coming next . . .

battlespace management in integrated operations

plus
ICAF at 80,
transformation in the UK,
multinational army interoperability,
and more in issue thirty-seven of JFQ

The Future of Reserve Forces

Information Ops as a Core Competency
A Vision for the National Guard
Responding to Chemical and Biological Incidents
NORTHCOM and the National Guard

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.
The militia being the great bulwark of defense and security for free states, and the Constitution having wisely committed to the national authority and use of that force as the best provision against an unsafe military establishment, I recommend to Congress a revision of the militia laws for the purpose of securing more effectually the services of all detachments.

—James Madison
coming next . . .

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The cover shows National Guardsmen and marines patrolling in Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Vernell Hall). The front inside cover features [top to bottom]: Fleet Reserve Squadron F/A-18E launching from USS Carl Vinson (U.S. Navy/Chris M. Valdez); Marine Corps Reserve AH-1 departing for patrol in Iraq (U.S. Marine Corps/Justin T. Kaleta); Army Reserve engineers constructing floating bridge across Tigris River (982d Signal Company/Joshua Gipe) and Texas Air National Guardsmen walking F-16 into position in Poland (835th Communications Squadron/Justin D. Pyle). The table of contents depicts [left] Vietnamese soldier instructing students on use of a rifle (AP Wide World Photo/Richard Vogel); [right] crew chief preparing Air National Guard fighter for competition (89th Communications Squadron/Dennis J. Henry). The back inside cover captures Marine Corps AV-8Bs preparing for refueling over Iraq (133d Airlift Wing/Erik Gudmundson). The back cover reveals [top] USS Vicksburg steaming through the Arabian Gulf (Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic/Michael Sandberg); [left to right] C-130 arriving at Kigali International Airport, Rwanda, Operation Silverback Express (48th Communications Squadron/Tony R. Tolley); Marine LAV securing Memphis Bridge, Ubaydi, Iraq (1st Marine Division Combat Camera/Jonathan C. Knauth); and soldier providing security outside Forward Operating Base Cobra, Afghanistan (55th Signal Company, Combat Camera/Jerry T. Combes).
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The U.S. way of organizing its military is commonly called the Total Force. This all-volunteer force is composed of citizen soldiers and active duty personnel. This mix gives the advantage of a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Both components are necessary, and they must work in harmony to achieve national objectives. In the near term, that means winning the global war on terrorism. In the long term, both the Reserve and the active components must transform to meet the threats of tomorrow. The key to both objectives is a healthy Total Force.

It is fitting that this issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* examines America’s Reserve component—its rich history and the challenges it faces today.

**History**

America’s Armed Forces evolved in fits and starts, with changing threats as the primary motivator for adaptation. Today’s Total Force is the great grandchild of the colonial Militia, which began with the Massachusetts Militia in 1636. Colonists activated that force to defend the New England colonies and maintain internal lines of control and commerce. Colonial navies were traditionally militia as well.
The birth of the Nation, however, necessitated evolution. The New England militia fought at Lexington and Concord, the first engagements of the Revolutionary War, in April 1775. It won the Army’s first battle streamer at Fort Ticonderoga in May 1775. It wasn’t until a month later that the Continental Congress officially established the Continental Army.

The Constitution and Bill of Rights contained many clauses empowering the new Nation to create and maintain militia; to organize, train, and equip military forces and employ them in war; and to “provide for the common defense.” This allowed a reconstituted Army, new ships, and a small standing Navy. The Federal Government retained control of the Army and Navy while the states controlled the militia until they were called up for Federal service. Then in 1792, the Militia Act reorganized the militia and articulated who would serve—men 18 to 45 years old. This act created rules for a compulsory militia, but volunteer militia units comprised the bulk of the American forces in the 19th century. This early period reminds us that our military tradition reflects a legacy of volunteerism and selfless neighbors—American citizens grabbing their muskets and heeding the call to arms to defend their liberties.

The War of 1812 was an early proof of concept for the Armed Forces: a small regular force supported by militia protecting the fledgling democracy. This principle differed from the European feature of larger and more powerful standing armies and navies that were also more costly.

There were many regional battles in the 19th century, including armed actions against pirates and a war with Mexico. But for the most part, leaders used the military primarily as a gendarmerie for internal stability. This domestic focus held throughout the westward expansion. After the Civil War, the states and the Federal Government examined the militia system and the balance between states’ rights and national defense requirements. By 1892 each governor had renamed his state militia the National Guard.

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Congress replaced the 1792 Militia Act with
the 1903 Dick Act, bolstering the Reserve role of the National Guard. This was an important turning point; the militia were now formally recognized as the Army’s wartime Reserve. Then in 1908, the Reserve Medical Corps became the first pool of officers in a “Reserve” status. This was the seed of the modern Reserve, with a force distinct from the state-led National Guards.

Other legislative acts in the first two decades of the 20th century helped the National Guard and Reserve evolve further. Congress created a Federal Naval Reserve in 1915, and in 1916 the Naval Reserve Appropriations Act created a Reserve Naval Flying Corps. The 1916 and 1920 National Defense Acts codified the National Guard, authorized drill pay and training days, and made the Guard a bureau. The Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps were also created, later becoming the Organized Reserve Corps, and further detailed the role and organization of the Reserve for both services.

During World War I, National Guard units were among the first American forces in France and included the famous 42nd “Rainbow Division”—a combined unit representing 26 states and the District of Columbia. On the Western Front, 18 of the 43 Army divisions were National Guard, and their total combat days exceeded the Regular Army and the National Army (draftees).

Guardsmen and Reservists served alongside their regular counterparts in World War II. It is interesting to note that the National Guard mobilized in late 1940, before America declared war, and that Guardsmen were present at Pearl Harbor. Bataan was another significant battle in which citizen soldiers bravely fought and sacrificed. Eighteen National Guard divisions eventually served overseas, including the 29th “Blue and Gray” Division, which took heavy losses in the first wave at Omaha Beach on D-Day. Some 200,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps served throughout the war.

The drawdown after World War II demanded tremendous organizational adjustment. The National Security Act of 1947 established a new service, the Air Force, and provided for two additional air arms, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.
The Reserve component had to adapt again when the Korean War erupted, and America recalled many troops to duty. In 1952 the Reserve was divided into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve to provide a tiered backup to meet Cold War threats. Throughout the Cold War, Reserve component volunteers served with distinction around the globe, including the Korean demilitarized zone, the Berlin Airlift, and Vietnam. Then in 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird took cooperation a step further by proposing a Total Force concept—one force of active duty and Reserve component elements. This philosophy made Reserve and Guard leaders accountable for readiness and preparedness, requiring a basic standard for training.

Throughout the last decade of the 20th century, the Reserve component has been significantly engaged in deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia. The National Guard and Reserve have been critical to fighting terrorism since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Today’s Challenges
The key challenge today is fighting the war on terrorism while being ready to respond to other threats worldwide and at the same time transforming the Armed Forces to defeat tomorrow’s threats. The national strategy against terror is to defend the homeland while taking the fight to the enemy. The Reserve component is critical to executing this strategy both at home and overseas.

At home, the Guard and Reserve are essential to the homeland defense mission. The Chief of Staff of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Command, Major General Raymond Rees, is a Guardsman. Defending the skies since 9/11, active duty and Reserve component tankers, the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), fighter aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, space assets, and ground based radar and communications personnel work seamlessly around the clock. The mission is not new—in the Cold War, we defended our skies against Soviet bombers. But Operation Noble Eagle now defends
against internal airborne threats as well, using an interagency approach and a layered defense.

The Guard and Reserve also have the critical mission of preserving port and airport security. They simultaneously defend America’s coasts and protect military bases. In fact, many Army Reserve units have changed focus and are now training more military police to help with security missions. Some 70 percent of military police capability now resides in the Guard and Reserve. As the Armed Forces work with domestic law enforcement partners and other agencies to meet threats to the homeland, the Reserve component is leading the way.

A terrific example of cooperation between the Armed Forces and law enforcement is the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Previously, law enforcement agencies formed ad hoc teams to respond to each terrorist case individually. Now there are 16 joint terrorism task forces nationwide who share information and work together to thwart terrorist acts and bring the perpetrators to justice. There is extensive Reserve component participation in these task forces, and there will be more in the future.

Worldwide, Reserve and National Guard members work alongside their active duty counterparts every day. Most recently, in Iraqi Freedom the Reserve and Guard supplied a wide spectrum of support. For example, Helicopter Mine Squadron 14 out of Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia, a combined active and Reserve unit, conducted critical mine clearing operations in vital waterways in the south and flew insertion sorties in Iraq. The Army Reserve 812th Military Police from Orangeburg, New York, helped break a 100 billion-dinar counterfeiting ring in
Iraq by seizing printing presses and arresting the counterfeiters. The National Guard 109th Medical Battalion, Company B, from Vermillion, South Dakota, treated some 21,000 patients since deploying to Kuwait in April 2003. The Air National Guard 163rd Refueling Wing from March Air Force Base offloaded 16 million pounds of fuel to 500 Coalition aircraft in Iraqi Freedom using its KC-135 aircraft. And the Florida, Indiana, and Oklahoma Army National Guard provided seven infantry battalions.

While Iraqi Freedom continues, the Guard and Reserve will participate in operations across the full spectrum of warfare—from fighting to peacekeeping, at home and abroad. Reserve personnel participate in missions in Bosnia, Korea, and Kosovo, air defense over the North Atlantic, and support to scientific expeditions in Antarctica. In fact, the Reserve component is now the major presence in the Balkans and Sinai operations. The National Guard and Reserve participate as full members of the Total Force 24/7/365.

**Vision for Tomorrow**

Although we are busy maintaining critical warfighting capabilities and conducting global operations, we must also work on transforming the Armed Forces—the active and Reserve components—to better meet the challenges we anticipate in coming years.

The Reserve component excels at innovation and experimentation, two vital factors for transformation. One example where the Reserve led the Total Force was with the LITENING Pod—an infrared, electro-optical laser-targeting pod for fighter aircraft. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard began using the LITENING II Pod after recognizing that their F-16s did not have the precision capability and accuracy they would need in future wars. They funded and tested the pod, then passed the information to the active component. Today, the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and active Air Force, as well as the air forces of Spain and Italy, are using these pods. In Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force Reserve 303rd Fighter Squadron from Whiteman Air Force Base, based in Iraq, used extended range LITENING targeting pods for close air support. And the 93rd Bomb Squadron, 917th Wing, from Barksdale Air Force Base, used the pod in combat for the first time on a B-52, turning the mature bomber into a capable, high-capacity, precision attack vehicle.

The Reserve component faces unique challenges, such as mobilizing members from their civilian jobs for deployment, which may require different training processes than the active forces. Iraqi Freedom showed that there is room to improve Reserve and Guard readiness and mobilization. Because the war on terrorism will likely take a long time to win, we need to be as predictable as we can in call-ups; we owe that to the Guardsmen and women and Reservists, their families, and their employers. This is also a recruiting and retention concern. More predictability—where we can be predictable—is therefore important on many levels. At the same time, we need a more accessible force with more operational availability to meet the demands of the current strategic environment. U.S. Joint Forces Command has taken the lead in looking at this problem and has proposed some “quick wins,” and there has been great progress.

The mobilization process must also move out of the industrial age into the information age. Our processes worked fine for the Cold War, but we need to be ready to deploy faster to react more rapidly to threats.

Today, the mobility process for the Army Reserve begins with an alert order, followed by mobilization and training, and then the troops deploy, serve, redeploy, and finally demobilize.
takes too long when we need more troops immediately. In the future, we may move the Reserve model to emulate the active component, where the troops train, stand alert, then deploy when needed. This is just one possibility, but changes in mobilization and readiness are clearly vital to making us more responsive as a Total Force.

However, time required to arrive in theater is not the sole measure of merit. As one colonel observed, dozens of golf carts could be fit in a C–17 and transported to a theater in a day, but when they were offloaded, personnel would be confined to traveling in golf carts. Equipment matters in battle. So as we integrate more among components, services, agencies, and allies, the Reserve component’s equipment and training must be acceptable and compatible. The LITENING pod is an example of innovation, but we have to ensure that Reserve units have the right resources and the right equipment at the right time to carry out their mission.

We must also address how we rebuild and mix forces. We need the right force mix and right type of units. High demand/low density (HD/LD) assets are a perfect example of where we need to reexamine the active/Reserve mix of capabilities. Deployment cycles by definition stress HD/LD units. What we need is more flexibility and what I call a deeper shelf so the same units are not tapped to deploy too frequently, which could affect retention and readiness. We must maintain the long-term health of the Reserve component and, by extension, the Total Force.

We also need to rethink what capabilities reside in the Guard and Reserve. And we may need to adjust the balance so the active and Reserve components better complement one another. Units might be required to retrain to meet the needs of the new strategic environment. An engineering company may also complete some search-and-rescue missions, for example, requiring additional training. Some units may change
their mission area either temporarily or permanently. Right now, for example, artillery troops are retraining to become military police at home and overseas—a particularly high demand role for the foreseeable future.

Missile defense is a case where changing missions require organizational adaptation in addition to retraining. The ground-based midcourse defense system, part of our layered missile defense architecture, is intended to defend the United States from ballistic missile attack by shooting down long-range missiles in flight. New organizations will need to communicate and share information to make it work well, including U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, North American Air Defense Command, the National Guard, and the Federal Aviation Agency.

The National Guard has a long tradition in the air defense mission and will remain on the cutting edge with ground-based midcourse defense. But today there are new organizational challenges that require sharing information rapidly and accurately among many agencies. It is a huge task and a critical mission for homeland defense—with little room for error.

But a prime challenge for the Total Force will be the new enhanced jointness—what I have been calling integrated operations. The term joint once referred to multiple services working together. Today that is the baseline. Many services, Federal agencies, allies and their governmental agencies, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations must cooperate to meet the full spectrum of military operations, from peacekeeping to battle to the transition to a lasting peace.

Here the Reserve component can lead the way. With the parallel goals of promoting jointness and effectiveness, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is transitioning separate Army National Guard and Air National Guard headquarters to joint headquarters—doing away with many duplicative headquarters officers. Consolidating 162 separate headquarters into 54 joint force headquarters will free funds that the Guard will reinvest in unit readiness. This type of serious reorganization and new thinking are what we need to transform the Armed Forces.

Professional military education (PME) is a vital forum for discussing the changes we must make to succeed. We need a good mix of active and Reserve component troops to participate in the appropriate joint PME courses to promote joint thinking and better prepare for joint duty. We began a pilot program in 2003 to make joint PME and Phase II qualifications more accessible to Reserve component officers. Future military education needs to continue to promulgate emerging concepts and debate and push a creative vision of jointness.

Many perceive the military as traditionally status quo. Our military culture needs to embrace the change necessary to transform. We need to encourage our troops to take smart risks. We must think in a more agile, unconventional manner to defeat the foes we face today, and the National Guard and Reserve are deep pools of talent. This issue of JFQ focusing on Reserve component matters is the type of forum I like to see. Advancing joint warfighting and transformation may rely on sharp bayonets, but it is impossible without sharper minds.

A healthy Total Force is essential to winning the global war on terrorism. The key to being prepared for future conflicts and emergencies is transforming the Total Force. As you read this issue, think outside of the box. Do not be afraid to reconsider how we do business. Think about how we can transform the Guard and Reserve to make the Total Force even stronger tomorrow, and pass your ideas along.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Issue 35 was the farewell publication for Robert Silano and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hays, USAF. After more than a decade of dedicated effort, Bob retired from Government service as editor, Joint Force Quarterly. He responded to General Colin Powell’s 1992 vision that the National Defense University should publish a professional military journal for the joint community and was central to the development of JFQ, maintaining the highest standards since the first issue in summer 1993. Colonel Hays also retired with the last issue but remains within the defense community. An Air Force Academy graduate, pilot, and doctor of political science, Pete brought his broad experience in strategy and scholarship to the executive editorship. Our staff wishes them both a fond farewell.

I should like to take this opportunity to introduce two new members of the Joint Force Quarterly team. Colonel Debra Taylor, USA, who recently arrived from a tour on the Joint Staff (J-2), now serves as Managing Editor of National Defense University Press. I am pleased to return to NDU from the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We stand ready to serve the professional military education and joint warfighting community.

Like the Armed Forces generally, JFQ is in a time of transition. The journal’s traditional focus on joint and combined warfighting will remain. But we will also include increasing coverage on what the Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, calls integrated operations, from planning through conflict to the transition to peace, which now must involve other U.S. Government agencies, allies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry partners. Our dynamic and challenging post-Cold War strategic environment demands that we add new topics and partners to our debates on the war on terrorism, joint warfighting, and military transformation.

Although the next few issues will mark an unprecedented transition, we plan to continue the standard of quality for which JFQ is known. There will be changes. We will strive to publish four issues a year on a regular schedule. We will attempt to respond to changes in world events. While a quarterly journal cannot be a current event forum or mirror an in-box, we will offer timely and provocative research and thought to encourage debate in the joint, combined, and integrated operations community. We will fight to achieve a more lean and-mean style, but one that is intellectually stimulating and visually appealing. We will also work closely with contributors to provide cutting-edge research and thought-provoking articles. In upcoming issues, we will offer new columns, features, and themes; interviews with senior military and civilian leaders and warfighters; letters to the editor and online forums for feedback; and a chance to shape future thinking with board-selected articles from the best military, civilian, industry, and policy analysts. Therefore, debates over U.S. security are as critical as ever.

America is at war, and the stakes could not be higher. We rely on our readers to tell us when we are on and off target. We want to provide unique points of view and move current debates out of the box. Our goal and motto is “On target—on time.” With your help, we will maintain the journal’s high standard. We’ve hit the ground running and welcome your articles and suggestions.

Thank you for your loyalty to JFQ, and we look forward to working with and hearing from you!

COLONEL (S) MERRICK E. KRAUSE, USAF
Director of Publications and
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly

"On target—on time"
now thy enemy. That adage has been repeated since armies first clashed on the field of battle. Understanding enemy intentions, tactics, and vulnerabilities is an essential part of warfare. But it is also necessary to know your friends. Making enemies is easy, but it is harder to make friends. The wrong approach to allied or occupied countries can quickly create enemies.

The United States has not been an occupying power since immediately after World War II. In Korea and Vietnam, where the goal was fighting and leaving, sensitivity to local culture was important, although it was not a long-term concern. In Iraq, however, a cultural divide brought to the fore issues that three generations of soldiers have considered only peripherally.

Operating in a foreign land can be a minefield. Few members of the Armed Forces will be familiar with cultural traditions of the countries in which they operate. Yet violation of local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into a hostile mob.

Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads forced to the ground, a position forbidden by Islam except during prayers. This action offends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture commonly used by their Croat enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to Somalis. The military has enough to worry about without alienating the local population.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Though it may be premature to draw definitive lessons from Afghanistan or Iraq, it is clear that the Armed Forces lack sophisticated knowledge of foreign countries. That does not dishonor their performance; cultural awareness is not a mission-essential task—but it should be.

Winning a conflict means more than subduing an enemy. While the U.S. military ran into trouble in the past, it was not because it lacked combat skills, personal courage, or the necessary resources. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, the process of restructuring the political order, economy, and social well-being of an entire country is as critical as defeating organized resistance. But it is cultural awareness that helps determine whether a host population supports long-term American military presence—and may determine the outcome of the mission.

It is uncertain whether the majority of the Iraqi people will support the multinational efforts, which many see as responsible for the unrest. Rebuilding Iraq may hinge on drawing appropriate inferences from ethnic and religious aspects of its culture—including tribal dynamics—and then properly responding to them. Commanders in Iraq have stressed the importance of being aware of these elements of the security landscape.
The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing in late 2003 to examine the lessons of Iraqi Freedom at which Major General Robert Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), highlighted the requirement for cultural awareness among both civilian and military personnel. His testimony emphasized that had American planners better understood Iraqi culture, efforts to win the peace would have been more sound. Senior officials and commanders might have reached a different conclusion on the willingness of Iraqis to welcome the U.S. military for an extended period of reconstruction.

Events during Uphold Democracy further emphasized cultural differences:

The Army in general had little appreciation of Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti other than its basic geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population’s culture and traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and act, and how they might react to military intervention, arguably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture in general focuses on training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the notion of culture awareness.

The need for cultural awareness is not unique to the American military. Russian soldiers in Chechnya made cultural blunders in dealing with local civilians who, once insulted or mistreated, either supported active resistance fighters or joined them. Moreover, Russian leaders realized that they had underestimated the influence of religion in the region.

Cultural Awareness

Understanding the culture and social factors peculiar to the countries in which Americans are most likely to be deployed will make the environment work to U.S. advantage. On the lowest level, awareness means knowing enough about local culture to permit military personnel to operate effectively. Along with linguistic capability, cultural awareness can highlight political, social, and other characteristics of the operational area. It can explain why local people may see things differently from Americans. It can enable troops on the ground to understand how their attitudes and actions directly influence mission outcome.

The Armed Forces often operate as part of coalitions and alliances. Nations cannot work together without recognizing their cultural differences—where the other guy is coming from. That awareness becomes even more important over time. It is not a touchy-feely or nice-to-have social grace; it is basic intelligence on attitudes and potential actions of host nations and coalition partners. Only such insights can enable the military to understand other cultures.
The 1940 Marine Corps manual on insurgency noted that:

*The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. By this study and ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured.*

Stability operations and postconflict reconstruction are among the major challenges facing the military in the post-Cold War world. This was clear even before Afghanistan and Iraq—two battlefronts in the global war on terrorism. The Army and Marine Corps have a history of conducting such operations under the rubric of *low intensity conflict* and *military operations other than war.* Operations in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903 and in Haiti from 1994 to 1995 also offer examples of partial success in such efforts. Other than foreign area officers, defense attachés, and Special Forces, there is insufficient cultural awareness and linguistic skill among commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

A combat brigade would not be deployed into hostile territory without maps. The beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The unit should have those coordinates as well.

### Defining the Need

Predeployment preparations must include cultural awareness training. Just as personnel are trained in specific tactics, they should be provided an understanding of the environment where they will operate. The ability of deployed personnel to draw inferences from experience or study could contribute decisively to the national strategy.

General Scales describes the operational environment and importance of cultural awareness:

*The image of sergeants and captains acting alone in the Afghanistan wilderness and the sands of Iraq, innovating on the fly with instruments of strategic killing power, reaffirms the truth that today’s leaders must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead indirectly at a much lower level. Today’s tactical leaders must be able to act alone in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances, lead soldiers they cannot touch, think so as to anticipate the enemy’s actions—they must be tactically proactive rather than reactive.*

The need for cultural awareness extends beyond the foxhole. Senior officers must create an appropriate command climate. Civilian officials need to be culturally aware in developing policy and strategy. They must know that imposing American values on unwilling people in a foreign country may have undesired strategic and operational consequences. Deployed personnel must have sufficient awareness in theaters where ambiguous and contradictory situations are the norm. And because of the reliance on the Reserve components, they must have similar training.

At a minimum, training on cultural awareness should occur on two levels. The first would be focused on planners. As an interim measure, programs for flag and field grade officers would be appropriate, along with greater emphasis on cultural awareness in curricula at both the staff and war college levels. As soon as practical, that training should be extended to all officers.

One report on the experiences of general officers who served in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti noted the need for additional training.

*Greater emphasis must be placed on geopolitical and cultural training for the Army’s officer corps. Such training must begin at the officer basic course and continue at all levels of professional military education. Officers at all grades will benefit from such training because of the likelihood that they will be involved in peace operations on multiple occasions throughout their careers.*

personnel must have awareness in theaters where ambiguous and contradictory situations are the norm
Training should be comprehensive and offered to both the active and Reserve components. The ideal program would reward continued learning and require that officers get an early start on becoming indirect leaders. Unit leaders would mentor their performance while undergoing instruction. Both the classroom and distance learning would stretch across career assignments. The curriculum would be historically based and thoroughly joint.

The second tier involves language and area studies. Commissioned and noncommissioned leaders must possess some language skills and understanding of nations to which they are deployed. This sort of training results in street sense—knowing how to gather intelligence from local people. That can only happen with cultural awareness. It is the level on which simple linguistic skills are essential: *Halt, lay down your weapon.* But it is better to warn of the likely consequences of such interactions with locals.

Compared to education, training involves imparting specific skills. It can be prepackaged and offered throughout a career. It is part of the daily military routine. As one officer described his experience in Bosnia:

*Specialists are assigned to ensure the commanders are politically astute, historically aware, and culturally sensitized. Unfortunately, this information has no real conduit down to company and platoon levels, and perhaps most important, to the individual soldier. In most organizations of the conventional infantry force, there is no foreign area officer or civil affairs officer who specializes in these matters to fill the gap. Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well informed in these facets of operations, it is often the company commander, platoon leader, or squad leader who finds himself... dealing with the civilian populace day by day.*

**A Matter of Timing**

Cultural awareness must be taught on the primary level. And knowing your enemy should be accompanied by knowing your friends. Moreover, educational and training programs should focus on those regions likely to pose threats to national security and cultures vital to long-term strategic relationships.

Mandating cultural awareness training is easier than implementing it. First, identifying which cultures to study and what level of proficiency to attain is demanding. There is no one-size-fits-all answer to cultural awareness. Nonspecific theories on cultural contexts can be detrimental, and generalizing cultural characteristics can be deceptive.

Americans are often direct in their conversations, expecting the truth with no hint of deception. At the
same time, Americans also tend to be uncomfortable with silent moments. People in some other countries, though, may prefer not to be direct and may shift their eyes away from the American...a person who is reluctant to maintain eye contact is called shifty-eyed and arouses suspicion. But in some countries an attempt to maintain eye contact may be perceived as a sign of aggression. Accordingly, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian countries, maintaining eye contact is not an acceptable behavior. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, eye contact and gestures of openness are important and could facilitate communications.

Predeployment training focuses on the current military situation for all the obvious reasons. But cultural awareness training must be accomplished on a regular basis and well in advance. Thus that knowledge must already be in place before it is time to go.

The national security strategy envisions a more assertively expeditionary military. Over the last two decades, extended coalition operations have become the norm. This requires operational planning that recognizes the importance of cultural awareness. If implemented, integrated training to develop such awareness will have lasting, positive effects for plans, actionable intelligence, and the credibility of U.S. objectives. Experience teaches that cultural awareness is a force multiplier. It is the time to be serious about enhancing our knowledge of today’s world. The Armed Forces are busier than ever before, but they are not too busy to be culturally aware.

NOTES


General Richard Myers was inducted into the Reserve Officers Association Minuteman Hall of Fame in 2004. At the banquet, he spoke at length about the future of the Total Force. He also recalled a telling question that he repeatedly poses to our troops across the globe:

I usually ask them a couple of questions and I try to send a couple of messages with the questions. The first one is, “Are there any Guard or Reservists in this crowd before you?” About a third or two-fifths of the hands go up.

I try to make a couple of points. One is you can’t tell [active duty from Reserve component] by looking at who’s serving. That’s important. There’s not much distinction today between active, Guard, and Reserve. And in many ways that’s a very good thing. . . . The second thing is to make sure everybody else in the room knows that Guard and Reservists are there, part of the organization. Because you might not think about it if somebody doesn’t ask the question.

The Total Force is part of today’s paradigm of integrated operations, where we work in an increasingly joint, combined, and interagency environment with a diverse set of new partners. Past stovepipes between the active and Reserve components are being removed, and the all-volunteer Total Force has a healthy future. But, as always, issues remain that require debate and continual reassessment. This forum offers a broad spectrum of viewpoints that should stimulate dialogue about timely Reserve component considerations.
Few policy issues are as complex, controversial, and in flux as those concerning Reserve forces. That was particularly true during the Vietnam War and, because of what happened there, during the following quarter century. At this juncture, when not only Reserve but active forces are being deployed and employed at a hectic pace, a review of Reserve forces policy as it has evolved since Vietnam may offer insights for possible revision of that policy to accommodate current realities.

The Vietnam Era

Reserve forces policy precipitated a crisis in political-military relations as the United States began deploying massive ground forces to Vietnam in July 1965. General William Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, since June 1964, had been reporting with increasing urgency that South Vietnamese forces were incapable of fending off the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong without intervention by American ground forces. Lacking drastic action, he cabled in early March 1965, “we are headed toward a [Viet Cong] takeover of the country” within a year.1

Later in March, 173d Airborne Brigade and two battalions of marines were dispatched, but that did not end the debate over ground forces. First there was extended discussion of how those forces might be used, with Westmoreland pressing for—and getting—more and more latitude for conducting...

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1. Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Tragedies of America’s Last Years in Vietnam.
offensive operations. In parallel, there was agonized consideration of dispatching far larger forces.

As the point of decision neared on sending more forces, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made one of his periodic “fact-finding” trips. When he left for the war zone in mid-July, staff actions were well under way in the Pentagon and White House preparatory to calling up Reserve forces. While McNamara was in Saigon, Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance cabled him that President Lyndon

at a White House meeting, President Johnson revealed that he had decided not to use the Reserves

Johnson was “favorably disposed to the call-up of Reserves and extension of tours of active duty personnel.” Vance added that the previous day he had met three times with the President and been assured that a “request for legislation authorizing call-up of Reserves would be acceptable.”

In his report to the President on returning to Washington July 20, 1965, McNamara recommended deployment of additional forces to Vietnam as requested by General Westmoreland and a concomitant call-up of 235,000 Reservists. The services, the Army in particular, were well along in planning for an order from the President to begin such a mobilization. Three days later, at a White House meeting, President Johnson revealed to McNamara and others that he had decided not to use the Reserves.

The President addressed the Nation on July 28, one of the most fateful junctures in the long war, saying that he planned to send 50,000 more troops to Vietnam, including the newly-created 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and that more would be sent as needed. Insiders waited expectantly to hear that he was authorizing mobilization to support the deployments but instead were astounded to learn that it would be done without the Reserve.

This constituted a crisis of the first magnitude for those charged with preparing and dispatching the deploying forces. The Army in particular, more reliant on its Reserves than the other services, was now in a bind. Instead of being able to supplement active units, it was now faced with replicating those forces, newly created and requiring equipment, training, and large numbers of additional young officers and noncommissioned officers.

General Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff from June 1964 to June 1968, recalled that the President’s refusal to call up Reserve forces constituted one of the most difficult crises in those turbulent years. The general learned of the decision in a July 24 meeting with McNamara and the service chiefs. All were stunned. “Mr. McNamara,” said Johnson, “I can assure you of one thing, and that is without a call-up of the Reserves the quality of the Army is going to erode and we’re going to suffer very badly.”

Brigadier General Hal Nelson, Army Chief of Military History, called the LBJ refusal “a watershed in American military history.” As a consequence, “the active force was required to undertake a massive expansion and bloody expeditionary campaign without the access to Reserve forces that every contingency plan had postulated, and the Reserve forces—to the dismay
of long-time committed members—became havens for those seeking to avoid active military service in that war.”

General Creighton Abrams served as Army Vice Chief of Staff from 1964 to 1967, the years of the buildup of large ground forces, and was involved in organizing, equipping, training, and deploying ever more Army troops—without recourse to Reserve forces. He was moved to observe that the massive increases consisted entirely of privates and second lieutenants, an agonizing situation when long-nurtured and experienced Reserve forces lay idle due to Presidential policy.

The effects General Johnson predicted were soon felt. In late 1966 he observed that the level of experience in the Army was steadily diminishing. As early as May 1966, he felt obliged to address the matter in a signed letter in the Weekly Summary, a close-hold Army publication distributed only to general officers. “By 1 July 1967,” he forecast from the force expansion already planned, “more than 40 percent of our officers and more than 70 percent of our enlisted men will have less than 2 years of service.” Johnson acknowledged that in units he visited young soldiers were filling jobs without the necessary experience, inevitable given the growth of the force and unavailability of Reservists. He emphasized that the problem was Army-wide.

The general enjoyed a reputation for exceptional integrity and dedication. Having barely survived as a prisoner of the Japanese during World War II, he fought his way back to professional prominence while winning a Distinguished Service Cross commanding infantry units during the early Korean War. He now found himself so opposed to the LBJ decision that he contemplated resignation in protest.

