in Germany as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada added forces to defend central Europe.

By the mid-1950s NATO had passed through childhood into adolescence. It was not only a political organization but a real military alliance.
America’s commitment to Europe was no longer in doubt. Germany had emerged as both a democracy and an ally. Britain, France, and Germany overcame their differences and were working together. Greece and Turkey had joined the Alliance. Western Europe was recovering its economic strength. By creating a Coal and Steel Community and then signing the Treaty of Rome, Europeans established a Common Market, following a path of economic integration.

The Cold War continued unabated. Diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement with Moscow failed. Eastern Europe fell further under communist control. Creation of the Warsaw Pact and the invasion of Hungary exacerbated East-West tensions. But Western Europe was now less vulnerable to Soviet threats.

The end of the Korean War and changing military technology, however, led to new defense priorities. President Eisenhower decided to buy deterrence on the cheap by anchoring doctrine to nuclear weapons. This strategy permitted less defense spending and smaller conventional forces. The Europeans were initially hesitant but came to support Eisenhower’s rationale because it offered security and savings. In 1957 the Alliance adopted a strategy of massive retaliation. It threatened a nuclear blow to the Soviet Union for almost any transgression. Both Britain and France began nuclearizing, and non-nuclear Germany found comfort under the growing NATO nuclear umbrella.

By the late 1950s the United States and its allies had a gleaming posture of several hundred long-range bombers with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) being developed. There were plans to deploy thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe as well. As the decade ended, nuclear deterrence was intact but the conventional buildup had badly slackened. Only 24 divisions and 2,400 combat aircraft—largely configured for a nuclear rather than a conventional war—were available to defend central Europe, a mere tripwire in confronting the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance was left dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons and rapid escalation against a major attack.

The Great Strategy Debate

The danger facing NATO was apparent as the 1960s dawned. Although its missile buildup was some years away, the Soviet Union was already acquiring ICBMs and could thereby expect to deter a U.S. nuclear retaliation for a conventional invasion of Western Europe. With deterrence in decline, the Cold War heated up and worry spread across the West.

Moscow began to brandish nuclear weapons and put pressure on Berlin. Western Europe was once more vulnerable to political blackmail and invasion. While the United States the Kennedy administration proposed that nuclear strategy be broadened by upgrading conventional defenses

faced down the Soviets in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin crisis exposed a lack of military options in central Europe. This gap weakened NATO diplomacy. If a war broke out, the Alliance could face the dismaying choice of either surrendering or triggering a nuclear holocaust. It confronted a grave crisis in its military strategy that went to the heart of its political cohesion and will.

The Atlantic Alliance fell into a paralyzing debate. The Kennedy administration proposed that its nuclear strategy be broadened by upgrading conventional defenses. Secretary of Defense McNamara announced this stance to the defense ministers at Athens in 1962. Washington argued that this step would strengthen deterrence by making conventional aggression less attractive while lessening an unhealthy dependence on nuclear escalation.

An alarmed Germany viewed the matter differently. Bonn valued the nuclear strategy and feared that Washington would weaken deterrence, not enhance it. Chancellor Adenauer fretted that America was backing away from the defense of Western Europe and instead would expose the continent to a destructive conventional war to prevent a nuclear attack on its own territory. He also feared a U.S. sell-out of Berlin or other steps to accommodate Moscow at Europe’s expense.

Britain and other allies were caught between two nations. Not wanting to weaken nuclear deterrence or undertake a conventional buildup, most sided with Germany. The debate might have been less volatile had it focused solely on military strategy, but deeper political controversies arose. The transatlantic relationship was changing because economic recovery made Europe less reliant on Washington. The Europeans were now more willing to assert their identities.

President de Gaulle entered the fray to attack U.S. strategy and political motives, alleging that Washington was trying to keep Western Europe subordinate. He did not advocate dismantling the Alliance, but he pulled out of the military command structure and expelled NATO headquarters from France. He proposed a Franco-German axis to lead Europe and invited other nations to join. Although none did, with the French veto of Britain’s admission to the Common Market because of its fealty to the United States NATO seemed to be coming apart at the seams.

Recognizing the danger to the transatlantic bond, leaders resolved to fashion a new strategy that met the core concerns of all parties. This process took five painful years. It involved intensive study of the military situation and heated debate over options. Support for a strong nuclear posture remained unabated. But most member nations became persuaded that a better conventional posture was feasible, affordable, and desirable.

Consensus emerged in 1967. The new strategy was flexible response. Critics complained that it was a compromise that did not resolve all strategic dilemmas. Yet it helped heal the political breach between Washington and European capitals. It also reduced
Flexible response did not abandon nuclear deterrence or the option to escalate. Although NATO rejected the multilateral nuclear force, it created the Nuclear Planning Group to ensure that U.S. and British forces would fully meet nuclear requirements. Yet flexible response also called for an initial and affordable conventional defense strong enough to fight hard in the early stages and make aggression problematic. It made clear that the defense would be fought on the borders of Germany rather than trading space for time through retreat. The forward defense line was moved to the inter-German border where it remained throughout the Cold War. While this step reassured Germany that it would be protected, the goal of strengthening conventional forces gave the United States confidence that nuclear escalation would not be premature.

The combination of undiminished nuclear strength and stronger conventional forces which characterized the new strategy promised to enhance deterrence and allow more options. Insistence on affordable defense budgets created incentives to use resources effectively and pursue integrated planning. And above all, flexible response restored political cohesion. America determined that its interests had been advanced; Germany and other allies felt satisfied. Moreover, flexible response was accompanied by the Harmel doctrine, which called for arms control and diplomatic outreach to the Warsaw Pact. NATO thus equipped itself with a dual-track policy aimed at fostering a sound military strategy and external political dialogue to lessen East-West tensions.

What brought flexible response to life were efforts to build a stronger conventional posture. Germany fielded its long-delayed army. The United States agreed to modernize its forces in Europe and other nations took similar steps. Plans were adopted for better integration through common doctrine and enhanced logistic support.
By the late 1960s NATO was capable of deploying 37 divisions and 2,900 combat aircraft in central Europe after a few weeks of mobilization. This force was smaller than its Warsaw Pact counterpart, but taking into account its superior weapons and the terrain it was within range of an initial forward defense. The building blocks of an improved strategy and force posture were then in place. The Alliance had passed through adolescence and was entering adulthood in reasonably good health.

Cloudy Priorities and Growing Resolve

NATO had growing pains in early adulthood. It also maintained a pattern of internal debate followed by agreement on a stronger defense. In the 1970s the Alliance faced a strategic problem. The Warsaw Pact threat to Europe did not slacken—it increased. But having learned the lesson ofbranch-dishing its sword too conspicuously, the Soviet Union called for détente in Europe: not an end to the Cold War but a cooling through negotiations and partial settlements.

Moscow seemed to be intent on consolidating its hold on Eastern Europe while weakening NATO resolve by lulling it to sleep. Yet the West had reasons for dialogue. Germany was in 1978 the Carter administration persuaded the Alliance to adopt the Long-Term Defense Plan eager to engage the Soviet Union on Berlin and those issues where accords might lessen tensions. Other European nations agreed, and although Washington was cautious it followed suit. Détente became the name of the game overnight. NATO was left to ensure that détente was not simply atmospheric but would actually enhance the West's security.

The fear that the Alliance would stumble proved wrong. Focusing on the many negotiating forums of détente, NATO adopted a coordinated diplomatic strategy to handle them. Negotiations would not alter the East-West standoff in central Europe because the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks stalled. But other efforts produced the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), an anti-ballistic missile treaty, a Berlin treaty, an agreement on East Germany, and human rights accords in Eastern Europe. This reduced flashpoints but did not end the Cold War.

As the political atmosphere improved, member nations again slackened their defense efforts. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact launched a sweeping push to gain offensive supremacy over NATO. The Soviet nuclear buildup accelerated and achieved parity. Modernization bolstered conventional forces to rival NATO which enhanced the capacity of the Warsaw Pact to launch a swift Blitzkrieg. Again, NATO military security was eroding in ways that left the Soviet Union better able to assert its strategic agenda in Europe and worldwide. The Cold War entered a dangerous new phase.

The Warsaw Pact buildup initially threw NATO into a crippling debate. Calls mounted for a countervailing response, but the Alliance reacted sluggishly. Divided, its members were reluctant to undertake détente or increase spending. They were also preoccupied with transatlantic economic frictions that diverted attention from defense. In 1970, NATO launched a defense improvement plan called AD-70, but progress was slow. Europe did little and U.S. modernization was delayed by Vietnam and budget cuts. The military balance in Europe was tilted toward the Warsaw Pact.

Eventually, greater awareness began to take hold. In the mid-1970s, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger called for more spending and stronger NATO forces. The end of the Vietnam conflict allowed American planners to refocus on Europe. In 1978 the Carter administration, bolstered by the allies, mostly on paper. Yet the decade ended with NATO pulling back from the brink of military inferiority.

Strategic Resurgence

The Alliance fully matured in the 1980s. It was a decade of strategic resurgence followed by the end of the Cold War. President Reagan mounted a military buildup by increasing defense spending, modernizing strategic forces, and launching the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for ballistic missile defense. He also pursued 600 ships for the Navy and strengthened U.S. forces in Asia and the Persian Gulf. But it was in Europe that his defense policies, supported by the allies, most directly engaged Soviet power.

A centerpiece of Reagan defense policy was deployment of longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF): 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles. NATO offered to refrain in exchange for an arms control accord on dismantling the large Soviet LRINF threat to Europe. When it was rebuffed, the Alliance deployed the missiles as pledged despite widespread protests across Europe. By the mid-1980s this policy had transformed the European nuclear balance.
The United States and its NATO allies also enhanced conventional defenses. The Reagan administration implemented the decision by President Carter to rapidly reinforce Europe in crises, increasing U.S. presence from 5 divisions and 8 fighter wings to 10 divisions and 20 wings within a few weeks. Europe contributed funding for host nation programs to provide logistic support. The size of NATO forces was further enhanced when Germany transformed reserve brigades into well-equipped combat formations. Other allies upgraded readiness and manpower. France also drew closer by making clear that its large army could be available for NATO missions in crises.

Alliance plans were heavily focused on upgrading defenses in northern Germany. While southern Germany was well secured by large U.S. and German forces, flat terrain in the Northern Command was an invitation to invasion, its forward defense line was brittle, and its forces weaker. NATO defense posture was upgraded by committing Americans in Ill Corps as reinforcements and the planned use of French reserves. In addition, British and German forces shifted to a maneuver doctrine that increased their flexibility. Meanwhile, NATO also reinforced Norway and Turkey.

Under U.S. leadership, NATO launched the Conventional Defense Initiative, a follow-on to LTDP. It was aided by sweeping modernization, which enhanced weapons quality and restored the armaments edge over the Warsaw Pact. The airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and new aircraft with better avionics and munitions restored air supremacy. Air forces could also contribute more to a land battle by destroying enemy air bases, logistic sites, and armored forces. Better airpower promised to blunt an enemy offensive, thereby taking pressure off ground forces.

Both new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles increased combat power. U.S. weapons led the way, but British and German models were also excellent. They enhanced tactical mobility in ways complementing the firepower from artillery, anti-tank missiles, and large logistic forces. In their wake came a doctrine that blended fire and maneuver—key to containing enemy breakthrough attacks. As a result, ground forces became more capable of fighting outnumbered and winning.

Modernization of U.S. and allied naval forces restored supremacy at sea. The U.S. carrier force grew in size. It acquired aircraft, cruise missiles, Aegis cruisers, and submarines. European navies also modernized. Thus their naval forces could not only defend the North Atlantic sealanes but destroy enemy forces in northern waters and the Mediterranean Sea. The impact was to blunt the ongoing Soviet effort to build a blue-water navy that could challenge NATO at sea.

By the late 1980s, NATO could deploy 45 divisions and 3,600 combat aircraft in central Europe. Its posture was smaller than the 90 divisions and 4,200 aircraft of the Warsaw Pact. But taking into account its higher quality, the allies could fight a formidable forward defense not only in early days but later. Improving morale plus successful joint and combined operations enhanced confidence. The difference was marked. The trends favored the Alliance, not the Warsaw Pact.

When NATO nuclear and conventional plans went into high gear, Soviet policy underwent a sea change. Premier Gorbachev offered arms control accords that would dismantle the offensive military threat of the Warsaw Pact while leaving Alliance defensive strategy intact. He also called for liberalization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which set the stage for the subsequent deluge. The Berlin wall came down and communism faded across Europe, replaced by democracy and market capitalism. Change spread to the Soviet Union when democracy replaced communism in 1991. Indeed, the Soviet Union was supplanted by Russia and 14 newly independent states.

NATO presided over German unification and the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. The LRINF and Conventional Forces in Europe Treaties reduced lingering fears. Instead of being dismantled, NATO planned to renew itself as a vibrant alliance for the post-Cold War era. When Kuwait was invaded in 1990, U.S. and coalition forces drew on NATO experience to dramatically defeat Iraq. All told, these
were remarkable achievements for an organization that began its life militarily and politically weak.

Lessons Learned

NATO was far from a perfect alliance during the Cold War. At times it drifted, behaved indecisively, and made errors. But it never made fatal errors; and it learned from its mistakes. In crisis it rose to the occasion and in normal times continually improved. As a result, Europe became more secure and the West won the Cold War.

Overall, the NATO experience illustrates that democracies can make a success of alliances and coalitions in peacetime. Historians will long debate how the Cold War was won, but it is clear the West could not have waged the conflict, much less triumphed, without the Alliance. NATO gets the lion’s share of credit for allowing its European members to recover their internal health and pursue unity. Its defense efforts were strong enough to check attempts by the Warsaw Pact to gain military superiority. The result was to leave the Soviet Union and its allies bankrupt, with no strategic gains to show for their huge investment. In this sense NATO helped provide the leverage that eventually overturned communism in Europe.

One canard repeated during the Cold War was that NATO success was driven by the Soviet threat. It implied that once the Alliance did not face an equivalent threat, it could not mobilize the unity and willpower to act. In truth, the Cold War was not responsible for NATO performance. The West could have responded in many other ways, although none would have been as effective. But it created an alliance at great cost and sacrifice, an unusual response even in a danger-laden era.

NATO was founded partly because the Western democracies had learned the bitter lesson of failing to collaborate prior to World War II. During that conflict, the United States, Britain, and other nations also learned that coalition planning can defeat powerful enemies. But even though that experience can account for the Alliance, it does not explain its growth and continued success. In the last two decades of the Cold War, Moscow disavowed aggressive intentions and offered warmer relations through diplomacy. No contests arose like the Cuban missile face-off or Berlin crisis. Instead, the response was silent, grueling military competition and frustrating negotiations. If NATO had been motivated only by a threat it would have lost its energy and focus. Something more basic and enduring explains its remarkable staying power.

Sustained performance was driven by widespread recognition that coalition planning served the vital interests of the allies. As NATO gained maturity, it acquired a reputation for effectiveness that transcended the crises of the moment.
at a time when big military threats to Western interests have been replaced by other dangers.

In implementing its plans, NATO made effective use of subcoalitions. The Central Region was defended by one, the Northern by another, and the Southern by a third. Thus members were most involved where their incentives were highest. Also important, NATO ensured that authority over the subcoalitions was distributed according to national willingness to accept responsibility and commit resources. Consequently it gained a reputation for even-handed conduct in internal affairs. Nations held command slots because they earned them.

In a greater sense, NATO achieved more equitable burden-sharing than commonly realized. No nation was required to commit more resources than it could realistically afford. The Alliance recognized that defense could not be bought at the expense of damaged economies and societies. The United States, like its allies, influenced policies commensurate with its contribution. Members thus got from NATO what they contributed. Only France chose to leave the integrated command. Other nations occasionally complained, but staying proved more attractive than leaving.

While many members made compromises, overall each one gained. Participation remained a winning proposition not only because the collective good was enhanced in Europe, but because the individual fortunes of the allies were enhanced. NATO policies normally made strategic sense. Rather than reaching weak decisions anchored in logrolling, the Alliance regularly agreed on action that improved security and peace. The effect was manifested in central Europe, where the famous “layer cake” defense was less than ideal but met the demands of a troubled time. Meanwhile, frontier nations such as Norway and Turkey were powerfully defended. This could not have occurred without pursuit of multilateralism or joint and combined operations.

Success was due to the capacity of NATO to promote strategic innovations as the Cold War unfolded. It switched gears to meet new challenges. As threats emerged, it often reacted slowly at first owing to internal debate. But once it reached consensus it acted with resolve. That pattern still holds. The Alliance requires patience but normally rewards sustained commitment. Finally, success owes to political and military institutions. The NATO story is remarkable not just because a transatlantic alliance was created but because it has worked so well for so long. Many key policy and strategy choices might have been made without an institutional framework. But the Alliance was responsible for implementing them. Its institutions developed the manifold programs and actions that brought the decisions to life. They provided discipline to force planning and diplomacy. They were heavily responsible for the strong forces fielded in response to ever-changing missions. Without them NATO would have been an alliance in name only.

Success also owes to key European nations, especially Britain, Germany, and France. Yet all members overcame national predilections. They patiently learned the art of combining power to preserve unity and produce sound policies. Coalition planning was not easy, but it worked.

NATO forces remained national but cooperated in ways not previously achieved in time of peace. They were driven by a coherent division of labor and well-constructed roles and missions. U.S. and British forces defended the seas and also provided large ground and air reinforcements for continental defense. Other nations created forces largely to defend their own regions but were attentive elsewhere as well. The effect was manifested in central Europe, where the famous “layer cake” defense was less than ideal but met the demands of a troubled time. Meanwhile, frontier nations such as Norway and Turkey were powerfully defended. This could not have occurred without pursuit of multilateralism or joint and combined operations.

Success was due to the capacity of NATO to promote strategic innovations as the Cold War unfolded. It switched gears to meet new challenges. As threats emerged, it often reacted slowly at first owing to internal debate. But once it reached consensus it acted with resolve. That pattern still holds. The Alliance requires patience but normally rewards sustained commitment. Finally, success owes to political and military institutions. The NATO story is remarkable not just because a transatlantic alliance was created but because it has worked so well for so long. Many key policy and strategy choices might have been made without an institutional framework. But the Alliance was responsible for implementing them. Its institutions developed the manifold programs and actions that brought the decisions to life. They provided discipline to force planning and diplomacy. They were heavily responsible for the strong forces fielded in response to ever-changing missions. Without them NATO would have been an alliance in name only.

The institutions worked by combining central direction and participation from lower levels. Regular summits and ministerial meetings allowed political leaders to determine strategic directions which were aided by ten-year plans that set key defense and improvement goals. Time and again, the plans elevated the NATO vision from the near to the long haul. This vision, in turn, provided officers and planners the framework to build forces and collaborative relations from the bottom up—the way real military strength is produced.

The bottom line is simple. The Cold War proved that Western democracies can accomplish magnificent goals when they work together. True, the NATO story reflects much political smoke and fury. But out of this discord—a mark of democracy at work—came a series of wise decisions and strong actions. It was the case during the Cold War and has been true in the turbulent 1990s. It is the core reason why NATO, old and experienced but still vibrant, remains capable of handling a demanding strategic agenda.

Spring 1999 / JPQ
The Brussels Treaty of March 1948 marked the determination of five West European nations—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—to develop a common defense system and strengthen ties among them in order to resist ideological, political, and military threats to their security interests. Talks with the United States and Canada then followed on establishing a North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. Five additional countries—Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal—were invited by the signatories of the Brussels Treaty to participate in the process. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949, bringing about a common security system of 12 nations.

Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty in 1952. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955 and Spain became a member in 1982. The accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland on March 12, 1999 has brought the number of members in the Alliance to a total of 19.

NATO members and the 25 nations which belong to the Partnership for Peace program comprise the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
Interlocking Euro-Atlantic Organizations

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

European Union (EU)

Western European Union (WEU)

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

For more information, visit the following Web sites:

The Washington Summit
http://www.nato50.gov

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
http://www.nato.int

Western European Union
http://www.weu.int

European Union
http://www.europa.eu.int

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
http://www.osce

Updated: 03/15/99

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Updated: 03/15/99

Spring 1999 / JPQ 17
NATO institutions and practices were created to defend against a large-scale, short-warning attack by the Warsaw Pact. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, Germany was reunited, the Warsaw Pact dismantled, and the Soviet Union dissolved into the Commonwealth of Independent States. Amidst such rapid and dramatic change, it is not surprising that some questioned the need to preserve NATO. What is striking is that as the Alliance enters its second half-century in this very different security environment, it is adapting to meet new challenges while retaining key elements that have defined it: consensus decisionmaking, integrated military command, and commitment to a common defense. It has expanded its missions to include projecting stability across the whole of Europe and adapted its structures to facilitate new members and a stronger European identity. This resilient transatlantic commitment of nations with shared interests and values was the vision of the founders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

New Missions

The initial survival of NATO at the end of the Cold War is attributable to a basic agreement among Europeans and North Americans that even without a Soviet threat, the residual insurance of continuing U.S. involvement was desirable at least for a transition period until Russian reform was well along. Europeans would thus feel more comfortable with the role of a unified Germany, and institutions such as the European Community, Western European Union (WEU), and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), could be strengthened. The United States wanted to remain a European power. Europe continued to constitute a vital group of allies, a major economic market, and an ongoing security interest. The United States also had a practical interest in retaining the advantages of forward stationed U.S. forces and interoperable European military-to-military contacts to build confidence within the Alliance. However, even these added missions were difficult to justify when the public perception was directed at a quickly receding Soviet threat. Other purposes would be required.

At the London Summit in 1990, NATO identified a new mission: out-of-area operations but provided a framework for Europeans to grow comfortable with a strong German, reduced defense requirements for individual member nations, and established patterns of transparency and cooperation in defense planning that built confidence within the Alliance. However, even these added missions were difficult to justify when the public perception was directed at a quickly receding Soviet threat. Other purposes would be required.

The Strategic Concept approved in 1991 identified significant risk from instability. NATO always served purposes other than simply deterring and defending against a Soviet attack. It ensured American participation in Europe, provided a framework for Europeans to grow comfortable with a strong Germany, reduced defense requirements for individual member nations, and established patterns of transparency and cooperation in defense planning that built confidence within the Alliance. However, even these added missions were difficult to justify when the public perception was directed at a quickly receding Soviet threat. Other purposes would be required.

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The new strategy resulted in a broader mission: extending stability throughout Europe both by engagement and projecting military power. The Strategic Concept approved in 1991 identified the new European security environment as one of reduced threat of calculated aggression, but with significant risk from instability. This justified moving away from large forces intended principally for defense in place and toward smaller and more agile forces that can be deployed throughout and beyond the NATO area in response to emerging crises.

The concept of projecting stability was short of political approval for out-of-area operations but provided a critical first step in that direction. NATO took another year to formally accept non-Article 5 collective defense missions for several reasons: France advocated Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) predilection, Germany had not yet received diplomatic initiatives and exchange programs. Its senior leaders fostered military-to-military contacts to build confidence and a sense of communal ity, helped professionalize former Warsaw Pact militaries and subordinate them to civilian control, and offered a way for the NATO military structure to engage beyond Alliance territory to shape the security environment. While continuing to advocate a common defense, the stationing of American troops in Europe, and both nuclear and conventional forces (but with reduced reliance on nuclear forces), the London Summit also directed a review of strategy, command architecture, and force structure.

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the constitutional ruling to participate in missions outside its territory, several allies did not want to appear to be rushing in where the Soviets had retreated, and wars in the former Yugoslavia were not yet dominating European security issues.

**Internal Adaptation**

Projecting stability required adapting NATO structures internally and building relationships with nations outside the Alliance. Conditioning structures to project stability was more involved than preparing them for participation by former enemies. Implementing the strategy demanded the negotiation of a detailed translation of political guidelines into military priorities, improving capabilities, reducing force size, reapporportioning a smaller number of command slots among members, and reconciling all these changes with the preservation of the integrated command structure.

The first and easiest change was reducing reliance on nuclear forces. The London Summit limited the use of such weapons to a matter of last resort. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and the High Level Group of national political representatives determined that without the Warsaw Pact, allied short-range nuclear forces could be eliminated if the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty went into effect. In October 1991, before this strategy was formally approved, NATO defense ministers agreed to reduce the nuclear arsenal by 80 percent.

Adapting the integrated military command (IMC) proved more difficult. The first issue was determining whether peacetime military integration was needed in an environment of reduced threat and expanded warning times. The Alliance is unique among international organizations in having a standing peacetime military structure. Routine interaction among militaries in IMC enables forces to conduct a broad range of operations, from high-intensity combat to peacekeeping in a permissive environment. The Strategic Concept outlined elements of common defense that were vital to operational coherence: common operational planning; multinational formations; stationing forces on each other’s territory; arrangements for reinforcement; standards and procedures for equipment, training, and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and interoperable infrastructure, armaments, and logistics. By adopting each of these critical elements, the NATO leadership effectively preserved the integrated military command beyond the Cold War.

The second issue in adapting IMC was determining how many and what types of forces allied nations should maintain. Most NATO forces are designed to defend their homelands, thus they take for granted private sector and local commercial support for contract services. European forces have three general shortfalls: lift, communications, and intelligence. The Strategic
Concept required a capability to quickly reach a trouble spot from anywhere in the NATO area, which meant improved power projection. If forces could be moved, fewer troops would be required overall and their stationing location, predominantly in western Germany, would matter less.

MC 400, the military implementation of the strategy, structured forces into three categories: reaction forces, intended to respond throughout the NATO area; main defense forces, which would constitute the bulk of European armies and are meant to be lower-readiness and in place; and augmentation forces, intended as a reserve. Tiering provided for a core of forces superior to those of the Cold War and cascaded down the capabilities of the rest. While the reaction forces comprised only 10 percent of the overall structure, they were considered sufficient to deter any limited attack and defend against short-warning strikes.

NATO also created multinational forces that demonstrated continuing commitment to common defense without the former threat, made national troop reductions more difficult, and justified the presence of American, British, and French troops in Germany after unification. The initial tranche consisted of two U.S.-German corps, a German-Dutch corps, and the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), containing forces from up to twelve nations. ARRC was critical because it was the only substantial ground force likely to be deployable throughout and beyond the NATO area in the short term.

The third issue in adapting IMC was revising NATO commands. Overall, the restructuring reduced headquarters strength by 25 percent (equal to the initial forces cut), built a reaction force command and supporting planning staffs, adjusted command boundaries to account for German unification, reduced the number of lower-level commands, and eliminated funds for national commands below the principal subordinate command level.

The final element of initial internal adaptation to the end of the Cold War was establishing resource primacy. Defense leaders had been concerned
that efforts to forge a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) would result in capabilities being siphoned from NATO requirements. In 1992 the Defense Planning Committee agreed that the primary responsibility of allied forces was to meet collective defense commitments.

Within two years NATO developed new missions, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, restructured conventional forces to provide a peace dividend while improving the capability of the part of the force it might actually employ, built multinational forces to demonstrate solidarity and retain forces in Europe, streamlined commands, and established the first call on resources. By the end of 1992, the Alliance had agreements in place to maintain and even strengthen its role in European security. Translating them into full political acceptance would take another three years and the sad example of war in the former Yugoslavia.

External Adaptation

At the Rome Summit in 1991, NATO created new institutions to manage the engagement of former adversaries. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) included all former Warsaw Pact states and became a forum for discussion and cooperation on defense issues. NACC formed parallel structures for routine consultations with allied defense, foreign policy, and military leaders. Enthusiasm by former Warsaw Pact states to be involved in NATO activities led to work plans for activities ranging from defense conversion and civilian control of the military to the development of joint peacekeeping doctrine. The council exposed its former adversaries to the political and military culture of cooperation and provided the first step towards Alliance expansion.

Although the council was an important innovation for including former Warsaw Pact states, it failed to meet the expectations of those nations which sought closer ties with NATO unhindered by Russia. By 1994 several of these states seemed fundamentally Western in character: they had democratic regimes, militaries subordinate to civilian control, market economies, and a willingness to participate in common defense. NATO resisted calls for expanding membership with a formula devised by Secretary General Woerner that regarded expansion not as “a question of if but when.” However, even with progress attained through NACC, the Alliance seemed to be running out of activities short of membership for prospective members.

The question was how to achieve closer relationships with democratizing states in central Europe without antagonizing Moscow. The United States developed an initiative to expand and marginally change NACC activities to encompass military-to-military contacts at lower levels, allowing nonmembers to move closer to the integrated military command and defense planning process. Substantively, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program extended NACC cooperation to military exercises and operations and gave it institutional structure through a coordination cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) that could be linked to the NATO military structure. Closer military cooperation would create the basis for their eventual incorporation into allied commands if membership was extended and into NATO-led operations regardless. It would also create a closer link in the meantime, even though partners were not being offered the defense guarantee. Moreover, NACC activities would be modified: nations could develop independent bilateral relationships with NATO. While marketed as a departure from previous policy, PFP actually was a continuation of the approach embodied in NACC and its work plans.

PFP more fully paralleled the internal functioning of the NATO defense planning process in order that new partners could understand the kinds of information exchange and evaluation which occur in allied defense channels. Framework documents signaled national intent while individual partnership programs outlined specific actions which partners and NATO would undertake, liaison officers were assigned to begin planning at SHAPE headquarters, and numerous cooperative topics were identified.

Military cooperation in PFP centered on peacekeeping, because the associated tasks are less operationally challenging than high-intensity combat and are of a sort that member and nonmember forces might come together to conduct. NATO then needed a way to
organize and command peace operations that did not threaten the primacy of its integrated military command.

SACEUR developed a proposal to link PFP activities to the military structure and provide more room for a separable-but-not-separate ESDI. The idea was to build individual command cells within existing NATO headquarters for planning and commanding combined and joint operations. Resulting combined joint task forces (CJTFs) could be pulled from the overall structure for non-NATO operations, either under WEU or another organization with Alliance support. Because they were indigenous to the integrated command, they would be assured support and would not compete with IMC for resources.

Both the PFP and CJTF initiatives were approved at the Brussels Summit in 1994. NATO leaders and nonmember nations eager to be included in allied operations quickly made PFP a going concern, with its first military exercise in the fall of 1994. CJTFs were more difficult to get off the ground, in part because of technical reasons and in part because allied political leaders did not fully embrace the concept until details of its application to ESDI were worked out at the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Berlin during June 1996.

The Former Yugoslavia

Involvement in the former Yugoslavia necessitated further internal adaptation since NATO practices (consultations, initiating military planning, identifying suitable available national forces, approving operational plans, transitioning forces from national to allied command, and conducting operations) were all formally keyed to an Article 5 threat.

Member nations did not even share a common opinion of peacekeeping. Several militaries had substantial background in monitoring existing peace agreements as part of U.N. forces, others had constabulary experience in working closely with civilian authority to enforce colonial will, and the United States viewed such operations as low intensity conflict. As a result, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council had an agreed peacekeeping doctrine more than four years before NATO itself could agree on the military parameters of peace operations. The military command had to settle for identifying useful assets.

