Homeland Defense and Security

U.S. Special Operations Command and the War on Terror

The Air Force’s Vector

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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

ABOUT THE COVER

The front cover shows soldiers with Joint Task Force Katrina patrolling the French Quarter (U.S. Army/Michael J. Carden); inside front cover depicts Marines patrolling Fallujah (U.S. Marine Corps/Thomas Rodman). Inside back cover shows [clockwise from the top] Quick Reaction Force exercise (U.S. Air Force/Derek C. Goodo); fighter preparing for Operation Noble Eagle (U.S. Air Force/Keri S. Whitehead); Coast Guard security team, Exercise Alaska Shield/Northern Edge 05 (U.S. Air Force/Mike Bautas); searching New Orleans for survivors of Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force Katrina (U.S. Marine Corps/Zachary R. Franklin); and security force training aboard USS Harry S. Truman (U.S. Navy/Kat Smith). The back cover shows [from the top] directing an F/A-18 aboard USS Kitty Hawk (U.S. Navy/Benjamin Dennis); sighting howitzer in Fallujah (55th Signal Company/Johan/Richard Van Boers); securing Daegu Air Base, Korea, Exercise Foal Eagle (U.S. Navy/John J. Poitier); and HH-60 helicopters refueling, Exercise Arctic SAREX 2005 (U.S. Air Force/Joshua Strang).

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A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND SECURITY JOURNAL
Their blood and their toil, their endurance and patriotism, have made us, and all who come after us forever their debtors.
—President Theodore Roosevelt, 1903

Delightful are the prospects that will open the view of United America—her sons well prepared to defend their own happiness, and ready to relieve the misery of others.
—John Dickinson, 1788

In a free society it is impossible to protect against every possible threat. And so the only way to defend our citizens where we live is to go after the terrorists where they live.
—President George W. Bush, 2005

If we are strong, our character will speak for itself. If we are weak, words will be of no help.
—President John F. Kennedy, 1963
As I begin my tenure as Chairman, I would like to share with you the guidance I have provided to the Joint Staff. This guidance provides the Joint Staff with strategic direction while ensuring unity of effort as it supports the execution of my duties as the Principal Military Advisor to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. While it applies to the Joint Staff, I hope my guidance will provide you with a better understanding of how I will approach my duties as Chairman. You can find the guidance posted on the Web at <www.jcs.mil>.

Though our focus is winning the War on Terrorism, the Nation’s Armed Forces must be prepared to conduct the full range of military operations. With that end in mind I have laid out my four mutually supporting priorities: win the war on terrorism, accelerate transformation, strengthen joint warfighting, and improve the quality of life of our Service members and their families.

We are serving in difficult times against a ruthless enemy. I plan to use future issues of JFQ to expand on topics that will challenge the finest Armed Forces in the world to be even better—more agile, more adaptive, more lethal. Likewise, I urge each of you to put pen to paper and use these pages to share information, discuss new developments, and foster intellectual debate. One of the strengths of our Armed Forces is an incredible array of intellectual power and it is through your views, ideas, and challenges to conventional wisdom that our Joint Force will achieve its greatest potential. I look forward to hearing from you.

Introduction

We are at war against an enemy whose publicly reiterated intent is to destroy our way of life. In response to this very real and present danger we must execute our responsibilities with a sustained sense of urgency. I do not want the Joint Staff to run faster and jump higher. To the contrary, I want you to stop doing things that do not contribute to shaping the future and focus your extraordinary talents and energies on defeating this enemy.

As the 16th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is an honor to lead this superb team. As Vice Chairman, I had the privilege of working with you for 4 years and I know your abilities and dedication are without peer. Your professional excellence will ensure we meet the many challenges that lie ahead.

Every individual on this staff, civilian and military, is critical to our success and is valued. You make a difference every day and you should feel a justifiable sense of pride in your contribution to the defense of America. Thank you for your service!
This Global War on Terrorism—a war of long duration—differs in many ways from that for which most of us have spent our time in service preparing. Our focus in this fight is not on kinetic effect against a massed enemy, but increasingly on the search for individuals and small cells of terrorists. Our opponents are ruthless and elusive but they are also vulnerable. Resourcefulness and organizational agility will enable us to prevail in this just cause—and prevail we will.

Our proper emphasis is on the War on Terrorism but we must remain prepared to conduct the full range of military operations. We will remain a force capable of defeating any opponent. Our challenge is to apply our experience and expertise in an adaptive and creative manner, encouraging initiative, innovation, and efficiency in the execution of our responsibilities.

This Guidance provides the Joint Staff with strategic direction to ensure unity of effort as we go about our duties in the service of the Nation.

As the Principal Military Advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises on both policy formulation and policy implementation. The Chairman’s responsibilities include strategy development, definition of roles and missions, contingency and strategic planning, programming and budgeting, and sustaining readiness, along with other functions as delineated in U.S. Code.

The Chairman, and by extension the Joint Staff, is not in the operational chain of command and has no operational authority. Our task is to articulate the orders of our President and Secretary of Defense to those who do have that operational authority and to support the efforts of those empowered with it. We must be of assistance to the combatant commanders as they carry out the missions they have been assigned.

The key to the staff’s effectiveness, therefore, is to understand its role, remain within its bounds, and function in a collaborative manner in active partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commanders, the Services, the combat support agencies, the interagency, and Congress. We should help others succeed.

It is not enough for us to be successful in responding to today’s challenges. We must help shape the future by identifying those actions which we can take now at a fraction of the cost of what it would take later to respond to a preventable crisis.

All nations face significant national security challenges. Many, like the United States, are acting in what they believe are the best interests of their citizens. The decisions those nations make and the paths they choose will significantly shape the world of our children and the challenges that will confront Americans in uniform in the coming decades. While the military is but one element of our Nation’s power, it can play an important role in this process. Our experience in the military aspects of such decisions has relevance to others and should be shared.

Priorities

My priorities are mutually supportive. Success in one will support success in others, while delay in one will impede success in others. We must aggressively identify those factors impeding our success, develop plans to overcome them, and establish metrics with which to assess our progress.

Win the War on Terrorism

Our enemies are violent extremists who would deny us, and all mankind, the freedom to choose our own destiny. Finding this distributed, loosely networked enemy is the greatest challenge we face. We must find and defeat them in an environment where information, perception, and how and what we communicate are every bit as critical as the application of traditional kinetic effects.

This is a war of long duration and we must plan and adapt accordingly. We are now 4 years into this campaign and should ask ourselves if the changes we have made to date are achieving the necessary effects. What additional changes are needed? Is the level of effort reflected in the level of return? How do we measure our progress?

We can take the fight to the enemy on the battlefield and we will prevail, but that is not enough. We will not defeat terrorists solely through the use of force. We must assist others to create good governance and the rule of law—shaping an environment that precludes the flourishing of terrorism, much as a healthy body rejects the onslaught of disease.

We must harness the elements of national power to win the War on Terrorism. My military advice to our Nation’s leaders will favor recommendations that integrate and coordinate our efforts with the work of others fighting this war. Through closer coordination within the Department of Defense and interagency, we maximize the impact of our military power and build trust, synergy, and momentum. We will focus on a collaborative approach to winning the War on Terrorism, building and enhancing interagency...
relationships. Look for ways that the military instrument—and the way it is applied—can complement and strengthen the actions of other elements of national power.

It is our collaborative efforts with our OSD counterparts, the interagency, and our Coalition partners that will ultimately determine our success in this war.

**Accelerate Transformation**

Transformation is a continual process, not an end-state. We must transform if we are to meet future challenges. Transformation is concepts and practices, technologies and capabilities, roles and missions, organizational structures, internal processes, doctrine and education, personnel policies, and much more. It applies to all—Active, Guard, and Reserve; officer and enlisted; and military and civilian.

It is as much a mindset and a culture as it is a technology or a platform and at its heart is a willingness on the part of the individual and the organization to embrace innovation and accept analyzed risk. We must influence both its direction and rate of change. If we do not change a single tool at our disposal, but simply change how we employ those tools, we will make significant progress in transformation.

We will focus not on defining transformation, but rather on promoting transformation across a broad spectrum of endeavors.

**Strengthen Joint Warfighting**

One of our central tasks as a staff is to strengthen joint warfighting. The goal of warfighting must be to produce a force capable of swiftly and decisively defeating any enemy. It is a prerequisite to winning the War on Terrorism and will significantly accelerate and be accelerated by transformation. This will require collaborative and innovative solutions to difficult cultural and resource challenges. We must transition from an interoperable to an interdependent force where different capability sets can be rapidly integrated to achieve desired effects. Innovative operational concepts, training, and experimentation along with a focus on teamwork are key to success. Driving the development of warfighting concepts, architectures, and capabilities will be a primary means to achieve this priority.

Equally critical will be the actual implementation of the many lessons we have gained in the course of this ongoing fight. Lessons learned must be tied to executable actions, for without implementation, lessons are never truly learned.

We have also gained a wealth of operational experience, knowledge, jointness, and savvy in this war. Those who have combat experience must be recognized as a significant resource and should be assigned where we can best employ their knowledge and experience.

There need be no conflict between Service experience and joint warfighting. To the contrary, I want you to bring your Service perspective to the decision process. The strength of this staff, like the strength of the Nation, lies in the articulation of multiple views. This leads to “best of breed” alternatives. Individual Service perspectives brought together jointly foster better solutions, which we then execute in a joint framework. We must strengthen the capabilities of the force without sacrificing the expertise and uniqueness of Service culture from which joint competence flows.

**Improve the Quality of Life of Our Service Members and Our Families**

Bringing our people home alive and intact is Quality of Life Job #1. The best leadership, the most innovative tactics, the best equipment, and the best force protection are indispensable to this goal.

We must show respect for the men and women who serve this country in the way we man, train, equip, mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, refurbish, and demobilize the force. This applies to the total force—Active, Guard and Reserve, military and civilian. The number and diversity of the organizations involved dictate that we take a systemic and holistic approach. We must be mindful of the effects of making changes to the quality of life of one portion of the force on the others and of the second and third order effects of initiatives in this area.

Respect begins at home. Leaders on the Joint Staff must ensure that we focus our energies to attain our goals we do so in a manner that provides for a surge capacity among our subordinates and their families. Leave, liberty, and good health are force multipliers. Our service to the Nation is a marathon, not a sprint, and we cannot succeed in our duties if we do not pace ourselves accordingly.

We have been entrusted with a force built on the ethos of a warrior. The quality of life initiatives we recommend must preserve that ethos while ensuring the Service member...
and his or her family receive the support and peace of mind they so richly deserve.

**Enablers**

The following are key enablers that are critical to accomplishing our priorities. Achieving them will require a commitment to innovative and efficient solutions.

▼ **Organizational Agility**

We must become a more agile staff, capable of reacting to change and executing our responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. To do so we must focus our energies, our organizational structure, and our resources on those key areas within our purview having the greatest impact on our priorities. We should conduct a fundamental assessment of our organizational structure. We must identify those changes in authority that will facilitate more effective, efficient action. We must also help close the seams and gaps across the staff, the combatant commands, the department, and our interagency partners—areas where responsibilities and authorities are not clearly defined, resulting in duplication, ambiguity, or lack of focus.

We must evaluate the processes the Joint Staff uses to execute its daily functions, to include our designated response times and our ability to provide timely recommendations, sound advice, and useful feedback. This staff is a collection of the best our Nation’s military has to offer, and we must harness this intellect and drive to identify “best of breed” processes to support the mission. Experience, born of longevity in key positions, will positively impact our efforts to increase staff efficiency.

We value and respect every member of the team, and we demonstrate that by not wasting their time. This will require a deliberate and candid look at our workload—what are we doing that we shouldn’t be? Are we effects-focused to facilitate best results? We must discontinue unproductive work and products that are seldom used by others. This will free resources for investment in those things we should be doing but which we are not.

Devote time to think, read, and write. Intellectual breadth and perspective lead to solutions. We cannot gain their benefit if we are unable to periodically detach ourselves from the day-to-day tasks that are a necessary part of our duties. Each of us must regularly carve out time to look beyond the present.

We must also address the quality of our writing. Effective communication is a core element of organizational agility, and we must discipline ourselves to describe issues and recommend solutions with clarity and precision. Time and energy devoted to clear, precise communications serve our staff, our seniors, and our subordinates well. Write simply.

▼ **Speed of Action and Decision**

Speed is critical to our future success. Improved speed of action and decision is one of the more important services we can provide our Nation’s leaders and those we support in executing the operational missions of the department. Improved speed of decision is not the same thing as making hasty decisions. Quality assessment is a critical element of an efficient decision cycle. We must discriminate between speed and haste.

Upward leadership and individual empowerment are force multipliers. I count on each of you, as I do myself, to ask questions. If something does not make sense, indicate that up the chain and ask why. I also count on you to identify those issues which merit my attention and those that can best be handled at a lower level. Recognize decisions that are yours to make—and make them. Recognize those that are your senior’s, and move them forward expeditiously.

Two cultural factors work directly against an increase in our speed of action and decision: avoidance of risk, and a reliance on consensus as the primary vehicle for decisionmaking. We must overcome these to avoid stagnation.

Risk is an inherent element of our business. We must identify it up front and never assume it away, but we cannot allow it to stop us from moving forward. Our emphasis should be on recommending solutions that offer flexibility as a hedge against uncertainty.

We must accept that some issues cannot be solved at a lower level. Blockage may occur among action officers, division chiefs, J-directors, or higher. Rather than waste the time and energy of our people, identify such contentious points early. If we cannot reach agreement on an issue within a reasonable amount of time, then we must be comfortable indicating so to our seniors and...
move the issue forward. This is as true for the action officer as it is for me. The key is to make sure that all are aware of the disagreement and are prepared to address the issue as it moves forward. We must give primacy to the objective and not the process.

Consensus can be a worthy goal but not if the ultimate outcome is a recommendation that is so diluted it fails to satisfy the requirement or issue at hand.

Conversely, we must identify a mechanism to move lower level consensus forward more quickly for final approval. We must find the appropriate level at which all aspects of an issue have been properly addressed and empower that level to more quickly formalize a decision.

In addition, we must link senior decision-makers in our organization with the action officers who have the greatest knowledge of an issue. When the detailed answers to questions are readily available to senior leaders, we can generate good decisions more rapidly.

Actions and decisions are also enabled by precise data—data truly relevant to the issue at hand. Our processes and data collection must produce predictive analysis to enable shaping action.

**Collaboration**

Collaboration is a powerful tool in achieving optimal solutions and overcoming disagreement. It enables us to function as part of a larger team, within our own staff, the Department of Defense, the interagency, and ultimately with our Coalition partners. The power of a team is vastly superior to that of an individual—whether that team be composed of people or of nations.

Our collaborative effort with OSD is critical to enhancing effectiveness in the interagency and can enable the interagency to function more like an integrated task force.

We must constantly ask ourselves who else needs to know what we know. Give others the benefit of your best thoughts; do not work in isolation. No one of us is as smart as all of us thinking together.

Standardized, interoperable, and readily available tools, which facilitate collaboration across a broad set of partners, are needed. Such collaboration tools can help us overcome the tyrannies of time and distance and enhance speed and precision in execution. Common operating pictures and common data packaging are essential.

We must create or adopt those tools with the greatest applicability.

**Outreach**

We can both learn from and help others through a proactive outreach program to nontraditional partners. Academia, industry, think tanks, and a host of other organizations possess a wide range of expertise and insights invaluable to finding solutions to our most pressing problems.

Our Coalition partners have significant insights to share with us as well. Our friends at home and abroad are our natural allies in this war, and we should seek to partner with them at every opportunity.

Outreach also extends to our duty to assist others in the execution of their responsibilities and to ensure that the American public has the opportunity to interact with their military. We should regularly interact with our fellow citizens, through speaking opportunities, participation in civic events, interaction with elected representatives and their staffs, and through the media. Americans need to see their military and to have the opportunity to dialogue with us. A direct link with the citizens we defend is a core element of the American construct.

**Professional Development**

Each of you represents the greatest resource of this organization. Training and education are fundamental to your professional development and I encourage all members of the Joint Staff—officer and enlisted; Active, Guard and Reserve; and civilian—to pursue these opportunities. It is incumbent upon each of us as leaders to ensure we develop our subordinates and to support those training and education opportunities available to them.

Our civilian employees are a special resource. Their long-term continuity and expertise in critical areas is a force multiplier—one that we must hone to its full potential. It is the duty of every supervisor to understand the workings of the civilian personnel system and to ensure that our civilian work force does as well. We must ensure our civilian service members are positioned to succeed.

The best investment we can make is in our professional development. Successful organizations are learning organizations.

**Conclusion**

We have much to do. We are at a critical time in the history of this great country and find ourselves challenged in ways we did not expect. We face a ruthless enemy intent on destroying our way of life. Generations of Americans have sacrificed and died that we might inherit the freedoms we all enjoy today. It now falls to us to protect those freedoms for our children and grandchildren. The Nation and the extraordinary men and women who serve in the Armed Forces require our best efforts—they deserve no less. I know you will deliver. It is my distinct honor to serve alongside you, and I thank you again for your service to our country. **JFQ**

**PETER PACE**

General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
From the Editor

D o suicide bombers look both ways before they cross the street? That sounds like the start of a bad joke. The answer is yes, but there is no punch line. Why they look is an essential element of security strategy.

Regardless of their motivations, suicide bombers intend to kill others through the vehicle of their own logically planned deaths. Terrorists train, create international funding schemes, and perform extensive tactical planning, including selecting targets that maximize casualties and wrapping bombs with nails to tear flesh. Their investment of time and effort is lost if a truck hits them before they make it to their intended destination, perhaps a bus stop or cafe.

Military strategists and security analysts since Sun Tzu have agreed that understanding the enemy is helpful to commanders. The real art lies in knowing what to do with the knowledge. This is the essence of effects-based operations: select targets that may be subject to influence and tailor methods to achieve effects that support the strategy. Readers will find this common intellectual thread among many articles in the past four issues of Joint Force Quarterly, and this issue in particular. There is a growing recognition beyond military circles of the necessity to understand the dissimilar Weltanschauung. In the War on Terror, security decisionmakers must consider the worldview that encourages terrorist and rogue leaders to believe they can succeed and how that view differs from that of peace-loving nations.

While considering a terrorist dodging traffic, analysts must keep in mind a moral imperative: one must not conflate atrocities such as those on September 11 or in Madrid, London, Bali, Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq with “freedom-fighting.” Indeed, in war, the target may define the act. Purposely murdering noncombatants, beheading kidnapped hostages, executing teachers, and driving car bombs into civilian queues contrast starkly with the internationally sanctioned approach of forcing the world’s worst dictators to stand trial, unabused, for crimes affecting millions.

Security professionals and free thinkers also need to guard against the lazy rationalization that terrorism today is just 21st-century reality judged with 20th-century situational ethics. Recent terrorist attacks demonstrate how far the terrorists of today go beyond international norms, laws, and standards of contemporary conflict. Consider an Islamic leader’s admonition when his children asked to kill a prisoner: “I do not want them to get used to shedding blood so young; at their age they do not know what it means to be a [Muslim] or an infidel, and they will grow accustomed to trifling with the lives of others.” The speaker was a man born in Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, almost 900 years ago—Saladin. Today’s terrorists are well outside even this 12th-century standard.

In response to the continuing challenges and opportunities provided by today’s dynamic strategic environment, this issue of Joint Force Quarterly features General Peter Pace’s first “Word from the Chairman,” calling for renewed focus on the War on Terror; a new Forum topic, Homeland Defense and Security; an intriguing U.S. Special Operations Command special feature; and the premiere of a new senior leader interview series, In Their Own Words. Although this issue does not directly address the topic of Jaywalking terrorists, the staff trusts that you will find the essays and articles thought-provoking and welcomes feedback from military and security professional readers alike.

Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
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Joint Force Quarterly is pleased to premiere exciting design improvements with this issue, JFQ 40, 1st quarter 2006. JFQ is now designed to optimize the professional readership’s time by organizing and color-coding articles and tabbing in useful categories listed in the table of contents, just inside the front cover: Forum, Special Feature, additional featured articles, Commentary, Interagency Dialogue, and historical research essays in the Recall series. Departments include A Word from the Chairman, From the Editor, Letters to the Editor, New in JFQ, and an expanded Book Review section led by NDU Press’s Lisa Yambrick. The Forum is the major thematic section for each issue containing several timely articles on relevant security topics, and now including a series of exclusive interviews with senior civilian and military leaders, In Their Own Words. In this issue, for the first time, JFQ’s Forum addresses Homeland Defense and Security, beginning with an interview of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale. Readers will notice that the Forum theme is now woven throughout JFQ: the cover and artwork rotate to reflect the Forum topic, as does A Word from the Chairman, recommended readings in the Book Review section, and the inside back cover.

JFQ is pleased to offer a timely Special Feature section on U.S. Special Operations Command, updated to the point when the issue went to press. This feature is replete with in-depth insights on U.S. Special Operations Command and its crucial role in the war on terror, including a discussion of the command’s vision and missions by the combatant commander, General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA. The Interagency Dialogue installment, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” is an important contribution by Tucker Mansager that the staff highly recommends.

You will notice JFQ’s illustration reflects our people more than their tools. Additional Web content, such as downloadable computer wallpaper, and other interesting information will be set off with a purple target(▲) to alert readers.

The NDU Press staff hopes you enjoy the updated look and feel of JFQ—a logical extension of upgrades made throughout 2005 based on reader input and the Chairman’s guidance—and we welcome your emailed comments, suggestions, and contributions. JFQ

NEW from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Defense Horizons 50
Sweden’s Use of Commercial Information Technology for Military Applications
Franklin D. Kramer and John C. Cittadino examine the advantages of buying commercial information technology for military uses, which Sweden does routinely, whereas America still debates whether such technology can do the job in defense applications.
Available from CTNSP only

Defense Horizons 49
Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology
Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych explore the mutual opportunities and obstacles of increasing cooperation between the defense research and technology communities in Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Available from CTNSP only

CTNSP publications: www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html

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Defending the homeland has been a historical role of the United States military since colonial militias took up arms to defend settlements in Massachusetts in 1637. In 1789, the U.S. Constitution dictated that the Federal Government would “provide for the common defense.” This role has evolved, as reflected in the lexicon of contemporary interagency policy. Currently, homeland security and homeland defense are related but different missions. Most in the American security community recognize this distinction as the difference between “law enforcement and warfighting.” Federal agencies and organizations further clarify this distinction in their strategies and charters. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the new Department of Defense (DOD) combatant command based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, explains:

"Homeland security is the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies."

DOD recognizes that other agencies lead homeland security efforts, and the Defense Department will support them when appropriate. Homeland security encompasses...
all levels of government and organizational support—local, state, and Federal. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, under the supervision of the Department of Homeland Security, leads the U.S. Government response to an extreme situation, whether natural disaster or terrorist attack. First responders, which include police, firefighters, and ambulance personnel, may work with Federal emergency staff from several agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes:

Indeed, the closest relationship the average citizen has with government is at the local level. State and local levels of government have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Local units are the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene. All disasters are ultimately local events.5

Homeland defense, according to USNORTHCOM, is “the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States.” As a military organization, USNORTHCOM’s operations within the United States are governed by law, notably the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act. This law states that “it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States . . . for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by any act of Congress.”6 USNORTHCOM’s missions are thus limited to military homeland defense and civil support to lead Federal agencies.6

The U.S. Government is still in the process of refining and defining the missions of homeland security and defense. Although recent issues of Joint Force Quarterly have articles addressing aspects of these homeland missions, this issue’s Forum is dedicated to a more in-depth examination of their individual frameworks. The Forum begins with an interview of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, who explains the reality and nuances of the new homeland defense mission and organizations dedicated to executing it. Colonel Donald Thompson analyzes the possible roles and challenges of DOD’s support role in civilian emergency preparedness response. Lieutenant Generals Joseph Inge and Eric Findley discuss U.S.-Canada cooperation in North American defense issues post-9/11. Lastly, Major General Rick Lynch and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Janzen consider the evolution of NATO’s strategic mission, demonstrated by its role in Iraq.

Recent national events have brought the importance of homeland security and defense to the forefront of national political attention. This JFQ Forum hopes to address the growing interest in the complex nature of the homeland security and defense missions by providing readers with informed and varied opinions on the evolving nature of this topic. JFQ

NOTES

1 Paul McHale, JFQ interview, October 6, 2005.
4 USNORTHCOM.
6 USNORTHCOM.

[Left page] World Trade Center south tower collapsing September 11, 2001 (AP/Wide World Photo/Jim Collins); [top left to right] the Pentagon moments after being attacked on 9/11 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jason Ingersoll); Hurricane Dennis battering Key West, July 9, 2005 (U.S. Navy/Jim Books); National Guard navigating flooded street near New Orleans Superdome as part of Joint Task Force Katrina (Fleet Combat Camera Atlantic/Brien Aho); and crash site of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania on 9/11 (Tribune-Review/Scott Spangler).
**JFQ:** One of the first items we were hoping you could illuminate is the difference, both in terms of terminology and philosophy, between homeland defense and homeland security.

**ASD(HD) McHale:** The difference is essentially a distinction between warfighting and law enforcement. In sum, the difference is captured by the distinct authorities and the types of forces that execute the missions pursuant to those authorities. The President of the United States, under Article 2 of the Constitution, is the Commander in Chief. His authority as Commander in Chief is delegated in part to the Secretary of Defense. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the combatant commanders respond to the chain of command and specifically to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. So by relying upon that military chain of command, we ultimately deploy military forces to achieve warfighting missions, including the missions within the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] AORs [areas of responsibility].