Johnson had earlier consulted retired General Omar Bradley about resigning. Bradley counselled against it: “If you resign you’re going to be a disgruntled general, you’ll be a headline for one day, and then you’ll be forgotten. . . . What you do is stay and you fight your battle and you continue to fight it to the best of your ability inside.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body also urged mobilization of Reserve forces, not only at the outset of major deployments but repetitively over the next several years. Johnson heeded Bradley’s advice and served on, working within the system to get the decision reversed but without success and with increasing bitterness. “Assessing relationships within the Department of Defense,” he said in a post-retirement oral history, “I think that here we had a catastrophe.” Sending the Army to war without its Reserves likely helped produce that outlook.

The Army Reserve forces were devastated by the President’s decision. Not only were dedicated soldiers demoralized by not being able to put their training into practice, but when the Reserve became a haven for those avoiding service in Vietnam it was an additional insult. Moreover, various units were stripped of equipment as the buildup continued, rendering them incapable of deployment even had mobilization been ordered.

The sorry state into which Reserve forces declined was illustrated early in 1968 when, after North Korea’s seizure of the intelligence ship USS Pueblo, President Johnson reluctantly ordered a small call-up, primarily to reconstitute the depleted Strategic Reserve. The result was a dismaying spate of class action lawsuits by units contesting the legality of their mobilization, despite which a small number of mobilized troops was eventually sent to Vietnam. By mid-December 1969, all the units called up had reverted to Reserve status.

After Vietnam

Following a year as deputy, General Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam in June 1968 and held the post four years. During most of his tenure the United States was progressively executing a unilateral withdrawal. In June 1972, with that action largely completed—deployed forces were down to 49,000 from a 1969 high of 543,400—Abrams went home to become Chief of Staff.

The Army was then showing signs of the long struggle in Vietnam. Despite the enormous sums spent in support of the war, much had been taken from the hide of the services. The great Seventh Army in Europe, as evaluated by General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, “ceased to be a field army and became
a large training and replacement depot for Vietnam." As a result it was rendered “singularly unready, incapable of fulfilling its NATO mission.”

**the Army saw the Total Force policy as changing how the Nation would employ Army National Guard and Reserve units in war by integrating the Reserve into plans**

Abrams set about rebuilding the Army, stressing two aspects: combat readiness and care of the soldier. When he took office, the authorized end strength was plummeting, and the Army was struggling to find even those numbers in a newly mandated all-volunteer era. Radically revised Reserve forces policy became part of the solution.

What was dubbed the Total Force policy was enunciated during the tenure of Secretary Melvin Laird. The point was to integrate active and Reserve forces of the various services into a more homogeneous whole. The Army saw the Total Force policy as changing how the Nation would employ Army National Guard and Reserve units in war by integrating the Reserve components into plans, thus creating more dependency on them. Wrote Don Oberdorfer:

> National mobilization was the critical underlying issue, even more important in the military view than the additional resources it would provide. Once accepted, mobilization could generate a ‘win the war’ psychology at home under which nearly any military initiative would be possible, instead of a ‘tolerate the war’ psychology under which nearly anything was difficult.6

When Laird’s successor, James Schlesinger, took office, he and Abrams established a relationship based on shared values. Abrams described the Army need for more combat power to meet its contingency missions, and Schlesinger agreed that if Abrams could save spaces by reducing headquarters and overhead he could apply those spaces to combat forces. Schlesinger persuaded Congress to stabilize end strength at what would now be seen as a robust 785,000.

Abrams set about slashing headquarters, beginning with his own Pentagon staff, and taking other measures to reduce noncombat forces. He also told Congress of his desire to increase the force structure from 13 to 16 divisions, the minimum he thought necessary given worldwide commitments.
and contingency roles. General William DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and a key player in resource allocation and management, had told Abrams that the Army had resources for 10 rather than 13 good divisions and certainly not for the 16 contemplated. Abrams acknowledged that but stressed the overriding importance of arresting the decline in end strength and building more combat power.

These actions were linked to fundamental Reserve issues. Abrams felt that Reserve forces, in addition to their contributions to combat capability, provided an essential link to public support. “They’re not taking us to war again without the Reserves!” said Abrams, a vow heard often by General Walter Kerwin, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Thus the Army set about restructuring so that in future major crises at least selective Reserve mobilization would be mandatory. The vehicle was a revised force structure that integrated Reserve and active elements so closely as to make the Reserve virtually inextricable from the whole. To ensure that outcome, the Army structure was modified to put a number of functions entirely or primarily in the Reserve components, chiefly combat support and combat service support, that would be needed in any significant combat involvement.

As for the active force building toward 16 divisions, the manpower savings derived from reorganization and headquarters reductions proved insufficient to provide the fully manned units Abrams desired. Thus was born the concept of roundout forces consisting of Reserve brigades or battalions, designated as affiliates of active divisions and tagged for mobilization and deployment with them in the event of war.

**What Is Different Now**

It can be argued that the extensive and extended recourse to Reserve forces of recent years, in the absence of a major war involving the population at large, is quite different from what Abrams contemplated when he put the current policies and supporting force structure in place.

What we are seeing now, unlike earlier periods of major conflict separated by long intervals of relative peace, is more or less continuous overseas military activity involving combat or potential combat and requiring significant Reserve forces. In addition to operations abroad, increased concern for homeland security in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has produced yet another large and continuing requirement.

Thus many Reservists have been called to active duty not once but repeatedly, sometimes for indeterminate periods or with repeated extensions. The result has been increasing strain on the individuals and their families and employers. Clearly a review of national Reserve policy is indicated, and it should begin with the fundamental mission and go on to consider size, structure, equipment, compensation, mobilization potential, and liability.

Graduation speakers at West Point often admonish those receiving commissions to be prepared for combat service. Every class ever graduated from the Military Academy has seen such service—the 1936 class of Creighton Abrams, William Westmoreland, and Bruce Palmer, Jr., for example, saw service in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—and world conditions suggest that successor classes can expect the same.

In more recent times the cycle has been shortening. Nearly a quarter century elapsed between World Wars I and II, then the Korean War erupted only five years after World War II, while the deployment of large-scale ground forces to Vietnam took place a dozen years later. After that conflict ended in 1973, significant deployments followed in rapid succession: Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For most of the last half century, such engagements took place in the context of the Cold War and the permanent and extensive overseas garrisons it induced. The tempo of operational missions increased further when the Cold War ended.

As of mid-September 2003, the Army had fighters and peacekeepers deployed in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cuba, the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Kosovo, Kuwait, Macedonia, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Sinai Desert, and Uzbekistan, totalling 180,000 soldiers. Of its 33 brigade combat teams, 16 were in Afghanistan and Iraq. Including assignments in the United States, 128,000 Reservists and Guardsmen were on active duty Army-wide, with 20,000 in Iraq and Kuwait, the latter apparently for one-year tours.

What seems undeniable is that for whatever reasons—fiscal, political, or strategic—the Nation is unwilling to maintain an active force that is adequate to current missions and operational tempo. As a consequence, Reserve forces not only supplement or reinforce the active force but often act as a surrogate for it. This stands the concept of Reserve forces on its head.

If policymakers perceive no difference between active and Reserve components in deployability in relative peacetime, a heavy burden falls on Reserve forces. Not only are they asked to maintain readiness comparable to the active force with the limited annual training allocated, but to deploy repeatedly for missions a year or more in duration while maintaining a civil profession. That may be asking too much, especially with possible continued and repetitive deployments for the war on terror. In such circumstances, it appears sustained operations will be the rule rather than the exception. Future Reserve policy must take this reality into account to be viable.

Reliance on Reserve forces is a function of the size of the active force, the capabilities allocated in the various components, and the threat. Compensating for inadequate active forces is the dominant factor in current circumstances. General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff and president of the Association of the U.S. Army, stated the matter straightforwardly in the organization’s news publication: “The Army and, indeed, all the services...
need an increase in end strength to meet the high operational tempo that shows little sign of abating in the continuing war on terrorism.

The services need an increase for another cogent reason—so they can stop regularly drawing on Reserve forces to do what the active forces should do. This includes the large numbers of mobilized Reserves providing routine security for active Army posts, two years and more after the emergency call-ups following 9/11. Instead, according to General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services were contemplating activating an additional 17,500 Reservists at the end of September 2001, an increase of 23 percent over the 76,000 from all the services currently on active duty.

By the close of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, it was clear that much had changed since the Abrams integration policy was first conceived, “most dramatically the sources and nature of the global threat. It seems inevitable that as adjustments are made to those new realities, the policy, missions, and composition of the Army’s Reserve forces will again undergo review and revision.” The Armed Forces now find themselves at another such point of taking stock and mid-course correction.

What Remains the Same

The motivations that led to the Total Force and to structuring the Army so Reserve mobilization would form part of any major deployment of ground forces remain as compelling as ever. Reservists, for instance, played an enormous role in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, where they not only were essential in getting the job done but validated what General Abrams sensed about the link to public support. General Robert Sennewald, USA, agreed after the Gulf War that Reserve force call-ups “involved hometown America and helped generate a feeling of support for our Armed Forces not seen since World War II.”

General Edward “Shy” Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, was even more definite: “General Abe decided [full-bore integration of the Reserve components] was the right way to do it... This time we had people from 1,330 towns, and that ensured widespread support. We had better think twice before we change that.”

General Sullivan recalled that as Army Chief of Staff he drew strength from the portraits of his predecessors on the walls of Quarters 1 at Fort Myer: “One [of General Abrams] in particular keeps me going because he set the Army on the successful path that has led to great victories, success, and a bond with the American people.” That same powerful phenomenon has been demonstrated during the ongoing war in Iraq, where if anything Reserve forces are playing an even more crucial part in combat operations and their aftermath.

Review and adjustment of policies for employing Reserve forces are urgently required. The composition and magnitude of such forces may also need major revision, as with the active force. But the planners who carry out such review and revision should be attentive to history and to what Creighton Abrams said with such emotion after the long ordeal of Vietnam. They should ensure that in major crises threatening vital national interests, “They’re not taking us to war again without the Reserves!”

NOTES

Despite assaults on U.S. citizens and facilities abroad and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the warnings of many within the intelligence and defense communities that the Nation was vulnerable to terrorist attack were insufficient to force major institutional change—or significantly increase preparedness—before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Tentative steps had been taken at Federal, state, and local levels. The Department of Defense (DOD) had funded the formation of joint weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams within the National Guard beginning in fiscal year 1998. These units were designed to provide direct assistance to civilian emergency responders in the event of a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack on the homeland. While they are few in number and were still in their operational infancy in 2001, it was one of these units, the New York National Guard 2d Civil Support Team (WMD), that became the first organized unit of any military service or component to arrive at Ground Zero on the morning.

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, ARNG, is Chief, National Guard Bureau.
of September 11, sampling the air to ensure than no biological or chemical contaminants were present and providing critical communications capabilities. Air National Guard fighters conducted air patrols against further attacks in New York and Washington and across the Nation. Homeland defense—the original mission of our militia forebears when they first settled this continent—had returned to the forefront at the dawning of a new century, demanding that the National Guard restructure in response.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush saw the need to transform the Guard for maximum utility in the war against terrorism and ensure that it remains ready, reliable, essential, and accessible. While many of the transformational tasks facing the military are service specific—particularly the need to revamp the lengthy mobilization and demobilization process the Army requires of its Guard and Reserve units—the most critical changes in the National Guard will be in the joint arena. In a memo sent July 30, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld tasked the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) to instill a greater joint focus in the Guard and improve DOD access to its capabilities. This article summarizes the course the bureau will follow. It is the joint vision for the future of the National Guard.

A Joint Bureau

We are transforming our headquarters and capabilities to shape the future. We must organize to operate in peacetime and fight in wartime in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Federal body that administers the funds and controls (but does not command) the Army and Air National Guard of the several states, territories, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and District of Columbia, needed to be organized and operate like a true joint staff. A provisional reorganization of the NGB staff on July 1, 2003 was initiated to facilitate coordination with the Joint Staff and the staffs of the various combatant commanders. We flattened and streamlined the organization, aligning staff functions and responsibilities with those of the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders, and for the first time had Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers attached to the bureau. Secretary Rumsfeld ratified these initial steps in his July 30 memo to CNGB. A formal concept and implementation plan for this reorganization is currently under review. It asks that NGB be organized under a joint table of distribution, with a limited number of billets designated as joint duty assignments on the joint duty assignment list—to be filled by active component officers from all the services, or the Joint Duty Assignment—Reserve (JDA–R)—to be filled by Reserve component officers nominated by each of the services’ Reserve components. When approved by DOD, NGB will be capable of achieving full operational capability as a joint bureau.

The proposed changes are required by the new national security environment, particularly as it relates to homeland security and civil support. They will be additive to the existing missions that the Army and Air National Guard perform for the services—not in lieu of those missions.

Some observers are concerned that seeking an expanded relationship with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff diminishes the Guard’s utility to the services. Such fears are unfounded; greater jointness can only improve the Guard’s ability to serve alongside its active duty counterparts in any contingency that may arise. Providing trained, ready, and equipped forces as a Federal Reserve of the Army and the Air Force remains the core mission. The National Guard Bureau will not seek to reduce or eliminate its statutory responsibilities in this realm as it seeks greater relevance in the joint arena.

The Guard is committed to transformation. We will aggressively work with the Army and Air Force to integrate into their transformation plans. Simultaneously, we are transforming
the Guard into a more joint and effective organization from top to bottom to meet the needs of elected and uniformed state and Federal leaders.

The National Guard Bureau has always been a unique organization. It was designated in legislation as a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force in 1958. However, NGB and the Guard have not enjoyed the training and experience opportunities that jointness has conferred on the rest of DOD since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Since that time—and particularly since 9/11—numerous other taskings have emerged that require the bureau to gain the training, experience, and status to operate in the joint arena as a full and formal player.

Why jointness for the National Guard? A unique ability to work in three legal statuses makes the Guard the most versatile DOD force available to the Federal Government for homeland security (HLS), homeland defense (HD), and military assistance to civil authorities (MACA). The attacks of September 11 illustrate this point. Some 8,500 New York Army and Air National Guard members were on the streets of New York City within 24 hours (some in state active duty status, and others—such as 24th Civil Support Team (WMD)—in U.S. Code, Title 32 status). Within 72 hours of President Bush’s request to the Governors, guardmembers were assisting civil authorities in protecting U.S. airports (in Title 32 status). The Air National Guard has logged more than 45,000 incident-free homeland defense sorties (in Title 10 status) over the United States since 9/11.

Not only is the National Guard dispersed in over 2,700 communities around the Nation (allowing for response times in the event of local emergencies that would be unachievable by the active components), but it is also legally empowered to assist civil authorities in ways that the active services—and their Federal Reserve components—are not. Because the Army and Air National Guard operate under state control in peacetime, they are not subject to posse comitatus restrictions barring Federal military forces from enforcing civil law. Thus, while serving in state active duty status or Title 32 status (which allows for Federal pay while under state command and control), the Army and Air Guard can directly assist civil authorities in maintaining peace and order. Congress, recognizing the Federal utility of the National Guard while under state control, amended Title 32 in October 2004 specifically to authorize the use of the Guard for homeland defense missions while in this status.

**Capitalizing on Connectivity**

Under existing law, CNGB reports to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. But the war on terrorism is a joint fight. Since 9/11, at the direction of Secretary Rumsfeld, the bureau has been providing continuous and integrated reporting of the Army and Air National Guard deployed in both a Federal and non-Federal status to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)(OSD–HD). Only the bureau can provide overarching situational awareness and a common relative operating picture regarding the employment of Army and Air Guard troops in each of the 50 states, territories, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
This demonstrates its essential role as the channel of communication between the states and the Army and Air Force. Given the new national security environment, the necessity to continue providing such data will only grow. The time has come to establish a formal relationship with combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense to facilitate coordination of HLS/HD/MACA.

To further this end, NGB has begun capitalizing on existing connectivity throughout the states and territories to establish a Joint Continental United States (CONUS) Communications Support Enterprise (JCCSE), linking NORTHCOM, PACOM, OSD–HD, and other Federal and state stakeholders. JCCSE would help provide command, control, and communications for the entire spectrum of HLS/HD/MACA missions and is one of several initiatives to extend and improve communications and interoperability to domestic incident sites.

Secretary Rumsfeld has tasked CNGB to adapt the National Guard to better support the war on terrorism, HD, and HLS. Learning to operate in a joint environment, as our combat forces increasingly do, is the most important step in this regard. Jointness is a state of mind; it is about how we think, act, and approach our jobs. Jointness cannot stop at the NGB level. It must build bottom-up from the states and become second nature there as well.

The adjutants general, as full partners in our initiatives, have begun the transformation of the Guard headquarters in each of the states, territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. A provisional joint force headquarters (JFHQ) was stood up in each state on October 1, 2003. When tied to the proper administrative and joint professional military education (JPME) processes, this measure will yield more joint-qualified officers and greater interoperability with the active components. More importantly, JFHQ can provide a standing joint force command and control capability across the Nation that would be available to combatant commanders (as well as Governors) for HLS/HD operations. Furthermore, the state headquarters transformation created efficiencies by consolidating the three separate headquarters in each state under one commander, using the
Reserve components be included in Guard. Congress has insisted that the be critical to the future of the National serve components. Joint training will of JPME for both the active and Re- cihng facilities to increase the availability cification centers and 318 distance learn- ing automated exercise and assessment sys- tem to assist in validating joint and in- teragency role for dealing practical experience or the statutory no other part of DOD has as much Guard is a natural leader in this arena; Adapting the Force Structure

New asymmetrical threats call for a different kind of warfighter and mission systems. We need to be smarter, lighter, more agile, and more lethal. The services will lead in rebalancing the force, and the NGB Army and Air directorates are fully engaged and working closely in the process. The Guard, drawing from the breadth of expertise residing in communities across the Nation, possesses natural strengths and efficiencies that should be exploited as the services transform. While the ultimate composition of Guard forces is yet to be determined, NGB expects that force structure changes instituted in the next three to seven years will increase the Guard contribution to the Total Force in several areas. For the Army National Guard, military police, chemical, information operations, military intelligence (particularly linguists), and Special Operations Forces are fields that draw on the civilian experience in our personnel to assist the Army in meet- ing its goals. For the Air Guard, security forces, information warfare, intelligence, and unmanned reconnaissance platforms represent areas of potential growth that would assist the Air Force in rebalancing its forces for the war on terrorism.

The Guard’s involvement with the ground-based, mid-course defense program is a current example of its force structure adapting to a changing security environment. The Army Guard created a missile defense battalion in Alaska and a missile defense brigade in Colorado. Manned by Army National Guardsmen, with augmentation from the active Army, these units will provide the United States with a first line of defense against missile at- tacks. Reflecting the new joint operat- ing environment at NGB, the Air Na- tional Guard, which assumed the CONUS air defense mission after the Cold War, stands ready to provide ad- ditional assistance.

The bureau has also been working on force-leveraging initiatives to im- prove the Guard’s ability to contribute to HLS/HD, with the goal of giving standard Guard units specialized train- ing to fill mission requirements in this arena. Each state has designated reac- tion forces—a company-sized unit to be ready within 4 hours and a battal- ion in 24 hours—that fill an identified NORTHCOM need. We have also cre- ated a dozen regional chemical, biolog- ical, radiological, nuclear, and high explo- sive force response packages. These packages train National Guard infantry, medical, chemical, and engi- neer troops together to rapidly provide security, decontamination, and urban search and rescue at an incident site anywhere in CONUS and have dramat- ically expanded national ability to re- spond to a terrorist attack. Other spe- cial capabilities-based packages, all using standard units in nonstandard ways, are under consideration.

The Guard is becoming an innov- ator in information operations, driven by HLS/HD requirements, and
each state has designated reaction forces—
a company-sized unit and a battalion

In a meeting with CNGB, the Joint Staff J–7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development) agreed that the Guard Bureau should be used as a partner to provide input for policy and doctrine for HLS/HD/MACA. The Guard is a natural leader in this arena; no other part of DOD has as much practical experience or the statutory intergovernmental role for dealing with civil authorities. It makes sense to put that role and experience to use. NGB has committed manpower to as- sist J–7 in developing joint doctrine, education, training, and exercises. In turn, J–7 has committed to a trial im- plementation of the joint training informa- tion management system at NGB and in Tennessee and Puerto Rico. Teaming with J–7, NGB will use its auto- mated exercise and assessment sys- tem to assist in validating joint and interagency readiness and will be configuring the 3 National Guard educa- tion centers and 318 distance learn- ing facilities to increase the availability of JPME for both the active and Re- serve components. Joint training will be critical to the future of the National Guard. Congress has insisted that the Reserve components be included in the DOD drive toward jointness, and the NGB task is to ensure that JPME opportunities become available so that we can meet this mandate.

NGB chief briefing reporters on National Guard transformation.
with the tremendous resource of traditional Guardsmen who work as information technology engineers and operators in civilian life. Major elements include vulnerability assessment teams, which identify weaknesses in communications networks; field support teams, designed to conduct tactical information operations missions; and computer emergency response teams, which act as first responders in case of information attacks. These groups can operate anywhere in the HLS/HD-combat operations spectrum and will provide Governors, Federal authorities, and combatant commanders a wide range of capabilities in a variety of tactical environments.

Hand-in-hand with innovative capabilities packaging, NGB is exploring ways to transition Guard soldiers and airmen rapidly from state status (state active duty or Title 32) to Federal status (Title 10). There is ample historic precedent. Air guardmembers have executed CONUS runway alert missions since the 1950s, and Army guardmembers manned Nike missile sites in the 1960s and 1970s, all while serving in a state status. In both cases, standing orders automatically transitioned these soldiers and airmen to Federal active duty the moment an enemy aircraft appeared on a radar screen. The new threat to our homeland can be met with a similarly innovative means of enabling guardmembers to continue to serve both their states and the Nation.

Secretary Rumsfeld has also charged CNGB to advise him on how the mobilization and demobilization process can be streamlined, particularly for the Army Guard. Here, the bureau’s experience of integrating the Air Guard into the Air Force aerospace expeditionary forces initiative has given valuable insight into how the Army could improve the process. While a multitude of policies must be addressed, in simple form NGB proposes changing the activation paradigm from alert, mobilize, train, certify, deploy to train, mobilize, deploy.

The Guard will, through innovative transformation, enhance and increase the depth and breadth of its readiness to perform all national security missions. Effectively leveraging existing forces, streamlining forces and organizations, creating or changing forces to meet near- and long-term needs, making organizations leaner, smaller, and more effective, and training and equipping to full readiness are the critical components of transformation.

We have approached transformation in an open, collegial manner, talking with all affected stakeholders—adjutants general, NGB, the Army, the Air Force, OSD, the Joint Staff, and others, working as a team. Change is necessary. Today’s guardmember, the 21st century minuteman, must be available to deploy at a moment’s notice to defend America at home or abroad. The Nation should expect no less.
Faced with the competing demands of providing an affordable national defense and maintaining the all-volunteer character of the military, defense policymakers on every level must seek innovative solutions. Transformation is the order of the day. An approach that permits the Nation to maintain a relatively small active force by providing a ready and inexpensive expansion force may sound too good to be true. It is not. The Department of Defense (DOD) is at a turning point in its use of the Reserve components and the National Guard. Driven by the unique requirements of Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Secretary has challenged the entire department to transition away from a Cold War approach in many areas of national security policy and action, particularly employing the incredibly rich resource of 1.2 million Guard and Reserve members.

**Circuit Breakers**

The policies and procedures applicable to Guard and Reserve administration and employment over the last
fifty years might be compared to a circuit breaker. A Reserve component member is either on or off active duty. Throwing the lever to effect that transition is a deliberate, laborious, and time-consuming procedure reserved for the gravest emergencies. The structure and policy reforms of the mid-1970s that led to Secretary Melvin Laird’s Total Force policy and to the Army doctrine attributed to General Creighton Abrams reflected an intentional decision to place key capabilities inside the Guard and Reserve to assure a sizable mobilization in the event of major conflict. These policies assumed that mobilization of those components would be a rare event. The changing national security situation has undermined these assumptions and others. However, many policies and procedures governing Guard and Reserve employment have remained largely unchanged.

Under the Cold War approach, an individual’s duty status is polar—another circuit breaker. One is either active or Reserve—on or off active duty. 

**today’s systems cannot meet the nuanced requirements of the global war on terrorism**

One either serves on weekends or full time. Pay systems, entitlement of allowances, medical care, base privileges—the list of opposites based on active or Reserve status goes on and on. The manpower management system that has evolved over decades to implement these policies and procedures is therefore a crude tool. Generations of servicemembers have had to muscle the systems into compliance or find workarounds and cosmetic solutions. The system can be considered fully capable only as long as the circuit breaker will be thrown about once a generation, and when it is thrown the result will be mass mobilization of vast numbers of replacements who are not needed in the early stages of a conflict and will remain on active duty for a fixed period.

In short, today’s systems are sufficient to employ a Guard and Reserve

that is a blunt instrument appropriate for the Cold War but cannot meet the nuanced requirements of the war on terrorism. Because the Department of Defense and its force providers have only a blunt instrument to mobilize augmenting and reinforcing Reserve resources, an inflexible and unwieldy resource is what the gaining commander often gets. It is not what the 21st century commander needs.

The post–Cold War reality of Guard and Reserve service is radically different—for the member, force provider, and gaining commander, who will lead a joint and Total Force comprised of active, Guard, and Reserve personnel in battle. In the past decade, and most acutely in the past two years, it has become increasingly obvious that the Guard and Reserve cannot fulfill their potential as a true partner in a Total Force with current manpower, personnel, and administrative policies and systems. The circuit breaker is worn out.

The Guard and Reserve components must replace the circuit breaker with a device that allows for adjusting the flow—a rheostat. They must replace today’s blunt manpower instruments with a kit of flexible, precise tools that allow Reserve members to move back and forth along a continuum of service that reflects both the needs of Reservists and those who employ them. This continuum is a way of describing the full spectrum of availability, ranging from members of the Individual Ready Reserve who do not routinely train as members of units and who may never be recalled to active duty, to individuals who perform short-term active service during the course of a year, to Reservists who volunteer for active duty for up to 365 days. It thus spans the range of possible employment up to a year and encompasses all categories of duty from drills, to annual training, to active duty in support of specific requirements and contingencies, to full mobilization.

**The Continuum of Reserve Service**

Conceiving of Reserve service as a continuum helps match the member’s capacity for service with operational requirements. It recognizes that an individual’s capacity for service will probably change many times throughout his career and that there is value to the Nation at every point along the continuum. Finally, such an approach recognizes that gaining
The Continuum of Reserve/Guard Service Since 1988

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Man-days</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>39</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>179</th>
<th>365</th>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Drill/Active Training, plus Additional Duties</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Drill/Active Training, plus Additional Duties</td>
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<td>Presidential Reserve Special Duty, Temporary Duty, etc.</td>
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<td>Individual Reserve</td>
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<td>Emergency Force</td>
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Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel).

commanders have a vast array of requirements that are amenable to a Reserve component solution.

A brief review of Guard and Reserve employment over the last fifteen years reflects a growing awareness of their capabilities and potential utilization. This portrayal of man-day contributions is evidence that members represent a source of both emergency and contingent manpower, useful in the full range of requirements facing commanders in both war and peace.

The distinction between emergency and contingent manpower is another aspect of the continuum and is useful in understanding resources and requirements. The need for emergency manpower is characterized by the once-in-a-generation requirement to build up the force for a major contingency such as Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom. The emergency portion of the force comprises the vast majority of Guard and Reserve members. The contingent manpower force, much smaller, can be applied against ongoing requirements ranging from individuals who augment service or joint staffs for days or weeks, to scheduled unit rotations, to such locales as the Sinai or Kosovo.

Contingent manpower can be employed across the spectrum of military operations—as complete units, smaller detachments, or individual augmentees. Such resources provide augmentation in such missions as exercise support, daily operations, theater engagement, peace support and enforcement, and low intensity combat. These requirements represent differing points on the continuum of service, with emergency requirements being filled by forces whose usual mode is at the lower end of the activity scale, while contingent requirements will mostly be filled by personnel who have greater availability and thus serve at the middle or higher regions of the scale.

Some members can fill both contingency and emergency requirements because their capacity changes over time, thus flexible and precise manpower systems are necessary. Such systems offer a scalable force that can be tailored to the needs of gaining force commanders. The challenge for today’s Guard and Reserve leaders is to build a new manpower management system—a rheostat—that will support the continuum of service concept.

Consider an illustration. Corporal Smith is in the first semester of his third year at State. He is taking his highest academic load to date. He wants to remain in good standing with his unit but is only available one weekend a month for training. He can attend his two-week annual training provided it is in the summer. Unless a national emergency is declared and his unit is activated, that will be the extent of his commitment to corps and country for the year, for he is a part of the emergency manpower force. Having graduated after two years, however, he wishes to take a break before graduate school and volunteers for duty in a composite unit that will deploy to Okinawa for six months. Now a sergeant, he has shifted to the right on the continuum scale, the contingent manpower pool. When the deployment is over, he must immediately shift back left, either returning to Selected Reserve status or joining the Individual Ready Reserve—available for mobilization but primarily focused on school and work. At each of these points on the continuum, he represents a unique national resource, provided his leaders know how to use him and make it feasible for him to serve. These leaders will need systems and processes to seamlessly shift this asset back and forth across the continuum of service. Sergeant Smith is too valuable to lose.

The Corporate Experience

Retailers, manufacturers, and other concerns with fluctuating business cycles long ago recognized the value of a scalable, pretrained work force composed of loyal members who have the standards and values that make up their unique corporate culture. The use of contingent manpower in the corporate world has already moved well beyond the idea that such a workforce will be comprised only of low-wage, low-skill, temporary employees. Today corporations use contingent manpower to perform a range of functions such as engineering, information technology, legal services, and marketing. The American Staffing Association, an industry advocacy group, claims that the fastest growth in this workforce segment is in professional and technical occupations. This model offers not only a cost-saving measure for private enterprises, but also an efficient means to conserve and maximize the use of valuable employees.
The Department of Labor defines contingent work as the use of independent contractors and part-time, temporary, seasonal, and leased workers. According to a survey by the American Management Association in cooperation with the Institute of Work at Seton Hall University, 93 percent of American firms employ some type of contingent workers and 73 percent place the need to attract specialized talent as a rationale.

Although the priority is to provide highly trained individuals and units to the gaining commander and devise the supporting establishment to accomplish that mission, cost cannot be ignored. Guard and Reserve forces have always been a cost-effective way to meet national security manpower challenges. Not only are pre-mobilization Reserve manpower costs significantly less than a full-time force, but these forces do not require the extensive and expensive tail, such as housing, base facilities, and DOD schools, active forces need.

**Actions Required**

What must Congress, DOD, and the services do to discard past conceptions of Reserve duty and embrace the continuum of service concept? The first step will be to break down the systemic administrative, manpower, and personnel barriers that prevent Guard and Reserve members from efficiently moving back and forth across the continuum of service.

- Revise outdated pay and personnel systems that are unduly complex to administer and fail to provide accurate pay and entitlements. Members who serve from 30 to 179 days (other than standard drills and annual training) routinely encounter administrative problems that are time-consuming and harm morale and willingness to serve. A modern integrated pay and personnel system with a single military identification card is long overdue. A fast food employee who begins work on Wednesday will receive an accurate paycheck Friday, with tax deductions and documentation of hours worked. The Guard and Reserve have not yet mastered that level of personnel support.
- Change the paradigm for Reserve pay, which assumes that a member of the Selected Reserve requires an administrative action to trigger a payment. Adopt the active component model, which assumes that a person is on duty and is entitled to pay and allowances unless an administrative action is taken showing the contrary. Selected Reserve personnel should be paid for 48 drills per year unless an administrative action shows they were not on duty.
- Address transitioning medical coverage from civilian insurers to TRICARE. Adequate health insurance and the ability to move smoothly from civilian plans in and out of government-funded TRICARE are critical to servicemembers and their families. Facilitate continuous family enrollment in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system regardless of active or Reserve status.
- Address transitioning medical coverage from civilian insurers to TRICARE. Adequate health insurance and the ability to move smoothly from civilian plans in and out of government-funded TRICARE are critical to servicemembers and their families. Facilitate continuous family enrollment in the defense enrollment eligibility reporting system regardless of active or Reserve status.
- Add flexibility to the management of authorized personnel strengths. Statutory limitations on end strength and controlled grade counting, as well as rules governing sanctuary protection and removal of personnel from the active status list, remain
impediments to the continuum of service concept. Policy change on the DOD level and legislative action will likely be required to allow the Guard and Reserve components the flexibility to use the right service-member at the right time. The artificial barrier that counts personnel on temporary active duty for more than 179 days against active component authorizations is the biggest obstacle to use of volunteers.