As it considered deploying allied troops to Bosnia, initially to monitor U.N. sanctions and the no-fly zone and subsequently to enforce the Dayton Accords, NATO had to develop the ability to authorize, oversee, and employ combat forces outside its area. It
alone could collect and analyze the intelligence to assess violations of U.N. resolutions, mount multinational maritime and tactical air operations to respond, and provide close air support for U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR). These were the first out-of-area operations and occasioned the first participation of French forces in the NATO command structure since 1966.

The Alliance needed to resolve two internal issues prior to its involvement in the Balkans: determine the role of SACEUR and establish the appropriate political level of operational oversight. While a debate over the role of the commander might seem arcane, it is crucial to understanding NATO. The French accepted the position outlined in Article 5 operations but did not believe these responsibilities should extend out-of-area. They argued that the subordinate operational commands were the proper echelon for organizing out-of-area operations, which would likely be smaller and involve more limited tasks than defending NATO territory.

For most allies in IMC, SACEUR is the glue that maintains the credibility of allied military operations. He runs NATO planning and the evaluation of force capabilities, translates military requirements into policy terms, and negotiates such terms with contributors to ensure adequate assets for a mission. He shields subordinate commanders from political pressure, allowing them to focus on operational requirements. That role within NATO is in some ways comparable to the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without such a supreme commander, many allies would lose confidence in the Alliance’s ability to organize and conduct operations. Members including the United States believe that national contributions can only be melded into United States believe that national operations. Members including the United States believe that national contributions can only be melded into the Integrated military command to conduct out-of-area operations on the same military terms as Article 5 simply because there was no other way to get the job done. In return, it received four key concessions: acknowledgement that NATO needed to develop new political practices for operating out-of-area; establishment of an ad hoc political military coordinating group consisting of political representatives from troop-contributing nations to review plans for out-of-area operations; the right of the North Atlantic Council to approve all military plans and operations; and representation in senior command positions when France committed troops to individual operations.

Ultimately both issues were resolved. France accepted the legitimacy of the integrated military command to conduct out-of-area operations on the same military terms as Article 5 simply because there was no other way to get the job done. In return, it received four key concessions: acknowledgement that NATO needed to develop new political practices for operating out-of-area; establishment of an ad hoc political military coordinating group consisting of political representatives from troop-contributing nations to review plans for out-of-area operations; the right of the North Atlantic Council to approve all military plans and operations; and representation in senior command positions when France committed troops to individual operations.

With this agreement NATO proceeded to plan for major ground involvement in the former Yugoslavia. In late 1994, the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs appeared set to achieve their war aims even with UNPROFOR on the ground and before terms for a NATO operation could be reached. But several factors converged in 1995 to prevent the Serbs from consolidating their gains in Bosnia and Croatian clandestine arming of the Bosnian army, collusion between the Croat and Bosnian forces, an effective offensive by those forces to roll back Bosnian Serb gains and “simplify” the negotiating map, sanctions against Serbia leading Belgrade to constrain the Bosnian Serbs, and international outrage over tactics employed by Bosnian Serbs in the spring offensives of 1995.

The United States led efforts to negotiate a cease fire consistent with territory held by each party to the conflict in Bosnia. Dayton produced a detailed schedule for demobilization, confidence building, and civilian reconstruction and re-enfranchisement, much of which was placed under the authority of the United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE). NATO agreed to take over UNPROFOR functions and its 60,000 troops, disbanding elements not folded into the allied operation. While a sustainable peace in Bosnia is still by no means assured, the Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequently the smaller Stabilization
Force (SFOR) created an environment in which the real work of rebuilding Bosnia through fostering a civil society could begin. NATO demonstrated many strengths in Bosnia: the resilience of its political institutions in developing practices for non-Article 5 operations; the value of an integrated military structure to plan, organize, and command a multinational force; the flexibility of commands to incorporate the forces of nations outside IMC, including 16 non-members; and the practicality of PFP and CJTF initiatives in bringing an effective European force into being.

A European Identity

European allies have consistently pressed for a broader role in their own security since the end of the Cold War. Virtually every allied document published since 1990 refers to the benefits of a stronger ESDI. To enhance the European allies have consistently pressed for a broader role in their own security

role of Europeans the Alliance is reducing U.S. representation in its commands, making its assets available through combined joint task forces, increasing support for WEU or EU to act as the institutional basis for ESDI, holding joint NATO-WEU meetings, and using allied staffs to review WEU contingency plans.

The stark differences between U.S. and European power projection capabilities generates an intractable problem for developing ESDI. Europe lacks the assets to be truly independent of the United States. And while some European leaders believed that high-end military capabilities were no longer required in the post-Cold War era, the Chairman of the Military Committee, Field Marshal Vincent, noted “We learned the hard lesson from NATO’s increasing involvement in Bosnia that a surprisingly wide range of very advanced military capabilities were eventually needed.” In 1996, the allies agreed that in return for a NATO right of first refusal over missions and committing to improve their forces, European allies could rely on NATO and the United States to supply assets needed for European operations. But even the Berlin agreement has not settled the ESDI debate. European allies continue to search for ways to better coordinate defense programs and institutional structures to build a stronger profile on defense issues.

NATO Expansion

The final major adaptation since the Cold War has been extending NATO membership to nations of the former Warsaw Pact. The process began shortly after the establishment of the PFP program. Both Bonn and Washington believed that the new democracies of central Europe risked setbacks unless the West validated the sacrifices which they had made to transform their societies and economies. They also came to believe by 1995 that the process could be managed without any damage to relations with Moscow provided the process was carried out slowly and transparently and was timed to follow the 1996 Russian presidential elections.

Determining which states would be invited to join began in 1995 with a study of the terms which new members should meet to ensure that they would be contributors to the common defense rather than just consumers of the security guarantee. The study stipulated that new members must meet both political and military criteria, the most important of which were to (1) resolve ethnic and extraterritorial disputes by peaceful means, (2) establish civilian control of the military, (3) share roles and risks of a common defense, (4) subscribe to the Alliance strategy, and (5) work toward interoperability of forces with other members. The terms ensured that all new members shared the political values of the Alliance and would eventually make a contribution to its defense capabilities.

As relations with the first group of candidates—namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—intensified, the Alliance institutionalized its relationship with Russia through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. That council does not provide Russia with a veto over NATO action, but it does acknowledge its importance in the European security landscape and provide for joint action when there is consensus.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted in March 1999. Although NATO seems committed to an open door policy, no new candidates are expected in the near term. Russia is not enthusiastic about expansion but appears to have accepted it without a major rift in its relations with the Alliance.

Managing relations with Russia while expanding both membership and responsibilities will be the predominant challenge to NATO. The Alliance will also continue to deal with internal disagreements over how to address security concerns that arise in Europe and beyond. However, such challenges by no means diminish the incredible achievements during and after the Cold War. The Alliance has succeeded in redirecting its efforts and its institutions from a large-scale, short-warning attack from the East toward new and diverse security threats. In only ten years it has built consensus on new missions, adapted its political and military processes and structures to shed the vestiges of the Cold War, contributed to a durable peace in the Balkans, and built institutional relationships with other organizations and major outside nations. It is a record the Alliance can be proud of and that would both surprise and please its founders.
The Atlantic Alliance: A View from Capitol Hill

By William V. Roth, Jr., and Stanley R. Sloan

In 1998, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the decision to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO. The debate over enlargement was both thorough and thoughtful. Congress addressed not only issues pertaining to the candidate states but also examined questions on the future role of NATO and its relationship to national interests. The final vote on enlargement not only advocated the addition of these countries but reaffirmed U.S. support for the Alliance.

The viability of NATO will depend on adjustment to changing international circumstances. The Alliance has never stood still. It adapted successfully throughout its history to developments ranging from the fielding of Soviet nuclear weapons to the French withdrawal from the integrated command structure, from the erection of the Berlin Wall to the end of the Warsaw Pact. Since 1989 the United States and its partners have evolved Alliance missions and the means to reflect the end of the Cold War, new challenges to their security interests, and the slow but sure process of European integration. The Washington Summit is the latest opportunity to adapt NATO to a changing international order. It is a chance for the allies to celebrate 50 years of success and lay the groundwork for the future. They must articulate the reasons for the continued existence of NATO.

To do so, they must adopt a new Strategic Concept that reflects contemporary...
conditions and opens membership to other democracies by inviting Slovenia to begin the process of joining. They cannot simply celebrate historic or recent accomplishments, but must demonstrate foresight and courage to meet the challenges ahead.

**A Vision**

In the next century NATO should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to collective defense and the promotion of allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace. The United States, Canada, and European democracies have a mutual interest in sustaining and improving political, economic, and military cooperation. Such cooperation not only maintains peaceful and prosperous relations inside the Euro-Atlantic area but also is a critical building block of stability for the international order.

The treaty offers an enduring political/military alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty remains a vital document whose words express the basic values and interests shared by its parties. The commitment of every ally to collective defense demonstrates a will to defend those values and interests, with force if necessary. On this basis, the Euro-Atlantic allies can develop responses to new challenges to their interests. The treaty offers an enduring framework that should expand as other European democracies share its values and are ready to contribute to its fulfillment. NATO, shaped in the crucible of the Cold War, has adapted to international conditions over decades. It remains the instrument that the allies should employ to mount a collective defense. The treaty also provides for the allies to use the framework of cooperation to defend and promote security interests beyond the Article 5 commitment to defend Alliance borders against direct attack.

**New Era**

Challenges to the interests of NATO members are of different character than those posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but they are numerous and often more complex. They will not always require armed response. But the availability of military options can frequently increase the chances for successful diplomatic resolution of issues. Moreover, maintaining core collective defense capabilities serves as a critical hedge against future challenges to the security of the allies. Consultations and cooperation can make such options available. As in the past, coalition responses will be far more politically convincing and militarily capable than those of any single nation.

America’s commitment and leading role remain critical to Alliance viability. Stability and peace in Europe can best be maintained by active U.S. participation. The active involvement of the allies in security challenges in and beyond Europe also will be vital to U.S. interests. Accordingly, a few suggestions are offered for consideration by the United States and its transatlantic allies. The Washington Summit must not only welcome new members to NATO but reaffirm the centrality of the organization. NATO is not an end in itself. Beyond the defense of territory, it is an expression of shared values and interests among its members and a vehicle to facilitate their cooperation. Its goal should be to create a system of cooperative security involving all European nations, with the transatlantic Alliance at its center. Therefore the Euro-Atlantic community can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice, and stability in a wider international order.

In keeping with the admonitions of the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies must ensure that trade and economic disagreements do not disrupt cooperative relations. Moreover, the collective interest will be served only occasionally by uncompromising go-it-alone approaches on the part of the United States or its allies. When fundamental disagreements block cooperation, consultations should be used to contain the potential damage of the inability to act in concert.

Effectiveness and political vitality ultimately rely on support from member parliaments and publics. Alliance governments and NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegations must make special efforts to explain to their publics and fellow parliamentarians the importance of pursuing common interests within the NATO framework. Given the centrality of the democratic process, the relationship of parliamentary assembly to NATO should

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**ARTICLE 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
be enhanced through intensified consultations and cooperation. The work of the assembly is not merely supportive; it is integral to the political relevance and credibility of overall Alliance efforts.

Core Missions

Collective defense against an attack on any member, as provided in Article 5 of the treaty, must remain the core NATO mission. Members must also direct increased political attention and defense resources on emerging outer core, non-Article 5 missions, including promoting stability in Europe, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to the terrorist challenge, and dealing with security threats beyond NATO borders. In the 21st century, outer core missions should be developed with the intent that the inner core mission of collective defense need not be invoked.

Members must build responses to new challenges around a solid nucleus of collective defense capabilities. They must ensure a seamless continuum between all political and military aspects of inner and outer core missions and capabilities. In this regard, military authorities should develop training, exercise, deployment, and rotation concepts that enable regular forces to maintain combat capabilities while employed in non-Article 5 operations.

The Alliance should not suggest that its missions will assume a global character or impose artificial geographic limits on such missions. Decisions should be based on the specific challenges to member security interests and the benefits or disadvantages of available options.

The allies must seek to act in unison—preferably with a mandate from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Members must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. NATO actions should nonetheless have appropriate legal authority where possible.

It is critical that the allies share responsibility in facing security challenges while working out acceptable allocations of tasks between North America and Europe as well as in Europe itself. Although tasks can be divided among allies, responsibility must always be shared. Operations in Bosnia have proven the wisdom of sharing. The disastrous early stages of the crisis illustrated the costs of trying to divide responsibility for challenges to NATO interests.

Even if terrorism affects only one ally, each terrorist act is part of a broader phenomenon that threatens the entire Alliance. Effective burden-sharing will require that all allies demonstrably contribute to combating terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counterterrorism strategies, and joint actions against threats.

The allies must extend the area of democracy and stability in Europe by opening Alliance structures to cooperation with all European states and membership to those who desire to join and meet the requirements. Moreover, there should be a constant effort to reach out to the countries of the Mediterranean region to develop mutual understanding and cooperation with willing partners in this strategic region bordering the Alliance.

Enlargement

NATO enlargement should be carefully paced, not paused. Having taken the first historic step down the enlargement path, the allies must
arms control is critical to managing relations among European states

costs would be substantial, feeding sus-
picion that a temporary pause will be-
come permanent. Therefore, to make it
crystal clear that the open door policy is
serious, Slovenia should be invited to
begin accession negotiations. In ad-
dition to indicating that Slovenia is
prepared for membership, it would
demonstrate that the door remains
open without overloading the process.
Furthermore, candidate nations must
be assured that their progress will be
closely monitored and discussed with
them annually.

Enlargement should not cause
costly competition between northern and
southern candidates. The Baltic states
deserve the opportunity for member-
ship and should be integrated into the
work of the Alliance. Candidate nations
should be judged against the guidelines
contained in the 1995 study on NATO
enlargement regardless of their geo-
graphic location. As agreed in Madrid in
July 1997, no European democracy
whose admission would fulfill treaty ob-
jectives should be excluded.

The Partnership for Peace program
must encourage partners toward maxi-
mum participation in Alliance activi-
ties. Partnership cells should be estab-
lished at subregional levels in the
command structure as well as at higher
levels to expand opportunities for the
Baltic states and other aspirants to
fully engage in NATO efforts. The
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
should be developed as a means of
channeling the views of partners into
the NATO planning and decisionmak-
ning processes for non-Article 5 opera-
tions and improving combined joint
task force (CJTF) capabilities.

Beyond Arms Control

The allies have opened many
doors to cooperate with Russia. The
Permanent Joint Council and the Part-
nership for Peace program offer Russia
virtually unlimited opportunities to
develop a serious consultative and co-
operative relationship with
NATO. The Alliance must con-
tinue to stress its desire for
such a relationship. Russia’s
importance to European secu-
rity must be acknowledged and its atti-
tude toward NATO should be moved
beyond Cold War assumptions.

Arms control is critical to manag-
ing relations among European states
and internationally. In particular,
adapting the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe to new European con-
ditions will be a source of long-term re-
assurance and stability. The allies must
nonetheless ensure that the revision of
the treaty does not restrict NATO flexi-
bility to reinforce old and new mem-
bers in crises or conduct peace support
operations. At the same time, the
requirements for the Treaty on Conven-
tional Forces Southern Europe should be
adapting the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe to new European con-
ditions to rejoin the Alliance.

The allies should pr omote OSCE
within the overall Alliance framework.
For example, members could shoulder
more of the burden and provide more
leadership in the southern/Mediterr-
anean region as resources allow. They
should agree that national command prerogatives will correspond to their contribution to allied interests there.

For the time being, an American officer
should retain command.

Based on progress toward a viable
European Security and Defense Iden-
tity (ESDI) within an Alliance frame-
work, and development of NATO as a
key contributor to a cooperative Euro-
pean security system, the French
should return to the integrated com-
mmand structure. If they participate, Al-
lied Forces Southern Europe should be
divided into a southwestern and
southeastern command. The former
should have a European commander
and deputy commander (most logi-
cally a French and Spanish officer) while a U.S. officer with a European
deployed should lead the latter.

The allies should concentrate on
developing the capabilities to imple-
ment the current goals of European de-
fense cooperation before elaborating
additional organizational schemes or
structural initiatives. This will require
more effective rationalization and con-
solidation of defense efforts both
within and among European states
than heretofore. High priority should
Roth and Sloan

NATO should transmit an annual report to the President of its parliamentary assembly on efforts to develop capabilities to meet the new mission profile, including recommendations to close remaining gaps. Members must demonstrate that they take their individual and collective security responsibilities seriously and are restructuring forces in light of guidelines in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance, particularly its political leaders and legislators, must realize where it is failing to meet the needs of its commanders and is limiting its ability to fulfill missions.

Reduced defense spending in most member states is weakening NATO ability to respond to new security challenges just as the operational tempo for allied forces is increasing. There should be a voluntary moratorium on further defense budget reductions that should continue until the allies decide on which capabilities and expenditures are needed to implement the NATO revised Strategic Concept. Even absent active major threats, member nations must remember that prudent defense can deter future threats as well as deal with current challenges.

The number of Americans deployed in Europe should be determined by national interests, including the requirement to ensure that U.S. and allied militaries can effectively plan, exercise for, and participate in agreed roles.

Defense Planning

The process of defense planning is being expanded with a focus on forces, equipment, training, and exercises for non-Article 5 missions like Bosnia. Planning related to implementation of the CJTF concept must be given a high priority. NATO nations must increase the emphasis on force projection. Both collective defense and non-Article 5 challenges will require forces capable of operating beyond their borders. The British white paper on defense, French modernization of its non-nuclear forces, and German force restructuring plans exemplify the directions in which the allies should move. In addition, all allied nations must identify forces that could be made available for non-Article 5 missions.

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American, British, Norwegian, and Polish troops jumping over Tuzla.

NATO and PFP member-nation aircraft during Cooperative Key ’98.
and missions. If America is to play a leading role in establishing and employing CJTFs to deal with future threats, it will be necessary to maintain sufficient forces in Europe to make this concept viable. Based on political guidance from NATO leaders in a revised Strategic Concept, U.S. and allied military officials should advise what levels and types of forces are required to implement specified missions.

Recognizing the potential for deployed technologies to both promote and undercut the allied ability to operate as a coalition, members should undertake two initiatives. First, they should in the near future develop a technology and industrial base strategy. Its goal should be to preserve vital, competitive, and complementary defense bases on both sides of the Atlantic, pursue a progressive elimination of barriers to NATO-wide defense trade, encourage the harmonization of competition policies, and remove barriers to sharing technology among allied states.

Second, the Alliance should launch a coalition technology initiative that would establish a requirement as part of the annual defense planning process to identify emerging technologies that could affect allied collaboration. The NATO Military Committee should be tasked to recommend which specific technologies could advance coalition operations and which might impede them.

As the leader in defense affairs and technology, the United States should ensure its ability to work in coalitions. The European allies, for their part, should harmonize their defense research and development for efficiency and to minimize duplication. The United States and the European allies should identify areas in which research, development, and procurement can be organized on a transatlantic basis. They should look particularly for commercial technologies whose coordinated integration into NATO forces would promote interoperability.

**Nuclear Weapons**

NATO must keep a nuclear weapons component in its strategy even though today there is no active threat calling for their use. Such weapons, although not aimed at any particular nation, have a deterrent effect that contributes to overall European stability. Because either rogue states or terrorist groups could acquire and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction, it would not be wise for NATO to make a blanket pledge of no first use.

The allies should nonetheless promote a progressive reduction of nuclear weapons. More critically, they should encourage international cooperation to NATO must jointly develop missile defense systems to protect its forces

minimize destabilizing deployments of nuclear weapons and should demonstrate resolve by cooperating with Russia and China to move nuclear weapons systems to lower levels of readiness to reduce the chance of accidental launch. The United States should maintain its token nuclear presence in Europe as long as it is seen as stabilizing.

The Alliance should give urgent attention to missile defense, in particular to protect forces engaged in military operations. The proliferation of missile technologies and systems, especially those that deliver weapons of mass destruction, is increasingly worrisome. It is unthinkable that a rogue state or terrorist group could acquire missiles with the intention of threatening an ally. Given limited resources, NATO must jointly develop missile defense systems to protect its forces.

**Facing Facts in the Balkans**

The contribution of NATO deployments to a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the importance of Alliance cooperation in promoting and protecting allied interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. But as long as the Balkans are a tinderbox, there can be no stable peace in Europe. If NATO intends to continue to play a constructive role in bringing enduring peace to that region, two important lessons from that tragedy must be heeded.

First, the early hesitation of the allies to respond to the crisis undoubtedly meant many lives lost and probably cost the allies much more financially and militarily in the long run. Second, the recent experience in Kosovo suggests that NATO should only threaten military intervention when it is prepared to follow through. Empty threats only undermine the effectiveness of current policies in the Balkans and, more broadly, long-term allied credibility.

Continued U.S. presence in Bosnia remains important. However, the European role in the operation should get increased emphasis, including designation of a European officer as the overall commander, within the chain of command. If NATO sends troops into Kosovo to enforce a peace settlement with clear, attainable objectives, European allies will have an opportunity to demonstrate the capability and credibility of an emerging ESDI. It is through this lens that the United States should consider its contribution.

Although the success of NATO over the last fifty years provides much to celebrate at the Washington Summit, it is imperative that we prepare the way for another five decades with a vital transatlantic alliance. Toward this end, the summit must reaffirm the Alliance commitment to the principles and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and the core mission of collective defense. NATO leaders should decisively move toward enlargement by inviting Slovenia to join. We must generate the capacity to manage the challenges of the next century, while the European allies must foster a more robust, capable role. Implementing these priorities will ensure that NATO remains true to the Washington Charter and also becomes even more effective in promoting and protecting the enduring interests and values that bind the transatlantic community.
The Atlantic Alliance: A View from the Pentagon

By WILLIAM S. COHEN

On last Veterans Day I joined in honoring those who have served the Nation in uniform. In cities and towns across North America and Europe, we also commemorated the 90th anniversary of the end of World War I. A veteran who had been on the front on November 11, 1918, described the moment when the guns fell silent; how men on both sides slowly, cautiously lifted their heads, how for the first time in four years they were able to stand up outside their squalid trenches.

But in the years that followed, that hopeful moment of peace was lost by leaders who failed to realize their common destiny and the need for free people to stand up and to defend one another. As a result, a quarter century after the end of World War I, Europe faced an even more terrible conflict and a shadow was once again falling over the continent. But in the wake of World War II the West responded before it was too late. By establishing NATO, we finally embraced collective defense, a concept that has been at the core of our transatlantic partnership for fifty years.

Emerging Consensus

Today the shadow of a global conflict no longer exists. The Alliance is strong, successful, and growing. Europe is both free and undivided for the first time. And our values are advancing on every continent. At the same time, the world remains dangerous, a landscape of rogue regimes, rekindled
ethnic hatreds, and the proliferation of dangerous weapons.

Fortunately, we know that the cooperation and determination which created NATO and saw us through the Cold War can guide us through the challenges ahead. But while our fundamental security principles endure, our forces must be transformed to suit this new landscape. We need a new Alliance for the new century, one that allows us to seize opportunities and is designed for the missions ahead. As Giulio Douhet said, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”

In addition to marking the anniversary of the most successful military alliance in history, the Washington Summit presents a unique opportunity to focus on transforming the capabilities of the Alliance to meet the defense challenges of the next fifty years. Our experience in Bosnia has not only proven to be a success in humanitarian and geopolitical terms, it has demonstrated that the transformation of NATO from a fixed positional defense to a flexible mobile defense is incomplete. Indeed, Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) suggest that should we have to operate outside Alliance territory in the future, we should anticipate doing so without preexisting communications, logistics, or other infrastructure. To merely maintain a force designed to defend against Warsaw Pact aggression or to make only superficial adjustments would be a dereliction of our duty to the soldiers, nations, and future of the Alliance. We must seize the historic opportunity of the Washington Summit to propel this necessary transformation.

A Revised Strategic Concept

Because our allies are modernizing and restructuring at different rates and observe differing national visions, NATO is not as effective as it should be. To move forward, we must build on the emerging consensus on developing a Common Operational Vision that embraces the concepts to be found in the
new Strategic Concept. We must forge a perspective that incorporates four core capabilities: mobility, effective engagement, survivability, and sustainability. We must be capable of projecting joint forces and joint assistance. We must engage effectively by delivering assets when and where they are needed. We must enhance survivability by protecting allied forces against terrorism and attack by chemical, biological, and electronic weapons. Finally, we must improve sustainability by being able to deliver supplies in any contingency.

These capabilities require three enablers: responsive information collection, processing, and dissemination; interoperability; and the exploitation of technological innovations. In practical terms our immediate focus must be on communications and logistics. A military force is only as effective as its flow of information, and NATO must have a fully interoperable communications capability for the next century to be successful. In the near term, the Washington Summit should agree to develop and implement specific command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities for allied forces that are now or may be working together in the future. For the long term, heads of state can approve efforts aimed at drawing up a timetable for developing and implementing a single integrated C3 architecture.

With respect to logistics, experience has taught us that static Cold War-style support arrangements are not useful for missions such as IFOR and SFOR since they are not deployable. As a short-term goal of the Washington Summit, individual nations would ensure that their logistics capabilities are as deployable as their force structures. Allied commanders must have the ability to quickly locate and move assets to support their forces. Over the longer term, I have asked the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference to consider creative solutions such as a multinational logistics center.

In addition to transforming our assets and capabilities, we must transform the way we think about operational challenges and move promising concepts from the desktop to the battlefield. To begin the process, we must
identify those critical operational challenges we face in each of the core and enabling capabilities. A revised Strategic Concept and innovative summit initiatives on defense capabilities will require equally innovative processes for their implementation. We must prioritize, coordinate, and integrate our work to ensure that the new Strategic Concept results in action that improves both national-level and Alliance defense capabilities. I have suggested that a high level steering group modeled on the Defense Group on Proliferation or the Senior Level Group could act as an effective mechanism. This is not to imply that we should abandon existing committees, but rather that this group ensure that the ideas found in the new Strategic Concept—mobility, effective engagement, sustainability, and survivability—are better reflected in the day-to-day activities of the C3 Board and Senior NATO Logisticians Conference. Change requires a common commitment. Thus the allies can best achieve these goals by learning from one another. Through collaboration, specific recommendations can be considered and implemented in coming years.

Our objective is nothing less than transforming our military capabilities, creating forces that are designed, equipped, and prepared for the 21st century and that can be combined into a single, powerful, interoperable unit to carry out any mission directed by the Alliance. These are ambitious goals but they are no more difficult than the many NATO successes over the last fifty years.

We cannot allow this effort to simply be a paper exercise, a flash of rhetoric developed for our anniversary summit that is left to gather dust after the celebration. Good intentions will do little for our soldiers in the field. The Dutch colonel who commands a multinational brigade in a future contingency may not care about what was resolved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, but he will care about the ability of his battalions to work together in battle. The German sergeant who directs supplies of food to ten thousand refugees may not care if our negotiations are conducted in a diplomatically correct manner, but he will care about effective communications with the Turkish transports hauling the supplies. And the Greek platoon leader who targets air support may not care about a statement containing high minded propositions, but he will care about the compatibility of his computer system with that of the French pilot circling overhead.

The lives of our troops and the future success of the Alliance depend on our actions today. I trust that the generation of NATO leaders who gather in 2049 will remember that we stood up and fulfilled our duty by preparing for tomorrow. As the world changes, we must have the foresight to change with it in order to bring about another fifty years of progress and cooperation. On that day, all the members of our Alliance will celebrate a full century of peace and stability.

This article is adapted from a keynote address presented to a conference entitled “Transforming NATO’s Defense Capabilities,” which was held on November 12, 1998, in Norfolk, Virginia.
Euro testify to the change in the strategic environment since the Alliance began fifty years ago. Yet with nine nations clamoring for membership, a dozen more cooperating closely with it both politically and militarily, a major military operation underway in Bosnia, and a growing responsibility in Kosovo, NATO is busier and more in demand than ever.

What accounts for this undiminished dynamism? Has not one of the root causes of its very existence—the common threat—been removed? The explanation of this longevity lies in a unique and enduring political nature and a flexibility to respond to change.

The Washington Summit will celebrate the achievements of a unique organization as well as map the way ahead. It will be far more than a 50th birthday party. It will formally welcome the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new allies. It will unveil a package of measures to draw partners closer to the Alliance. And last but not least, it will present a revised Strategic Concept for the next century.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall ten years ago and the recent launch of the

Prospects for the Next Fifty Years

By JAVIER SOLANA
These characteristics have led the Alliance to shape not only its own security environment, but that of the Euro-Atlantic region from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

**Enduring Foundations**

The Atlantic Alliance was forged through the existential threat of a military adversary. But its aim was also to bring democratic North American and European nations together in the wake of a devastating world war. The commonality of purpose and principle shared by the allies did not disappear with the Soviet Union. The political principles of the Washington Treaty which guided NATO through the Cold War remain relevant today.

The Alliance can pride itself on lasting achievements that illustrate its uniqueness:
- It connects North America and Europe in a way that corresponds to the wider strategic interests of both sides of the Atlantic. It thus created the foundations for a transatlantic community that today reaches far beyond the security dimension.
- For 40 years its defense efforts enabled the allies not only to protect each other from direct military aggression but also from political intimidation by the Soviet Union. It thus established the notion of the North Atlantic area as a common security space.
- Military cooperation in NATO maximized the effectiveness of allied contributions and ensured a cost-effective defense. Member states were thus able to keep down their defense expenditures within economically feasible margins and at the same time prevent a potentially negative renationalization of defense.
- It eased the reintegration of Germany into Europe after the War by creating a common security culture of which Germany was a member. By laying concerns about a united Germany unfounded.
- Although defensive and status quo-oriented in military terms, the allies remained committed to their political goal of a just and lasting order of peace for the entire European continent. The 1967 Harmel Report set out a balanced strategy of maintaining a sound defense while at the same time pursuing a dialogue with the Warsaw Pact. This dual approach enabled NATO to seize the opportunities provided by detente and arms control. It also proved to be a successful formula for the Alliance to act as a stabilizing framework in winding down the Cold War and in establishing solid patterns of cooperation with former foes.

**The Post-Cold War Era**

When the Cold War ended, the political and security balance in Europe changed overnight. The Soviet Union collapsed, leaving more than a dozen new nations in a state of transition. The allies concluded that the second pillar of the dual approach contained in the Harmel Report could be taken to the fullest: to act proactively across the enlarging membership erases the notion of a Europe divided into spheres of influence

Euro-Atlantic political space to shape the security environment, manage it, and mitigate the potential for instability and conflict within their immediate neighborhood and beyond. Active cooperation has many manifestations today including the following:

- NATO is pursuing a policy of partnership and outreach in central and eastern Europe and offers assistance and guidance to countries emerging into the new light of democracy and market economy. Alliance initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) have helped establish sound civil-military relations, transparent defense budgets, and above all military interoperability. Though cooperation and outreach, NATO contributes to a fundamental restructuring of the military establishments across Europe, planting the seeds of a new security culture.
- It has admitted three new members from central and eastern Europe in response to the unending quest of the new democracies to join the structures and organizations of Western Europe. The policy of prudently enlarging membership offers the reforming democracies a true prospect of integration and fulfillment of their European and Atlantic aspirations. This process erases old dividing lines and signals the return of nations with their own distinct voice and their commitment to Atlantic values. It also erases the notion of a Europe divided into spheres of influence—a concept that represents excess baggage on our journey to the 21st century.