By contrast, homeland security captures the broad set of statutory authorities that assign to various law enforcement agencies the requirement to defend the citizens of the United States against unlawful activities, including and most especially the activities of transnational terrorists. Those authorities are derived from congressional action, they are subject to the control of the President of the United States through the execution of his executive responsibilities, but they are distinct from the warfighting activities that take place under his authority as Commander in Chief. When you look at those two areas of responsibility, it’s clear that among the Cabinet officers, only the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for warfighting. The primary Cabinet officer assigned the bulk of those homeland security missions is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Working in conjunction with one another, exercising distinct but related authorities, the Secretary of Defense conducts warfighting to protect the American people, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security exercises law enforcement responsibilities to achieve the same result.

We recently published the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, and in capturing the distinction that I just described, we specifically define *homeland defense* as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President, and that direction is pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief. When you look at those two areas of responsibility, it’s clear that among the Cabinet officers, only the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for warfighting. The primary Cabinet officer assigned the bulk of those homeland security missions is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Working in conjunction with one another, exercising distinct but related authorities, the Secretary of Defense conducts warfighting to protect the American people, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security exercises law enforcement responsibilities to achieve the same result.

On October 6, 2005, Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of *Joint Force Quarterly* interviewed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Honorable Paul McHale, at the Pentagon.
definitions are helpful, at the end of the day, Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld is the warfighter, and Secretary [Michael] Chertoff is one of our nation's senior law enforcement officials, and, in combination, these two cabinet officers use their authorities to achieve the common purpose of protecting the American people.

**JFQ:** How does the Department of Defense (DOD)—in conjunction or separately, depending upon the two missions you describe—inform, educate, and relate to the domestic public, first responders, and all the other agencies and military personnel who are required in the different roles and missions?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** Most of our contact with the first responder community is conducted through and coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security. Under the provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as well as the related provisions of Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 5, the lead agency for preventing attacks within the United States is the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security has the assigned duty to work in close coordination with the various elements of state and local government, to include first responders, and so Defense achieves its coordination under the interagency lead of DHS. The relationship between Defense and Homeland Security is very close; it reflects a 3-year effort predating the creation of DHS to ensure that our two departments would be working effectively to achieve common goals. On a practical level, what that means is for over 2 years, 65 employees from our office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense have been working full-time at Homeland Security headquarters. Those Defense employees work each and every day side by side with their DHS counterparts to ensure that there is complete, open, transparent communication on all relevant matters between the two departments.

In addition, there is daily, almost continuous, contact between the Homeland Security Operations Center over in DHS and our office here in the Pentagon. That relationship couldn't be much tighter than it is. The current director of the Homeland Security Operations Center is a retired Marine Corps general officer, Matt Broderick. Matt was chosen for his position at DHS because of his exceptional leadership skills, and in part I think because of his familiarity with the Department of Defense. So he is exactly the right guy in exactly the right position to ensure that the relationship between DHS and DOD will be a close one.

Through the normal procedures of the interagency process, senior officials from DOD and DHS meet daily at the deputies and principal level. It is a rare day that senior officials in the DOD are not in direct contact with the Secretary of DHS or his deputy.

**JFQ:** The United States is engaged in a limited war against a vague enemy, a transnational enemy, who is fighting a total war against us. How can America defend itself with the mismatch of wills, especially in an environment where modern technology levels the playing field through weapons proliferation and new communications capabilities?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** I would respectfully disagree with the premise of the question; that is, I don't think that there is a mismatch of wills to the detriment of our
ongoing national effort. The barbaric acts of September 11, 2001, galvanized the American spirit, and although we have faced significant, sometimes painful, challenges, during the intervening period of time, my sense is that our nation remains resolute. It is the intent of our adversaries to weaken the American political will through the prosecution of asymmetric warfare, but my assessment is that the enemy’s strategic objective to date has not been successful. Americans recall with clarity the losses we experienced on September 11, and they remain committed to our ongoing military operations both overseas and here at home to protect American lives, property, and ultimately, freedom. Homeland defense begins overseas; power projection is an integrated element of what is ultimately the successful defense of our nation here at home. I have not sensed any diminished purpose on the part of the American people in supporting both the pursuit of al Qaeda on distant battlefields and a more robust capability to protect against domestic attacks that al Qaeda might launch here at home.

There are many things that we can do today to provide a stronger homeland defense and more robust civil support capabilities that would have been difficult if not impossible at the time of the September 11 attacks. The creation of NORTHCOM, the identification of its substantial range of missions, and the integration of DOD capabilities into a larger national homeland security effort have all produced an operational environment in which we can more successfully defend the American people.

**JFQ:** There is a lot of discussion about a zero-sum game over the resources for providing for the defense and capabilities across all the services and all the agencies. How is the U.S. military balancing resources for training and power projection versus supporting operations at home?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** Nearly every national and departmental document produced in the last 5 years has identified homeland defense as the Nation’s highest priority. Ultimately, everything we do in the Department of Defense is for the protection of the American people. We are obligated to provide that defense within a world of finite resources, so that requires prioritization of mission requirements and a tough-minded application of risk management. There’s no question in my mind that homeland defense is receiving far more of an emphasis today than was the case 5 or 10 years ago, and that means that looking at risk, identifying threats, and allocating resources—core homeland defense activities and related civil support missions—are now being robustly supported, initially in dollars, but ultimately in training, equipment, and assigned personnel.

When NORTHCOM was created, the combatant command was initially a capability established in the shadow of NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command]. Because we had experienced a tragic loss of life as a result of an attack launched from within our own airspace on September 11, initial homeland defense activities tended to focus on the air domain. During the past 4 years, it’s been clear that additional capabilities in the maritime, land, and cyber domains must be added to the traditional NORAD missions to ensure that NORTHCOM will be a truly joint command. Great progress has been made in that regard. As a result, most recently demonstrated in our successful military response to Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM is now capable of effective mission execution, not just in the air domain, but with equal competence in the maritime, land, and cyber domains. And that has required a reallocation of resources, a process that I expect to continue following the completion of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review.

Since September 11, both as a matter of policy and operational capability, DOD has developed, under NORTHCOM command and control, the ability to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous WMD [weapons of mass destruction] attacks conducted at geographically dispersed areas within the United States. That kind of multiple WMD response would have been very difficult for DOD to achieve in a timely manner as recently as 4 or 5 years ago. It’s now recognized that one of NORTHCOM’s core requirements is the ability to promptly and effectively respond to multiple WMD attacks because it’s under those circumstances that civilian authorities are likely to be overwhelmed, and DOD capabilities are likely to be called upon. Establishing the kinds of task forces required to support a multiple WMD response has necessitated a reallocation of related resources to pay the inevitable costs associated with an essential but expensive capability.

**JFQ:** Could you expand on NORTHCOM’s missions and perhaps the Defense Department’s involvement in recent domestic humanitarian relief efforts?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** NORTHCOM was created for two purposes: to conduct warfighting within the homeland defense AOR, and to provide civil support to lead Federal agencies when civilian authorities are overwhelmed or a unique DOD capability is required. Each and every day since September 11, NORTHCOM has conducted operational homeland defense activities that resemble the kind of defensive measures that we conduct daily within other regional combatant commands throughout the world. NORTHCOM deploys aircraft, anticipates maritime threats, and alerts land warfare...
capabilities. That kind of warfighting capacity goes largely unobserved, but for the professionals at NORTHCOM, it’s a part of daily life. Each day since September 11, we have been flying combat air patrols, to ensure that, unlike September 11, the airspace of the United States will never again be used as a domain from which terrorists can launch attacks upon the American people. It’s not an accident that the attacks of September 11 have not been repeated since that time. Many of the vulnerabilities associated with domestic aviation have been eliminated, and our defensive capabilities, to include the sobering mission of shooting down a domestic aircraft after a terrorist takeover, have provided substantial deterrence and effective operational capabilities to defeat a potential terrorist attack.

NORTHCOM is prepared today to conduct maritime intercept operations in order to detect and defeat, along a maritime approach, a weapon of mass destruction. As we conduct this interview, there are Army units on alert as quick reaction forces. We don’t hide that fact. We want to influence and deter terrorist planning by openly highlighting the fact that any domestic land attack conducted by terrorists within the United States will meet, if necessary and at the direction of the President, active-duty U.S. military forces who are prepared to engage in land warfare on our own soil as an ultimate safeguard of American security. And so it is entirely possible that a terrorist attack on a U.S. nuclear power plant would confront the presence of the 82nd Airborne or some other military unit with similar warfighting capabilities. Land defense in the United States is primarily a law enforcement function, but we are prepared to conduct warfighting missions under extreme circumstances on our own soil in order to defeat a terrorist attack.

The military response to Hurricane Katrina was wholly dependent upon the effective integration of unprecedented National Guard capabilities. The Katrina response was the largest, fastest civil support mission in the history of the United States. We deployed 72,000 military forces in just over 10 days. Of the 72,000 forces deployed, 50,000 were drawn from the National Guard, and by design, a much smaller Active Component capability was deployed. 50,000 National Guardsmen versus 22,000 active duty, with a large portion of the active duty being drawn from offshore U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel. The concept reflected in the strategy was a belief that active-duty military personnel should be preserved whenever possible for ongoing power projection missions while recognizing that Reserve Component capabilities, most especially the National Guard, are ideally suited for domestic missions, including homeland defense and civil support.

The strong logistics backbone and ready availability of the National Guard makes it ideally suited to a prompt, effective response in remediating the consequences of a catastrophic event, whether a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. Our massive response to Hurricane Katrina proved the merit of that approach.

We anticipate that the focused reliance on the Reserve Component, most especially reliance on the National Guard for homeland defense and civil support missions, will continue into the future, and if anything,
that approach was decisively validated by the National Guard’s superb response to Hurricane Katrina. By September 10, we had 50,000 National Guardsmen from all 50 states, 3 territories, and the District of Columbia deployed into the Gulf region, providing an incredibly effective humanitarian relief capability. Never has the Guard been more important to the Nation.

One of our continuing challenges is to ensure that National Guard operational planning is fully integrated into the Total Force. Frankly, we need to improve that integration in response to future civil support missions. The Total Force task organization deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina reflected a very large, very robust mix of Active Component and Reserve Component capabilities, but the operational planning conducted and superbly executed by the Guard was largely completed without close coordination with NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff. Superb leaders stepped up to the plate and got the job done. Next time, we may be able to improve our performance by more detailed, better integrated planning to ensure Active Component and Reserve Component capabilities are mutually reinforcing. In response to Katrina, we got it right because the operators made it work, not because of our prior planning.

**JFQ:** Could you give us your thoughts on any key challenges or opportunities you see on the immediate horizon?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** I’d like to reemphasize the clear requirement and emerging capability to respond to multiple WMD attacks; the need, when deploying National Guard military police [MP] units for purposes of restoring civil order, to incorporate a full range of nonlethal weapons capabilities into the deploying units; operational competency; and the need for a detailed ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] plan in order to ensure that we will have appropriate imagery to support more rapid and accurate damage assessment, following a catastrophic event such as the Katrina disaster. Frankly, we should have learned that lesson following Hurricane Andrew in 1992; it took several days for the scope of the disaster to become known. Similarly, early reports following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall were inaccurate and optimistic; the damage was far worse than originally thought. And so in preparation for Hurricane Rita, [USNORTHCOM Commander] Admiral [Timothy] Keating developed a detailed ISR plan to deploy, as necessary, UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], P3s, and employ geospatial imagery in order to get an immediate and accurate understanding of the damage.

We need to develop seamless interoperable radio communication among and between first responders, the National Guard, and Title 10 military forces. Such interoperability is technologically feasible right now, and yet because we did not plan or prepare for the deployment of such capability, few if any police officers could effectively communicate with military personnel, and indeed many National Guard Soldiers were unable to communicate by radio with their Title 10 counterparts because our Title 10 forces were equipped with frequency-hopping SINGARS [single-channel ground-air secure radios] and many National Guard units were not. And so interoperability of communications remains a high priority as an element of future planning.

We need to look at the ability to reestablish the first responder community following a catastrophic event. In short, we have to find a way to more rapidly backfill the absence of local police officers. That means that National Guard MP units will have to systematically anticipate the very type of mission that was so very successfully executed but not planned in advance of Hurricane Katrina to include the rapid deployment of nonlethal weapons as part of a broader range of National Guard MP weapons capabilities. Deadly force will remain a necessary option in addressing the life-threatening requirements associated with the restoration of civil order, but military forces deployed in law enforcement missions domestically should also have the alternative when operationally appropriate to use nonlethal and less than lethal force if that will accomplish the mission.

Mass evacuation will inevitably involve significant DOD resources. Again, during Katrina, we did it quite well. TRANSCOM’s [U.S. Transportation Command] performance was flawless when you consider that many of these evacuations involving thousands of citizens were executed with little or no warning and involved the mass movement of civilian personnel in a crisis environment. TRANSCOM’s successful completion of that mission was nothing short of remarkable. Having done it under pressure, we now have the duty to plan it more carefully in anticipation of future catastrophic events requiring similar evacuations. We did it quite well without [prior] planning, we can do it better if we anticipate the mission.

**JFQ:** The President made remarks in the press about more military involvement in huge domestic disasters, such as in New Orleans or a flu pandemic. Could you describe what this means at a practical level?

**ASD(HD) McHale:** Each year in the United States, there are over 50 Presidential declared major disasters under the Stafford Act. When a major disaster is declared by the President, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
becomes the lead Federal agency, and DOD plays a supporting role to the extent that our resources are required to assist FEMA. That system is based on the detailed provisions of the National Response Plan, and the history of that supporting role executed by DOD goes back three or four decades under the provisions of the preexisting Federal Response Plan. And in fact as I mentioned earlier, DOD’s support missions predate both the Stafford Act and the Federal Response Plan and indeed go back to the earliest days of our nation’s history.

Very few analysts would suggest that DOD should play the lead role in responding to major disasters of the magnitude that we experience each year on a recurring basis. The system of support established under the Federal Response Plan, reflected in the ongoing provisions of the National Response Plan, would seem to be appropriate and effective in marshalling DOD resources to support the designated lead Federal agency, FEMA. What will be subject to ongoing examination is the question of whether DOD should play a more substantial role and perhaps a leadership role in responding to the much rarer, much more substantial occurrence of a catastrophic event—not simply a hurricane, but a hurricane of the magnitude of Katrina. Not simply a terrorist attack, but a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction where the devastation might cover a large area, produce a significant number of casualties, and raise issues of residual contamination. It is likely that for some time to come, and probably even beyond the publication date of this interview, that the role of the DOD in responding to such catastrophic events will be subject to continuing review and perhaps statutory action. In most cases, indeed, in the vast majority of cases, DOD should remain as a supporting element of a larger national effort. But in light of the hard realities that we confronted following Katrina, it is reasonable to reexamine and perhaps redefine DOD’s role in response to a truly catastrophic event.

I am confident that any new definition of DOD responsibilities in relationship to a catastrophic event will remain consistent with our historic belief that the role of the military within domestic American society should be limited, that our operational activities should be constrained, that our relationship to law enforcement activities should be carefully limited to extraordinary circumstances and be of a brief duration. Nonetheless, there are potential reforms that would enable DOD to more quickly deploy even larger humanitarian relief capabilities in a more effective way under appropriate circumstances reflecting the immediate and overwhelming requirements of a catastrophic event. We do recognize that what we did in the aftermath of Katrina reflected the urgency of the mission requirement, not the detail of our prior planning. Because Americans were in need, we exceeded all the benchmarks of prior planning. Therefore, it may be time to raise the bar, tighten our plans, and achieve an even higher, more rapid, and effective military response in some future catastrophic event. Our performance was better than our plans, and it’s time to close that gap.

I would emphasize that I think interagency coordination, especially between DHS and DOD, functioned effectively during Katrina, and could be expected to function quite well following any catastrophic event. We have the right connectivity at the top now; the challenge is to develop the follow-on operational capabilities that move the assistance rapidly and effectively. The right people are talking to each other. Katrina revealed that there are significant unmet requirements in terms of rapid deployment of emergency assistance. We in DOD have a duty to work with our interagency partners in order to ensure that civilian capabilities are properly planned, effectively resourced, and are well coordinated with DOD to ensure that once we get downrange, our national response will achieve unity of effort. At this point we’ve got the right documents, we’ve got the right dialogue, I don’t believe we’ve yet achieved the right operational capabilities. If somebody is hungry, or cold, or wet, it’s small comfort to tell them that somewhere back in Washington, there’s a piece of paper assessing the crisis.

**JFQ:** Thank you, sir, for your time.

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Col Krause and Dr. Smotherman extend their thanks to ASD(HD) McHale, and to his assistant for communications, CDR Lawrence Zelvin, USN, for the opportunity to ask in-depth questions about the current roles of the Department of Defense in homeland defense missions.
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is not a first responder, it earned good grades for its capabilities when the local first responder infrastructure was overwhelmed. Katrina exposed larger systemic problems, however, with local, state, Federal, and military coordination—problems that would be more apparent and have far more negative consequences in a terrorist attack on multiple cities. The jumbled medical response when there were relatively few serious injuries as a direct result of the hurricane shows that there is much to be done to prepare for a terrorist incident that suddenly produces hundreds or thousands of casualties.

Katrina demonstrated the need for effective requirements-based planning for such an emergency in the homeland. DOD planning, training, and exercising expertise has much to offer civilian emergency preparedness efforts and should play a proactive role prior to an incident. However, military downsizing, outsourcing of installation support, and tighter integration within local communities are increasing the dependence of military bases or posts on local civilian infrastructure. DOD accepts some operational risk by depending on elements outside its control, and it would be prudent to get actively involved in comprehensive planning and preparedness, both to reduce DOD’s own vulnerabilities and to improve homeland security.

In most domestic incidents, the military is prepared to respond to calls for assistance with all the resources at its disposal. Some have called this support model “you call us when you need us and we’ll do all we can,” but this idea has two flaws. First, a nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist attack may call for the immediate deployment of capabilities that no local or state government can afford to maintain. Second, there is a built-in response delay as requests for assistance flow from local to state to Federal officials. At each level, units and resources must be identified that meet the need, equipment must be issued, and transportation must be arranged. The result is usually like pick-up...
basketball—an impromptu game among players who just met and play according to their own habits without strategy or coordination. This type of support also erroneously suggests that DOD has only a response role in a national medical emergency, and then only when all other resources have been exhausted. As such a resource of last resort, the department would indeed have little to offer. Deployable field hospitals take days or weeks to transport and set up, and military medical professionals would be of little benefit if they did not become engaged until 3 to 5 days into the crisis. In a true national or regional medical emergency, there would likely be such social and economic disruption that DOD resources would indeed be “too little, too late” if called on only after all other national resources were exhausted. Such are some allegations about the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

Homeland Security and Defense

There has been a massive national emphasis on homeland security and homeland defense since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new Federal department has been created, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars, and industry, academia, and communities across the country have become involved. The President has declared a war on terror, and DOD has taken the fight to the enemy with Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The Department of Defense reorganized, realigned, and added elements to support the missions of homeland defense and homeland security. A new geographic combatant command, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), was created with an area of responsibility that includes all of North America. The command puts the homeland defense missions being performed by other DOD organizations under a single command. A policy office and position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense were created. The Directorate of Military Support, the office that approved requests for military assistance to civilian authorities (usually for natural disasters), formerly located within the Office of the Secretary of the Army, was reorganized as the Joint Directorate of Military Support, elevated in stature with flag officer leadership, and moved to the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff.

DOD is going to great lengths to demarcate the homeland defense and homeland security missions, partly to make it clear that the military has no desire to take on civilian responsibilities. The department is the lead Federal agency for homeland defense tasks, described in the USNORTHCOM mission statement as conducting “operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility.” DOD’s limited involvement in homeland security is carefully defined later in the statement as providing “defense support of civil authorities, including consequence management operations.” In reality, apart from actual combat operations, the mission areas of homeland security and homeland defense overlap more often than not, suggesting the need for greater civil-military interaction.

The homeland defense and homeland security overlap is particularly obvious and difficult to address in the medical and public health areas, when a coordinated civil-military response is required in the face of an incident producing significant casualties. There is no “healthcare system” in the United States; there is instead a vast network of public and private institutions, agencies, and individuals who deliver healthcare services, many provided by local, state, and Federal authorities. Public health agencies protect the public from environmental and infectious disease threats, respond to disease outbreaks, and provide direct healthcare services to the neediest populations. Healthcare delivery services, on the other hand, are furnished by a different arrangement. Hospitals are both urban and rural and may be private for-profit, private nonprofit, or public. Actual providers—physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, mental health workers, and allied healthcare workers—may be either government employees or attached to a hospital or healthcare system. More commonly, providers may operate as independent small businesses.

The DOD Military Healthcare System has physicians, nurses, and other allied personnel to meet the day-to-day needs of the active-duty force, military family members, and retirees and their beneficiaries, but it depends in large part on the civilian healthy adults and family members, but most specialty care and almost all inpatient care come from civilian physicians and hospitals in adjacent communities.

DOD accepts some risk by depending on the civilian network. This risk may be inappropriate in providing peacetime healthcare services, but it has considerable implications for a timely response to a terrorist incident within the United States that affects a DOD installation or civilian infrastructure that DOD depends on for force projection. Should terrorists attack a military installation with conventional weapons, USNORTHCOM has the responsibility and plans to bring in combat forces to protect that installation. The response to such an attack, however, would likely require that casualties be transported to civilian referral hospitals that are largely unprepared. Civilian hospitals are often filled to capacity, have few isolation beds for contagious infections, and have insufficient staff to handle a large influx of additional patients. If the attack involved the threat of biological or chemical weapons, the hospital might refuse to take contaminated or contagious casualties altogether. In such an event, USNORTHCOM would find it difficult to identify and task needed military medical support capabilities.

There are three broad areas in which DOD action might reduce this operational risk, but all involve more proactive

command engagement with civilian agencies and organizations: requirements-based mass casualty planning, understanding the institutional cultures of civilian partners in a regional mass casualty response, and coordinated crisis management decision-making. While actions in each of these areas will enhance homeland security, they are also essential to the maintenance of robust homeland defense capabilities. Over time, analysis of the local, state, and Federal response to Katrina will yield further details and insights about improving these elements of DOD-civilian collaboration. This article discusses the three major areas where DOD might reduce the operational risk of depending on the civilian network.

Requirements-Based Planning

Comprehensive planning for a mass casualty response must start with defining the requirements, identifying the capabilities needed to meet them, and linking particular units or personnel to a given scenario in a specific location. Policies and procedures must be developed to task particular resources for an actual mission, pay all associated costs, and backfill the unit or personnel for the mission it was performing when tasked. Response planning that begins with capabilities puts the cart before the horse and is destined to fail.

It is difficult to predict the types and numbers of casualties from a conventional explosion, a communicable biological weapons attack, release of a chemical agent, a nuclear weapon detonation, or a radiological dispersion device. Numbers of casualties would depend on whether the explosion or release takes place indoors or outdoors, in a thickly populated area, in or near a mass transit system, or at the busiest time on a weekday. These complexities are associated with the first-order effects of the attack—the victims directly injured, exposed, or contaminated.

Complexities increase exponentially through the second- and third-order effects—the unintended consequences. People exposed to radiological material or anthrax spores could track the material on their shoes and clothes, endangering others. Those fleeing an incident area might move to a more hazardous zone. Persons exposed to a covert release of a communicable biological agent such as smallpox, plague, or influenza could depart the initial area of exposure and travel to their homes, school, work, or around the world on commercial flights while incubating an infection. They become a risk to others and cause secondary cases as person-to-person transmission takes place.

These types of complexities, especially those that deal with how people might respond in a crisis, cause many officials to move such requirements planning into the “too hard to do” box. In actuality, however, much supportive work has been done in social network analysis and adaptive response that sheds light on likely human behaviors. The question that faces the Nation is who should identify this supportive work, test and improve solutions, and integrate strategies into response plans at all levels. From the local, state, Federal, and military perspective, this is indeed too hard to do because so much complex coordination is required.

All-inclusive answers to these and future questions must be developed in a setting that mirrors the likely response to an incident. Capabilities that are available at each level of response must be compared with the likely requirements.

Local: Since mass casualty response begins with local emergency medical response, hospital emergency departments, and emergency management agencies, the capabilities in each of these sectors must be clearly described.

State: Response capabilities at the state level are often limited to National Guard resources under control of the Governor, in addition to law enforcement agencies. Few states have significant medical response resources, though public health laboratories are essential in supporting a response to a natural pandemic or a biological terrorism agent.

Federal: Capabilities of various Federal agencies are poorly defined at best, and assumptions are often made that because a particular agency has a specific capability in its day-to-day mission, that agency could provide the same capability in the event of a national disaster. As an example, according to Emergency Support Function #1 in the National Response Plan, the Department of Transportation is responsible for Federal and civil transportation support. But department officials recognize that since they often contract with private truckers, they cannot count on these carriers in an emergency that may require working in a contaminated environment.

Closing Capability Gaps

As capability shortfalls are identified, authorities in response agencies at all levels must develop plans for closing these gaps. Comprehensive plans include the required capability, the point in the evolution of the crisis when it is needed, where the resource can be obtained, who must authorize the
request, who must approve its fulfillment, who will reimburse associated costs, how the capability will be replaced when it goes to the requesting location, and when it will be released to return home.

The best surge capacity plans obtain capabilities from neighboring areas through mutual aid compacts. These agreements are used every day as police and fire response units move across jurisdictional boundaries to meet short-term surge needs. A national agreement addresses the two most significant barriers to mutual aid: liability and reimbursement. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact, established in 1996, is administered by the National Emergency Management Association, and provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Response capabilities beyond fire and emergency medical services, however, often resemble the pick-up game described above; officials meet for the first time at the scene of the emergency.

Coordinated procedures and protocols for closing these gaps are rarely in place for regional and multistate mass casualty incidents because few jurisdictions have had to develop them. The hurricane-prone Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and earthquake-prone California are exceptions, but by and large the United States is not ready for a national mass casualty response.