- Legislate changes to permit qualified personnel who retire or leave active duty with a severance payment to serve in the Guard and Reserve component without jeopardizing accrued benefits. This expansion and extension of the manpower pool makes sense at a time when work life expectancy is increasing.
- Change the paradigm that describes a servicemember leaving active duty as separation. Unless the member is leaving under circumstances that render further Reserve service impossible, the end of active duty should be seen as transition, signaling to all involved the opportunities for continued service.
- Ensure that those responsible for recruiting, retaining, and promoting Guard and Reserve members understand that over a career it is acceptable to move back and forth across the continuum of service for both personal reasons and the operational needs of the service. Leaders, both active and Reserve, must recognize that there is value at every point.
- Guarantee family readiness programs. They play an important role in both recruiting and retention. On another level, the support of families is of strategic importance. Unhappy family members who publicly voice frustration with a unit that does not meet their needs affect the willingness of national leaders to employ the Guard and Reserve. Family readiness programs ensure that families fully support their members. The programs must serve individual augmentees as well as unit members.
- Create flexible systems to permit force providers to efficiently and effectively build composite units—temporary groupings of volunteers formed for specific missions who on completion will return to another unit or to Individual Ready Reserve status.

Perceptions and Practices

Implementing the continuum-of-service concept will require the Guard and Reserve components to change. The Department of Defense, services, and combatant and gaining force commanders must also change. Active component leaders must recognize that the Reserve is the true all-volunteer force and must be managed differently from the active component, in a complementary manner rather than forcing members and units to utilize systems designed for their active counterparts, who volunteer to serve the day they enlist. At that point, contractual obligations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice bind them to their commitments. Reservists are not similarly bound but effectively volunteer every time they report for duty. Nothing beyond a desire for service, sustained by an appreciation of the quality of that service, causes a member to join or remain.

Even if all of the actions outlined above are taken and the continuum of service becomes a reality, active component officers and civilian leaders must come to view employment of the Reserve differently.

First, skillful Reserve employment must become a core competency. The commanding general of an infantry division would never accept a battalion commander’s acknowledgment that he knew little about fire support or logistics. No senior DOD leader would tolerate a general or flag officer who had no knowledge of joint operations. Yet although the Guard and Reserve comprise a significant portion of the Nation’s overall combat capability, and critical skills and capabilities are found in them, it is still common to hear senior officers and leaders acknowledge that they know little about the Reserve. Worse, there is little desire to learn. Competence in using Guard and
Reserve forces must be viewed as comparable to professional qualification as a joint specialty officer.

Second, the Reserve component must not be viewed as the force of last resort, to be employed only when the active component has reached its breaking point. Guard and Reserve members have shown that they will come when called, stay as ready as resources allow, and bring skills and capabilities that not only augment but enrich the joint force. Such a force deserves the respect accorded an all-volunteer force in readiness. Anyone who views employment of that force as a sign of national weakness rather than strength wastes the investment that has created it and denigrates those who comprise it.

Lastly, the need to maintain the linkages between our professional, largely career military and the American people must be recognized. Isolation of the active component from the values and experiences of their countrymen can only lead to problems. The Reserve potential to maintain that connectivity is immense. Presence in communities around the country and the interjection into military culture of the civilian values held by most Americans have historically kept the Armed Forces well grounded, responsive to national leadership, and worthy of the support of their fellow citizens. Losing confidence in the militia tradition puts those attributes at risk.

The idea that Guard and Reserve service can be a continuum and not a succession of polar opposites will require fundamental changes in both substance and perceptions. Its increased use has been a reality for many years. However, administrative, personnel, and manpower systems have failed to keep up with the increase and the changing nature of Reserve service. If the corporate world can revise its views about the shape of its work force and devise efficient and effective mechanisms for employing their pool of both full-time and contingent talent, those responsible for shaping and preparing the Armed Forces can do the same. There are no insurmountable bars to the development and implementation of similarly flexible tools to maximize use of citizen-warriors. These steps will provide a key element of the affordable national defense that taxpayers seek.
The catastrophe of 9/11 marked the beginning of earnest mobilization and reconstruction operations but with a new twist. Such operations became just as cogent for active duty soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen as operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo. At the same time, 9/11 highlighted a role for the Army and Air National Guard that has always been key to the existence of those organizations: functioning as a state or territorial Governor’s first responders to domestic emergencies and calamities.

The National Guard was quickly on the scene in New York City helping police, fire, and emergency medical personnel to secure order. 1st Battalion, 101st Cavalry (Tank), with headquarters on Staten Island just across the bay from the crumbling Twin Towers, reacted automatically, being immediately...

By RAYMOND E. BELL, JR.

Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USA (Ret.), has served in all three components of the Army as well as in joint assignments. He has been widely published on military subjects and is a former editor of National Guard magazine.
thrust into a stabilization and reconstruction operation. Not tanks but troops on foot rapidly cordoned off the soot-choked area. They entered a battlefield so wasted as to defy imagination—and one that required quick and effective action. The Guard, ready and able to do its duty, went to work.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 will not soon fade from memory. But the mission of stabilization and reconstruction (emergency repair) in New York City has long since been turned over to civilian authorities. The state Army National Guard has gone on to other stabilization missions as well as participating in Iraqi Freedom. Today almost every Army and Air Force establishment is protected by Guardsmen who check identification, inspect vehicles, and control traffic. Army Guardsmen secured Air Force bases in a joint mode. These are basic stabilization operations that are key to protecting personnel, equipment, and property.

A National Guard Billet

The Federal Government has recognized the vital contribution the Army and Air National Guard make to homeland defense and its inherent stabilization and emergency repair missions. A National Guard officer has been assigned to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The major general serves as chief of staff to the commander of NORTHCOM, who is an active duty Army or Air Force four-star. It is clearly intended that the Guard play a vital role in executing the responsibilities of this joint command. It is possible that this form of stabilization will become the exclusive mission of the National Guard. There will be resistance in the Guard community to such operations becoming its sole task; in any case, that seems unlikely in light of operations in Iraq.

This essay does not debate the efficacy of National Guard roles but rather delineates proposed participation in NORTHCOM, and in doing so advocates making the command a four-star Army or Air National Guard general officer billet.

Such an assignment may seem ludicrous to the active community, but when considering qualifications for this command position, the proposal makes better sense. It is a given that both the Army and Air Guard will be the major contributors to homeland defense, so the NORTHCOM commander must know both organizations. Few active duty generals, especially Army, have experience with both the Army and Air side of the National Guard. On the other hand, the state adjutants general must deal with both components daily.

A second qualification is the ability to interact with state and territorial governors. Politics are anathema to most of the military but are a fact of life in the Guard. Indeed, many will contend that once an individual reaches flag rank in any component, politics of some kind are involved in getting things done.

Because there are 54 National Guards representing the 50 states and Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C., the pool of Guard generals with these joint qualifications for being NORTHCOM commander is large. The selection of a fully qualified individual should be easy on the basis of such availability alone.

A third requirement is the ability to interface with both state and Federal military and civilian bureaucracies. National Guard generals who work full time in their respective organizations must be adept at balancing conflicting requirements. Active duty generals rarely have to interface with such bureaucracies outside their own components.

National Guard generals are usually appointed to a position for at least four years, in contrast to active duty generals, who rarely serve more than two years and often little longer than a year. The stability and continuity required to command NORTHCOM calls for a sufficiently long tour of duty for effective preparation and adequate response to crises.

The above qualifications highlight the unique nature of NORTHCOM. The fact that a Guard general has already been appointed chief of staff recognizes the need for high-ranking Guard representation. A further step would be reversing the command relationship by making the National Guard general the commander and an active duty major general his chief of staff.
From the National Guard perspective, the elevation of a Guardsman to a command on the same level as out-of-country joint commands has special merit. Active generals or admirals command these geographic organizations. In theory, these commands are headquarters only and are resourced by service-specific commands such as U.S. Army Forces Command for the Army or U.S. Special Operations Command, a joint command in its own right. U.S. Central Command also drew on Army combat units from U.S. European Command as well as Forces Command. Some forces in place, such as those in Korea, are dedicated to a particular unified command.

Gaining Acceptance
While the Air National Guard can claim to be well integrated into the three-component Air Force, there is a perception that the Army National Guard can never be as professional as the active Army and drains resources from its active counterpart. At the same time, there is a subliminal feeling that a competition exists between the active and Guard components that could lead to the Guard assuming the active component’s most cherished missions. Real or not, the Army Guard has a history of believing there is an active Army bias against it. Appointing a National Guard four-star may not entirely assuage the tension, but it would recognize a new measure of equality despite possible active Army resistance.

The situation in Bosnia is representative of how Guard competence is viewed by the active community. While a National Guard headquarters commands the American effort, it has not been a completely Guard endeavor. To “stiffen” the Guard formation, an active Army unit has often made up part of the complement. Once on the ground, however, the components have been seamlessly integrated. Only the shoulder patches betray any differences between the components. Since all components are now made up of volunteers, only unit performance differentiates quality.

If an Army National Guard general were to command NORTHCOM, there could be rancor over losing an active duty four-star slot. The relationship between the active Army and Guard could suffer. But because command would rotate between services, the loss would perhaps be felt only periodically by either active component.

A major argument not only for a National Guard general commanding NORTHCOM, but for the command to become primarily a Guard organization, is that most of the units, both air and ground, would come from the Guard. Fighter aircraft flying patrols within the continental United States, for example, are primarily from Air National Guard units. By law, Federal military units are not automatically deployed to either natural or terrorist disasters. They must be invited into a state as would have been the case with the World Trade Center attacks. The New York National Guard was a primary responder, and no active duty Army units were deployed to assist in the city. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, although the active Army was eager to assist, it had to await authority from the Governor of Florida before sending Federal troops, either active Army or mobilized Army Reserve.

This does not mean that active Army soldiers, for example, are not first responders. As in the ice storm of 2000, soldiers from 10th Mountain Division quickly took the field to assist distressed civilians in the vicinity of Fort Drum. But the primary responsibility has rested with state forces in the past, and no change is foreseen. The bulk of operations involving natural disasters will continue to rest with the National Guard on a state duty status.

The Guard will play a major role in counterterrorist operations as it did in airport security. The President requested that Governors place their Guardsmen on airport duty until the Transportation Security Administration hired sufficient security personnel, with the Federal Government bearing the cost. How such operations will be paid for in the future remains undetermined, but this is one of the easiest to accommodate of all the ramifications of establishing the Guard as an effective homeland defense organization.

Organizing and Enhancing
The major challenge to NORTHCOM in accepting National Guard formations for defense and security operations is how to organize them. Cries are frequent for such units to “reorganize” to meet operational requirements. But it appears not to be well understood that most states and territories have current formations that already meet stipulated requirements. Many, designated as troop commands or state area commands, are structured to perform homeland defense and security operations.

In Guam, for example, a force of 767 Army and 306 Air Guard personnel could be considered insignificant, yet the Guam Territorial Command speaks for itself. Its Army Guard has an infantry battalion suitable for physical security duties for both natural disasters and terrorist incidents. There are also engineer, quartermaster, and military intelligence detachments. Appropriate homeland security and defense missions for these units are self-explanatory. In the Air National Guard, there are no flying units but rather an air base group and services flying squadron. Both formations work with the active Air Force at Anderson Airfield, but in their own right they services visiting Air National Guard aerial units assigned to protect Guam’s skies. Finally, the civil engineering squadron has a vital role, along with its Army Guard engineering component, in homeland defense.

The example of Guam demonstrates how carefully the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has structured state and territorial forces over the years. Guam’s force structure is no accident. Engineer-type units are vital to helping the island recover its vital services after typhoons. The infantry battalion not only contributes as a combat formation but can help preserve law and order and prevent looting after a storm.
The National Guard in Guam does not have major combat, combat support, or aerial units. New Mexico, on the other hand, has an air defense unit (Army Guard) and a fighter unit (Air Guard). The air defense brigade has a proud history dating back to combat in the Philippines in 1942. Its subordinate units are also located near White Sands Missile Range, allowing the firing batteries easy access to live fire areas. The fighter wing is one of the most proficient Air Force aerial units. The weather in New Mexico is consistently ideal for maintaining flying proficiency. Holloman Air Force Base is close to Mexico, allowing the wing to fly patrols over the border. Since the NORTHCOM area of responsibility now includes Mexico, aircraft based in New Mexico are ideally located to deploy south of the border. The state also has an organization that encompasses units not assigned to active service roles, 93rd Troop Command. These units, with no designated role in the organizational schemes of the active Army, would be placed under NORTHCOM command in homeland defense operations even as New Mexico’s major Army and Air Guard elements could be called upon.

Of the 54 National Guards in the United States, 49 have both state area commands and numbered troop commands. Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, and Pennsylvania have only state area commands, while Guam has the aforementioned territorial command. These specialized Army Guard troop commands do not include any of the Army Guard combat divisions, enhanced readiness brigades, or other major combat or combat support units. State area commands, however, are really headquarters that serve the Governor’s state emergency response needs and can draw on other National Guard organizations as needed.

The 49 troop commands would be the most appropriate for placement under NORTHCOM command and control. If the command were required to deploy federalized National Guard units to the Mexican border, for example, it could ask for the authority to send units from Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.

The capability of the command to task these troop commands (and certain state area commands) helps overcome one of the Guard’s greatest fears: that homeland defense and security will become its sole mission. There would, for instance, be no programmed requirement for the Army Guard’s major combat formations, such as its armored, mechanized, and infantry divisions as well as its combat brigades, to engage in homeland defense. These units would continue to be dedicated to reinforcing the active Army in performing its global responsibilities. It is foreseen that the eight National Guard divisions and the fifteen “enhanced” combat brigades would therefore not be drawn into the homeland defense and security role except in an additional reinforcing capacity for short surges. The integration of the Air Guard into the active Air Force is so complete, and its nature is so different from the Army Guard, that
there is little danger that it would be singled out for exclusively homeland defense duties.

**Specifically for Homeland Defense**

The future role of NGB has lurked in the background throughout this discussion. The bureau has recently transformed into a joint headquarters. The chief, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, has also recently called on the states and territories to reduce the 162 state National Guard headquarters by two-thirds, making the remaining 54 offices joint. This move, as part of National Guard transformation, is designed to bring together the Air and Army Guard headquarter elements in each state and territory (to include the District of Columbia) to provide a more effective intercomponent synergism. The objective is to add agility and versatility to the Guard’s capability to respond to terrorist attack, natural disaster, or war.

The National Guard Bureau’s relationship with NORTHCOM is easily defined. NGB serves as a force provider, as it does for the other major combatant commands. At the same time that many elements of the troop commands would be considered dedicated to NORTHCOM, the bureau would still resource many troop commands to meet other requirements such as humanitarian missions to South and Central America.

While the deployment of presently organized units of the troop commands is theoretically a good idea, organizational shortcomings remain. Thirty-two states now have civilian support teams and more are being organized, but many states need to have their troop commands augmented by units specifically organized for homeland defense. Some of these units now exist only in the active Army and Army Reserve, such as civil affairs and psychological operations. Derivations of such units should become troop command components.

Civil affairs units are in great demand in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo. They could serve similar functions in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, where the civilian administrative structure is obliterated by a natural or manmade catastrophe. These organizations are made up of those who in civilian life are mid-level executives who know how to assemble assets, direct civilian operations, make assessments, and coordinate with civilian authorities. Each troop command should have one of these units, preferably a battalion that consists of a few hundred personnel. While civil affairs units do not ordinarily have subordinate units, there is no reason why they cannot. In a state with a small National Guard, the civil affairs battalion might be the major element of the troop command and head signal, engineer, medical, aviation, military police, and service support detachments. It could also command a psychological operations element. Such units were especially useful in helping the stricken population of southern Florida after Hurricane Andrew in stabilization and reconstruction (emergency repair) operations. Such units have mobile printing facilities and loudspeaker-equipped vehicles. Where the rapid and widespread dissemination of critical information is necessary and the telephone network and Internet are impaired, psychological operations units become more important. A variation of current psychological operations units is essential in the war against terrorism and in the interest of national security and defense.

Placing a Guardsman at the pinnacle of NORTHCOM appears viable. With the present troop command structure, modified as described, the National Guard as the principal component of the command thus becomes the major military player in homeland defense operations. At the same time, the jointness of the National Guard, which is so vital to accomplishing the Guard’s mission—protecting the integrity of the United States—is enhanced. As it is, the National Guard stands ready to respond to events that might be a repeat of 9/11 at the same time it pursues jointness as its new mantra.

The author acknowledges the substantial contribution of COL Robert Armstrong, USAR, to this article.
Landpower and the Reserve Components

By JOHN C.F. TILLSON

The Army Reserve components—the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR, established in 1908) and Army National Guard (ARNG, established in 1936)—have distinguished themselves throughout the Nation’s history. Both served proudly in World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War when they stood ready for instant mobilization in the worldwide war against communism, the first Gulf War in 1991, the second Gulf War in 2003, and a variety of post–Cold War assignments from Bosnia and Kosovo to the Sinai and Afghanistan.

The modern history of the Reserve components began with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird implementing the Total Force policy in 1970. He directed the military departments to consider the Reserve as part of the total force available to meet security needs. The Reserve components assumed an increasing role in the national security strategy during the 1970s. They were receiving modern...
equipment and the resources to maintain manning and training levels by the end of the decade. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s they continued to increase their capabilities and their support to the active component.

**A Growing Demand**

Questions regarding the accessibility of Reservists and their willingness to serve in the first Gulf War were resolved by successful Reserve participation. The President’s willingness to mobilize the Reserve components and their enthusiastic response has quieted the skeptics. Confidence in both units and individuals is now high within DOD. The major question facing the Army and the Nation today is what impact more frequent deployment will have on citizens serving.

Although the resources devoted to the Reserve components have always fluctuated, the last thirty years have seen a focus on readiness and capability. As the active force has been reduced in the post–Cold War world, the demands on the Reserve components have increased. This will call for added resources to enable more training, better equipment, and appropriate pay and benefits.

It appears that the challenges facing ARNG and USAR will increase. They will occur both at home and abroad and cover the range of military options from the law enforcement and mitigation tasks associated with homeland security and defense, to peacekeeping and stability operations in failed states, to major combat. This piece puts these issues for the Army Reserve components into perspective, identifies current ARNG and USAR transformational initiatives, and suggests additional options for dealing with evolving challenges.

As we consider the future of ARNG and USAR, we must understand their size and importance relative to the Army active component and to the active and Reserve components of the other services. A number of insights emerge.

- The Army total force is much larger than the other services.
- The Army Reserve components are much larger than the other Reserve components.

**Transformation Plans**

Both USAR and ARNG have plans to transform their forces and management to meet new demands. These plans do not appear complete, but their outlines seem reasonably well understood. The major aspects of the USAR transformation plan are:

- Change the management paradigm from alert-mobilize-train-deploy to train-alert-deploy to enhance the ability of units to deploy rapidly. Schedule unit readiness to provide predictability to members and ensure units are ready when needed. Achieve a 10:1 capability-to-need ratio so a soldier will deploy once in 5 years for a maximum of 270 days.
- Reduce the number of units, including command and control headquarters, within the current manpower level to fully man (90 percent or higher) the remaining units.
- Create an individuals account (12 percent of USAR end strength) to ensure that soldiers in units are qualified in their military operational specialty and fully deployable. Soldiers undergoing individual training, for example in basic or advanced training, will be in that account and will not count against the manning levels of units. Soldiers in advanced training will not have to train and maintain membership in a troop unit simultaneously.
- Cease the practice of cross leveling soldiers between units to fully man the receiving unit. This change is made possible by the reduced number of units and the individuals account.
- Reform the individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) program to create an individual augmentee (1A) program to provide individuals across a range of specialties needed by combatant commanders.

Aspects of the ARNG transformation plan are:

- Change the management paradigm from alert-mobilize-train-deploy to train-alert-deploy in order to enhance the ability of units to deploy rapidly.
- Enhance the ability to provide combat support units such as military police, chemical, information operations, and military intelligence. Provide reaction forces to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) capable of dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats.
- As part of an ARNG restructuring initiative, reshape one or more divisions to a more versatile design called the multifunctional division, made up of mobile light brigades (MLBs) consisting of two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron, an engineer battalion, and a forward support battalion.
- Create a joint National Guard Bureau and joint state headquarters with staff
**Chain of Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Governors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>FEMA Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Armies</td>
<td>FEMA Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Commands</td>
<td>State Area Coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Managers</td>
<td>Installations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Localities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Establish a joint continental United States (CONUS) communications support element (JCCSE) linking NORTHCOM, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and other Federal and state agencies involved in HS/HD/MACA.

The above summary suggests that each organization is responding to the direction from the Secretary of Defense to enhance its ability to mobilize and change management paradigms. In addition, both Reserve components are reorganizing forces to meet anticipated demands. Neither has provided much detail on the specifics of these plans. How will these very different organizations accomplish these goals? Which will prove the more agile and responsive to the new world? Will the **a rotational schedule allows all units to appreciate the benefits of high readiness**

smaller and more centralized USAR with its closer connection to the active component, or the widely decentralized ARNG with its 54 separate headquarters, prove more adept and creative in transforming? Either way, USAR and ARNG might consider additional changes.

**Improve Predictability**

Both components are working to improve mobilization predictability for their members. The Navy and Air Force offer models for achieving this goal. The Navy has long scheduled the deployments of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups so sailors can predict time away from home. The recently adapted Air Force concept of the air expeditionary force provides the same benefit for both active and Reserve members.

Establishing a rotation has advantages beyond predictability. A rotational schedule appears essential for the Army to meet the goals of its new train-alert-deploy paradigm. If ARNG were to establish a 3-year rotation for its 15 enhanced brigades, for example, it could have five brigades essentially ready to deploy on alert at all times. It could establish a similar schedule for special mission brigades and MLBs. This would be a significant improvement over the current concept of training brigades for 90 days following mobilization and prior to deployment. USAR, which deploys primarily battalions and separate companies, could establish a similar schedule. A 3 to 5-year timetable appears appropriate since both components should manage personnel policies to keep units relatively stable for that time. Unlike the Army approach to tiered readiness, in which some units are held on a constant high level of deployment readiness while others are held on a lower level, a rotational schedule allows all units to appreciate the benefits of high readiness, which include better manning levels, equipment fill, and training. The most important benefit is the ability to deploy on alert without much post-mobilization training. If USAR and ARNG are to take full advantage of a rotational schedule, however, they will also have to adjust personnel and other policies. For example, if a rotation is to provide more competent units deployable on alert, ARNG and USAR must find a way to ensure that at least officers and noncommissioned officers are stabilized in units for an entire rotation. It will do no good if units are placed on such a schedule while individual soldiers continue to move in and out.

**Improve Unit Readiness**

It appears USAR is taking some initiatives that ARNG might consider, reducing its total force structure, including headquarters, to more fully

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*Tillson*
man the remaining units and thereby improve unit readiness. In addition, USAR is creating an individuals account to ensure that untrained and nondeployable soldiers are not occupying spaces in units scheduled for rapid deployment. Both changes could also enhance ARNG ability to deploy units rapidly and avoid cross leveling soldiers between units.

The potential for force structure reductions and an individuals account to enhance Reserve unit readiness by increasing deployable manning levels has long been recognized. The obstacle has been reluctance to decrease unit spaces—to reduce force structure. This hesitation is most likely based on belief that lost force structure is gone forever and that the Reserve will lose not just that but the funds associated with it and will not be able to fund either increased manning levels in the remaining units or the individuals account. USAR is to be congratulated for taking this risk, and DOD management must support the effort.

### Increase Individual Augmentees

USAR proposes to expand its individual augmentee program to meet the needs of the Army and combatant commanders for specially trained personnel. Individual mobilization augmentees are paid members of the Selected Reserve. This is a useful step ARNG might also adopt. Unfortunately, it does not solve the major difficulty with the current augmentee program, which is the unwillingness of the active component to take responsibility for augmentees. Nor does it take advantage of the full range of pretrained manpower. There is recognition that many active Army units and joint headquarters are inadequately manned in peacetime and require trained, rapidly available individual augmentees to perform their wartime missions fully within the required timeframe. That is also true for many Reserve units. Thus it seems reasonable to create an IA/IMA program in ARNG as well as USAR and for the Army as a whole to see that individual augmentees are assigned in advance to fill positions in active and Reserve units and in joint headquarters, that they have training opportunities, and that the gaining component or joint headquarters provide at least part of the funding.

Two other sources of pretrained individual manpower could be included to increase potential augmentees. The first is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), soldiers who have left the active component or the Selective Reserve but have time remaining in their 8-year military service obligation (MSO). Many could contribute in a mobilization if the Army took the management steps to ensure their availability to meet the needs of all three components.

Should steps be taken to enhance the IRR contribution to a mobilization, efforts might also be made to increase IRR size by retaining many of the Army’s best-trained soldiers in the pool, those who leave the Army after 8 years and prior to their retirement eligibility at 20 years. For example, a highly trained technician who leaves after 10 years is lost forever the day he leaves the active component or the Selected

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Table 1. A Comparison of Active and Reserve Manpower by Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Active Manpower (thousands)</th>
<th>Reserve Manpower (thousands)</th>
<th>Reserves as percent of the total force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Army Active and Reserve Force Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Active Force</th>
<th>Reserve Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>USAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver Battalions</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Battalions</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer, Signal, Intelligence Battalions</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter Battalions</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Squadrons</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Battalions</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Battalions and Squadrons</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Companies</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Navy Active and Reserve Force Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Active Force</th>
<th>Reserve Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Aircraft</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Supply Ships</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Countermeasure Ships</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tillson

Ensure that plans include the mobilization of sufficient additional resources to ensure that mobilizing units, including the commander and staff, can focus on their duties and training for their new tasks rather than on managing mobilization and training activities.

Confirm that equipment, ammunition, and facilities are sufficient to provide aggressive training to all units following Reserve. Should the Army take steps to retain these people in IRR following their separation—adding a provision in reenlistment contracts to extend MSO or providing a departure bonus to stay in IRR, for example—it could greatly expand this trained pool.

The other source of pretrained individual manpower is the Retired Reserve. There is a long tradition, as well as provisions in Title 10, that military members who retire before 30 years of service can be recalled to active duty. That is why their compensation is called retainer pay. The Army had plans to recall retirees during the Cold War and even issued recall orders.

**Enhance the Overall Mobilization Process**

Both USAR and ARNG are working to implement the new train-alert-deploy paradigm, and little specific information is available. While the idea is attractive, the need to mobilize will not disappear so long as USAR and ARNG units are comprised of part-time soldiers. The real issue is change in the emphasis, and presumably the financing, provided each aspect of the traditional paradigm of train-alert-mobilize-deploy. In reality, the only difference between the Reserve and active paradigms is the need to mobilize and the emphasis given each step in the process. With few exceptions, active units require some training prior to deployment. Moreover, given the limited strategic lift available to move both active and Reserve forces, the Army can usually expect to have time between alert and deployment to train both active and Reserve units. In addition, while active units need not mobilize, they must prepare for overseas movement, and this process—obtaining equipment and updating medical records—also has aspects of mobilization. The key to the new approach is how well manned, trained, and equipped Reserve units can be prior to alert and how effectively they can mobilize. The preceding sections discussed concepts for improving unit manpower and training readiness. Ideas for improving the way Reserve units and individuals transition from a peacetime status in the United States to a wartime status overseas include:

- Identify or create volunteer units, as in the old Standard Bearer program, comprised of individuals who volunteer in advance to be mobilized on short notice. Provide special benefits to volunteer units.
- Ensure that plans include the mobilization of sufficient additional resources to ensure that mobilizing units, including the commander and staff, can focus on their duties and training for their new tasks rather than on managing mobilization and training activities.
- Confirm that equipment, ammunition, and facilities are sufficient to provide aggressive training to all units following Reserve.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Air Force Active and Reserve Force Structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Force</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighter Wing Equivalent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tankers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C–17</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C–5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing Total</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5. Marine Corps Active and Reserve Force Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Force</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing Aircraft</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing Aircraft</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maneuver Battalions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery Battalions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Service Support Battalions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engineer, Signal, Intelligence, SAM Battalions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marine vehicles crossing ribbon bridge operated by Army Reserve unit in Iraq.
mobilization and to continue unit training after the unit has loaded its equipment on the boat and is waiting for airlift to deploy the soldiers.

- Ensure that units arriving earlier have the resources to continue training in the overseas theater while they wait for the rest of the units.
- Use a database that includes all soldiers—active and Reserve, IRR, and retirees—and facilitates efforts to track individuals during mobilization.

**Create a Virtual Chain of Command**

The Army National Guard decisions to create a joint National Guard Bureau and joint state headquarters and JCCSE linking NORTHCOM, PACOM, OSD, the Joint Staff, and other Federal and state agencies involved in HS/HD/MACA have the potential to enhance the Defense Department contribution far beyond what ARNG itself can contribute. Given that these missions are inherently local, the establishment of a joint headquarters in each state and of JCCSE could unify command and control throughout DOD. Today there is no way for the many stovepipe organizations—the 10 service active and Reserve components and the 16 defense agencies—to coordinate HS/HD/MACA. Current management systems do not provide a mechanism for local entities to coordinate among stovepipes. Even with adjacent locations, entities belonging to different services or components have no formal way to coordinate planning and funding, or in the event of an attack to coordinate responses. Although local leaders have undoubtedly created informal plans, they are no substitute for formal planning and execution.

The move to create joint state headquarters provides ARNG an opportunity to pull together the HS/HD/MACA activities of all DOD services and agencies statewide. It would keep track of all DOD entities, active and Reserve, including both deployable units and the extensive support structure that includes about 30 percent of the department’s military personnel and virtually all its civilians. The joint headquarters would involve all those assets in planning and execution. It could also coordinate DOD efforts with state and local undertakings. In a civil support mission calling for engineers, for example, the joint headquarters could coordinate the efforts of Army active and Reserve component engineers, Navy Seabees, Air Force Redhorse and Prime Beef units, Marine Corps engineers, and the engineer assets of the services and defense agencies within the state that are not organized into traditional units. Absent this role of the joint headquarters, there is no subordinate to the Secretary of Defense with the authority to provide this coordination function.

Since major HS/HD/MACA missions will likely involve multiple states, a regional headquarters should coordinate regional planning and execution. One option would be the existing regional readiness command (RRC)

![National Guardsmen patrolling Baghdad.](image-url)
of the Army Reserve. In addition to their normal duties of preparing USAR units for deployment, these headquarters could be responsible for coordinating regional planning and execution of HS/HD/MACA missions. They could work with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regional headquarters. Should coordination among RRCs be needed, the headquarters of First and Fifth Armies, east and west of the Mississippi, could be included in this virtual chain of command.

This organization might report directly to NORTHCOM or through the joint National Guard Bureau working as a standing joint task force for HS/HD/MACA missions. In either case, this would provide a nationwide organization to pull together all DOD assets for planning and execution based on existing command and control structures with no combat mission outside the United States. Regardless of the structure chosen, the JCCSE developed by ARNG could provide the command and control backbone. The DOD virtual chain of command could link to the Department of Homeland Security and the states.