- NATO is developing a new relationship with Russia. This very large but young democracy is still in search of its role in the new security environment in post-Cold War Europe. The Alliance is engaging this great Eurasian power constructively in discussions about the emerging European security system. Such a system must include it.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in May 1997 provides the basis for an increasingly cooperative relationship. The creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council institutionalized regular political consultations and thus paved the way for enhanced military cooperation as well.

- The Alliance is forming a distinct relationship with Ukraine, a nation of pivotal importance for European security and stability. Priority areas for NATO-Ukraine cooperation include peacekeeping, joint training, logistics, education, seminars, exchange of experts, and defense reform. With this assistance a stable, democratic Ukraine can become a net contributor.

- NATO is supporting the growing aspiration of European allies, particularly those in the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU), to take on greater responsibility for such security issues as peacekeeping and crisis management. The new command structure creates a distinct option for European-led crisis operations. By shifting more responsibility to the European allies, a more mature transatlantic relationship can emerge, with a fairer sharing of roles.

- The Alliance is conducting a dialogue with several nations from the southern Mediterranean shores, based on the premise that security in Europe is linked to that of the Mediterranean. This exchange is intended to increase...
Solana

Its responses to the post-Cold War era have thus created their own dynamics that will last far into the next century. To carry these positive dynamics forward is the basis for the new NATO vision. But there is more. Beyond the threshold of the next century lie challenges to our transatlantic community. Globalization, for example, offers society opportunities to become more creative and prosperous but also more vulnerable. The rapid dissemination of technology and information offers new ways of production, but these can also help more states develop weapons of mass destruction. Regional conflict will present us with cruel choices between costly indifference and costly engagement. And the competition for natural resources will give projects such as oil pipelines or dams far-reaching ramifications. Finally, an economic understanding by promoting transparency and cooperation on issues of mutual relevance. It will evolve with a view of creating an overall frame of reference specific to the Mediterranean region.

- In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo the allies provide military back-up to political and diplomatic efforts. They furnished it first through air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions and subsequently by implementing the Dayton accords. NATO is leading the multinational peace forces in Bosnia while ensuring compliance with the military aspects of the accords. It unites a unique coalition of more than 30 nations within a joint military operation to create the secure environment for peace-building and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, by backing resolute diplomacy with military pressure, it is attempting to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. It also paved the way for the deployment of a verification mission for Kosovo and supports it through information gathering by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and an extraction force stationed in neighboring Macedonia. It also stands ready to contribute to a political settlement.

Beyond the Post-Cold War Era

The bipolar system, with its pre-set scenarios and strategies, conditioned NATO security policies and structures. The post-Cold War era has thus led to reorientation and improvisation. In retrospect the Alliance made correct choices. Its decisions and initiatives resulted in new security relationships that changed the face of Europe. Its responses to the post-Cold War era have thus created their own dynamics that will last far into the next century.

To carry these positive dynamics forward is the basis for the new NATO vision. But there is more. Beyond the threshold of the next century lie challenges to our transatlantic community. Globalization, for example, offers society opportunities to become more creative and prosperous but also more vulnerable. The rapid dissemination of technology and information offers new ways of production, but these can also help more states develop weapons of mass destruction. Regional conflict will present us with cruel choices between costly indifference and costly engagement. And the competition for natural resources will give projects such as oil pipelines or dams far-reaching ramifications. Finally, an economic
downswing, environmental disaster, or regional conflict could turn migration into severe political turbulence.

The Washington Summit will demonstrate that the adaptation of the 1990s was more than a soft landing from the Cold War; it served as preparation for the future. The policies and initiatives NATO set on track through the decade were in fact investments in its collective ability to meet the challenges of the next century. After four decades of Cold War and one since, the Alliance is now assuming an enhanced role as a promoter of security. Fulfilling expanded ambitions demands vision and confidence. NATO has both attributes. Indeed, its political and military agenda will remain the cornerstone of transatlantic security. It has a long-term strategic agenda for a long-term strategic alliance based on shared values, interests, and pragmatic problem-solving. It has all the ingredients for a successful security policy: a strong commitment to democratic values, a penchant for economic innovation and competition coupled with generosity towards less fortunate neighbors, and effective military tools. With this combination of assets NATO can assist in establishing a democratic and prosperous Eastern Europe, supporting Russian democratic transformation, preventing and managing regional conflicts, and fighting terrorism and other challenges.

- North America and Europe must remain linked in security. The transatlantic relationship remains the most successful example of a community of shared values, interests, and pragmatic problem-solving. It has all the ingredients for a successful security policy: a strong commitment to democratic values, a penchant for economic innovation and competition coupled with generosity towards less fortunate neighbors, and effective military tools. With this combination of assets NATO can assist in establishing a democratic and prosperous Eastern Europe, supporting Russian democratic transformation, preventing and managing regional conflicts, and fighting terrorism and other challenges.

- There is a need to concretely develop a stronger European security personality. A self-confident, more mature Europe is a more valuable partner to North America in managing wider security challenges. A Europe capable of coherent military action is a precondition for the Alliance’s long-term health. Efforts to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in the Alliance must come to fruition. The option for the European allies to draw on NATO capabilities for European-led peacekeeping and crisis management must become tangible. Moreover, a new chapter in relations between NATO and the European Union will have to open if this aspiration is to be truly realized.

- European integration will continue and NATO must play a pivotal role in this political process. The policy of enlargement will continue after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Other nations are seeking membership in NATO and EU and are demonstrating progress in political, economic, and military reforms and in being good neighbors. Keeping this powerful incentive for reform requires maintaining the momentum of the enlargement process, particularly through a credible open door policy. This policy must strike a balance between ensuring NATO’s effectiveness, the legitimate aspirations of the new democracies for integration and membership, and overall security and stability in Europe.

- Cooperation between member and nonmember countries must deepen. If future crises and conflicts are to be tackled by a wider coalition of allies and partners, we need mechanisms to set up such coalitions rapidly and effectively. Thus the NATO policy of partnership and outreach must continue to develop, moving from dialogue and confidence-building into operational matters. This cooperation with partners will be further embedded in Alliance policies and structures and provide us with new options for crisis management and peace support. Political consultation and cooperation with partners will extend to new areas in crisis prevention, regional security cooperation, and disaster relief.

- The Russian Federation has to be included in building security in Europe. Russia will probably remain a country of contradictions—but it nevertheless has legitimate security interests that demand our cooperation. A close NATO-Russia relationship will not mean agreement in every case. We must achieve a relationship where disagreement in one area does not prevent progress in another. It is already within reach. Our common interests in areas such as managing regional crises and preventing proliferation are clear. The stage is set for a pragmatic strategic partnership.

- In the Balkans long-term stability must be established for Bosnia, which means looking beyond the time-frame of the Stabilization Forces mandate. Once the parties realize that reconstruction, not violence, is the only
available option, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries will have the right to rejoin the international community. In Kosovo, where the international community faces humanitarian, political, and legal dilemmas, a solution must be found that allows the Kosovars a substantial degree of self-government within the confines of Yugoslavia proper. In finding such a solution, we must avoid pitting moral considerations against international law. And we must remember that a security policy that does not take as its point of reference the needs of humanity risks the worst possible fate—irrelevance.

- As regards Kosovo’s immediate neighbors, Albania and Macedonia, NATO has contributed to stabilizing these countries and helping them deal with an influx of refugees. Macedonia, in turn, is hosting the Headquarters for the Air Verification Mission and the NATO Extraction Force to support the OSCE verification mission. This new Alliance role of crisis prevention should be explored further. The mechanisms, such as PFP, are in place. Hopefully the prospect of long-term stability, coupled with economic benefits, will draw the entire Balkans back into the European mainstream. The Alliance will be ready to assist when the time comes.

- There is a need to further improve interoperability and sustainability among allied forces. In the future, these forces must be on the same wavelength and able to move long distances effectively and quickly. They must be able to communicate service to service and ally to ally in a world where information technologies are becoming part of the soldier’s basic kit. That is why we are preparing a Defense Capabilities Initiative to address the challenges posed by rapid advances in military technology. In addition we will ensure that the problems posed by transatlantic defense industry restructuring are addressed in a frank transatlantic dialogue.

- There is a need to guard against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have brought home the fact that the quest for nuclear weaponry was not only a Cold War phenomenon. So have the clandestine nuclear efforts by other countries. It is no exaggeration to state that proliferation could emerge as one of the greatest security challenges of the next century. Weapons of mass destruction can pose a tremendous risk to our national territories and populations as well as to our troops deployed on peace support operations. That is why we are preparing a summit initiative on these weapons which, in addition to sharing information among allies, could coordinate Alliance support for nonproliferation efforts.
The Strategic Concept

NATO will unveil a revised Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit that is designed to guide the activities of the Alliance into the next century. What is the purpose of this document?

Strategic Concept 1999 will reaffirm the nature and purpose of the Alliance, offer a clear strategic perspective on the evolution of European security, assess the current and future security environment, and set out fundamental efforts that the allies will collectively undertake. In so doing it will recommit NATO members to collective defense and the transatlantic link. And it will take into account not only new roles and missions but a decade of adaptation of objectives the Alliance has pursued vigorously since the end of the Cold War.

But the Strategic Concept is also at heart a planning document. It provides the guidance to defense planners to ensure that the Alliance has the capabilities needed to translate political decision and purpose into military action. The concept is thus the key link between the political agenda and the coordinated and cooperative military activities to carry it out.

To fulfill this role requires a careful forward-looking assessment of what the Alliance may face and what it will need in the decades ahead. Major aggression is unlikely in the strategic environment of the foreseeable future, but the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is still subject to a range of unpredictable risks. Developments outside NATO territory, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and more recently Kosovo, can threaten the stability of allied and partner nations. In the final analysis, similar events could threaten our security require a collective response.

Thus the revised Strategic Concept will define a new balance between the traditional role of collective defense and new roles in crisis management. Such operations have become an intrinsic part of the more general objective of reinforcing and extending stability. NATO should act where it can offer added value, not assume the role of the global policeman. This policy was underlined as early as 1993: on a case-by-case basis and in accord with its own procedures, the Alliance is ready to support peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the U.N. Security Council or the responsibility of OSCE.

All of this is based on a broad approach to security which recognizes the role of political, economic, social, and environmental elements in the more complex and multifaceted post-Cold War security landscape. Indeed, this broad approach has guided the Alliance in its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other international organizations such as OSCE, EU, WEU, the Council of Europe and, of course, the United Nations. Our aim—more clearly in our sights than ever—is to construct a security architecture in which the Alliance contribution to security and stability complements and reinforces the contributions to dialogue, international cooperation, and crisis management of these other organizations.

Therefore, in addition to maintaining military capabilities sufficient to prevent war, fulfill the full range of missions, and manage crises affecting the security of its members, NATO strategy incorporates the continued pursuit of dialogue, cooperation, and partnership. It pursues a balanced partnership between the European and North American allies through the development of ESDI within the Alliance. This will enable Europeans to make a more coherent contribution as well as allow them to act by themselves.

Strategic Concept 1999 will draw individual elements of the NATO agenda into a single, coherent strategic framework. Whether it be enlargement, crisis management, European defense integration, a strong partnership with Russia, closer relations with our FIF partners, transforming the latent potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) into a substantive forum for consultation and cooperation, or any other part of the agenda I have described—these are all organic parts of a coherent security strategy. Individual NATO programs and initiatives are part and parcel of a basic reordering of Euro-Atlantic security. This revamping is more than just the healing of the wounds of the Cold War. NATO is preparing for a more promising future in which all countries in Europe will feel more secure and in which instability and mistrust should disappear.

The Washington Summit will thus provide a Strategic Concept for the 21st century. It will offer a perspective on future security challenges that may face the allies collectively or individually. It will show that we can best tackle them through teamwork. It will give us guidelines on how to prepare our forces for such contingencies, taking the short, medium, and longer-term view of what the future may hold. But it will also be an active document, a tool by which we can shape and mitigate what lies ahead, a proactive approach to expand the potential of like-minded democracies in ensuring the security of their people, values, and territory.

Barely three days after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the American commentator Walter Lippman wrote the following assessment:

The pact will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union and, come what may, will survive it.

These words have proven true. At the end of this century Europe and North America have emerged as the most successful community of nations in history. It is today, as it has always been, a community of values as well as interests, of vision as well as pragmatism, of continuity as well as change. The Alliance epitomizes these virtues. That is why it will remain an indispensable foundation of our security for another 50 years.
It has been almost a decade since the Berlin Wall collapsed under the weight of an ideology which was at odds with the human spirit. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and demise of Soviet military power, the imminent threat of a conventional attack of the scale and breadth that the Alliance faced for its first forty years vanished. Strategic warning of such an attack had been measured in days; we now have the luxury of addressing far lesser challenges in terms of months or years. Of equal if not greater importance is the universal recognition of the bankruptcy of the ideology that drove the threat. Thus the means and will that menaced the West have been swept onto the rubbish heap of history. NATO should be proud of its victory in the Cold War, a triumph that produced no real losers—only winners.

As we celebrate that accomplishment, we must prepare for the formidable challenges of the next century.
While they are less imminent threats to Western survival, they nevertheless pose a fundamental danger because of their insidious mechanisms, intrinsic complexity, and intractability to resolution. Besting them will test the will and instruments of the Alliance to a degree that will rival and in some respects exceed that posed by the Warsaw Pact.

Two broad arcs of crisis have emerged since the Iron Curtain parted, one extending from the North Cape through the oil-rich Caucasus to the southwest, and the other astride the southern littoral of the Mediterranean through the Middle East, with their nexus in the Balkans. In the East, the end of the Cold War unleashed national hatreds long deadened under heavy-handed repression. Historic flashpoints reigned in the Balkans, along the perimeter of the former Soviet Union, and in potentially aggressive states in both North Africa and the Middle East. We continue to confront transnational threats such as uncontrollable migrant flows and organized crime. Corruption, black market smuggling, and terrorism have assisted traffickers in weapons of mass destruction, causing the dangers of nuclear, chemical, and biological destruction to reemerge as a great concern. These dangers stem from instability in the absence of democratic institutions and free market economies.

Practical Responses

Over the last decade NATO has responded to a new security environment by undergoing substantive change, both internally and externally. A new Strategic Concept has been formulated and will be refined at the Washington Summit. New relationships with the militaries of Russia and Ukraine have been implemented. The NATO military structure has been significantly modified—a wave of restructuring, downsizing, multinationalizing, and reshaping of its forces. Transition to a new command structure is beginning, and formation of more flexible military headquarters such as the combined joint task force (CJTF) is well underway.

The new security environment has also led to another practical response to regional security challenges: NATO and neighboring nations have come together in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Common threats have encouraged former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in developing a firm basis for democratic and economic reform. In this process PFP has succeeded in more ways than originally envisioned. Military engagement and exercises led to cooperation at higher levels. Initiatives such as
operations in the Balkans have focused attention on the post-hostilities phase of a conflict

During the Cold War, the response to a massive Warsaw Pact onslaught would have been overwhelmingly one of arms. At the theater level and below operations would have been driven almost exclusively by military considerations and our focus would not have extended beyond the cessation of hostilities. The operational environment in the Balkans today—as will be true of most future contingencies—is essentially different. It is complex. Multiple instruments of influence and power are wielded by a broad spectrum of national, multinational, and transnational actors often in competition with one another and sometimes in the pursuit of ill-defined or contrary ends. While military power remains a significant element in the complex equation of conflict resolution, success is more often the product of a complementary admixture of multiple means employed with mutually amplifying consequences. Operations in the Balkans have focused attention on the post-hostilities phase of a conflict, “beyond the horizon of victory.” As Basil Liddell-Hart observed, inattention to this period has all too frequently led the strategists of this century to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Operations at this stage demand unparalleled skill and judgment on the part of all soldiers, from commanders to squad members. Individually, we must discriminate between persuading and forcing, insisting and doing, presence and action. Institutionally, we must adjust educational and training programs to meet the demands of this new environment.

A Balkan Focus

As an organization we must fill key capability gaps. It is critical to enhance our ability to interface with a broad range of international organizations and civil bodies. Of equal importance is a robust capability to operate—effectively engage—beyond the traditional bounds of conventional operations, most significantly in the ill-defined and politically sensitive void between routine law enforcement and the lower end of operations. In addition to profiling the contributions of special operations forces, this role necessitates creating specialized new organizational structures and puts a premium on developing nonlethal means. In Bosnia, a specialized brigade-sized organization, the Carabinieri-inspired multinational specialized unit (MSU), has performed superbly and shown the way ahead for NATO.

While non-Article 5 operations, especially peace support, will consume much energy in the next century, the deterrent effect of military force, to include nuclear weapons, must also remain an inalienable component of the Strategic Concept. Mediation and compromise will not always deter conflict, nor will moral, diplomatic, or economic suasion always be adequate to remove underlying causes. Some antagonists will underestimate NATO resolve and resort to “the final judgment...
of kings. The Alliance must thus retain its warfighting capabilities. Force must remain a feasible choice even if it is our last choice.

Our experience in the Balkans has been particularly instructive in this regard. Again the political imperative emerges: application of force will be measured against a standard that stretches the envelope of what is technically possible—with little room for error. Strikes must enjoy near perfect precision and target effect and be virtually free of collateral damage and friendly casualties. The implications for force planning are clear: precision attack with all-weather, survivable systems (land, sea, air) will define NATO operational capabilities in the next century. It is sobering to note that over the last decade we witnessed a growing technological gradient rather than a convergence of national capabilities. If it widens, this gap will be troubling for Alliance unity in crisis.

The Balkans engagement has revealed key shortcomings in force structure. Foremost is the need for an Alliance air-ground surveillance system to complement our existing aerial surveillance capability. This will be an important component of allied information dominance. The requirement to enhance capabilities at the civil-military interface—from liaison with civil and nongovernmental organizations to new structures such as MSU—is also clear. The importance of special operations forces will also increase.

The Balkans experience has placed a premium on reaction forces. As the initial deployment to Bosnia and planning for Kosovo have repeatedly revealed—recently with respect to a possible peace implementation force—the capability to introduce capable ground forces into a crisis situation in a timely manner leaves much to be desired. To deter, force need only be reasonably available. Its use in the future, however, includes a critical temporal element: it must be readily on hand when a political decision to commit it is made. NATO posture currently reflects an unhealthy reliance on airpower for rapid action. But airpower alone can be an uncertain and inadequate instrument. We urgently need to strengthen
our ground reaction forces. The commitment of ground troops in the immediate aftermath of air and maritime actions remains as a poignant signal of national resolve.

Our reaction force headquarters deserves and must receive greater attention. In addition to rapidly completing work on the CJTF initiative, we must recognize what it represents and consider formalizing the sequence of deployments—accepting rather than jousting with the tyranny of time. In another ground deployment to the Balkans, for example, we would likely lead with our most ready outfit, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Land, followed by Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). In an extended operation, a CJTF (once it is tailored and manned) would then take the reins as early as feasible, allowing us to reconstitute our reaction capability. If this is necessarily the headquarters flow, let’s recognize and exercise it.

Beyond the Horizon

While the near-term focus must remain on the Balkan situation, where NATO must succeed to remain credible, we should ask if it is prudent to look beyond that horizon and consider reaction force requirements for the next century. From my perspective, a second, Mediterranean-based ARRC would provide for a more balanced strategic readiness posture.

Second, Mediterranean-based ARRC makes strategic sense. It would provide for a more balanced strategic readiness posture, provide an opportunity for the maturation of the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI), and fill the reaction headquarters gap that necessarily occurs as currently structured. This second reaction corps would also relieve the high training and operational pressure on the existing ARRC and would offer a structure to facilitate training and foster the interoperability of Southern Region-based reaction forces.

We must follow through vigorously in the full integration of the three accession states into the integrated military structure. We have made enormous progress, but experience teaches us that reaching full integration—from top to bottom, from air-defense to logistics, from territorial defense to more complex force projection missions—can require a decade of sustained work. The Alliance will leverage technology through the interoperability affirmation program, a rigorous, multifaceted, computer-driven training package, to accelerate this process.

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The interoperability of staffs and units remains a major challenge. As stated previously, our post-Cold War experience teaches us that multinationalism is being driven to ever-lower tactical echelons—witness the multinational divisions, brigades, and battalions in the Stabilization Force. Interoperability, once viewed as a future goal, is now an operational imperative. It confronts us in Bosnia and throughout the Southern Region where NATO is currently focused on Kosovo.

We will exploit technology to help close this gap. The Allied Command Europe Command and Staff Training Program will meld a cadre of expert trainers with computer simulation to create a flexible training resource, tailored to the specific needs of each headquarters. We expect this program to be operational before the turn of the century.

We must look to communications as well. Essential to the ability to maintain information dominance, communications connectivity has not kept up with the pace of tactical multinationalism. If mercantilism precludes us from procuring like systems, we must at least field compatible ones. It will not be possible to counter the challenges of interoperability with technology alone. We must sustain our focus on both converging procedures and continuously validating capabilities through demanding exercises. National traditions must give way to multinational requirements.

Convergence

In the Balkans, NATO forces stand shoulder-to-shoulder with a broad range of partners. That crucible has demonstrated the enormous success of the initial Alliance investment in PFP. We must strengthen this program. In its first phase, it was an exciting experiment, nothing more than an exercise designed to break down barriers to communications and ease tensions between former adversaries. A second phase took us beyond low-level exercises to the creation of interoperability objectives for partner forces to help target their efforts and our assistance, and more substantial exercises designed to help assess progress.

Now there is an opportunity to move to a third phase, with the goal of the convergence of military capabilities, to the degree that partners will become fully interoperable with allied forces. In this vein we might seek to combine interoperability objectives to make something akin to NATO force goals and establish a force planning program for PFP analogous to that of the Alliance. We could form multinational partner units—with or without member nation participation—designed to fill specific niches in non-Article 5 needs. The multinational specialized unit currently deployed in Bosnia, to which both members and nonmembers have contributed forces—sets a standard in this regard. The Alliance must include capable partners in larger-scale exercises and develop structures to strengthen partner proficiency in a broader array of missions.

Finally, all member nations must protect their military competence from continuing cuts in structures and budgets. The peace dividend has been granted. Defense spending is at historic lows and is continuing to decline in many capitals. Compared to the 1980s, outlays by NATO members as a percentage of gross domestic product have fallen by half. Manpower has been reduced by 30 percent, land forces by 50 percent, naval forces by 40 percent, and air forces by 30 percent. The United States has redeployed 70 percent of its forces in Europe since the beginning of the 1990s. These developments were necessary and correct. But in looking to the future, we must cope with dangerous challenges and adapt our institutions in a budgetary environment in which there is little or no margin for error. It is time to halt this trend. We must have adequate and stable resourcing over time. Our forces require adequate training, structure, and investment. As already stated, they must stay abreast of advances in technology.

The bedrock of our security rests on the transformation of NATO military structures and capabilities and, more crucially, on the men and women in uniform. It is our responsibility to train them appropriately, order them in effective organizations, and equip them to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The application of force will be required. As Sir Michael Howard noted a decade ago, “We have, for better or worse, not reached a state of social development when the soldier will find no opportunity to exercise his profession, or when warrior values have become obsolete.” He was certainly proven right during the first decade of the post-Cold War era. We must assume that he will be proven right for decades to come and prepare accordingly.

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the NATO periphery. We face a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increases in the lethality of terrorism, non-state sponsored adventurism, and other asymmetric challenges. These dangers have forced us to reconsider the definitions of peace, territorial integrity, and security—concepts that are the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. NATO accepts the fact that it must change to remain as relevant as it has been for 50 years. Politically, programs such as the Founding Act with Russia, a distinct relationship with Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the

**Transforming NATO Defense Capabilities**

By H A R O L D W. G E H M A N, J R.

The transatlantic relationship created by the Washington Treaty of 1949 has been uniquely enduring and successful in warding off common dangers. However, this achievement has resulted in a new era that cannot be characterized in bipolar terms. Ethnic conflict, political instability, and territorial disputes are mounting around the NATO periphery. We face a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increases in the lethality of terrorism, non-state sponsored adventurism, and other asymmetric challenges. These dangers have forced us to reconsider the definitions of peace, territorial integrity, and security—concepts that are the *raison d'être* of the Alliance.

NATO accepts the fact that it must change to remain as relevant as it has been for 50 years. Politically, programs such as the Founding Act with Russia, a distinct relationship with Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the
Partnership for Peace program evidence this development and extend transparency to the east and south. The most discernible new mission is the assumption of peacekeeping responsibilities as leader of Implementation and Stabilization Force. Bosnia has been a success in both humanitarian and geopolitical terms and demonstrated that the transformation of the Alliance from a fixed defense posture to flexible mobile operations is well underway. NATO force levels have been reduced by 35 percent and shifted from high-readiness, forward-deployed heavy units to a mix of lower-readiness and core rapid reaction forces. Significant progress also is being made in doctrine, organization, and technology to ensure that NATO forces can serve as an effective crisis management tool whenever the collective interest of the allies is threatened.

The Strategic Concept approved in 1991 offered a broad definition of security that set the stage for operations in the Balkans. NATO heads of state will approve a new Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit that is likely to continue that trend toward operations around the periphery of its territory. The next century will present a global environment of rapidly changing technology and diverse asymmetric threats. Members of the Alliance are struggling to make the transition to the information age while facing competing demands for resources. Such challenges will test the ability of its defense forces to function as a coherent and compatible team capable of undertaking joint missions and operations. NATO thus needs a more systematic way of preparing for the rapid development of defense capabilities required by the new Strategic Concept. Although the current force planning process has been effective, it is a deficiency-based planning system unsuited for the larger and faster changes that are bearing down.

ACLANT acts as the conduit for the flow of planning, concepts, and technology between North America and Europe

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Transatlantic Link

Throughout NATO history, the transatlantic link has referred to the political, economic, and military ties between North America and Europe. As one of two major NATO commands, Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) is the western pillar of that relationship. It was founded to ensure that military forces and sustainment could flow from North America to defend Europe. Traditional common defense operations are integral to the Alliance and remain the primary ACLANT mission; however, the changing security environment provides an opportunity to use the maritime expertise of the command in new ways. ACLANT is currently in the forefront of planning and conducting sea-based combined and joint operations designed to employ the full spectrum of military capabilities from different military services—capabilities that will provide the means of dealing with crises on the periphery of NATO. The unfolding of initiatives such as the combined joint task force, Partnership for Peace program, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, European Multinational Maritime Force, and counterproliferation are vital to the Alliance and enjoy a high priority. Interoperability problems and learning to exploit technology are also critical issues. The character of the ACLANT staff has changed significantly to accommodate them. It is genuinely joint with representatives of every service who capitalize on the core competencies of the Armed Forces as a whole.

In many ways these efforts represent the new meaning of the transatlantic link. ACLANT acts as the conduit for the flow of planning, concepts, and technology between North America and Europe. We view ourselves as a bridge to the future, leading in innovation as we adapt to changes in the strategic and operational environment on behalf of the
Alliance. These efforts are enhanced by the synergy between ACLANT and U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM).

The ACOM Connection

As commander in chief of U.S. Atlantic Command I am responsible for military interests of the Nation in the geographic area of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North to South Pole, excluding the Caribbean and North Sea. While this is a vast area of responsibility (AOR), the only sizeable populations are found in Iceland and the Azores—and they are not experiencing any major crises. This enables me to focus on assigned functional responsibilities.

Our charges include command of more than 1.2 million soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen within the United States—or roughly 80 percent of general purpose combat forces. Because my AOR lacks hot spots, I provide these forces to the other geographic commanders in chief. More
Phases of Joint Experimentation

**Near Term**
- maintain current dominance
- enhance capabilities of existing forces by quickly identifying innovative and current operational concepts, evaluating their potential, and applying off-the-shelf solutions

**Mid Term**
- actualize Joint Vision 2010
- achieve and maintain full spectrum dominance with the 2010 force through joint experimentation with evolutionary concepts

**Long Term**
- dominate the revolution in military affairs (RMA)
- through bold thinking, shape the joint-force-after-next by developing and exploring revolutionary concepts

Importantly, ACOM is responsible for joint training and integration, which are very much focused on future warfighting challenges. In fact, we like to say that the future is in our AOR. All of these tasks mesh well with my NATO responsibilities and are key to bringing about the healthy changes which I believe are needed in the U.S. military and the Alliance as a whole. Given these varied responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense asked me to host a conference last autumn entitled “Transforming NATO’s Defense Capabilities” to examine current efforts and future plans to bring about change. In addition to presentations on transforming national militaries, most participants accepted the call to transform allied capabilities to deal with challenges in the next century. There was agreement that long-term force planning, which has served NATO well, will not enable us to get where we must go. I am pleased because this means we can start working on solutions. It will allow us to take the fear out of the planning process in the future. There was also a consensus on one solution—the requirement for a Common Operational Vision for our defense forces. It could act as an umbrella concept for a more methodical process that allows the Alliance to systematically work on change without necessarily predicting the future.

**Joint Experimentation**

My role at the Norfolk conference, beyond playing host, was to describe one way in which we are dealing with the transformation of the U.S. military. In October 1998, ACOM became the DOD executive agent for a process known as joint experimentation. The decision by the Secretary of Defense to assign this vital role to us represented the culmination of dedicated efforts by both the Pentagon and Congress.

There are two primary and enduring reasons to pursue joint experimentation that equally apply to the United States and NATO: to prevent surprises by potential adversaries and to maintain our military advantage. Experimentation will help in the exploration of innovative approaches and leap-ahead capabilities and in the exploitation of opportunities to transform the U.S. military into a 21st century force. The bottom line is keeping all our options open.

Before experimenting, however, we are spending considerable time and effort to determine what constitutes an experiment and how the process of selecting topics, developing objectives, and analyzing results works. Joint experimentation is a long-term enterprise, not a series of isolated events. It is not a demonstration or exercise, although with careful planning an experiment can be conducted within an exercise. Experimentation must go beyond studies. We must experiment to discover and learn, not just demonstrate or verify. This is an iterative process for developing and assessing concept-based hypotheses to identify and recommend the best value-added solutions.

We are focused on integrated capabilities and warfighting concepts on the operational level, with forays onto the tactical and strategic levels. We will support, integrate, and leverage programs in conjunction with CINCs, services, and agencies to synchronize efforts and provide a joint context for experimentation. This plan involves performing simultaneous near-term, mid-term, and long-term experiments in the areas of doctrine, organization, and technology.

Near-term experiments seek to correct deficiencies in current forces and doctrine by rapid integration of off-the-shelf technology and changes in current operational concepts. Our methods include the leveraging of scheduled demonstrations and tests as well as conducting experiments.
efforts are focused one to six years out and impact on the current future year defense plan. Mid-term experiments seek to build joint capabilities with emerging technologies and evolution-
ary operational concepts. The bulk of such efforts involve experiments and

**joint experimentation is an aggressive, innovative process to propel the Armed Forces into the future**

wargaming. The Common Operational Vision concepts based on Joint Vision 2010 fall into the mid-term category. Long-term experimentation explores revolutionary ideas and future tech-

ologies. Although experiments will be used when possible, wargaming, workshops, and seminars will be the most common methods.