Planning Needs: Three Approaches

National all-hazard mass casualty planning for acts of terrorism includes three primary parts, only two of which are currently being addressed. The first planning approach is local and state response planning, which varies in quality according to the community's experience and resources. For a terrorist attack, such as the 2001 anthrax letters on the East Coast, an efficient response must consist of integrated, coordinated planning between all response sectors: public health, emergency medical, fire, law enforcement, hospital-based emergency medical care, private sector healthcare delivery, local emergency management agencies, local elected officials, military installations, public and private sector businesses (which would provide food, water, utilities, communications, and transportation), volunteer organizations, schools, faith-based organizations, and the news media. Such comprehensive local planning is rare. Katrina showed that even when plans are in place, they must be promptly executed. Local leaders cannot afford to wait for the Federal Government to provide an initial response.

The second approach is planning for a Federal response (for example, for the moment when states may approach the Federal Government through the Department of Homeland Security seeking Federal financial aid and response assets). This response may include Federal Emergency Management Agency support for New Orleans, including pharmaceutical and medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile, or support from the National Interagency Fire Center for annual western wildfires.

Real Federal medical resources are limited, primarily consisting of small deployable medical teams from the National Disaster Medical System. These teams are made up of several dozen volunteer medical professionals and their support staff who are federalized and deployed to a disaster site with equipment and supplies for 72 hours. There are also teams with mortuary, veterinarian, nurse, and pharmacist expertise. Planning for Federal alternate hospital facilities is under way, but integration with actual local and state response capabilities has yet to be accomplished. These facilities will provide bed space to care for nonemergency
hospitalized patients, so existing hospital space can be reserved for new, more seriously injured casualties, but Katrina showed that staffing requirements for these facilities cannot be met from Federal sources.

The third approach is planning for a national response where issues are addressed that are too big for, or beyond the jurisdiction of, state and local agencies—and beyond clear Federal control. This type of planning includes organizations and institutions that operate on the border between state and society. It includes interface with and involvement of private sector businesses, volunteer organizations, faith-based organizations, national professional societies, and academic institutions. These groups are not part of any formal governmental structure, but they play a crucial role in society. One such group, the American Red Cross, has such national credibility and organization that it is responsible for an entire emergency support function in the National Response Plan. Other organizations provide essential support and cohesion to civil society and are readily apparent at the local community level, such as Rotary Clubs, churches, synagogues, mosques, and the Civil Aviation Patrol. As Katrina demonstrated, involvement of these groups is essential to disseminate information through respected local opinion leaders and to identify lacking. Perhaps most critical is providing funding with strings attached to cajole local and state agencies into developing regional plans. Resources must be included for hospital preparedness requirements because patient care revenues are off limits for such needs. Meaningful performance standards and benchmarks must be developed so appropriate targets may be established. Local, state, and regional needs must include identification of medical surge capacity hospital bed space in fixed facilities and at alternate sites such as schools. Medical supplies and equipment; and liability protection and reimbursement for adaptation to local needs. These models should include sources, organization, and management of healthcare professionals; credentialing, training, and personal protective equipment; and liability protection and reimbursement. Methods should be included to maximize existing hospital bed space and to create alternate facilities, transport casualties to regions with excess capacity, and identify funding sources for local hospital preparedness. National professional medical and legal societies should be engaged to discuss mechanisms of triage and the graceful degradation of the quality of emergency care that will take place in the face of mass casualties.

Federal Role in Mass Casualty Planning

The Federal Government has a leadership role in all three of the above planning approaches. Its agencies must support local and state agencies by providing principles for preparedness, goals and objectives, strategies for implementation, and opportunities for testing and exercising local plans. Networking and identifying local and state best practices are two essentials that can only be done from the national point of view, but both are currently lacking. Perhaps most critical is providing funding with strings attached to cajole local and state agencies into developing regional plans. Resources must be included for hospital preparedness requirements because patient care revenues are off limits for such needs. Meaningful performance standards and benchmarks must be developed so appropriate targets may be established. Local, state, and regional needs must include identification of medical surge capacity hospital bed space in fixed facilities and at alternate sites such as schools. Medical supplies and equipment; and liability protection and reimbursement for adaptation to local needs. These models should include sources, organization, and management of healthcare professionals; credentialing, training, and personal protective equipment; and liability protection and reimbursement. Methods should be included to maximize existing hospital bed space and to create alternate facilities, transport casualties to regions with excess capacity, and identify funding sources for local hospital preparedness. National professional medical and legal societies should be engaged to discuss mechanisms of triage and the graceful degradation of the quality of emergency care that will take place in the face of mass casualties.

Organizational Barriers to Coordinated Planning

The rate-limiting step in coordinated planning is the requirement to work across bureaucratic, organizational, and professional barriers. Whenever communication or coordination must take place between agencies, organizations, jurisdictions, or offices, potential stumbling blocks exist. These barriers may thwart communication horizontally, with like agencies at the same levels of government, or vertically, when proceeding up or down the chain of command. Organizational culture becomes a barrier when moving across agencies or business sectors, and bureaucratic obstacles to information flow seem to be ubiquitous.
An example of bureaucratic inefficiency is the initial response to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in early 2003. According to Yanzhong Huang in his analysis of the political aftermath of SARS in China:

*The presence of such a fragmented and disjointed bureaucracy within an authoritarian political structure means that policy immobility can only be overcome with the intervention of an upper-level government that has the authority to aggregate conflicting interests. However, this tends to encourage lower-level governments to shift their policy overload to the upper levels in order to avoid assuming responsibilities. . . . Government officials at all levels tended to distort the information they pass up to their political masters in order to place themselves in a good light. While this is not unique to China, the problem is alleviated in democracies through “decentralized oversight,” which enables citizen interest groups to check up on administrative actions.*

Elements of these bureaucratic inefficiencies are a reality at many levels of government in the United States. Bureaucratic inertia may be overcome, but only with sustained effort.

**Crisis Decisionmaking**

To paraphrase General George Patton, the best plan is useless if executed too late. The best confirmation that planning and preparedness efforts are adequate is to demonstrate successful decisionmaking in executing a plan in a staged crisis management exercise. Such tests should be part of the planning-training-exercising cycle of each agency but must intentionally focus on cross-jurisdictional crisis communication. As this exercise process matures and leaders develop greater experience with making complex decisions quickly and early in a crisis when desired information may be incomplete, exercise scenarios can be made more challenging. Authorities will gain confidence in their own abilities and become comfortable with the actions of responders from other agencies. All will learn better crisis communication with the media and how to engage the public on actions to protect themselves. None of these steps may happen, however, until the basic coordinated planning described above takes place. For Katrina, a massive Federal response in less than 72 hours was widely criticized due to a lack of understanding that the first response is necessarily a state and local responsibility. If DOD does not get involved in coordinated planning, military installations near the affected area will be unlikely to maintain their usual operational capability. Many personnel live off post, and installations depend on local civilians to work on post. Infrastructure is often shared with civilian communities, and daily delivery of food, goods, and services is necessary to keep the facility operational. If a large incident occurred nearby, the installation would have

**an example of bureaucratic inefficiency is the initial response to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in early 2003**

with a civilian airport may be shut down to control the spread of an epidemic, restricting the ability to move vital forces or cargo. The installation commander may seal the gates to protect military resources, but this is likely to further degrade force projection capabilities since the installation will rapidly run short of food, supplies, and support personnel.

This risk was identified in the context of a public health emergency with SARS, when the Defense Science Board commented that “the department’s capability to perform its mission could be limited if there is no plan for immediate protection of the force. While DOD has cautiously adopted a supporting role in response to an outbreak and related consequence management, this deferral may result in delayed action when immediate action is demanded.” DOD needs a robust ability to surge medical treatment for its own forces, and this ability must be integrated with those in the civilian sector so it can maintain crucial force projection capabilities.

**Preparedness Defined**

A national target for preparedness for combating terrorism has been proposed by the Gilmore Commission and applies equally to any domestic emergency:

**Preparedness for combating terrorism requires measurable demonstrated capacity by communities, states, and private-sector entities throughout the United States to**
respond to acute threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts by all of the essential participants, including elected officials, police, fire, medical, public health, emergency managers, intelligence, community organizations, the media, and the public at large. At times, this may require support from the military—Active and Reserve. Such preparedness requires effective and well-coordinated preventive efforts by the components of the intelligence community, law enforcement entities, and a well-educated and informed public. These efforts must be sustainable over the foreseeable future while maintaining a free civil society.¹

The actual national need is for integrated, coordinated, all-hazard response planning. All requirements, capabilities, and potential sources must be considered and courses of action must be developed to close gaps. Plans need to be fashioned and realistically exercised, then improved, then exercised again. Next, training must be developed that supports integration of these plans into day-to-day actions at every level. The military contains much of the national expertise for such deliberative planning. The process involved in planning for and executing a major military operation involves many of the steps described above. A coordinated military campaign plan is much more complex, contains a greater number of variables, and requires many more assumptions in the face of uncertainties than does the response to a major terrorist incident in the United States.

The military possesses several core competencies that directly support mass casualty planning. The initial policy support for such proactive engagement appears to be in place. The new Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognizes the need to access mission risks, improve DOD consequence management capabilities for multiple mass casualty attacks, and enhance the capabilities of interagency partners.² Joint Publication 3–26, Homeland Security, provides definitions and operational parameters for homeland security, including the process for requesting assistance in consequence management.

These policy documents are a significant step in the right direction as DOD prepares for its new homeland security role. The need persists, as Katrina’s lessons are analyzed, to identify the mechanism in which military medical, logistic, and response planners may engage at the appropriate Federal, state, and local levels. U.S. Northern Command does not appear to have the necessary policy or authority for such involvement in civilian preparedness planning. Military planning for civil support will be ineffective if it is not carried out with all the agencies involved in a response. Engagement at the Federal interagency level is important but insufficient. It is incumbent on leadership to create the national forum in which functional, effective mass casualty preparedness planning can occur across artificial bureaucratic barriers.

This mass casualty planning forum should be cosponsored by the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Defense, but it must focus on local and state needs first. Its charter should be to support state development of local, state, and regional mass casualty preparedness and response plans, in contrast to the current focus on Federal and national response planning. It must include private sector and volunteer sources of resources and must engage local and national medical associations.

If a concerted effort is made to develop indisputably effective plans that incorporate public, private, and volunteer resources, the impact of terrorist acts and natural disasters will be reduced and the homeland will indeed become more secure. JFQ


North American Defense and Security after 9/11

By JOSEPH R. INGE and ERIC A. FINDLEY

Canada and the United States fought as partners in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Operation Desert Storm, the Balkans, and most recently in Afghanistan. Our mutual participation in these conflicts and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focused on joint and combined operations in overseas theaters. We have been allies in diplomacy and in the defense of North America, planning and acting within the intent of the Ogdensburg Announcement (1940), the North Atlantic Treaty (1948), and the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Agreement (1958). Our nations have a long history of cooperation that has resulted in the prosperity, safety, and freedom of our peoples.

In the 10 years after the Persian Gulf War, there were numerous terrorist attacks against the United States, to include the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; a car bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1995; a truck bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; two U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and the bombing of the USS Cole near Yemen in 2000. Subsequently, force protection was enhanced in all overseas locations, and law enforcement officials investigated each of these incidents.

Throughout the 1990s and into the next century, the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), like the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), focused on external strategic threats to the country. During this same period, the post–Cold War peace dividend saw military budget and personnel cuts, base closures, and a military focused on the away game in the Balkans and other distant theaters.

The New Threat Environment

The synchronized terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans no longer insulated our people from foreign aggression. Although the Canadian homeland was not directly attacked, the terrorists had temporarily achieved one of their goals: to damage the North American economies by targeting the United States.

Canada and the United States have the largest trade relationship of any two countries, with $1.8 billion in trade per day in Canadian
Some 85 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States and 25 percent of U.S. exports go to Canada. Additionally, 39 states consider Canada their top export destination. Hence, the economic impact of the 9/11 attacks was felt by both nations at the local, state and provincial, and national levels. For instance, increased border security resulted in a 30-mile line of trucks at the border immediately after the attacks, depleting inventories that relied on just-in-time supplies. Although the impact on both economies was temporary, it became clear that an attack on one nation affects the safety, security, economy, and well-being of the other.

Both governments recognized that by working together to strengthen their partner-ship, they could meet the challenges of this new threat environment. Homeland defense and homeland security became top priorities for our nations as articulated in Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

Recognizing that we must fight the away and home games simultaneously, President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. Canada began Operation Apollo in Afghanistan, contributing significant land, sea, and air forces totaling 2,300 men and women. As part of the United Nations International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Canada has been the lead nation in the Kabul Multinational Brigade, providing both the commander and deputy commander from 2003 through 2004. The home game has also changed. Prime Minister Paul Martin emphasized in the National Security Policy that the September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. . . . Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security.

Similarly, President Bush described the Canada-U.S. relationship as vital during the Summit of the Americas on January 13, 2004, emphasizing that “we share the same values: freedom and human dignity and treating people decently” He elaborated in the National Security Strategy that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada.” Hence, both leaders have articulated their visions of a safe and secure environment for our peoples. In addition, meeting in Ottawa, Prime Minister Martin and President Bush issued the following joint statement:

Canada and the United States will work to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of our North American security arrangements by:

- improving the coordination of intelligence-sharing, cross-border law enforcement, and counterterrorism
- taking further steps to secure the Canada-U.S. border while improving the flow of legitimate traffic, through investments in border infrastructure and a land pre-clearance initiative
- combating human trafficking
- increasing the security of critical infrastructure, including transportation, energy, and communications networks
- ensuring the security and integrity of passports issued by each country, consistent with our Consular Understanding of January 13, 2004

Embedding these principles into new political agreements and enabling mechanisms would lead to enhanced defense and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutual societies continue to prosper in an environment where citizens are safe and free.

Before the 9/11 attacks, no single agency in Canada or the United States was in charge of security. That changed when President Bush created the Department of Homeland Security and Prime Minister Martin created Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. Both agencies now have oversight of homeland security, to include the federal leads for emergency responses within our respective borders.

In addition, Canada and the United States signed the Smart Borders Declaration in December 2001 to secure the movement of people and goods between nations. Border security initiatives aimed to:

- ensure biometrics in border and immigration systems
- enhance the design and issuance processes of travel and proof-of-status documents
- validate the identity of travelers at ports of entry.

The threat environment expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetric threat from bombers, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and air- or sea-launched cruise missiles to a continuing symmetric threat, and an emergent asymmetric threat, which was focused across all domains, borders, and agencies. Accordingly, political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new home game. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defense of the American homeland and also to provide military assistance to civil authorities.

Canada and the United States have had integrated air operations under NORAD for almost five decades. The NORAD agreement was primarily focused on the Soviet Union and other external threats but has refocused on threats from within. In this age of transnational terrorism, nonstate actors now have the destructive capacity that once belonged only to nation-states. Therefore, Canadian and U.S. leaders determined that it was critical to study North American security and defense in other domains as well. One option may be adding new roles and missions to the successful NORAD construct.

the Bi-National Planning Group was created to study the future of cooperation in broadening bi-national defense arrangements

Bi-National Planning Group

As a result of a change in the threat environment, and at the request of the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American Secretary of State, the Bi-National Planning Group was created to study the future of cooperation in broadening bi-national defense arrangements for North American security. The Canadian-U.S. Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation (December 2002) gave the group a multifaceted mandate to determine the optimal defense arrangements to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks, as well as to respond to natural disasters or other emergencies in the two countries. To ensure that all stakeholders were represented, members were designated from the Canadian Forces, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM.

The group initiated a formal analysis on enhanced military cooperation to determine the changes in concepts, policies, authorities, organization, and technology needed. More specifically, it is working toward:

- reviewing existing Canadian-U.S. defense plans and protocols with a view toward improving North American land and maritime defense as well as military support to civil agencies in both countries
- preparing bi-national contingency plans to respond to threats, attacks, and other major emergencies
- maintaining awareness of emerging situations through maritime surveillance, to include assessment of maritime threats, incidents, and emergencies to advise and/or warn both governments
- designing and participating in exercises
- planning and participating in joint training programs
- establishing coordination mechanisms with relevant Canadian and U.S. federal agencies.

Plans and Protocols

The group investigated Canada-U.S. plans and agreements associated with Canadian National Defence Headquarters, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM, as well as applicable bi-national memoranda or agreements impacting the Canadian Forces and Transport-Canada and the U.S. Transportation, Pacific, Joint Forces, former Atlantic, and Army Forces Commands.

Next, the group created a Bi-National Document Library containing treaties, agreements, directives, regulations, memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreement between Canada and the United States. This online library will greatly assist planners on both sides of the border working on bi-national and cross-border issues, enabling them to search by keyword, category, title, classification, and Bi-National Planning Group document number. The library also links to other online research sites such as the Canadian Forces Virtual Library and U.S. DOD documents. This is no small accomplishment, since a single repository of bi-national plans, policies, and agreements did not previously exist.

After a thorough review of these documents, researchers identified the necessity to develop strong relationships with key Canadian Department of National Defence and U.S. DOD entities, as well as other government departments and agencies to ensure the defense and security of our homelands.

Preparing Canada-U.S. Plans

Canadian and U.S. planners have created bi-national defense plans since 1940. The first was focused on countering a potential Nazi invasion of North America, while subsequent plans focused on the Japanese threat that emerged in 1941. As a result of the 9/11 attacks, Article V of the NATO agreement was invoked for the first time. But subsequent review of the Canada-U.S. family of plans determined that the Basic Security Document, Land Operations Plan, Maritime-East Operations Plan, and Maritime-West Operations Plan were all outdated.
These plans did not adequately address asymmetric threats, and many of the organizations in them no longer existed. In addition, although the Basic Security Document and the Land Operations Plan addressed military support to civil authorities, neither addressed the roles of the newly created Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada as lead agencies in homeland security. So the group followed a deliberate planning process.

First, the group focused on the Canadian National Security Policy, the 1994 White Paper on Defence, and the 2005 International Policy Statement on Defense. It then compared these documents to the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, as well as Theater Security Cooperation Guidance. The group also reviewed the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Unified Command Plan, and Forces for Unified Commands to ensure that the analysis was compliant with these directives.

This review initiated a revision of the Basic Security Document, which is being further developed between National Defence Headquarters and USNORTHCOM staffs. The revised document provides strategic level guidance for the planning of bi-national operations for the defense of the Canada-U.S. region and bi-national military support to civil authorities. The draft now incorporates overarching guidance derived from the Prime Minister’s National Security Policy, the 1994 white paper, and the President’s National Security Strategy, as well as guidance from other critical Department of National Defence and DOD documents. Hence, the Basic Security Document is similar in scope to the U.S. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, as it is intended to provide strategic guidance from the Chief of Defence Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operational commanders from both countries: the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, NORAD Commander, USNORTHCOM Commander, and the Canada Command Commander.

Group planners also compared the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process and the U.S. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, finding commonality in content with minor deviations in format. Using these documents, a new military-to-military support to civil authorities plan was developed to facilitate bi-national consequence management. Canadian Forces did a great job in supporting the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts; and once this plan is approved, it will improve the speed of bilateral responses through systemic rather than ad hoc mechanisms.

Finally, the Bi-National Planning Group has undertaken the task of creating a strategic concept plan for the joint and combined defense of North America in a Combined Defense Plan. The plan will capture the information, processes, and procedures from the former Land Operations Plan, Maritime-East Operations Plan, and Maritime-West Operations Plan, but will add a newer focus on asymmetric threats as well as joint and combined responses to deter, detect, or defeat those threats bi-nationally.

**Maritime Domain Awareness**

The Honorable Paul McHale, as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and Admiral James Loy, USCG (Ret.), as the U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, created a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Group that has tackled many tough issues. *Maritime domain awareness* is defined as the effective understanding of anything in the maritime environment that could adversely affect Canadian-U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment.

MDA is greater than mere surveillance since it is broad in scope and geography, acts as an enabler for all maritime missions, and must be a fully integrated effort for local, state, provincial, and federal governments as well as the private sector. Since the shipment of commodities or passengers in the maritime sector comes from other modes of transportation, many interdependencies cross this domain. Hence, MDA must be viewed as an end-to-end
international transportation problem as well as a subset of global domain awareness (GDA), which the group defines as the knowledge in all environments of anything that could adversely affect Canadian-U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment.

Global domain awareness is achieved if situational awareness and actionable intelligence are seamlessly integrated across all domains, resulting in synergy across all operational functions. Due to multiple inter-dependencies and interconnectivity, GDA supports a spectrum of missions across many agencies and organizations, civilian and military. Examples include:

- modes of transportation within the land domain feeding ships within the maritime domain and vice versa
- intermodal transportation blurring the boundaries between land, maritime, and air domains
- asymmetric maritime threats expanding the wide array of threat vectors
- law enforcement agencies having the best information but the military having the best response capabilities, or vice versa, reinforcing a need for interagency cooperation.

These examples help update Cold War paradigms related to threats and responses to them. Traditional thinking does little to defeat an asymmetric threat. For instance, an enemy destroyer did not attack USS Cole; fighter aircraft or cruise missiles did not attack the Pentagon; and the withdrawal from Mogadishu was not the result of a high-tech armored threat. The boundaries have become blurred between defense, security, and law enforcement, resulting in an even greater need for bi-national global domain awareness. Therefore, the Bi-National Planning Group assessed the state of maritime awareness. Therefore, the Bi-National Plan

Due to a lack of formal shared mechanisms (not ad hoc) such as fully manned and fully networked maritime information fusing capabilities between Canadian and U.S. operations centers, the group developed a maritime awareness concept that provides information sharing and awareness on vessels of interest as a temporary workaround. This proof-of-concept positioned a Canadian Forces maritime intelligence analyst inside the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center to work closely with an American analyst. Combined information on the vessel of interest is then provided to the Canadian National Defence Command Center and the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center.

Research is being conducted by the Bi-National Planning Group staff and will be conducted between the Canadian and U.S. staffs in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, automated information-sharing, intelligence fusion, and development of a common operational picture in the maritime domain. Additional gaps between military and civilian intelligence coordination centers in maritime surveillance capabilities and bi-national cooperation have been identified in the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence Seaway System. A bi-national team is investigating activities to improve strategic MDA for this system. MDA issues were also highlighted and discussed at a tabletop exercise that involved a terrorist attack against Detroit and Windsor to outline bi-national responses and requirements. Development of additional coordination issues will naturally evolve as the group pursues the bi-national staffing of the Basic Security Document and Combined Defense Plan.

**Bi-National Exercises and Training**

Joint, bi-national training and exercises conducted across all domains would enhance defense of our homelands and could provide added benefits to Canadian and U.S. forces if they deploy to an overseas crisis. Although NORAD regularly conducts training and exercises to respond to threats in the air, the group determined that, excluding NORAD, no major Canadian-U.S. exercises have occurred in a joint and combined environment for over a decade at the strategic or joint task force/operational levels in the land or maritime domains. This is a serious gap since training and exercises are the mechanisms that produce greater interoperability, which is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to operate effectively together.

In the near term, as part of its Civil Assistance Plan development, the group initiated a tabletop exercise program to provide scenario-driven discussions and analyses of natural disasters and terrorist incidents. Lessons learned from each exercise on processes, functions, and mechanisms are being embedded in both defense and civil support planning. By design, these exercises were joint and combined and included military and civilian stakeholders.

Future tabletop exercises will also assist in validating plans prior to submission for bi-national approval, which is compliant with the deliberate planning processes of the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process and the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (in which a plan is developed and then exercised to refine it). These exercises helped establish and improve appropriate coordination processes and mechanisms among relevant Canadian departments and U.S. Federal agencies.

In addition to the tabletop exercises, 28 members of Canadian Forces along with personnel from government departments and agencies observed USNORTHCOM’s Exercise Unified Defense 04, which introduced National Defence Headquarters and J-Staff representatives to the command’s operational processes and key personnel. That was a good step toward enhanced cooperation in training and exercises, but the next step must be actual participation at the strategic and operational levels, geared toward joint and combined mission-essential tasks.

**Enhanced Cooperation**

Alliances, like partnerships, require time and attention. Canada and the United States have had a unique relationship: a common heritage and goals, an undefended border, and integrated and expanding economies.

The greatest threat to our economy, security, and relationship could be a terrorist attack launched from Canadian territory against the United States, or vice versa. Enhanced military cooperation is necessary to ensure the defense and security of the North American homeland in view of
today’s asymmetric threats and to provide fast, efficient, and trained military assets to assist in civil support missions. Building, sustaining, and enhancing relationships between the Department of National Defence and the Department of Defense, as well as intergovernmental and interagency relationships with federal departments and agencies, provinces, states, local organizations, and other entities, are critical.

Forces that train in a joint and combined environment increase interoperability. The increases in interoperability between forces in the domestic land, maritime, and air domains will have a synergistic effect on future coalition operations in the international environment as well.

Canadian-U.S. military cooperation should be based on the 47-year success of NORAD. As the first step, our nations should continue to improve information-sharing among all relevant departments and agencies across the border. The Bi-National Planning Group recommends a seamless sharing of information and intelligence on defense and security issues.

Although this directive preceded the 9/11 Commission Report, it complements the report’s finding that shifting to a “need to share” paradigm is critical to preclude another surprise attack.

On March 23, 2005, the elected leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States gathered in Texas to announce the establishment of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. One of the stated goals is to establish a common approach to security to protect North America from external threats, prevent and respond to threats within North America, and further streamline the secure and efficient movement of legitimate, low-risk traffic across our shared borders. Likewise, during the discussions that will lead to the 2006 renewal of the NORAD Agreement, Canada and the United States have the opportunity to consider expansion of bi-national cooperation in information sharing in maritime and land domains, as well as in bi-national military assistance to civil authorities in the event of emergency.