Modernize Policies and Practices

There are other areas where the Army could take advantage of ongoing initiatives or change policies and practices to enhance Reserve ability to meet the needs of the Army and Nation:

- All of DOD is in the process of implementing the defense integrated military human resources system (DIMHRS). This new personnel management system will put all soldiers on the same procedure and facilitate their transition from component to component. The Army should ensure that it establishes policies that will allow soldiers to move easily from active to Reserve status and from USAR to ARNG and vice versa. This will enhance the ability of individuals to satisfy career needs and of the Army to place the right soldier in the right job. DIMHRS will also facilitate Army efforts to track unit manning and turbulence/turnover, allowing the service to better maintain stable units and schedule rotational readiness.

- To ensure that Reserve units are ready to deploy and are treated fairly, train active and Reserve forces to the same standard and require performance to standard. Make active commanders accountable for Reserve readiness. Train Reserve units in fewer tasks to recognize limited training time. Link units and tasks to specific contingency plans and use the new defense readiness reporting system to report readiness for them.

- Expand opportunities for members of one component to serve in the other to enhance Reserve readiness and mutual understanding. Make active component duty with Reserve units career-enhancing by making it equivalent to command time (for example, active Marine instructors and inspectors assigned to Reserve units are selected by central command selection boards and receive command credit).

- Develop educational programs that promote integration and mutual understanding of the history and background of each component. Start at West Point and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps. A symbolic move would be allowing Army players to wear ARNG division patches on their football uniforms.

- Conduct more integrated active and Reserve component training at Army combat training centers. Emphasize command and staff training in peacetime for ARNG brigades.

- Increase the number of full-time (either active or Reserve) commanders and staff officers in Reserve units, especially those deploying early.

- Adopt the Air Force practice of assigning missions to ARNG or USAR headquarters, allowing the component headquarters to identify the resources needed to perform Reserve missions to standard and additional resources to tackle more demanding missions.

The world has changed dramatically since the Cold War. No one envisioned the demand that would be placed on USAR and ARNG forces, and no one can predict what will happen ten or more years from now. But the near-term future is clear. Requirements in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq can be expected to remain high. USAR and ARNG units will continue to deploy overseas to meet those and other demands. The toll on soldiers and their families and employers will continue. The challenge to military and civilian leaders on all levels is to make the decisions and establish the policies, practices, and procedures that will allow these dedicated Americans to do their duty at least cost.

NOTES

1 The ARNG inactive National Guard program is not designed to provide individual augmentees to meet Army or joint needs.

2 IRR are unpaid members of the Ready Reserve. Army Personnel Command, under control of the Chief of Staff and Secretary, manages IRR, not USAR or ARNG.

3 Title 10, chapter 39, section 688 and chapter 575, section 6485, allows any retiree to be recalled regardless of age.

4 The only likely exception is at the beginning when the system is not yet full of deploying units.
After the United States was attacked on 9/11, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Reservists did not wait for President George Bush’s mobilization proclamation of September 14, 2001 to spring into action. Within minutes, Coast Guard Reservists reported to their active duty units in the tri-state New York City metropolitan area to support relief and emergency rescue operations at the site of the World Trade Center. Within days, more than 1,100 bolstered the ranks of active duty personnel engaged in security operations at ports and along waterways around the United States.

Each of the seven Reserve components responded similarly on 9/11 and during the following months, often without waiting to be ordered. “Before the fireball disappeared from above the Pentagon, Air National Guardsmen
and Air Force, Navy, and Marine Reservists were patrolling the skies over Washington, D.C., New York, and several other American cities,” said Thomas Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. “They volunteered and responded to the Nation’s needs without hesitation and with a deep sense of purpose.”¹

At the peak of their mobilization in response to the President’s declaration of a national emergency, nearly 38,000 sea service Reservists were on active duty by spring 2003: 4,442 Coast Guard, 21,316 Marine Corps, and 12,045 Navy. For the Coast Guard and Marine Corps, this mobilization represented more than half of their selected Reservists (SELRES).

Just as the war on terrorism represents a watershed in national security affairs, it has also obliged the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services to reassess their Reserve organizations, including their resources and how they mobilize and demobilize. In July 2003, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directed the Secretaries of the four military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to rebalance active and Reserve capabilities. He indicated that the relationship is not optimal for future needs and that three initiatives are needed:

- structuring active and Reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve
- establishing a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements
- making mobilization and demobilization more efficient.

The Navy and Marine Corps were well under way in reviewing their Reserve components before Rumsfeld’s tasking. The Coast Guard, a multimission and military service assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, also launched a strategic assessment of its Reserve component in 2003 to address post-9/11 mobilization needs.

**the Coast Guard Reserve is best described as a force provider for its parent service**

1990s, individual Reserve training units were eliminated and selected Reservists were integrated into active operational units. This provision for force augmentation allows the service to use trained Reservists for day-to-day operations and surge units for emergent missions such as disaster relief following a flood, environmental cleanup of an oil spill, or DOD contingency operation overseas—while continuing to perform traditional missions.

Contrasting the Coast Guard Reserve with the other services’ Reserve components, Vice Admiral Thomas Barrett, Vice Commandant, said, “Our Reservists come in different packages; one size doesn’t fit all.”²

Of its 8,000 selected Reservists, the Coast Guard mobilized more than 5,400 following the 9/11 attacks, the most since World War II. Given its lead role for maritime homeland security, it assigned the majority to the United States to support units safeguarding military loadouts in ports and participate in Liberty Shield. The surge mode during the past two years saw Reservists mobilized primarily as individuals assigned to active fleet units; the six port security units (PSUs) are a principal exception.

Each PSU numbers 135 selected Reservists and 5 active duty members. While mainly intended for harbor defense and port security overseas, the units can be employed for homeland security missions. PSUs should be prepared to deploy within 96 hours.

Some 550 selected Reservists deployed overseas during expeditionary operations in support of the Coast Guard’s Title 10 responsibilities as part of the war on terrorism during Iraqi Freedom. Most served in the four PSUs deployed to the U.S. European and Central Command areas of responsibility in the Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf. “[Reservists] have been tremendously effective in helping us meet the surge requirement,” said Admiral Thomas Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard.³ Vice Admiral Timothy Keating, then commander U.S. Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command, also
Rear Admiral James Van Sice, Director of Reserve and Training at Coast Guard Headquarters, led efforts in 2004 to capture the lessons learned from post 9/11 recalls to develop a better trained and more ready Reserve force. Key to this work is a Reserve Strategic Assessment that identified 84 readiness gaps and actions to correct them. The first phase was completed in early 2004. “The goal is simple—to have the right people with the right skills in the right places to meet the spectrum of contingencies we face,” Van Sice said.

The Coast Guard is also assessing its manpower requirements, including those that dictate the missions and size of the Reserve. A flag-level working group charted by the Commandant will recommend the missions most suitable for the Reserve and its overall size. The goal is to ensure that the Reserve has the mix of competencies and force structure to continue to support praised Coast Guard Reserve–augmented units during Iraqi Freedom, telling the U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2003, “They are employed around the clock” providing port security and interdicting oil smuggled out of Iraq.

Reserve augmentation also enabled the Coast Guard to add new capabilities to its force structure. The first four maritime safety and security teams were commissioned in 2002 and more are planned. These fast-response teams, modeled after PSUs, will improve security in ports, waterways, and coastal areas. Similarly, virtually all Coast Guard sea marshals are Reservists, trained law enforcement personnel who board high-interest merchant vessels in militarily or economically strategic ports to prevent acts of terrorism.

The Reserve component began incremental growth during FY03 and is expected to stabilize at 8,100. “A robust and well trained Reserve force . . . is an integral part of the Coast Guard’s plan to provide critical infrastructure protection, coastal and port security, and defense readiness,” Admiral Collins told Congress in March 2003. “Funding is essential to properly maintain readiness, alignment with DOD counterparts, and to provide critical capabilities to DOD combatant commanders.”

Faced with an increased operating tempo and limited resources, growing and aligning this workforce to the level required to support operational commitments in all mission areas remains the biggest challenge.

The Reserve’s top goals are aligned with the Commandant’s direction in the areas of readiness, people, and stewardship—including maximizing the mobilization capability of the Reserve workforce, growing and training a capable force to support operational missions, and delivering measurable results that support the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security.
Coast Guard missions while being ready for emergency mobilization.

**A Force Multiplier**

The mission of the U.S. Naval Reserve Force is to provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy-Marine Corps team throughout the range of operations from peace to war. Numbering some 690,000 in 2003, the force consists of the Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve. As with the Coast Guard and Marine Corps, SELRES is the Navy's primary source of immediate mobilization manpower and represents Reservists who are paid as weekend drillers or serve in full-time support on active duty status in the training and administration of the Naval Reserve Force program.

In addition to numerous subordinate commands, Naval Reserve Force ships serve under the operational control of the two Navy fleet commanders for the Atlantic and Pacific. Naval Air Force Reserve squadrons are equipped with some of the most modern aircraft and technology.

During congressional testimony on Guard and Reserve issues in May 2003, Vice Admiral John Totushek, Chief of Naval Reserve, described a “remarkably challenging and successful” year. Recruiting and retention were generally up. Today, integration of Reserve personnel on all levels of the Navy training organization continues.

All Navy mission capability for fleet support airlift, naval coastal warfare, inshore undersea warfare, naval embarked advisory teams, and naval control of shipping comes from the Reserve. Originally designed to protect ships in foreign ports following the terrorist attack on the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in October 2000, naval coastal warfare groups, for example, have been deployed continuously around the world since 9/11 to secure ports for follow-on forces and support sea-basing operations. “After 11 September we realized the force multiplier that [CNO] and the [Marine Corps] Commandant have available with their Reserve components,” said Hansford Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Navy.

Naval Reserve personnel and units have distinguished themselves in numerous ways during the war on terrorism. Strike-Fighter Squadron 201, a tactical squadron based at Naval Air Station Fort Worth, was recalled to active duty for 10 months in 2002, including a 5-month combat deployment on the nuclear-powered USS Theodore Roosevelt—the first Navy tactical Reserve squadron deployed aboard an aircraft carrier since Korea.
The squadron flew 324 combat sorties during Iraqi Freedom as a fully integrated unit of 8th Carrier Air Wing. Composed of experienced aviators and support personnel, it ultimately led the air wing in target acquisition, destruction of targets, sortie completion, and grades for carrier landings. Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons 4 and 5 performed similar yeoman’s service, providing all Navy combat search and rescue during Iraqi Freedom as well as supporting Special Operations Forces. Allocating all of a mission capability to the Reserve force does pose important considerations regarding the active/Reserve mix during prolonged mobilization.

The scope and duration of the Naval Reserve mobilization has also presented challenges similar to those encountered by Reserve counterparts in all services. “Times of crisis are always stressful for the active or Reserve servicemember and their family,” said a spokesman for the Naval Reserve Force. “For the Reservist, however, being recalled to active duty involves a significant change in their employment and, in many cases, their pay, lifestyle, family health care, and geographical location.”

Because a recall is generally unplanned, Reservists suffer when their military pay is less than their civilian wage. They may risk losing their civilian jobs or quality medical care for themselves and their dependents.

In 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, ordered a comprehensive active/Reserve force mix study, which specifically addressed potential shortfalls and high-demand/low-density unit requirements. The initial area of change involved antiterrorism and force protection personnel. Additionally, newly established active component security force assets are being created to provide the fleet with a unit and point defense previously filled by Reserve naval coastal warfare forces.

Clark and Barnum also commissioned a study in 2002 to determine methods of transformation for the Naval Reserve to be integrated with the active force in a way that supports Clark’s Sea Power 21 vision for Navy transformation.

In his CNO Guidance for 2004, Clark directed the Chief of Naval Reserve and Commander, Fleet Forces Command to report the potential improvements to achieve two-way integration of the Navy’s active and Reserve components, streamline Naval Reserve headquarters, and increase Reserve access to active platforms and equipment. As Clark told the Naval Reserve Association at its 50th anniversary conference in 2004, “The active and
the Reserve elements are going to be partners like never before.”

Vice Admiral John Cotton, Chief of Naval Reserve, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2004 that the Naval Reserve was “changing our culture and the shape of the force, moving away from an obsolete Cold War construct to one that provides tailorable, flexible capability in support of 21st century warfighting.”

To achieve this goal, the Navy began in 2004 to integrate its Reserves into the new Fleet Response Plan through both unit level and individual augmentation for day-to-day operational support while maintaining the ability to mobilize Reservists and equipment to support expanded surge operations. In an effort to align missions by capabilities, Commander, Naval Reserve Force in Washington, and Commander, Naval Reserve Forces Command in New Orleans, were assigned “additional duty” to Commander, Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk.

“For the first time ever,” Cotton said, “one fleet commander acting for all other Navy commanders is conducting a zero-based review, where every Reserve unit and billet is being reviewed for capability relevance and alignment with fleet requirements and then forwarded to CNO for inclusion in future budget deliberations and requests.”

Looking to the future, Cotton maintains that improving accessibility and integration will be the Naval Reserve’s cornerstones for its contribution to readiness. “Collocating our Reserve personnel and hardware with their supported fleet units streamlines the activation process, enabling individuals to train alongside, and be more familiar with, the units they will augment.”

Train, Mobilize, and Deploy

The mission of Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) is to augment and reinforce active Marine forces in time of war, national emergency, or contingency operations; provide personnel and operational tempo relief for the active forces in peacetime; and offer service to the community. It is the headquarters command for all 100,000 Reservists and nearly 300 units at nearly 200 sites nationwide. The largest command in the Corps, it has four major subordinate commands: 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and Marine Corps Reserve Support Command.

The Reserve has been closely integrated with the active component under a Total Force concept in recent years. Reservists provide individuals and specific units to augment and reinforce active capabilities. At the peak of mobilization during 2002 to 2003, 21,300 were on active duty in support of Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom; 75 percent of SELRES marines activated participated in combat operations in Iraq. More than 7,000 Reservists were activated to support Iraqi Freedom II early in 2004.

Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps did not transfer capabilities—combat support units, for example—horizontally from its active to Reserve component during the Cold War. This policy is consistent with the Marine Corps’ dependence on the readiness of its total force of active and Reserve marines. “Our posture as forward deployed forces in readiness does not allow us to have combat support or combat service support functions primarily in the Reserve structure,” said Lieutenant General Emil Bedard, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations.11 “We strive to ensure our Reserve forces are as well trained and as ready as our active forces.”

Reservists achieve high levels of readiness by integrating into ongoing exercises and training, including two combined-arms exercises per year conducted entirely by Reserve forces. This focus ensures that mobilization readiness for such contingencies as Iraqi Freedom is the top MFR priority at all times. “We were able to mobilize quickly and efficiently,” said Lieutenant General Dennis McCarthy, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve. “One reason for this is Marine Corps Reserve units do not plan for or require post-mobilization training. Our plan has always been to train first so we are ready to mobilize and rapidly deploy.”
True to their tradition of being “first to fight,” the Marines—active and Reserve—are trained for combat in the most likely battlefields of the 21st century. Reserve marines of Company 1, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, for example, journeyed to Fort Campbell with their battalion to improve their urban combat skills during two weeks of annual training.

The Marine Corps Reserve achieved its recruiting goals in 2002 and 2003 despite the challenge of high retention in the active component—a prime prior-service source for accessions. The long-term impact of sustained or repeated mobilizations on recruiting and retention is still undetermined, but it will be assessed as large numbers of Reservists are demobilized. Increased funding in the Reserve procurement and operations/maintenance accounts during FY02 contributed to a “good” general state of readiness, McCarthy told Congress in May 2003. Like the Naval Reserve Force, however, MFR aviation and ground equipment continues to age faster than replacement rates, reflecting a policy decision by the Marine Corps to fund current readiness accounts for both its active and Reserve components at a higher priority than recapitalization and transformation.

“Maintaining these aging legacy platforms requires increased financial and manpower investment with each passing year due to parts obsolescence and higher rates of equipment failure,” McCarthy said. “Aircraft maintenance requirements are increasing at an approximate rate of 8 percent per year. For example, for every hour the CH–46 [helicopter] is airborne, it requires 37 man-hours of maintenance.”

While MFR mobilization in 2002 and 2003 generally progressed smoothly (98 percent of SELRES marines called up for duty reported, and less than 1 percent requested a deferment, delay, or exemption), there were difficulties integrating and synchronizing SELRES augmentees into selected Marine Corps Reserve units. “We need a system to mobilize sailors together with their Marine units, and we need to ensure their individual training readiness is on par with the Marine unit they will join for future operations,” maintained McCarthy. For the near term, his top priorities are to ensure that all MFR marines and sailors are deactivated as soon as their missions are accomplished and to support them and their families during the transition back to civilian life.

McCarthy seeks to prepare Marine Forces Reserve for future action, which “will require strong recruiting, retention, and training programs, and providing the modern equipment needed for the next battles in the global war on terrorism.”

Lessons learned during Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are being reviewed and applied. According to McCarthy, “The biggest lesson so far is that most of what we were doing before 9/11 was right on target—we were able to mobilize quickly and efficiently. Overall, Marine Forces Reserve
successfully augmented and reinforced the active component of our Corps.”

New capabilities will be added to Marine Forces Reserve, including an intelligence support battalion, two security battalions, and an augmentation command element for 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. Efforts are also being directed to ensure that MFR units have compatible equipment to remain interoperable with active units, which is especially important in digital communications. MFR is also fine-tuning the process for individual augmentation to ensure that marines mobilized individually are fully qualified and certified for their duties, especially in the joint arena.

During a February 2003 visit with marines in Qatar, General Michael Hagee, Commandant, said, “I understand from the numbers that two-thirds of you here are Reservists. I know you simply as marines—and looking at performance I can’t tell the difference.” As part of Hagee’s top priorities during 2004, the Marine Corps continues to strengthen total-force transformation, including continued improvement of the active/Reserve mix.

The road ahead for Marine Forces Reserve will build on a tradition of training, mobilizing, and deploying personnel and units to augment and reinforce the active force.

**The One Force**

According to Thomas Hall, the total force concept for the Guard and Reserve is “alive and well,” but the issue confronting DOD in the post-9/11 era is the policy for “the one force.” The current Reserve mobilization process, tied to the Cold War and a “time-phased deployment plan for the Fulda Gap,” is not responsive or timely. “We mobilize just in case, not just in time.”

Hall’s concerns over mobilization were reflected in an August 2003 report by the General Accounting Office on Reserve call-up following 9/11. The study found that the process was inefficient and existing operation plans failed to accurately identify mobilization requirements. These concerns, coupled with the mix of capabilities required in the active force, underline the current DOD initiative to rebalance the Guard and Reserve before increasing active component end strength.

The challenge facing DOD is that today’s active/Reserve mix was crafted in the post-Vietnam period when conscious decisions were made to place critical support capabilities in the Reserve components—when it was vowed that the United States would never go to war again without Reserve mobilization. “They are on the front lines all too regularly now, with debilitating effects on recruiting and retention,” Major General Thomas Wilkerson, former Commander, MFR, told the U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2003. “They are ridden hard and put to bed wet on many occasions.”

The post-9/11 era also introduced a new national security strategy calling for the preemption of terrorist threats against the United States. Noted Admiral Barrett, “This is a fundamental paradigm shift” that will affect the size and mix of Reserve capabilities for commanders.

The Reserve components of the sea services are confronting these issues head on as they assess the events of the past three years. The winds of change are blowing hardest in the direction of the Naval Reserve as Navy leadership implements fundamental adjustments to its size, organization, resources, end strength, and alignment with the active force.

The Coast Guard Reserve and Marine Forces Reserve will also adjust their policies and programs in light of ongoing studies, service-unique experiences in support of the war on terrorism, and the impact of extended mobilization on the ranks of their Reservists—all with an eye on military effectiveness and affordability.

Sea-service Reservists have made significant contributions to the fight against terrorism at home and overseas in keeping with the rich traditions of citizen soldiers. The challenge facing the services is to refine a mobilization process, active/Reserve capability mix, and alignment in a way best suited to 21st century realities. This adjustment from the Cold War structure must be made in a way that sustains a unique repository of experienced, dedicated Reserve professionals without placing a disproportionate burden on their shoulders.

**NOTES**

9 Jack Hanzlik, e-mail to author, September 5, 2003.
13 Ibid.
Airpower and the Reserve Components

By PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

Technically, the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve (AFR) were born soon after the Air Force itself with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. In truth, the roots of both Air Reserve components (ARCs) go back nearly to the Wright Brothers. Both organizations have matured over time. Today, ANG consists of 106,600 personnel with 1,350 aircraft while AFR has 75,600 personnel and 400 aircraft. All ARC units and personnel must meet active component standards. This simple but immutable requirement means both the Guard and Reserve are combat-ready and available to deploy worldwide within 72 hours. It is no coincidence that Guard and Reserve crews have so often flown away with top honors at annual Gunsmoke, William Tell, and Bomb and Navigation competitions. Despite past achievements and the essential place of ARCs in today’s military, there are major challenges ahead.

Regulars and Reservists

Air Guard and Reserve personnel served in the Army Air Service during World War I, but it was World War II that provided their first major test. It was obvious that the United States had too few Regulars to carry the load, so

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The war was fought largely by volunteers and draftees—citizen soldiers, sailors, and airmen. When the war ended and the United States demobilized, there was a scramble for funds between the services. For its part, the Air Force preferred to invest in Regulars. The Air Guard and Reserve were pushed aside, saddled with outdated equipment, and not taken seriously: common derogatory terms were “flyable storage” and “military aero clubs.” When the Korean War broke out and ARC units were activated, they performed poorly, living down to the reputation pinned on them.

In the wake of that conflict things improved for ARCs, but when the next major test came in Vietnam, those gains were thwarted when the President decided to fight the war with draftees and Regulars. Except for token call-ups, ARCs were not activated, which had a doubly bad effect. Not only were the two Air Reserve forces not used despite the money and time invested in training for just such a contingency; but they acquired a reputation as draft havens for escaping combat service. Respect for these units by the Regulars sank to new lows.

Fortunately, the problem was recognized and solutions were implemented after the war. First, the end of the draft in 1973 meant that in all future conflicts the ARCs would be the major source of reinforcements. Second, new equipment flooded into ARCs. The post-Vietnam drawdown sent hundreds of relatively new yet combat-proven aircraft from the Regular component into the Guard and Reserve. During this period AFR gained its first fighters—F–105s as well as AC–130 gunships, rescue helicopters, and KC–135s. ANG, which had long flown various fighter models, now acquired newer F–4s, A–7s, A–10s, and C–130Es. At the same time, and more importantly, the Air Force hierarchy, prodded by Congress, worked in concert with ARC leaders to instill a long overdue cultural change.

Although the Total Force concept—the belief that the Regular, Guard, and Reserve components were symbiotic and essential partners in achieving the Air Force mission—was articulated as early as 1968, it gained traction only slowly. There were encouraging signs to be sure: the first associate program was established in 1968 with AFR. In this scheme, a wing of aircraft was owned by the Regular component, but they were flown and maintained by separate Regular and Reserve squadrons. The program expanded dramatically and by the end of the Vietnam War included 4 C–5 squadrons and 13 C–141 units. The Total Force concept was becoming a policy.

The military buildup during the 1980s also benefitted ARCs, so both components were in excellent shape when Saddam Hussein moved into Kuwait in August 1990. During the Desert Shield buildup and the Desert Storm combat that followed, ANG and AFR were mobilized and played crucial roles. Over 12,000 Guardsmen entered Federal service, half deployed to Southwest Asia. The Reserve contributed a further 20,000, nearly 8,000 of whom were medical specialists. Virtually every aspect of air combat was reliant on ARCs, including fighters, bombers,
tankers, airlift, reconnaissance, maintenance, medicine, aerial port, and intelligence. Victory in Desert Storm would have been impossible without the Guard and Reserve, and air commander General Charles Horner paid the ultimate compliment when he stated flatly that he could tell no difference between a Regular, Reservist, or Guardsman.

The Air Force drew down dramatically after Desert Storm, cutting both force structure and personnel. Units were deactivated, causing local turmoil. When a Regular unit is deactivated, the personnel and equipment simply pack up and move on or are assigned to another unit. But the Guard and Reserve are locally recruited and have strong local ties; when a unit is deactivated or its aircraft retired, there are often few options for the thousands of people involved. There was, however, a small silver lining to this cloud. As after Vietnam, when Regular units deactivated, their front-line F–15s, F–16s, C–5s, and B–1s were handed down to the ARCs to replace older models. The decade following Desert Storm saw the ARCs become leaner but also more diversified and effective. AFR activated its first space operations squadron in 1993, with ANG following in 1995. Associate units in fighters, bombers, tankers, and airlifters continued to emerge, and in 2001 ANG adapted a similar structure when it teamed with Regulars to form a blended joint surveillance and target attack radar system wing at Robins Air Force Base.

The ARCs responded to the 9/11 attacks by rejuvenating an air defense system that had been allowed to atrophy. Once there were over 2,600 aircraft dedicated to air defense of the United States, but they dwindled to a few dozen by the late 1990s. After 9/11, the ARCs flew most interceptor and patrol missions over the United States.

**Reservists bristle at the insinuation that they are “personnel based” rather than “unit based”**

First Air Force, previously commanded by Regulars, received an ANG commander in 1997 and now has primary responsibility for the air defense of the country. At the same time, Guard and Reserve special units such as airborne warning and control system and EC–130 elements began operating at a heavier tempo. When combat began in Afghanistan and then Iraq, the ARCs played a key role. The contribution of both the Air Guard and Reserve in Noble Eagle over the United States, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Iraqi Freedom was thus substantial, as was the total effort shouldered by the ARCs, specifically the percentages of aircrew by component.

**The Air Expeditionary Force**

ANG and AFR accomplish certain missions and contribute a range of crucial capabilities at low cost. Yet the ARCs have garnered on average only 10 percent of the Air Force budget over the past decade. Although this cost-effectiveness is typically gained at the expense of long-term commitment in a deployed status, such statistics make it clear why the Total Force policy has been such a resounding success.

However, challenges face the ARCs. The first, which confronts the entire Air Force, is operations tempo. The end of the Cold War meant profound changes for the Armed Forces. It is often noted that the military has evolved from a stable, predictable, near-garrison force to a volatile, unpredictable, expeditionary force. Its commitments have grown fourfold since the Cold War, while the Air Force has shrunk by 40 percent, making for a greatly increased operations tempo throughout the Total Force.

One response to this increase has been a new organizational structure, the air expeditionary force (AEF). Essentially, 10 AEFs were established, each eligible to deploy for contingencies worldwide during a 90-day window. At the end of its alert cycle, an AEF is replaced by another, returns home, and reverts to normal operations, training, and exercise status for the next year. It would thus ordinarily deploy for 90 days every 15 months. This schedule allows predictability not previously possible while spreading deployments throughout the Air Force. It also enhances flexibility by deploying units for a variety of contingencies in a variety of locations.

A strength of AEF is that it reinforces the Air Force commitment to the Total Force. Previously, Guard and Reserve units were often used as fillers to replace Regular units that deployed overseas. This was particularly true in AFR, although Reservists bristle at the insinuation that they are “personnel based” rather than “unit based.” AFR units deploy to support U.S. contingencies—as do Reservists. Nonetheless, AEF presents special challenges to the ARCs. Overall, 7,000 Guardsmen and 2,000 Reservists were mobilized for Iraqi Freedom, while at the same time Noble Eagle continues; and these two organizations handle more than 75 percent of the flying missions for Noble Eagle. This commitment is expected to continue.

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**Table 1. Average Age of USAF Aircraft by Component**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft type</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>ANG</th>
<th>AFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A–10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F–15</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F–16</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C–130</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C–141</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C–5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC–135</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lower operations tempo of the Cold War, long seen as ideal for the Guard and Reserve, has become problematic due to frequent and sustained deployments. Instead of being held in reserve for a major war, ANG and AFR have become part of the spear tip in a series of contingencies. In Iraqi Freedom, the ARCs constituted the bulk of the airlift and tanker fleets, while also contributing significantly in virtually all other areas. This level of effort can cause difficulties with employers, especially if the return time for deployments is not guaranteed.

Operations tempo would seem to be a particularly sensitive issue to Guardsmen and Reservists; after all, most were once Regulars but supposedly switched to ARC to avoid the toll the high deployment pace was taking on their families. According to that argument, the Total Force policy has been a double-edge sword: the ARCs welcome the heightened respect and attention but has inherited an increased operations tempo that may create morale problems.

Officials from both components reject this argument. Instead they welcome the opportunity to be a part of the Total Force in fact as well as in name, sharing in virtually all the missions and weapons systems of the Regular component. They have no desire to return to the sedentary garrison lifestyle of the Cold War or be seen as a “Federal jobs program.” According to these officials, the rank and file feel similarly; they wish to be an integral part of the global Air Force mission. Statistics bear this out. Both ANG and AFR attempt to meet requirements through a voluntary system, “ask rather than task.” That has been possible 95 percent of the time. Even during the pressure of the past 2 years with near-simultaneous contingencies, volunteers were still plentiful enough to handle 75 percent of taskings. In addition, an innovative process of “rainbowing”—combining personnel or equipment from several organizations to meet a deployment requirement—has proven effective. Perhaps of greater significance, ARC recruitment and retention goals have not been a serious problem over the past decade. AFR, for example, has met 96 percent of its recruiting goals, and its retention rate for both officers and enlisted personnel has averaged 90 percent during that period. ANG has done even better. Conventional wisdom would say that the surge in operations tempo since 9/11 would have caused thousands of Guardsmen and Reservists to vote with their feet. Thus far that has not happened, although officials from both components caution that stop-loss actions may have distorted the data over the past two years. Nonetheless, they remain guardedly optimistic that recruitment and retention goals will continue to be met.
Guard currently operates six squadrons, and three are flown by the Reserve. What will happen to the highly trained personnel of these nine fighter squadrons when their planes head for the bone yard? Ideally, such units will transition into new aircraft—although, as noted, such possibilities are limited. Another solution is to form additional associate and blended units at Regular component air bases near ARC locations scheduled for retirement, or to merge with units across state lines to provide a regional capability. If transitioning into new or different aircraft proves impossible, perhaps flying units can be converted into space operations, intelligence, or maintenance units. Other options include an increased ARC presence in training and education programs. Most flying training units on the major command level have an ARC input, and Reservists are now beginning to assume

**Staying Equipped**

A more worrisome issue is modernization as aircraft age and become more costly to maintain. At the same time, the Air Force is committed to transformation—fielding revolutionary weapons to meet new demands. The F/A–22, F–35, Global Hawk, and uninhabited combat air vehicles are the future, but they are expensive. It will be difficult to balance the needs of modernization—keeping the current inventory in combat condition while transforming into new technologies. For the ARCs, this pinch is acute.

On average ARC aircraft are older than their Regular counterparts. Modernization costs will fall more heavily on the ARCs simply because old aircraft are more expensive to maintain and will wear out first. Especially vexing, when ARC aircraft are retired there are few options for replacing them. Unlike the drawdowns in the wake of Vietnam and Desert Storm, when large numbers of aircraft flowed from the Regulars to the ARCs, there is no such movement contemplated in the future. Even when the F/A–22 and F–35 begin to come on line in the decade ahead, the aircraft they replace—F–15s and F–16s—will be nearing the end of their useful lives. There will be little incentive to put them in the ARCs.

More immediately, there are rumblings that the venerable A–10 is reaching the end of its service life. The Guard currently operates six squadrons, and three are flown by the Reserve. What will happen to the highly trained personnel of these nine fighter squadrons when their planes head for the bone yard? Ideally, such units will transition into new aircraft—although, as noted, such possibilities are limited. Another solution is to form additional associate and blended units at Regular component air bases near ARC locations scheduled for retirement, or to merge with units across state lines to provide a regional capability. If transitioning into new or different aircraft proves impossible, perhaps flying units can be converted into space operations, intelligence, or maintenance units. Other options include an increased ARC presence in training and education programs. Most flying training units on the major command level have an ARC input, and Reservists are now beginning to assume
were once Regulars, so they understand that life. The reverse is not always true. The average Regular is often mystified by Reserve organization and procedures. For example, the dual status of air “technicians,” who exist in both components, means they are military personnel subject to military discipline and procedures but are also civilian employees subject to Civil Service Administration regulation. Similarly, the various and not transparent guidelines regarding Reserve “man-days,” and the differing pay and entitlement packages based on the number of days of active duty, are a source of confusion. In addition, the question of volunteer versus nonvolunteer status can lead to misunderstanding. Under the law, the rights and entitlements of Guard and Reserve personnel are the same whether they have volunteered or been mobilized. Yet there are psychological issues involved with employers and families. Finally, minor administrative, fiscal, and managerial glitches have also arisen over the past two years. Most have been quickly rectified, but to an airman going off to war, any glitch is one too many.