Joint experimentation is an aggres-
sive, innovative process to propel the Armed Forces into the future. It is also timely—occurring as a more methodi-
cal and systematic approach is required to transform military institutions to en-
sure their relevancy. Joint experimenta-
tion is key to changing doctrine, organ-
ization, and technology to meet this challenge of transformation.

**Concept Development**

NATO recognizes the requirement for concept development and exper-
imentation (CDE) as integral to force planning. CDE will help the Alliance and individual member nations to transform defense forces to meet emerging conditions. It will support implementation of the new Strategic Concept and the operational vision for NATO forces and help member nations harness emerging technology via inno-
vative operational concepts. CDE will examine both doctrine and organiza-
tion as well as technology and, like U.S. joint experimentation, focus si-
multaneously on near-term, mid-term, and long-term concepts. It will save money by identifying the most prom-

ising concepts and helping nations avoid locking in on expensive techni-
cal solutions too early.

In the process of implementing a CDE program within NATO we are proceeding along two complementary tracks. The first involves leveraging na-
tion-centered experimentation efforts which involve battlefield operational tasks such as the rapid insertion of re-
action forces to stabilize crises, defense against hostile aircraft, or the de-
tection and destruction of theater ballistic missiles.

Using this approach, coalitions of interested members oper-
ating under a lead nation would col-
laboratively develop and experiment with new operational concepts devel-
oped to carry out critical tasks.

This process begins by identifying critical task needs across the range of potential military operations. Tasks could be selected from various sources which include: NATO-validated long-
term requirement force goals; NATO-
sponsored requirement identification efforts (such as land, maritime, and aerospace long-range studies); member

nations; Supreme Allied Commander Europe or Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT); research and de-
velopement committees; and the pri-
vate sector. To gain the maximum ben-
efit for the resources expended, tasks will be chosen when significant short-
falls exist or the potential for major improvement is clear. Initially CDE is focused on reaction forces, but it could be extended to all defense forces. ACLANT, in association with Allied Command Europe, will help coordi-
nate and support the development of concepts from battlefield operational tasks and facilitate the conduct and evaluation of experiments.

The second CDE track involves experiments on functional areas such as command, control, and communi-
cation (C3), intelligence, logistics, and mobility. Concepts for the experiments could be selected, refined, and devel-
oped by a major command working group from the same sources as na-
tional level CDE. ACLANT would cre-
ate a campaign plan to provide a high-
level description of the process and an assessment of the utility of candidate concepts for experimentation. It would then present the plan to the North At-
lantic Council via the NATO Military Committee for review and concur-
rence. Once approved, the command would develop a plan for each concept to describe the schedule, participants, and desired capabilities in sufficient detail that operational commanders or agencies such as the NATO C3 Agency or SACLANT Undersa Research Center can carry out the trial. This would con-
tain a hypothesis that both defines ob-
jectives and describes the collection and analysis of data. ACLANT will ex-
amine the results reached on a given concept as well as information from other experiments to draw conclusions on its utility and value for combined operations. After a thorough review, these conclusions will become recom-
mended actions for implementation.

It is not clear what exact shape transformation will take. Yet we expect the challenges of the next century to be both quantitatively and qualita-

tively different from those of the Cold War and to require changes in individ-
ual and collective institutions, military strategies, and defense postures. The in-
stitutional challenge can scarcely be ex-
aggerated. Usually a sea change in the military occurs only after a new, ascen-
dant threat appears on the horizon or major crises begin to unfold. Fortu-
nately, the end of the Cold War leaves us without the former threat for now.

This is an era of dynamic change, constrained resources, and rapid tech-
nological advances. It requires bold, innovative thinking and an ability to shape and manage change to preserve the leadership role of the Alliance. Technology must be an ally. To suc-
cceed, we must look into the future, ex-

plore innovative operational concepts, develop the right technology, commit assets wisely, and prepare the joint and combined community for tomorrow. A program of concept development and experimentation is indispensable to systematic change. By seizing this op-
portunity, NATO will remain the secu-
rity organization of choice for the next century.
The issue of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is not new. Long before the recent meeting between the British and French heads of state at St. Malo, Europeans considered strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, and encouraged a security role for the European Union (EU) and its eventual friendly takeover of the Western European Union (WEU). The result is a new proposal for a new time, based on the accords reached in the last five years—especially breakthroughs made at the 1996 North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting held in Berlin.

Europeans must improve their capabilities for force projection and sustainability if ESDI is to be more than a slogan, and they have taken up this challenge. In the past, European discussions of ESDI have dealt almost entirely with institutional arrangements. These are important—and one should not diminish either the significance of ESDI for European construction or the deepening of EU integration. But any discussion of ESDI that is not based on real capabilities and commitments will be just a paper drill. These points were central to the summons issued by Prime Minister Blair for a renewed European dialogue on ESDI and for an emphasis on capabilities that must be applauded.

Alexander R. Vershbow is the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and previously served on the staff of the National Security Council.
The French role in such events is a very positive development. In time, increased efforts to coordinate improvements in capabilities—if indeed this is a result of St. Malo—can lead to greater interoperability between France and other allies. Greater French involvement with NATO military structures—particularly if Paris decides to participate fully—will strengthen ESDI within NATO, given the formidable capabilities that France brings to the table.

The overall direction in the wake of the St. Malo meeting is positive, and we look forward to a continuing exchange on ESDI. As Secretary of State Albright has observed, the United States welcomes a more capable European partner with modern, flexible military forces that can put out fires in Europe’s back yard and work with the

**Congress and the public are looking for a more equitable sharing of responsibilities within the Alliance**

The French role in such events is a very positive development. In time, increased efforts to coordinate improvements in capabilities—if indeed this is a result of St. Malo—can lead to greater interoperability between France and other allies. Greater French involvement with NATO military structures—particularly if Paris decides to participate fully—will strengthen ESDI within NATO, given the formidable capabilities that France brings to the table.

The overall direction in the wake of the St. Malo meeting is positive, and we look forward to a continuing exchange on ESDI. As Secretary of State Albright has observed, the United States welcomes a more capable European partner with modern, flexible military forces that can put out fires in Europe’s back yard and work with the

**Congress and the public are looking for a more equitable sharing of responsibilities within the Alliance**

Alliance to defend common interests. A stronger ESDI will depend not only on strengthening decisionmaking structures and collective political will, but also on tangible improvements in European military capabilities which promote ESDI.

At the same time, the framework of transatlantic cooperation as well as the Berlin decisions of 1996 are important and positive developments that must be taken into account as ESDI evolves. Improved military capabilities will shore up the foundation of the ESDI structure, but we also need to preserve the transatlantic roof for ESDI established at Berlin.

**Questions and Pitfalls**

In the United States, both Congress and the public are looking for a more equitable sharing of responsibilities within the Alliance. A robust ESDI that preserves the transatlantic dimension of the Atlantic Alliance will make both Europe and NATO stronger, and that is essential to sustaining American support. However, problems may arise as Europe reflects on the advance of ESDI.

First, a high priority must be placed on finalizing the remaining work from Berlin to build ESDI within NATO. We should not lose sight of this important work, which holds real promise. We are close to the finish line, but time is getting short, and we must press on and finish the job by the Washington Summit. There will be no time to take the process further after Washington, once the framework is set. More dual-hatting at different levels of the planning and command structure will enable WEU or EU to prepare for and conduct Petersburg missions without the need to create duplicate structures—which would be both costly and politically divisive.

Second, the United States—like the United Kingdom—is open-minded about institutional arrangements Europeans may want to make for a future security and defense identity. Because of support for a strong ESDI and the fruitful relationship between NATO and WEU, there is interest in the institutional side of ESDI. Should a defense dimension be transposed into the European Union? A chief concern is that in exploring ways to transpose the NATO–WEU relationship into a possible NATO–EU framework, we ensure that the new relationship embodies and preserves the principles which were so carefully crafted in Berlin.

One particularly important point contained in the Berlin communiqué was the principle that we will act together—under the auspices of NATO—whenever possible. This was the best way to ensure solidarity and effectiveness. Whether or not the United States participates, decisions on the NATO, WEU, or EU leadership of operations will be common. There must be unity of purpose even when some allies opt out of a specific operation.

This is not a question of sequencing in the literal sense; consultations will occur in many forums and formats as a crisis unfolds. The key is to have a thorough transatlantic discussion before making a final decision on which military action is necessary. This is important because security deliberations differ from economic and foreign policy. Apart from the smallest of operations, there is always the risk that a situation may escalate, even to the level of Article 5, and additional NATO (namely, U.S.) military support may be required. Thus consulting fully through NATO makes operational sense and is vital to maintaining solidarity, which is the hallmark of the Alliance. This is what Secretary Albright means by “no decoupling.”

Moreover, the principle of “separate but not separate forces” must be observed rather than duplicating our existing capabilities and structures. With flat or declining defense budgets the trend across most of Europe, redundant structures would be particularly unwise. We also must take into account the differing membership status of countries so as to avoid discrimination and creating new dividing lines. Inclusiveness must be the general rule. A European operation will have the greatest chance of success if it has political and practical support from non-EU allies—not least Turkey.

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A Capabilities Initiative

One should note that WEU has taken an admirably inclusive approach with different forms of status for non-EU allies, non-NATO EU members, and central and east European partners. The divergence in membership between NATO and the European Union will grow with the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance and could increase given the sluggish pace of EU enlargement.

Thus if ESDI becomes more an EU than WEU affair, it will require innovation in keeping non-EU Europeans engaged—perhaps opening the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to non-EU countries interested in participating in operations to implement its decisions. Otherwise, the availability of NATO assets and support could be jeopardized not by an American veto, but by the resentment of allies shut out of the action. Indeed, we are already hearing complaints that the post-St. Malo debate is taking place mainly in EU, not at NATO or even WEU.

Therefore institutional aspects need to be handled with care. But, as previously indicated, institutional questions should be secondary to the fundamental issue of capabilities. Once the ESDI foundation is bolstered by improved European allied force projection and sustainment capabilities under a solid transatlantic roof, specific institutional arrangements will be easier to work out.

Given the importance of capability improvements, we are pleased that Germany, as WEU president, is conducting an audit of assets available for European-led operations; and we look forward to seeing the results. This effort, however, could also be carried out in the NATO framework.

The United States has proposed—and NATO has taken up—an initiative on defense capabilities that will be on the agenda at the Washington Summit. We believe the work suitably complements efforts underway after the St. Malo meeting to further develop ESDI. The NATO initiative aims at enhancing capabilities for crisis management operations beyond Alliance territory—where greater mobility, sustainability, survivability, and interoperability are essential.
Our success in Bosnia has been significant in both humanitarian and geopolitical terms, but it has also revealed that refocusing the Alliance from a fixed, positional defense to a more flexible, mobile defense is incomplete—particularly when one looks at European military forces. Together with work underway in WEU, European allies should seize upon the Defense Capabilities Initiative as a tool for leveraging the force restructuring which was endorsed at the summit in St. Malo.

Drawing another lesson from Bosnia—and more recently from Kosovo—it is clear that the United States and Europe rely on each other to undertake operations where their common interests are at stake. ESDI is not simply a West-West discussion. Its development will directly affect how Americans and Europeans are able to deal with future crises in the East and on Europe’s periphery.

The anniversary of NATO celebrates a truly extraordinary achievement. However we must not lose sight of our obligation to prepare to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We can best honor the past success of the Alliance by working together to create an equally ambitious, forward-looking, and more balanced transatlantic security partnership for the next fifty years.

This article is adapted from a speech delivered to the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies on January 28, 1999, in Paris.

Franco-British Summit: Joint Declaration on European Defense

December 4, 1998
St. Malo, France

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.

2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council and meetings of Defence Ministers). The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.

5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.
By JOHN M. COLLINS

Special Operations Forces (SOF) help shape the international security environment, prepare for an uncertain future, and respond with precision in a range of potential crises. Unique training and skills enable them to operate in situations where conventional units cannot be used for political or military reasons. Moreover, they place a priority on applying finesse rather than brute force and possess overt, covert, and clandestine capabilities not found elsewhere within the Armed Forces. No other formations are permanently organized, equipped, and trained for foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and other highly sensitive missions. In addition, SOF have call on unparalleled interagency and international expertise. Their skills offer unique, cost-effective, low-profile, and direct as well as indirect measures that enhance international stability, inhibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), combat terrorism, and check illicit drug trafficking in peacetime.

Familiarity with their areas of responsibility (AORs) and their ability to work closely with foreign military and other institutions give SOF an advantage over conventional forces in situations that demand cultural awareness. Army Special Forces and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) specialists, along with some Navy and Air Force personnel, are regionally oriented. Knowledge of social, political, and economic factors, coupled with language fluency, enables them to establish relationships with foreign military and civilian personnel.

Colonel John M. Collins, USA (Ret.), has served as a senior specialist in national defense with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress and is the author of eleven books.
Peacetime Challenges

Foreign internal defense operations counter the effects of poverty, ignorance, lawlessness, and other ills that undermine the security of a nation. Success in such situations, which commonly takes years to achieve, not only promotes peace and stability but progressively reduces reliance on the United States. Multifaceted SOF units, which keep abreast of developments in their respective areas of interest, are best suited to perform such missions.

Several advantages are evident. Small, self-reliant SOF units function effectively in austere circumstances without an extensive infrastructure. In pursuit of U.S. interests, PSYOP campaigns mold public opinion, and civic action programs aid the local citizenry as evidenced in Haiti, where fewer than 1,200 SOCOM personnel became the de facto government. Such nontraditional efforts actually hone SOF skills, whereas conventional combat formations gradually lose their edge when assigned similar missions.

The WMD Threat

Acquisition of a relatively few weapons of mass destruction with reliable delivery systems could convert a small, aggressive state into a regional power overnight. Suitcase-size bombs could immeasurably intensify the leverage of terrorists and drug cartels. President Clinton warned that “the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC] weapons ... constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” and declared “a national emergency to deal with that threat,” which persists despite arms control agreements and export controls.

Detailed intelligence—which is essential for counterproliferation policies, plans, programs, and operations—is hard to obtain because cover, concealment, dispersal, and deception are used to mask WMD activity at each stage from research and development through production, storage, and deployment. Clever ploys may fool spies-in-the-sky as the Indian nuclear testing did in May 1998. Dual-use technology, moreover, makes it difficult for distant sensors to distinguish between illicit and legitimate projects. Not every nuclear reactor, for example, yields weapons grade plutonium. Facilities that could manufacture biological agents resemble plants that produce vaccines. Modern pharmaceutical plants commonly incorporate waste disposal and safety procedures once associated only with chemical warfare facilities.

Under favorable circumstances, SOF can confirm evidence gathered by other means and fill in the blanks that overhead assets may overlook. This can include participation in interagency and international intelligence collection programs to locate, identify, and follow NBC ingredients and weapons aboard ships and aircraft en route to and from a probable proliferator. As directed, SOF could collect water and soil samples in the vicinity of suspicious installations to detect the presence of the radioactive residues which uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction processes deposit. Clandestine teams can probe for methylphosphonate fingerprints that denote nerve gas production or augment officially sanctioned searches such as that conducted by the United Nations in Iraq.

Black Arts

Sabotage involves surreptitious operations to damage or destroy enemy supplies, facilities, and infrastructure, including materiel associated with WMD. SOF teams experienced in the use of demolitions, incendiary devices, and other means can attack confirmed WMD targets when missile or conventional air strikes are inappropriate.
Although no law or statute prohibits abduction, such actions rank among the most delicate of all clandestine operations. When special mission units (SMUs) on a chase during Operation Just Cause, and languid U.N. decisionmaking similarly has afflicted efforts to apprehend notorious Bosnian Serb war criminals.

Snatches that undermine nuclear weapon programs would be far more rewarding than those directed against biological and chemical warfare projects, which require less expertise to undertake. Scientists, technicians, and program managers who develop WMD constitute a potentially lucrative target. But decisionmakers have left such threats untouched, largely because of their noncombatant status in peacetime, even though they could provide an enemy with an enormous capability in war.

Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, which still remains in force, explicitly asserts that “no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination... No agency of the intelligence community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order.” That statement bans such actions by U.S. surrogates as well as Americans, even when discriminate or economic in terms of their force requirements, costs, and civilian casualties.

Most counterproliferation options open to SOF are unappealing and risk-laden, but inaction can allow despots to deploy WMD with destabilizing and even disastrous effects.

Counterterrorism

Terrorists who promote sociopolitical causes apply public, impersonal, repetitive violence or threats of violence in efforts to spread dismay and disrupt community routines so severely that compliance with their demands eventually seems preferable to continued resistance.

The United States has never experienced acts of terrorism on an extensive scale. No individual or group, for example, sought to exploit the explosions that riddled the World Trade Center in 1993, the Federal building in Oklahoma City two years later, or Khobar Towers in 1996. However, terrorists with portable WMD could wreak terrible damage. Even a well-planned hoax might achieve their political goals. The target list could include record centers, information storage and transfer facilities, transport and communication nodes, water supplies, electric power plants, petrochemical factories, and nuclear reactors.
The U.S. Government actuates programs to combat domestic and transnational terrorism. Although legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act foreclose full use of military capabilities inside the United States, the President could ease this restriction with the concurrence of Congress and the courts if an extremely perilous threat arose.

SOCOM is the only DOD component directed by law to plan and conduct counterterrorism operations (offensive countermeasures). Military commanders at every level, along with Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, share antiterrorism (passive protection) responsibilities, but SOF units have devised such innovative tactics and techniques that many Federal agencies call on their expertise. SMUs, for example, helped plan security for the Olympics in Los Angeles.

Primary responsibility for terrorism rests with the FBI at home and CIA abroad. SOCOM special mission units have unique skills that policymakers may utilize under certain circumstances, but their routine use could raise suspicions among allies and friends who resent foreign intelligence intrusion and could degrade SOF ability in performing advisory and assistance missions overseas.

Absent reliable intelligence, SOF are unable to conduct preemptive strikes against terrorists. Experience gained from actual terrorist operations is limited. Special mission units excel in practice hostage rescues, but the last publicized event occurred in December 1989 during Just Cause, when an alleged CIA operative was freed from prison in Panama City before guards could kill him.

Counternarcotics Operations

Active measures to detect, monitor, and discourage, disrupt, or interdict the production and distribution of illicit drugs form the basis of counternarcotics operations. Area-oriented SOF teams
completed more than 190 such missions during fiscal year 1997 in response to requests by CINCs and U.S. missions, most of which helped the militaries of Latin America.

Not all counternarcotics duty is hazardous. Reserve officers associated with SOF professional development heighten threat awareness among senior officers and civilian officials while PSYOP military information support teams conduct classes for school children. A squadron of Air Force Special Operations Command that is focused on foreign internal defense teaches host nation air crews to maintain fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, without which they could only cover a small fraction of the territory where drug producers and smugglers operate.

Events in Peru recently took a new turn when drug traffickers, who were losing aircraft at an unprecedented rate, began transporting larger amounts of coca paste by boat from their hideouts in the Andes to processing centers in Colombia. In response, a 30-man U.S. contingent composed mainly of members of Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs established a riverine training base for local counternarcotics forces at Iquitos, where several navigable mountain streams empty into the upper Amazon. Instruction on slowing down or stopping the waterborne movement of drugs applies lessons from the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone in South Vietnam some thirty years ago. It is too early to predict whether blocking operations will succeed, but coca cultivation has already shifted dramatically from Peru to Colombia, partly because drug shipments by inland waterway is too slow for narco entrepreneurs.

Colombian drug cartels, transnational criminals, and insurgents collaborate to multiply their respective capabilities. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in return for an estimated $60 million or more each month, protect coca and opium crops, processing facilities, and airfields from the Colombian military and police. Russian crime syndicates supply cartels as well as FARC with weapons in exchange for cocaine, giving them more firepower than many armies. Therefore Colombia was chagrined when the United States decertified that country and terminated the transfer of military equipment and most training after it was reported to have an unacceptably poor record in counternarcotics efforts. By exception to this ban, SOF personnel still teach intelligence collection, scouting, patrolling, infantry tactics, and counterterrorism but, like other American personnel, they are forbidden to participate in counterinsurgency operations.

The Price of Success

The extensive deployment of high-demand, low-density SOF outside the continental United States in fiscal year 1997 indicates how valuable the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, and CINCs consider their contributions in situations short of war. In fact, SOF are so appropriate for many security problems around the world that there is a
tendency to overextend them, as a comparison of their authorized strength and deployments indicates. Concentrations remain heaviest in Europe and the Pacific region (see accompanying tables). Even though many SOF personnel hone their skills largely in the Continental United States, military operations other than war take others overseas. Army Special Forces, for example, logged one-third of their man-weeks abroad last year. Two active groups bore the biggest loads, because the other three and those units in the Army National Guard are oriented toward areas with relatively few requirements. The U.S. Army Reserve, who comprise a unique broadcast group which supports CINC’s around the world, practically met themselves coming and going to the field. This is part of the price of SOF success.

Table 1. SOF Deployments Outside the Continental U.S. (FY98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOF Type</th>
<th>Authorized Personnel</th>
<th>Total OCONUS</th>
<th>Average OCONUS</th>
<th>Total Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>8,781</td>
<td>53,555</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOC Air Wings</td>
<td>10,122</td>
<td>32,365</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>16,030</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy SEALs</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>22,169</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>2,883</td>
<td>12,568</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Boats</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>13,086</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>5,309</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Aviation</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Tactics</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF Headquarters and Special Operations Commands</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>8,373</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,057</strong></td>
<td><strong>168,202</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,235</strong></td>
<td><strong>152</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. SOF Areas of Operation (FY98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified Command</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,178</strong></td>
<td><strong>152</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Self-reliant, highly-motivated, superbly-trained SOF, especially those proficient in foreign languages and with cross-cultural skills, seem ideally suited for many missions which conventional forces cannot perform as effectively or economically in the twilight zone between peace and war. Low key training teams, information programs, and civic action can foster good will and routinely enhance American influence around the world. Moreover, the President and Congress could relax political and legal constraints on SOF if an enemy with weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to the United States or its allies.

Several facts about special operations nevertheless caution against overcommitment:

- humans are more important than hardware
- quality is more important than quantity
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
- competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Experienced SOF constitute a discrete instrument of national power, an invaluable resource that would take years to reconstitute if squandered. U.S. leaders would be well advised to assign them to those missions which they are eminently qualified to perform in peacetime and war while constantly bearing in mind both the strengths and limits of their unique capabilities.

NOTES

1 Title 10, section 167, of the U.S. Code identifies SOF as “core forces or as augmenting forces” in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E. That excludes Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), which are essentially conventional task forces, and Marine Corps Reserve Civil Affairs units that mainly furnish tactical support for expeditionary forces.


3 For a discussion of such operations, see John M. Collins, Assassination and Abduction as Tools of National Policy (Norfolk: Armed Forces Staff College, March 17, 1963).

4 Title 10, section 1385, U.S. Code, “Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus.”
In an era of tight budgets, long-range investment decisions call for careful determination of future strategic requirements. This process, in turn, requires identifying the kinds of tasks the Armed Forces will conduct tomorrow. The Army after Next (AAN) project was launched in 1996 to examine the nature of such tasks, particularly with respect to landpower. AAN is focused on the years 2020–25, the earliest period that choices made today on long-term investment will bear fruit. Research and wargaming for this project have produced valuable insights into the nature of future strategic requirements, which indicates that landpower will be vital in both peacetime and war.

The Geostrategic Environment

In order to determine the tasks which will appear in the national security strategy of tomorrow we must develop a tentative picture of the future geostrategic environment. AAN foresees a rapidly changing environment in which the United States remains engaged internationally and retains its leadership in multinational defense arrangements and in promoting democratic values, free markets, and human rights. Although the multipolar security system will endure, the future will be increasingly complex, characterized...
by shifting power relationships and ad hoc security structures, as opposed to stable alliances. Current sources of conflict—ethic rival, nationalism, religious antagonism, and competition for resources, including water—may well intensify as world population increases. Threats such as transnational crime, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking may also grow, creating security problems markedly different from those of today. Such a dynamic geopolitical context is likely to mean that the Armed Forces will have to execute a range of missions almost everywhere in the world. Suppressing and containing conflict will become increasingly critical since economic, humanitarian, and environmental costs will often reach beyond the immediate area of conflict.

AAN also posits the ascendancy of one or more major military competitors—modernized states which threaten the interests of the United States and its allies in a specific region—rather than peer competitors with symmetrical capabilities. These military competitors will probably concede American superiority in certain areas, preferring instead to develop asymmetric strategies and niche capabilities that avoid strengths and exploit weaknesses. Asymmetric strategies are much more common historically than the literature on the subject suggests. They amount to a search for the proverbial Achilles heel. Such strategies may undermine national will by employing low-tech information warfare, terrorism, missile strikes against the homeland, or covert operations targeted at commercial or financial infrastructures. Yet one should not make too much of the projected rise of such competitors. As the conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan have shown, a relatively minor competitor can challenge a superpower. Thus, even without a major competitor, the United States will require a first-rate military, capable of winning across the conflict spectrum.

The current transformation of warfare (sometimes called the revolution in military affairs) is likely to continue. It may lead to critical advances in precision targeting, information, propulsion, and biogenic technologies. Precision weapons systems will have greater range and accuracy, with a deadly zone extending to 200 kilometers within the next 25 years. At the same time, information systems are changing command and control via real-time situation awareness. Near-instantaneous flow of critical information will enable decentralized operations at a faster pace.

**An Overarching Concept**

The second step in assessing strategic requirements is learning how the dynamic nature of the geostrategic environment affects national security strategy. For one thing, a multipolar world may require a frequent and extensive commitment of U.S. political, economic, and military assets to protect its interests. Consequently, in contrast to the Cold War, strategy should be focused on maintaining a stable peace and growing prosperity. In essence, America should pursue a strategy of containment into a positive one that shapes the peace but in resolving conflict. This strategic concept will more than likely rest upon three pillars:

- maintaining and shaping the peace through stability and support operations
- building coalitions and alliances to respond to regional crises and containing conflict
- waging decisive campaigns to limit collateral damage and achieve durable peace.

Secondly, although strategy (using national means in ways that achieve desired ends) will remain constant, the ways will change, resulting in revolutionary capabilities. And landpower may have unprecedented reach, control, and potential for decision. Even though truly surgical military action will likely remain elusive, decisive results may be achieved in far less time with less collateral damage. In any case, revolutionary capabilities will have application across the conflict spectrum.
Shaping the Peace

Maintaining and shaping the peace is a continuous task. It is also labor intensive. Its prime activities—stability and support operations—require regional expertise as well as disciplined troops on the ground. When crises erupt, it may not be practical or wise to withdraw forces engaged in stability or support operations. For one thing, those forces may not be able to respond quickly. Secondly, withdrawal may undermine long-term regional objectives. Even temporary substitutions of U.S. forces by allies or coalition partners will mean delays. In short, fulfillment of national security strategy will require the commitment of forces at strategic locations throughout the world. Honoring commitments, in turn, will necessitate leaving a number of forces in place, making them unavailable for other missions despite any reshuffling of priorities.

Stability operations aid national security strategy by providing treaty enforcement through activities such as peace operations, arms control verification, and counterproliferation operations. They also stabilize democratic regimes through daily engagement. Stability operations frequently involve enforcing or facilitating treaties or agreements on boundaries, access to resources, or arms control and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They also entail a wide range of military-to-military contacts designed to lessen tension, increase communication on capabilities and intentions, and raise understanding between hostile nations. Stability operations, and participation by the United States in them, stand to grow in proportion to their strategic utility.

Peace operations ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes. Opposing parties tend to agree to settlements guaranteed by the presence of a trusted, impartial outside force. The peacekeepers expedite compliance. The professional reputation of the Armed Forces and the support which they muster have made them a popular choice to lead peace operations. The number of such operations has increased annually over the last few decades and may even accelerate in the future.

Arms control verification and counterproliferation operations are likely to be more critical as a means for achieving strategic stabilization. Arms control measures and verification regimes often result from treaties negotiated between sovereign equals interested in reducing tensions or limiting WMD proliferation. The number of such treaties has grown since 1945. Arms control measures can also be imposed as an outcome of war, like that exercised against Iraq recently. Such
Steps may prove increasingly critical to conflict termination. Verification regimes that ensure compliance are vital strategic work. Similarly, counterproliferation activities may become more common as the geostrategic environment becomes more dynamic and unstable. They will require highly skilled, direct-action capabilities such as those possessed by Special Operations Forces. Although they will be joint and combined endeavors, Army capabilities and expertise will be key to their success.

Support operations facilitate the aims of national security strategy through various means, most notably assisting in collective efforts to counter transnational terrorism and crime and provide noncombatant evacuation and disaster relief. The military will probably give increasing support to international law enforcement agencies fighting international terrorists and criminals. The illegal transfer of funds and high-value physical and intellectual property is rising sharply, and indications are that such trends will continue. As the sophistication and impact of these crimes grow, military support to national and international law enforcement will become more significant.

**Noncombatant evacuation and disaster relief operations** are soldier-intensive, requiring landpower-specific capabilities

We have seen the use of military force expand in support of noncombatant evacuation and disaster relief operations. The former protect U.S. and allied citizens while the latter defend relief workers and ensure the delivery of supplies.
The future may reveal an expansion of permanent multinational organizations, perhaps under American leadership, to respond to such emergencies. Support operations are also soldier-intensive, requiring regional expertise and landpower-specific skills and capabilities.

AAN wargames have demonstrated the value of building coalitions and alliances. Regional coalitions and alliances, which distribute the benefit and cost of maintaining and shaping the peace closest to home, offer the best promise for peace over the next twenty to thirty years. The day-to-day interaction of an integrated alliance builds regional stability by deterring aggression and reducing conflict among its members.

Such security arrangements greatly facilitate crisis response and conflict containment by providing a framework for cooperation, base access, and burden sharing. Landpower formations demonstrate resolve in a regional contingency and help ensure U.S. leadership of allied operations. Such teamwork requires a commitment of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in proportion to the degree of integration required. Programs like the Partnership for Peace may serve as a standard for future endeavors. These programs facilitate international cooperation in stability operations by removing suspicions and building a basis for future collaboration.

Responding to Regional Crises

Thus far AAN studies have examined crises ranging from WMD proliferation to the threat of territorial aggression in areas of vital national interest. Wargames have demonstrated that even when vital interests are at stake political leaders
tend to wait as long as possible before approving action. Consequently, the greater the speed and reach of a response force, the longer political and diplomatic efforts have to defuse volatile situations. Wargames have also revealed that decisionmakers prefer to let crises defuse without using force, particularly since military movement may trigger escalation rather than de-escalation. Indeed, the global information environment may make it increasingly difficult to hide troop movements. Hence political leaders tend to opt for military options that afford the maximum time before committing military force.