The group’s Interim Report on Enhanced Military Cooperation concluded that the new threat paradigm requires new perspectives; hence, there is a need to move from a “need to know” to a “need to share” culture of information protection between nations. This paradigm shift is supported not only by Canada’s National Security Policy, but also by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence: “All [Intelligence Community] members are hereby directed to . . . develop supporting policies, processes, procedures, and training needed to achieve the maximum degree of information exchange among IC agencies, with our customers, and with our foreign partners.”

The authors wish to express their appreciation to Biff Baker of the Science Applications International Corporation from the Bi-National Planning Group for his research and editorial assistance.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been called the most successful military alliance in modern history. Achievements in forestalling Soviet expansion in Europe and in conducting the peace and stability operations in the Balkans demonstrate future utility for the organization. However, NATO is at a crossroads. Terror attacks on Western interests during the last decade were punctuated by the events of September 11, 2001. The former collective defense posture of the Alliance is now challenged both politically and militarily to engage in broader world policy. As a result, NATO politicians and strategic planners are confronted by operational considerations well beyond the bounds of Europe but with serious implications at home.

The transformation into this new era is highlighted by creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the deployment of Allied forces to Afghanistan to command the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I) represents the most recent test of the organization’s resolve and future direction. Still in its infancy, NTM–I provides insight into the Alliance decision process while highlighting implications for future NATO-led, out-of-area operations.

NATO Transforms

The transformation of NATO has progressed rapidly in the 21st century. Beginning in 1999 with the expansion from 16 to the current 26 nations, the Alliance has embarked on ambitious ventures that have tested the resolve of old and new members. In the midst of the expansion (consisting of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004), members outlined future objectives at the Prague Summit in 2002. There, then-Secretary General Lord George Robertson stated, “NATO must change radically if it is to be effective. . . . It must

By RICK LYNCH and PHILLIP D. JANZEN

Major General Rick Lynch, USA, is deputy chief of staff, Political/Military/Economic, Multi-National Force–Iraq, and was deputy chief of staff for Operations at Joint Forces Command Naples. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, USA, is Iraq desk officer in the Political Advisor’s Office at Joint Forces Command Naples.
modernize or be marginalized.” Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, USMC, emphasized the need to move NATO beyond its Cold War thinking of static defense, while capitalizing on its capabilities to shape and influence the 21st-century security environment: “We have too much capability for the past and not enough capacity for the future.”

To meet the challenge, NATO realigned its command structure from a static, defensive posture embodied in two strategic-level commands, two regional operational-level commands, and several joint subregional commands, to a more streamlined functional structure. The new structure is based in a strategic command responsible for transforming the Alliance—Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia (formerly Strategic Allied Command Atlantic), and a second strategic command responsible for the operational aspects of NATO—Allied Command Operations, or Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The transformation further devolved the regionally based command structure into a more flexible, operationally based hierarchy with land, maritime, and air component commands.

With new focus and energy derived from the Prague Summit, NATO embarked on a historical out-of-area mission, taking command of ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 11, 2003. The German commander, Lieutenant General Norbert Van Heyst, marked this event, stating, “During the 1990s, we saw NATO starting to take on peacekeeping duties, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo and Macedonia. But that was limited . . . to the Euro-Atlantic region. But as of today, the Alliance will for the first time be leading an operation outside Europe, in Asia, and that is quite unique.”

Later that year, NATO inaugurated the NRF, an operational concept designed to use modern, flexible, rapidly deployable joint forces to combat asymmetric threats, namely terrorism.

NATO’s most recent and arguably most challenging out-of-area operation is the NTM—I. The hard political and military lessons identified in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan are being relearned in Iraq: success in NATO-led operations will always rest on political will, funding, and personnel resources, all inextricably linked to the requirement for unanimity among members.

The Road to Baghdad

ISAF marked a sea change in Allied operational vision; however, NATO resolve to engage worldwide problems was soon tested again with Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. Under authority derived from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441, coalition forces invaded Iraq to remove Ba’athist dictator Saddam Hussein and eliminate the suspected threat from weapons of mass destruction. As early as November 2002 at the Prague Summit, Alliance members pledged full support for UN efforts to ensure full compliance by Iraq with UNSCR 1441, stating that it remained an Alliance policy. However, there were no further discussions of specific involvement in Iraq until Turkey requested Article 4 defense of its borders with that country in February 2003. Later that year, Poland requested support to its leadership of a coalition-based international sector in Iraq, fully embroiling NATO ministers in debate about how the Alliance could further support coalition efforts in Iraq and with the government in Baghdad.

Early in 2004, planning staffs began considering support options to the fledgling government. An assessment visit made in February 2004 facilitated initial contacts with coalition leadership and provided early ideas for a potentially enhanced role in Iraq. Results from that trip indicated a spectrum of possible roles, all capitalizing on NATO core competencies and recent experience from stabilization operations in the Balkans. Early thoughts focused on the possibility of helping train Iraqi military leaders. A second and more robust assessment visit was planned to identify specific training requirements for presentation to NATO political leadership in the North Atlantic Council.

Political support for involvement in Iraq reached a crescendo in June 2004. The NATO Secretary General proposed further participation on three conditions: a UN Security Council Resolution pledging international support to the government, a request from the government for military support, and unanimous consent within the Alliance.

The first of these three conditions was met by the passage of UNSCR 1546 on June 8, 2004, which endorsed “the formation of the new interim Iraqi government” and “developing effective Iraqi police, border enforcement, and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi ministries.” It asked “member states and international organizations to assist the government . . . in building the capability of these institutions.”

On June 20, the second condition for support was achieved with receipt of an official request from interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to the Secretary General for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in four priority areas: the Department of Border Enforcement, police service, national guard, and army. Iraqi leadership emphasized the desire for training in Iraq—an effort to bolster public support for the ISF and demonstrate national resolve for restructuring the security forces in line with democratic principles.

Finally, during the NATO Summit in Istanbul on June 28, the expanded Alliance
pledged its full support to the interim government. In the Istanbul Statement, heads of state announced, “In response to the request of the Iraqi interim government, and in accordance with UNSCR 1546 . . . we have decided today to offer NATO’s assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces.” The declaration ended with a call for further proposals to support the nascent Iraqi security institutions “as a matter of urgency.”

Energized by the UN resolution, the official request from the government, and unanimity in the Alliance, a second 11-man reconnaissance and assessment team deployed in July 2004 with officers from Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples, Allied Command Transition (ACT), and SHAPE. The JFC Naples commander initially accompanied the team, facilitating access to the highest levels of Iraqi and coalition leadership, including Defense Minister Hazim al-Sha’lan, who emphasized his priorities for training support within Iraq and highlighted the sense of urgency for NATO support preceding the 2005 national elections. At the conclusion of the visit, three liaison officers were left in Iraq to further coordinate efforts with the coalition headquarters. The resulting trip report captured key elements of training and equipment shortfalls and outlined further possible assistance to the ISF.

The NATO Training Implementation Mission

NATO acted on its unanimous political support for Iraq when SACEUR ordered JFC Naples to deploy a training and equipment needs assessment team on July 30, 2004. Under the leadership of Major General Carel Hilderink of the Netherlands, the mission was named the NATO Training Implementation Mission–Iraq (NTIM–I) and was composed of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from nine nations and four NATO commands. The NTIM–I was tasked to assess the training and equipment needs of the Iraqi Security Forces, identify the best methods for conducting training both inside and outside the country, and report the findings to SACEUR. It was also tasked to initiate immediate training assistance to the ISF in leadership and command and control. The team included specialists from ACT, directed to coordinate and conduct the detailed training needs analysis. Also on the team were functional area specialists from the NATO Joint Warfare Center and NATO School Oberammergau, tasked to assist with the assessment and then to commence immediate, needs-based training of officers. In less than 3 weeks, the NTIM–I had developed a fully coordinated training needs analysis based on direct consultation with officials of the Interim Iraqi Government and the coalition’s Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I).

The final report in August 2004 confirmed earlier assessments of training gaps in middle to senior ISF leadership and the need for a formalized Iraqi training command structure. Other identified training needs included army brigade and division staff training and professional officer/NCO development. The report analyzed all identified training shortfalls from 16 broad categories and isolated immediate equipment requirements. While the report emphasized in-country training, it also

Iraqi Security Forces patrolling in Tal Afar

nations with political restrictions on deploying forces to Iraq can remain supportive by training forces at outside sites

Fleet Combat Camera Group Pacific (Alan D. Monyelle)
addressed recommendations for training outside Iraq.

Commensurate with the completed training needs analysis, training of officers began on August 24, with Allied officers mentoring their counterparts in national command and control centers of the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This early effort was termed right-seat mentoring and was characterized by NATO officers providing real-time, day-to-day assistance on operational and strategic command and control functions. Topics were determined in consultation with Iraqi military leadership and the Iraqi staff directors of each organization. Mentors addressed topics ranging from crisis action reporting to operational communications. While difficult to quantify, the success of the NTIM–I training was quickly recognized by both Iraqi and coalition leadership for its immediate value and future potential for an expanded NATO training mission in that country.

In conjunction with the right-seat mentoring, the first NATO team in Iraq established a coordination body for future training and equipment support to the ISF. The Training and Equipment Coordination Committee became a forum where Allied leadership could routinely meet with both coalition and Iraqi officers to discuss national priorities, deconflict bilateral support with alliance proposals, and present training and equipment offers from member nations to the ISF. The NATO Training and Education Coordination Group (NTECG) was also established in Brussels to maintain a solid interface among members, ACT, SHAPE, JFC Naples, and the Allied headquarters in Baghdad on all issues related to out-of-country training requirements as well as equipment and training offers.

**NTIM–I Becomes NTM–I**

The first chapter of the NATO mission ended with delivery of the training needs analysis to SHAPE in September 2004. The report identified ISF training and equipment needs and recommended a way forward for the Alliance. Training and mentoring in Iraq continued with a small cadre of staff, while work commenced in Naples to translate the August 2004 report into military advice for Allied political leadership. Based on the NTIM–I recommendations, NATO political authorities agreed to expand assistance, including establishment of an Alliance-supported, Iraqi-led formal military training institution in Iraq. In November 2004, a strategic-level operations plan received political approval, codifying training and equipment support. On the heels of that approval, NATO authorities issued an activation order on December 16, authorizing expansion in Iraq to 300 trainers and staff, and transitioning from the Training Implementation Mission–Iraq to the current NATO Training Mission–Iraq.

The period between September and December 2004 was fraught with debate. During the political process to approve an expanded NATO mission, JFC Naples continued its presence in Baghdad with a second rotation of the NTIM–I followed by a third, which marked the transition to the NTM–I. Both teams continued mentoring Iraqi leadership and deepened liaison arrangements with MNSTC–I and the Ministry of Defense. The NATO staff in Baghdad also expanded coordination of training and equipment support. More importantly, work continued on developing the crown jewel of the mission: an Iraqi-led military leadership academy focused on professional development and training.

In little more than 5 months, NATO had conducted an operational assessment and a detailed training needs analysis and expanded the training and equipment support mission in Iraq from 14 mentor/trainers to a mission of 85 personnel in Baghdad and 12 in Brussels. To date, maturing assistance is credited with training 516 officers in Iraq and 126 in NATO education and training facilities elsewhere. Equipment support is equally impressive. Benefiting from restructuring militaries in both new and old Alliance members, Iraq has received donations of primarily former Warsaw Pact hardware ideal for rebuilding an Iraqi military familiar with that equipment. Highlights include 77 refurbished T–72 main battle tanks, 14,000 assorted small arms, and over 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition. Pending offers could more than triple current donations.

**The Way Ahead**

The August 2004 report emphasized the need for an institutionalized training hierarchy within the officer and NCO professional development system. The Iraqi request for a formal military education institution motivated a NATO search for sites to house what is now known as the Training Education and Doctrine Center (TEDC). NTIM–I members analyzed several locations with the final proposal focused on the town of Ar Rustamiyah, 25 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, selected because of the Iraqi desire to return the professional military academy to its traditional site. Operational advantages included infrastructure considerations and force protection. The site has existing administrative, training, and life support facilities and capacity for expansion. Force protection is enhanced through proximity to coalition forces posted in a compound adjacent to the site.

Early development of assistance at Ar Rustamiyah began in September 2004 when NATO assigned liaison officers to assist...
MNSTC–I with ongoing training efforts there. They were also tasked to develop and refine an infrastructure plan for the future site of the TEDC. A complete site development plan is now being implemented. Once fully developed, the center will be an Iraqi-led, NATO-supported operation that will include a basic officer commissioning course, a junior and senior staff college, and eventually a senior officer war college. The TEDC is expected to train over 1,000 officers annually. The center will eventually offer a full spectrum of professional military leadership training while parallel assistance continues in the form of NATO right-seat mentoring in the national-level command and control centers, sustaining instruction received at the TEDC.

Despite the Iraqi priority for training ISF leadership in Iraq, a significant portion of current training support involves training outside the country. This has both political and functional advantages. Those nations with political restrictions on deploying forces to Iraq can remain supportive of the NTM–I by training forces at outside sites. On the functional side, existing NATO education and training facilities provide excellent resources for training leadership disciplines. Also, officers are exposed to Western democracies while receiving expert instruction on specific subjects not offered in Iraq. Out-of-country training throughput in 2005 was expected to be 380 officers attending courses at the Joint Warfare Center in Norway, the NATO Defence College in Italy, or the NATO School in Germany.

The NTECG continues to refine its procedures in working with Allied, national, Iraqi government, and NATO coordination mechanisms in Iraq. The group not only synchronizes Iraqi requirements with national offers, but also facilitates the import of offered equipment as well as movement of Iraqi officers to and from training facilities outside the country.

Observations and Lessons Learned

As with all democratically run military operations, the NATO assistance mission to Iraq depends on political support for funding and personnel. The Alliance has struggled to apply outdated mechanisms and policies to the fluid environment of the out-of-area support mission. Funding rules for this operation follow the “costs-lay-where-they-fall” approach, which effectively puts fiscal responsibility on nations contributing to the mission. NATO training and infrastructure expenses in Iraq have also given rise to a new Alliance financial challenge, the trust fund. Hesitant to commit common funds to the NTM–I, NATO political leadership established a Byzantine system of NTM–I trust funds initially to support training and presumably to fund transportation of donated equipment to Iraq. The training trust fund is currently prioritized to “out-of-Iraq” training, while the trust fund for transportation costs is nonexistent. Additionally, these trust funds allow nations to attach “restrictions” or “caveats” on how their contributions can be utilized. Finally and most notably, development of the TEDC at Ar Rustamiyah languishes from the lack of committed NATO funds for infrastructure improvements.

NATO personnel issues are equally unwieldy. Some contributing nations attach operational restrictions on personnel that are not commensurate with the political commitment at Istanbul. In addition to operational caveats on personnel, members can have differing limitations or requirements on the length of deployment, predisciplinary training, mid-tour leaves, and other personnel issues unforeseen to operational planners.

In short, the way ahead for NATO in Iraq will always return to the issues of political support and consensus, money, and people. The history of the training mission harbors significant insights for future Allied joint and combined operations. The following capture some of the lessons and their implications for NTM–I and the Alliance.

The most significant lesson from this mission involves supporting political pronouncements with political will. At the Istanbul Summit, all 26 members committed to support the government of Iraq “with the training of its security forces” and sought further proposals for that support “as a matter of urgency.” This statement soon rang hollow as political consensus was overshadowed by political posturing over involvement in Iraq. With each step, from the reconnaissance mission in July 2004 to the delay in funding Istanbul pledge to support Iraq and have contributed to out-of-country support have also in practice politically blocked progress on the main effort of in-country training. The lesson is clear: once the commitment is made and plans are approved, nations must be obligated to support the efforts politically if not materially. There are many ways to improve the political dimensions of NATO decisionmaking, but in the end, success always depends on political commitment throughout the operation.

Revising Funding Policy

The Alliance is well into the transformation process from a static defense organization to a more flexible, deployable mechanism for operations in and out of Europe. The NRF concept and its inherent structures illustrate how NATO is transforming into a more responsive joint and combined force. However, as the command structure and strategic and operational concepts have rapidly evolved to meet changing threats, financial support mechanisms have not adapted. For

once accord is reached for a NATO-led operation, operational decisions should not be held hostage to the political process

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Caveats and Preferences

National caveats on personnel participating in NATO-led operations are not a new challenge. Lessons learned from operations in the Balkans often emphasize the impact of caveats on that mission. Nations contributing personnel to the NTM–I also apply operational caveats to their force offerings, to include restrictions on the place of duty and length of deployment. Operational impacts from caveats are countless but include restricting force protection troops from securing vehicle convoys. Another case involves limiting personnel to duty in Baghdad’s International Zone. In all cases, the NTM–I commander is forced to find other solutions to operational requirements. When nations transfer operational control of their personnel to the NATO command structure, they should also transfer the trust in the command for proper employment of forces. This trust is built on careful national consideration of the operational plans, which are politically supported or rejected well in advance of deployment.

As stated throughout, Iraqi leadership has always emphasized a preference for training assistance in Iraq. The symbolism, practicality, and cost-effectiveness of in-country pronouncements. A nation can politically support an operation at absolutely no cost to its own treasury. Trust funds also attract an even more complex political dimension: the caveat. Contributing nations can place restrictions and constraints on the use of their contributions, creating an unwieldy system of accounting checks and balances. NATO should revisit its funding policy, which penalizes contributing nations by forcing them to pay for their participation. The use of trust funds is also a growing failure. NATO has committed the political capital of the Alliance and all 26 nations represented to train Iraqi officers. It is now prepared to squander that capital by failing to fund the commitment. Through trust funds, NATO has, in effect, put out the tin cup for interested donors. As one budget officer put it, “What we really need is Jerry Lewis, some air-time, and a phone bank, and then we would be talking real money.” These are just a few operational issues directly related to funding that highlight what any military thinker will understand. Without adequate financial resources, and the flexibility to apply those resources at the decisive points in an operation, mission failure becomes a strong possibility. 

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The idea of trust funds to support an operation is also fraught with disaster. Announcing support for an operation plays well in the international arena; however, trust funds allow nations to avoid any financial obligation associated with their verbal pronouncements. A nation can politically support an operation at absolutely no cost to its own treasury. Trust funds also attract an even more complex political dimension: the caveat. Contributing nations can place restrictions and constraints on the use of their contributions, creating an unwieldy system of accounting checks and balances.

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Notes from NTIM–I meeting with Minister Sha’lan, August 27, 2004.

4 Available at <www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040609_UNSCR_Text.html>
5 Available at <www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0622a.htm>
6 Available at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-089c.htm>
7 Notes from NTIM–I meeting with Minister Sha’lan, August 27, 2004.

duty and length of deployment. Operational impacts from caveats are countless but include restricting force protection troops from securing vehicle convoys. Another case involves limiting personnel to duty in Baghdad’s International Zone. In all cases, the NTM–I commander is forced to find other solutions to operational requirements. When nations transfer operational control of their personnel to the NATO command structure, they should also transfer the trust in the command for proper employment of forces. This trust is built on careful national consideration of the operational plans, which are politically supported or rejected well in advance of deployment.

As stated throughout, Iraqi leadership has always emphasized a preference for training assistance in Iraq. The symbolism, practicality, and cost-effectiveness of in-country training is also the most effective means to train large numbers of officers in a formal setting run by Iraqis for Iraqis. Yet NATO budget managers have prioritized training trust funds for out-of-country training, favoring the political appeal of training in Europe over the more difficult task of training in Iraq. As the TEDC matures, a cost-benefit analysis will undoubtedly favor training support in Iraq. Finally, while arguably beneficial for the few officers fortunate enough to leave, out-of-country training has limited value and scope by any comparison with training conducted in-country.

The Iraqis have clearly voiced their preference for a course of action readily supported by numerous advantages. NATO leadership should now refocus NTM–I on its original priority—delivery of support in Iraq.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has embarked on a determined transition to a more responsive and deployable posture amidst emerging global threats and instability. Adapting to that environment will be the greatest challenge for an enduring Alliance. Matching the developing NATO Response Force capability and the additional resources of an expanding organization with politically supported mechanisms to support the use of those resources demands the full attention of Allied leadership. As NATO considers its potential response to disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, and future stability operations, the now-familiar lessons identified from the training mission in Iraq must become lessons learned and applied. Only then will NATO maintain its place in history and further its reputation as the modern world’s most successful military alliance. JFQ
The purpose of this competition is to stimulate strategic thinking and promote well-written research and a broader security debate among professionals. Students from all services, interagency students, and international fellows attending senior U.S. service or joint professional military education colleges are eligible to compete.

Winning essays will be published in issue 43 (4th Quarter 2006) of Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ). The publication of the winning essays is meant to assist the Chairman with the tasks of stimulating critical thinking among security professionals and making the research more accessible to a wider readership while publicly honoring the winners and their faculty supporters. Furthermore, NDU Press will consider all semifinalist research papers for publication in future issues of JFQ. Judges representing each senior-level school bring nominated papers to NDU for semifinalist and finalist rounds. Finalists receive a certificate signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, USMC. Winners will also receive awards generously provided by the NDU Foundation.

To learn more about the 2006 Strategic Essay Contest, visit the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu.
Today’s U.S. Special Operators are the product of centuries of development of military strategy, tactics, and technology. The Athenians were famous for their mastery of the sea, but their greatest general, Alcibiades, was known for his awareness and exploitation of the customs and unique capabilities of rival powers. The Romans relied on their heavy infantry, understood the value of examining enemy culture and language, and used slaves to translate and provide critical intelligence in analysis of adversaries.

Special Forces gained recognition after World War I, but they became more widely recognized during World War II and after, when the daring exploits of American and British silent warriors gained renown through the press and popular movies.

During the Cold War, American strategists and planners considered both U.S. Special Forces and the Soviet Spetsnaz as vital factors in conflict. When terrorists began to kidnap, hijack, and kill Americans and their allies in the 1970s and 1980s, Special Operators took note and expanded their expertise to deal better with the transnational terrorist threat. Desert One, the attempted rescue of American hostages held by Iranian radicals, spurred considerable scrutiny of Special Forces capabilities and provided impetus for the services to move forward aggressively. Special Operations evolved more rapidly through the 1980s, and by 1990, operators had employed the latest technology, training, and tactics around the globe. With every operation, American Special Operations became more sophisticated, and the joint U.S. Special Operations Command grew in capability.

The 24-hour news cycle emphasized the crucial role of Special Operations in Operation Desert Storm. American and British Special Operators returned with essential experience that helped the profession advance rapidly through the 1990s; these lessons were incorporated into tactics and technology in preparation for more flexible applications of the military instrument in the dynamic post–Cold War strategic environment.

Because of the importance—and danger—of missions delegated to Special Operators, leaders recognized early that considerable joint and dedicated training and tailored, highly specialized equipment were required. In 1998, General Peter Schoomaker, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and now Chief of Staff of the Army, said:
We must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems and provide a coherent set of choices to the supported [combatant commander] or joint force commander—more often like Sun Tzu, less like Clausewitz. This means training and educating people how to think, not just what to think.¹

After the attacks on September 11, 2001, America needed a uniquely capable force with the experience and ability to operate in areas previously considered improbable battlegrounds. Few can forget the iconic image of an American combat controller on a horse, armed with a global positioning device and radio, directing bomber strikes against the Taliban. Some consider Operation Enduring Freedom, the successful battle for the liberation of Afghanistan, a new American way of war: an air and space war supported by joint teams of Special Operators and indigenous forces on the ground. Operation Iraqi Freedom, the second major test in the War on Terror, has seen further integration of Special Operations into a joint and coalition environment. While northern Iraq saw the largest airdrop since Grenada and southern Iraq saw a lightning war of maneuver, western Iraq was again the domain of Special Operators and joint air. Special Forces and traditional military capabilities were uniquely and expertly tailored to meet the threat.

This U.S. Special Operations Command JFQ special feature section begins with an essay by General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, who presents the command’s history and describes its diverse global portfolio. Next, Lieutenant General Dell Dailey and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Webb frame the role of the command in the War on Terror. Major General Paulette Risher then describes the organization and education of Special Operations warfighters. The special feature concludes with a discussion by Dale Uhler on the approach and requirements for acquisition of new technology critical to keeping the command on the cutting edge.

M.E. Krause

Born from crisis and shaped through experience, today’s special operations capability did not come easily. Contemporary Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the product of tragedy, vision, and the innovation of Congress. Unique authorities given to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) empower Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen to perform diverse yet critical missions. Exceptional training, enhanced education, cutting-edge technology, and force maturity, coupled with the authority, agility, and willingness to change, form a responsive framework fundamental to Special Operations Forces defeating adversaries across the globe.

History
U.S. Special Operations Command, like the Central Intelligence Agency, can trace its lineage to World War II and the Office of Strategic Services. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War I Medal of Honor recipient William “Wild Bill” Donovan came the idea to create a new force with unprecedented capabilities to fight the Axis powers. This force would have skills enabling it to work deep behind enemy lines, perform clandestine missions, and provide strategic intelligence. The Office of Strategic Services played a critical role in the Allied victory; however, these exceptional skills rapidly deteriorated after the war.

Although special operations personnel in all the services struggled to maintain their capabilities in the postwar years, support was severely lacking, in particular during the Cold War when strategic nuclear forces took center stage. During the Vietnam War, Army Special Forces and Rangers, Navy Underwater Demolition and Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, and Air Force air commandos contributed significantly. However, the resources and organization to fully harness their potential were lacking, and again these special capabilities were greatly reduced after the war.

The growing number of terrorist incidents in the 1970s presaged the new threat of terror-based warfare we face today. It also triggered the formation of the very command structure that is leading the war on terror: USSOCOM. In 1980, Operation Eagle Claw was launched to rescue the 53 Americans being held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The rescue force met with disaster at a remote site known as “Desert One,” resulting in mission failure.
and the loss of life and equipment. The operators, composed of Marine helicopter pilots flying from Navy ships with Army Rangers and Special Forces and a mix of Air Force C–130s, knew they were facing steep odds. They did not have the benefits of habitual joint training, SOF-unique equipment, or fully developed skills. Nor did they have the joint procedures to pull off such a difficult mission. A capability gap was identified that fateful night, and a strategic transformation would be required to overcome that gap.