The close working relationships developed within the ARCs over the past decade have been crucial in removing problems. That does not mean the Air Force can rest on its laurels. As each new generation comes aboard in both the Regular and Reserve components, it must continue the educational function. Airpower and spacepower increasingly depend on a seamless Total Force, so all airmen must understand the vital ARC role. It cannot be overstated that the mission of the Air Force depends utterly on the Guard and Reserve, and that will continue in the decades ahead.

There has always been tension between the Air Force components, which have differing goals, demands, and even loyalties based on the state and local focus of Guard and Reserve units. This does not mean they are condemned to misunderstandings, misconceptions, and animosity. A large majority of Guardsmen and Reservists have wider responsibilities in undergraduate pilot training units.

Regardless, this is a thorny issue with political overtones. The ARCs have formidable support in Congress, and modernization, transformation, and basing problems must be solved to the satisfaction of elected officials on all levels.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to the Reserve components and provides independent and timely advice and recommendations on the challenges they face. The Secretary has asked the board to support transformation, rebalance and strengthen the Reserve components, and assist the Reserve in reconnecting with America.

The board meets quarterly and reports annually to Congress. It consists of 24 members including the Chairman, the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each military department, and flag and general officers from active and Reserve forces and the Coast Guard. The regular officers are designated by their respective service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff names the military executive, and the Secretary of Defense designates the Reserve officers. Congress has repeatedly stated its

The Honorable Albert C. Zapanta is Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.
desire that the board act independently in its advisory and reporting roles—a position steadfastly maintained and more important than ever due to increased reliance on Reserve forces and mobilizations in support of the war on terrorism.

**Mobilization**

Total Force policies, the Abrams Doctrine, downsizing, and increasing peacetime missions and contingencies have led to greater reliance on Reserve forces. Some 319,000 of the 1.2 million Reserve component personnel (27 percent) were called to active duty from September 11, 2001, through the end of 2003. Reservists supported operations centers and flight operations and provided security at the Pentagon, Ground Zero, airports, seaports, and military installations nationwide. They fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq and tracked terrorists throughout Africa and Asia. They are maintaining the peace in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, and the Sinai and have participated in a wide range of domestic missions. There is no indication that reliance on the Reserve components will lessen in the foreseeable future.

How effectively the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have mobilized and pursued organizational and process improvements has been studied since 9/11. Reserve component forces were traditionally mobilized based on deliberate operational plans. The services used predictable operating cycles and advance notification to prepare for mobilizations. When existing operation plans were not sufficient, mobilizations were guided by a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination. The current threat environment, however, creates a need to move toward a capabilities-based approach.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided guidance to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) about developing a more agile, responsive process for mobilizing Reserve forces and individuals. The plan requires changes in service and joint doctrine, policy, and law. JFCOM assembled subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve

**the board has developed a long-term relationship with JFCOM to help with mobilization process reform and related issues**

Affairs (OASD/RA), the Joint Staff, command centers, the services, and the seven Reserve components to seek mobilization process reform. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the services, OASD/RA, and other OSD staff formed a working group to identify “quick win” opportunities to improve policy and process changes that could boost mobilization efficiency. The board participated in both efforts and has developed a long-term relationship with JFCOM to help with mobilization process reform and related issues. The board developed a white paper on mobilization reform, a summary of significant issues, recommendations, and actions toward mobilization reform in October 2003, which consisted of information from published reports, board visits to unified commanders, lessons learned, and conferences.

The mobilization process typically begins with identifying requirements, which are consolidated and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as requests for forces. The services review approved requirements and coordinate with force providers and Reserve component headquarters to verify individual and unit readiness. Finally, the services issue activation orders to units and individuals. This normally takes several weeks. Most Reservists complete the activation process within 24 to 96 hours, though some require lengthy post-activation/mobilization training that delays movement into theater. Medical, dental, family, or employer problems can appear any time, requiring a replacement and further delaying the process. Factors that impact efficiency include identifying valid mobilization requirements, negotiating the approval process, identifying and validating the appropriate fill, certifying individual readiness, notifying individuals in a timely manner, timely processing of mobilization (activation) orders, completing the activation process (which includes medical and dental certification, benefits/legal and mission-related briefings, security clearance certification or processing, uniform and personal protective equipment issuance, and establishing active duty pay accounts), and validating mission-specific training, equipment processing, etc.

**Judicious and Prudent Use**

To ease pressure on Reserve resources, commanders should request capabilities in detail without specifying which service will provide them. All services with forces available should be used without a bias toward the service that has traditionally met the request. Joint Reserve sourcing solutions should meet all requirements external to the services while supporting internal service requirements for providing additional activated forces.

Judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components to reach a high level of efficiency and effectiveness in the mobilization process will require changes in policy, law, and doctrine. The magnitude and duration of the war on terrorism make the Reserve role essential. The following precepts have been proposed by the Reserve Board before sourcing a required capability to a Reserve unit or individual:

- **Activate Reserve component forces**, when possible with the consent of the individuals being called to full-time duty.
- **Employ units and individuals in a manner that maximizes utilization of core capabilities throughout the validated requirement or the length of the original orders to active duty, whichever is shorter.**
- **Give early consideration to the feasibility of using alternate manpower sources** such as active duty forces, coalition forces, host nation support, civilian contractors, labor, or technological solutions.
- **Apply innovative management alternatives** such as retiree volunteers, civilian volunteers, and auxiliary members.
- **Provide predictability to Reservists, families, and employers when sourcing requirements.**
The Reserve Components Operating Environment

**Total Force Policy:** In 1973, as a result of declining defense budgets and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger enacted The Total Force Policy, which states that Active, Guard, and Reserve forces will share in world-wide missions, resource allocations, and force structure. All will be equipped and trained to the same standards. Today, the Total Force is comprised of the Active and Reserve components, Department of Defense civilians, and the civilian contractor workforce.

**Abrams Doctrine:** After the Vietnam War, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams vowed that the Army would never again go to war without engaging the support of the American public. He stressed the importance of the citizen soldier as the link between a viable national security policy and the will of the people. In his “roundout” concept, Abrams advocated a force structure that links the Reserve component with Active forces so that significant future deployments will have to involve Reserve forces, thereby ensuring and protecting the vital link to the American people.

**Transformation:** World events since the Cold War underscore the ever-changing face of America’s adversaries. The Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation in strategies, force structure, and capabilities designed to keep the Nation a step ahead of the threats emerging during the first 25 years of the 21st century. By its very nature, transformation will provide evolutionary, nontraditional approaches to winning the war on terror.

**History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board was established in 1952, just five years after the Department of Defense itself was set up in 1947. That same year President Harry Truman ordered the Secretary of Defense to strengthen all elements of the Reserve components. In response, James Forrestal appointed the Committee on Civilian Components to make a comprehensive, objective, and impartial study of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. The committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense create a standing committee to recommend policies and procedures affecting the Guard and Reserve. The Secretary of Defense adopted the committee’s recommendations, and on June 14, 1949, created a Civilian Components Policy Board.

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George G. Marshall changed the name of the organization to the Reserve Forces Policy Board to more accurately reflect the Board’s focus. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 then codified the Reserve Forces Policy Board in the Department of Defense.

Although the board had existed via regulations for a number of years, Congress envisioned a somewhat different purpose for it. As outlined in Title 10, U.S. Code, Congress chartered the board to act as the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on all National Guard and Reserve component matters. It further stipulated that this board would act independently to monitor, review, and evaluate proposals, actions, and situations impacting Guard and Reserve forces.

While there are more than 60 official boards within DOD, only three are recognized as senior boards: the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, and the RFPB. The others are civilian boards created by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is the only DOD board that was created by Title 10 and is also the only board that acts independently, both in the evaluation of proposals and development of policy recommendations and in the preparation of its annual report to the Congress and the President. The board’s charter as it was originally envisioned has enabled it to keep pace with the evolving role of the Reserve components over the years.

**The Secretary of Defense has charged this board to:**

- **Support transformation.** The board supports Reserve component efforts to keep pace with transformation in strategies, force structure, and capabilities. The board works to fulfill its role as policy advisor through an annual schedule of outreach to combatant commands, this year focusing on a variety of inputs associated with mobilization challenges. Another way the board is fulfilling this role is to look at creative ways in which the Reserve components might both be organized and utilized for post-conflict operations. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the difficulties associated with stability and reconstruction. We are exploring new ways to make available through the Reserve components the expertise and personnel required to accomplish this aspect of the mission.

- **Reconnect with America.** The board has initiated a series of Citizen-Patriot Forums to serve as an information-gathering tool to gain insight from American stakeholders on Guard and Reserve Issues that impact them. Forums are conducted in conjunction with board visits to major command locations and field units and usually involve 20–40 community, public, and private sector leaders. The forums have raised and validated several common issues this year. These include concerns with the duration of the mobilization, on behalf of local responders regarding their inclusion in the Federal planning process for civic emergencies, and a need for more information concerning available outlets for the spirit of volunteerism. A recurring theme also focused on the number of state militias that could be utilized to support the war on terror.

- **Strengthen the board’s outreach.** The board has an active website and has recently launched an electronic issues update. This e-mail from the Chairman is sent out periodically to board members and is also available on the website.
Care must be exercised when notifying Reservists of pending activation to ensure that irreversible employment or financial decisions are not made prior to the actual issuance of orders.

Board-supported recommendations to improve the mobilization process include:

- naming one organization as the source process owner for identifying requirements, generating requests for forces, and sourcing requirements based on capabilities
- developing a standard operating cycle concept to increase predictability
- reviewing and improving the existing joint billet validation process
- ensuring requests for forces are prioritized and filled as they are generated, replacing sequential decisionmaking with a parallel and collaborative process

To activate Reserve component members quickly and get them in theater will require innovative funding, care must be exercised to ensure that irreversible employment or financial decisions are not made prior to issuance of orders.

To activate Reserve component members quickly and get them in theater will require innovative funding, training, and alert processes. The collective training time at home or at the mobilization station must be reduced. Funding to improve sustained training and equipment readiness must be sufficient to reduce the time from activation to arrival in theater. Shrinking the deficit between mobilized mission readiness levels and peacetime standards, manning, and resourcing levels will enhance the responsiveness of these units while decreasing the overall activation period required to validate standards and perform the operational mission.

For all but the most urgent operational requirements, the goal must be to provide Reservists at least a 30-day notice of activation. Predictability can be maximized by notifying members that they are being considered. Once they are notified, they along with their families and employers should be prepared in every way to meet challenges of the activation period. Another tenet of predictability is transitioning to the alert period by issuing activation orders as soon as operationally feasible.

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streamlining the activation/mobilization process for members and equipment to remove duplicative processes and repetitive training

- increasing full-time support manning to back the mobilization process
- developing policies and guidance
- automating the procedure and developing capability for all process owners to see the status of individual or unit processing
- improving supplemental personnel equipment issue
- capturing readiness information on the resources within all units that are available to meet the tailored requirements of commanders to improve visibility to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, component commanders, and Reserve components have been diligently working to improve the mobilization process, rebalance the forces, and develop sustainability and predictability. Support and cooperation from DOD, Congress, and collaboration among the services, Joint Staff, Reserve components, combatant commanders, and defense agencies make the mobilization process more relevant, efficient, and effective. The board has supported and participated with agencies within and outside of DOD in developing the best policy, as well as proposed legislative change recommendations, to reform mobilization.

Specific Needs

Premobilization training. Each service has occupational specialist training identified by various names. The Reserve consists of both prior- and nonprior service personnel. Each service component is challenged in training them quickly to meet both deployability and unit readiness standards. While a unit may have willing members filling required positions, they may not be deployable because they are not qualified in their occupational specialties. Nonprior members recruited under a split enlistment option to accommodate civilian education schedules may have attended basic training but may still be awaiting a school seat for occupational specialty training. Prior servicemembers may have been recruited to a unit due to domicile proximity but may not have retrained in the appropriate occupational skill. When a unit is activated, cross leveling
may be needed to fill the vacancies. The board supports a change in DOD regulations and statutes to provide the capability for prior- and nonprior service members to retrain within 12 months from initial entry-level training, or on commissioning.

**Flexibility to support voluntarism.** Involuntary activations to support contingencies should be reduced, meaning there must be greater reliance on volunteers. Current policy, law, and regulations are unsupportive of members performing extended active duty in a volunteer status. Reservists count against active duty end strength and controlled grade limitations if they serve beyond 179 consecutive days on voluntary active duty orders or 270 consecutive days in support of a combatant command. This impact is mitigated through delegation of end strength waivers to the military departments at the close of the fiscal year. However, all services employ volunteer force management procedures based on the potential impact on end strength and controlled grades. Removing these restrictions will reduce the uncertainty of the waiver process and facilitate the use of volunteers in support of increased operational commitments. The board supports a change in policy and, if appropriate, for the long-term legislative change to Title 10 to allow the services greater flexibility in employing Reservists in a voluntary status in support of contingencies.

**Joint automated tracking system.** The current process of mobilizing Reserve members is fragmented with stovepiped and incomplete tracking systems that are not standardized or interoperable across the joint community and do not offer leaders and process users visibility of critical information to make timely and accurate decisions. The services, combatant commanders, and joint planners have indicated the need for a common system of tracking Reserve personnel in the mobilization process from individual notification through demobilization. The long-term focus should be on developing a common mobilization system, integrated and compatible with current and planned DOD and service readiness, personnel management, and operational planning systems. The services have systems in place or under development to improve personnel tracking; however, they are not integrated, nor do they contain consistent data elements. The board believes an initial approach would be to integrate existing service-specific system data, share it across DOD, and fund accelerated system development.

**Medical and dental readiness.** Individual medical and dental readiness prior to activation has a tremendous impact on members, unit readiness, and mobilization. Some Reservists arrive at the processing station without proper medical or dental screening. They may have problems that delay deployment. Additionally, the Reserve components have difficulty complying with annual medical/dental readiness requirements because the Defense Health Program only funds care for Reservists on active duty for more than 30 days. Compounding this problem, treatment facilities for statutory and regulatory screenings may not have sufficient resources to provide the necessary screening and care. The following approaches could address this deficiency: implement DOD individual medical readiness standards; improve the categorization and tracking of individual medical readiness of all Reservists; revise Title 10, section 1074, to include funded medical and dental examinations and treatment to meet readiness standards regardless of duty status; and resource medical and dental readiness on a level that allows Reservists to maintain the statutory and regulatory requirements.

The board recognizes that keeping personnel medically and dentally ready is costly; however, continued reliance on the Reserve components means alternatives must be explored. One advance has been the policy for standardization of individual medical readiness reporting issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, which the services are implementing. Another is legislation to allow medical and dental screening and care when Reservists are notified of a call to active duty exceeding 30 days. DOD policy broadens this provision by stating that a member of the Ready Reserve may at any time while in a military duty status be provided any medical and dental screening or care necessary to meet applicable standards for deployment, as provided by the policies and procedures of the service and Reserve component concerned. These policies will require continuing evaluation to determine whether they should be modified.

**Family support.** Much has been done since the Persian Gulf War to improve all areas of family support, particularly health care; yet there is still a significant lack of understanding, access to, eligibility for, and rules governing TRICARE benefits and of the importance of maintaining current Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System information. These programs are complex and often are not designed with Reservists in mind. Ensuring continuity and equity of health care will take work, especially since half of the families of members do not live within reasonable proximity to military treatment facilities. The goal should be affordable family health care on the right level regardless of demographics and existing medical coverage. Continuity of care has been the leading issue of the Reserve component chiefs the last three years.

In addition, family members must understand their benefits and how to access them. Family support programs change frequently, and it is hard to keep members informed due to their geographic dispersion. There are some great initiatives within the services to improve family support; however, much can be done to enhance standardization and accountability across the services. Programs are being designed from a joint service, Total Force perspective, and the services and Reserve components are making every effort to ensure that any member or family, whether active, Guard, or Reserve,
The board is interested in assisting with the development of policy as it relates to civilianization and privatization.

TRICARE and family support programs. Timely education and assistance will be particularly important as we use volunteers more frequently and for shorter periods.

Employer support. Growing Reserve use has also increased strain on employers. The board is concerned that continuous mobilizations will have a negative impact on Reserve manning. Measures must be put in place to ensure that employer support does not become too great a burden, particularly for small businesses and self-employed Reservists. Much is being done by OSD, employer support of the Guard and Reserve, and Congress, but a need remains to develop policy as a basis for how to best share the talents of individual Reservists, enhance employer support and voluntarism, and strengthen member rights and family support.

Force management and rebalancing. Managing force requirements for prolonged contingency operations requires that use of the Reserve components be managed in a way that sustains their capabilities over the long run. To prevent over-stressing, a process must be developed that tracks augmentees and individuals within units who have been previously activated to support the global war on terrorism. Solutions such as shifting recruiting and retention to target stressed capabilities, and innovative training technology to reclassify Reservists not previously activated, should be considered to meet the skill sets for predictable needs. The services must look now for approaches to sustain the Reserve forces for future requirements, such as developing a “just in time” rather than a “just in case” force structure and offering financial and other incentives to attract and retain personnel for stressed units. Examples of force structure development include constructing modular units that can be tailored to support required capabilities and blending active and Reserve components to support a common mission and take advantage of Reserve strengths and experience.

A New Compact

The present paradigm of the 39-day Reservist must change to allow greater flexibility and a transformation construct such as continuum of service to be instituted. The answer must also include a new compact with members, their employers, and their families which provides realistic incentives for participation beyond one drill weekend per month and two weeks during the summer. Reliance on the Reserve components will continue into the foreseeable future; thus it is crucial that our governing laws and regulations support this environment. The active component suffers under the current system due to inability to fill requirements efficiently and effectively, and the individual Reservist suffers because the laws and regulations negatively impact individual compensation, benefits, entitlements, and career progression.

The board applauds the methods the Reserve components have developed to support the active component mission with volunteers. However, it will take DOD support and congressional action to develop the statutes and regulations to fully support this transformation once policy is set. DOD and the services are moving rapidly to identify and execute force structure changes, participate in mobilization reform, and develop policy and legislative changes to support innovative management practices. For example, with transformation there is some discussion of civilianizing the Military Judge Advocate General’s Corps, a move that could raise policy issues. The board is interested in assisting with the development of policy as it relates to civilianization and privatization that impacts the Reserve components.

The services have implemented measures to improve the force mix and early reliance on involuntary mobilizations. For example, between fiscal years 2005 and 2009 the Army will rebalance over 100,000 spaces to improve force readiness and ease the
stress on the Guard and Reserve. The Air Force is organized and funded to integrate the Reserve components into every aspect of its mission. Its air and space expeditionary force construct allows for maximum use of volunteers, thus minimizing the need for involuntary mobilization within the first 15 days of a rapidly developing contingency. The Naval Reserve contains a significant portion of Navy airlift and maritime patrol capability, and these resources are integrated to the point of seamless operations. The Coast Guard began commissioning the first of 13 maritime safety and security teams for domestic security operations in FY02, reducing the need for Reserve-staffed port security units to respond to local contingencies. Port security units are designed to support combatant commanders overseas in strategic ports of debarkation. Every service has made structural changes in the active and Reserve components that reduce

stresses on critical skills and enhance capabilities. Many began before September 11, 2001, though the need to continue is recognized. Some changes in Reserve management policies are being implemented to improve voluntarism. The board concurs with the current direction and measures to rebalance the force and develop innovative management practices.

**Fairness and Equity**

RFPB continues to hear themes of differing equity and compensation between the active and Reserve components. These comments are voiced most often as RFPB visits the combatant commanders and deployed Reserve component forces supporting the global war on terrorism. Equity in pay and benefits remains a concern for many Reservists and for the board. Identifying inequities and proposing policy solutions through DOD will remain a priority for RFPB. Recommended changes must take into account the statutory and budget implications.

Regardless of which component a servicemember belongs to—active, Guard, or Reserve—the pay and benefits for the same duty in the same locale should be the same. To RFPB that means the entire compensation package, basic pay plus incentives, bonuses, special pays, and such benefits as basic allowance for housing (BAH), medical and dental care, per diem, and family support. Recognizing the importance of these issues to the future Total Force, Congress and DOD have focused on correction. The most notable of their efforts are improved health care benefits, full commissary privileges, hostile fire and imminent danger pay, and new tax breaks.
A recurring inconsistency is how the services interpret and pay travel claims. Reservists wonder why their per diem or travel allowance differs from members in another component, especially at the same location with the same duty. The increasing use of Reservists, particularly in a deployed status, has raised the intensity and visibility of this issue. All the active and Reserve components are compensated using the joint travel regulations (JTR) to compute eligibility and amounts. On the surface this appears to be an administrative matter that could be easily fixed. However, digging deeper into specifics, the board sees it not as a systemic problem with JTR, but rather a matter of the services applying different interpretations to these regulations. Thus it becomes a morale issue. The board unanimously supports any effort to simplify and clarify travel and per diem entitlements to provide uniformity of interpretation and payment.

Many Reservists earn more in their civilian jobs than on active duty. An attempt to remedy this issue with a mobilization insurance system was disastrous and was quickly terminated by DOD. The level of Reserve involvement at home and abroad makes the insurance solution financially unportable within an already-stressed DOD budget. While there is no easy solution, RFPB continues to support all efforts to review the many proposals aimed at providing relief. This is a recruiting and retention issue that will not go away.

Another problem is inequitable treatment in matters such as billeting, personal protective equipment, and organizational clothing. Perceived as second class treatment, such unevenness shows a level of insensitivity that must be changed to ensure that Reservists serve equally with their active duty peers.

RFPB is concerned that a proposed merger of the Reserve personnel appropriation with the active duty account could shift Reserve training dollars into the active duty pay account; thus the board believes both equity and policy concerns should be addressed before this takes place.

Under current law, BAH inequities exist for Reservists serving on active duty less than 140 days and those without dependents, who must maintain a primary residence while serving temporary periods of active duty. While this disparate payment saves substantial sums for DOD, these members receive significantly less daily housing entitlement than their active duty counterparts. There is an exception for members serving in support of
contingency operations, but separate BAH rates still apply for noncontingency duty.

The board is concerned further that while improvements have been made to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 through the Service-members’ Civil Relief Act of 2003, there is no remedy for inequities that arise when student Reservists are involuntarily called to support the global war on terrorism. Protections must be extended to student Guard and Reserve members who lose tuition and placement at colleges and universities.

**Jointness**

Full integration of the Reserve components in joint operations is no longer an ideal; it is reality. Given the strategic situation, national security policy, and future commitments, their use tomorrow will most likely resemble their use today except they will be more jointly oriented and tasked. Training, equipping, maintaining, and educating members to the level of their active duty counterparts continues. Joint officer management and joint professional military education are inextricably linked. Understanding their active duty counterparts continues. Joint officer management and joint professional military education are inextricably linked. Understanding

A report by the General Accounting Office to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and House of Representatives stated that the absence of a strategic plan for joint officer development is a barrier to joint professional military education integration and implementation. Further studies by independent contractors concluded that operational and organization changes are needed to implement the mandated joint professional military education program. The board believes DOD Instruction 1215.20 can be a catalyst to address the systemic problems that preclude full integration of the Reserve component–joint officer management program and that the program should be supported to head off the need for a waiver for a candidate to be appointed as a Reserve component chief.

**Stability Operations**

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have allowed RFPB to contribute to policy recommendations related to stabilization and reconstruction operations. This represents an area where creativity might provide solutions for the future. One idea that arose from a 2003 symposium was a universal command, a Reserve component organization of military and civilian volunteers. Other proposals include separate stability and reconstruction divisions, one active and one Reserve, and future brigades and units of action. The board held a stability and reconstruction conference in January and agreed on the need for a quick response force that reflects modularity and flexibility.

Stabilization and reconstruction operations are sometimes referred to as the postconflict phase although, as seen in Iraq, the line between the conflict and stabilization phases is gray. Reserve component units such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, and engineers already play a key role. RFPB plans in 2004 to focus on organizational structure implications, developing policy, and the impact of stabilization and reconstruction on Reserve component units and members, to include use of civilian volunteers. Given today’s emphasis on force rebalancing and transformation, the board has a role in reviewing current proposals for reform in the context of DOD policy and its recommendation. It will coordinate with DOD and other Federal agencies including the National Defense University, Office of Force Transformation, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute as well as leading scholars and think tanks.

Warfighting and stabilization demand new approaches for Reserve component use. RFPB is assisting other organizations and doing independent research concerning expanded use of auxiliaries and recalled retirees, utilizing existing authority for creating a Temporary Reserve, expanding use of State Defense Forces, and examining other mechanisms to meet military needs and contribute to a new paradigm of Reserve service. The objective will be to develop policy for using some or all of these mechanisms.

Guard and Reserve personnel serve in the most technologically advanced force in the world and are continually asked to do more. To continue using Reservists at this pace, we must develop the best possible compensation and incentive package and sensitize our leadership to ensure fair and equitable treatment. Though Reserve members are true patriots and fully understand their responsibilities, the stress on families and employers along with fairness and equity issues could harm retention. In these turbulent and watershed times, it is essential that the Reserve Forces Policy Board continue to be a viable, independent source of policy advice to the Secretary of Defense and at the same time meet its role of keeping the President and Congress informed with its annual report and working on behalf of the extraordinary Guard and Reserve men and women who serve the Nation.
Joint staff officers and force commanders involved in joint homeland security operations inside the United States will need a thorough understanding of the National Guard. They may have mobilized Guard units operating under their command and control. They may need to coordinate with a parallel Guard operation conducted under the authority of a Governor. They may even provide forces to support a state Guard already engaged in an operation.

In Department of Defense (DOD) terminology, homeland security encompasses both homeland defense and military support to civil authorities. Homeland defense encompasses those traditional military functions undertaken to protect the United States from external threats. Military support to civil authorities (MSCA) refers to assistance to civilian governmental entities—Federal, state, or local—that the services may provide to help manage a crisis, attack, or calamity. This article addresses potential joint force interactions with the Guard in both homeland defense and MSCA missions.

The National Guard is a unique military organization. Its dual state
and Federal nature can confuse even its members. Sometimes Guardsmen are paid and commanded by the Federal Government, sometimes by state governments. Most often they are federally funded but state controlled. While this may seem a jumble of crossing authorities, it is actually a tried and proven structure that is flexible and responsive.

After a historical overview, this article explores each status under which the National Guard operates, gives examples of these three options at home and overseas, and suggests implications for joint homeland security. The flexibility and responsiveness resulting from these duty options are potent tools for joint force commanders and civilian leaders as America adjusts to the post-9/11 security environment.

**History, Federalism, and the Constitution**

Two realities are crucial to understanding the nature and capabilities of the National Guard. First, while Army and Air Guard units are Reserve components of the Army and Air Force, they are first and foremost the militia of the states that own them. Second, state governments are sovereign entities under the Constitution.

Like their counterparts in the other Reserve components, members of the Army and Air National Guard are citizen soldiers. Most hold civilian vocations but dedicate at least one weekend a month plus two weeks a year to wearing a uniform and training to augment the Army or Air Force.

Unlike Reservists, Guardsmen do nearly all training and some operations under the command and control of state governments. In 54 states and territories, including the District of Columbia, National Guard forces are under the leadership of two-star adjutants general usually appointed by the Governors, who are the commanders in chief in their states. The President is the Commander in Chief of the militia only when it is in Federal service. Unless ordered to Federal active duty, a Guardsman’s chain of command stops at the Governor’s mansion.

Although immediately available to states for domestic emergencies, a relatively small percentage of the National Guard is employed in yearly state call-ups. Consequently, Guardsmen spend most duty time training to Army or Air Force standards in case they are mobilized to augment the active components. Most funding thus comes from the Federal Government.

While training is focused on meeting Army and Air Force performance standards for Federal wartime missions, it simultaneously supports state missions. Warfighting skills such as leadership, communication, and disciplined teamwork as well as technical skills such as operating vehicles and aircraft are honed for combat but have proven to be just the abilities needed when Governors call for help.

The purposes behind this unique state/Federal institution are found in some of the fundamental threads of American history. The Guard is America’s oldest military force, tracing its roots to 1636, when the Massachusetts Bay Colony first organized the existing militia companies of several towns into larger regiments. After the Revolution, the founding fathers explicitly recognized the importance of maintaining the citizen-soldier tradition and established it, and the attendant state and Federal authorities, into the militia clause of the Constitution:

> The Congress shall have power . . . to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions [and] provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Much of the rationale for the modern structure is based on the Nation being a union of sovereign states. The Constitution preserves the rights and powers of states by explicitly enumerating the powers of the Federal Government and declaring that all others are reserved to the states. This federalism is central to American democracy. The apportionment of authority over today’s organized militia between the states and the Federal Government works to the benefit of both.

The state/Federal construct benefits states by preserving their authority and providing them immediate access to a trained, disciplined, organized, and equipped force for domestic emergencies such as civil disturbances, natural disasters, and terrorist attack. The sovereignty of states and their ability to conduct independent military operations have significant practical implications for future joint force commanders and staffs operating in the homeland, and these are addressed below.

The Guard construct benefits the Federal Government in several ways. First, it provides a cost-effective Reserve. The Army National Guard provides 38 percent of total Army force...
structure and 30 percent of total personnel for 14 percent of the nonprocurement budget. The Air National Guard provides 34 percent of total Air Force aircraft and 20 percent of Air Force personnel for 11 percent of the nonprocurement budget.

Second, with potent state and community ties, the Guard attracts public (and thus political) support for a robust national defense. At a time when ever fewer Americans have direct military experience, the Guard’s state and local connections help assure broad-based support through a visible presence and direct community involvement on the hometown level. There are some 3,200 National Guard facilities in 2,700 communities. The hometown armories are brick and mortar connections from the local level to national defense. There is at least one facility for most of the 3,000 counties. The average congressional district is home to a thousand Guardsmen.

Third, the dual state and Federal access to the National Guard provides taxpayers an additional leveraged return on defense investment. Personnel and equipment in the Guard stand ready for two contingencies—domestic emergency or overseas mission—rather than one.

Finally, the state connection provides a means by which Federal military assets can be employed on the state level to address joint state/Federal interests such as fighting drugs or countering the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

The constitutionally mandated Federal part in organizing, arming, disciplining, and governing the Guard are accomplished by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), a joint organization of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. By statute, the bureau is the channel by which these services communicate with the states and territories on all matters pertaining to the National Guard.

Beyond these intergovernmental and community relations aspects, however, joint force commanders and staff must also understand the training and operational responsiveness and flexibility of the National Guard. That requires understanding that its activities generally fall into state active duty, Federal active duty, or DOD-funded, state-executed training and operations under Title 32 of the U.S. Code.

**State Active Duty—Emergency Response Missions**

Calling out the Guard has become a metaphor for extraordinary efforts to deal with crises. It happens half a dozen times a year in the average state. As a result, National Guard headquarters known as state area commands have tremendous background in calling and employing forces large and small for domestic operations in support of civil authorities. This level of practical experience exists nowhere else in the military. Guardsmen in this status are funded solely by the state and governed by state military laws. If they use federally owned equipment, the Federal property and fiscal officer for that state, reporting to the National Guard Bureau, ensures that the state reimburses the Federal Government accordingly.

National Guard activations for state emergency response missions are most frequently precipitated by a natural disaster. A tornado strikes and Guard bulldozers clear the streets. Hurricanes threaten and the Guard assists in evacuation before and recovery after. Rivers flood and Guardsmen organize sandbag teams and rescue victims from rooftops by helicopter. These can be large operations. For example, West Virginia battled recurring floods in 2001. At one point the adjutant general had over 4,000 Guardsmen from four states employed there for several weeks.