Responding to regional crises will often require a combination of forward-presence forces and strategic maneuver by a force able to execute operational maneuver over strategic distances. For wargaming purposes, AAN developed just that, a joint expeditionary force (JEF) comprised of highly integrated land, sea, air, and space elements. JEF rapid movement capabilities, when combined with forward-deployed, operationally significant ground forces, facilitate decisionmaking and garner support from allies and coalition partners by demonstrating U.S. resolve. Operational significance varies according to circumstances. In general, it means assuming an appreciable share of the risk and committing a force large enough to make a difference on the ground. At the same time, JEF offers the strategic mobility to achieve decisive effects fast. AAN wargames have repeatedly validated the essential nature of the following tasks with regard to crisis response:

- Achieving information dominance. Information operations have proven vital. Positioning of space surveillance, navigation, and communications assets has become integral to setting the conditions for victory. The insertion of low-signature special operations forces enhanced the quality of information provided to decisionmakers. Information operations also continue beyond the active fighting to stability operations. Information dominance can never be assumed, and the ability to achieve it is highly conditional. However, it is likely that the United States and its allies will possess the potential to achieve and reliably maintain it on the strategic and operational levels during critical times.
LANDPOWER

- Employing forward-presence forces. The presence of ground forces demonstrated resolve, galvanized allied action, and sent a strong signal to aggressors. Special Operations Forces and conventional landpower formations must continue to provide forward presence in areas of strategic interest. Their liaison efforts facilitate the development of a desired endstate, provide accurate assessments of the condition of allied forces, and strengthen allied/coalition efforts by coordinating the arrival of U.S. combat power throughout the various stages of the campaign.

- Protecting operationally significant landpower. AAN wargames have shown that the landpower component of an integrated JEF helped prevent conflict escalation. JEF can execute operational preclusion from strategic distances, the equivalent of an early checkmate in chess. The landpower force can arrive and assume a decisive positional advantage before aggression can take place. Or, if such an act has already happened or is underway, it can change the relationship of forces on the battlefield such that further aggressive actions are precluded.

- Evacuating U.S. and allied citizens. Since the number of U.S. and allied businessmen and visitors abroad is growing steadily, crisis response will likely require the evacuation of numerous civilians. In the games, highly mobile, disciplined Special Operations Forces with "regional street smarts" were needed for this mission.

### Waging Decisive Campaigns

If deterrence and crisis containment fail, the United States and its coalition partners must be able to win decisive campaigns. Although military procedures will continue to change, associated defeat mechanisms will remain fundamentally the same: attrition and destroying enemy cohesion. A great power should have a choice between these two alternatives. At the root of the debate over future warfighting requirements is an incomplete understanding of the pros and cons of each. Both approaches attack the will of enemy leadership but in different ways. Defeat by attrition endures the determination of political leaders by destroying their physical power to resist. The other defeat mechanism collapses the resolution of enemy soldiers and the cohesion of enemy organizations, causing enemy warmaking capability to disintegrate. The great captains have employed both approaches. Some have combined them.

The first approach, defeat by attrition, relies on destroying military capability—people and matériel. It stresses the physical dimension of war and power. The principle is eliminating the capability to fight. Defeat results when resistance becomes impossible or is believed to be so. This perception depends on such imponderables as morale, discipline, and leadership. Attrition has traditionally involved great numbers of casualties on both sides. Commanders are forced to assess combat results in terms of exchange ratios, the grizzly calculus of losing so many of our soldiers for so many of theirs. Modern weapons increase the attractiveness of attrition because they proffer the advantage of overhead platforms, intelligence superiority, and long-range precision strikes to destroy an enemy at a distance.

A current school of thought holds that precision munitions have revolutionized combat to the point that wars can be won through long-range precision strike alone. It argues that neutralizing key enemy capabilities is sufficient and that close combat forces are not required. This may succeed in some cases but not others. Precision engagement, relying on attrition with standoff weapons, may punish an enemy and risk few casualties, but it is difficult to be sure of success. Attrition effects can be slow to produce decisive results. What is effective in the open desert will not necessarily suffice in forests, mountains, or urban areas where precision firepower is disadvantaged. History suggests that an entrenched, disciplined force can resist after lengthy bombardment and massive damage. Moreover, the effects of attrition are usually transitory. It possesses no forcing function to compel enemy compliance even after inflicting great destruction. Attrition works best when vital interests are not at stake and time and resources are unlimited.

The second approach—defeat by disintegration—emphasizes the psychological dimension of warfare. It attacks the state of mind of combatants even after inflicting great destruction. Attrition works best when vital interests are not at stake and decisive results are important. The disintegration approach economizes the use of destructive fires, exploiting them more completely. Firepower not only destroys, it psychologically suppresses soldiers and disrupts their organizations. The rapid arrival of troops on the ground to take control of a local situation before the transitory effects of firepower pass enables the
exploitation of those effects. On the operational level of war, disintegration occurs when the effect of numerous tactical engagements are combined with dislocating maneuver, as occurred in France in 1940 and the Persian Gulf in 1991. However, disintegration methods require a mobile and well-trained force.

In most cases, winning a decisive campaign will require disintegration rather than attrition. Decisive results can be achieved and guaranteed only when sufficient combat power is available to control people and places. Such control normally requires the kind of presence provided only by landpower. AAN studies indicate that forces capable of simultaneous and fully integrated land, sea, air, and space operations can achieve rapid disintegration of enemy resistance. Sea, air, and space operations isolate the relevant battle space while air-ground operations quickly defeat key enemy organizations, and follow-on stability forces restore control and secure the peace. To be sure, military action only resolves a crisis if the peace that follows is durable.

We began by emphasizing the importance of determining future strategic requirements with regard to landpower. Soldiers, probably no fewer than the United States currently possesses, will prove indispensable to executing national security strategy which reflects the theme of engagement. American landpower, in concert with allies and partners who share our interests, bears the burden of maintaining and shaping the peace. It is also critical to alliances and coalitions capable of crisis response and conflict containment. We will have to contribute an operationally significant landpower force in order to lead any regional contingency effort. The number of troops engaged in such missions is already substantial, and the demand is likely to increase. Landpower also allows winning decisive campaigns in pursuit of a durable peace. It permits a broader range of options in terms of military action, to include a choice of defeat mechanisms. When resistance is overcome, the presence of landpower provides the force to guarantee compliance with peace terms. Finally, it supplies the protection to establish legitimate authority and rebuild the area of conflict.

Strategy, operational art, and tactics entail asymmetries, specifically leveraging them to gain advantages. Too much of one kind of power—land, sea, air, or space—may result in asymmetries that invite exploitation. Likewise, leadership in the dynamic, unstable geopolitical environment of tomorrow will periodically call for a demonstration of U.S. resolve. Sea, air, or space capabilities are unlikely to suffice alone. Resolve means being willing to put American men and women in harm’s way and then standing by them.
Joint Fires Coordination:

Service Competencies and Boundary Challenges

By ROBERT J. D’AMICO

The boundaries between close and deep battlespace will vary among combatant commands in typical theaters of operations. The point at which deep and close battlespace meet rates attention from planners because it challenges joint force commanders (JFCs) who must conduct tactical and operational fires and maneuvers as well as joint fire support. One cause for this consideration is the umbrella under which joint fires are placed, where cross-boundary coordination is critical for synchronized actions that create economy of force, unity of effort, and integrated joint operations. Joint doctrine does not sufficiently address intra-theater, cross-boundary joint fires coordination. The answer lies in modifying doctrine. This proposal can be examined in joint publications, joint universal lessons learned (JULL) archives, combined forces command, and combatant command boundary relationships and sources. The problem transcends service interests. More importantly, lives depend on adequate joint fires coordination. A review of the differences between terms of art and service perspectives on battlespace reveals the implications of this issue for commanders and suggests some solutions.

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Toward a Common Understanding

The services use different terminology to discuss joint fires and close and deep battlespace. In Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, joint fires are “fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective.” The Army distinguishes between operational and tactical fires. In short, operational fires are lethal and non-lethal weapon effects that influence enemy operational forces, critical functions, and key facilities to accomplish operational objectives in support of either an operation or a campaign. For instance, advanced tactical missile system (ATACMS) fire against an enemy surface-to-surface launcher can be operational. On the other hand, tactical fires are lethal or non-lethal weapon effects that achieve tactical objectives in direct support of a major operation. ATACMS or multiple launch rocket systems, for example, when fired at an enemy heavy artillery position provide direct support and realize tactical objectives.

Close and Deep Operations. The Air Force considers operational fires as deep operations, or operational fires beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) which include air interdiction, strategic attack, suppression of enemy air defenses, and offensive counter-air missions. The goal of these fires is to achieve a desired effect on a given target set or system of targets. Tactical fires also include close air support for ground forces in the close battlespace before FSCL.

Again joint fires can be operational or tactical. The difference between them is their purpose: the former have operational objectives and the latter have tactical objectives. They can also be attacks on close or deep targets with direct fire, direct support, or deep supporting fire. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the purpose of operational and tactical fires. For example, some sources state that the key distinction between them lies in the result, with operational fires having a decisive impact on the outcome of a major operation or campaign. As shown in figure 1, joint fires beyond FSCL occur in deep battlespace and before it in close battlespace.

This notion of a generic joint operations area (JOA) vividly depicts boundaries and typical missions. But what are deep and close operations? Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force doctrine does not directly consider them. Only the Army conceptualizes these operations. In Field Manual 100-5, Operations, close operations involve immediate contact and include corps/division current battles. The battlespace lies beyond the forward line of troops. By contrast, deep operations may defeat an enemy outright and include activities against opposing forces and functions beyond close battle. Deep battlespace, moreover, is the area beyond FSCL.

In sum the inconsistency in service descriptions of joint fires and battlespaces makes debate over joint fires coordination difficult. Cross-boundary actions involving operational fires in depth and tactical fires in the close fight are important for planners. Joint fire support with synchronized actions can provide greater economy of force and unity of effort. Unfortunately, terminology is not the sole disparity. New weapons which can rapidly attack deep targets permeate the battlefield. Moreover, methodologies for establishing intra-theater boundaries are missing from joint doctrine.

Service Specialization

Every service has weapon systems that traverse intra-theater boundaries. They can attack close and deep targets; thus command, control, and coordination become critical operational design requirements. For example, the Army has ATACMS and Apache helicopters; the Marine Corps has F/A-18s, AV-8s, and LAMB aircraft; Special Operations Forces have direct action and special reconnaissance teams; and both the Navy and Air Force have strike aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Service weapon systems can conduct close air support, strategic attack, and interdiction missions as well as others that affect deep battlespace.
Because of increasing service capabilities to attack deep targets, there is a growing need for joint fire support and greater coordination for joint fires between close and deep battles. One perspective advocates that the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) control all assets which influence the close battlespace, such as A-10s, and that the joint force air component commander (JFACC) control all assets which influence the deep battlespace, such as ATACMS. Unfortunately, this approach to forming air and land commander boundaries may not solve the inevitable requirement for synchronized cross-boundary actions during wartime.

Boundaries that separate deep and close battlespaces are nominally well established within theaters of operations but are not clearly based on joint doctrine. Joint fires crossing intra-theater boundaries must be deconflicted to prevent fratricide and duplication while supporting operational momentum, maintaining the initiative, and conducting maneuvers.

The method of segmenting JOA varies among joint force commanders (JFCs). Various joint publications provide guidance. For example, Joint Pub 2, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, discusses supported commander responsibilities and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, discusses establishing supported and supporting relationships between components. In a major theater war (MTW) like Korea, the commander in chief of Combined Forces Command (CFC) sets boundaries, areas of operations (AOs), and command relationships among subordinate commanders (see figure 2).

Close battlespace describes the area between the forward line of troops (FLOT) and FSCL. As shown in figure 1, joint fires in this area consist of close air support, counter air, direct support missions, and more. JFLOC is the supported commander whose forward boundary extends well beyond FSCL. In Korea this is called the deep battle synchronization line (DBSL). It is important since the airspace beyond it is controlled tightly by sequencing and prioritizing air assets to conduct simultaneous missions in the air component commander’s deep battlespace. But from an Army perspective this boundary clashes with the independence of JFLCC and need to shape operational depth. JFACC is the supported commander for deep operations beyond the land component commander’s forward boundary. In this AO, joint fires consist of air and surface interdiction missions that affect operational maneuvers of JFLCC, as well as support for special operations, strategic attack, counter air, and direct support missions.
**Supported Commanders**

The cross-boundary joint fires coordination problem is intense between SSCL and the land component commander’s forward boundary because both supported commanders in the close and deep battles have time-sensitive missions there. Overlapping actions must be synchronized since they are interdependent, but joint doctrine offers little guidance on how to achieve it. In addition, the situation is exacerbated in rapidly mobile battles when FSCL and the JFLCC forward boundary move quickly. As a battle becomes more mobile, the distance between FLOT and FSCL grows, which increases the demand for close air support (CAS) missions.

Moreover, controlling CAS in a rapidly moving battle is difficult (figure 3). Furthermore, interdiction beyond FSCL but before the JFLCC forward boundary must be preplanned to complement operational maneuvers, disrupt the movement of troops and equipment toward the close battle, and control the air space. JFACC is normally the supported commander for interdiction; however, such missions are critical just beyond SSCL where JFACC is normally the supported commander. This battlespace area is not within the JFACC boundary. Unfortunately, joint doctrine offers little direction on ensuring economy of force and unity of effort in this critical warfighting zone.

Joint Pub 3-0 briefly discusses control and coordinating measures. It states that FSCLs are permissive fire support coordinating measures established and adjusted by JFLCC. Additionally, Joint Pub 3-09 asserts that commanders conducting joint fires beyond FSCL must inform all affected commanders to avoid fratricide. Doctrine specifically addressing joint fire support declares that coordinating is critical to “avoid conflicting or redundant attack operations.”

Because an FSCL is a permissive fire support coordinating measure, joint fires beyond this point allow for rapid attacks of targets of opportunity which are within the air tasking order (ATO) planning cycle. Major operations and command relationships must be flexible enough to capitalize on the growing capability of supported commanders to attack time sensitive targets beyond FSCL. Moreover, FSCL is not a boundary. The synchronization of actions on both sides of it is normally the responsibility of JFLCC out to the forward boundary. Furthermore, joint publications state that in exceptional situations commanders unable to coordinate activities may attack targets beyond FSCL. But failing to coordinate “may increase the risk of fratricide or waste limited resources.” If ground forces can attack targets without coordinating with JFACC, then synchronizing actions, coordinating targeting, and achieving objectives are jeopardized.

Joint doctrine offers little advice on the cross-boundary problem and in some cases affords special status to a service. For example, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), protects a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) from supported commanders who desire to use its air assets. During an amphibious operation, the integrated use of Marine air and ground forces is mandated because an amphibious objective area (AOA) is vulnerable. But once an operation is complete and AOA disestablished, synchronized joint fires in the deep battle become problematic. For instance, Joint Pub 0-2 indicates that excess MAGTF sorties go to JFC. However, sorties for counter-air, long-range interdiction, and reconnaissance do not qualify as excess since they furnish “a distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort.”
Synchronization

When AOA is disestablished and MAGTF uses organic air to shape its deep operational maneuvers, joint fires among the services become nearly impossible to synchronize. Deconflicting offensive counter-air, strategic attack, and interdiction missions is a priority to prevent fratricide. The problem is that concerns for joint service deconfliction override those for synchronized actions when there is clearly an opportunity for joint fires coordination which provides greater economy of force and unity of effort. A simple solution to deconflict forces has been to provide MAGTF with its own boundary (AOI), which protrudes well beyond FSCL and the JFACC forward boundary. This allows freedom of maneuver, but with a loss of joint fires coordination and support, economy of force, and unity of effort. This separate organization fragments JFC command and control because integrated MAGTF operations, even as part of an MTW, are protected.

The complexity of this difficulty can be seen in the controversy associated with Joint Pub 3-09, which was in coordination between 1994 and 1998. It was published last year, but the lengthy coordination is indicative of the joint fires controversy and illustrates the complexity of the problem of joint fires and the conflict among the services. Another indicator of the importance of this issue is revealed in the JULLs database. Cross-boundary joint fire was identified by U.S. Pacific, U.S. Central, and U.S. Atlantic Commands as well as CJCS in exercises and real operations. For example, a Marine unit in Unified Endeavor “95 highlighted the need to integrate joint fire support efficiently and effectively to support joint forces. The boundary between a MAGTF air wing and JFACC assets in Cobra Gold ’94, and the unified use of joint service assets to reach JFC objectives, caused major problems for planners. Difficulty during Ulchi Focus Lens ’94 in coordinating joint fires beyond FSCL resulted in ATO production problems for JFACC and an increased likelihood of fratricide. Finally, the 82d Airborne Division identified FSCL placement problems during Gallant Eagle.
'88. In short, maneuvering airspace for organic Army aviation assets was too small to provide adequate close air support for ground units because of the confined space between FLOT and FSCL and because FSCL changes were not coordinated with other component commanders.

The Combined Forces Command solution. In Korea, CFC addressed this problem by appointing JF ACC as the “coordinating authority” for operational fires between FSCL and DBSL. Moreover, he said that in combat JFLCC can still attack time-sensitive targets between FSCL and the forward boundary without informing JF ACC. However, “such attacks should be the exception rather than the rule,” according to the Deep Operations Primer—Korea.

In the Korean theater CFC efforts to resolve the problem have not been totally successful. For example, synchronization problems identified during joint and combined command and control exercises (Ulchi Focus) involved direct support missions beyond FSCL. However, incorporating direct fire beyond FSCL was relatively easy to coordinate between supported commanders because of short flight times of direct fire assets.

Desert Storm. Some critics may argue that exercises and simulations are not suitable test cases to claim that a cross-boundary problem is significant—possibly arguing that exercises are not robust enough or that operational leaders will resolve this real war challenge. One need only look at JULLs from Desert Storm to realize that this is untrue. During that real-war operation, the Army and Marine Corps applied different rules for cross-boundary fires. The former service thought that it could provide both direct and indirect fires in deep battlespace while the latter treated FSCL as the boundary. The Joint Staff recommendation was to redefine the term. The new definition found in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms describes a boundary as a line delineating areas to allow coordination and deconfliction between units, formations, or areas. Unfortunately, it does not solve the problem of joint fires coordination across intra-theater boundaries.

**Implications of the Challenge**

This topic is controversial because it transcends the joint services and involves issues at the core of service functional specialties. With ever-increasing weapon capabilities to simultaneously and precisely attack targets throughout close and deep battlespaces, coupled with a trend toward near-real time information, the cross-boundary problem is now acute. In the near future, it may become overwhelming for operational commanders unless joint doctrine is crafted to address it adequately. Additionally, the issue will affect many JFCs executing their war plans. However, the problem is beyond the sight of many commanders in less developed theaters. In small-scale contingencies, establishing appropriate missions and tasks, tailoring forces, and organizing command structures may be overwhelming goals during planning phases. This operational challenge has immediate and future importance to joint operations.

Despite a lack of attention in joint pubs, the area between the JFLCC forward boundary and FSCL is critical when synchronizing actions among joint forces, achieving economy of force, and establishing an optimal time-space-force relationship. Synchronization of actions beyond FSCL is key for operational momentum and integrated operational maneuvers focused on JFC objectives. Interdiction missions, for example, should aim at enemy forces that affect operational maneuvers; those not closely connected with operational maneuvers are irrelevant to ground commanders (and possibly have adverse effects on offensive operations and operational momentum). When JFLCC must attack a high priority target beyond FSCL with direct fire or deep supporting fire, joint fire support can reduce the vulnerability of some assets. JF ACC can reprioritize or divert counter air or other deep battle missions to provide joint fire support. In
Korea, the synchronization of actions in the area between FSCL and the forward boundary is handled by two working groups, the JFLCC deep operations coordination cell and the JFACC synchronization cell. Both ensure operational maneuvers are complemented with deep battlespace missions.

In addition, synchronizing JFACC and MAGTF actions can enhance the economy of force as interdiction, counter-air, and close air support missions among services become complementary (rather than deconflicted) and support JFC campaign objectives with a unified effort. The isolation of a MAGTF in its AO after establishing an AOA allows it unity of command and independent operations; however, joint fire support and coordination problems are intensified while unity of effort may be degraded.

Finally, the optimal relationship among space, time, and forces fits neatly with operational designs that emphasize the synchronization of joint actions around FSCL. For example, as shown in figure 3, FSCL placement becomes farther removed from FLOT during rapidly moving battles. This increased space requires more forces for close air support in front of FSCL and interdiction beyond it. In sum, rapidly moving battles attempt to minimize time and capture objectives quickly at the cost of requiring greater space and more forces. The synchronization of joint fires is critical for greater unity of effort, economy of force, and achievement of objectives.

Joint fires coordination among supported commanders is a complex issue with significant implications. Individual service specialties, including doctrine and weapon systems, as well as the cross-boundary challenge to realize economy of force and unity of effort, must be addressed when campaigns are being planned. The solution rests in the heart of operational synchronization which, according to Joint Pub 3-0, is the essence of campaign planning and execution. Problems affecting both supporting and supported commanders exist. Currently the solution often lies in flexible and innovative operational leadership. But joint doctrine must be expanded to cope with this challenge because senior leaders depend on the Armed Forces to effectively provide the means to achieve the desired political ends with the greatest success at the least cost. Smaller budgets and realigned roles and missions will make the cross-boundary problem more important to solve.
In this post-Cold War period, we need to continuously improve campaign planning and work through valid command and control issues. Intra-theater, cross-boundary coordination is critical for JFCs in achieving objectives with the greatest unity of effort and economy of force. Synchronized joint fires in the deep battlespace contribute to a soundly executed campaign plan. Thus joint doctrine should be modified to resolve this challenge. Solutions range from organizational structural changes to increased command and control to include:

- providing JFLCCs enough maneuvering area beyond FSCL to independently shape the deep battlespace—allowing for unity of command and centralized control
- synchronizing air interdiction missions with ground operational maneuvers
- creating liaison elements within both JFLCC and JFACC staffs to focus on close and deep battlespace maneuvers; communication between supported commanders is key
- appointing JFACC as the coordination authority for operational fires beyond FSCL to ensure unity of effort and avoid duplication and fratricide
- minimizing uncoordinated cross-boundary joint fires and limiting them to time-sensitive and emerging critical targets
- valuing cost-effective joint fires; cross-boundary joint fires should not occur as a matter of convenience
- keeping egos out of the solution—lives are at stake.

Most importantly, commanders, staffs, and combatant units must focus on objectives and find the best options to achieve them. Solutions based on service biases or special agenda only complicate a joint force commander’s mission.

JFQ
In Only the Paranoid Survive, former Intel Corporation president and CEO Andy Grove described how his business faced radical changes and not only survived but prospered. “Whether a company became a winner or a loser was related to its degree of adaptability.” The key factor is recognizing and taking advantage of strategic inflection points. He described a strategic inflection point as “a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are about to change. They are full-scale changes in the way business is conducted, so that simply adopting new technology or fighting the competition as you used to may be insufficient.”

The Joint Strategic Review, Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Defense Panel each indicated that the Armed Forces have reached a strategic inflection point in the area of national security. The next century promises to be a time when emerging technologies coupled with an agile mindset will, if exploited, fundamentally alter and substantially increase our warfighting capability.

The 21st Century Environment

Despite the recent downturn in Asian economies, leading economists continue to predict that by 2020 both China and India will emerge as trading superpowers, and the global economic center of gravity will shift from west to east. In that same year, eight of the ten largest
The threat in the early years of the next century will be the “stepchild of Chechnya.”

Economies will lie around the rim of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Almost every nation is becoming interdependent in the global marketplace. They compete for scarce resources—notably oil—to maintain economic expansion. Such growth is increasing the ability of emerging states to respond to security threats militarily with high-tech systems and weapons of mass destruction. History has repeatedly proven that this mix of highly charged competing economies, limited natural resources, and proliferation is a recipe for regional instability.

Further, threats today are multidimensional and are not limited to the power and authority of nation-states. Globalization and economic interdependence increase the power base of nonstate actors. Multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and bodies such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization have acquired influence over a domain once controlled by governments. Traditional lines of sovereignty have become blurred. And with the demise of the Soviet Union and the bipolarity on which our national security strategy was long oriented we have witnessed growing violence. The disintegration of the Soviet republics and Yugoslavia, the tragedies in Somalia and Rwanda, and the conflict in Liberia signify the trend toward splintering nations along ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal lines. This suggests not only crises between and within nations but a greater degree of general instability—a time of chaos.

The threat in the early years of the next century will not be the “son of Desert Storm”—it will be the “stepchild of Chechnya.” Our most dangerous enemy will not be doctrinaire or predictable. It will not attempt to match us tank for tank or plane for plane in an effort to refight the kind of industrial age war to which we are accustomed. Instead it will challenge us asymmetrically in ways against which we are least able to prepare. At such times we have fallen back on traditional lines of sovereignty and the defense in depth that we are accustomed to rely on the defense industrial base and the advantage of time that enabled us to overcome our failure to adapt prior to Pearl Harbor.

To adequately capitalize on the historic opportunity presented by the simultaneous strategic pause and strategic inflection point—and to remain a superpower—we must adapt. We must effect a revolution in military affairs. Accordingly, the Armed Forces are developing operational concepts that will drive doctrine, structure, weapons, equipment, and training in the next century. For the first time, however, they are doing so from a joint perspective. Recognizing that the battlefield of tomorrow will demand synergy between and among land, sea, air, and space forces, each service is examining how it can maximize its contribution to the joint fight.

In July 1996 the Chairman issued JV 2010 as a conceptual framework for how the Armed Forces will fight in the future. It serves as a common

Strategic Inflection Point

Traditionally the U.S. military has been reluctant to abandon attrition warfare and recognize the opportunities afforded by strategic inflection points. We do not like change and have paid for it time and again with blood. Fortunately, however, we have had the time and industrial capacity to overcome this lack of foresight. We have proven to be highly capable of adapting once threatened. At such times we have fallen back on the groundwork laid by visionaries. A junior Army officer, George Patton, recognized the strategic inflection point created by the industrial age. He studied the work of European strategists such as J.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell-Hart, and Heinz Guderian and laid the basis for replacing the American horse cavalry with the speed, shock, and firepower of armored warfare. Similarly a young Marine captain, Pete Ellis, looked at the rising power of Japan in the Pacific, the need of the Navy for advanced bases for power projection in the region, and the likelihood that the Japanese would try to deny us that ability and wrote the seminal Advanced Base Force Operations in Micronesia. This was the genesis of the amphibious warfare capability that won the war in the Pacific and facilitated the invasion of Europe on the beaches of Normandy.

The present strategic inflection point, ushered in by the information revolution, comes at an even more exciting time—concurrent with a rare strategic pause, a period when we are unlikely to be challenged by a military peer competitor in the initial years of the 21st century. The nature of the information age, however, makes it important to embrace the strategic inflection point early and be proactive in adapting to it. We may no longer be able to rely on the defense industrial base and the advantage of time that enabled us to overcome our failure to adapt prior to Pearl Harbor.

Spring 1999 / JFQ
template for leveraging technological advances and channeling human vitality and innovation to realize joint effectiveness. Focused on achieving dominance across the spectrum of military operations through new concepts, this template provides a shared direction for the services, unified commands, and defense agencies.

In developing service operational concepts, the first step is identifying the core capabilities we need, in what quantity we need them, in which services we find them, and in what balance we require them in the active and Reserve components. The roots of these capabilities are found in the roles that Congress assigns to each service. To provide the services with the specific guidance to fulfill these roles, every Secretary of Defense since James Forrestal has assigned functions by executive order to ensure that the United States maintains all the capabilities needed by the warfighting CINCs to accomplish their missions.

Within assigned roles and functions each service chief must orient his operational concepts toward providing generally service-unique capabilities to CINCs, which will be valuable in the new global security environment. The Air Force, for example, must focus on core capabilities to fulfill its assigned roles and functions of strategic air and missile warfare and air transport. Additionally, it must look to space. The Navy must gear training, equipment, and organization to maintain and operate open sea lines of communication, to provide strategic sealift, and with the Marine Corps to project power ashore across the spectrum of warfare. The Army fulfills its role as the Nation’s “chain mail” fist of diplomacy by ensuring that it has the capability to conduct decisive, sustained combat operations on land. And the Marine Corps must maintain those core competencies to meet its congressionally mandated role of fielding expeditionary forces-in-readiness.

The future operational concepts of each service must focus on its core competencies. While assigned functions should be such that there is no unnecessary duplication, it is also important that there are no gaps. Thus a degree of redundancy between and within service capabilities is actually desirable. The fact that wide receivers, tight ends, and running backs can all catch passes does not make that capability unnecessarily duplicative for a team. They have different but complementary abilities that present a multifaceted, synergistic offense. No one would suggest that a team save money by eliminating tight ends because their ability to catch passes is duplicative.
The Naval Contribution

Our naval services will play a crucial role in the next century. With the end of the Cold War, a permanent U.S. presence is no longer required in many parts of the world. In addition, some nations increasingly view the United States as a cultural threat. Thus permanent land-based presence overseas will likely continue to shrink. Moreover, the tyranny of distance—particularly in the Pacific-Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf littorals—challenges the response time of land-based forces, making the forward deployment of naval forces necessary. Distance equates to time and time equates to political leverage. The information age is making time the predominant factor in warfare. The more immediate our involvement the more rapid and credible our response must be, and thus the more we can influence the outcome.

In this environment U.S. interests can only be promoted by a wide range of global strategic and operational capabilities and selective presence. Naval expeditionary forces, being strategically and operationally mobile and free from relying on host nation support or permission to operate in theater, offer both CINC’s and JFC’s a credible presence abroad. Consisting of carrier battle groups and amphibious readiness groups, along with embarked Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), naval expeditionary forces shape the battlespace, deter or contain conflicts, and contribute greatly to prosecuting joint campaigns and rapidly defeating an enemy. Indeed, naval expeditionary forces will constitute the leading edge of JTF responses to crises or conflicts.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

It is insufficient to field naval expeditionary forces prepared to fight the battles of tomorrow with doctrine and weapons designed for the wars of yesterday. Potential enemies are unlikely to again allow us the luxury of an unopposed buildup of combat power in theater like that afforded in Southwest Asia. We must adapt our forces to the realities of the new era and capitalize on the opportunities afforded by the strategic inflection point. To defeat the complex and dynamic threats of 2010 and beyond, we must field a naval force that can respond to a wide array of contingencies across the conflict spectrum—from disaster relief and humanitarian operations to full-fledged sustained combat at sea and ashore. It must be organized, trained, and equipped with weapons and doctrine to simultaneously meet multiple challenges throughout this spectrum.

The Marine Corps is committed to exploiting the strategic inflection point in military affairs by focusing experimentation, research, development, and procurement strategies on bringing the doctrinal concept known as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) to fruition. OMFTS is a marriage between maneuver and naval warfare. From maneuver warfare comes an understanding
of the nature of conflict, the imperative of decisive objectives, and the requirement for skillful operations at a high tempo. Naval warfare contributes to a deep appreciation of the strategic and operational levels, advantages inherent in seaborne movement, and flexibility afforded by sea-based logistics, fire support, and force sustainment. The heart of OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces on the operational level to exploit enemy vulnerabilities to deal a decisive blow. It is directed against a center of gravity—an objective (such as unit, capability, or perception) whose seizure, destruction, or neutralization will profoundly impact an enemy's capability to continue the struggle. OMFTS is distinguished from all other species of operational maneuver by the extensive use of the sea for operational advantage. The heart of OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces on the operational level to exploit enemy vulnerabilities to deal a decisive blow. It is directed against a center of gravity—an objective (such as unit, capability, or perception) whose seizure, destruction, or neutralization will profoundly impact an enemy's capability to continue the struggle. OMFTS is distinguished from all other species of operational maneuver by the extensive use of the sea for operational advantage. The sea is as an avenue for friendly movement (dominant maneuver) and a barrier to an enemy (force protection). Concurrently, it is a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. It provides forces with a secure assembly or attack position and controlled medium for logistics, fire support, and tactical and operational movement.