As a result of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, Congress tasked the Department of Defense (DOD) to build a capability to conduct special operations missions. Despite this directive, DOD failed to act, largely because the services did not view Special Operations as vital to national defense, and they could not agree on its substance, funding, or how it would be controlled.

Some visionaries in Congress took action to remedy the deficiency. Congressmen Dan Daniel (D–VA) and Bill Nichols (D–AL), along with Senators Carl Levin (D–MI), Sam Nunn (D–GA), Barry Goldwater (R–AZ), and William Cohen (R–ME), saw the need for a Special Operations Force with unique skills and pushed forward innovative policy fixes. Because of this group’s leadership, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the act in 1987 instituted major defense reforms, including formal establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

**Authorities**

The creation of a unified combatant command for SOF, commanded by a four-star general, was not the only mandate of the legislation. Also called for were an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a low-intensity conflict coordinating board within the National Security Council, and SOF Major Force Program (MPF)–11. The objectives of the Nunn-Cohen amendment were to:

- provide close civilian oversight for special operations and low-intensity conflict activities
- ensure that genuine expertise and a diversity of views are available to the President and Secretary of Defense regarding special operations requirements and low-intensity threats
- improve interagency planning and coordination for Special Operations and low-intensity conflict
- bolster Special Operations capabilities in such areas as joint doctrine and training, intelligence support, command and control, budgetary authority, personnel management, and mission planning.

By aligning SOF under a single responsive headquarters, this legislation fostered interoperability among the services and provided USSOCOM with control over its own resources, better enabling it to meet its responsibilities to train, organize, and equip SOF. The new authorities were the construct of a highly flexible command, providing the President with additional options for approaching difficult problems.

USSOCOM was assigned authority to:

- exercise combatant command authority over Active and Reserve SOF in the United States
- command SOF missions as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense
- develop SOF strategy, doctrine, and tactics
- organize, train, and equip SOF
- program and budget for SOF
- develop/procure SOF-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services
- prioritize and validate SOF requirements
- ensure interoperability of equipment and personnel
- ensure combat readiness
- monitor SOF personnel management
- conduct internal audits.

The impact of this legislation has been profound. Since its passage, USSOCOM has galvanized all joint Special Operations capabilities into a world-class force with the skill to execute the most challenging missions. The command has been willing to utilize these authorities to continuously reevaluate the SOF mission, force structure, organization, and virtually every aspect of the USSOCOM construct, and to change where necessary to meet the latest threat. This willingness continues to be the hallmark of the command’s synergy—all the while adhering strictly to moral, ethical, and legal virtues. USSOCOM has provided highly trained and equipped forces to combatant commanders but, although authorized, has seldom acted as a supported command.

**Supporting to Supported Command**

The role of training, organizing, and equipping dramatically changed in 2002 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave USSOCOM the lead in planning the war on terror. He subsequently expanded this role, more recently detailed in the President’s guidance in the 2005 Unified Command Plan, giving USSOCOM the additional responsibility to plan, synchronize for DOD, and, when directed, execute Special Operations in the war on terror. Transitioning to the supported role was a natural, although challenging, evolution for the command—and marked another key event in the evolution of Special Operations.

To meet the dual USSOCOM mission, the Center for Special Operations (CSO) was created primarily to prosecute the war on terror. Combining the traditional joint headquarters functions of intelligence, current operations, and long-range plans and strategy, and overlaid by a Joint Interagency Coordination Group, the organization is the command's warfighting hub. Led by a three-star general or flag officer, the joint interagency staff exercises command and control of the war on terror operations from its location at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The center includes a trained and ready joint task force headquarters that allows for seamless planning and execution of operations that traverse the spectrum of conflict. This structure provides USSOCOM the flexibility to transition to a joint special operations task force as required. Free of administrative functions, the center’s sole responsibility is planning, synchronizing, supporting, and executing...
Special Operations in the war on terror across the globe.

In coordination with the center’s joint task force, the Special Operations Joint Inter-agency Collaboration Center was created to integrate global information requirements and facilitate information sharing with appropriate agencies. Linking priority DOD and non-DOD agencies, this center provides a means for rapid information exchange and analysis. As observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, rapid exploitation of information is the surest method to capture or kill an adversary.

Combined under one center, these elements form a powerful, responsive, and revolutionary structure to fight the war on terror. With minimal growth, USSOCOM transformed the headquarters from a supporting to a supported command and is uniquely postured to perform its new role as a warfighter, while maintaining its Title 10 responsibility to organize, train, and equip Special Operations Forces.

Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are tremendously supportive and continue to execute operations, including SOF-unique missions, as the supported commanders in their theaters, with USSOCOM in a supporting role. The GCCs maintain the best regional focus and knowledge of their areas of operations, having conducted many successful operations since the war on terror began. Each has a theater-specific Special Operations Command to support his Special Operations logistics, planning, and operational control requirements. Theater Special Operations Commands have grown considerably over the last few years and, in most cases, are commanded by a two-star general or flag officer. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, however, the commander of USSOCOM will serve as the supported commander for specified operations. This designation allows improved centralized planning, expands options for mission execution, and permits a more flexible command structure to match an adversary that spans multiple countries and often several GCC regions.

USSOCOM is quickly meeting its new requirements through the CSO, which has been reviewing global strategies, developing courses of action, and formulating recommendations for operational force employment by the commander through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The CSO recently finalized the war on terror plan and, in the process, identified requirements for new authorities necessary to take the fight forward. Many of these requirements were approved immediately, while others call for legislative changes, making them less timely. Even so, the formation of a global plan to fight terror is an important event.

Growth

Successes in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a growing demand for SOF around the globe, evidenced by the largest number of our warriors and special-skills personnel currently forward deployed than ever before. Some policymakers have called for an exponential growth in SOF, but unbridled growth is not without risk. As SOF remain decisive on the battlefield, USSOCOM is working to reconstitute its world-class forces while carefully expanding capability. SOF is not a solution for every problem. Special operations personnel and tactics must continue to be applied at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary. Any growth must be targeted toward unique SOF skills because of the extended time it takes to develop a fully qualified and experienced operator. And growth must not come at the expense of quality.

To meet the challenges on the battlefield, USSOCOM is judiciously adding force structure in Special Forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, Naval special warfare, and Air Force Special Operations, as well as providing additional staff to its Theater Special Operations Commands. To create more Special Operators, the command is increasing the number of instructors, support personnel, and facilities within the training institutions to expand capacity without lowering standards. Throughout this process, USSOCOM will emphasize quality over quantity.

In the next 4 years, USSOCOM will increase by some 2,300 personnel, including 2 additional SEAL team equivalents and 500 Special Forces Soldiers. The command, for example, is enlarging the Army Special Forces (SF) community by one battalion per Special Forces group. This force structure improvement will realign SF for expeditionary deployments for purpose, ending the Cold War concept of presence and reducing the strain on overutilized SOF. To equip the new battalions, USSOCOM utilizes MFP–11 to acquire all SOF-unique equipment but relies on the standard service agreement with the Army, whereby that service provides SOF with all service-common equipment, for items such as the M4 rifle, machineguns, laser-aiming devices, and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. In the case of aviation, the services provide the basic airframe, and USSOCOM, with MFP–11 funds, modifies and enhances the airframe to meet SOF requirements. This is a critical distinction. When SOF grows in any form, so must the corresponding service. Adding SF battalions, SEAL team equivalents, or special operations aviation detachments requires the component service to reallocate portions of its budget, give up force structure, or grow more force structure to compensate.

One of USSOCOM’s most important issues, with considerable impact on its ability to grow, is retention of experienced operators. With the help of the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
command has instituted retention initiatives that include targeted bonuses for specific operational specialties and some of the more seasoned operators, with over half of those eligible taking the bonus within the first few months. Additionally, new educational benefits for all members of SOF were approved, offering advanced education through the PhD level. USSOCOM’s Joint Special Operations University has expanded to improve joint education for SOF personnel and will continue to develop new and pertinent military curricula while making civilian education opportunities available. While USSOCOM’s operations tempo is high, recruiting is good, training programs are full, and retention remains strong.

Engaged Around the World

One of the primary goals of the SOF-led coalition in Afghanistan was to capture or kill al Qaeda and Taliban forces, and indeed SOF, together with Afghan National Army units, coalition partners, and conventional U.S. forces, have conducted hundreds of operations throughout the country. These successes resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban, capture of anticoalition forces, and destruction of thousands of weapons and immeasurable quantities of explosives. The successful elections of October 2004 are the true metric of SOF achievement.

Today, SOF is working to rebuild infrastructure and establish a rapport with the populace. Deployed in small detachments throughout Afghanistan, Special Operators are working directly with the National Army, conventional U.S. forces, and central and local authorities, allowing them to identify problems and work toward cooperative solutions through local governments. This relationship also allows them to gather information about anticoalition efforts invaluable to long-term national interests.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Special Operators were at the vanguard of the invasion. Assigned several critical missions on three simultaneous fronts, they operated deep inside Iraq to prevent the V Corps in the north from reinforcing Baghdad, conducted special reconnaissance and direct action missions in western Iraq, and supported Combined Forces Land Component Command movement from the south toward Baghdad. Other units searched out and destroyed mobile missiles, conducted support and stability operations throughout the country, and interdicted borders and lines of communication. After the invasion, special operations units were crucial to the capture or elimination of most of the key personnel within the regime, including Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay. SOF are still on the ground capturing high-value targets.

Following the collapse of the regime, SOF continue to play a major stability role with the long-term goal of assisting in the building of a free and democratic nation. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs are performing foreign internal defense missions and training Iraqi soldiers in the skills necessary to win the fight. Today, every direct action mission launched against anticoalition forces is led and conducted by Iraqi soldiers, while
Special Operators advise and provide critical support. Elections and reestablishment of self-governance are highlights of SOF success in the region.

While significant attention has been placed on the command’s direct action capabilities as Special Operators find, fix, and finish the enemy, that is only one element of the command’s warfighting capability. Another role, more critical to the long-term success of the war on terror, is keeping warfare from igniting in other regions. The preferred solution is for individual nations to subvert terrorism using internal capabilities, but if that is not feasible, U.S. Special Operations Forces can advise the host nation and, if necessary, work in conjunction with its forces. As forward-deployed warrior-diplomats, culturally sophisticated Special Operators are continuing to build long-term, positive relationships with host nations worldwide and undermine those who spread the seeds of terrorism. SOF are in dozens of countries conducting theater security cooperation events specifically to train and work with host nations to eliminate terrorism. This engagement is always accomplished with the knowledge and coordination of host nation leaders, their American Ambassadors and U.S. country teams, and combatant commanders.

Regrettably, the current operations tempo has severely stressed the command’s ability to support theater security cooperation events and train with coalition partners. As the situation in Iraq continues to mature, it becomes imperative that SOF be incrementally replaced by their conventional force counterparts, lest we win the peace there at the cost of success elsewhere.

Today’s deployments are focused. The command is working closely with the geographic combatant commanders to determine where Special Operators can achieve the best effects. USSOCOM will continue to emphasize its unconventional warfare capabilities and use foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and information operations skill sets to enable willing partner nations to eliminate the conditions that provide fertile ground for terrorist causes. We consider this the “deep fight,” but not in the traditional sense of battlespace—rather, in the sense of time. Defeating terrorists will require not only capturing or killing today’s operatives, but also influencing the conditions that will impact the vulnerability of future generations to terrorist recruiting. Through careful engagement, the goal is for Special Operations Forces to provide nations with the tools, training, and capabilities to secure their own borders and provide their own internal stability, thus helping civilized people around the world to live free from fear of terrorist attacks.

The Key to the Future: SOF Operators

In Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2006, USSOCOM radically refocused, choosing to equip operators with the best and latest technology at the expense of important aviation modernization. Individual operator equipment, including the latest body armor integrated with modular load carrying systems, miniature day/night weapon sights, extreme climate clothing, and the latest generation night vision devices were identified and fully funded within our budget. With the help of Congress, acquisition was accelerated through supplemental funding, delivering this and other critical equipment rapidly to the battlefield.

Additional USSOCOM force structure requirements, focusing on growth in appropriate skills to the right size without losing quality, were also identified and validated.

Marines training with M203 40mm grenade launchers at Miriam Range, Djibouti

Measuring the Challenge

While the command is planned to grow by nearly 2,300 personnel, this approved and funded growth is less than required. Limited by its relatively small budget (1.7 percent of the DOD total), the command continues to reassess and reprioritize force structure requirements. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review may direct new resources to USSOCOM for additional appropriate growth.

As POM 2008 is constructed, the command is emphasizing training in critical skills, education, and increased regional focus to ensure not only that its warriors have the technical capabilities, intellectual skills, regional expertise, and language and cultural proficiency to win today’s conflicts, but also...
that they remain prepared to face the uncertainties of tomorrow. To remain a synergistic and decisive force, SOF warriors will need to remain globally engaged and postured to respond on short notice against diverse targets. Modernization of aviation assets, the arrival of the Special Operations variant of the tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft (CV–22), and maritime mobility assets such as the Advanced SEAL Delivery System will ensure SOF are ready to respond.

**SOF accomplish missions that are tactical but that have impact across the strategic spectrum**

Among its future goals, the command is focusing on objectives that will guide the development of a global SOF network. The goal is to position and manage SOF, in conjunction with other DOD, interagency, and partner assets, in simultaneous operations around the world against terrorist organizations along with their allies and sponsors. This will necessitate the synchronization of global information to gain persistent visibility and coordination while integrating the command and control of all SOF. Identification of operators, leadership, and infrastructure across the spectrum of terrorist networks requires an integrated and adaptive blue force network. Special Operators will remain essential in this role while they continue to develop indigenous capabilities to fight terrorists and rogue regimes. By positioning and networking SOF in key locations to obtain and disseminate information, supported by specialized equipment and advanced technologies, USSOCOM continues to develop over greater situational awareness throughout vital regions to enhance its effectiveness in combating terrorist networks and remain a force multiplier.

Long-term success depends on the continued ability to employ a sustainable mix of capabilities rapidly. In addition to finding and eliminating terrorists, civil affairs and information operations forces will conduct stabilization, construction, and reconstruction operations early on to help partner nations reduce or eliminate the underlying conditions that feed terrorism. Civil affairs personnel are involved in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, working with conventional forces to win hearts and minds through construction projects, medical assistance, education, and placing a friendly face on the U.S. presence.

**The Essence of SOF**

Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective has required units that combined selected people with unique training, experience, and equipment employing tactics not found in conventional units. Such small forces can be employed quickly and act with speed and agility in all facets of operations. These characteristics epitomize SOF, who accomplish missions that are tactical in nature but have impact across the strategic spectrum from peacetime engagement to high-intensity combat.

The defining quality of SOF has always been its distinctive warriors, whose development is guided by four truths. First, humans are more important than hardware. Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen are the most critical component, a fundamental truth that USSOCOM is reinforcing in its funding priorities. Second, quality is better than quantity. A few carefully selected, well-trained, and well-led people are preferable to larger numbers of lower quality personnel.

The third truth is that SOF cannot be mass-produced. There is no easy formula for creating them. They are specially recruited, assessed, and trained. Today, there are those who would designate various conventional units as “SOF” to speed growth or simply because they believe they are like SOF. This would be a tragic mistake for those units, who are not prepared for what they will face, as well as for USSOCOM, as it would ultimately destroy a very capable force.

Finally, competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. Time is perhaps the most critical element: time to select, assess, train, and educate personnel and to gain the experience to perform the complex operations required. Experience—a key element—can only be gained over time. Highly specialized skill sets are required, including mastery of technology (spanning the spectrum from no-tech to high-tech), cultural and regional awareness, and operational expertise. Since competent forces cannot be fashioned instantly, decisionmakers must plan ahead.

Like their predecessors through the years, today’s Special Operators are an integral part of the joint force. The war on terror is different from any struggle the Nation has faced. Success requires patience and the application of every instrument of national and international power. Special Operations Forces are the natural pick when the mission requires capabilities not found elsewhere. Innovation, initiative, and judgment are the hallmarks of Special Operators. They remain the only force with language proficiency and cultural awareness for specific regions, allowing them to operate more effectively on foreign turf in conjunction with host nation forces. With the continued support of the President, Congress, and the American people, the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the U.S. Special Operations Command will continue to apply energy, focus, skill, and determination to quell the roots of terrorism and, when necessary, bring terrorists and their supporters to justice . . . or bring justice to them. **JFQ**

**NOTES**

2 James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 47.
3 Ibid., 48.
4 Ibid., 319–413.

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On October 19, 2001, U.S. Special Operators were the first forces to bring the war on terror to the enemy in his own back yard as Operation Enduring Freedom began in earnest. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted parachute operations, helicopter infiltrations, unconventional warfare, and direct action missions just as they have during combat and training for the last 40 years. Formed around the nucleus of the 5th Special Forces Group, small numbers of Special Operators, along with allied special forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, executed a classic unconventional warfare campaign using advanced technology combined with the tried and true methods of organizing indigenous forces (the Northern Alliance and others) to rapidly rout the Taliban and free the people of Afghanistan from their brutal rule. In the next phase of the war on terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Special Operations Forces were again first on the ground. Responsible for multiple combat fronts, they fixed the location of Iraqi army divisions while conventional forces made their drive from the south. These initial operations sent a strong message that terrorism and its sponsorship will draw a significant response.

Since 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan have been the most visible battlegrounds in the war on terror. However, Special Operators have been heavily engaged in less publicized ventures. In the Philippines and the Pacific Rim, they are working closely with and training partner nations’ forces to track, locate, and neutralize the terrorist threats within their borders. In the tri-border region of South America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay), they are helping bring law and order to an area long known for its illicit activities and now associated with terrorist organizations. In the Pan-Sahel region of Africa, Special Operators, along with conventional forces, are training and assisting new partner nations in developing capabilities to deny terrorists freedom of movement and a new sanctuary.

This fight is global, and Special Operators are leading the way in every engagement.

they undertake. Utilizing their unique training, skills, and cultural awareness, they are doing what they do best: developing links within the population that will provide ongoing intelligence and personal relationships that will cement ties with allies around the world. With such capabilities and a global perspective, Special Operators will have an enduring role in defeating terrorism.

The War on Terror
America’s vision of who its enemies are has evolved since September 11, 2001. Much like 65 years ago, a surprise attack has awakened the Nation to the grim realities of a threat intent on establishing a new world order that denies basic rights and individual liberty for the sake of narrowly interpreted ideology. Terrorism, once viewed as a largely criminal threat best dealt with through nonmilitary means, has now become the primary focus of our national security efforts. Terrorist groups are no longer simply law enforcement problems; rather, they are enemies of free people everywhere.

The challenge requires the mobilization of a collective will and resources, including all elements of national power, as well as the concerted efforts of allies and the private sector. Many of the actions the U.S. Government must take in this war will occur outside of designated combat zones, requiring unprecedented cooperation among departments. A synchronized national plan that applies all the capabilities of the Nation and its coalition partners is needed more than ever. The military element of national power will be just one of many.

This effort requires organizations capable of coordinating the efforts of all these diverse groups. Much like the newly established National Counterterrorism Center, designed at the national level to integrate and synchronize the U.S. Government-wide effort, U.S. Special Operations Command (USOCCOM) is structuring and posturing to lead Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in the war on terror. In so doing, USOCCOM will expand and elevate its demonstrated tactical and operational prowess to the strategic level.

Establishing Focus
DOD has been fighting the war on terror for over 4 years. The operational and structural changes undertaken to fight a lethal and agile enemy have been significant, nowhere more than in USOCCOM.

Continuing the strategic transformation that created Special Operations Command, the Secretary of Defense has granted the command new authorities to prosecute the war on terror. Known for speed of action, agility, and flexibility, the command has been designated as the supported combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, when directed, executing campaigns against terrorist organizations. Inherent in these authorities are five major responsibilities: synchronizing DOD efforts toward a common strategic endstate; establishing priorities for action and intelligence; directing global operational preparation of the environment to find, fix, and capture key terrorist leaders or facilitators; supporting the combatant commanders in their regional efforts to defeat terrorist organizations; and finally, as directed, exercising command and control of counterterrorism operations.

USOCCOM reorganized its headquarters to meet the increased scope of responsibility and sponsored numerous forums for DOD organizations, other government agencies, and partners to collaborate in the development and execution of global efforts to defeat terrorism. The Center for Special Operations (CSO) was created to serve as the nerve center for intelligence, operations, and plans to carry out USOCCOM’s new warfighting responsibilities. The center includes the traditional J-2, J-3, and J-5 directorates functionally organized to plan and execute global operations in support of the war on terror. Recognizing the need for integrated U.S. Government and coalition coordination, CSO broadened its organization to include allies and other members of the interagency as full partners. USOCCOM developed a Collaborative Planning Environment (CPE) that provides the processes and technical tools to synchronize plans and operations rapidly among the combatant commands, DOD agencies, other government agencies, and partner nations. Additionally, Special Operations Command has led a series of annual SOF deployment conferences to prioritize utilization of limited assets, global targeting conferences to focus planning and intelligence collection, and time-sensitive planning exercises to rehearse rapid planning and execution processes. The effect has been to create the cooperative architecture necessary to establish and maintain the desired endstate: an environment inhospitable to terrorism. To achieve this goal, a common understanding is needed of how terrorism works and how we can operate against its organizations.

Understanding the Enemy
Key to winning the campaign is the ability to understand the enemy. The terrorist threat must be defined broadly, to include the known organizations of today, those who support them, and the potential organizations of tomorrow. Efforts are not solely oriented against the primary threat—the al Qaeda network. We seek to disable or dismantle all organizations that use terror to achieve their objectives.

Transnational terrorist networks with the capability and intent to do harm pose the single greatest threat to American peace and prosperity. Organizations such as al Qaeda have established a worldwide network of operators, supporters, and leaders, with links to other terrorist organizations, state sponsors, criminal enterprises, and organizations willing to provide mutual support. These networks are self-organizing; dispersed; composed of formal, informal, kinship, and cultural associations; and tied by varied and sometimes transparent links. They exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in a free and democratic society. They find safe haven by taking advantage of seams in Western policies and infrastructure. These groups understand and exploit the ease and speed of communications, financial transfers, and intercontinental movement of people to

America’s vision of who its enemies are has evolved since September 11, 2001
enable their global reach. Cumulatively, they pose significant military and foreign policy challenges because they have both the intent and capability to inflict mass casualties and generate global effects.

As with past foes, current foes have exploitable vulnerabilities. The enemy is not monolithic. The groups that comprise it do not share a common endstate. They do not have an endless pool of support; it is limited and it is drying up. They cannot move around the globe undetected as before; they leave trails and we can track them. They have used advances in global technology, but we are continuing to disrupt and exploit their ability to communicate internally. Their power to motivate new adherents is limited to their ability to control the distribution of information among the vulnerable populations within which they live. That ability is slowly, yet visibly, eroding.

They have been routed in many engagements and will continue to lose every time they stand up and fight. As we continue to operate against them, our understanding grows. As our understanding grows, their vulnerabilities become more apparent and exploitable.

The dynamic and global nature of the terrorist threat requires continuous reassessment and evaluation to stay ahead of the enemy. Most importantly, we must understand how these organizations emerge, operate, and sustain themselves.

We can postulate a model to simplify the complex problem of how and why terrorist organizations are able to accomplish these imperatives. Organizations that use terror operate in a cycle of four critical components: a local populace from which to draw support; the tacit or active support of a sympathetic or apathetic public; local and regional terrorist acts perpetrated as a result of states unwilling or unable to counter terrorism; and terror that results from global network links built on popular support and the inability of states to control local and regional terrorist networks. It is the combination of global network links and the ability to generate global effects utilizing weapons of mass destruction (or mass effect) that poses the greatest strategic threat and must remain our highest priority.

Each component of the counterclockwise cycle is dependent on the others. Terrorists develop active support for a given cause by espousing a message or ideology that resonates with a targeted populace. Tacit support results from some combination of fear and apathy among those not inclined to believe their message. As a popular support base develops, terrorists expand their freedom of action locally or regionally within states that either cannot or will not enforce the rule of law. Unwilling or incapable states are vulnerable to becoming havens for terrorist organizations and provide operational freedom of action. The establishment of global network links through a combination of safe haven and operational freedom of action permits terrorists to achieve global reach and project power. Finally, the cycle is completed when successful terrorist operations reinforce ideological justification and influence that portion of the populace that is susceptible to the extremist ideology—bringing new recruits and resources to the cause. It is against this model that USSOCOM has structured its campaign strategy.

**Strategy Implementation**

The endstate the United States seeks, an environment inhospitable to terrorism, requires an innovative, adaptive strategy that addresses the entire cycle of terrorism. It calls for the full cooperation of the international community and the entire U.S. Government. All involved must subscribe to four guiding principles: preventing the emergence of new terrorist threats, isolating threats that have emerged from their support base, defeating isolated threats, and preventing the reemergence of threats already defeated.

**Prevent the emergence.** First, DOD must conduct operations in support of the larger U.S. Government–led effort to prevent the emergence of new terrorist threats against the United States and its interests. Done properly, these actions will minimize combat engagements. Our goal is to make local conditions untenable for terrorists through focused engagement with like-minded nations to address the conditions that allow terrorism to emerge. These efforts enable populations misinformed by censorship or other impediments to hear the truth, which is our most valuable tool. By directing our initiatives against terrorist-supporting nations and disenfranchised populations, we can reach the recruiting base before individuals become terrorists.