When a state facing a domestic emergency needs additional assets—such as during a large-scale Federal mobilization of its units for overseas deployment—it may borrow Guard capability. The ability to share assets across state lines has been made nearly effortless through emergency management assistance compacts, which standardize the exchange and reimbursement of response capabilities, including Guard units. That proved effective in West Virginia.

Unlike their Federal military counterparts, Guardsmen operating under the command and control of state authorities can directly help enforce the law. Federal forces generally cannot be employed for that purpose under the Federal posse comitatus law, while state-controlled forces can. This ranges from providing an extra visible security presence at large events to partnering with police to quell riots and restore order. When protesters opposing the World Trade Organization rioted in Seattle in 1999, Guardsmen helped restore order.

### Multi-Levels of Command and Missions

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<td>Federal</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Active Duty—Overseas</td>
<td>IAW state law (riot control, emergency response, etc.)</td>
<td>Training and other federally authorized</td>
<td>Overseas duty; domestic WMD; insurrection, invasion, etc.</td>
</tr>
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**rivers flood and Guardsmen organize sandbag teams and rescue victims from rooftops by helicopter**
The recovery and security operations the New York and New Jersey National Guard mounted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks were by far the largest recent emergency response missions under state active duty. The Guard met virtually all the military support needs of the civil authorities of the state and city of New York. Its heavy construction equipment arrived at Ground Zero immediately. Guardsmen deployed throughout the city to help police maintain order and secure key locations. The ability to respond rapidly to the needs of the Governor put assets where they were needed.

Other Governors also called the Guard to state active duty to bolster security. California Guardsmen secured the Golden Gate Bridge while Florida Guardsmen protected ports. Members in several states were deployed to secure nuclear power plants and other assets.

While this ability to respond to Governors is a powerful tool for protecting lives and property, it also has an implication for military readiness. A unit completing a demanding tour of state active duty may not have sufficient readiness to perform its Federal wartime mission. The National Guard Bureau therefore monitors both state call-ups of Guard assets and unit readiness reports. Its oversight of the forces and equipment in each state makes it a valuable coordination center when assets are needed across state lines. As a result, the bureau is able to maintain DOD situational awareness about Guard capabilities and operations. It is gearing up to provide that information to U.S. Northern Command. This NGB capability becomes particularly valuable to any joint force commander tasked to lead Federal military operations as part of a homeland security mission in the continental United States.

Every state has the constitutional prerogative and capacity to conduct domestic military operations. As elected officials, Governors have a powerful political incentive to respond visibly and decisively to any threat to lives and property. Any active duty joint force deployed in an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, for example, would almost certainly arrive to find that the National Guard has been ordered by the Governor and the operation is already under way. With many years of working with states, the National Guard Bureau can help avoid conflicts, enhance unity of effort, and contribute to mission accomplishment.

Because state governments are sovereign, the interactions of Federal forces with those under state control require tact and sensitivity to political realities and prerogatives that do not normally factor into strictly U.S. operations. Major General Timothy Lowenberg, adjutant general of Washington state and a Guard expert on homeland security, said in an August 2002 interview, “Active duty officers can best understand this if they think of the National Guard as extremely friendly and interoperable allied forces.”

**Mobilization and Calls to Federal Service**

Title 10 of the U.S. Code contains several provisions under which the National Guard can be brought to Federal active duty for various operational purposes and durations inside the United States. Units may be ordered under a Presidential Reserve call-up to respond to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction. Otherwise, this authority is limited inside the United States. Presidential call-up cannot be used to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, enforce Federal laws, or assist civil authorities in responding to disasters. The Department of Defense has recommended removing this limitation.

These activities are specifically provided for elsewhere. Both units and members can be called into Federal service by a Presidential call-up under Title 10, chapter 15, section 12406 to enforce Federal laws or suppress insurrections, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy—sometimes called selective mobilization. In Graphic Hand in 1970, the Guard was employed under this authority to augment the postal service during a strike.

Partial mobilization is free of the domestic employment limitations of a Presidential Reserve call-up but requires congressional approval or a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Federalizing or mobilizing the Guard for Federal active duty at home has advantages as well as disadvantages. Once a unit is ordered to Federal active duty, its state command relationships are severed. The cost and responsibility for administrative and logistic support fall to the gaining Federal command. If other Federal military units are involved, unity of command is enhanced. Lost, however,
are the Guard’s state and local connections as well as its state-derived exemption from *posse comitatus*.

The Governor of California called out the National Guard in the Los Angeles riots in 1992. Happy to have the Federal Government pay their bill, state officials agreed that the Guard should be transitioned from state to Federal duty. That placed the Guard along with participating marines under a single Federal commander. Law enforcement officials involved, however, noted problems. First, their own connectivity was immediately hampered when habitual relationships with the National Guard command structure were replaced with a new Federal military command unfamiliar with the local situation, personalities, and sensitivities. There was greater hindrance to the mission when, as a result of Federal *posse comitatus* restrictions, the Guard could no longer perform many law enforcement support tasks in the riot area.

In 2002, some 1,700 Guardsmen were tasked to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service in bolstering security along national borders. Pentagon officials considered using Title 32 duty, whereby Guardsmen would remain under state control so they could legally perform law enforcement tasks. In the end, because the mission supported Federal agencies and involved a Federal responsibility—border security—the decision was made to mobilize the Guardsmen to Federal Title 10 duty. Subsequently, the National Governors Association was critical and published a statement that such duties should be performed using Title 32.

**DOD Funded, State Executed**

Mobilizations to Federal active duty and call-ups to state active duty are relatively infrequent during a career. Guardsmen spend most duty time in normal training and operations governed under Title 32. They perform at least 39 days of training a year—typically 2 days a month plus 15 days of

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*in response to Hurricane Andrew, some 20,000 active duty troops worked with a state force of 6,000 Florida Guardsmen*
Guard assets in civilian law enforcement actions in the war on drugs under Title 32. This support includes information analysis, ground reconnaissance and surveillance, and aerial observation. The law authorizes up to 4,000 Guardsmen for this mission. Current funding provides just under 3,000 nationwide. The unique advantage of this program is that the Guardsmen perform counterdrug duties while remaining members of their combat units and training there. The Nation gets both military support to law enforcement and a ready deployable combat asset. This model could be expanded beyond the counterdrug arena to counterterrorism.

Title 32 duty was the tool of choice for employing the National Guard to secure 442 commercial airports in 52 states and territories following 9/11. The President asked Governors to take this step and provided the money in order to reassure the traveling public and help the economy. Some Guardsmen were on duty the next day. Some 7,000 Army and Air Guard were performing at all of the listed airports within a week, operating with Federal funding but under the command and control of the Governors.

Weapons of mass destruction civil support teams also operate as federally resourced, state-controlled assets under Title 32. These full-time, 22-member joint Army and Air National Guard units are trained and equipped with modern technology to assess a chemical, biological, or radiological attack, advise the on-scene incident commander, and facilitate the arrival of additional assets.

The Guard also has a record of contributing to the strategic defense of the United States while remaining under a state chain of command. During the Cold War, up to 82 batteries of Army Guardsmen manned antiaircraft artillery and Nike missile sites defending against the Soviet bomber threat. A special mobilization compact transitioned the Guardsmen to Federal active duty immediately when targets appeared on their radar screens.

Today, the Guard still uses Title 32 duty for homeland defense. First Air Force, comprised mostly of Air National Guardsmen, provides air sovereignty and air defense for the continental United States. Divided into three sectors, it uses its attached wings to scramble fighter jets to intercept threat or unidentified aircraft entering U.S. airspace. It has pioneered a particularly innovative way to leverage state-controlled forces for Federal military purposes. To get the most flexible use of the assets, pilots and aircraft remain in their state-controlled training status unless actually scrambled for an intercept. Air Guard fighter units assigned to this mission perform their training...
and even sit alert in their normal Title 32 training status under state command and control either during drill or annual training. When they launch or divert to intercept a bogie, the pilots transition to Federal Title 10 orders and respond to a Federal chain of command to execute the mission. In this way, the forces are only federalized for the Federal portion. Training, administration, maintenance, and other aspects are performed under state control using Guard resources.

Regulatory and policy obstacles inhibit the integration of state-controlled forces with Federal active duty forces. The code of Federal regulations and DOD directives pertaining to military support to civil authorities restrict Federal forces from being under the command and control of officers in state status. Such obstacles to unity of effort may warrant review in light of the new domestic security environment. Changing these regulations could provide for more flexible employment of military assets using the gamut of command relationships from tactical control to combatant command.

Service under Title 32, in which Guardsmen remain under the command and control of state governments but conduct federally prescribed and resourced training, has traditionally been exclusively for that training purpose. Increasing use for operational purposes in recent years has evolved a unique and effective optional tool for decisionmakers in meeting certain requirements.

Based on the citizen-soldier tradition rooted in the founding of the Nation and codified into the militia clause of the Constitution, today’s National Guard remains a unique state/Federal construct. The sovereignty of states and their ability to conduct independent military operations are essential parts of American federalism that stem from the Constitution, which all military officers are sworn to defend.

The state/Federal structure provides three operational benefits: experience, responsiveness, and flexibility. National Guard forces offer experience based on their relatively frequent employment in state operations in support to civil authorities ranging from disaster relief to law enforcement. They also have homeland defense experience such as missile defense and air sovereignty operations. They offer responsiveness in that they are near every potential target in America and can be on-scene in hours. They offer flexibility in that the three possible duty options provide a broad array of capabilities for meeting any threat. Underlying these benefits and essential to them all is the readiness derived from training, organizing, and resourcing for overseas deployability and combat. These issues are crucial to the joint force commander and staff seeking to understand and work with the National Guard inside the United States.
It is 5:30 on a cool, still evening in Washington. There is a slight haze due to the rush hour traffic. It is getting dark and a thermal inversion is holding the haze in place. A tanker truck pulls to a downtown curb. The driver turns on the flashers, exits, and walks up the street, apparently in search of a pay phone to call for help. He is never seen again.

Two men get out on the other side of the vehicle. One moves to the valves extending from the tank and quickly begins opening them. An officer at a nearby Federal building comes out to see what is going on. The second man shoots him repeatedly. With the sounds of the shots still echoing, both men run south. They don’t get far before falling to the sidewalk gasping.

Pedestrians and drivers begin coughing and collapsing in an expanding circle around the truck. The odor of chlorine fills the air. Everyone is trying to escape, but the gas is expanding and being drawn into vehicle and building ventilation systems.

9-1-1 calls from cells phones and surrounding buildings flood the switchboards. More alarming to inbound firefighters, the calls are coming from many floors of the buildings. As the responders close on the scene, they find the streets blocked with wrecked, stalled, and abandoned vehicles.

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, is senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
City fire and emergency services would be overwhelmed in the above scenario. The casualties could number in the hundreds and be scattered through numerous multistory buildings and vehicles. Simply conducting a methodical search for casualties would require a major effort. Chlorine gas is heavier than air. Drawn into buildings by ventilation systems, it could form pockets, particularly in stairwells and other low points. Thus every rescuer would need individual protective equipment to move safely. DC Fire has made major strides in preparing for such an emergency, yet like all city fire departments it simply cannot afford the necessary manpower and equipment.

On Scene in Two Hours

Fortunately, DC Fire has trained with and can call on the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). Its 117 marines and sailors, on 1-hour alert, can be on scene within 2 hours. Working under the direction of DC Incident Command System, they can increase the city’s ability to conduct rescue and mass decontamination operations. If the initial force is insufficient, an additional 200 marines and sailors can be dispatched within 4 hours. Since CBIRF trains full-time and has protective equipment to conduct three entries per person, the unit can conduct sustained operations. Unfortunately, it is the only Department of Defense (DOD) unit that provides a major search, extraction, and decontamination capability.

First responders know what is required to react to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack. They must execute mitigation and rescue. Mitigation consists of both stopping the release of more agent and cordon off the area to limit victims. Rescue consists of entering the contaminated area, finding victims, extracting them, decontaminating them, and treating them. Both tasks must be accomplished quickly to minimize casualties. The final task, recovery, is not one for first responders; it will be a time-consuming process better handled by contractors.

Most major municipalities can at least mitigate the effects of a chemical or high-yield explosive attack. They have well-trained hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams that can stop additional release. Their police departments can identify the contaminated area by observing people in the vicinity. They can then expand the area to allow for contamination migration and establish the cordon. In addition, many cities have basic radiation detection instruments and can establish a cordon in radiological or nuclear attacks. Biological attacks unfold more slowly, and mitigation is primarily thorough identification and quarantine using preventative health and medical experts.

Unfortunately, municipalities cannot conduct the large-scale search, rescue, decontamination, and treatment needed in such an attack. Even the Tokyo Fire Department, one of the best trained and equipped in the world, was overwhelmed by a badly executed sarin gas attack on their subway system. Cities simply cannot afford to keep the large number of trained personnel on alert to respond to such an incident.

Examining the sequence of events after a CBRNE event reveals the gap in resources. Obviously, local authorities will provide the initial response. In the case of a CBRNE event, they will immediately call in all off-duty first responders. Even then, only HAZMAT-trained and equipped responders can safely enter such an environment. Given the intense physical effort required to conduct mass personnel rescue and decontamination, the on-duty shift will exhaust its people—and more importantly its on-truck supply of protective equipment—within hours. Currently, their only source of relief will be the off-duty shifts using whatever equipment is available in ready local stocks. The best local response forces can sustain is 8 to 16 hours in a contaminated environment, even drawing on robust mutual aid agreements.

While the Department of Justice-funded pre-positioned stocks will provide additional equipment, no personnel come with it.

Out-of-state, mobilized military and commercial assets should begin arriving in significant numbers around the 72 to 120 hour mark assuming rapid identification and mobilization. Federal-local coordination is improving but still cannot ensure reinforcement by that time. Even when they do arrive, few personnel will have the training and equipment to work in a contaminated environment.

During the gap before mobilized assets arrive, the first responders will be struggling to continue rescue operations. Even with total mobilization of all shifts and resources, they will be overwhelmed by the number of casualties. Moving casualties is physically demanding and exponentially more so in a contaminated environment. Responders must wear heavy, hot, and restrictive personal protective equipment. Under current Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) regulations, they are limited to level A (fully encapsulated) suits whenever they enter an unknown environment. Even after the agent is identified, most departments around the country lack any other personal protective equipment.

Thus the deficiency in response to CBRNE lies primarily in the rescue of victims between the time local responders are overwhelmed and other assets can mobilize. Neither state nor Federal assets, with the exception of CBIRF, are currently prepared to assist. A secondary deficiency lies in the limited number of rescue personnel that can be mobilized after the initial crisis.

This may seem like a harsh assessment given the effort since 9/11. In fact there has been a great deal of discussion and some progress on defining the DOD role in homeland defense. With the standup of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security, the department now has a single point of contact. This staff can take a coherent overall look at what the DOD response role should be.

Unfortunately, this top-level effort is still in its infancy. On the tactical level, despite an alphabet soup of acronyms, DOD provides little support to first responders. CBIRF offers a robust, immediate asset within the national capital region, but elsewhere its response is slowed by the time-distance problem.

**Who Has the Mission?**

While there is a long list of other DOD assets, none are trained or equipped for rescue operations in a contaminated environment. The most publicized asset, National Guard civil support teams (CSTs), consists of 32 teams stationed around the country, but they are limited to 22 personnel per team. While they bring an exceptional reconnaissance, advice, and communication capability, they provide extremely limited assistance for the actual rescue and decontamination of victims. In essence, they can tell a local incident commander what the contaminant is, recommend what to do, and provide a powerful communications capability. But they cannot help downrange.

Aside from CBIRF and CST, the other DOD assets are essentially headquarters. These provide even more communications assets and numerous experts to advise the incident or unified commander, but they cannot assist in the trenches. The Army provides the chemical biological rapid response team (CBRRT), which furnishes expert advice, superb communications assets, and a command team. They bring no one who can assist the first responders in the hot zone.

The Army has also been studying a guardian brigade to consolidate many of its chemical and biological defense assets: outstanding technical escort unit soldiers, CBRRT, some chemical companies, explosive ordnance disposal experts, detection experts, and numerous scientists. Unfortunately, these assets still consist mostly of headquarters and technical experts. The proposed organization contains very few soldiers equipped to go downrange and none specifically trained for search, extraction, decontamination, and treatment of casualties.

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**the Army has been studying a guardian brigade to consolidate many of its chemical and biological defense assets**
Combining them in a brigade may offer training and organization benefits but will not increase the number of responders on the scene. However, it will require more personnel for the brigade headquarters.

In addition to these headquarters, all the services and many Federal agencies have experts who can respond to biological and radiological incidents. However, none are trained and equipped to participate in the rescue aspects of CBRNE response.

One final problem with DOD assistance is the first responders’ perception of what such help means. There is an impression among local authorities that when DOD comes to town, it brings two things: a large headquarters and someone saying, “We’re from DOD and we’re in charge.” Frankly, first responders do not think they need either.

The obvious question is whether DOD should take on the mission. Isn’t it more suited to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? It could end up there once the department is stood up and fully functioning. But some aspects of CBRNE response heavily favor a military force heading the effort.

First, the mission requires fit young people. Extracting bodies from a contaminated environment is physically demanding, calling for a combination of aerobic and anaerobic conditioning that should be a hallmark of ground combat forces but is not usually enforceable in civilian organizations. Second, until certain OSHA, NIOSH, and Code of Federal Regulations requirements are rewritten, civilian responders do not have access to the full range of personal protective equipment military personnel can use. Third, training, maintenance, and readiness requirements are high for this type of work. Military forces have a culture of performing exactly these functions in peacetime. Finally, the sheer cost of maintaining over a hundred civilian personnel on alert is prohibitive. There is no additional pay for alert status in the military. Further, tours in these units are usually limited to a few years, so the burden of one-hour alert status does not become unbearable. Marines and sailors of CBIRF stand a month of one-hour alert followed by a month of regular duty. During the alert month, they conduct all training and exercises in the immediate vicinity of CBIRF headquarters so they can always respond in an hour.

The one DHS exception could be the Coast Guard. It already provides three regional, highly skilled HAZMAT strike teams under its national strike team. It also has the necessary military structure. While true experts, the teams lack sufficient manpower. Perhaps the Coast Guard could be enlarged to fulfill the rescue mission, but
it is currently badly stretched and has a very small manpower base.

The solution is multiple CBIRF-like units that are regionally based. Their location should depend on population mass. CBRNE weapons are most effective when used in heavily populated areas. Obviously, response is faster if the unit is located in the area attacked. Therefore, we would station units in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Washington. This concept would provide numerous benefits:

- The vast majority of the population is within a five-hour drive of a CBIRF unit.
- Each unit would keep a 117-man response team ready to deploy in its own vehicles on 1-hour alert, and another unit of similar size and identically equipped would be ready in 4 hours.
- Units could reinforce each other by ground or air, providing both the massive effort and long-term sustainment needed for rescue operations in a mass casualty event. The industrial accident at Bhopal, India, showed how big an incident can be. Records from World War I and the Iran-Iraq war reveal that victims of chemical attacks may be disabled and immobile but still live for days. Clearly we need a robust, sustainable capability.

Finding the Right Unit

The next issue is who should provide the units. DOD could use active forces, Reserve/Guard forces, or a mix. To understand the skills required, we should examine CBIRF, which has determined that the following unit capabilities are needed to conduct operations in a contaminated environment:

- The Nation could respond to multiple attacks, a key capability given the al Qaeda pattern of conducting simultaneous strikes.

if unprotected victims are still moving or breathing by the time security marines arrive, the atmosphere should be safe for the marines

CBIRF reconnaissance, security, extraction, decontamination, medical, command and control, and support.

CBRNE reconnaissance. This requires the ability to detect and identify chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial materials, biological agents, and all types of radiological contamination. CBIRF uses all standard DOD chemical detection equipment and papers, the mass spectograph/gas chromograph, and a more sophisticated mobile lab. It also has a standoff chemical agent detection van. For biological agents, it employs assay tickets and polymerase chain reaction technology that uses DNA identification of proteins present in biological agents. For radiological detection, it has individual detectors for each marine and sailor as well as all military detection equipment. This allows it to identify alpha, beta, gamma, X-ray, and neutron radiation. These skills require extensive training and are highly perishable.

Security. This is not security as it is normally envisioned. It is not about facing outward and isolating the site. CBIRF security personnel face inward. They must keep the decontamination and medical facilities from being overrun and contaminated by victims while they set up. To protect the set up, they must wear personal protective equipment. These marines are dressed when they arrive, move downrange, triage and assist victims, and keep order while decon sets up and recon enters the hot zone. Since they are wearing only limited protection, they use risk-based assessment to determine their limit of advance. Simply stated, if unprotected victims are in distress but are still moving or breathing by the time security marines arrive, the atmosphere should be safe for the marines, who will advance to help those victims but no farther and never indoors until the recon teams have made entry. Security marines are not full-time extraction marines; they have had the two-week CBIRF basic course to become qualified responders and participated in two days of training in risk assessment and tactics. Each month before they are assigned to a response force, they attend a day of refresher training. Thus they are qualified to assist with the manpower-intensive task of moving nonambulatory victims.

Search and extraction. These marines are full-time extractors and train to a higher level than security marines. They train to work on supplied air in up to level B protection and to search collapsed structures and
are equipped to find whether the atmosphere is explosive or has a low oxygen level.

Decontamination. Decon marines take the same two-week course, then move to a full-time decontamination platoon where they train to meet standards for setting up the site rapidly, determining the best decon methods, and deconning the patients and equipment taken downrange. The actual tent set up for ambulatory, nonambulatory, and force protection lines is relatively cheap—$20,000–$25,000—and the force requirement is only 15 personnel; so it is possible to have multiple decon set ups in an organization. CBIRF has three complete sets of decon tents—they simply never throw away the previous set. They have full-time manning for two tents and can augment with headquarters/security marines to man the third set.

Medical. CBIRF has 2 board-certified emergency room physicians, an assistant, an emergency room nurse, and 22 corpsmen. All are trained to treat combined CBRNE and trauma casualties. This unit should be bigger since medical care will be in high demand and CBIRF apparently has the only medical personnel who routinely enter contaminated zones and work in protective equipment.

Command group and cold zone support. The command group provides the scene size up, coordination, liaison, and operational control of all CBIRF forces. Cold zone support provides all aspects of logistic, administrative, and communications support to include resources for reconstituting each team when it exits the hot zone.

The key question is how to expand existing capability so the entire Nation is covered. There are three options: an active duty force expanded to regimental size, a Reserve or Guard force, or a combination.

An active duty force would provide the fastest response for localities with a battalion stationed nearby. The regimental headquarters and a response battalion would be collocated near Washington, DC, the most obvious target for a terror attack. With fewer than 3,000 personnel, the regiment could expand up to another six battalions located to provide maximum coverage based on population density studies and drive times from their locations. The probability of being a target should also be factored in. There will be argument against using regular forces, given their heavy worldwide tasking. Yet the 3,000 personnel required is only .25 percent of the 1.2 million active duty personnel. And equipping six additional CBIRFs would cost only $150 million—.03 percent of the $400 billion DOD budget. The CBIRF annual operations and maintenance cost is less than $4 million, so a 7-battalion regiment could be run for under $30 million.

Given that homeland protection is DOD’s top priority, this seems reasonable to fulfill a critical need. An alternative is to build a CBRNE regiment...
would be in a separate armory with the primary duty. Worse, the units will not be formed at the same armory. They will be composite units assembled from platoons from various companies that would remain focused on their conventional wartime missions. Somehow they are to provide their designated CBRNE platoons with the specialized training to function in CBRNE rescue. Further, these platoons are supposed to integrate easily with the platoons from other companies, sometimes from different states, at the crisis site. The intense teamwork required on site virtually ensures such a unit will fail at the scene.

While the current planned configuration for a National Guard CBRNE response unit will probably not work, the Guard can provide such units if they are formed from a single unit, then trained and equipped with the primary mission of providing response in an armory. Each soldier would carry a pager. The pager alert would also serve as electronic mobilization orders. Each soldier's response gear would be in his personal vehicle. That way he could either meet the force at the marshalling area or at the armory. Depending on the location of armories and where soldiers live, the alert time could vary, but the lead elements need to be moving out in an hour or less.

Under this process, each company would have the alert for a month. Each battalion could cover one quarter. Four battalions from one brigade would cover a year. A brigade could be assigned to each Federal Emergency Management Agency region so each region would always have a response company on alert. That is a huge commitment—yet only 40 small battalions would provide complete coverage. The Army National Guard fields 8 divisions and 15 enhanced brigades, or about 47 total brigades. The vast majority were not activated for Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom. Ten of these brigades could be converted to this critical mission since they do not seem to be needed for warfighting.

Battalion and brigade staffs would be much smaller than their combat arms counterparts under this plan. They would be essentially administrative headquarters, although the battalion staff must be prepared to function as the response force command element if two or more companies are committed to an event. CBIRF manages that with fewer than 20 personnel.

Company staffs would be larger than combat arms company staffs in order to provide personnel for the incident response command post, support personnel to furnish administrative, intelligence, logistic, and communications support, and professional trainers. In addition, each company would need full-time soldiers or civilian contractors to maintain the equipment, stay current on changes in tactics and techniques in this fast-moving field, and then set up the training to keep the company current. CBIRF used four full-time trainers—a former fire chief, a former tech rescue leader, a former paramedic/rescue man, and a former nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) staff noncommissioned officer.

Each company would consist of a headquarters/security platoon, reconnaissance element, extraction platoon, personnel decontamination platoon, and medical platoon. The headquarters platoon must be larger than that normally associated with a line company but in keeping with those associated with independent companies. Its personnel would have their normal duties but would also train to provide a protective skirmish line to the force as it sets up. This requires knowledge of level C protective equipment and basic military police compliance techniques. CBIRF uses the standard techniques taught in the Marine Corps martial arts program. However, CBIRF has found that the most effective way to protect the force is to provide initial victim assistance. The team would use a bullhorn and hand signals to guide ambulatory victims to the decon triage area where medical personnel would immediately begin to triage and treat victims with symptoms. Security force personnel would talk the others through buddy assistance and provide initial supplies for simple buddy decontamination. The security force personnel would also have a fire hose line for gross decontamination using the fog setting. Since the full decon site set up should take no more than 15 minutes, the initial victims would be triaged and ready to decontaminate about the time the line is ready. Once the decontamination line is functioning and the
reconnaissance element has found the edge of the hot zone, security personnel would move to that position to assist at the casualty collection point. They would also operate any vehicles that provide evacuation from the casualty collection point to the decon triage site. (CBIRF uses a Gator/trailer combination for this mission.)

The headquarters/security platoon would provide the command group, the security platoon, and the cold zone support group. The command group consists of the company commander, emergency services officer (firefighter), NBC officer, medical officer, radio operator, logistic officer, law enforcement liaison officer, and incident commander liaison officer. This team provides all on-site command, control, and coordination functions.

The headquarters/security platoon would provide the security force personnel to execute the missions above. The company executive officer would lead all other soldiers in the platoon.

In addition, the headquarters/security platoon, with 35 personnel, would provide a cold zone support group of 10 soldiers to give logistic support and assist with reconstitution of the platoons after their first entry.

The recon element would need full-time soldiers due to extensive training and highly perishable skills. They must be able to detect and quantify all chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals/materials, and biological and radiological agents. Fortunately, this mission can be filled by the existing National Guard CST. Since they would no longer have their command, coordination, communication, decontamination, or medical functions, the 22 personnel can easily be configured as the reconnaissance element. They have the skills; they would simply need to organize and train to send a higher percentage of their personnel down-range to provide the multiple teams required in a major incident. CST must be embedded in each response company so they train together constantly. This calls for either forming new teams or reassigning existing teams from states with low threat of attack.

The extraction platoon’s primary function is to enter the hot zone, find victims, package them for movement, then move them to the edge of the hot zone. It will have a commander (preferably a professional crash fire rescuer), a sergeant, two radio operators, and two 14-man extraction squads with a squad leader, his rescue buddy/radio man, and three fire teams of four. Each team will be broken into two-man extraction teams. This gives each rescue squad six two-man rescue teams plus the squad leader and his buddy. The platoon could flood a target with 12 teams plus two squad leader teams, and the platoon commander and sergeant with their radio operators can be two more teams. The total is 32 personnel. This platoon will require extensive training on protective equipment to be prepared and equipped for level A, B, or C entries.
They must also be trained in victim packaging and movement as well as primary and secondary search.

The decontamination platoon will focus on personnel. It should be composed mostly of NBC people and led by an NBC officer with an NBC sergeant. They will maintain three decontamination lines. The first is for decontamination of response force personnel, the second for ambulatory patients, and the third for nonambulatory patients. Only 15 soldiers are required to run a full ambulatory, nonambulatory, and force protection line, but the workload is heavy. Relief personnel are essential. The platoon total is 25.

The medical platoon should consist of 3 medical officers and 12 medics. If the manning is available it should be larger. They must run three sites. The casualty collection point is the first medical treatment site and is placed at the very edge of the hot zone with the junior medical officer in charge. He should take six medics. This is the first opportunity to treat the victims. They are outside the hot zone and are not being affected by the poison, so medical personnel can get immediate drugs on board and stabilize major trauma. The next medical station is decon triage, manned by an emergency room nurse and four other medics. They maintain treatment while patients wait for decontamination. The final station is medical stabilization, consisting of the senior medical officer and two medics. It is located just beyond decontamination in the cold zone. This station should be quickly turned over to civilian first responders, and the response company personnel should move downrange to decon triage. The platoon total is 15.

While it will require major reorganization, using the Guard for this mission has a number of positive aspects. First, providing emergency support to the community is a traditional Guard mission. Second, Guardsmen can develop long-term relationships with first responders and other companies and battalions in their region. Third, a large number of personnel (40 battalions, or 16,000) will be trained to deal with an emergency in their community whether they are on alert or not. Fourth, it provides a vital wartime mission for the Guard. In essence, international terrorists want to bring the fight to our hometowns. If they succeed, it will be because we have had no intelligence or warning. Response under these conditions is clearly in keeping with the historical role of the minuteman.

The third option, mixed Guard and Regulars, also has distinct advantages. One to three active battalions in a CBRNE regiment would provide a catalyst for developing new training, techniques, and equipment for the mission. It would offer a reservoir of knowledge for active forces in post-CBRNE attack consequence management. That is a distinctly different problem than traditional NBC defense for military units. They can also provide an active duty advocate for their Guard counterparts. The relationship could be like that between enhanced Guard brigades and their active duty counterparts.

While expanding CBRNE capabilities is clearly an idea whose time has come, there will be numerous and loud objections. Some will cite stretched DOD assets. But official department policy states that homeland defense is the number one priority. Mitigation of damage and rescue of civilians post-attack is part of that mission. Certainly a tiny percentage of DOD assets can be spared for this top priority.

Some will argue that posse comitatus prohibits Federal troops being used in domestic events. This is an invalid argument since CBRNE units are not armed and do not attempt to enforce laws.

Some will argue that it is a mission for Homeland Security. This may be legitimate, but unique physical and disciplinary requirements make it more appropriate for military forces.
The United States fields the most capable military the world has seen. Some are concerned that the Nation will settle into complacency and wait for the historic norm—for the high cost of military failure to stimulate change. Such repose would be inconsistent with the record of innovation the Armed Forces have realized over the past two decades and with the goals of current Department of Defense (DOD) leadership. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and senior military leaders are intent on transforming U.S. forces to better prepare for 21st century challenges. Among other things, according to the DOD Transformation Planning Guidance of April 2003, pursuing transformation means “the Department must align itself with the information revolution not just by exploiting information technology, but by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and operating concepts.” Put differently, the emerging American way of war means fighting first for information dominance.
Nothing better exemplifies this bold push for transformation and information dominance than the DOD commitment to make information operations (IO) a core military competency. On October 30, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld signed the Information Operations Roadmap, a detailed plan being implemented by the Pentagon. This article introduces the IO roadmap to a broader military audience to stimulate debate on its implications.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified information operations as one of six operational goals for DOD transformation. It required the Department to treat it, along with intelligence and space assets, not simply as an enabler of current forces but as a core capability of future forces. Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2004–2009 directed that a roadmap be developed for making IO a core military competency, fully integrated into deliberate and crisis action planning and capable of being executed as part of supported and supporting operations. The result was the Information Operations Roadmap.