OMFTS is not merely a way of introducing an expeditionary force onto foreign soil but of projecting expeditionary power directly against a center of gravity or critical vulnerability. The idea is to use the operational mobility of naval power to launch an attack at the time and place of our choosing to decisively exploit an enemy weakness. OMFTS envisions making the beach transparent to amphibious warfare through the ship-to-objective maneuver supporting concept. No longer will the success of amphibious operations rely on the ability to create, maintain, and protect a lodgment for rapid and progressive buildup of combat power ashore. Made possible by technological advances for transporting landing forces ashore, OMFTS seeks to generate high operating tempo by combining ship-to-shore movement and what has traditionally been called subsequent operations ashore into a single decisive maneuver directly from amphibious shipping.

The operational pillars explicit in JV 2010—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and force protection—are all deeply imbedded within the OMFTS concept. Future improvements in the precision and lethality of long-range weapons, greater reliance on seaborne fire support, and a possible decrease in the petroleum, oil, and lubricant requirements for military land vehicles promise to greatly reduce or eliminate the need to establish significant fire support platforms and supply facilities ashore. This reduction of land-based combat support and logistics coupled with focused logistics initiatives will narrow the range of threats, reduce force protection requirements, and facilitate the rapid reembarkation and redeployment of MAGTFs. The additional speed and flexibility offered by these new techniques could translate into high tempos of operation. By using the sea as maneuver space, enemy vulnerabilities can be exploited and opportunities can be seized before they vanish. In short, MAGTF will act so quickly the enemy will be unable to react effectively. This is dominant maneuver.

To prevent unnecessary duplication with other services, OMFTS focuses on providing core competencies needed by the Marine Corps to fulfill its role as the Nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness: expeditionary preparedness, combined-arms operations, expeditionary operations, sea-based operations, forcible entry from the sea, and Reserve integration. They define the culture of the Corps as well as its role in the defense establishment. They are what it brings to the joint fight.

Empowering the Joint Force Commander

OMFTS will significantly enhance MAGTF capabilities, making it an even more useful force for warfighting CINCs and JFCs. It enables a task force to serve as a sea-based operational maneuver element (OME). It will not only increase decisive- ness, flexibility, and responsiveness in military operations other than war but enhance its capability
for forcible entry and complementing other services in sustained operations ashore at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. Exercising OMFTS, the force can execute precise combat actions, both concurrently and in sequence, that are focused on profoundly impacting an enemy’s ability and will to fight. Employed as an OME, the force will constitute a unique sea-based operational capability for JFC maintained in immediate readiness to create its own opportunities or exploit those resulting from the activities of other joint force components. In this role, MAGTFs will be assigned operational level missions that will have a decisive impact on the campaign’s overall outcome.

Sea-basing. OMFTS affords the CINC and JFC the advantages of a sea-based force, making the naval expeditionary force his most significant tool in the littoral environment. Since three-quarters of the world’s population, four-fifths of national capitals, and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade lie within 300 miles of a coast, the vast majority of 21st century conflicts and crises will likely take place in the littorals. Employing OMFTS, naval expeditionary forces will provide the range of capabilities for a maritime power to compensate for the absence of permanent overseas bases. The OMFTS-capable sea-based force offers mobility, sustainability, rapid deployment, forward presence, and extraordinary strategic reach. With sea-based logistics, fire support, medical facilities, and command and control assets, this force maximizes its protection by limiting its footprint—and hence its vulnerability—ashore. This degree of force protection is further enhanced by initiating OMFTS from well over the horizon. Finally, the sea-based force can shape the operational environment. JFC can begin operations in the time, place, and manner of his choosing. He thus retains the initiative and controls the key elements of time and space.

Operational depth. OMFTS will enable us to direct our efforts against the operational depth of the enemy in terms of geographic reach, time, and function. Exercising it, MAGTF can rapidly posture forces within theater by developing the operational picture via reconnaissance-pull tactics and task organizing only what is needed for the fight. This permits JFC to sustain momentum and take advantage of all available resources to press the fight, attacking enemy forces and capabilities simultaneously, vice sequentially, throughout the battlespace.

Mission depth. With the OMFTS-capable task force, JFC will have a far more versatile warfighting tool. OMFTS enhances the force to serve as a multi-role organization. It will be able to operate not only across the geographical depth of a region, but across the spectrum of conflict and tasks at the same time. Modern crises represent an amorphous phenomenon—a “three block war” where the Marine Corps may have to execute a range of missions across different levels of crisis response and warfare within the narrow confines of three contiguous city blocks. As the crisis evolves, MAGTF will be able to adapt and shift mission focus in mid-stride without losing momentum or effect.

Tempo. Through the naval expeditionary force employing OMFTS, JFC will control the rate of actions and interactions within a campaign—the tempo—to maintain the initiative. He will do so in subtle and multidimensional terms by altering enemy perceptions as well as attacking the entire breadth and depth of its capabilities. Tempo is relative and not absolute. The focus must be on ensuring that our tempo is superior to an enemy’s. Overwhelming tempo will bring about operational shock (or psychological dislocation) through a rapid breakdown of an enemy, causing it to become disoriented, diverted from its objective, and unable to make decisions.

Reach back. While we have come a long way in cooperation and interoperability among the services, we realize that tomorrow’s chaotic battlefield will not permit us to stop there. We do not have a monopoly on good ideas. The OMFTS-capable task force will thus further empower JFC with the knowledge and skills of other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, academia, business, information systems, and scientific and technical organizations via computers and telecommunications. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) will be geared to providing JFC a “reach back” capability to tap into these resources for interagency and coalition responses. This capability will be embedded in the MAGTF command element to be at the commander’s fingertips. The advantages incurred by joint interagency task forces, centered around a MAGTF commander as JFC, also demonstrate the potential of the OMFTS-capable task force of tomorrow.

Enabling force. The decisive ground and air combat power brought to bear by the Army and Air Force is fundamental where sustained operations ashore are needed. In these scenarios, the OMFTS naval expeditionary force can act as an enabler to prepare theaters for heavier forces. Enabling operations may be as fundamental as creating a command and coordination system for an assembling joint or coalition force to plug into, or

the decisive power brought to bear by the Army and Air Force is fundamental where sustained operations ashore are needed
as complex as conducting a forcible entry to seize forward operating bases for more substantive ground, naval, and aviation forces. Accordingly, OMFTS is driving Marine doctrine development, training, and acquisition to ensure that command elements are capable of functioning as interim JFC headquarters—and that each MAGTF aviation combat element commander can serve as an enabling joint force air component commander.

**Exploitation force.** The OMFTS-capable task force will also act as a commander’s littoral exploitation force. Serving as an operational maneuver element (OME), MAGTF takes advantage of the opportunities created by the activity of other joint force components. JFC will exploit enemy reactions through rapid and focused MAGTF operations which capitalize on the results of ongoing engagements to achieve decisive results. For example, a task force functioning as an OME may exploit a joint force breakthrough by striking at enemy units attempting to retrograde enemy reactions through rapid and focused other joint force components. JFC will exploit ground, naval, and aviation forces. Accordingly, enabling joint force air component commander. Combat element commander can serve as an enabling headquarters—and that each MAGTF aviation elements are capable of functioning as interim JFC training, and acquisition to ensure that command OMFTS is driving Marine doctrine development, forces trying to reinforce. from the engagement or attack other enemy of the opportunities created by the activity of neuver element (OME), MAGTF takes advantage

**Enabling Technologies**

The Marine Corps is pursuing technology to field MAGTFs with the command and control, mobility, firepower, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities to conduct OMFTS. It has thus shown an absolute commitment to taking advantage of the strategic inflection point and the strategic pause. The Corps is taking reasonable risks in its modernization efforts by keeping some of its essential equipment end items well beyond their planned service lives to avoid evolutionary or bridging technologies in favor of leveraging leap ahead technologies that promise a warfighting edge well into the next century. The three most prominent enabling technologies are the MV–22 Osprey, the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV), and the joint strike fighter (JSF).

**MV–22 Osprey.** OMFTS requires the task force to strike from over the horizon to project land forces deep into the enemy interior. The revolutionary MV–22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft makes this a reality. With a 600-nautical mile combat radius and a 2,100-mile ferry ability, the Osprey will range throughout the opponent’s operational depth. It is capable of global self-deployment with its aerial refueling ability. Its range, speed, and payload nearly triple the current MAGTF area of influence. This significantly complicates an enemy’s defensive requirements, inhibits its ability to concentrate combat power, and effectively neutralizes its efforts to deny access to our forces. The opponent has to defend everywhere. The superior combat radius of this aircraft also allows Navy ships to maintain adequate stand-off distance from enemy ships-to-shore missiles, underwater mines, and other emerging threats. Although procuring the UH–60 Blackhawk would have eased difficulties that the Marines are experiencing with the 30-year-old CH–46 Sea Knight helicopter, the strategic pause makes the MV–22 a logical and ultimately cost-effective choice. The additional capability this platform affords MAGTF, and hence JFC, makes it well worth the wait.

**Advanced amphibious assault vehicle.** AAAV is the third leg of the amphibious triad, joining the MV–22 and the landing craft air cushion (already in service). Each component is critical to the over-the-horizon assaults envisioned by OMFTS. AAAV will allow naval expeditionary forces to eliminate the battlefield mobility gap traditionally associated with amphibious operations and, for the first time in the history of naval warfare, maneuver from ship to objective in a single seamless stroke while giving both the ships and landing forces sufficient sea space for maneuver, surprise, and protection. The transition from sea to land and vice versa is virtually transparent to the force embarked aboard AAAVs. Projection of these forces will allow naval expeditionary forces to engage with the 27-year-old assault amphibian vehicle for another eight years will be painful, AAAV leap ahead capabilities make this platform the right decision.

**Joint strike fighter.** The short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) JSF brings a quantum increase in fixed wing air support to the OMFTS-capable task force. This aircraft will provide the Marines with a superior performance, state-of-the-art, multi-mission jet aircraft that can operate with full mission loads from amphibious ships or austere expeditionary airfields. The STOVL JSF will be a stealthy, superior attack aircraft, a top-line fighter, and an escort for the MV–22 troop transport—all in one platform. It will replace the F/A–18 C/D Hornet and the AV–8B Harrier in the Marine inventory, surpassing the combined strengths and capabilities of both. The JSF program promises not only to replace Marine Corps fixed wing aircraft but the Air Force F–16 Falcon, Navy F/A–18 C/D, and Royal Navy AV–8B. This neck down approach will result in optimal commonality between variants and minimize life cycle costs. Again, the easier acquisition choice with respect to maintaining the aging fleet of fixed wing aircraft would be to procure the F/A–18 E/F Super Hornet for the Marine Corps, but only JSF brings the expeditionary, multi-mission capability needed in the next century.
Primarily addressing current limitations in mobility and firepower, the MV-22, AAV, and STOVL JSF are three tangible steps in progressively enabling the task force to conduct OMFTS. They represent a significant beginning to an acquisition strategy oriented toward replacing the aging Cold War arsenal with agile, multi-role systems that can contribute across the spectrum of conflict and win not just tomorrow’s fight but the day after tomorrow’s. A major prerequisite in pursuing these technologies is versatility. OMFTS platforms must contribute to operations in environments where enemies seek to minimize our technological advantage. Where the platform itself presents inherent environmental limitations, incorporating versatility in its munitions may be the answer. Non-lethal weapons offer substantial promise in this regard.

The Human Dimension

The diverse nature of the 21st century threat requires much more than acquiring advanced equipment and weapons systems. As always, people and not machines define our success in war. Time and again well-trained, disciplined, and cohesive units—people with strong character—have overcome disadvantages in both size and weaponry. As mentioned, our 21st century enemy will avoid our strengths and instead confront us in environments that negate technological advantages. It will attempt to fight in the close terrain of the urban jungle—where it is difficult to consolidate combat power and employ more lethal weapons without causing collateral damage and injuring innocents. They will seek to exploit the media to depict Americans making critical judgment errors in the heat of battle and thus influence world opinion and popular will to sustain the effort. In this environment, individual
Sea Dragon builds on existing strengths of the naval services within a joint warfighting framework

**Operational Maneuver**

decisions can have strategic implications. Because the human dimension is more significant than the technological, the rationale for our acquisition strategy is to equip the man and not man the equipment.

Junior enlisted members of the Marine Corps must have sound judgment and be both improvisers and innovators. When the world is literally exploding around them, they must have the intelligence, skills, and character to take the right action. The OMFTS warfighting concept accounts for the human dimension by enhancing individual training and promoting an innovative spirit within the Marine Corps as an institution. We implemented this transformation to develop individual, values-based decisionmaking abilities along with flexible but unbreakable unit cohesion in situations of extreme stress. Consisting of four phases—recruiting, training, cohesion, and sustainment—the process begins when the applicants come into contact with recruiters and will continue throughout their service. Because those executing OMFTS must be comfortable with high-tech weapons and information systems and trained to employ them, the Marine Corps has elevated its recruiting and training standards across the board.

**Experimentation**

Many OMFTS-enabling technologies—particularly those that address naval surface fire support, C4I, mine countermeasures, and sea-based sustained logistics platforms—are still being identified and developed. Similarly, the doctrine, training, education, and structure of the ideal OMFTS force is a work in progress. To facilitate this effort and provide a forum for institutional innovation, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) was established in 1995. It is presently engaged in a five-year experimentation plan (FYEP) entitled Sea Dragon—a process of concept development and experimentation that builds on the existing strengths of the naval services within a joint warfighting framework. In coordination with the Navy, the FYEP goal is to improve the capabilities of naval forces on the operational level which exploits an enemy’s center of gravity by inflicting a decisive blow. With a focus on developing expeditionary forces-in-readiness, OMFTS provides CINCs and JFCs with a utilitarian, sea-based MAGTF with capabilities across the operational spectrum—from disaster relief and humanitarian operations to full-fledged sustained combat. The Marine Corps is well on the way to developing the people, doctrine, and organization to acquiring equipment and systems to field enhanced, OMFTS-capable MAGTFs. With a similar focus throughout the military on innovation, aggressive and cooperative experimentation, and acquisition programs which exploit leap-ahead technologies, the United States will remain a superpower for generations to come.
Non-lethal weapons are evolving. To date they have been seen as applicable on the tactical level in military operations other than war. The demand for them will increase and spread across the conflict spectrum. A new class of non-lethal technology is also emerging that will have more direct applications on the operational and strategic levels. This evolution will depend on research to ensure that these weapons comply with political, legal, and ethical considerations.

From Eclectic to Synergistic

Until recently the development of non-lethal weapons has been a disparate effort. Isolated corners of the defense establishment focused on various technologies. Some laboratories worked on acoustics while others pursued laser technology. Moreover, it was difficult to get institutional support for non-lethal weaponry. Although senior officials expressed interest in such weapons as early as 1991, that support was not communicated to lower echelons. Some were strongly in favor of such efforts while others were very much opposed to them.

The 1995 evacuation of Somalia brought about a change in support for non-lethal weapons. While preparing for the operation, Chief
Warrant Officer Charles Heal, USMCR, observed fellow marines planning to confront hostile mobs with deadly force. Having witnessed failures in crowd control during the Los Angeles riots as a member of the sheriff’s department, he recommended that the Marine Corps obtain and deploy non-lethal weapons to Somalia. It was the first occasion when such weaponry was thoroughly integrated into U.S. operational planning.

From a tactical perspective, these weapons filled a critical vulnerability gap in the operation. *People would run up and try to steal equipment off a marine’s person, knowing that our rules of engagement wouldn’t allow us to shoot them,* according to one marine after his tour in Somalia. As an adjunct to deadly force, non-lethal weapons offered new options to the Marines by delaying, degrading, and denying an enemy while minimizing casualties. This suggested greater freedom of action in what had otherwise been a restricted situation.

Somalia became a catalyst for a coherent program. “The fact that marines were enthusiastic about non-lethal weapons had a positive influence on other armed forces,” as one scholar refers to them. U.S. involvement will be unavoidable in such conflicts. As the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps indicated, “The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to [their] vital interests.”

Therein is the danger. Local clashes can trigger wider conflicts as outside nations and groups with cultural affinities take sides with consequences for the global order and economy.

In this environment the Armed Forces must walk a fine line. While the use of force may be tactical in application, it can be profound in strategic terms. Consider the Balkans where Russia identifies with the Serbs while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran align with Muslim minorities. The misuse of force, real or perceived, could inflame cultural animosities well beyond the tactical level.

Sole reliance on lethal force will prove a liability. Its use by the Russians in Chechnya did more to strengthen resistance than weaken it. After the Tiananmen Square incident it turned international opinion against the regime in Beijing. It also jeopardizes coalitions. Almost every government in the Islamic world, to include many which had supported the coalition during the Persian Gulf War, has condemned U.S. strikes against Iraq in the aftermath of Desert Storm.

Non-lethal weapons are indispensable to military operations other than war. Over the last few years much has been done in development. A joint concept for non-lethal weapons has been issued. Related training is being developed for every service and joint standing rules of engagement are being amended. A Human Effect Advisory Panel on non-lethal weapons has been established. Moreover, such weapons have been provided to U.S. forces in Bosnia and soon will be fielded with forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. This advancement comes at a time when these weapons are needed more than ever.

**Across the Conflict Spectrum**

The international security environment makes non-violent imperatives today. Superpower rivalry has been displaced by a clash of cultures—or “dangerous conflicts...between people of different cultural entities,” as one scholar refers to them. U.S. involvement will be unavoidable in such conflicts. As the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps indicated, “The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to [their] vital interests.”

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Urban Warfare

Non-lethal weapons will become more widely applicable across the conflict spectrum. This will occur as the locus of war shifts from the battlefield to urban areas. “A particularly challenging aspect of the future security environment will be the increasing likelihood of military operations in cities,” as the National Defense Panel reported. There are several reasons for this shift. First, the world is becoming more urban. Relative to 1990, urban dwellers are expected to triple by 2025, reaching four billion, or 61 percent of the world population. Moreover, the Armed Forces will be unable to avoid built-up areas in maneuver warfare. Deployment will require movement through ports and airfields located in cities. Nor will they be able to bypass sprawling “megacities” that continue to grow in the developing world.

In addition, enemies may lure us into urban areas “in an attempt to mitigate our capabilities and make us fight where we are least effective,” as the Commandant of the Marine Corps has remarked. This was the situation in 1993 when Somali warlords sought to fight U.S. forces in the alleys of a third world city where combat was reduced to rifle against rifle.

Urban warfare poses unique problems for less discriminate and catastrophic use of force. Enemies may blend with noncombatants. Moreover, they may use civilians as shields to deter attack, as occurred in Somalia and Iraq. At the very least they will use the urban infrastructure for cover, concealment, and movement.

Non-lethals will be vital in urban warfare, as indicated in the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan. They can be used to channel noncombatants away from combat. They can also enable a commander to separate the combatants from noncombatants with a minimum of casualties. They can be used to clear human roadblocks which protect high-value targets. Additionally, they can reduce collateral damage to the infrastructure and ultimately the cost of war. It may no longer be necessary to destroy a village in order to save it.

The implications of non-lethals for regional conflict may go well beyond the tactical level. They will significantly contribute to preventing hostilities. An enemy may see high lethality as too disproportionate a penalty to be a credible deterrent whereas non-lethal weapons may be deterrents at lower levels. The end result is best described by the current commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zinni: “Non-lethal weapons when properly applied . . . make the United States more formidable, not less so.”

Non-lethal weaponry is also key to maintaining political will. As one report has explained, “In regional conflict, [the U.S.] stake may seem less apparent. We should provide forces with capabilities that minimize the need to trade American lives with tyrants and aggressors who do not care about their own people.” To a great extent, non-lethals represent such capabilities.

Weapons of Tomorrow

The next generation of non-lethal weaponry holds great promise. By comparison, today’s capabilities are manifest by blunt trauma weapons, aqueous/sticky foams, and oleoresin capsicum spray. Their applications are tactical whereas the next generation will have more direct operational and strategic applications.

Desert Storm provided a glimpse of things to come. Electronic microchips with a computer virus were reportedly inserted into a printer being smuggled into Iraq via Jordan for delivery to an air defense bunker. The virus was designed to disable the computers that enabled coordination and communications between air defense batteries. According to one account, it devoured “Windows” whenever technicians opened monitor screens to check on aspects of the air defense system.

A more strategic example was the use of carbon fiber in the Gulf War. Tomahawk missiles released thousands of spools of carbon fibers over Iraqi power stations that floated down to short circuit electrical components that ultimately disrupted electrical supplies. Such technology revealed the possibility of attacking military and civilian infrastructures without the catastrophic damage associated with conventional weaponry.
The next generation of non-lethals is now emerging. It includes acoustics, electromagnetic pulse, lasers, and other directed energy weapons. In the future, microwave weapons might disable communications in enemy rear areas. Lasers might degrade key sensor systems. Cruise missiles carrying electromagnetic pulse systems or microscopic carbon fibers that can penetrate almost any electrical system could shut down military and civilian infrastructures.

Such technology can serve several strategic purposes. It can support economic sanctions. Prior to more lethal warfighting, it can create strategic paralysis—a pause that gives diplomacy time to work. The basic principle is that non-lethals can leave an enemy more vulnerable to deadly force. If such force becomes justified, this technology can degrade and disable enemy forces until conventional force can be brought to bear.

The applications of such weapons on the operational and strategic levels must be weighed. Their advent is rapidly approaching. In addition, turning new technology into military capabilities is time-consuming. Finally, the United States is not the only nation developing this technology. China, Russia, Germany, Israel, France, and Britain are thought to be pursuing antipersonnel laser programs or other directed energy weapons, many of which are covertly sold on the international arms market.

Multidisciplinary R&D

Non-lethals hold considerable promise but also pose tremendous challenges. Increasingly they will have to be acceptable in legal, social, and ethical terms. This legitimacy as well as further development will largely depend on a precise understanding of their human effects. These impacts determine what makes a weapon either lethal or non-lethal. But this is easier said than done.

As the TECOM Technology Symposium in 1997 concluded regarding non-lethal weapons, “Determining the target effects on personnel is the greatest challenge to the testing community.” There are several reasons for this problem. The potential of injury and death severely limits human tests. Animal testing, which is also limited, is not always reliable. In addition, the biotechnology required for developing non-lethals does not fit within the bounds of past research disciplines. The problem is compounded by the fact that non-lethal technology cuts across the spectrum of science.

Yet understanding non-lethal weapons effects determines safe employment parameters and ultimately rules of engagement. It is also necessary to ensure compliance with international law. Lasers that cause permanent blindness violate the Blinding Laser Ban of 1995—a treaty initiated by the United States. Directed energy weapons that target the central nervous system and cause neuropsychological disorders may violate the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980. And weapons that go beyond non-lethal intentions and cause “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” could violate the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977.

Environmental consequences must also be considered. A modification of the environment with harmful effects on humans would violate the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Knowledge of human and environmental effects may be necessary to establish international standards. Past conventions were drafted when such technology was the stuff of science fiction. How non-lethals are defined and employed may be subject to broad interpretation. New protocols may be needed to ensure that they are not abused in warfare or in domestic law enforcement.

Controversy already surrounds non-lethals. A number of speakers at the Symposium on the Medical Profession and the Effects of Weapons in 1996 at Montreux, Switzerland, claimed that many violated international laws and that the medical and legal communities must use medical data to counter arguments to the contrary. Subsequently, in a statement presented to the U.N. General Assembly the International Committee of the Red Cross warned that “the obligation to examine the humanitarian law implications of all new weapons, including those assumed to be ‘non-lethal’, must be taken with the utmost seriousness.”
Developing non-lethal weapons demands a concerted multidisciplinary approach, a reality recognized as early as 1973 in efforts at Aberdeen Proving Ground. However, two things have changed since then: technology has become more complex and so have regulatory overviews.

Pennsylvania State University possesses the expertise to conduct multidisciplinary research on non-lethal weapons. Many of the technologies being developed in its applied research laboratory have import for non-ethals. In 1977 the university established the Institute for Non-lethal Defense Technologies to coordinate various research projects among its colleges of medicine, health and human development, engineering, and earth and mineral sciences as well as its Institute for Policy Research, the Dickinson School of Law, and the Applied Research Laboratory. This effort supports the Human Effects Advisory Panel, which will address human effects for the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate, including quantitatively defining non-lethal and incapacitation effects.

In testimony before Congress, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency noted that non-ethals have "the potential to dramatically alter the nature of warfare." Their application is evolving from the tactical to strategic levels. However, their complexity makes them unlike other weapons, and many of their effects remain undetermined. The outcome of this evolution depends on an unprecedented multidisciplinary research and development effort. It will mean the difference between the use and misuse of non-lethal weaponry not only by the Armed Forces but other organizations as well.

NOTES
Making the Joint Journey

By WILLIAM A. OWENS

Thirteen years have gone by since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act made joint operations and joint force planning the law. Over that time the Department of Defense has established centers, management procedures, planning organizations, and command structures that bear the term joint prominently in their titles. Military professionals talk and write about jointness. We congratulate ourselves on how far we have come from the bad old days of unrestrained service parochialism and excessive redundancy among the Armed Forces.

Much of this self-congratulation is justified. There is greater planning coordination among the Armed Forces and more cross-service operational integration today. The assignment to a joint command and staff is now a virtual necessity for career advancement, and the increasing number of joint entities—from task forces to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—bear witness to the advance of a common perspective. The conglomeration of laws, organizations, and procedures that function under the rubric of jointness epitomizes how the military of today differs from that of yesterday. Some things really have changed.

Yet jointness is a term that has been invented. You will not find it in the dictionary; and it is difficult to institutionalize a universal meaning for the concept. Moreover, objective evaluation reveals major caveats in the notion that the Defense Establishment has become more joint. Despite the period since the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, operations remain more joint in name than in conduct, and the process of determining requirements is more joint in rhetoric than in execution. Desert Storm, sometimes touted as the advent of joint operations in the American way of war, was more remarkable for its similarity to the command and operational patterns of the Vietnam era than as a reification of joint warfare concepts. Look beneath the surface and you will uncover the same organizational pattern. Geography, not synergy, structured the responsibilities and missions of the service components in the Persian Gulf just as it did twenty-five years earlier in Southeast Asia. Difficulties rather than ease characterized cross-service communications and coordination. The fact that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force worked so well together is more a testament to the initiative and skill of those who did the actual fighting than to a real shift to joint command and control. And military operations since have provided scant evidence of rapid progress in this area.

Unfortunately the story is much the same with regard to joint force planning and identifying military requirements. While a joint perspective is not absent from considerations of requirements for future forces, it remains far subordinate to that of the individual services at a time when each recognizes increasing budget constraints and believes it is involved in a zero-sum funding contest. Service parochialism is still the most important factor in force planning.

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Some Reasons

A joint perspective comes down to cross-service trust and the belief that another component can reliably provide a military function. Too often the functional redundancy of the Armed Forces stems from a basic desire to avoid reliance on another service or external source. Regardless of why duplication and redundancy exist, once in place they become vested. Internal organizations are formed to conduct functions, maintain facilities, and ensure that these weapons or functions will be available. And the most potent rationale for duplication is soon proclaimed: it is essential because the vagaries and fog of war demand redundancy to compensate for the unexpected. After all, aren’t the stakes too high to depend on another service—specialized for another kind of warfare and focused on its own needs—to come through in a crisis? Isn’t it better if functions and matériel that may be needed are all part of the same structure, tied together by a specialized doctrine, identifiable by a specialized insignia, and wedded to the same traditions, culture, and language? And isn’t this the way that we’ve always done it and the way that has been proven by victory on the battlefield?

The substance of the rationale for the crystalline stovepipes that separate the services, I refer to them as crystalline because it is easy to miss them. Sometimes we see through them as if they were not there. Yet if you look closely you will discover them. And if you function inside one you are quick to learn how far you can go before hitting the side, for we shroud them in authority and tradition. We inculcate military careerists with these traditions and reinforce them throughout their lives, formally through service evaluation systems that determine how fast and how far people rise and informally in many subtle ways. The higher careerists rise, the more they see their role as protectors of service traditions, doctrine, and loyalties.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act promulgated a joint perspective in force planning by expanding the role of unified commanders in the planning, programming, and budgeting system. The unified commanders, most with regional responsibilities, are after all joint commanders and as such are positioned to best understand and advocate that perspective. But look closely at how these regional commands actually participate in planning and designing future forces. Unified commanders often command primarily by defining areas of responsibility and activity for separate service components assigned to them. And when asked for recommendations on the size, structure, and character of future forces, they usually compile the separate recommendations furnished by service components assigned to their command which are often drafted back in Washington by service staffs. They are dispatched in time for service components of a unified command to change the letterhead, correct the spelling, and more rarely adjust the substance to reflect the component commander’s particular bias before submitting the requirements. The staff of the unified commander, in effect, will then staple together the input from each service component in time to dispatch recommendations back to Washington for the next cycle of planning, programming, and budgeting.

Then there are joint task forces. There are a lot of them now, organized for exercises and operations. Because of them, we are getting better at joint operations. The operative word is still task. JTFs narrow jointness to particular events for particular durations. That means they are not regarded as the operational norm; we deal with them as temporary perturbations, exceptions to comfortable administrative and cultural channels that link Washington and components abroad. We are getting better at conducting joint operations. Synergy is enhanced among separate service components when they exercise and operate together, and we are institutionalizing our knowledge on how to do it. But we should not yet claim victory or ignore how hard it is for components to interface.
We created the joint doctrine formulation process in part to overcome this parochialism. Institutions like the Joint Doctrine Center in Norfolk, Virginia, and elements of the Joint Staff have produced literally tons of publications that sketch, and sometimes offer exquisite details for, what is termed joint doctrine. Yet this growing body of literature is not so much joint doctrine as simply an amalgam of service doctrines. Those charged with producing joint doctrine have no independent source of data, information, or concepts on how to generate new synergism from the interaction of the services other than what the individual services provide them. They rely on inputs from service staffs that are focused on their own doctrine. As a result, purple-wrapped joint doctrine pubs are usually either compilations of how each service goes about doing a particular thing or highly coordinated summaries of what the services do similarly. Service parochialism has dominated the defense planning and programming processes up through the last half of the 20th century.

Changing the Planning Process

The identification of military requirements should be consolidated in a Joint Requirements Committee, chaired by the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman (or his designated representative, perhaps the Vice Chairman) serving as the senior military member and deputy chairman. Membership should be restricted to the service chiefs or vice chiefs and four senior civilian members from the Office of the Secretary. The committee would be responsible for setting all military requirements.