**Isolate the threat.** When a threat emerges, DOD will act decisively as part of the overall U.S. Government and international effort to isolate it, seizing the initiative by targeting the critical network links that enable terrorists to project power and influence. The goal is to reduce scope, reach, and...
capabilities from a global to a regional and eventually a local level, making them subject to defeat in detail over time. These actions must be precisely selected and executed to prevent galvanizing support for the enemy.  

**Defeat the threat.** While working to isolate a specific threat, we will simultaneously take action to defeat it by enabling and working with our partners to conduct decisive operations. We will work to increase allies’ capacity for unilateral action on their own soil and to persuade or compel unwilling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary. We must continually target terrorists wherever they make themselves vulnerable, keeping them dispersed, disrupted, and on the run.  

The scope is much broader than application of military force alone. By developing a global team to defeat a global problem, we provide time for other nations to engage, for intelligence agencies to develop a further understanding of terrorists and their networks, and for constant pressure from all directions to have a cumulative effect on the enemy.  

**Prevent reemergence.** Once the threat is defeated, our efforts turn to maintaining a global environment that prevents the reemergence of the threat. This environment will require cooperative efforts of all departments of the U.S. Government and coalition partners. It calls for a global Blue Force network with the ability to coordinate and support worldwide, regional, and local efforts to fight terrorist organizations down to the lowest level.  

**Near- and Long-Term Effects**  
Vital to executing this strategy is applying sustained global pressure across the enemy’s depth and breadth by imposing unsolvable dilemmas on leaders at every level. To impose such dilemmas, the strategy must address the requirement to generate both near- and long-term effects on the enemy and the environment in which he fights. Near- and long-term effects must be undertaken simultaneously even though it may take years to achieve results.

Our highest priority is to generate near-term effects that prevent or deter the enemy from attacking the United States and its allies and interests. DOD, the rest of the interagency community, and key international partners must take concerted actions, both offensive and defensive, designed to accomplish three interrelated objectives. First, we must prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining the resources and access necessary to conduct attacks. These actions must be oriented on the network infrastructure and leadership that provide the enemy global access and connectivity by targeting the critical resources and capabilities needed to plan, resource, and execute attacks. The goal is to deny enemies the ability to acquire, develop, or use weapons of mass destruction. Next, we must disrupt the ability of terrorist organizations to operate effectively over the long term by attacking their resource bases. We must remove their ability not only to execute operations now, but also to generate additional support and sustain themselves. Third, we must maintain global pressure on the enemy to allow other efforts to mature sufficiently and erode the base of physical, cultural, and ideological support.  

To succeed over the long term, we must generate enduring effects on the enemy system that deny the sources of power that enable the enemy to sustain efforts. The defeat of organizations that use terrorism to pursue their aims will become a reality only when our international partners are capable of conducting sustained operations within their borders. Our partners have the cultural and historical understanding that working with American technology, intelligence, and training will allow them to execute operations to defeat and prevent terrorism on their own soil.  

Terrorists rely on freedom of action largely defined by their ability to garner active and tacit support from the population in which they live and the states from which they operate. Over the long term, DOD must undertake operations designed to deny or restrict the enemy’s freedom of action, whether physical or virtual. We must erode the attraction of the ideology that inspires our most dangerous enemies and address the underlying conditions that often allow these ideologies to prosper. Ideology influences popular sentiment that causes people to join the movement or provide support. It bolsters the worldview that accepts terrorism as legitimate, even obligatory. It is the glue that binds the various organizations in loose coalition and enables coordination. There are underlying conditions in many societies that allow the promises of terrorists to gain traction within a vulnerable population through violence. Both of these aspects of the enemy’s ability to sustain efforts must be confronted by every tool available so the populations from which they garner support are less subject to subversion. The purpose of these actions must be to isolate terrorist organizations from the populations that provide them freedom of action and resources. The erosion of the attractiveness of extremist ideologies to the vulnerable populations around the globe is the effect that will ultimately ensure that we prevail.

The war on terror will take many years. It will require patience, persistence, and a comprehensive approach. Military means alone will not be sufficient. Instead, the war will call for the concerted efforts of the entire interagency, international partners, and private sector. The public perspective should be that this is a national rather than a purely military problem, and the world should see this war as an international rather than an American crisis.

Today, U.S. Special Operations Forces and our allies deployed in the Horn of Africa use a Swahili phrase to capture the nature of their operation: Hara’ mbee—“all pull together” or “all help out.” It was a rallying cry to bring Kenya together when it achieved independence, and it represents what it will take to win this war. JFQ

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**we must disrupt the ability of terrorist organizations to operate effectively over the long term by attacking their resource bases**

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The 60th Anniversary of The National War College (NWC) began September 19, 2005, with a special evening attended by General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.). More events are planned throughout this celebration, concluding on June 6, 2006, with a program to mark the World War II D-Day Invasion. Each event commemorates a significant strategic period in the development of the college curriculum that produced a large alumni of national leaders in and out of government. All events will be open to NWC students and alumni and to guests by special invitation.

In October 1945, Admiral Harry W. Hill was appointed as the first Commandant of the National War College and tasked with establishing a college for the postwar joint education of the Armed Forces.

The National War College mission is to educate future leaders of the Armed Forces, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy.

The National War College has occupied Roosevelt Hall since the founding of the College, except for 1998–1999 during the hall’s renovation. The College was incorporated into the National Defense University in 1976, when the latter was created as the country’s preeminent joint professional military education center.
Since its inception, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been committed to making its role in a current or future fight a success. Conceived from the failed rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran in 1980, USSOCOM would come to exemplify the concepts of jointness and transformation before the terms became widely used. From the catastrophe known as “Desert One” came a loud call for reform: a change in the nature, condition, and character of a force that needed to be interoperable across and outside the services to deal with the growing threat of low-intensity conflict. Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) would spend several years determining the policy fixes required to improve Special Operations Forces (SOF) readiness and capability. Ultimately, those requirements would equate to a highly capable, uniquely skilled and equipped group of Active Duty and Reserve Component forces who successfully conduct Special Operations.
Assessing current readiness and forecasting future needs in support of national security strategy and military strategy are still command priorities. While remaining focused on maintaining its strengths in personnel and equipment for today’s war, USSOCOM also realizes it must constantly seek to improve its education, training, technology, and equipment for tomorrow, and to transform to meet the future challenges of Special Operations. President George W. Bush described transformation as:

a process, not a one-time event. It’s not easy because it requires balancing two sometimes conflicting priorities, the need to train and maintain our forces, to meet all our security responsibilities in the world right now, with the need to research, develop, plan, and deploy new systems and strategies that will allow us to meet our responsibilities in a much different world.¹

USSOCOM recognizes those relentless issues and has dedicated personnel and resources not only to evaluate current readiness, but also to concentrate on what SOF should look like tomorrow.

A Clearly Focused Command

Established by Congress in 1987, USSOCOM was envisioned as a unified command with service-like responsibilities to oversee all Special Operations Forces. Designated responsibilities outlined in Title 10 of the United States Code included resource allocation and budget management, ostensibly to bolster special operations capabilities in such areas as joint doctrine and training, personnel management, and mission planning. The law also mandated that, should the President or Secretary of Defense direct, the commander of USSOCOM would exercise command of a selected special operations mission.² Thus, although most of the command’s effort would support the other combatant commands, under certain circumstances it could become a supported command.

In 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expanded the command’s role with two additional tasks: leading planning for the war on terror, and commanding specified operations in the war.³ The twofold USSOCOM mission statement captures both new and old roles: “plan, direct, and execute special operations in the global war on terrorism” as the lead combatant command, and “train and equip” SOF.

U.S. Special Operations Command is unique because it can act as a supporting or supported command, and it has its own budget authority and program objective memorandum. Its relatively small number of assigned forces (49,000) and portion of the defense budget (1.7 percent) offer a tremendous advantage: the ability to combine a service-like force provider role with a supported warfighter role. This unmatched ability allows SOF to act aggressively with speed, creativity, and boldness. Superbly equipped and trained, with the authority to develop imaginative solutions, Special Operations Forces routinely succeed in complex operational environments. Numerous missions in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom illustrate SOF-unique skill sets and the forces ability to achieve objectives no one else has trained or prepared for. These longstanding characteristics of Special Operators did not appear overnight, but were the result of an organization that understood the power of looking toward future needs.

Organized for Success

The command, located in Tampa, Florida, takes pride in its ability to shape a headquarters organization to best fulfill its mission. The first commander, General James J. Lindsay, USA, organized USSOCOM along the lines of a typical unified command “J-directorate,” with two modifications. He assigned budgeting and acquisition responsibilities to the J–8 (Resources) directorate and created a new J–9 (Futures) directorate to support psychological operations and civil affairs, two of the command’s nine core tasks. In the late 1990s, General Peter Schoomaker, USA, eliminated the traditional J-staff alignment to focus on the command’s critical role to resource Special Operations. The alignment incorporated like or complementary functions into five centers of excellence: command support; acquisition and logistics; requirements and resources; intelligence and information operations; and policy, training, and readiness. Each center, led by a general officer, flag officer, or senior executive service civilian, concentrated on strategic and operational priorities relevant to its functional responsibilities.

Confronted with Secretary Rumsfeld’s 2002 guidance on the war on terror and the USSOCOM role as a supported command, General Bryan “Doug” Brown, USA, the current commander, immediately began a phased realignment of his staff. It began with creating the Center for Special Operations, a joint, interagency directorate responsible for operational issues related to the war on terror. The next phase consolidated all intelligence, operations, and planning functions, previously performed across three different centers, into the new center. During the third phase, USSOCOM established a deployable, standing joint task force headquarters embedded in the Center for Special Operations. This action enhanced the command’s ability to meet the Secretary’s guidance and will provide additional capability in the command and control of SOF.

The realignments that formed the Center for Special Operations reduced or removed many of the responsibilities in two existing centers. This led to changes in functions and titles in two of the six centers. The command also supplements its center designations with subordinated J-coded directorates, improving coordination with outside agencies more familiar with a J-staff structure and functions. For example, the J–6 is under the Center for Networks and Communications. Its comprehensive mission is to implement and manage global communications and networks for USSOCOM, its components, and subordinate commands. It also ensures the reliability, interoperability, and security of command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems to SOF across the spectrum of conflict.

For a command with three diverse but linked priorities (the war on terror, readiness, and the future), the Center for Knowledge and Futures was conceptualized to meet current readiness and long-range transformational functions simultaneously. What used to belong primarily to the...
Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness has been radically transformed. Led by a one-star general, the Center for Knowledge and Futures consists of a Directorate of Joint SOF Knowledge (J–7) and a Directorate of Futures (J–9). The J–7 directorate predominantly develops, matures, and integrates the joint SOF body of knowledge formulated from doctrine, lessons learned, training, exercises, and educational venues. The J–9 directorate leads in concept development, transformation, joint experimentation, and wargaming in order to investigate and create a compelling vision of the future of Special Operations.

Focus Areas

The Center for Knowledge and Futures focuses on five tasks that are inexorably linked to SOF readiness and the future of special operations.

Joint SOF Body of Knowledge. All professions and organizations have a body of knowledge; joint Special Operations and USSOCOM are no different. It is the J–7’s responsibility to foster the interrelationships and transfer of knowledge between and among doctrine, lessons learned, education, training, and exercises. Dynamic doctrine is the framework for SOF warfighting and is where the development and sustainment of training and education programs start. It is supplemented and refined through an effective lessons learned program and renewed and delivered through a comprehensive coordination process with the Joint Staff, services, and combatant commands.

In late 2003, the command established a lessons learned program to capture and record information gleaned directly or indirectly from SOF participating in exercises or operations. The command then used a remedial action program with representatives from across the headquarters centers to quickly address areas requiring investigation and resolution. In July 2004, the division activated a Web portal to provide searchable database functions. Although in its infancy compared to the services’ lessons learned programs and U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (all of which supported USSOCOM developmental efforts), the command’s program is increasingly contributing to readiness and transformation.

The command continues to refine and expand educational and knowledge-sharing opportunities within its own institutions, such as the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), and throughout the joint professional military education community at large. Activated in 2000, JSOU continues its proven programs of SOF-specific curriculum development and education outreach to the intermediate and senior service and joint academic institutions. Two examples are the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the inaugural class of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies program at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Besides its resident and mobile education teams supporting primarily Special Operations units, JSOU’s newly-formed Strategic Studies division is sowing SOF strategic influence throughout the senior national, DOD, and interagency communities. Essential to this SOF virtual think tank capability is the close association of carefully selected senior fellows who research, analyze, and publish products on SOF’s strategic challenges.

Joint SOF Training. The combination of basic and specialized military skills and knowledge Special Operations Forces require starts with intense training. The J–7 Training, Policy, and Validation Division oversees the multiple institutions and organizations that prepare SOF warriors. One of its core responsibilities is overseeing development, coordination, and maintenance of USSOCOM’s joint mission essential task list, the Special Operations–relevant portions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Training System. This is essential to developing validated training courses and programs. The command foreign language program, for example, turns out hundreds of language-trained Special Operators annually, based on long-established requirements of the regional combatant commanders. In light of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the command has revitalized its foreign language program, both to maintain the language skills regional combatant commands need and to remain flexible enough to focus language training against areas where SOF may operate.

One critical area the Training Division manages is the continuing development, improvement, and implementation of sophisticated live, virtual, and constructive simulations to better support SOF and overall joint training. Without a multidisciplinary approach to provide common operational, technical, and system architectures, such integrated simulations could not operate among those service programs that support Special Operations. The command’s Database Generation System, for example, provides realistic databases to support sophisticated SOF training and rehearsal systems. Such
systems are crucial to the elevated level of preparation SOF needs in the war on terror. Ongoing development and refinement of a consolidated Geospatial Intelligence Data Management process is similarly improving interoperability within SOF and DOD mission preparation, planning, training, rehearsal, and experimentation systems.

**Warrior Preparation.** Recognizing the tremendous potential of the Joint National Training Capability, the command actively supports U.S. Joint Forces Command in developing numerous joint training opportunities. For example, USSOCOM works actively with its service components, focusing on opportunities to align schedules and training events with their conventional deployment partners. Special Operations Forces provide their expertise in numerous exercises sponsored by the geographic combatant commanders each year. To support its role in the war on terror, USSOCOM sponsors *Able Warrior*, its own command post and field training exercise. This exercise concentrates on the rapid decisionmaking capability between headquarters, USSOCOM, the geographic commanders, and the Joint Staff. *Able Warrior* has been approved to become part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercise Program in fiscal year 2006, and the J–7 Exercise Division is working to link it to other exercises in that program.

**Strategic Planning.** The vision statement—“To be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the global war on terrorism, and accomplishing the strategic objectives of the United States”—shows where the command’s spear is pointing. A significant part of the strategic planning process identifies the objectives where SOF future operating concepts can support this vision. The J–9 ensures that transformational considerations are debated and linked appropriately to priorities and operating concepts envisioned in SOF’s future. Proof of concepts is obtained in exercises and through experimentation, concept prototyping, and wargaming. J–9 uses its own expertise and linkages outside of the command in each of these areas to determine the right level of engagement, based on the commander’s priorities and endorsement. Linking special operations concepts to JCS-sponsored exercises and experimentation, for example, provides the opportunity to amplify ideas and identify potential future capabilities and strategies.

**Clearinghouse of Ideas.** To maintain its effectiveness as a unique command tasked with planning the war on terror and training and equipping SOF, General Brown tasked the Futures Division to be his “clearinghouse of ideas.” Its primary task is to gather and evaluate innovative ideas both from within the command and DOD and beyond—the limitless array of thinking in universities, government, science labs, think tanks, and the private sector. The Strategic Operations Working Group, for example, is a panel specifically developed to provide the commander and his senior staff alternative perspectives to areas of concern facing the command.

Since 2004, three panels have addressed operations, strategy, technology,
and scientific issues. The first, the SOF Senior Leaders Panel, included prominent retired members of the SOF community who examined command and control, authorities, logistics, and other military issues the command may confront as the war on terror evolves. A Strategists Panel convened futurists, authors, academics, and strategic thinkers attuned to the command’s near- and mid-term challenges. It examined potential effects of current strategies, discussed goals in the war on terror, and analyzed ways to strengthen multinational alliances. A third, the Scientists Panel, assembled military and civilian scientists from both the physical and behavioral sciences. These scientists, together with technologists, addressed from a scientific perspective the new paradigm spawned by the war on terror: cultural and communications issues, sensor networks, tunable weapons systems, surveillance and detection tools, data mining and link analysis, and medical enhancements for performance and endurance. Each panel has provided the commander with valuable insights.

As the military looks at potential paths to understanding and traversing future challenges, U.S. Special Operations Command continues to set the pace. "Special Operations Forces will focus on the disruption, defeat, and destruction of terrorists and terrorism around the globe. We will ensure that we can sustain that fight indefinitely by making readiness a priority for the long term." This mission statement clearly demonstrates recognition that investment in educating and training our people and building future leaders is crucial to meeting the Nation’s security commitments. Lifelong improvement of special operations personnel absolutely depends on mindful information gathering and sharing knowledge. “Humans are more important than hardware,” states the first of SOF’s enduring truths. It has never been more appropriate.

The mission statement continues, "While maintaining the offensive in the global war on terrorism, we will simultaneously seek to transform the command into an organization that continues to leverage every possible advantage." SOF training and exercises are undergoing constant improvements, and the command looks to the DOD Training Transformation effort as a prime opportunity to demonstrate its current level of readiness and as a place to hone or test new concepts. How to transform—how to identify and develop those capabilities SOF will need to be a useful part of the future joint team while maintaining the readiness to shape and respond to the world today—is a significant linchpin.

Methodically and intentionally looking to the future through various lenses will better position USSOCOM to carry out its lead role in the war on terror and its service-like responsibilities to man, equip, and train special operations. More importantly, it will lead to SOF warriors with stronger capabilities, better warfighting concepts, and improved joint operational skills that serve the combatant commanders and the Nation.

**NOTES**

1 On April 24, 1980, a mission to rescue 53 American hostages was aborted at a desolate site in Iran known as “Desert One.” Tragedy occurred when two aircraft collided on the ground and eight men died. The event culminated a period of SOF decline in the 1970s that was due to distrust between SOF and the conventional military and to funding cuts. Desert One led to the DOD appointment of an investigative panel chaired by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway. See USSOCOM’s History, 15th Anniversary Edition, April 16, 2002.


3 United States Code, Title 10, Part I, Chapter 6, Section 167.


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Technology

Force Multiplier for Special Operations

By D A L E G . U H L E R

The global war on terror has brought new attention to Special Operations Forces (SOF). Their performance in Afghanistan and Iraq and around the world reflects the high standards they have maintained for years. A relatively small number of carefully selected, capable, well-trained, and well-led people are the key to that high quality. Although SOF operators, regardless of mission or service, remain the essence of the force, they often rely on advanced technology to achieve superior speed, stealth, precision, survivability, and lethality.

Today, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is developing technology in a radically different environment from just a few years ago. Through streamlined development and acquisition processes, maximized use of commercial technologies when feasible, and technology applications modified to its requirements, USSOCOM provides the technology solutions that will enable its warfighters to become even more capable.
Technology Solutions

In the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, SOF warriors were beneficiaries of responsive acquisition when they requested advanced technology solutions and received them in days and weeks rather than the normal months and years. For example, consider the times that elapsed between USSOCOM receipt of combat mission needs requests and initial operating capability for the required equipment:

- Laser targeting devices to assist in the close air support for deployed SOF operators: 7 days
- Remote camera controllers as part of the reconnaissance and surveillance kit to help operators manage up to 16 sensors in both line-of-sight and satellite communications modes: 11 days
- Coalition video teleconferencing capability so members of the Northern Alliance could communicate over hundreds of miles: 28 days
- Force protection equipment for a safe house including advanced cameras, video-cassette recorders, and bulletproof blankets: 21 days
- Blue Force tracking capabilities to allow positive identification of friendly forces and reduce fratricide (perhaps the hardest problem the command faced): 6 months.

In addition to rapid fielding processes, technology push has been a key strategy component over the past decade. Examples include:

- The “pointer,” a man-portable unmanned aerial vehicle capable of carrying tactical video cameras and transmitting imagery back to the controlling ground station. A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) item was upgraded, production restarted, and a cadre of SOF operators trained to operate and deploy the system in under 8 months.
- The remote miniature weather station and companion laser ceilometer, a small, autonomous weather station capable of recording, storing, and reporting meteoric data for SOF aircrews. It provides accurate data and reduces the need to deploy a two-man weather team into high-risk environments.
- The multiband inter-/intra-team radio, a 2.2-pound, hand-held radio providing ground-to-ground or ground-to-air communication. It offers embedded security (indicator encryption) for both AM/FM voice and data communications and is satellite-capable. The radio was designed and prototyped by USSOCOM in response to a specific SOF requirement but has become a standard radio for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
- The hemostatic dressing, developed for use by tactical combat care providers to stop the flow of blood from penetrating trauma wounds such as gunshots and shrapnel.

Hemostatic technologies are saving lives today.

USSOCOM early on recognized the pivotal role advanced technology would play in special operations capabilities

USSOCOM early on recognized the pivotal role advanced technology would play in special operations capabilities, and in 1992 Congress expanded the command’s ability to develop SOF-unique technology. Congressional language encouraged defense research activities to assist the command with basic research and advanced engineering to “develop technologies that have special operations potential.” Although the legislation establishing the command in 1987 provided for “development and acquisition of Special Operations–peculiar equipment,” technology developments did not begin in earnest until 1992. Since then, USSOCOM has managed hundreds of projects to support operations around the world.

Current Technology Focus

Four areas are central to technology development in USSOCOM: the SOF warrior-as-platform concept, sensor technology, advanced power and energy, and support systems.

The warrior-as-platform development area focuses on the individual and the mission equipment carried. The nature of SOF is to be disruptive enough to break the enemy’s will to fight as well as to damage him physically. To accomplish these tasks, we need to enhance survivability, sustainability, lethality, situational awareness, maneuverability, communications, and physical performance. Of these abilities, USSOCOM has chosen to focus on survivability and lethality. In the first area, we see the greatest potential in developing a passive, tunable signature management capability for the dismounted operator. Several promising technologies are being considered to make this a reality. As for lethality, SOF is interested in low-weight, low-volume directed energy systems. The command has had some success with these technologies and is partnering with other agencies on two platform-mounted systems.
will be designed to operate on reduced power, with minimum logistic support, and in extreme environments.

The third development area is advanced power and energy. Because SOF teams primarily fight dismounted, weight is often a major impediment. Power sources must be small, lightweight, inexpensive, high-performance, high-power, durable, rechargeable, and versatile enough to power a variety of equipment. USSOCOM is investigating variable/regulating fuel cells to power man-pack systems. These cells may provide a long-term solution, but improved batteries appear to offer the best mid-term options. Special Operations Forces do not want and cannot afford to develop SOF-unique power sources. Through the mid-term, they will rely on service-common batteries, while encouraging advances in battery technology as well as new designs for equipment with significantly decreased power requirements. Support systems constitute the final development area. These are all the other vital

In these areas, the command has a successful “proof of principle” project fabricating a conformal polyimide microelectro-mechanical antenna for aircraft application. USSOCOM, in conjunction with the services, will continue to upgrade and plan for the replacement of existing mobility platforms to meet emerging operational requirements and will upgrade support equipment to maintain a clear technological edge over the enemy.

**Processes**

The command equips and supports SOF with various strategies to solve 80 percent of problems with technological developments alone. The process begins with a capability need or current operational requirement. If the requirement has user support and can be validated, USSOCOM will attempt to integrate it into an ongoing program. If that is impossible, other development options allow us to proceed with minimal risk. The first involves finding a COTS item or nondevelopmental item that can be modified to satisfy the specific need. This is the preferred option, as the majority of development and testing is complete and the task is limited to making the item sufficiently rugged to function in an operational environment. A second low-risk option is competitive prototyping, allowing two or more companies to develop prototypes that users can test to determine which are worthy of further consideration.

Spiral development is the preferred approach to product creation and improvement. In each spiral, the next increment of an increasingly effective or complex system is developed and integrated, producing a constantly improving capability. This process allows technology to adapt rapidly to the latest changes in terrorist tactics or evolve ahead of the enemy and exploit areas they believe are safe. Utilization of systems engineering principles and innovative risk management, combined with streamlining the acquisition and procurement processes, have significantly shortened the time from design to production to fielding.

Under Major Force Program (MFP)–11, the USSOCOM program in the Federal budget, the command manages 52 percent

**future technology development to support the special operations warrior should not be made to compete with current wartime operating budgets**
of all acquisition programs in-house and delegates varying degrees of management for the balance to the appropriate military department. The command also partners with the military departments, other Government agencies, and foreign governments to conduct research and develop the technologies SOF needs.

While the same overarching statutes and policies used throughout DOD apply to USSOCOM, the command is adept at harnessing the flexibilities inherent in these guidelines to provide solutions for the SOF operator. Various headquarters centers integrate technology development with concept development, requirements generation, and validation process to generate innovation at all levels. Furthermore, whenever possible, our contracting office uses Federal acquisition regulation waivers to shorten or expedite the acquisition process.

The war on terror will be protracted and will require a technology investment strategy looking out 20 to 25 years. Future technology development needed to support the special operations warrior should not be made to compete with current wartime operating budgets. The future of SOF depends on maintaining a commitment to harvesting emerging technologies and applying them in a visionary way to its missions. We must also identify sufficient funds to support future technology development to prevail in the battle environment of the 21st century.

**Multiple Development Programs**

Providing current and future technology to the SOF warrior is the responsibility of the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center of USSOCOM. Within the center, the Advanced Technology Directorate currently manages four development programs: technology development, special technology, advanced technology, and medical technology.