The roadmap charts a course for developing IO into a mature warfighting capability and a core joint competency. It is designed to enable capabilities to keep pace with threats and exploit opportunities afforded by innovation and information technologies. Lessons learned from Iraqi Freedom underscore the validity of its recommendations.

**A Core Military Competency**

The key assumption underlying the IO roadmap is that exploiting information for decisionmaking has become critical for military success. Accordingly, it must be treated on a par with ground, maritime, air, and special operations. Core military competency is a common expression but is not well defined. Intuitively, it might be considered a set of priority capabilities organized for clear military purposes of overriding importance. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the preface to the roadmap, noted that a core competency is one for which the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and combatant commands share a common appreciation. He articulated more specific criteria within the roadmap. To become a core competency, IO requires policies and procedures that:

- define IO, provide a common understanding of its functions, and clarify authorities and boundaries for execution
- delegate maximum authority to commanders to plan and execute integrated IO.

IO further needs plans, operations, and experiments that:

- incorporate IO in contingency planning within all joint force headquarters
- integrate it into the broader development of new operational concepts
- include it in all major training regimes and exercises.

IO force development is made possible by:

- four-star combatant commander advocacy of experimentation, concept development, and defining needed capabilities
- streamlined organizational and command and control relationships
- a trained and educated career force
- joint program equivalents to develop dedicated information capabilities.

The central objective of the roadmap is to accelerate the transition of IO to a core military competency by providing a way ahead on all of these requisite activity areas. This article summarizes the roadmap’s contents in five major areas: IO policy, effective command and control and supporting organizations, a trained and ready career force, focused analytic and intelligence support, and enhanced core information capabilities.
**Policy: Achieving a Common Framework**

Until now, the lack of common understanding among the services, combatant commands, and defense agencies impeded improving IO capabilities. The construct promulgated in the 1996 DOD directive on information operations and the 1998 Joint Publication 3–13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, proved too broad for implementation. The depiction was really no more than a basket of 13 highly disparate activity areas linked only by their general relevance to militarily useful information. While it was hoped that the broad grouping would provide a center of mass for IO activities, it actually retarded progress by reducing understanding to a tautology: information operations are operations relating to information. As the services applied the concept, they did not uniformly equip or train their forces. In turn, combatant commanders did not generate requirements specific enough to act on or fully integrate IO into their plans and orders.

Thus the first and most necessary prerequisite for making IO a core military competency was a focused and uniform understanding of what it is and how it contributes to joint operations. The roadmap offers a conceptual framework that includes three specific functions, five core capabilities that must be integrated and routinely used by the joint warfighting commander, and a supporting definition that flows from these functions and capabilities.

The three related and mutually supporting IO functions are of overriding importance due to their impact on adversary decisionmaking, both human (individual and collective) and automated:

- **Deter, discourage, dissuade, and direct an enemy**, disrupting its unity of command and purpose while preserving our own. IO should provide the joint force commander the capability to affect the decisionmaking calculus of an individual enemy by introducing considerations that affect its perceptions, and by extension its behavior, in a manner that best suits U.S. objectives.
- **Protect our plans and misdirect the enemy**, allowing our forces to mass their effects to maximum advantage while the enemy expends its forces to little effect. The growing transparency of the battlefield, fueled by the explosion in global information sources, will increase the importance of understanding an enemy’s intentions and shielding our own. The joint force commander must control all sources of information that can signal his intentions and divest the intentions of the enemy early and often.
- **Control adversarial communications and networks and protect our own**, crippling an enemy’s ability to direct an organized defense while preserving our own command and control. As enemies become more dependent on networked systems, the ability to disrupt those systems will allow friendly forces to maintain decision superiority, enabling joint force commanders to operate inside an adversary’s decision cycle.

All three IO functions, properly integrated, are mutually supporting and directly impact enemy ability to conduct coherent operations. As in all military endeavors, many supporting activities must be integrated and executed to permit effective information operations, but only a few actually bring U.S. forces into contact with the enemy to directly produce the effects described in these three functions. Those that do are considered core IO capabilities.

The roadmap narrows the scope from the 1996 list of thirteen primary information capabilities to five: electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), operations security (OPSEC), military deception, and computer network operations (CNO). IO was narrowed to these five core capabilities for three reasons:

- They are operational in a direct and immediate sense; they either achieve critical operational effects or directly prevent the enemy from doing so.
- They are interdependent and increasingly must be integrated to achieve desired effects.
- They more clearly define the capabilities the services and U.S. Special Operations Command are expected to organize, train, equip, and provide to combatant commanders.

An overly broad conceptualization, as represented in the original 13 activity categories, dilutes its focus on human and automated decisionmaking. It also tends to divorce IO from the three primary operational information objectives of greatest importance to the warfighter enumerated in the three IO functions: controlling adversary perceptions, plans, and communications while protecting the same for U.S. forces. In contrast, the five core areas identified in the roadmap are operational, interrelated, and essential to information dominance.

The core capabilities are increasingly interdependent. At first blush “soft” military sciences such as PSYOP and deception might seem unrelated to the more technical EW and CNO, but such is not the case. For example, PSYOP can support EW by advertising U.S. attack capability to confuse the enemy, OPSEC supports PSYOP by controlling emissions, and EW supports OPSEC with disciplined emissions control plans to better manage a commander’s electromagnetic signatures and military deception by...
selectively jamming, interfering, or electronic masking. Other examples, including those involving CNO, could be offered. The point is that these five disciplines are related and their interdependency is increasing, especially as military use of the electromagnetic spectrum grows. Thus they are best thought of as an integrated set of disciplines.

**Supporting and Related Capabilities**

Like all core military competencies, information operations cannot succeed without diverse supporting capabilities, which are recognized in the IO roadmap.

- Capabilities such as physical security, information assurance, counterintelligence, and physical attack contribute to IO planning objectives. However, like many supporting capabilities, such as logistics and surveillance and reconnaissance, they serve other core competencies and do not require planned contact with the enemy to produce effects.

- Public affairs and civil military operations remain related activities. By pursuing their own important objectives, these capabilities help promulgate U.S. intentions to both friends and enemies, complementing information operations generally and PSYOP in particular. They can encourage support for friendly military endeavors, an objective PSYOP can promote as well, especially when employed to support U.S. public diplomacy as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines.

  - PSYOP can use more aggressive tactics, techniques, and procedures to directly discourage and disuade enemies than the public and civil affairs disciplines. In a world where global communications are the norm, the likelihood that its messages will be replayed to a broader audience, including the American public, means PSYOP needs defined boundaries. The roadmap limits its support to military endeavors (exercises, deployments, and operations) in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments—for example, when enemies are part of the equation.

  Given the more focused depiction of IO in the three functions and five core capabilities, its definition needed to be revamped. The new definition, to be included in the revised DOD Directive on Information Operations and in updated joint publications, emphasizes protecting our decisionmaking process while targeting that of an enemy. The roadmap definition of IO is “the integrated employment of the core capabilities..."
of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related activities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while protecting our own.”

The verbs in this definition are important for the range of activity they convey. Disrupt includes interrupting or upsetting decisionmaking, corrupt entails contaminating or subverting it, and usurp involves controlling an adversary’s decisionmaking processes. All could be reasonable objectives for the joint force commander, depending on the target in question.

As the definition indicates, the DOD IO concept is focused on warfighting and creating effects for the joint force commander. The commander cannot orchestrate effects without timely authority to use information capabilities. Therefore, there are specific guidelines for delegating selected capabilities. Their net result is to permit the commander greater latitude to employ IO capabilities.

While concerned with wartime execution, the roadmap assumes IO application across the range of military operations during peace, crisis, and war. Full-spectrum means full-time insofar as information operations require substantial peacetime precursor activity—especially analytic support:

- Well before crises develop, the IO battlespace should be prepared through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and planning across the electromagnetic spectrum to enable rapid effects at the beginning of a conflict.
- Potential enemy audiences and particularly senior decisionmakers should be understood, along with decisionmaking processes and priorities. If such human factors analysis is not conducted in advance, it is unlikely we can craft PSYOP themes and messages that will modify adversary behavior.

- Computer network defense and OPSEC are vital in all phases of conflict but should be given priority during peacetime to prevent enemies from preparing their own information operations. Protecting plans and networks will ensure our ability to make decisions and execute them with minimum disruption.

The full-spectrum is full-time theme resonates throughout the roadmap. There is nothing part-time or collateral about a core military competency. A capability as important as IO requires full-time leadership and oversight, advocacy, career force members, and analytic support.

Other than a common framework for understanding IO, perhaps the most important prerequisite for advancing it as a core competency is clear joint leadership. The roadmap strongly supports assigning advocacy and oversight to a four-star combatant commander. As one advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted during roadmap development, if DOD truly cared about IO it would put someone in charge of it. It did. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), was assigned that responsibility in the most recent unified command plan and charged with integrating and coordinating DOD information operations across the five core capabilities and across geographic areas. With this mandate, he has specific authority to develop concepts for integrated IO, prioritize information planning needs among combatant commanders, improve measures of information effectiveness, and promote IO in joint concept development and experimentation. To better execute these new responsibilities, STRATCOM created a Joint Force Headquarters for Information Operations. Headed by a three-star, the headquarters will be prepared to act as a supporting and sometimes a supported commander.

A Trained and Educated Career Workforce

In the past, each service developed specialists in information disciplines to meet service-specific requirements. There was little attention to integrating IO on the joint level. In addition, the increasingly complex technology associated with EW, PSYOP, and CNO tended to isolate the specialists who practiced these disciplines, hindering integration of core IO capabilities. However, the five capabilities are increasingly interdependent, as noted above. For maximum effect, they must be integrated in plans and operations by a set of professionals who understand all five disciplines. Accordingly, the IO roadmap endorses professional information forces with supporting training and education.
An IO career force composed of planners and capability specialists should be established to provide combatant commanders a cadre of experts who can assist with integrating information into deliberate and contingency plans. Secondly, the career force designation will allow capability specialists to explore other core capabilities so they can better integrate them into operations. The career force will break cultural norms. Isolated communities of core capability personnel will have to think of themselves as part of the larger IO community.

The career force includes the designation of service and joint billets to provide IO opportunities up to senior executive or flag level. This should ensure that experts occupy key jobs on combatant commander and other staffs. To address the persistent but not well documented problem of poor promotion and retention of core capability professionals, the roadmap mandates actions to monitor accession, retention, and promotion in the career force. Once documented and understood, these deficiencies can be corrected.

Joint and service training should be aligned to support the career force. A roadmap survey of existing joint and service training revealed widely divergent approaches to IO and insufficient appreciation of it in the most junior and senior officer ranks. There was consensus that officers should be introduced to IO earlier (O–4s and below) and again as general officers responsible for integrating IO with the other warfighting disciplines.

Joint Forces Staff College is assigned the lead for joint training and has been given additional resources to develop a standardized joint IO curriculum on the field grade and general/flag levels, including preparing and presenting an expanded joint information planner’s course. The college is encouraged to collaborate with service schools to integrate joint IO into curricula.

A DOD Center of Excellence will present graduate-level, full-spectrum IO core and specialty programs and support joint doctrine development through analysis and research. The private sector is creating technologies and techniques central to several core capability areas. It is critical that the Department have a center of expertise that can stay abreast of these developments and help the military absorb ideas that will improve information capabilities. The Center of Excellence will encourage development of innovative IO concepts and tools and help introduce them for use in experiments and exercises.
The IO Center of Excellence, located at the Naval Postgraduate School, will focus on executive and professional development, curricular conferences, and assistance with exercises, joint doctrine, distributed learning, and outreach to the IO community.

**Consolidated Analytic Support**

As noted above, some core capabilities require a foundation of hard analysis in peacetime to be well executed. Rapid analytic support is also needed during conflict as targets emerge and original assumptions are proven false. The need to adjust fire quickly has always been vital to PSYOP. Nimble analysis is also required to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum with CNO and EW. As EA–6B pilots discovered in Afghanistan, the target one trains for may prove not to be a problem (in this case, integrated enemy air defenses). Rapid analytic support can help reconfigure EW capabilities to unexpected target sets.

While conventional capabilities and target sets benefit from a solid, integrated analytic support base, IO does not. Combatant command staffs cannot produce sufficiently rapid solutions for tailored information effects due to lack of organic staff expertise and a single center in the continental United States facilitating integration of IO analysis, planning, and targeting. Multiple studies and operational experience have documented these shortfalls, and the roadmap recommends fixing the problem promptly. Resources have already been obligated.

The roadmap tasks STRATCOM with developing a joint integrative analysis and planning capability (JIAPC) to provide timely analysis, planning, and targeting in support of combatant commander IO requirements. JIAPC consists of an integrated network of analysis centers under STRATCOM leadership with the mandate to provide holistic support to commanders. It draws on the Electromagnetic-Space Analysis Center at the National Security Agency and the Human Factors Analysis Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide intelligence and characterize IO targets. It uses the expertise at the Joint Information Operations Center to assist with planning and draws on the Joint Warfighting Analysis Center and other sources to support targeting. STRATCOM will oversee the integration of the analysis from these centers and ensure that they are responsive to combatant commander requirements. While it will take time to fully implement the JIAPC concept, the command already has funding to improve the virtual collaboration between the analysis centers.

**Improving Core Capabilities**

Many recommendations in the roadmap address means to enhance each of the five core IO capabilities. Following is an overview of the main ideas:

*Develop a defense in depth strategy for network defense.* Computer networks are increasingly an operational center of gravity as the military transforms into an information-centric force. DOD needs a robust, layered defense based on global and enclave situational awareness with a centralized capability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and respond to attacks. Such a defense in depth strategy should operate on the premise that the Department will “fight the net” as it would a weapon system or other joint force capability with a priority for battlefield performance. The net must be considered a priority asset, used accordingly, and be sufficiently protected to absorb hits without suffering catastrophic failure. Since the network will presumably come under attack, the warfighter must expect some degradation and be prepared to fight on while network defenders reconstitute the network.

The Defense Department has produced lists of enhancements for network defense, some of which have been implemented. Missing is an overarching strategy that takes limited resources into account, chooses an approach to network defense among alternatives, and balances the alternatives and associated resource requirements against known risks. A tailored strategy, carefully constructed and managed with near- and long-term objectives, would more likely give senior leaders confidence that additional investments in network defense will ensure the graceful degradation of the network rather than its collapse. This is a tall order given the complexity of our ever-changing networks and the evolving threat, but it is essential if we want to avoid building a critical vulnerability into our information-reliant transformed forces.

*Improve network and electromagnetic attack capability.* Our forces must dominate the electromagnetic spectrum with attack capabilities to prevail in an information-centric fight. Too much of the electronic warfare effort has been focused on electronic protection for discrete platforms. Electronic attack capability is invariably in short supply and cannot operate with sufficient freedom across the battlespace. To keep up with the explosion of commercial and government products that exploit the electromagnetic spectrum for military ends, DOD needs a robust suite of EW and CNO capabilities with increased reliability through improved command and control, assurance testing, and refined tactics and procedures. Yet the Department lacks a coherent EW vision and investment strategy. Current programs are
service-specific, with decentralized development and operations.

The Pentagon needs a capability to provide maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, denying, degrading, disrupting, or destroying a broad range of enemy sensors, command and control, and critical support infrastructures. The roadmap recommended, and DOD established, an Electronic Warfare Executive Steering Group, led by the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The group is charged with developing a multiservice investment strategy and providing more effective oversight of the development of EW systems and operational architectures. It will oversee creation of an EW roadmap that provides an architecture and investment strategy. The IO roadmap lays down criteria for an EW roadmap, including the need for options that improve operator access to the full suite of EW programs and to changes in policies and procedures for delegating authority to apportion, allocate, and use such capabilities.

Increase psychological operations capabilities. Iraqi Freedom again highlighted the role of PSYOP to the joint commander and the need for improvement. Though helpful, PSYOP found it difficult to keep up with fast-moving forces that needed tailored messages delivered immediately prior to combat to achieve the desired effect.

To better support combatant commanders, PSYOP must focus on adversary decisionmaking. It must be planned well in advance to achieve the powerful behavior modification desired. Its products require in-depth knowledge of the audience’s decisionmaking processes and factors influencing them. Additionally, the products must be rapidly developed, with quality deliverables and messages disseminated directly to targeted audiences throughout an area of operations.

The IO roadmap recommends a number of improvements to PSYOP, including increases in force structure. Perhaps the most important recommendation, already funded, was for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to create a Joint PSYOP Support Element for two tasks. First, it will rapidly produce commercial quality product prototypes for combatant commanders, and second, it will help commands coordinate their PSYOP programs and products with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that they are consistent with overall U.S. themes and messages. The element will maintain a team in Washington to facilitate coordination.

To improve the timely, multimode dissemination of products using PSYOP delivery systems, SOCOM has initiated an advanced concept technology demonstration along with other modernization efforts. It includes upgrades to traditional delivery systems such as leaflets and loudspeakers that are highly responsive to maneuver commanders. Other technologies are being pursued that will expand the capability to disseminate targeted messages. This is a significant challenge that must be met to maximize PSYOP potential in the information age.

Advocacy for operations security and military deception. Protecting the commanders’ plans while misdirecting those of the enemy is one of the three broad functions of integrated IO. Typically, it is assumed that overwhelming power can compensate for accurate enemy knowledge of our intentions and capabilities. This may be true in some circumstances, but it would be unwise to rely on this hope or fail to seize additional advantages.

Military deception and OPSEC were successful in Iraqi Freedom. Nonetheless there is room for improvement, and it should start with personnel. Deception requires centralized planning, security, and close integration with operational planning. While OPSEC and deception do not have a standing career force, personnel will receive specialized training in both disciplines sufficient to plan and execute full spectrum IO. In addition, the Secretary of Defense assigned STRATCOM the lead for ensuring that joint OPSEC is fully integrated into IO concepts, planning, and career force education and training.
The IO roadmap is a milestone in DOD transformation, and more specifically for those who labor in IO disciplines. It establishes the building blocks Secretary Rumsfeld identified as necessary for achieving a core military competency. The roadmap demonstrates that the Department recognizes the importance of IO and is committed to maximizing its contributions to joint force commanders across the range of military operations.

Collectively, the recommendations of the roadmap begin the transformation of IO into a core military capability. Fully implemented, they will produce the following benefits for the Department in general and for combatant commanders in particular:

- A common lexicon and approach to IO, including integrated information campaign planning
- More execution authority delegated to commanders
- A trained and educated career force capable of IO planning and execution
- Centralized planning, integration, and analysis support from STRATCOM
- Enhanced capabilities for the warfighter
- Improved ability to disseminate messages aimed at influencing enemy decisions
- Protection of networks through a defense in depth strategy
- A robust offensive suite of capabilities with increased reliability through improved command and control, assurance testing, and refined tactics and procedures.

Many of the IO roadmap recommendations are implemented or under way. The DOD IO Executive Committee, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with representation from key civilian and military stakeholders, exercised oversight of roadmap implementation for the year following publication. The committee reported its accomplishments to the Secretary in November 2004. At the same time, it noted that a number of issues require continuing oversight and direction that will be provided by the IO and Space Executive Committee chaired by the Under Secretary for Intelligence.

Implementing the roadmap will affect not only the information community but the entire profession of arms. The impact that IO can have on both human and automated decisionmaking suggests how its capabilities contribute to joint force transformation. More broadly, IO makes the military consider not only the physical assets of both sides but also their approach to decisionmaking and how it affects the time, place, and way their physical capabilities are used. In this respect, developing IO as a core military competency might encourage joint warfighters to think about conflict with a more balanced appreciation for its mental and physical aspects. In any case, progress toward implementing the roadmap deserves scrutiny by those interested in the evolving operational art of war.
In the fifteen years since the establishment of the national renewal policy, called *doi moi*, Vietnam has emerged from socioeconomic crisis characterized by extensive and debilitating rates of poverty and unemployment into a regional power experiencing double-digit economic growth, stable government, and a more powerful military.

As a sovereign state, Vietnam has a clear policy of defending the national interests, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Fundamentally, peace and self-defense are the cornerstones.

The National View of Defense

The policy objectives of Vietnam’s national defense are to:

- safeguard peace
- maintain and develop relations of friendship, cooperation, and joint development with other countries

Senior General Pham Van Tra is Minister of National Defense, Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Vietnam has proven that its people are self-reliant and capable of defending their land. The national defense protects the security interests of the country and, at the same time, respects the security interests of others, sincerely wishing to be a friend to countries struggling for peace, independence, and development. The defense policy is devised on the basis of the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian interests of the country, while considering and learning from international experience.

The national defense is one of peace and of readiness to show good will for relations with all countries worldwide, including those involved in disputes with Vietnam concerning territorial borders, islands, and the continental shelf. It contributes to the national policy of openness, diversification, and multilateralization of external relations without aligning with one country against another, without confrontation and aggression against any country, and without joining an arms race, while still preserving the right to build forces. Vietnam puts its national security in the framework of regional security and actively contributes to overall world security. It neither joins military alliances nor engages in military operations contrary to the spirit of safeguarding peace.

Vietnam advocates striving for the prevention and elimination of war menaces, supports nuclear-free policy, and opposes the production of weapons of mass destruction. It supports combating terrorists based on international laws and the U.N. charter.

**Building an All-People’s National Defense**

The all-people’s national defense requires that all the people, not the armed forces alone, take part in building a national defense and protecting the country. The people have a decisive role in the all-people’s national defense. Consolidating the defense of Vietnam should be closely associated with consolidating the people’s security.

In building a posture of all-people’s national defense as well as that of the people’s security, the foremost task is to win hearts and minds and implement a national defense by the people and for the people. The basic challenge is to build defense potential in every aspect—a firm posture of all-people’s security.

Building the defense potential. Politico-spiritual potential is one of the basic strengths of defense power. Building the politico-spiritual strength of the people implies building confidence in our political lines, in our cause of national construction and preservation, and in the renewal policies of our party.

Building economic potential. The techno-material foundation of the all-people’s national defense is gradually built on the basis of economic
Van Tra

Development. The building of the defense industry is stressed to supply the armed forces with ever more modern equipment and techniques. Along with this, a system must be built for mobilizing the overall economy and industry in service of defense when necessary.

Building scientific and technological potential. The government considers science and technology, along with education and training, the priorities for national policy and the driving force of socioeconomic development. They are also the requirements for maintaining national independence and building prosperity.

To create military potential is to create a physical and spiritual power in the country in order to produce military strength and mobilize that strength in the cause of national defense. In building military potential, due attention must be paid to creating a material foundation (defense industry and defense economy), fostering a well-grounded military intellectual standard (science of military art, military social science and humanities, military science and techniques), and perfecting the armed forces organizations (military staffing and equipment and improving the defense posture). Establishing a strong military potential should be linked to building the posture of an all-people’s national defense.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam advocates turning provinces into strong defense zones. Each zone should be self-reliant and self-resilient. Each should regularly build the whole people’s aggregate strength and firmly defend the locality in the common posture of the whole country. Should war occur, such a zone will be capable of taking the initiative in fighting an enemy at the very beginning, attacking tenaciously, holding positions steadfastly, wearing away and destroying the opponent, and bogging down the enemy so it becomes passive. A zone should create opportunities and coordinate closely with national forces to gain victory.

The state sets forth tasks and objectives of defense building for each locality in its short- and long-term plans for national development. The process of implementing plans is also a process of state management in the field of national defense.

Vietnam has greatly reduced active troops in peacetime and built reserve forces for mobilization, improving the quality of militia and self-defense forces and effecting a new balance among three categories of forces.

The people’s army is a component of the People’s Armed Forces and is currently being built up in peacetime conditions. It has to meet the requirements of the two strategic tasks, namely to build and defend the country. The fundamental functions of the people’s army are to fight for national defense, and simultaneously to mobilize the masses and to take part in national development.

The organizational structure embracing four categories of forces (the regular forces, the local forces, the militia, and self-defense forces) is the soundest system of organization, most suited to the people’s war in Vietnam.

Regular Forces

The regular forces are well trained, with high mobility and great assault and firepower involving several combined arms and services. They are organized and incorporated into strategic armies, corps, and units with effective strength and armaments, high combat readiness, and real fighting power. They are capable of waging timely combat anywhere, at any time, under all circumstances.

**Vietnam**

**Defense Budget:** $2.2 billion for 2002; the gross domestic product in 2002 was $34 billion ($425 per capita).

**Manpower:** With a population of 80,048,000, Vietnam has a total of 11,281,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is 484,000. Reserve forces number 3–4 million.

**Armed Forces:** Vietnam has an army of 412,000 with 1,315 main battle tanks; a navy with 42,000 sailors and two submarines and six frigates; and an air force with 30,000 personnel and 189 combat aircraft.

The regular forces are organized into army, navy, and air force and air defense.

The army is now structured into army corps. Due to combined arms and specially trained troops, it is fully capable of fighting on diverse terrains and in different weathers across the vastness of the country. The army now has strong firepower and crack capabilities; it is quite capable of staging different types of military operations and has creative and flexible fighting patterns.

The people’s navy consists of all combat and logistic elements operating in bluewater where there are islands, archipelagos, gulfs, and continental shelves, and along the coast. It is organized into many combat groups present in the various waters of Vietnam. These conditions are favorable to quick deployment, movement, and high concentration of troops to deal with critical events.

The air defense-air force plays a key role in the fight against sudden attacks and air raids. It will be further built up to the point where it can fulfill its mission to protect and control Vietnamese air space. The air force is organized into divisions and possesses aircraft of different types. It is structured in three categories of fighting forces.

Local Forces

The local force is associated with specific defense zones. The structure and size of local forces varies with the size and importance of the provinces, cities, and districts. Consisting of professional technical units, it is a mobile and full-time force existing in every locality and is a key force in a defense zone.

The border guard force is responsible for protecting national sovereignty and the security of the border areas, inland and over the sea, and other important targets. It is also a fighting force and is the first to be involved in counterattacks against aggressive actions.

The militia and self-defense force is a part time force of the masses. It is organized across the country and linked with the security protection organization to make a joint structure ensuring capabilities of both fighting and security maintenance in the locality. It is assigned to be ready to fight in its own villages, streets, offices, and production places and maintain public order and social security.

The reserve force is extensively organized, compatible with the theory of modern people’s war. It contains all the components of regular forces. The reserve comes from various areas and from the services of the regular and local forces; thus many citizens are involved in reserve service.
Implementing the National Defense Policy

Building the People’s Armed Forces politically. A political foundation serves as a basis for building strong forces in all aspects. This directly contributes to promoting combat strength on the political and ideological front of the current struggle.

Building and training a contingent of officers and technical personnel. The system of army schools, colleges, and institutes is an integral part of the overall system of schools, colleges, and universities of the state, and it should meet the requirements set out by the state. In training officers and technical personnel, the army and state should work together to foster a supply of talented personnel combining specialized military training with civil career training to help them gain adequate knowledge of fields such as politics, economics, culture, sociology, law, production, technology, and management.

Maintaining, improving, and reasonably acquiring and supplementing technical equipment and weapons. Weapons acquisition must be approached in the context of the relationship between men and weapons, the development of clever fighting patterns, the proper use of weapons, and high combat effectiveness. These factors have been studied in the development of the Vietnamese military art.

Developing the military science. In order to continue building and developing its military science, Vietnam must discover rules and laws of national defense for new circumstances and conditions. These will be enriched with more theories of building the People’s Armed Forces and maintaining national defense in peacetime. The military science will continue to develop so as to raise its own standard while keeping abreast with the pace of the world military revolution. Building the military science of Vietnam should be coupled with training and fostering military talents and enhancing the intellectuality of the defense posture and national preservation.

Modernizing the command system. Nowadays, in the face of great challenges posed by science and technology and by informatics warfare, the command system should be modernized to keep pace with general world standards. The war of national defense in the future will also bear the features and characteristics of informatics and high-tech warfare. Therefore, improving and raising the quality of the communication and information system is of great importance in building up the fighting strength of the People’s Armed Forces and that of the all-people’s national defense.

Building well-rounded grass-roots units. Units should be developed with the political field as the mainstay, a contingent of officers and technical personnel as the center, and education and training as a regular duty. All this work should be associated with promoting standardization, with attending to the material and spiritual life of officers and soldiers, and with building unity within the army itself and in close relationship with the people.

Expanding international cooperation. In the interest of strengthening peace, and in compliance with the foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, openness, diversification, and multilateralization of external relations of the state, the national defense policy advocates establishing and promoting relations of cooperation and exchange with other countries’ armed forces on the basis of equality and mutual understanding.

The People’s Armed Forces are always prepared to fulfill their task of firmly safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and, at the same time, are willing to cooperate in issues favorable to the peace and security of the region. Moreover, they actively take part in building the country. This is a responsible attitude contributing to the peace and security of the world in general. Hopefully this introduction to the national defense policy of Vietnam will promote understanding with other defense communities. Such understanding contributes to confidence building among nations, peace, cooperation for development, and security in the region and the world over.

Sailors at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi.
A new security concept emerged on the American defense-planning scene several years ago. Asymmetric warfare was worked into the 1997 National Security Strategy. Analysts and major defense documents have since described the more vexing and menacing security challenges as asymmetric. The term is used in connection with threats, strategies, and warfare. Asymmetry typically describes an enemy that thinks or acts differently from America, especially when faced with conventionally superior U.S. forces. Asymmetric threats are most often associated with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and unfamiliar capabilities such as those displayed in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Such weapons leverage vulnerabilities we either overlook or tolerate. And these asymmetric approaches can generate dramatic outcomes for a weaker power.

Yet this concept has lost its usefulness in part because it means different things to different people. Moreover, when joined with warfare or threats, the term asymmetric adds little to the strategic thinking of ages past. Observations that weak and clever enemies can bring a stronger power to its knees by exploiting vulnerabilities or can brazenly challenge muscle-bound modern militaries with a surprise use of frightening weapons or unfamiliar maneuvering simply restate the obvious: strategy matters. So what does the concept of asymmetry add to an understanding of warfare and the threat? Is it a useful defense planning or policy analysis tool in this post-Cold War, post-9/11 world?
These are not idle questions. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has described a variety of acute threats to the United States as asymmetric. That has been his shorthand for WMD, ballistic and cruise missiles, and terrorism. He confessed in an interview with The New York Times that he was at a loss to explain what this concept really meant. “I don’t like it. I wish I knew an alternative. I wish I knew a better way of saying ‘weapons of mass destruction.’”1 In his frustration, it appears he intuitively reached a conclusion offered here, that the relatively young concept of asymmetry appears to have outlived its usefulness in the context of security discussions.

**Making Sense of It All**

Despite being militarily dominant, the United States today must prepare defenses against dissimilar enemies who are able to exploit vulnerabilities by using shadowy tactics and highly lethal weapons. These parties threaten to strike at the foundations of national security, alter the American way of life, and dumbfound the highly efficient, ultramodern Armed Forces. Asymmetry, a multifaceted, multidimensional concept that sought to capture these dangers, was rushed into service to help analysts make sense of it all.

The post–Cold War world is perplexing. The military dominance of the United States defines today’s international power system, a reality made plain by the country’s global strategy, power projection capabilities, operational expertise, force structure, defense budget, leadership responsibilities, and technological and industrial might. This unmatched power might explain a curious feature of asymmetry: it is often a synonym for anti-Americanism.

Several factors work against U.S. security despite its global dominance. Included are self-imposed constraints, those real or perceived obligations that limit Washington’s ability or willingness to act militarily. Unilateral legal constraints include such measures as the Posse Comitatus Act, arms control conventions such as the Biological Weapons Convention and Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Executive order banning assassination. U.S. commanders and leaders also rigorously plan and execute operations according to the well-developed laws of armed conflict. Whereas Osama bin Laden and his supporters believe it is their duty to target civilians and that attacks against the infidel will be rewarded, war for Americans is a measure of last resort against armed enemies for principle and in defense of interests.