A combined military-civilian staff would support the committee. It would be the only DOD staff dedicated to identifying requirements. We should strip out all other requirements bodies from the services and consolidate analytic resources in the new requirements committee staff. In effect this would remove the requirement function from the services and charge them with implementing decisions of the Joint Requirements Committee (on which they would be represented). The service chiefs would be specified as CEOs of the infrastructure, training personnel and managing facilities. This is no small task. It involves 65 percent of the defense budget.

The staff of the Secretary of Defense would also shift in function, losing all its independent requirement-setting taskings and dropping elements whose primary role has been to represent the budgetary interests of particular groups. This in turn would justify reducing civilian and military staffs in the Pentagon by half. It would cut the civilian staff to about the level of the early 1960s when the Armed Forces were nearly twice as large as today.

Removing the requirements function from the services would be a major change. It would not mean that the services would be abolished or unified. They would remain the repository of the traditions that distinguish them individually. But a major prop that reinforces the stovepipes would be gone, and with it the entire tempestuous superstructure and mystique of budget shares and force structure maintenance. With an outside body (but one in which each service would be represented) setting the requirements, these obstacles would erode quickly.

Consolidating

Removing the services from the requirement-setting function would make it easier to merge key support functions. Nearly every analysis and assessment, from the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces ten years later, indicated that there is real redundancy in the support structure but that it is too difficult to change. That has been true, not because the changes did not make sense but because the services opposed them. That opposition was rooted in parochialism and distrust. But redundancy was also justified annually because the services argued that maintaining separate support functions was a military requirement.

There have been efforts in the past to consolidate support functions. The most serious was the creation of defense agencies by Secretary Robert McNamara to provide integrated intelligence, communications, and logistics support for all military components. Over time it became obvious that his efforts were unsuccessful. Today we face the complexity and duplication generated not only by service redundancy, but by an increasing number of defense agencies which have become additional competitors for resources and the basis for duplication.

However, when the role of the services in requirement identification is removed, the game literally changes. It is time to consolidate the four great enablers of combat power—intelligence, communications, logistics, and medical services. Individual services should be made the executive agents for these support functions, assuming the management responsibility for the Armed Forces. Together with this consolidation, the separate logistics, communications, and intelligence agencies should be abolished.
But we don’t want to go too far. The benefits of service identity and traditions should be maintained. Only when traditions get in the way of the purpose of the military and become ends in themselves must we adjust what is, after all, an historical phenomenon. It is the abuses of service parochialism that must be curtailed.

The age-old practice of denigrating other services stems from an ignorance of what actually occurs within them. It is sometimes rationalized by the argument that the complexity of what goes on within each service is so great and the skills demanded so high that one can’t afford the luxury of learning about other services. Taking time away from the responsibility of mastering the mores, operational doctrine, and systems of one’s own service is counterproductive. Personnel undergo extensive and intense training throughout their careers; but they are not taught about the advantages of truly joint operations.

Changing the Academies

The problem starts in the service academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. The goal of the academies is to provide cadets and midshipmen with a solid education. Although some graduates are given a choice of service, the central goal of each academy has been not simply to produce good military officers, but good Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force officers. Interestingly, most sociological studies of what makes a good Navy officer as distinct from a good Army officer point to experience and training received after commissioning. Yet the distinctiveness among the services is accentuated the most at the academies.

That emphasis should be reversed. Service academies and ROTC programs ought to stress a joint perspective and, in particular, acquaint cadets and midshipmen with paradigms and systems found in the other services. The net result could be significant: each graduate might emerge proud not only of his or her service, but of what the Armed Forces provide jointly to national security. Specialization in the mores, systems, and operational doctrine of a particular service will come with experience and additional training. We must orient the academy experience toward producing good military officers.

Various study groups and commissions have proposed changes in officer education. They range from expanding the current exchange programs which allow some cadets and midshipmen to participate in other service academies to introducing more joint perspective classes at each academy to, more radically, consolidating the academies into a national military academy. I think the best approach would be to rotate the classes among academies. For example, a midshipman could spend the first year at the Naval Academy, the second at the Military Academy at West Point, the third at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, and the fourth back at Annapolis. A similar rotation would apply to the Military Academy and the Air Force Academy. There would be little or no cost differential with the single-academy pattern that dominates the early socialization of officers today. Similar exchanges could be devised for ROTC programs, although their size would suggest consolidating them into a single program. In the final analysis, we want to make young officers of every service aware and proud of the Armed Forces, capable of operating together, and able to start their military careers thinking jointly.

Career Training

The professional military education and training system through which a better joint perspective can be built already exists. We do not have to make major changes in it or in the pattern by which individuals pass through it during their careers. We should, however, change some of what occurs inside it.

One key change would be to incorporate an improved understanding of the major military systems used by each service and of the new information systems that are binding platforms and systems into the emerging system of systems. Some may argue that the sophistication and complexity of the platforms and systems which make up the core of each service mean that learning about them would encroach on the time needed to grasp the essentials of one’s own service. I disagree. There is no more important knowledge than that imparted by a joint perspective and increased awareness of the major systems of each service. This understanding ought to be a condition for promotion throughout the Armed Forces. If we are to accelerate the transformation of America’s military—as I am convinced we should—we must draw on the insights, innovation, and intelligence of the entire officer corps.
In June 1998 the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) opened a new era by expanding education in this area for the military, intelligence professionals, and other members of the national security community at large with the introduction of an undergraduate degree in intelligence. As the only accredited institution offering a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence, JMIC is educating the next generation of intelligence leaders within a joint environment for the roles and responsibilities outlined in Joint Vision 2010.

During their year of graduate study at JMIC, officers and senior noncommissioned officers from every service and civilians from across the intelligence and law enforcement communities consider such issues. They are exposed to senior military leaders and civilian policymakers as part of the study of the dynamics and tensions between intelligence and policy as well as the impact of personalities and group dynamics—beyond the wiring diagrams—on the national security process.

The curriculum, which requires a thesis for the master’s degree, consists of core courses in national security policy, national military strategy, the international security environment, strategic...
warning and threat management, collection, research and analysis, and information technologies.

Educating Full Partners

JMIC was established in 1962 as the Defense Intelligence School by merging the Army and Navy intelligence schools. It operated under the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and was attached to that agency for administrative support. In 1980 Congress authorized the award of a master’s degree, which was accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools in 1983. The institution was rechartered as the Defense Intelligence College with a twofold mission of education and research. A decade later, in the era of joint doctrine, the college adopted its current name. In 1997 Congress authorized it to award a second degree, the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence. Accreditation was reaffirmed in June 1998 to include the new degree.

The main campus is located in Washington at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base with a satellite campus at the National Security Agency. The student body averages 430–450 annually, including full-time enrollment in both postgraduate and undergraduate programs as well as part-time study in the weekend and evening programs, a master’s program for Reserve Components, and a postgraduate program at the NSA campus.

To meet the requirements of sponsoring services, departments, and agencies, the college is preparing defense, intelligence, and national security leaders of tomorrow to be full partners with their policy, planning, and operations counterparts. Graduates will be focused on the uncertainties of the emerging world and capable of anticipating and tailoring intelligence for the national, theater, and tactical levels.

Gaming and Simulation

In preparing students to play a role in shaping the real-time comprehensive picture—the lead-player role in providing commanders a high-confidence view of both friend and foe—the college draws on the teaching tools of case methodology, gaming, and simulation. Wargame electives are designed within the settings of major wargames hosted by the military staff and war colleges with whom JMIC maintains a working relationship: the National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Staff College, U.S. Army War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Air University.

In March 1998, a group of 16 JMIC graduate students—comprised of Army and Air Force captains and a Navy lieutenant—played the parts of J-2s and deputy J-2s in a capstone exercise at the U.S. Army War College. They prepared by taking the elective joint intelligence exercise course to interact with more senior counterparts at Carlisle Barracks. They joined the exercise in full stride, manning intelligence cells, providing regular briefings, and participating throughout in discussing options with exercise decisionmakers. At the request of the U.S. Army War College, 36 students for the college are scheduled to participate in next year’s exercise, Strategic Crisis ‘99.

JMIC plans to expand the opportunity for its students in future gaming and exercises to participate not only on-scene but from remote locations, replicating the growing information-age, real-world demands on the flow of intelligence. In part to facilitate cyber-era activity in gaming and exercises, the college has fitted out and is operating a technology laboratory and, as a result of the curriculum review completed in 1997, added a core course on information technologies in the cyber era.

Students work in a computer/software setting which mirrors state-of-the-art environments found throughout the intelligence community. Both college and students are exploring interlocking architectures that facilitate worldwide collaboration in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Also, in exploring the emerging world of computer deception, JMIC is encouraging critiques of system strengths and
weaknesses. If there is one truth in this fast-moving era, it is that students bring greater cyberspace knowledge and skills to their studies and research each year.

Research
Teaching and research are conducted at the highest levels of security classification—one of the college’s great strengths—with students, faculty, and staff holding the appropriate clearances. Academic freedom is central. Research by both students and faculty is produced on the classified and unclassified levels and contributes directly to the area of national security affairs and to theory, doctrine, and methodology in the field of intelligence.

Although graduate students can choose the topic of their master’s theses, there is a growing menu of recommended subjects provided by services, commands, and agencies in the intelligence community. When theses have been approved and students have been awarded their degree, summaries of their works are posted on Intelink where they can be accessed by the user community. A thesis on Japan’s capabilities and limitations as a peacekeeping nation, for example, drew a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for similar research on 31 other nations.

The faculty not only guides research but collaborates with students on synergistic products. In 1997 JMIC published Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action, examining intelligence in the era of coalition warfare, U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking, and international refugee crises. It distilled essays from theses written by graduate students from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Department of State. This volume has been used in the classroom at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Harvard University, and the
Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. In addition, works by both students and faculty have appeared in *Studies in Intelligence*, a quarterly journal issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and *Defense Intelligence Journal*, which is published by the JMIC Foundation. Research also is distributed through JMIC discussion papers and occasional papers.

**The Undergraduate Degree**

Our noncommissioned officer corps is the envy of militaries around the world. Within the intelligence community, NCOs are increasingly filling positions on the national and theater levels which previously were occupied by commissioned officers. Many noncommissioned officers, along with their civilian intelligence-technician counterparts, may have earned college credit but do not hold baccalaureate degrees. Another JMIC contribution is the program it affords talented, highly motivated NCOs, culminating in both undergraduate and graduate degrees in the field of intelligence.

The bachelor’s degree program is a senior year, degree-completion program. It is a demanding course of study which requires applicants to have completed three undergraduate years of college for admission: a minimum of 80 semester hours of undergraduate studies with at least 20 credits in upper division classes. At least 30 credits must have been earned in the classrooms of a regionally accredited college and with satisfaction of sufficient general education requirements in fields such as math and science. A 2.5 cumulative grade point average is required and a writing sample is part of the application process. During the four-quarter academic year leading to the bachelor’s degree, students take courses from across the field of intelligence, including a culminating senior seminar in intelligence which requires a major research paper.

A recent report by the Commission on Higher Education made the following observation:

*The Joint Military Intelligence College exhibits the principles and practices that the Middle States Association considers characteristics of excellence in institutions of higher education. Particularly noteworthy is the clear sense of mission and purpose which permeates the college and the dedication of its faculty, administration, and staff. It has been recognized that the Joint Military Intelligence College is a national asset performing a national service.*

This evaluation is a reminder that excellence in teaching and research must be attained with each incoming class and new academic year. It emphasizes that a basic characteristic of excellence is the way in which institutional research and outcomes assessment is conducted. How graduates view the quality and value of their education and how receiving services, commands, and agencies regard the performance of JMIC graduates is central to its work.
Conduit or Cul-de-Sac?
Information Flow in Civil-Military Operations

By MICHAEL M. SMITH and MELINDA HOFSTETTER

Information sharing, closer cooperation—how often do we hear these terms in connection with the relationships between the Armed Forces and foreign militaries, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations? We debate their implications during exercises and at conferences. But is this development reaching the field? How can commanders ensure that junior officers and noncommissioned officers foster relations with their counterparts? How can communications be improved to relieve the increasingly crowded joint and combined humanitarian/peace operations process and aid in mission accomplishment?

Even well trained combat units will not be ready for the change in perceptions, attitudes, operating tempo, and activities required in civil-military operations (CMOs) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) without additional training. Warfighting skills do not transfer directly to peace operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or many other CMO/MOOTW missions. Much of this problem is institutional. The military tends to regard these missions as aberrations that will not endure. Moreover, they simply do not like to perform them. Thus experiences and lessons learned often are not properly captured. (The British have a similar problem; they refer to lessons identified, that is, lessons only to be forgotten and reidentified later.) There are many recorded instances of soldiers having to reinvent the wheel because they could not find appropriate documentation. The problem is exacerbated by the normal rotation of personnel whereby we lose institutional knowledge and skills.

This article recounts problems faced by battalion through brigade-sized units operating in a multinational arena in support of CMOs. Although most MOOTW are also CMOs, the emphasis is placed on relationships among military staffs...
information is difficult to characterize because of its complexity and uniqueness

Intelligence Phobia
In a recent study Andrei Raevsky points out that intelligence is critical to any military operation, especially peace operations. Yet collecting it may be regarded as secretive, subversive, and hostile and thus often is seen outside the military as inconsistent with peacekeeping which is supposedly conducted impartially. But Raevsky views peace operations without intelligence as being "blind, deaf, and brainless." He emphasizes the special challenge of peacekeeping missions:

Because of its escalatory potential, this type of operation requires a much more complex intelligence capability which, besides providing the essential intelligence support for the peacekeeping mission proper, continuously keeps track of all activities in the area affecting the peacekeeping operation and updates the intelligence picture needed for possible combat actions and the likely resulting escalation.

Moreover, in looking at insurgencies throughout history and how they were defeated (or how insurgents defeated those in power), we find that intelligence played a key role whether it was "evaluating moral effects, denoting how the political situation might be transformed, or gauging what might induce guerrillas to cease fighting and negotiate." This analysis can be extended to virtually every CMO.

Know Your Mission
The days when one knew one's enemy—or ally for that matter—are all but over. Even the basic Clausewitzian construct of war has changed. The destruction of enemy military power may not be the object at all. One principle found in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of the 1930s is now widely accepted. Warfare must transcend material destruction of property and populations to deal with the underlying economic, sociological, religious, and ethnic issues of society at large. The operational objective in the 1930s as today was not to kill noncombatants but to bend them to our will and prevent them from obstructing the mission. Yet operational doctrine does not support broadly-based MOOTW training that fully addresses such matters.

Multidimensional tasks facing the Armed Forces have expanded. Traditional doctrine was focused on defending the Nation against a global competitor, disposing with regional threats, and providing short-term crisis support such as non-combatant evacuation operations. The military now confronts new formulations of national interest. These more frequent but less traditional missions "encompass a wide range of combined and joint military operations beyond peacekeeping engagements and short of major theater wars," according to Strategic Assessment 1998. Mission success is rare when the military is asked to assist either failing or failed states characterized by domestic turmoil, transnational threats, terrorism, drugs, environmental problems, and disease. Further challenges arise in disengagement and stabilization, prisoner exchange, demobilization and weapons control, mine clearance, humanitarian relief, dislocated civilians, internal political cooperation, monitoring elections and democratization, policing and criminal justice, civil and social order, and economic restoration. Parties to conflicts include not only traditional militaries but paramilitaries, insurgents, organized gangs, and warlords. Some questions must be asked up front: What do we want to do? How is mission accomplishment defined? What is the strategy? Who is in charge? Most of these questions are political and must be answered because they determine the boundaries of operations.

The exchange of information in MOOTW and CMOs—including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations—is difficult to characterize because of its complexity and uniqueness. The political, humanitarian, and military dimensions must be coordinated. Yet neither the military nor international organizations nor NGOs tend to coordinate well with each other. Such terms as coordination, cooperation, and consensus building have become familiar in multinational settings such as humanitarian emergencies, but are infrequently operationalized in the field. Integration of information might be a more appropriate term on the operational level.

Building trust and confidence through face-to-face interaction is significant in information integration and can be accomplished relatively easily one-on-one at worker level. Unity of effort implies that each actor touched by a operation is in accord with mission objectives and is striving toward a consensus, works toward the common good, and recognizes that integrating information is in everyone's best interest.

Making an Unholy Alliance Holy
It can take time to convince NGOs that the military shares its goal and is there to cooperate. Thus both the military and NGO community
often go about accomplishing the mission differently. The military seeks to stabilize the situation in the short term by establishing a secure environment, stopping hunger, setting up temporary shelters in the face of natural disasters, or otherwise easing humanitarian pressures. International organizations and NGOs, on the other hand, have dealt for decades with humanitarian situations such as poverty, underdevelopment, disease, and starvation. They have not viewed the security environment as bipolar and east-west, but often as multifaceted and north-south in origin. Consequently, the military has a different impetus from the outset.

Civilian organizations take a long-term approach. They are frequently in the area well before the military and remain much longer. In Kosovo, for example, some international organizations and NGOs have been on the ground for three years.

International organizations and NGOs are not homogenous. The single leader concept used by the military is difficult for them because each group has its own objectives. Some are politically based while others are politically biased. Some are faith or advocacy based and all are constituency supported. Collectively they have no coherent structure or shared vision to pull them together as do the Armed Forces—sometimes a strength since the NGO hierarchy is not subject to bureaucratic layering and political crosscurrents. Moreover, there is competition for publicity, which translates into fundraising. Yet NGOs share with the military such collaborative principles as a strong moral imperative, professionalism, and a respect for life. Moreover, the military must realize that many NGO and international organization workers have had more field experience than
the more information that can be shared, the greater the chance of mission success

most company grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. The derogatory phrase “herding cats,” which alludes to NGO and international organization workers as an uncontrollable yet monolithic block of tree-huggers, is misplaced and should be abandoned.

The military and NGOs must acknowledge the differences in their respective approaches while recognizing their commonalities. They must remember that an enemy may not be attackable in a traditional sense. The enemy may be hunger or disease. Accordingly dialogue is imperative. It benefits both sides to share information they have collected in order to work toward the common goal of mission accomplishment—which may either be short term from the military standpoint or long term for NGOs.

A Role for Intelligence

Although the military tends to think of NGOs in connection with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, most relief organizations regard these sort of operations as sideshows to long-term infrastructure development. Participants in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions are thus programmed by cultural predilections and process information. Language is another complication. While English may be the common language of international operations, specialized terminology and acronyms inhibit communication within the military. Many civilians can confront a confusing fog of war when trying to communicate with the military in the field.

Moreover, one might assume in communicating with allies and other foreign nationals that they share identical values when in fact they do not. Information is processed either visually or aurally through subconscious filters, opening lines of communication requires prolonged exposure to foreign cultures and skills difficult to nurture within the military.

Information Sharing

As part of the pre-deployment work-up for a mission, both intelligence officers and others on every level gather information on the anticipated environment, including an in-depth awareness of the surroundings and players to be encountered. The process can be assisted by a sound human intelligence base, although that is an acknowledged deficiency in the intelligence field. Owing to declining assets for information/intelligence sources, a clear and up-to-date read on local attitudes and customs may not be available. Some voids can nonetheless be filled through open sources: the media, NGOs, the Department of State, Web sites, and both American and foreign agencies and organizations such as the United Nations. Another source is local and regional news, especially that of the opposition and fringe factions which may oppose U.S. presence.

Everyone connected to the area of operation can act as eyes and ears. Relief workers now operate on both sides of the conflictive zone rather than only in government-held territory, giving them access to more area than the military. They can provide insights on the atmosphere of a place or incident. But their own agendas may bias such accounts; therefore their observations must be evaluated to ensure that their description of the situation is founded on reliable information.

Not everyone will share information equally; yet the military must be forthcoming whether or not it receives information back in kind. The Armed Forces must realize that civilian members of nongovernment organizations are under no obligation to share information and may in fact view cooperation with the military negatively. Yet the more information that can be shared, the greater the situational awareness, and the greater the chance of mission success.

Despite widespread assumption that the Armed Forces and NGOs have different missions, acknowledging their commonality, for example, that their mutual goal is “securing the safety of the local population,” will likely lead to a freer flow of information. Toward that end, it is imperative to find the right medium for exchanging ideas. It may not be possible to formalize links between the military and NGOs, but that may not be necessary or desirable. Informal bonds can be forged through professional or social contacts, under the auspices of other organizations, or by exploiting commonalities. Intelligence personnel can confer with the same sources that NGOs and the media use to form their opinions. This offers insight into, for instance, how the media reports certain events.

In addition, sharing information can be complicated by the problems of interoperability, rules of engagement, and terminology. Information sharing must take place on both the headquarters and field levels. NGOs can share information on either a formal or ad hoc basis. Sharing can also occur at regular intergovernmental meetings such as those conducted by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. When there is military involvement, the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) provides a vehicle for military-to-NGO meetings. Finally, Web sites such as
**INFORMATION FLOW**

**Sources**

[This compilation of sources was selected to assist junior staff officers in organizing the overwhelming flow of information and supplement informational gaps prior to a deployment.]

**InterAction**—American Council for Voluntary International Action (http://www.interaction.org). The goal of this coalition of over 150 NGOs is assisting in humanitarian efforts worldwide. The Web site has hotlinks to other NGO sites and a Disaster Response Internet Directory with links to the United Nations, U.S. Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, other governmental sites, news services, and NATO resources. There are listings for situation reports that provide country-specific lists of NGOs and their activities in crisis areas. Planners can learn ahead of time who is already there, make initial contact with the U.S. office, and get a more accurate picture of what is happening on the ground. InterAction also publishes Monday Developments, a twice weekly electronic and hard-copy newsletter on humanitarian activities worldwide and the crises driving them.

**ReliefWeb** (http://www.notes.reliefweb.int). Sponsored by U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ReliefWeb offers “up-to-date information collected from over 170 sources on complex emergencies and natural disasters. Users from over 150 countries access an average of 200,000 documents each month.” There is also an on-line archive of sitreps from OCHA and other U.N. agencies that cover over 800 natural disasters.

**Integrated Regional Information Network** (accessible through ReliefWeb). Also OCHA-managed, IRIN provides daily and weekly information on regional problems of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. It collects data from governments, local and international NGOs, U.N. agencies, and other sources. By its own account, “the network tries to stimulate an esprit de corps among the diverse disciplines (political, humanitarian, legal, military, and media) responding to the complex emergencies affecting the regions they cover.”

**U.S. Agency for International Development** (www.info.usaid.gov/resources/). This is one of many USAID Web sites entitled “Development Links.” The page lists sites of those agencies and organizations involved in humanitarian and development activities around the world. There are lists of U.S. Government agencies, embassies, NGOs, and PVS; InterAction’s list of NGO sites, international and regional organizations, and conferences; and a general reference information list.

**UNHCR** (http://www.unhcr.ch/). Web site containing, among other things, briefing notes on refugee crises worldwide, press releases, country updates, and special UNHCR newsreel service. A “what’s new” page has information which goes back two months.

**Greater Horn Information Exchange** (http://gaha.info.gov/gHIE). Web site features reports, fact sheets, field guides, activity summaries, data sets, scientific papers, and analyses of east/central African nations in crisis. Maps and sitreps are available as well as disaster histories.

**Sphere Project** (http://www.ifrc.org/sphere). Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response is an attempt by a consortium of organizations to develop their version of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance Handbook and UNHCR handbooks. Seven chapters discuss water, sanitation, shelter, and food aid. There are also sections on an NGO code of conduct and code of best practice. Includes analysis standards, indicators, warning signs, and recommendations for prevention and mitigation; excellent references, very easy to read and use.

**Joint Publication 3-57** [draft], Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pki/new_pki.htm). U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute hosts a Web site for the draft joint CMD document that replaces Joint Pub 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, which was too limited in scope. Review and comments are encouraged. U.S. Special Operations Command is lead agency; the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School is executive agent.

**Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook** (April 1995, MCOA-1540–002–95). Published by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, this is an extremely useful pocket-sized handbook that can be used to “determine gaps of information . . . as a brevity code to efficiently request information . . . and as a baseline support tool for intelligence centers providing operational intelligence to forward deployed units.” MCOA also publishes the Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook, focusing on the urban setting in which many of tomorrow’s emergences are expected to arise.

**UNHOI Handbook for Emergencies**. Part one includes some of the features covered in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Handbook. Contains chapter on site selection for refugee camps in the early stages of an emergency, considering everything from water supply to soil conditions to land rights. Appendices cover topics from needs assessment and immediate responses to refugee health care to hand drawn diagrams of wells and latrines. Section on NGO coordination as well as corruption in emergencies when large sums of money and supplies are being distributed. Part two contains handy information such as an emergency office supply list, emergency field kit list, and guidelines for media relations and coordination with local governments. Interesting from UNHCO viewpoint and has overlapping data that intelligence officers and others will find useful.

**JFQ**
the Integrated Regional Information Network, ReliefWeb, and the USAID Famine Early Warning System are available. Each of these information sharing platforms may be susceptible to cultural differences and field requirements that vary from crisis to crisis.

Security, changing needs in a given environment, or a sudden impending mass movement of civilians can greatly affect when and how relations between actors on the humanitarian playing field are sustained. For instance, though CMOCs are proven venues for military-to-NGO sharing, a lot more goes on in a decentralized fashion outside of them than inside. In Somalia, for example, coordination took place at the separate humanitarian relief sectors, often hundreds of miles from CMOC. Each dealt with the local level of violence, clans and sub-clans, and other issues. Coordinated, coherent responses were not forthcoming from the centralized response system.

Operators and analysts should take advantage of existing networks for information sharing. Formal networks include embassies, government ministries, political movements, and international organizations such as NGOs. Traditional if informal networks include local press, television, and radio along with international media (such as the Voice of America and BBC). Informal sources include taxi drivers, street hawkers, market vendors, and the local populace. Further understanding is obtainable through observing such factors as ethnic or tribal relationships, differences between civil and military compensation, whether there are soup kitchens, and what is being sold in second-hand markets (noncritical goods such as jewelry and carpets or critical goods such as pots and pans). These indicators give insight into the coping mechanisms of a population and a more definitive assessment of a deteriorating situation; yet they often go unexplored. There will always be the concern to protect intelligence sources and methods, but a wealth of information can be gathered just by using one’s eyes and ears in the operational area.

NOTES


Floods in the Midwest, hurricanes in Florida, and oil spills along the coast of Rhode Island are recent catastrophic natural phenomena which have made headline news. And each has involved responses by the Armed Forces, who are increasingly being asked to operate in domestic contingencies. This involves working alongside governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other private groups. While most joint operations are conducted beyond our national borders, we must not forget that jointness begins at home.

**The Home Front**

With the Cold War over, there is a growing realization that national security is underpinned by more than military strength and is influenced by factors other than warfare. It can suffer when the economy is disrupted, social fabric is strained, or the international environment is threatened. Absent a superpower threat, the Armed Forces have turned to other roles, and with mixed results have participated in peace operations, drug interdiction, and disaster relief. This has sometimes led to activities within our own borders. Yet little attention has been given to the unique roles the military can play in domestic security threats or the demands confronting joint forces in this arena. “Military support for national goals short of war,” as it is termed in Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, requires the application of skills other than warfighting and coordination with a wide range of domestic agencies.

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Commander Alan L. Brown, USCGR, is the senior Reserve officer assigned to the Marine Safety Office in Providence, Rhode Island.
The National Defense Panel recommended that the Armed Forces increase their attention to defense of the homeland. Response to terrorist attacks, especially those employing either chemical or biological agents, was highlighted as an emerging requirement. Limited attacks from smaller nations or transnational groups were cited as a growing threat. The panel also urged the Pentagon to refocus the role of the National Guard and make response to domestic crises its major mission. These recommendations illustrate the increasing pressure on the military to assume domestic roles.

In conducting operations at home, different services predominate for varied reasons. These undertakings bring to the fore the “three guards”: the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard. The Army National Guard and Air National Guard occupy a key role because of their link to state governments and because governors can call them up in emergencies. The Coast Guard is vital because of its regulatory powers. With authority similar to that held by governors, the Secretary of Transportation can call up Coast Guard Reservists in a domestic crisis. This is an arena in which local knowledge and community ties have high utility.

Domestic operations are numerous and varied. They include responses to natural disasters (hurricanes, storms, floods, earthquakes, and fires) and man-made disasters (oil spills, hazardous material releases, and explosions). Law enforcement reaction to problems such as rioting and acts of terrorism is also a factor, although the use of combat forces, like the Los Angeles riots of 1991, should be the exception and not the rule.

The Armed Forces can fill a variety of roles in domestic emergencies. Installations and bases can be used as staging areas. The military can provide ground, sea, and air transport as well as everything from construction equipment to platforms for airborne observations. Portable sources of communications, medical treatment, food, and shelter are all available in the inventory. Military personnel also can offer security and a flexible supply of skilled labor. While prevention of domestic terrorism is primarily the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, most responses to terrorist incidents will involve many organizations, including the Armed Forces.

Some argue that noncombat operations sap the power of the military by diverting strength from warfighting. Yet the application of combat power is the business end of military institutions,
the culmination of a range of logistical and support assets. Often considered the “sinews of war,” these capabilities are exercised and strengthened by involvement in domestic emergencies. Units that provide them can practice such wartime skills as marshaling and controlling forces in the field, providing transportation, assisting in construction, and furnishing logistic support.

Another Chain of Command

A sound command structure is critical in every operation. Without effective and informed decisionmaking, a strong chain of command, and reliable communications, any force runs the risk of disaster. This concern for command and control has led to much change. Cooperation among the services has grown less controversial because of the growing emphasis on jointness, legislative action, and success in the Persian Gulf War. Debate is focused on details, not on the basic concept of jointness.

The Armed Forces command staff organization for joint operations developed during the last century, has evolved into a body with a single commander and six subordinate elements (see standard joint staff organization below.)

However, while this organization is commonly used by the Armed Forces and many allied militaries, it is not the only structure that operational commanders are likely to encounter. Modern warfare is often coalition warfare. Commanders may find that partners use different organizational concepts and may thus must be adaptive. Going beyond the standard staff organization, however, is not necessarily a problem. The organization should serve the commander, not the reverse.

Domestic operations are rarely exclusively military ventures. Participation by other agencies complicates command relationships even more than coalition operations. With Federal, state, and local governments and private sector organizations involved, homeland operations come with many overlapping jurisdictions and roles. Thus the joint staff organization, although proven in military operations, has its limitations. While it effectively coordinates service roles, it ends there, leaving commanders to build relationships and communications with other actors on a piecemeal basis.

However a standard model for managing domestic events known as the incident command system (ICS) is gaining acceptance. Developed during the 1970s to coordinate firefighting in California, it has been adapted to a wide range of contingencies. It is specifically designed as an ad hoc approach which is built in modular fashion so that responders can create large or small organizations. It is also intended to flex and reorganize during a crisis to meet emerging needs. ICS has been used for fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, riots, hazardous material releases, and oil spills (see basic organization in figure 2).