The Special Operations Technology Development program has the longest planning horizon of the four programs within the directorate and focuses on technologies that promise to meet a future need but are currently not mature enough to field. This program provides a valuable way to influence and leverage external technology development that may not otherwise be affordable within limited command development resources. These projects tend to be driven by technology rather than by requirements and are often structured to leverage ongoing developmental efforts in other DOD and Federal organizations. While studies and laboratory prototypes are the primary focus of this program, some projects focus on transition, such as the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar. By service standards, the technology development program is small, but it provides the command entrée to the larger science and technology community and provides options to develop systems and subsystems to meet future needs peculiar to Special Operations.

The Special Operations Science and Technology program, a companion to the technology development effort, encompasses advanced engineering development, rapid prototyping, and demonstration and evaluation of developmental items in operational environments. Here, USSOCOM matches advanced technologies with mission requirements or, where appropriate, accelerates system development to meet urgent needs in the SOF community.

**Theater Special Operations Commands**

Special Forces Soldier providing security during attack at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom
and deployed combat commanders may sponsor projects to put field-ready prototypes into the hands of operators for evaluation before committing to further development or large-scale procurement. One project nearing transition to acquisition is the Machine-Based Language Translation device, conducted in coordination with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop a hand-held speech and language translator known as the Phraselator, a one-way, phrase-based voice-to-voice machine translator. Special Operators in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are using it to interpret and translate words and phrases. At 5 by 8 inches, the current model weighs 2 pounds and has up to 50 languages. The operator speaks or chooses a stored phrase from a menu and the device repeats the words in the targeted language.

The Advanced Technology Directorate provides technical support to the Small Business Innovation Research program. This Federally mandated program allows small businesses to conduct exploratory and advanced development engineering to create innovative items for government and commercial use. Two examples of producing operational equipment for SOF in this area are the Miniature Multi-Band Beacon, which is used as a point designator enabling aircraft to deliver ordnance and mark parachute drop zones, and the Extreme Environment Hand-Wear System, which allows operators to use equipment with warm hands in cold climates. The program gives USSOCOM unique access to an important segment of the national industrial base.

The Special Operations Medical Technology Program focuses on physiological and informational studies and nonsystem development to protect, enhance, and restore the health of Special Operators. Its projects support the medically related requirements of both operators and medical personnel. Research and development studies provide operational guidelines or recommendations on procedures and proposed equipment. Products are normally disseminated to field organizations through medical channels. Successful prototype equipment typically transitions to acquisition as a component of a set or as a commercial item available for unit purchase. The development and rapid fielding of the one-handed tourniquet provided SOF with a greatly enhanced life-saving product.

The Advanced Technology Directorate manages a multitude of projects. Since 1992, over 40 percent of completed projects have progressed from development to acquisition. Transition, however, is not the only measure of success. It is equally important to identify technologies that are not ready for fielding to avoid delays and target funding toward the most promising projects. Acquisition programs will continue to be forward leaning, creative, and flexible, yet fiscally judicious.

**Command-Wide Effort**

The headquarters centers and component commands (Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and Air Force Special Operations Command) are all active participants in the technology development and acquisition processes. The component commands are responsible for combat development, in addition to developing nonmaterial solutions for deployed and deploying forces. They cooperate in user evaluations for emerging technologies with the Special Operations Research Support Element taking the lead. In addition, the components provide ranges to test equipment and systems, as well as platforms (aircraft, surface craft, or ground mobility) to support testing and cover the costs of SOF personnel participating in user evaluations. Finally, the components coordinate on joint requirements and interoperability needs during the capabilities documents staffing process. These vital documents are the basis for systems engineering; if they are not produced in a timely fashion, costs can rise and initial operating capabilities can be delayed.

Forward-deployed Special Operators also have the opportunity to see and use the latest in high-tech weaponry, communications, personal equipment, and sensors from around the globe. They feed this information to the headquarters, often through USSOCOM components, for evaluation and possible integration into existing equipment. Technology scouts throughout the headquarters help identify emerging technologies, regardless of source, with potential for satisfying existing deficiencies or enhancing operational capabilities. All these activities and programs have a common purpose: to ensure that the SOF warrior has access to the finest equipment available.

**Opportunities Outside USSOCOM**

The command pursues multiple leveraging opportunities each year outside the command. Options can include advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs), technology transition initiatives (TTIs), partnerships with other agencies or services, open communication and active

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**Airmen position a Predator UAV at Tallil Air Base, Iraq**

U.S. Air Force (Eric Smith)
USSOCOM maintains liaison officers from various government labs on its staff to assist in the transfer of emerging technology

Under the program, OSD provides near-term funding to support continued development of promising technology, provided the receiving command agrees to commit sufficient funds to provide program stability in the next budget. USSOCOM has accepted TTI funds to expedite development of wide-field-of-view night vision goggles, a voice response translator, and the Sea-Air-Land Delivery Vehicle Advanced Reconnaissance System. All these items are critical, and TTI funding will shorten the time needed to place them in the hands of SOF warfighters.

In recent years, the military has become much more a user than a developer of technology, and little of the technology used by SOF is developed in-house. The robust USSOCOM technology harvesting programs access technologies of special operations interest regardless of source. Within the headquarters, the technical industrial liaison officer manages the annual Advanced Planning Briefing to Industry to state SOF needs and frame the command’s side of the dialogue, allowing vendors to present their technological and corporate capabilities to the headquarters staff.

USSOCOM also works closely with DOD and national laboratories and maintains liaison officers from various government labs on its staff to assist in the transfer of emerging technology. This has been especially effective with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, whose programs focus on high-payoff technologies with unique operational applications for SOF.

Through the Foreign Comparative Testing Program, USSOCOM tests nondevelopmental items from allies that appear to have potential for SOF use. The Defense Acquisition Challenge Program evaluates new technologies and enhancements that often result in technology insertions and improvements in ongoing acquisition programs. This program emphasizes the use of small domestic companies.

It is critical to maximize the use of commercial technologies and technology applications, modified to SOF requirements, to satisfy near-term needs. Since the commercial research and development horizon is normally at the mid-term range (3 to 5 years), SOF technology development efforts must have a concern for longer-range development. Some of the limited Major Force Program funds must continue to focus on development that can truly transform SOF but that is currently beyond the comfort zone of commercial development, such as directed energy and signature management.

The SOF technology development community participates in wargames to assist key decisionmakers in identifying technologies for fighting the war on terror now and in the future. We recognize that these tools are only as good as the plans and concepts they support. We are invested in working with other staff elements to ensure cogent technology inputs and keep pace with new requirements, plans, and concepts.

USSOCOM recognizes that technology cannot solve all operational problems. To be effective, equipment must meet the operational need and provide a persistent problem for the enemy. Modern warfare involves the application of all types of equipment. Special Operators regularly use an extraordinary range of technologies, as was demonstrated by supplying Special Forces teams in Afghanistan with AK–47 ammunition, oats for horses, and leather saddles to replace wooden saddles, as well as satellite-supported laptops for directing air strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. The results were staggering operational successes. The synergies of the combined no-tech, low-tech, and high-tech equipment in the hands of skilled and innovative operators were simply too much for their adversaries, and will continue to be so in the future.

It has been said that today’s science is tomorrow’s technology. U.S. Special Operations Command will continue to partner with agencies and organizations that are on the leading edge of science to take advantage of technology breakthroughs when they occur, which will enable Special Operators to be ever more capable.

NOTES

Chasing U-Boats and Hunting Insurgents

Lessons from an Underhand Way of War

By J A N S . B R E E M E R

Jan S. Breemer is a professor of National Security Decision Making at the Naval War College’s Monterey Program and has published extensively on national and international security.

Just over a century ago, a British admiral condemned the newly invented submarine as an “underhand, unfair, and damned un-English weapon.” The officer underscored his disdain for the craft by urging that submarine crews be treated as pirates and hanged. Winston Churchill, then the Royal Navy’s political head, was not willing to go quite that far, yet at one point during World War I, he ordered that captured U-boat crews be treated as criminals, not prisoners of war. Churchill’s action was symptomatic of the professional naval attitude toward this below-the-belt weapon: sinking merchant ships without warning was not “legitimate” warfare as behooved a civilized power. Churchill himself had said before the war that doing so was akin to “the spreading of pestilence and the assassination of individuals.”

Those sentiments of long ago have a familiar ring, albeit in a different context: insurgency warfare. Regular soldiers have historically looked on insurgency warfare as underhanded and unfair and, a U.S. combatant in Iraq might add, “damned un-American.” From the Soldier’s perspective, the insurgents’ war-making methods are neither those of a civilized opponent nor in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Particularly objectionable is the insurgent’s stealthiness: “the man, or woman, who appears to be a peaceable citizen but who
The soldier’s horror at “war in the shadows” and the sailor’s disgust at war “below the belt” are rooted in two sources. The first is a moral and professional revolution against what is seen as a particularly nonheroic and inhumane form of warfare. Submarines and insurgents do not fight according the Western way of war, in which the opponents declare themselves and slug it out face to face. Because of the way submarines have been used in two World Wars, they and insurgents share a reputation for being indiscriminate. Because the U-boats refused to distinguish between civilian and military shipping, or between neutrals and enemies, they acquired the “terrorist” sobriquet. The second, more practical reason for the submarine and the insurgent’s ill repute has to do with the difficulty for the conventional sailor and soldier in finding—and therefore defeating—their respective opponents. Submarine and insurgency opponents involve asymmetric warfare; both have historically tied down disproportionately large numbers of forces. As many as 10 counterinsurgent or antisubmarine defenders can be needed for each enemy operative.

Fighting and defeating the submarine is the business of antisubmarine warfare (ASW); counterinsurgency is its counterpart in irregular war. At first glance, the two forms of warfare could hardly be more different; one is fought at sea and is technology-intensive, while the other is almost exclusively carried out on land and is manpower-intensive. Yet the strategic and operational problems posed by the insurgent and the submarine display similarities, notably the difficulty of finding either. This essay compares the problems of ASW and counterinsurgency. It explores in particular the strategic and operational similarities, as well as the different, yet strikingly similar, solutions to which antisubmarine and counterinsurgency warriors have resorted. In the end, it considers a final similarity between these forms of warfare: namely, the penchant for sailors and soldiers to repeatedly unlearn the lessons of the underhand and unfair ways of war.

**Crushing the Nests**

The central problem in both ASW and counterinsurgency is the difficulty of finding and identifying the adversary. The physical circumstances that make for submarine and insurgent stealth are very different, but there are broad similarities. The submarine derives its stealth from separating its acoustic signature from the background noise of the surrounding ocean. The insurgent’s strength similarly comes from his ability to fade in and out of the background noise of the population at large.

At one point during the campaign against the U-boat in World War I, President Woodrow Wilson expressed his frustration with the Allies’ inability to find and sink enough boats at sea. He proposed that the U.S. and British navies team up and “crush the hornets’ nest.” He made clear the advantage of destroying the U-boats in their operating bases: “I know where the nest is.” He was correct to attack the submarines at their moorings to solve the difficulty of finding them. The problem was that the opponent also knew this and had taken measures to protect the boats while they were concentrated in port. The President claimed he was prepared to lose half of an Anglo-American striking fleet in the endeavor. American and British naval planners held that the price far outweighed the uncertain benefits.

The difficulty of destroying the underwater opponent at the source resurfaced in the next World War. In 1942, British and American bombers began a sustained campaign against U-boat bases along the Atlantic coast. During the first 5 months of 1943 alone, 9,000 tons of high explosives and incendiaries were dropped. Unfortunately for the Allies, the Germans were prepared: U-boat pens had been wrapped in concrete up to 25 feet thick and were defended by dense antiaircraft batteries. None of the shelters were ever penetrated, and only one U-boat was destroyed at its base in Trondheim, Norway. When, in an attempt to achieve greater accuracies, American bombers switched to low-level attacks, heavy losses forced the abandonment of that strategy.

Between the cost and risk of directly attacking the sources of the submarine menace, and the temptation to do so in order to short-circuit the detection problem, ASW strategists resorted to a compromise containment option. This usually involved laying minefields and other explosive underwater devices. Again, the record is mixed. Tens of thousands of mines were laid during both World Wars in an effort to bottle up the U-boats in their ports, but they had little impact. In World War I, nearly a third of the 178 U-boats lost were sunk by mines; however, most sinkings occurred in minefields planted astride the boats’ transit lanes, not their base exits. Results were worse in World War II: of 687 U-boats sunk, mines victimized only 35. The reasons for these meager effects were the same in both wars: the poor reliability...
of mines, particularly British ones, and the ASW defender’s frequent failure to patrol the minefields with ships ready to counter enemy efforts to clear a passage and break out. The reason for this omission was basically the one that deterred the defender from “storming the nests”: the danger of operating in the teeth of the enemy’s strength. Consequently, the U-boat was always able to find or quickly create a crack in the mine barriers.

Attacking Dodge City

Destroying or containing insurgents at the source in Iraq has proven even more difficult. There are two kinds of insurgent sources: strongholds inside the immediate theater of operations, and sanctuaries for training and replenishment outside the theater, frequently across international borders. Physical geography in different conflicts has varied from mountains, to jungles, to urban areas, but there have always been two common factors: the difficulty of access and the problem of finding and fighting insurgents in their terrain of choice. Just as the depths of the seas are the submarine’s principal protection, rugged terrain, whether in mountains or jungles or urban centers, is the insurgent’s main means to compensate for a relative disadvantage in numbers and equipment. His familiarity with the terrain gives him an edge on several counts:

- strongholds are likely located in areas where the insurgents enjoy a degree of popular sympathy
- insurgents will almost certainly have an intelligence advantage
- insurgents will know when a large counteroperation is afoot.

Next, due in part to this intelligence, the insurgent will prepare the battlefield with mines, booby traps, fire zones, and improvised explosive devices.

When the specter of a guerrilla war first loomed in Iraq, some suggested that its defeat would be easier than in Vietnam because the insurgents would not enjoy the protective canopy of jungle foliage. That was not the case. Because jungle or mountain hideouts are commonly located in thinly populated areas, insurgents can usually be isolated from the surrounding population. But as the United States has discovered in Iraq, isolating urban insurgency strongholds from the population at large is far more problematic.

In Fallujah, 70 percent of the population of 300,000 had to be evacuated before 15,000 U.S. troops could seek out and destroy the few thousand insurgents rumored to be ensconced in the “Dodge City of Iraq.”

The costs and risks of a storming-the-nests strategy have historically outweighed its tactical advantages. Even more powerful reasons militate against this strategy in a counterinsurgency environment. Urban counterinsurgency operations are costly, risky, and arguably counterproductive if the overall strategic aim is to isolate the insurgents from the population at large.

The ASW defender’s second-best choice has historically been to intercept the boats after they leave the relative safety of home bases but before they reach their hunting grounds. Minefields, tripwires, and physical obstructions such as nets have been the principal methods. The best known mine barriers in World War I were the Dover barrage between France and England, the Northern barrage between the Scottish isles and Norway, and the Otranto barrier between Italy and the former Yugoslavia. The British had planned to replicate the first two at the outbreak of the next World War, but Germany’s swift occupation of France and Norway rendered the plan moot.

The necessity for mines and other physical barriers to be backed up with mobile quick-reaction forces holds equally when the opponents are insurgents. Stone walls and other obstructions have been used for thousands of years to prevent the infiltration of undesirable elements. The two best-known attempts since World War II to use this strategy to prevent the transit of guerrillas to and from their sanctuaries were the French-built Morice Line in Algeria and the so-called McNamara Line in Vietnam. The success of the first compared with the broad failure of the second highlights the critical role of the mobile component in a counterinsurgency barrier strategy.

The French began construction of the Morice Line in the spring of 1957, when it became clear that tactics so far had failed to suppress the activities of the Algerian guerrilla
movement. The line stretched some 200 miles along the Algerian-Tunisian border, anchored in the north on the Mediterranean Sea, and in the south at the Sahara Desert. Its main features included an 8-foot-high electrified fence, minefields on both sides, barbed wire entanglements, and electronic sensors that set off an alarm when the fence was penetrated.

Eighty thousand soldiers garrisoned the line. It was patrolled on foot 24 hours a day. When the alarm was activated, mobile strike teams, supported by tanks, artillery, and helicopters, could respond quickly. All indications are that the barrier was an unqualified military success. By the end of 1958, the combination of static and mobile defenses had killed over 6,000 would-be intruders and intercepted thousands of weapons before they could reach the guerrillas inside Algeria. The line ensured that some 30,000 insurgents in Tunisia were cut off from their patrol areas in Algeria.

The decision to build the McNamara Line was prompted by the recognition that the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam had failed to stem the infiltration of men and materiel into the South. Although the name is usually associated with an antipersonnel barrier that was to span the Vietnamese isthmus just south of the demilitarized zone, it was actually only half of a complex multibarrier system. The second half involved an antivehicular barrier over the Laotian panhandle to interdict traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Work on the antipersonnel portion began in the summer of 1967 and was to be completed a year later. Its code name was Dye Marker, but McNamara Line stuck.

Had it been completed as first planned, it would have resembled the Morice Line—a cleared strip 600 to 1,000 yards wide, filled with barbed wire, minefields, and sensors, overseen by watchtowers, and backed up by a series of manned strongpoints and fire support bases. Things turned out very differently, however. Preliminary work on the barrier was completed during the first few months of construction, but progress was slow, not in the least because the U.S. Marine Corps construction crews had to work within range of North Vietnamese artillery. Then, the Tet offensive happened in the spring of 1968; sensors and other equipment destined for Dye Marker were diverted to the Marine defenders at Khe Sanh. When the siege was over, work on the McNamara Line was never resumed.

The success of the Morice Line highlights the same lesson ASW strategists have learned: static barrage systems alone are a partial and temporary palliative at best in preventing the opponent from moving to and from his area of operations. Successful barriers, whether at sea or on land, have involved static obstructions complemented with frequent and mobile patrols on the ground. The Morice Line was manned by an average of 400 soldiers a mile. Had this number been applied to Dye Marker, some 64,000 Soldiers and Marines would have been needed. Those numbers were not available; thus, if the McNamara Line had been completed as first envisaged, chances are that, like the Dover anti-U boat mine barrage in World War I, it would have leaked like a sieve.
Seeking Out the Enemy

Senior U.S. military leaders never shared McNamara’s enthusiasm for the barrier. The Army and the Marine Corps alike feared it would be manned with forces they much preferred to use in offensive search-and-destroy operations. Searching for and destroying guerrillas on land, and hunting and killing U-boats at sea, have historically been the soldiers’ and sailors’ preferred counterinsurgency and ASW solutions. However, from a strategic cost-benefit perspective, hunting down and destroying the opponent in his operating area has been the least productive option for at least two reasons. The first is that, in contrast with the antisource and antitransit alternatives, the enemy is now on the loose and set to target his victims. The second goes back to the problem that links the submarine and the insurgent to begin with: looking for a submarine at sea or finding an insurgent in the field is like looking for a needle in a haystack. One historical fact is highly suggestive: in both ASW and counterinsurgency, most hostile encounters have been the result of flaming datums. That is, most U-boats were detected and most guerrillas found after they revealed their presence by initiating hostile action.

Despite a vast investment in manpower, ships, and—later in the war—aircraft, the hunt-and-kill (HUK) strategy was a failure on about every count: it rarely kept the U-boats from sinking merchant vessels and sank few U-boats in return. One HUK operation in September 1916 is illustrative. Over 1 week, 2 or 3 U-boats sank more than 30 merchantmen in an area off the south coast of England that was being watched over by 49 destroyers, 48 torpedo boats, and 168 auxiliaries. The weeklong hunt itself involved 13 destroyers and 7 decoy vessels, known as Q-ships; the submarines got away unscathed.

Rounding Up the Usual Suspects

A story in The Economist about an American counterinsurgency raid in Iraq would have sounded familiar to the British ASW crews who sought in vain for U-boats in September 1916. It reported how one night in fall 2004, a convoy of 1,000 troops, with Apache helicopters overhead, descended on Baij. Their targets were three houses in the town center that intelligence had linked to the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led insurgents. When the Americans arrived, they found ample evidence that insurgents had been active, but none could be found in the houses or elsewhere. Nevertheless, 70 men were detained on the grounds that they were, according to an informant, “bad.”

Offensive sweeps, cordon-and-destroy operations, and search-and-destroy missions have been standard features of the counterinsurgency repertoire since the birth of irregular warfare. In post–World War II counterinsurgency campaigns, at least, they also appear rarely to have produced the desired results. According to one professional student of insurgency warfare, “Routine patrols, isolated ambushes, large-scale sweeps, and even outposts, tend to be wasted activities” and are “historically ineffective.” Indicative of the strategic failure of the search-and-destroy alternative as practiced in Vietnam is that, after 4 years, the term was dropped because it had become associated with “aimless searches in the jungle and the destruction of property.”

The reasons the search-and-destroy counterinsurgency solution has proven mostly disappointing are the same that have historically bedeviled HUK operations against submarines in their patrol areas:
lack of actionable intelligence. HUK tactics against submarines in transit have one important advantage: the ASW defender knows that for the submarine to travel from its operating base to or from its patrol area, it must pass through a known area, often a geographically constricted chokepoint. The ASW hunter in open waters must cover a vast expanse. In one way, hunting for insurgents is even more difficult than chasing submarines. During both World Wars, the British and their allies knew what kind of target the “gray wolves” were looking for—merchant ships. That meant that the ASW hunters could reasonably expect their prey to congregate in the shipping lanes. That was usually not enough to find the enemy. In the case of counterinsurgency, as seen again in Iraq, the insurgent’s target set is far more diverse: coalition soldiers, Iraqi police and national guard, civilian collaborators, worshippers in mosques—the list goes on. The question of who and what to protect, and therefore where and how to concentrate resources, is accordingly much more difficult. This has critical implications for the applicability to counterinsurgency of the one ASW solution that defeated the U-boats: the convoy system.

Rethinking the Nature of Counter(insurgency)

Historians of the two U-boat wars are unanimous in the verdict that the convoy system was the single most effective ASW strategy in terms of ships saved and enemy submarines sunk. It was also a strategic choice made only with the greatest reluctance by most senior naval planners in World War I. There was less resistance in World War II, but even then Winston Churchill confessed how, despite the convoy system’s obvious success, he “always sought to rupture this defensive obsession by searching for forms of counteroffensive. . . . I could not rest with the policy of ‘convoy and blockade.’” The convoy system was successful for several reasons, but the key was a shift in thinking about the nature of the ASW problem. It was the recognition that victory against the U-boats was less about the number of submarines sunk and more about the number of ships and cargoes saved. In operational terms, this meant that the ASW defender’s first responsibility was to ensure the security of friendly shipping—not hunting U-boats. Convoying did this in two ways: by rerouting shipping away from known U-boat concentrations or, if that failed, interposing warships between the submarines and their prey. Escort screens effectively separated shipping from the enemy. Next, by herding vessels otherwise scattered across the ocean into groups, the seas were effectively emptied, and the burden of finding the target shifted to the submarine.

When in early 1917 Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare against all shipping regardless of nationality, it hoped that up to 40 percent of neutral shipping would be deterred from continuing trade with England. The threat appeared to work; in January 1917, the number of port entrances and clearances by neutrals still amounted to over 1,300, but during the next 2 months, the monthly average fell by almost two-thirds. It required the introduction of the convoy system and the new sense of security it brought for the neutrals to come back and ply their trade.

Again, the lesson learned by comparing ASW and counterinsurgency operations is striking. The counterinsurgency defender faces essentially the same problem found in ASW: how to create enough security for the population to give him, not the insurgents, its allegiance. This is not to say that security is enough—there must be a promise of a better future as well. It is nevertheless a truism that the population will give its allegiance to the side that will best protect it. As with ASW, the offensive seek-and-destroy solution has made at best a marginal contribution to counterinsurgency. In fact, when the factor of collateral damage is included, its gains are probably zero.

**Lessons Learned, Unlearned, and Relearned**

ASW and counterinsurgency have something else in common: the repeated institutional failure of navies and armies to absorb and pass on the lessons learned in these two most difficult forms of war. Indeed, it may be precisely because these kinds of war are so difficult to contend with that armies and navies have preferred to put the whole unsavory business behind them and go back to “real” soldiering and sailing. Robert Cassidy made this point:

*Because the experience [in Vietnam] was perceived as anathema to the mainstream American military, hard lessons learned there about fighting guerrillas were neither embedded nor preserved in the U.S. Army’s institutional memory. The American military culture’s efforts to expunge the specter of Vietnam, embodied in the mantra “No More Vietnams,” also prevented the U.S. Army as an institution from really learning from those lessons.*
focused almost exclusively on a big conventional war in Europe—the scenario preferred by the U.S. military culture.  

The Allied navies that fought the hard-fought war against the U-boats in 1914–1918 also went back to business as usual. Most admirals assumed their preoccupation with the navy of battleships and the upstart aircraft carrier. Even such an astute naval observer as Hector Bywater concluded that when all was said and done, the submarine could amount to no more than an “auxiliary of the surface fleet” and could “in no conceivable circumstances force a decision.” Anyway, the British now had active sonar, which finally made the hunt for submarines possible—or at least the British thought so. Moreover, far fewer ships were needed. In September 1939, the entire British Empire mustered just 200 destroyers, compared with over 430 in the Royal Navy at the end of World War I. In the end, “virtually every surface and air antisubmarine lesson of the first submarine war had to be, and ultimately was, releaunched in the second at immense cost in blood, sweat, and treasure.”

It is commonly held that if a target can be seen, it can almost certainly be hit, and if hit, it will most likely be destroyed. Battles and wars waged under these circumstances can be fought and won at the tactical, force-on-force level. When, on the other hand, targets are ambiguous and seen only fleetingly, a winning solution may need to be found at the strategic level. That means shifting the soldier’s solution space from the tactical to the strategic level, which entails a change in perspectives on the nature of the objective at hand. The British response to the U-boats in World War I highlights this point. Their initial mistake was to confuse strategic ends and tactical means and to counter the U-boats’ strategy at the tactical level. It was a solution that simply was not in the grasp of existing detection and attack technologies. Only when the British ran out of tactical alternatives and defeat stared them in the face did they visualize the defeat of the U-boats as a strategic problem in which the objective was not to sink U-boats, but to preserve ships and cargoes.