Strict observance of just war doctrine and the perceived need for popular support to initiate and prosecute military action abroad also bind Washington. The American people will have less of a stomach for casualties, in other words, if they believe a military action is ill-conceived, bungled, or unjust.

We also live in a world where enemies can have very different stakes in a conflict and radically divergent measures for success. Whereas the United States may travel to a distant theater to defend national interests, its forces may be locked in battle with an enemy fighting for survival. And whereas the Pentagon may define victory as a series of battles leading to a decisive military engagement and perhaps unconditional surrender, the other side may achieve victory by merely stalling military operations, politically dividing alliances and coalitions, or humiliating the Armed Forces, as happened to U.S. Army Rangers in the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

The asymmetry concept also includes toleration of two classes of vulnerabilities, those inherent to the national society and system of government and those that policymakers deem low risk. With respect to the first, Americans adhere rigorously to a system of legal due process and zealously guard their civil liberties. Given the demands for open society and trade, they live with porous borders, maintain a multi-ethnic society, and promote and defend access to information, technologies, and American hospitality. These factors conspire to leave public and private infrastructures open to attack from within. Concerns about how homeland security measures violate civil liberties underscore how tough a political problem this is.

Toleration of some dangers exists by policy choice. Assessments that certain vulnerabilities are low risk mean some threats are given a low priority in defense planning. For years, Washington tolerated vulnerability to ballistic missile attack, a trend President George Bush reversed with his pledge to deploy a defense against all ranges of ballistic missiles to protect the United States, its troops, and its allies and friends. U.S. leaders continue to tolerate the susceptibility of satellite constellations to attack or operational disruption.

The Nation also faces multiple threats from enemies spread across the globe. Contingencies can arise unexpectedly, and planners must prepare to defend interests or prosecute war against a wide range of groups, some of which are stateless and may have access to highly lethal weapons. There also remains a significant arms and technology proliferation challenge that has given life
to what one might call the democratization of destruction.

The term asymmetric has also been used to characterize threats considered unconventional in other ways. Such threats are:

- unusual in our view (taking and torturing hostages)
- irregular—against the laws of armed conflict or in violation of treaties (using nuclear weapons to disrupt satellite operations)
- unmatched to our capabilities and departing from war as we understand it (flying airplanes into buildings)
- highly leveraged against our assets (using ballistic missiles and WMD)
- difficult to respond to in kind or proportionately, so responses against terrorism or guerrilla warfare seem heavy-handed.

Asymmetric threats may also be unknown or have unforeseen consequences—for example, a wide-scale biological attack that reduces an urban area to a wasteland.

Many of these threats are not aimed at physical control and do not rely on brute strength; rather they play on vulnerabilities and seek inadvertent cooperation. In significant respects, the analytical process engendered by the concept of asymmetry is nothing more than effective strategy at work between combatants.

**A Definitional Quagmire**

The real test of a concept is whether it can consistently enhance understanding. On the surface, asymmetry appears to address today’s threats, especially among politicians who typically use sweeping rhetoric. The term is used prevalently, so the presumption is that it has meaning. It reflects the world’s shades of gray and shifting threats. It also speaks to national vulnerabilities and lack of preparedness and is thus politically useful.

Yet the analytical utility of the term is less certain when a definition cannot be reached. Asymmetric approaches, according to some, involve acting in unexpected ways or presenting enemy leaders with capabilities and situations they are unable or unwilling to respond to. Such approaches represent ways of coping with superior American power and achieving equality. Others think of it as a way of “acting, organizing, and thinking differently [to] maximize one’s own advantage, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.”

Does this sound familiar to students of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu?

One may use asymmetry to address threat types: homeland vulnerability, WMD, ballistic and cruise missiles, and terrorism. Or perhaps one means unconventional attacks against the homeland. In any case, the defender cannot simply engage an army, navy, or air force. Asymmetry can thus describe any threat, tactic, or approach deemed unfair, unorthodox, surprising, equalizing, urgent, unfamiliar, or unimaginable.

At this point one may be accused of quibbling. After all, the above uses roughly coincide with our understanding of what is asymmetric. Yet it is also true that all successful deceptions share in the truth. Our concept obsession is a potential barrier to clear thought and consequently to sound planning. We analyze to make sense of reality. Based on available evidence and assumptions, we ask what threats or risks exist and how they should be prioritized. What should be the responses, and how should we carry them out? What strategies and tactics and what equipment and weapons should the country have? Can the concept of asymmetry help answer these questions?

Asymmetry boils down to recognizing difference, since to be asymmetric is to be different. Yet differences lie at the heart of international life. History and geography have rewarded or punished polities unevenly. Moreover, states can be distinguished because of their legal and political characteristics.

Heterogeneity permeates the military universe and yields strikingly dissimilar military cultures. Threats from enemies who think in unorthodox ways and resort to surprising tactics are as old as warfare. Sun Tzu’s 500 B.C. *The Art of War* taught that, “as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness. . . . All warfare . . . is based on deception.”

The United States has historically been familiar with asymmetric foes. During the French and Indian wars and the battles for independence against Great Britain in the 1770s and 1780s, the colonists resorted to unconventional tactics to defeat the highly disciplined British forces. Nor were Union and Confederate soldiers symmetrically matched in the Civil War. Indeed, the United States has fought in many unequal contests in the Western Hemisphere and in Asia over the past two centuries. Which facts of military life, patterns of human behavior, and features of the world does asymmetry set in sharp relief?

Now consider that definitions are the analyst’s basic tools. The art of discerning differences and similarities is the basis of thought. To define
something is to determine its essential qualities and meaning, which distinguish it from other things. Socrates observed that the “methods of division and collection” are “instruments that enable me to speak and to think.” The more sharply we render the things we discuss and debate, the better we understand what sets them apart.

One way to look at whether the concept of asymmetry adds to or detracts from powers of discrimination is to see whether it is central in planning. Is the concept reflected in how we organize, plan, or fight? There is good reason to believe it is irrelevant in these processes. While asymmetry is peppered throughout the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, an examination of the table of contents and report headings suggests that it was not an organizing principle for the authors. A country can make elaborate defense plans and mobilize to defeat a biological weapon threat, terrorists, or ballistic missiles, but can it organize to defeat asymmetric threats?

Clearly not, since without further interrogation the subject matter is not distinguishable.

Can asymmetry help categorize threat types? Yes, but once we consider everything that has been defined as asymmetric, we once again must scratch our temples and wonder how useful this exercise really is. Terrorism, sabotage, insurgencies, use of ballistic and cruise missiles, information warfare techniques, nuclear explosions in space, violence against the environment, WMD, and antisatellite or antiship weapons have all been said to pose asymmetric threats to the United States and its interests. It is hard to deny that the asymmetric basket of threats is large and growing. Perhaps it is more productive to ask which threats are not asymmetric.

Weapons of mass destruction are almost universally considered the archetypal asymmetric weapon for their perceived ability to achieve a disproportionate effect that may have a catastrophic outcome on strategic balances. Yet is not the appearance of such weapons merely a function of technological discovery? These weapons become asymmetric in the hands of enemies, but to what benefit in understanding?

**Searching for Taliban members in Afghanistan.**
There is evidence throughout history that innovations in weapons and tactics profoundly affect the balance of power. The introduction of cavalry spurred the fall of the Roman Empire. The crossbow and longbow allowed commoners to challenge knights on horseback. The telegraph and railway gave Union forces an unmatched communication and logistic advantage in the Civil War, much as U.S. dominance of space and satellite communication granted a favorable climate to wage war against Iraq in 1991. The observation that new instruments of war and tactics introduce asymmetries and can give one side an advantage is not very insightful. To be sure, reactions to those new weapons and tactics will occur as actors on all sides endeavor to regain the advantage by introducing new asymmetries.

Besides reminding planners that enemies will use different or unfair tactics or employ unconventional weapons, the use of asymmetry in security discussions can confound analysis by insisting on nonsensical distinctions and oversimplified conclusions. For example, when we are told that a Chinese antisatellite weapon capability would be a “useful asymmetrical means” of disabling U.S. satellites, does that mean we can also find a “symmetrical” way? What might that be? Asymmetry’s loose definition may lead to distinctions that are logical but that on closer examination appear rather foolish. If there is not a symmetrical side to our understanding, can a meaningful asymmetrical side exist?

**Welcome Back Sun Tzu**

“When I have won a victory,” said Sun Tzu in *The Art of War*, “I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.”

Strategy—what a concept! Target an enemy’s weaknesses, avoid his strengths, surprise him, master the indirect approach—this has been the stuff of victory throughout history. The goal of a strategist has always been to win the upper hand by leveling the playing field when one’s side is disadvantaged and to prevent the opponent from gaining an operational or tactical advantage. So why do we believe we need a new concept that describes how an enemy will approach us to do us harm?

Asymmetry did not come into focus until the United States was well into its effort to understand the post–Cold War security environment. One could reasonably assume that its rise is linked to the disappearance of the intellectual construct adopted to keep the peace during the Cold War standoff.

Between 1945 and 1991, the nuclear-age cognoscenti and makers of opinion and policy redefined strategy to suit unprecedented security circumstances. In a radical departure from the classical understanding, all things strategic became inextricably identified with nuclear weapons and East-West warfare. The principal organizing strategy permeating U.S. planning circles was mutual assured destruction (MAD), a strikingly symmetrical and historically surreal way to
consider war. For decades we deliberately sought nuclear parity with the Soviet Union through arms control. This symmetrical strategy meant central reliance on a possible outcome of nuclear annihilation for both sides.

Washington found at the end of the Cold War that mutual annihilation meant reliance on principles that were not easily transferred from one security era to the next. So while MAD may have prevented the next hot war (although the world came perilously close to nuclear disaster in October 1962), it is now obviously inappropriate in a world of multiple enemies, where decision-makers in hostile and friendly regimes cannot be deemed to be uniformly predictable and rational. It was not prudent, in other words, to have a MAD relationship with Saddam Hussein. Total war dominated yesterday’s security debates; today we strive to fathom wars that are unnervingly limited and that madden us with their unconventionality.

MAD proponents believed that safety could only be assured through plans calling for the immediate and apocalyptic use of brute force against an enemy on the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, and they knew the likelihood of massive retaliation. We lived by a creed: whatever buried us would bury them. Over and over came warnings that a nuclear war must never be fought because it could never be won. That made the failure of deterrence inconceivable. We could have strategies for deterrence and arms control but not for military triumph. Victory was at bottom a deeply troubling thought. Where in all of this could one hope to find a method and philosophy for winning?

The emergence of asymmetry as a security concept coincided with a collective attempt to recover intellectually from an extreme strategy of inflicting widespread and indiscriminate destruction. Yet what was really lacking was strategic awareness. The essence of military strategy endows warfare “with intelligent properties that raise it above the brute application of force.” Properly understood, it recognizes a path to victory (or achievement of objectives), and that path may lead through the thickets of combat. Asymmetry, as has been seen, sounds like strategy insofar as it embodies action concepts that leverage unpredictability, indirectness, and unorthodoxy and recognizes possible victory of the weak over the strong.

The focus on victory against those who endanger American lives, liberties, and way of life motivates defense policymakers and planners in the post-MAD world. They have certain knowledge that they face enemies who would “use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself,” who are malicious and ruthless, crafty and subversive, unorthodox and monumentally “unfair” in their tactics. Today, sturdy defenses and a doctrine of preemptive strike make far more sense. The Nation understands the need to be prepared to fight and win against an enemy that operates according to strange terms of warfare.

The Armed Forces employ unconventionality and unpredictability to upset, disorient, or otherwise weaken an enemy’s forces and plans. By turning weakness into strength, they can compel an enemy to give up its political purpose. B.H. Liddell Hart wrote in his classic exposition:

_"Effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home....To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponent’s balance and thus increases his resisting power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold and upsetting his balance results in self-exhaustion, increasing in disproportionate ratio to the effective strain put upon him."_

This begs the question of how discerning we are if we are amazed by what once passed for common sense. With strategy (as traditionally understood) on sabbatical and our attention so absurdly (though necessarily) focused on a single and equally powerful enemy for half a century, asymmetry arrived at the end of Cold War competition as strategy’s impostor. It came replete with a somewhat dubious though vaguely convincing language and analytical framework for understanding threats and the new security environment.

Reading about asymmetric warfare, one typically envisions a decision by one side to not assault the other’s army, navy, or air force head-on. Yet it is a sin against strategy in any given battle for one force, large or small, to be perfectly predictable by pairing off even imperfectly with an enemy. Such cases have had tragic outcomes. In
World War I, for example, the symmetrical strategy and operational plans that led to force-on-force tactical engagements in the trenches left the practitioners of war with a barbaric method of combat as the only option for success. A perfect symmetry in opposing forces means that the brains of those forces are acting in a monumentally nonstrategic manner. All strategy works on asymmetries, so asymmetric warfare is representative of all rationally executed warfare.

The present obsession with asymmetric threats is evidence of the very banality of our musings on the post–Cold War security environment and on the dynamic forces and counterforces fed into U.S. security policy. After the fall of the Soviet Union, American mental reflexes were unresponsive to the memories of strategy’s eternal logic as it had been revealed in the martial contests of the past. Asymmetry was there to fill the resulting void.

Reconsidering a Catchphrase

As Colin Gray noted, “A problem with popular formulas can be that their familiarity breeds an unwarranted confidence in interpretation.” The same may be said of popular jargon. While the concept of asymmetry appeared on the scene to bring coherence to planning in a world of multiple, diverse threats and complex international interactions, one could readily conclude that it has done neither. Asymmetry is classically general; its very ubiquity renders it irrelevant.

There is an analogy here with the word cancerous. To call something cancerous is to not say much that is meaningful without clarification from a physician. Cancer of the what? Is it benign or malignant? Is there a cure? What are the recovery timelines? How long does one have to live? Only with answers to these questions can one put order into his life and prioritize what is important in light of new circumstances. Similarly, one cannot know much about anything asymmetric without delving into its context.

We have hung onto the term in part because it allows us to presume that we have tied the world’s complicating factors into our thoughts and discussions. It helps express certain ideas and sounds erudite. But it also lives on because users and readers alike have been less than critical.

It is said that the beginning of wisdom is the proper understanding of things. We understand today that some things are different from yesterday. We face a series of dangers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and globally with the threat of WMD, ballistic missiles, and al Qaeda-brand terrorism. America’s defense leadership has taken steps to ensure that the Armed Forces retain their own asymmetric battlefield advantages through the transformation process. Homeland security is now the watchword and is responsible for the most far-reaching U.S. Government reorganization since Harry Truman. It is also clear that we have to think outside the box. We face adversaries who are committed to looking for and exploiting our defense seams. The baseline concept adopted to explain this reality is asymmetry.

Yet asymmetry’s most profound contribution to analysis is as a reminder that today’s world is different. There is evidence that this term is nothing more than a Beltway buzzword that is nearing the end of its life. Secretary Rumsfeld’s observation must give one pause. While the term was used extensively in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, it does not appear in the September 2002 National Security Strategy—a rather odd omission if the concept is of any use in explaining our world. We have come full circle from 1997.

Owing to its analytical shortcomings and the need for a strong sense of priority in defense planning, this concept will fade rapidly from defense jargon. Meanwhile, if we are going to use this term, we should explain what we mean. Yet if we must spend too much time explaining, perhaps we should not use it at all.

NOTES

8 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, pp. 66, 134.
9 Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 25.
Admiral Thomas Hinman Moorer  
(1912–2004)  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

V I T A

Born in Mt. Willing, Alabama; graduated from Naval Academy (1933); completed naval aviation training (1936); flew with fighter squadrons based on carriers USS Langley, Lexington, and Enterprise (1936–41); serving with Patrol Squadron 22 at Pearl Harbor when Japanese attacked (1941); flew combat missions in Dutch East Indies Campaign; had various tours afloat including acting as operations officer aboard USS Midway and serving on the staff of commander, Carrier Division 4, Atlantic Fleet; commanded USS Salisbury Sound; assumed command of Seventh Fleet (1962); appointed commander in chief of Pacific Fleet (1964); assumed command of NATO U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet (1965); served as Chief of Naval Operations (1967–70); acted as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970–74); died in Bethesda, Maryland.

The struggle has moved into a rapidly changing global setting. If there is a breakdown in the American policy consensus, this is due in large part to the fact that the old premises no longer seem to apply to the emerging global situation. They do not accommodate such phenomena as emerging new actors on the world stage, the ever more revolutionary thrust of technology, the shifts in global wealth and power, the economic vulnerabilities of the industrialized world, and the sharpening competition for progressively scarce global resources.

—from U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad

Portrait by Albert K. Murray
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
A Review Essay
BY JAMES R. BLAKER

The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division
by Bing West and Ray L. Smith
New York: Bantam Dell, 2003
320 pp. $24.95
[ISBN: 0-553-80376-X]

The Iraq War: A Military History
by Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr.
368 pp. $25.95
[ISBN: 0-674-01280-1]

The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons
by Anthony H. Cordesman
592 pp. $25.00
[ISBN: 0-89206-432-3]

S

Short wars such as the United States fought with Iraq in spring 2003 cause us to burrow into the souls of those who fight them as well as those who are casualties. Yet the huge populations who get their information from headlines and sound bites respond with short attention spans when the miniwars end. Thus short wars spawn intense efforts to describe and assess them before the memory fades into oblivion. This is a challenge to historians and analysts. Comprehensive descriptions of short wars are hard to write both quickly and well because statistics, anecdotes, data, and assessments emerge slowly, particularly when the war’s purpose, conduct, and results are politically charged by approaching elections. All this applies to the months after major combat operations ended in Iraq.

But three early looks at Iraqi Freedom hit the streets within a few months of the seizure of Baghdad, all first rate. Whatever limits early publication imposed on depth of insight and range of assessment, the three taken together offer a far more comprehensive overview, more insight, and more interesting reads than anything yet to emerge from official histories and lessons learned. And The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division by Bing West and Ray L. Smith, The Iraq War: A Military History by Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., and The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons by Anthony H. Cordesman reveal much about the bias screens the authors used.

West and Smith accompanied the Marine Corps 1st Division on its assault up from Kuwait through the middle of Iraq. Their interest was mostly the conduct of Iraqi Freedom on the tactical level. Both served as marines in Vietnam and contrast the way small combat units fought in the two conflicts. They portray, often graphically and with experienced sensitivity to the fears and courage of infantrymen, the differences and continuities, concluding generally that today’s grunts are tougher, smarter, better armed, and more technically able. The authors are impressed as much by the leap in power in the hands of—and at the call of—American infantrymen as by the continuity of their courage, skill, and conviction.

Experience, tactical sense, and perspective distinguish the authors from the embedded reporters who also saw things from the tactical level. Their reputations and connections with the marines—Smith is a retired major general who goes by “E.T.” from the entrenching tool he used as a weapon during a battle in I Corps, and West, also a combat veteran, is an accomplished chronicler of Marine Corps exploits—freed them from many of the constraints imposed on embedded reporters, got them their own vehicle, and smoothed access throughout the Corps hierarchy. But experience and sense also help them build more general insights from the tactical details they saw up close and dirty during the three-week campaign.

Murray, a prolific historian, and Scales, a retired Army major general and historian in his own right, focus more on the operational level. Their interest is in how well the larger units—corps, divisions, and brigades—executed plans and adjusted to surprises. They write about the use of land, naval, and airpower to crush or avoid what military force the Iraqis tried to throw against the Americans and British. Further, they compare the conflict on the operational level with Desert Storm a decade earlier. They find that the attributes of transformation have grown. Speed, precision, battlespace knowledge, force interdependence, and sequencing were all in markedly greater abundance. But the authors are careful to caveat the undeniable technical advances and increased effectiveness by iterating that the essential factors in the improve- ment remain training, preparation, experience, and skill on the part of the warriors and their leaders.

Unlike West and Smith, Murray and Scales do not rest their case on direct observation or participation. But while

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their sources are official reports and interviews, their reputations, appreciation of military affairs, and acknowledgments gave them extraordinary access to the opinions and views of field commanders. Both are distinguished military historians and deft writers with a consistent perspective on military technology and combat effectiveness. Their book burnishes their credentials and confirms their perspective with mounting empirical evidence.

Cordesman’s book comes closest to a strategic view of the war. It presents an almost encyclopedic collection of data, mostly from official releases, and laces it with generally well-reasoned judgments regarding validity, accuracy, and significance. This is no mean accomplishment given that Iraqi Freedom was the most information-controlled conflict involving U.S. forces since World War II.

But although the book is the best collection of source material available to date, the information tends to smooth the narrative flow. Page-plus quotations from official statements provide all the nuances and caveats of good bureaucratic. And the catalogue of issues addressed with data and footnoted crasse. And the catalogue of issues nuances and caveats of good bureau- craticese. And the catalogue of issues addressed with data and footnoted sources is truly impressive—from blue force trackers, bandwidth, and the rest of the technical inventory used in the war, to what happened to the weapons of mass destruction, to the doctrine of pre-emption, to all the topics that affect contemporary elections. His book will arm any wonk, lobbyist, student, and citizen with facts and opinions sufficient to dominate any decision meeting or cocktail party. But the quotations and comprehensiveness of his issue survey add little to the lilt of the explication. Still, Cordesman fills in much of the Washing- ton interplay and debate about the war where the other books only hint at it.

All three works adopt the official chronology of the conflict with its generally accepted high and low points. They all highlight the speed at which American ground forces rolled toward Bagh- dad, the much more effective ground and air integration, the concerns on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels about the risk of a long supply line through unsecured territory, and the ability of U.S. forces to adapt to political challenges such as the lack of access for 4th Mechanized Division through Turkey and to opportunities on the battlefield such as the “thunder runs” into the heart of Baghdad that broke Iraqi hopes for a goal line stand there.

It is in tone and emphasis—in addition to their focuses on the levels of war—that the books differ. The March Up and The Iraq War by Murray and Scales are seized by the romance of military campaigns. To West and Smith, the Marines and their battlefield leaders are the heroic heirs of Xenophon’s hoplites marching through Iraq centuries before. To Murray and Scales, the heroes are the American scholar-generals, vested with a new level of military skill and technology, yet knowledgeable and empowered by Clausewitz’s “eternal truths” regarding the fog and friction of war. Cordesman is more skeptical of both the heroism of the American combatants and their leaders’ superior wisdom. While he does not denigrate either, he is more cautious in implying superhuman attributes and more attuned to the foibles of individu- als and to the military mismatch between Iraq and the world’s only military super-superpower.

The central issue in all three books is the origin and nature of U.S. military superiority. It is the pseudo-debate between those who purportedly believe that American information technology drives the increasing dominance of the military and those who claim it is understanding the great theorists who argued that so much of war must remain unas- sailable by logic or technology that it will always remain cloaked in the fog of confusion, complexity, and chance. The issue is most clearly joined by Williamson and Scales, who devote their book largely to demonstrating the inanity of those who “claim to lift the fog of war.” It is a screed, of course, for those to whom they ascribe such beliefs have only claimed that reducing fog and friction more than an enemy gives one a better chance of victory. But the spurious accusation adds spice to an otherwise esoteric and increasingly boring discussion, which is good because it really is important to get the relationship between good people and good technol- ogy right.

The Iraq war will rekindle this important issue and, particularly in its aftermath of reconstruction, retrospec- tion, and alliance rebuilding, will help drive American politics and interna- tional relations. All three books offer a good basis for understanding and influ- encing the future. The good news is that all these authors are likely to have more to say about the post-major combat period.

Look for Joint Force Quarterly on the Joint Doctrine Web site

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

A Book Review
BY ROBERT TOMES

Uncovering Ways of War: Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941
by Thomas Gilbert Mahnken
224 pp. $35.00

The revolution in military affairs (RMA) dominated defense modernization discourse during the 1990s. At the end of the decade, the debate shifted to contending defense transformation strategies and objectives. A mix of technological, organizational, and operational innovation generally precedes and spurs RMAs. Understanding the origins of profound military change thus calls for understanding the emergence and diffusion of innovations. This argument is fundamental to the analysis provided in Thomas G. Mahnken’s Uncovering Ways of War.

Studies of interwar military innovation sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment influenced RMA discussions in the 1990s and inform current transformation planning. Many of these studies use historical cases of military reform to draw lessons for leading change. Questions about foreign military innovation have evolved largely on the margins of these studies, leaving a crucial gap in the innovation literature used in many institutions of senior military education. Similarly, U.S. defense modernization discussions provide little understanding of foreign military innovation as a strategic concern or a contribution to defense planning. Continuing work in such areas is essential. Foreign research and development, analysis of operational innovation, and such capabilities as jamming the global positioning system to diminish U.S. military strength, tend to be classified or considered with specific asymmetric threats to friendly forces, denying entry into theaters, and dealing with adaptive enemies. Students of military innovation have few resources for understanding the strategic aspects of why states fail to identify and respond to foreign military innovation.

Uncovering Ways of War addresses the myriad organizational and psychological factors influencing detecting, understanding, and responding to foreign military innovations from 1918 to 1941. Refreshingly succinct case studies document U.S. detection and understanding of nine innovation cases in three states: Japan (carrier aviation, surface and amphibious warfare), Germany (rocketry, tactical aviation, armored warfare), and Great Britain (integrated air defense, tactical aviation, armored warfare, tank experiments). The intelligence organizations assessed are the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Army Military Intelligence Division (MID), whose military attaches were the primary source of information on foreign military developments during the interwar period. The cases are characteristic of the problems befalling intelligence analysts attempting to detect, understand, and communicate the essence of foreign military innovation.

Comparative analysis yields three cases of failure to recognize the emergence of new ways of war (Japanese carrier innovation, German rocketry, and British integrated air defense) and two where innovations were partly recognized (Japanese surface warfare, German tactical aviation). The four successful cases included two where foreign practices similar to U.S. developments were recognized (Japanese amphibious warfare, British armored warfare) and two where dissimilar practices were recognized (German armored warfare, British tank experiments). Further analysis centers on why failure, partial success, or success occurred.

Both ONI and MID were inclined to monitor foreign developments in existing areas of warfare, overlooking or discounting unfamiliar territory. Little attention was paid to radar and missiles, for example. Similarly, technology and doctrine untested in combat were detected less frequently than proven capabilities. Also, biases about technological superiority blinded both organizations to foreign innovation.

Some scholars will be overwhelmed by the theoretical chapter relating literature on organizational culture and psychology to the question of why innovations are overlooked or ignored. The limited treatment of theory, however, is likely to appeal to defense policy analysts and military leaders. In the relationship between intelligence and defense planning, Mahnken provides an important counter to arguments that intelligence has never informed U.S. military change. That he delves into the cognitive aspects of his subject distinguishes

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his work from most military innovation studies, which tend to focus on cognitive determinants of doctrinal change and technological adaptation only to explore why states succeed or fail to adapt. Few explore interplays between intelligence and military planning biases and the compounding of intelligence shortcomings by linking intelligence of future threats with plans to meet them.

Mahnken’s research objectives do not provide comprehensive cases studies. Readers will get the most from his historical data if they are generally informed of the strategic context and political dynamics driving U.S. military developments. Cases well documented elsewhere are complemented by Mahnken’s study of the interwar period. His discussion of American perception of Japanese military capabilities, for example, adds important insights into Timothy Moy’s chapters on U.S. amphibious assault innovations in War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001). It also comes at an opportune time.

Recent conflicts provide future enemies with abundant data on the U.S. military, informing their attempts to understand our strengths and weaknesses and pursue capabilities to diminish our performance on the battlefield. During the wide and varied RMA discussions of the 1990s, furthermore, only a handful of scholars questioned whether U.S. intelligence agencies were truly postured to recognize and inform defense planners of RMAs in weaker powers—something historical data suggest is likely. More importantly, few addressed factors impeding recognition of both similar and dissimilar foreign military innovations.

A multipart, three-stage framework suggests indicators of military innovation derived from analysis of a rising power (Japan) and rapid shifts in military effectiveness (Germany). The stages are 1) speculation: studies, conceptual work, or analysis of U.S. capabilities; 2) experimentation: gaming, demonstrations, or other indications of testing new ways of war; and 3) implementation: publishing new doctrine, shifts in modernization plans, new military units, additional career paths, or changes in military education. To this might be added an antecedent step following from Mahnken’s conclusions about biased assessments of foreign military innovation: understanding the strategic context and operational challenges unique to the specific military—that is, understanding both the sense of necessity impelling change and the opportunities for pursuing it.

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THE LONG SHADOW OF VERSAILLES

A Book Review

BY JANEEN M. KLINGER

Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World
by Margaret MacMillan
New York: Random House, 2001
570 pp. $35.00
[ISBN: 0–375–50826–0]

The subtitle to Margaret MacMillan’s meticulously researched and skillfully narrated book is no literary exaggeration: the Versailles peace treaty indeed changed the world. However, MacMillan demolishes the myth that the significance of the treaty lay in its excessively punitive treatment of Germany, making it a source for World War II. Rather, she shows that the lasting impact relates to self-determination being introduced to international politics and how the concept was applied—especially to the non-European world. Indeed, an undercurrent of the book is unintended consequences, for MacMillan traces policies that appeared sensible at the outset to show how they were subverted. Her work is timely for those seeking to understand the origin of problems in today’s trouble spots; and it offers sober warning for policymakers and strategists devising plans for the long term.

Many elements in this narrative are familiar, but it is a reminder of the broader significance of the Treaty of Versailles. The accord not only dealt with Germany but redrew the borders in Central Europe and the Balkans, all politically incompatible interests at stake concerning the disposition of Germany. Given the devastation visited on France, Georges Clemenceau was the most adamant in seeking revenge, compensation, and security. He did not get the division of Germany he wanted, but he got a demilitarized Rhineland under occupation for 15 years. Similarly, the Allies were at odds over reparation, both in total amount demanded and how it would be allocated.

Against the backdrop of Allied division and acrimony over the German treaty, it is no wonder compromise would come elsewhere, as in the repeated sacrifice of self-determination for the political expediency of Allied unity. To be sure, the concept suffered from ambiguity and the implicit way it was expressed in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Secretary of State Robert Lansing recognized the ambiguity inherent in the formulation: “When the President talks of self-determination, what unit does he have in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.”

The problematic way the peacemakers applied self-determination is illustrated throughout the book. For example, in Central Europe and the Balkans, all the parties making claims against disputed territory presented their own population statistics based on nationality. However, in the Balkans a single disputed territory might actually contain Serbs,
Hungarians, Germans, Russians, and others. Any territorial division according to self-determination required the peace-makers “to impose a rational order on an irrational world.” In other cases, territorial arrangements solidified an irrational order because of great power rivalry. Thus in the disposition of Ottoman territory, imperial competition between Britain and France created modern Iraq from three disparate provinces that could hardly be expected to cohere.

Despite the problems of self-determination, the concept then as now provided an attractive beacon for suppliants to the victorious powers. And as Lansing anticipated, it was bound to disappoint. For example, the Germans expected to be treated according to the precepts in the Fourteen Points and retain European territory with German population at a minimum. When the treaty fell short, they felt so betrayed by Wilson that their embassy in Washington was the only one to refuse to fly its flag at half-mast when he died in 1924.

A more important betrayal of the principle, with tragic consequences for the remainder of the century, involved China and Japan. Both nations declared war on Germany and believed they were entitled to participate as victors at the peace conference. For Japan, victory meant it should retain German concessions on the Shantung peninsula in China it had seized during the war. Peking assumed that the principle of national self-determination and territorial integrity obliged the great powers to return Shantung to Chinese control. When Japan threatened not to sign the German treaty, Wilson’s compromise was to allow it to retain Shantung. A year after the Paris conference, radicals formed the Chinese Communist Party. Its emergence marked Peking’s gradual turning away from the West. Japanese diplomacy proved to be a pyrrhic victory because it poisoned Japanese relations with the West and gave rise to the notion of Japan as a “Yellow Prussia.” That image took root in the West and perhaps created a self-fulfilling prophecy that made the Pacific war inevitable. Woodrow Wilson was fully cognizant of the flaws in the peace agreement relating to the compromises. However, he told his wife that the mistakes could be remedied by the League of Nations. That they were not and continue to pose intractable dilemmas for world politics is the tragedy told in Paris 1919.
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