This system, with its unified staff structure, should be familiar to those experienced in a Joint Staff environment. Disaster response has much in common with warfighting; thus it is not surprising that the designers of ICS copied elements of standard military organization. Operations, planning, and logistics sections are all familiar to the military mind, as are many of the subordinate elements such as air operations, demobilization, and communications. The ICS organization also has provisions for multijurisdictional incidents (which occur often in the domestic environment) through a unified command concept. In a unified command, the incident commander role is shared by representatives of each organization with jurisdiction over an incident. Although this leadership by committee might seem to threaten unity of command, it is actually quite workable because of the cohesiveness provided by a common and immediate threat.

The incident command system provides a single focal point for dealing with the press and political officials. This is vital since domestic operations take place under intense political scrutiny. One might even view these players as the domestic analog of hostile forces. But the prudent leader realizes that they can contribute to success as well as failure and manages public information and political liaison accordingly. The press assumes a vital role in passing useful information to the public, and local politicians often play an important part in coordinating the response.
One facet of ICS not frequently seen in military operations is the building of consensus when organizations are formed, especially unified commands. Military organizations have clear chains of command and rely on hierarchical decision-making. The ICS model deliberately mixes all parties; thus at the outset it might be unclear who should lead, and in what role. With overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities, there are many right answers to any question. The most difficult decision is how to fill the incident commander role. A major advantage of the ICS organization is that it compels responders to make that decision, then work together under that command. Thus disasters need not be faced without central control or unity of effort.

The Coast Guard has adopted ICS as its standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. Commandant Instruction 16471.2 outlines the Coast Guard approach for training and qualifying personnel under the ICS implementation plan. While it was originally favored only within the marine safety program, ICS has now gained support throughout the organization.

Commanders involved in a domestic incident might find themselves providing much of the staff and field force or performing a supporting role, dealing with elements of an ICS staff. The system is widely used in the civilian sector, so participants in the operation can quickly establish roles and responsibilities. Elements of the Armed Forces that might be involved in such operations should become familiar with this concept and practice it in exercises. They should communicate frequently in order to know what forces and capabilities are available locally. Thus they can act more effectively as a joint force when called upon.

**Anatomy of Two Joint Operations**

A comparison of domestic incidents illustrates the challenges that confront joint forces.

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**Figure 2. Basic Incident Command System Organization**

- **Incident Commander**
  - Staff
  - Safety Officer
  - Liaison Officer
  - Public Information Officer

- **Operations Section**
  - Branches (up to 5)
  - Resources
  - Air Operations

- **Planning Section**
  - Resources Unit
  - Situation Unit
  - Documentation Unit
  - Demobilization Unit
  - Technical Specialists

- **Logistics Section**
  - Service Branch
    - Communications Unit
    - Medical Unit
    - Food Unit
    - Support Branch
    - Supply Unit
    - Facilities Unit
    - Ground Support Unit
  - Procurement Unit
  - Comp/Claims Unit
  - Cost Unit
  - Time Unit
  - Procurement Unit

- **Finance Section**
  - Branches (up to 25)
  - Resources
  - Unit Service Branch
  - Support Branch
  - Time Unit
  - Procurement Unit
  - Comp/Claims Unit
  - Cost Unit
  - Procurement Unit

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and the value of ICS in organizing the response. Both events involved oil spills resulting from vessel groundings; the tank vessel *World Prodigy* in June 1989 and the tank barge *North Cape* in January 1996. Each was the largest spill in the history of Rhode Island when it occurred. In both a Coast Guard officer, the captain of the port, led the response. Each involved a multitude of military and civilian organizations. The first grounding occurred before ICS was in use for oil spill response. In the second the command post utilized the system.

As could be expected, the first response to the grounding of *World Prodigy* was conducted by the Coast Guard. A command post was established at the Coast Guard station at Castle Hill. The spiller proved unresponsive, and the captain of the port quickly “federalized” the spill, taking over the response. Among the first organizations involved was the Naval Education and Training Center. Yard patrol boats loaded with oil containment booms were sent to the scene. The center was also used as a staging area. The incident occurred at the height of tourist season, and roads were soon clogged by the curious. The Army National Guard closed off approaches to the Coast Guard station and provided logistic support while the Air National Guard furnished helicopters.

The command post was made up of a confusing collection of personnel, all with their own agendas. While most key players knew each other and interacted effectively, it was difficult for newcomers to orient themselves. The captain of the port considered implementing the Commander Coast Guard Forces organization, an integral part of mobilization planning at the time. But, feeling that it was too restrictive and cumbersome and did not address the problem of liaison with other agencies, he opted instead to build an ad hoc staff more tailored to immediate needs.
While the North Cape spill was similar in many respects, the response was different. The captain of the port again moved to the local Coast Guard station, in this case at Point Judith. But that proved inadequate. The Rhode Island emergency management agency contracted for the use of a local hotel both as a command post and a staging area. At the time of the World Prodigy spill, during the tail end of the Cold War, the agency took a limited role in domestic emergencies, feeling its greatest role was civil defense. During the North Cape spill the opposite was true. After the Coast Guard, it played one of the largest parts in coordinating the response. The Coast Guard and the state government had agreed to use ICS in an environmental disaster, and a command post was quickly formed along those lines. The agency issued reflective vests with ICS titles on the front and back, reducing confusion about positions. The operations vest went to a Coast Guard officer and the logistics vest to an agency employee.

In the North Cape incident the spiller cooperated with the Coast Guard, took responsibility, and began to hire response assets. Representatives of the spiller and contractors were folded into the ICS staff, in contrast to the adversarial relationship with the Coast Guard, which they were responsible for hiring. The Coast Guard and contractors were involved but not in a cooperative or developed approach. The issue once more proved a valuable staging area for the local Coast Guard and its staff provided salvage and oil recovery vessels. Its staff attended to more pressing issues. Planners and stress cooperation and integration.

As the scene unfolded, the next major ICS post filled was that of planning head. This task was also assumed by a state employee, who knew little about oil spills but was trained in the ICS concept. Throughout the event, this individual acted as a conscience for the incident commander, planning for the next step as other personnel attended to more pressing issues. Planners focused on documentation, scheduled meetings, and stressed cooperation and integration.

The fourth major ICS post, finance, was filled by a Coast Guard warrant officer from the National Strike Team. Other elements included public information and communications functions, people by Coast Guard personnel, and a food unit, provided by Red Cross volunteers. Security was furnished by local police. National Guard support, though limited, was part of the response. The Naval Education and Training Center once more proved a valuable staging area for salvage and oil recovery vessels. Its staff provided support and its piers were used as a storm shelter for the salvaged barge after it was refloated.

**Cooperative Effort**

The North Cape command post had its share of confusion, especially in the first day after the ship was grounded. Yet it was organized more quickly than the World Prodigy command post, largely because of the ICS concept. Despite their diverse nature, there was more cooperation between the organizations which responded quickly to the emergency. Duplication of effort and parallel logistics operations were reduced. Unlike the World Prodigy spill where nearly every organization had its own logistics tail, logistics had become a cooperative effort. Although communications equipment and services were limited during the first couple of days, organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency supplied a surplus capability. The command post did not stick strictly to the ICS model, but in the spirit of flexibility evolved in a manner comfortable to all participants. There was some clustering of people by organization, but it did not hamper the team effort of the command post.

The similarities of these two operations show the character of a typical domestic incident. It occurs with little or no notice. It often involves response and joint action from multiple military services. Even when commanders lead the response, a range of civil and local agencies can and should be involved. A command post convenient to the operating area is often built from scratch. Cooperation and consensus are imperative. And importantly, the differences between the operations show the utility of the ICS system in improving effectiveness.

Involvement in domestic incidents is a critical role for the Armed Forces. Their capabilities make the difference between success and failure. Moreover, their participation reminds the public that they are a positive force in ensuring safety and security. They exercise logistical and support capabilities, the “sinews of war.” They bring new challenges to commanders, requiring skills such as team building and consensus. But through the flexible use of organizational concepts such as the incident command system, these challenges can be overcome.

The staff concept used in joint operations is not the only command and control system available to the military. The ICS concept should be encouraged and tested. Because jointness begins at home, the type of operations conducted overseas should also be practiced at home.
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer  
(1899–1988)  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

VITA

Born in Honesdale, Pennsylvania; graduated from Military Academy (1920); served with artillery battery at home and in the Philippines (1921–26); instructor, natural and experimental philosophy, West Point (1926–30, 1934–35); troop and staff duty in the Philippines (1931–34); instructor, coast artillery school (1936); graduated from command and general staff school (1936) and Army War College (1940); served with 70th and 38th Coast Artillery (1940–41); plans and operations officer on the General Staff and at Army Ground Forces Headquarters (1941–42); commanded 34th Coast Artillery Brigade; plans and operations officer, Allied Forces Headquarters, England, and deputy chief of staff, Fifth Army, North Africa (1942–43); chief of staff to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and U.S. theater commander (1944–45); senior Army member of the joint strategic survey committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1945–47); deputy commandant, National War College (1947–49); director, office of military assistance (1949–50); commanded 11th Airborne Division in CONUS and 7th Infantry Division in operations in Korea (1951–52); deputy chief of staff, plans and research (1952–55); commanding general, U.S. Forces Far East, and Eighth Army (1955); commander in chief, Far East and U.N. commands and governor of Ryukyu Islands (1955–57); Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1957–59); Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1959–60); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1960–62); commanding general, U.S. Forces Europe (1962–69); Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1963–69); died in Washington.

This Alliance has forged a shield of military security, behind which the stability and prosperity of Europe have been created out of the havoc left by World War II. I have had a long association with NATO; I know its history and purposes. I believe it is a firm and sound pledge to all the nations of this great alliance with humility and the determination to be worthy of the great honor they have conferred upon me.

—Lyman Louis Lemnitzer  
(September 1962)
Doctrine

A MATTER OF DEFINITION

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, draws on the Joint Terminological Master Database (of June 10, 1998) that may be accessed via the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) on the Joint Doctrine Homepage [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine] or on the JEL CD-ROM. This 602-page, perfect bound volume includes standard terms that govern DOD-wide activities and, in particular, the conduct of joint operations by the Armed Forces.

Under DOD Directive 5025.12, “Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology,” the Secretary of Defense directed the use of Joint Pub 1-02 throughout the Department of Defense in order to ensure uniformity in the application of terminology.

This volume has been distributed to the Joint Staff, unified commands, and service staffs. A limited number has been stocked to meet interim requirements until release of the revised edition which received preliminary coordination in February 1999. Requests for copies should be directed to the Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine Division, 300 Fenwick Boulevard (Bldg. 96), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651–1064; phone: (757) 726–6522/DSN 680–6522.


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MAHAN’S BLINDNESS AND BRILLIANCE
A Review Essay by
BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered
by Jon Tetsor Sumida

Ironclads at War: The Origin and Development of the Armored Warship, 1854–1891
By Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani

The reputation of Alfred Thayer Mahan as a brilliant and influential naval theorist is not in doubt. Nor is that of his near-contemporary, Karl Marx, as an economic and political thinker. For historians, Mahan and Marx will always be significant for ideas that had an impact on their own times and on several following generations. But a consideration today is the truth and relevance of their ideas for war and politics on the eve of a new century.

During the Cold War, an understanding of Marx was regarded as fundamental to knowing your enemy. Now Marx is rarely discussed in our war colleges. His ideas have been relegated to the dustbin of history. At a time when the United States faces no naval peer and is unlikely to face a foreseeable future, similar issues should be raised about Mahan’s ideas on seapower. Should they guide naval policy into the first half of the 21st century? Are they likely to influence war and politics on the eve of a new century?

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Inventors like Alfred Thayer Mahan have been their intention—Mahan is mentioned only briefly and uncritically toward the end—yet it may provide the greatest worth of their unique book.

Although this reviewer has taught at Newport and readed The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 for the second, third, and even fourth time to discuss it with eleven seminar groups, he gained fresh appreciation of Mahan’s thinking from Inventing Grand Strategy. Sumida argues convincingly that Mahan was far more flexible about applying the tenets of naval warfare and much less rigid in his insistence on the necessity for a decisive engagement with an enemy fleet than commonly supposed. Because Mahan’s father, Dennis Hart Mahan, taught at West Point for nearly fifty years and was influenced by Jomini, many scholars have emphasized the Napoleonic influence on the younger Mahan. Some have gone so far as to label A.T. Mahan “the Jomini of the sea,” maintaining that both men stressed operations over strategy, insisted on a determinist vision of rules for conducting war, and argued that success in war basically depended on seizing a superior position, then smashing one’s enemy in an all-or-nothing battle. Sumida argues that there is some validity in this portrayal of Mahan’s early ideas. But he emphasizes that the admiral developed far more sophisticated thinking as his grasp of war technology increased and his understanding of the nature of warfare.

Alfred Thayer Mahan reached similar conclusions, thus he based his study of seapower on history and eventually described it as an all-inclusive category of warfare, eventually arguing that the practice of war was an art, not a science, and that the study of military history was more useful in appreciating the nature of warfare. Alfred Thayer Mahan reached similar conclusions, thus he based his study of seapower on history and eventually described it as an all-inclusive category of warfare, eventually arguing that the practice of war was an art, not a science, and that the study of military history was more useful in appreciating the nature of warfare.

Brian R. Sullivan taught military history at Yale University and the Naval War College.
element in naval warfare. He pointed out that good sailors could win with inferior equipment while the finest technology was of little use to badly led and badly trained men. He insisted that training and education—especially if based on naval and wider aspects of history—were more critical in preparing for war than the latest forms of weapons, propulsion, and armor. What ultimately led to victory was educated intuition based on experience, study of history, superior leadership qualities, and the ability to operate despite one's fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and confusion of battle. In other words, Mahan's mature ideas are an excellent antidote for the current belief that technology can virtually eliminate the fog of war and the friction inherent in warfare. Mahan, Sumida contends, was more a Clausewitzian than a Jominian.

So what seeds of doubt do Greene and Massignani cast in Ironclads at War about the verity of Mahan's concepts? Ironically, their narrative strongly suggests that despite his great stress on the usefulness of history for understanding war, Mahan ignored the highly relevant naval events of his own lifetime as he theorized. To this reviewer, previously ignorant of many naval conflicts which these authors analyze, it had appeared that Mahan had no choice but to use examples from the age of sail to formulate concepts for seapower in the age of steam. There seemed little armored steam-driven warship experience from which he could draw. However, Ironclads at War makes clear that the opposite was true. There had been ten significant naval wars involving modern warships between Mahan's adolescence and mid-1886 when he began The Influence of Sea Power. More important, these ten conflicts—which are surely enough to guide students of naval history—offer an example after example to underscore many of Mahan's concepts of naval strategy and operations. He may have been more flexible than previously acknowledged about putting principles into action. But no idea, however adaptable, can be stretched too far without breaking. It seems that a number of Mahan's theories founder when they run into the wars of 1854–85. Mahan had no choice but to use examples from the age of sail to formulate concepts for seapower in the age of steam. There seemed little armored steam-driven warship experience from which he could draw. However, Ironclads at War makes clear that the opposite was true. There had been ten significant naval wars involving modern warships between Mahan's adolescence and mid-1886 when he began The Influence of Sea Power. More important, these ten conflicts—which are surely enough to guide students of naval history—offer an example after example to underscore many of Mahan's concepts of naval strategy and operations. He may have been more flexible than previously acknowledged about putting principles into action. But no idea, however adaptable, can be stretched too far without breaking. It seems that a number of Mahan's theories founder when they run into the wars of 1854–85. There is no point in gloating over Mahan's mistakes. One of the major reasons great thinkers is not the absence of error in their concepts but the creation of ideas that prove of lasting value. However, if theoreticians are shown to be wrong even in the light of their own times, or if they misunderstand contemporary facts that undermine their interpretation of reality, then their influence is diminished. Such thinkers may still be influential but that is quite different from discovering new depths of truth. In this regard, Mahan seems to fail part of the test of greatness. He ignored or misunderstood too much of what was taking place in naval affairs between 1836 when he entered Annapolis and 1890 when his first major work on seapower appeared.

To begin with, control of the seas during the actual conflicts of that period did not bring the benefits that Mahan insisted it would. Consider the naval advantages of Britain and France in the Crimea, the Union in the Civil War, Austria and Prussia in 1864, Paraguay's enemies in 1865–70, Russia in 1877–78, and France over China in 1894–85. It would be foolish to dismiss superiority as insignificant. After all, Britain and France could not have even reached the Crimea without their dominion of the sea, and one can hardly regard the North's naval superiority over the Confederacy as unimportant. But neither did such capabilities bring the stronger naval powers victory. Why? Because by the middle of the last century technology was reducing the previously powerful and largely independent role of sea transport and naval interdiction in economics and in war.

Nelson had opined, “A ship's a fool to fight a fort.” That had been true when such a dust-jittred wooden hulls against stone bastions bristling with guns far heavier than any ship of the line carried. In the half-century between Trafalgar and the allied bombardment of Fort Sumter and Sveaborg, however, naval technology had advanced a good deal. The Crimean War bore witness to steam-powered, armored shell-firing vessels that blasted apart Russian fortifications in the Baltic and Black Seas with impunity. Greene and Massignani point out that the threat this capability posed by the defense of St. Petersburg—Sweden was close to entering the war, which would have offered the allies naval support bases close to the Russian capital—persuaded Alexander II to send his ministers to the peace table, not the destruction of his Black Sea fleet, the disruption of Russia's negligible maritime commerce, nor the fall of Sebastopol. However, the use of navies to attack land targets, cover amphibious landings, and carry out other joint operations hardly represented what Mahan would describe some thirty years later as the ideal use of naval power. Nonetheless, the course of European and American industrialization made advanced nations far less dependent on maritime commerce to sustain a war economy, while railways allowed land transport to compete for the first time with water transportation in terms of cost, efficiency, and load bearing.

By the early 20th century the change in the balance of sea and landpower would become even more pronounced.

One set of statistics illustrates this point. In 1870 the combined merchant fleets of the six greatest European powers had displaced 9.3 million tons, by 1910 they had nearly doubled to 18.3 million tons, along with their cargo-carrying capacity. But during the same forty years, the railroad networks of these countries more than tripled from 47,000 to 145,000 miles and the freight they carried rose from 290 million tons to 1.683 trillion tons, a sizable increase. Moreover, these figures do not include the growing length of rail lines nor the weight of rail traffic in European colonies. Despite rising efficiencies of steam over sail, the huge savings in the cost of shipping derived from the Suez Canal, and the burgeoning economic role of overseas possessions for Europe, investment in railways was proving even more valuable in every respect. The Panama and Suez Canals were less significant to the growth and security of the United States, Russia, and India than the Transcontinental, Siberian, and Great Indian Peninsula Railroads.
During the same period seapower lost its transoceanic monopoly over the communication of information. The Atlantic cable was completed in 1865. More significantly, wireless telegraph and radio transmissions were perfected in the decade after 1891, culminating in the first transmission by Marconi from England to Newfoundland in 1901. Zeppelin’s airship made its first successful flight in 1900. Three years later, the Wright brothers took to the air over Kitty Hawk while Blériot and Farman made their historic flights in 1909. Seapower could no longer block nor give access to the flow of intelligence as it had in the days of Hawke, Rodney, and Nelson.

By 1890 technology had long since altered warfare in ways antithetical to Mahan and his ideas on the preferable employment of battle fleets. One did not have to wait until the German use of the submarine during World War I for evidence that Mahan was completely wrong to insist that “It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it.... This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies.” Yet as recent work by Chester Hearn and Raimondo Luraghi has convincingly demonstrated, steam power enabled eight Confederate cruisers to wreak utter havoc on the Union merchant fleet, a blow from which American shipping took decades to recover. Simultaneously, despite the Northern naval blockade, Southern industrialization made the Confederacy self-sufficient in armaments only three years after secession. Meanwhile, defensive naval technology—the torpedoes (primitive sea mines) which Admiral Farragut damned at Mobile Bay, for example—was preventing the U.S. Navy from enforcing a close blockade of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.

Technology in the latter half of the 19th century rendered other aspects of Mahan’s thinking obsolete. The first torpedo in the current sense of the term was invented by Robert Whitehead in 1866, with ominous consequences for Mahan. Whether merchant or naval, 17th and 18th century sailing ships had been close to identical in speed and protection. But the advantages enjoyed by an armored, high-speed, shell-firing cruiser over a steamer of the same era, post-1860, gave it enormous superiority as a commerce raider in comparison to its frigate predecessors.

Nonetheless, the influence of technology was reducing the relative position of seapower. The destruction of railways, not naval blockade, doomed the Confederacy in 1863–65. Particularly tellingly is the fact that the Civil War was the only conflict in which Mahan served. He performed blockade duty, the focus of his frigate predecessors. Nevertheless, it is the influence of technology that was reducing the relative position of seapower instead of seapower. The destruction of railways, not naval blockade, doomed the Confederacy in 1863–65. Particularly telling is the fact that the Civil War was the only conflict in which Mahan served. He performed blockade duty, the focus of his first book, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*.

That railways transformed war was demonstrated by Helmuth von Moltke, who used them in the wars of 1866 and 1870–71. In the latter conflict between France and the German states, the French under Admirals Louis-Henri de Gueydon and Louis-Édouard Bouët-Willaumez deployed to the North Sea and Baltic. But despite overwhelming naval superiority, Grene and Massignani demonstrate that the French fleet accomplished virtually nothing. Prussia neither had possessions overseas nor depended on maritime commerce. Its railroads supplied all the needs for war against France, which sought a decisive sea battle while the Prussian navy refused to leave port. Lacking both ships capable of inshore operations and forces for amphibious landings—which Mahan found unwise distractions from concentration of a harbinger—French admirals steamed back and forth uselessly for several months, then sailed home. No wonder the French developed the *Joie Esole* concept of naval warfare that stressed commerce-sinking cruisers and David-like torpedoes over giant battleships.

The above points hardly present new arguments against Mahan. Some were raised in the mid-1890s. Still *Ironclads at War* suggests questions about his selection of the history on which to base seapower concepts. Had there been no major naval warfare from the downfall of Napoleon to the time when Mahan began to write *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, his choice of the period 1650–1781 (and later 1792–1815) to illustrate his ideas would be unremarkable. But Greene and Massignani demonstrate just how much recent naval experience and mid-to late-19th century technological development he dismissed. After reading *Ironclads at War*, one wonders whether Mahan was an objective analyst or a polemicist arguing for construction of a modern U.S. Navy.

As a result, it seems highly unlikely that a future naval opponent would base its operations and strategy on Mahanian principles. In fact, history has already shown that this would be folly. An old gibe retailed at the Naval War College suggests that the United States owes a major debt to Mahan. The adoption of his ideas by Germany, Italy, and Japan doomed their surface fleets to defeat in the two world wars. Mahan was a primary influence on the decision to construct the modern U.S. Navy. But as George Baer and other historians have pointed out, the admiral’s ideas did not guide American naval strategy in World Wars I and II or the Cold War. In the
Atlantic-Mediterranean theater, including the post-1945 era, the Navy concentrated on convoy protection and amphibious operations. In the Pacific, it focused on amphibious warfare as well as commerce destruction. It fought enemy battle fleets only when they sought out our forces or as an adjunct to landings by the Army or Marine Corps. Does Mahan have value for the 21st century? Sunami supplies a convincing answer in the last chapter of *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command*. The enduring value of Mahan is not to be found in dated notions of naval power and strategy. Instead it is his approach to thinking about threats and the use of force, methods to inculcate strategic thinking, concepts of leadership and command, and ideas on the very nature of warfare that provide the classic worth of his works. The admiral invented modern security studies through the use of historical cases to analyze strategy and operations. He also established a way to relate the principles of war, developed to understand land warfare, to conflict at sea.

Mahan displayed the courage and common sense to admit mistakes and change his mind. Over the final two decades of his life, he concluded that ideas that had made him famous and respected in the 1890s were erroneous. On reflection, he would admit that as technology altered patterns of commerce and transport it transformed the purpose of navies and thus the proper makeup of fleets. Having earlier argued that seapower had made England the most powerful state in the world, he recognized that the British Empire was declining and argued for what later would become known as the special relationship to maintain North Atlantic and global security. Most importantly, Mahan foresaw how the United States should function as a great international power. More than anyone else before or since, he educated both the Navy and the American people on the use of diplomacy, military force, and warfare on a global scale when isolationism still ruled the foreign policy formulated along the Potomac. For these reasons, despite his faults as a historian and a prophet, Alfred Thayer Mahan deserves the gratitude and respect of his countrymen and free people everywhere—a claim that can hardly be made for Karl Marx.

REASSESSING THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM, AGAIN
A Book Review by F.G. HOFFMAN

Over since the last helicopter lifted off the roof of the American embassy in Saigon in 1975, professional soldiers, defense analysts, military historians, and pundits of all stripes have debated the reasons for America's failure in South Vietnam. Assessments range from flaws in national security decisionmaking to shortcomings in the military. Some analysts, such as Bertram Wyatt-Brown and Jane Fonda for losing the conflict. The result is a perpetuation of Vietnam myths that still influence attitudes toward the Armed Forces.

"Americans have yet to come to terms with the war," Jeffrey Record states in his recent book, *The Wrong War*, "precisely because they cannot agree on what happened to the United States in Vietnam and why." Was it a winnable unfortunate or a colossal strategic blunder? Did the military fight with one hand tied behind their backs? Did American citizens die in vain? What were the causes and nature of the conflict? Were they accurately assessed? Was there consistency in U.S. political and military strategies? If we were strategically defeated, what led to it and who is to blame? A former legislative assistant to Senators Sam Nunn and Lloyd Bentsen, Record served as an adviser in Vietnam with the Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support program. His last book, *Hollow Victory: A Century View of the Gulf War*, advanced his standing in the eyes of many readers as an objective analyst and brutally candid observer of American military affairs.

Record seeks to answer some basic questions on the Vietnam conflict in *The Wrong War*. Why did a great power lose a protracted war against a "damn little piss ant country?" How should responsibility for America's defeat be allocated? What roles did civilian and military leaders play in making strategy? Was the war winnable? Would defeat have been avoidable if another strategy had been pursued? The author rejects determinism and reminds us that violence between states leads to complex dilemmas which are difficult to dissect or analyze. But he accepts that the war was within our capacity to win militarily because North Vietnam could have been crushed by American might. The issue is whether the United States could have won with the political and military limits it placed on itself. The author identifies four causes for defeat:

- misinterpretation or overestimation of the significance and nature of the conflict
- woeful underestimation of the opponent's tenacity and combat power
- overestimation of U.S. political stamina and military effectiveness in the theater
- absence of a politically competitive partner in South Vietnam

The arrogance of the U.S. government during the early stages of the conflict has been the subject of many books. Ignorant of Vietnam's history, geography, and culture, Americans failed to grasp the nature of the war. Estimates of the resolve, tenacity, and commitments by participants were poorly constructed and, in retrospect, utterly baseless.

The asymmetries of commitment between combatants proves decisive in *The Wrong War*. What Record calls a "culturally rooted disposition" to focus on tangible indices of national power and quantifiable measures of effectiveness enabled the United States to ignore imponderables and intangibles—factors which Clausewitz warned were decisive. He singles out Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for "know it all approach" and blamed him for transforming his office into a "temple of quantitative analysis" that worshiped empirical but irrelevant facts.

Such criticism is well founded but certainly not unique. The central issues the author raises concern assigning blame to civilian and military decision-makers. Here he offers his strongest and most valuable conclusions. He notes that
While critical of military aspects of the war Record is also disturbed by the underfunding of efforts to bolster Saigon’s political infrastructure and by belated attempts at pacification. He is not convinced that America was capable of pacifying South Vietnam. But he is mistaken in assuming that the U.S. military was accountable for designing and undertaking nation-building. Nowhere are alternatives discussed or assessed. It is taken for granted that saving political and economic infrastructure was a legitimate task for the American military to lead.

The author expresses pessimism about South Vietnam as a partner. America “could not have picked a more intractable enemy and a feebler ally.” The South did not accept the Americanization of the war nor was it able to build a nation which could survive without massive U.S. intervention which, by itself, was destruction to Saigon’s political, economic, and social structures. In the end, the leadership of the South was “fatally out of touch with its own people” and unable to establish and maintain the credibility and support to thwart the North’s incessant drive to unify the country.

Record’s conclusions are ambiguous. He finds it difficult to avoid determining that the United States lacked any strategically decisive and morally acceptable military options in Vietnam. He prefers to echo the famous lament uttered by Omar Bradley that Korea was “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

This is an equivocal and unsatisfying conclusion. It does not evaluate political and military options that might have persuaded China and Russia to refrain from supplying North Vietnam or that could have at least minimized access to its port and other facilities. Major intervention in 1965, to include strategic bombing, naval blockade, and a substantial investment in political and military capital, may have convinced the North and their supporters that America was serious. Incremental investments gave the impression that the United States was not committed and ceded escalation to its adversaries. Gradualism as a strategy was clearly disapproved in Vietnam, but it is a long stretch to conclude that the war was unwinnable under any circumstances or strategy.

Does Record admit the potential of pacification programs? The United States devoted 95 percent of its resources to search and destroy operations in rural areas of Vietnam, employing overwhelming firepower against targets that did not warrant the expenditure. It seems in retrospect that an effective pacification campaign, in addition to rigorous training of the Vietnamese military between 1961 and 1965, might have had some chance of success.

Numerous books have touted efforts such as the Combined Action Platoon, which was originated by the Marine Corps, based on its exclusive experience in fighting small wars. Record acknowledges that the Marines had an affinity for irregular warfare but did not address how similar programs could be implemented or expanded. He is correct in stating that there is compelling evidence that the way the war was conducted—using firepower-oriented, attrition-based search and destroy operations—was inappropriate. Although it is true that the U.S. military as a whole was culturally disposed to its uniquely American technocentric approach to warfare, it does not necessarily hold that a multifaceted civil-military approach could not have been designed or effectively implemented earlier. More than mere assertion is needed to conclude otherwise.

Overall this book can be recommended not because it offers a complete or original analysis of the Vietnam War but because it synthesizes many of the contending perspectives generated over the last two decades. For those who believe Vietnam has been regarded as an anomaly that resulted from the incompetence of arrogant civilian leaders. As The Wrong War reveals, the situation was much more complex, and the military must assume some of the blame. The conflict was multifaceted, and assigning culpability for misjudgments requires a comprehensive examination. Although Record elucidates some of the questions needed to formulate such a framework, he does substantiate any of his conclusions.

Record dispels a number of prevailing myths about Vietnam. A generation of has grown up on the lessons of this conflict, and many institutions were reshaped so that there would be “no more Vietnams.” The price of learning those lessons was high. Thus it is incumbent on political officials and professional soldiers to validate them unemotionally and objectively. This book is a step towards that goal.
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JFQ

Spring 1999

120

JFQ / Spring 1999

120
Le Traité de l’Atlantique Nord
Washington DC
le 4 avril 1949

Les États parties au présent Traité, réaffirmant leur foi dans les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et leur désir de vivre en paix avec tous les peuples et tous les gouvernements. Déterminés à sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leur civilisation, fondés sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le règne du droit. Soucieux de favoriser dans la région de l’Atlantique Nord le bien-être et la stabilité. Résolus à unir leurs efforts pour leur défense collective et pour la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité. Se sont mis d’accord sur le présent Traité de l’Atlantique Nord...
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