The counterinsurgency defender shares many of the same tactical problems that challenged the ASW defender. The key problem is the missing first element in the find-hit-destroy sequence. Thus, the counterinsurgency planner may need to follow in the footsteps of the U-boat hunters and seek to defeat the opponent asymmetrically—that is, at the strategic level. This means that the first objective is no longer to kill insurgents, but to defeat the insurgent’s purpose; killing insurgents becomes merely one means toward that end. The insurgent’s purpose is to undermine the government’s central claim to legitimacy, which is the ability to provide law, order, and security. His tactical means is violence, but it is a violence whose significance is strategic first and tactical second.

Just as U-boat commanders were instructed to avoid tactical encounters with the convoy escorts and concentrate on the convoy itself, so insurgent violence is aimed less at the government’s and population’s physical capacity to resist than their moral stamina. The defender’s strategic goal follows logically; it is to defeat the insurgent’s physical and moral capacity to create and sustain an environment of physical and moral insecurity.

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NOTES

2 Ibid., 51.  
3 The term war in the shadows is borrowed from Robert B. Asprey’s two-volume history of guerrilla warfare, War in the Shadows (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975). John Winton’s study of subterfuge and surprise in naval warfare is entitled Below the Belt (Greenwich, CT: Conway Maritime Press, 1981).  
7 “When deadly force bumps into hearts and minds,” The Economist (January 1, 2005), 32.  
The sole focus of the Air Force is to carry out national defense policy from the air and space. Its personnel have always played a vital role in helping joint commanders achieve objectives across the range of military operations. Forces operating in these mediums will continue to influence enemy activities in the air, in space, on land, and at sea.

The Air Force’s strategy is to focus on controlling and executing air and space operations. This article discusses our unofficial view of how the Air Force will contribute to the joint force in the near future.

A Dynamic World

The United States seeks to assure allies and friends, dissuade potential opponents, deter aggression and coercion, and, when necessary, defeat antagonists anywhere in the world. It endeavors to maintain international stability and to redress imbalances in military power that might threaten that stability. In the wake of 9/11, the Nation has placed new emphasis on rooting out terrorist groups with international reach and changing the behavior of the states that support them. There is also heightened focus on countering those seeking to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Moreover, national strategy has placed greater stress on preemptive operations, which require more integrated intelligence capabilities, close coordination with allies, and quick and precise strikes against adversaries before they can strike. The Armed Forces will be prepared to sustain operations in a CBRN environment and take the initiative, if called on, to decisively defeat adversaries armed with such weapons.

During the Cold War, the United States required a large, standing, forward-deployed force capable of confronting the Warsaw Pact and associated threats. Now, instead of a cataclysmic, all-encompassing war with a designated foe, U.S. forces prepare for conflicts with regional powers while conducting
an ongoing campaign against terrorist groups and other nonstate actors. These tasks are fraught with ambiguity. The nebulous nature of fighting elusive nonstate actors and the difficulties posed by weak and failed states (some either having or attempting to acquire CBRN weapons) have added to the traditional problems of understanding opponents’ capabilities and intentions. In addition to the challenges the military has long prepared for, it must be ready for adversaries posing catastrophic, disruptive, and irregular threats.

To meet these emerging challenges, the United States needs the ability to project and sustain power worldwide. Regional powers may concentrate on building capabilities to handle contingencies within their own spheres of influence, but U.S. interests require the means to deliver force and sustain operations virtually anywhere in the world. This necessitates a varied and deep arsenal.

**Operational Challenges**

The Air Force faces a number of challenges at the operational level. One is a high operational tempo. To meet a steady demand for air and space capabilities worldwide, the service must be able to surge rapidly to supply a large number of assets including Airmen, aircraft, and other systems for multiple, simultaneous contingencies. Responsiveness requires lashing together surveillance capabilities, command and control assets, and people and systems on alert. Many operational plans rely on Air Force assets to provide the bulk of the joint force’s combat power during the critical opening weeks of a crisis, so Air Force units must be ready to deploy with little notice.

Operational tempo has grown since the Cold War. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the Air Force and other services were tasked to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq. That commitment, totaling nearly 400,000 sorties, continued as operations over Bosnia commenced in the mid-1990s. The frequency of contingencies then increased further, with Operations Allied Force in 1999, Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom in 2001, and Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Remarkably, all of them occurred during an era when the Air Force experienced an almost one-third reduction in personnel and a significant decline in force structure.

Another challenge regards overseas basing and overflight rights. Access to established bases and permission to overfly allied territory within and near expected theaters in Europe and Northeast Asia were assurred during the Cold War. The locus of conflict has now shifted to areas such as Southwest Asia and East Asia, where distances are greater and political support for basing and overflight is less certain. With the likelihood that there will be little time to prepare for an upcoming conflict, the military will need to be able to conduct long-range strikes, work with coalition partners, and establish, protect, and sustain bases in far-flung areas to provide forward-based airpower.

Opponents who cannot hope to counter U.S. forces directly will have a strong incentive to use other means, including CBRN weapons. They will have a number of ways to impede our forces from deploying to regions of conflict, including ballistic and cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, naval mines and submarines, counterspace weapons, mortars, car bombs, improvised explosive devices, snipers, suicide bombers, and other asymmetric means.

The proliferation of robust air defense systems poses another challenge to air and space operations. Adversaries are acquiring more modern surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and fighter aircraft with advanced air-to-air missiles, creating
integrated defensive systems that seek to deny the ability to operate aircraft over their territory. The Air Force must be able to defeat or suppress these threats rapidly to give follow-on forces the freedom to operate.

Still another challenge is that, while the military has reaped great benefit from harnessing information technologies, its growing dependence on them creates new vulnerabilities. Limited bandwidth restricts the amount of data that can be transmitted. Adversaries know that and are likely to target satellites, the ground systems with which they exchange data, and other computer and communications nodes. Nuclear-capable enemies might also consider high-altitude nuclear detonations to disrupt electronic devices.

**Operational Opportunities**

The Air Force can capitalize on a number of opportunities to counter the above challenges. For example, the service is highly flexible in its ability to deploy forces. Its air expeditionary force system allows conduct of routine operations while maintaining the capacity to respond to crises on short notice. Units can also be tailored rapidly into force packages of appropriate size and capability to achieve joint military objectives.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations lists three joint actions that comprise a common basis for cooperative efforts with other agencies and partners. Each matches up with three longstanding Air Force capabilities: Persistent Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), Global Mobility, and Rapid Strike.

Other operational opportunities discussed below fall under all these areas. Through each one, the Air Force helps integrate different elements to make the joint force more potent.

**Persistent C4ISR**

Because they move quickly and altitude allows them to see far away, aircraft have always been used for reconnaissance. The Air Force has led the way in supporting joint force awareness of the operational environment by deploying platforms and sensors that collectively enable U.S. and allied forces to observe large parts of the battlespace. Persistent C4ISR gives the joint force and national leadership improved knowledge and better opportunities to deter and engage the enemy. It also provides decisionmakers more situational awareness and hence greater confidence.

Increased awareness spans many arenas. The joint force needs to understand potential adversaries and factors such as weather (both terrestrial and space) that could affect operations. Satellites provide multispectral surveillance of designated areas around the globe. The Launch Detection Center detects and reports launches of intercontinental ballistic, intermediate range ballistic, and theater ballistic missiles around the world, to include the launch of a single Scud. Manned and unmanned Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities can also conduct responsive, fine-grained observation in designated areas.

The Air Force commands a network of satellites combined with airborne assets to enable global communications. Some of these assets transmit surveillance information to operations centers in near real time. They also transmit tactical orders to combat units quickly and reliably, allowing sensors, controllers, and shooters to communicate with each other, providing better and faster means for sharing information horizontally.

As used in Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, this new level of flexibility increasingly allows forces to attack fleeting targets such as mobile missile launchers, tanks, troop transports, and even individuals in motorized vehicles more effectively. It also helps follow up intelligence tips about the locations of enemy leadership. Datalinks allow sensors and shooters to share tactically useful information quickly and accurately.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force helped the joint force move from “deconfliction” of operations to a more collaborative, often integrated approach. In that conflict, the newly created air component coordination element worked to increase communication and coordination between the air and land operations, improving both joint planning and execution. Precise interdiction and close air support played an important role in the speed and success of the operation, with weapons delivery within minutes of tasking in most cases.

Air Force units and headquarters are becoming better integrated with other services and with Government agencies. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force worked closely with Special Operations Forces and elements of the Intelligence Community to target Taliban and al Qaeda forces.

In addition to increasing integration between the Air Force, the joint force, and within the interagency community, better communications enhance cooperation with coalition partners. Sharing missile warning,
navigation, targeting, and other data with partners helps build the trust that fosters unity of effort.

Global Mobility

The Air Force also extends the mobility of the joint force. Aircraft exploit the vertical dimension above the earth, giving air and space forces very real advantages and making them truly global assets. Aircraft can move at great speed unimpeded by rivers, oceans, mountains, or valleys. Missiles fly at even greater speed and can reach targets anywhere in minutes.

Long-range aircraft at bases in the continental United States, enduring forward bases, and other facilities allow the Air Force to strike centers of gravity within hours of tasking. Aircraft also provide a variety of capabilities, from humanitarian aid to intercepting enemy ground forces to deploying and sustaining joint ground forces.

Leveraging the ability to refuel in the air increases mission endurance, reaches more distant targets, and reduces dependence on bases in theater. Also, mobility allows attack of enemies from multiple avenues. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the joint force used C–17s to deliver 1,000 troops and 40 ground vehicles into northern Iraq, opening a second front despite the Turkish government’s refusal to allow the use of its territory for basing or ground transport.

Rapid Strike

Mobility is about the ability to go places quickly. Strike is about what to do when you get there. The development of precision weapons has allowed each sortie to engage multiple targets instead of devoting multiple sorties to a single target. The Air Force is working to disseminate this capability throughout its fleet. For example, in Operation Allied Force, B–2 bombers for the first time dropped joint direct attack munitions on different targets in a single pass instead of one target per pass. By applying relatively new technologies such as the global positioning system and Litening pod targeting systems to old platforms such as the B–52, the Air Force can produce a wider range of effects, including minimizing collateral damage. Today’s precision weapons can be delivered both day and night, and some are effective in bad weather, reducing enemy sanctuaries.

Greater combat effectiveness helps Airmen accomplish their missions at less risk by reducing the number of sorties necessary to create an effect. Stealth technology, standoff weapons, and unmanned aircraft also reduce risk. Other emerging technologies, such as small diameter bombs and airborne lasers, raise the prospect of creating effects more precisely and at greater range.

Emerging technologies, such as small diameter bombs and airborne lasers, raise the prospect of creating effects more precisely and at greater range. As counterair capabilities improve, the Air Force has found it necessary to field new strike capabilities such as stealth, supercruise, and advanced avionics to ensure superiority.

In addition to brute force, the Air Force employs more subtle means. Nonkinetic measures can have a significant impact on conflict. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force dropped thousands of leaflets that cautioned Iraqi troops against resisting coalition forces and gave instructions for demonstrating nonhostile intent. Tank operators were advised to point their gun barrels toward the rear and fly white flags, for example. The coalition followed up on the message by targeting personnel who did not comply. These tactics were remarkably effective in reducing the Iraqi threat.

Two particularly important missions can frame the Air Force contribution to the joint fight: defeating aggression by enemy states and defeating threats from nonstate actors. In both, combatant commanders will set a number of tasks. The joint force commander must orchestrate the accomplishment of these tasks, some of which must be conducted sequentially and others simultaneously. Both state and nonstate adversaries can employ catastrophic, disruptive, irregular, and traditional threats to the United States and its military.
Defeating State Adversaries

To defeat an enemy state, the joint force must gain and maintain access to the theater of operations, provide protection from attacks, and create conditions to fight the enemy with a high probability of success. The joint force will also seek initially to coerce or neutralize enemy leaders and, in many cases, to defeat or neutralize enemy surface, counterair, and counterspace forces.

Access to the theater of operations involves both political and physical components. During peacetime, combatant commanders build working relationships with military and political leaders across the globe. These activities, often referred to as engagement or security cooperation, include meetings, exchanges, joint and combined training, and large-scale exercises. Combatant commanders engage with foreign counterparts to foster interoperability and to increase the likelihood that these leaders will grant the U.S. military and its coalition partners access to the theater of operations during crises. This access covers a range of activities, from permitting overflight to basing forces, and will involve working closely with other U.S. agencies. In addition to the above activities, the Air Force supports engagement by providing airlift search and rescue, communications, and other assistance to components of the joint force.

The physical aspect of access includes striking from long range and deploying into the theater itself. Air assets contribute to these objectives because they can move quickly across large distances. In the future, the Air Force will help strike from long range by employing fighters, bombers, the air refueling fleet, and missiles to “kick the door down” where enemies seek to deny theater access. Other Air Force instruments available to joint force commanders to fulfill this mission include unmanned aerial vehicles, space surveillance assets, and standoff weapons.

Joint force commanders must be able to rapidly deploy forces into their theaters. Air assets will continue to play a large role. For example, the Air Force maintains a network of forward bases around the world that helps the joint force deploy and sustain forces closer to areas of conflict. The service has upgraded bases in Diego Garcia, the United Kingdom, and Guam by hardening hangars and modernizing other facilities. Almost all Army troops, key equipment, and critical spares are transported to combat theaters by air. Strike and other aircraft also rely heavily on tanker aircraft to extend their range and persistence and increase their flexibility.

The Air Force will help all components of the joint force to become more proficient in terms of combat power, while at the same time reducing the amount of support necessary to sustain troops and equipment. Interoperability between joint and coalition partners in this area is growing in importance.

Providing Freedom from Attack

Early in a conflict, the joint force will need to neutralize or destroy the enemy’s offensive weapons and their means of delivery as well as protect coalition forces, allied territory, and the U.S. homeland from such threats as ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, and terrorist or paramilitary forces. It may also have to prevent the transit of CBRN weapons between states or nonstate actors desiring to obtain such capabilities or defeat adversaries equipped with them. Air Force assets can help by deterring or preventing attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles, denying reconnaissance operations, detecting missile launches, detecting, tracking, and interdicting CBRN weapons in transit, and taking the fight to the enemy.
The joint force needs to gain early freedom to attack by defeating enemy air- and ground-based defensive systems. These systems can consist of networks of surface-to-air missiles, radars and other sensors, and antiaircraft artillery. Other targets in this category could include aircraft and surface-to-surface missile systems.

Air components are well suited to accomplish this task because they can reach into enemy territory to suppress or destroy systems without putting large numbers of forces at risk. Joint forces lost only one manned fixed-wing aircraft and no aircrews to enemy fire during Operation Iraqi Freedom in over 41,000 sorties. The Air Force will continue to use stealth, supercruise, and standoff capabilities to set conditions to lower risk for follow-on operations.

By gaining freedom to attack, the joint force can achieve other operational goals. When countering a state aggressor, the force will likely seek to defeat or neutralize the enemy’s surface forces. The Air Force has made considerable strides in this area and can now kill almost anything it can find. During the first weeks of Iraqi Freedom, for example, coalition air forces compelled Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard divisions around Baghdad to remain dispersed while U.S. Army and Marine forces approached the city. After days of air attacks, those divisions offered no organized resistance. The 3rd Infantry Division did not find a Medina Division capable of a coherent defense. Much Iraqi equipment was abandoned.

Air Force assets have also demonstrated an increasing ability to conduct missions similar to those traditionally undertaken by artillery and other surface fires. Modern air assets have greater range, flexibility, lethality, and accuracy than their predecessors due in large part to integration of network-centric information, varied precision weapons, and better combat identification capabilities.

Air and space forces work in conjunction with surface forces against enemy surface forces. If enemy surface forces mass in response to friendly surface forces, the former risk detection and destruction by air and space assets. In recent conflicts with the United States, state aggressors have avoided massing ground troops above the battalion level because of their vulnerability to airstrikes. If forces disperse to avoid destruction from above, however, they can be defeated by surface forces or at least prevented from operating effectively.

Another objective against a state aggressor could be coercing or neutralizing enemy leadership. By giving the joint force commander the ability to “reach out and touch” enemy leaders and the assets they value, air and space kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities offer a means to remove them, reduce their ability to resist, or convince them to concede without suffering invasion.

Defeating Nonstate Actors

To prevail against nonstate actors, the joint force will need to fulfill another set of missions and apply skills that are somewhat different from those associated with countering state adversaries. There are four key tasks: understanding enemies, identifying them, capturing or killing them, and assisting the forces of friendly countries.

Air and space forces provide support to Special Operations Forces, who will continue to play a key role in countering nonstate actors. Air assets give Special Operators the lift to deploy to the theater and will sustain them once there. They also provide intelligence and fire support.

The United States will often work and share information with friendly countries to counter nonstate enemies. In addition to conducting such coalition operations, the military trains with partners and provides advice, equipment, and such assistance as civic support. These activities help gain access by building trust and familiarity. They strengthen state capabilities to counter nonstate threats and demonstrate U.S. resolve. Moreover, they help create a climate that is inhospitable to nonstate actors. The Air Force will continue to play an important role in these activities, especially in training in airlift, combat search and rescue, attack, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Given a dynamic and complex world, the best Air Force tool is not technology, but human capital. The service’s key requirement continues to be developing people who are more agile, innovative, adaptable, and proactive. By encouraging innovation in the education of Airmen, the Air Force can best increase understanding of the operational environment, the required capabilities for that environment, and the effective employment of those capabilities to achieve operational goals. In short, by investing foremost in its people, and by enlarging cultural and technical capabilities, the service can increase its contribution to the joint force. JFQ

Air Force assets have demonstrated an increasing ability to conduct missions similar to those traditionally undertaken by artillery and other surface fires.

One of the most difficult challenges facing the joint force is to understand likely opponents. Nonstate enemies are unlike the Soviet foe against whom the United States once prepared. They view the world far differently from the West, making it imperative to increase understanding of their “operational code.” Air Force surveillance systems will be vital to this enterprise. Signals intelligence and other sensors will gather information on global and regional terrorist networks. Air Force foreign area officers and educational institutions have an important role in building this knowledge.

The military is working to improve its ability to locate and incapacitate small groups and individuals, vital when facing a nonstate actor. The Air Force can help in a number of ways. First, air and space assets can provide the surveillance to locate and identify adversaries. Persistent surveillance is critical. After locating adversaries, air assets can engage them in a timely manner. The joint force needs the ability to act with precision to prevent collateral damage, which will be assisted by Air Force integration of manned, unmanned, and space capabilities. It will be necessary to monitor and extract value from a vast amount of information. Once its sensors find something of interest, the Air Force must have the capability to focus on it quickly and pass what is relevant to those able to take action.
The debate over information operations (IO) grows more confused because IO continues to be wrongly understood in its relationship to the so-called kinetic elements of military operations. Contrary to entrenched perceptions, IO is not merely a family of related skill sets or capabilities that in all cases augment “kinetic operations.” Collectively, they are properly understood as a specific purpose and emphasis within an overall plan of action that under some circumstances might be the main effort. The most essential factor for employing IO is therefore the commander’s intent with regard to the political objective of a given operation. Viewing IO in any other way precludes recognition of the relationship the “IO purpose” inherently has with other activities of war within the universe of political conflict, and consequently distorts thinking with regard to full incorporation and appropriate

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employment of all tools that might generate a desired information effect. Thus, operational planning that regards IO as mere augmentation to operations by application of five narrowly defined “pillars,” currently revised and identified as operations security, psychological operations (PSYOP), deception, computer network operations, and electronic warfare, is fatally flawed.

Information operations, unlike other battlefield effects, focus on influencing perceptions or attitudes as opposed to destroying things or seizing terrain. During Operation Desert Storm, one of the most powerful IO instruments against Iraqi forces consisted of pre-announced B–52 strikes that followed leaflet drops detailing procedures for surrender, the key IO element being the B–52 itself. Similarly, the purpose for employing a weapon may be either to destroy a specific target or send threats to influence personnel targets, or both. Understood in this way, it is apparent that almost any weapon, tool, or element at the commander’s disposal apart from the five pillars may have potential for achieving a specific IO objective.

Part of the difficulty in distinguishing information operations from kinetic operations has resulted from failure to understand IO within any kind of general theory on the relationship of the dynamics of war, such as between a joint direct attack munition and PSYOP. Consequently, the lack of intellectual discipline imposed by such a paradigm confuses the roles and relationships of the elements of combat operations and the circumstances in which they are appropriately applied. Application of a theory is thus essential to highlight the distinguishing qualities of IO and their relationship to kinetic operations. This article examines IO in the context of Clausewitzian theory and proposes a model that shows the role of IO across the spectrum of conflict.

A Political Instrument

The usefulness of a theory depends on how well it can explain the relationship of elements not formally understood, and predict the unknown and as yet unobserved. Clausewitz’s theory of war offers surprising predictive insight into the dynamics of IO within the multidomain universe of political conflict and a clearer understanding of the dynamics that dictate the role and situational employment of elements of power to achieve IO objectives.

As a reminder, On War was an effort to develop a genuine theory of war that described both the characteristics and relationship of various dynamics within armed conflict:

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view. . . . Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

In developing his theory, Clausewitz describes war within the context of political conflict, which is broadly dominated by two factors: violence and “moral” (psychological) factors. The relationship these two factors share appears to be the same one that modern doctrine writers and military operators are struggling less successfully to describe with the terms kinetic operations and information operations.

The power of his IO theory results from analyzing the relationship of two basic factors that Clausewitz asserts undergird it: political policy and military force expressed in violence. Political policy is derived from his famous dictum: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will . . . not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”

The first key extrapolation is that IO—as a subcategory of war operations—is a political activity. This may appear to belabor the obvious; however, this deceptively simple observation highlights the essential and intensely political character of IO as it relates to political conflict in general. It also points out how intertwined IO is with the purely political machinery of what Clausewitz called “policy”—the political process he considered the third basic element of war.

Though IO and kinetic operations share the mutual purpose of achieving political objectives, unless the political nature of IO is clearly established, the dominant military culture tends to regard rhetorical activities associated with persuasion and influence as mere sideshow techniques adopted from civilian life into military operations with limited importance, rather than as intrinsic elements of political
conflict itself. So what ultimately defines IO
as opposed to nonpolitical informational
activities—such as advertising or personal
engagement with key personalities—is the
purpose of application and not the instru-
ment used. In contrast, defining the tools for
kinetic operations, such as tanks or combat
aircraft, is relatively easy because these have
no role in civilian society and are almost
never assembled for any other end except
coercive political purposes such as war.

The second factor that Clausewitz
asserted distinguished mere political conten-
tion from war is violence. Moreover, in his
theoretical sense, the more purely violent
a political contention becomes, the more
closely it approximates the abstract concept
of an “ideal” state of “total war.” This is seen
as Clausewitz equates the Platonic abstraction
of “ideal war” with “pure violence.”

The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an
act of force, and there is no logical limit to the
application of that force. . . . This is the first
case of interaction and the first ‘extreme’ we
meet with.6

War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a
complete, untrammeled, absolute mani-
festation of violence (as the pure concept would
require), war would of its own independent
will usurp the place of policy. . . .7

This conception would be ineluctable even
if war were total war, the pure element of
enmity unleashed.8

In contrast, the less violent a political
conflict is, the less reflective it is of a condi-
tion that would define it as war:

The more powerful and inspiring the motives
for war . . . the closer will war approach its
abstract concept [pure violence], the more
important will be the destruction of the
enemy, the more closely will the military
aims and the political objects of war coin-
cide, and the more military and less political
will war appear to be. On the other hand, the
less intense the motives, the less will the mili-
tary element’s natural tendency to violence
 coincide with political directives. As a result,
war will be driven further from its natural
course, the political object will be more and
more at variance with the aim of ideal war,
and the conflict will seem increasingly politi-
cal in character.9

In depicting graphically the relationship of
violence to political objectives at the heart
of Clausewitz’s theory, a continuum emerges
(see figure 1). It is the political nature of war
as reflected along this continuum, which
graduates in intensity of violence from one
extreme to another depending on political
objectives, that makes Clausewitz’s theory
valuable for understanding the nature of
information operations and their relationship
to kinetic operations.

The end of the spectrum approaching
total war would mean a condition so violent
and frantic that it reaches the point of chaos
and surpasses the ability of policymakers to
control it. Clausewitz described this condition:

When whole communities go to war—whole
peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the
reason always lies in some political situation,
and the occasion is always due to some political
object. . . . [Were pure violence to usurp the
place of policy] it would then drive policy out of
office and rule by the laws of its own nature.10

Levels of Violence

If taken to the extreme that the theory
predicts, a war of pure violence would be
characterized by such unbridled use of
kinetic instruments that other instruments
of political conflict would be reduced to
virtual irrelevance—a level of violence and
singleness of purpose with no other object
but the total destruction of the adversary
and his civilization.

In finding a real-world example, some
would argue that wars approaching this
level of violence have actually been fought.
Some posit World War II with its policies of
“genocidal lebensraum” on the one side and
“unconditional surrender” on the other.11
Also, Bernard Brodie asserts that nuclear
war approaches Clausewitz’s notion of pure
enmity and absolute violence.12
Clausewitz and Information Operations

As the political object will almost reassert itself. . . . Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.

But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will revert itself. . . . Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.

Are there real-world examples of purely political conflicts devoid of violence, as the theory predicts? Practical examples in our own time include elections in stable democratic societies. A 19th-century senator from Kansas provides insight into such bloodless struggles:

The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The decalogue and the golden rule have no place in a political campaign. The object is success. To defeat the antagonist and expel the party in power is the purpose. The Republicans and Democrats are as irreconcilably opposed to each other as were Grant and Lee in the Wilderness. They use ballots instead of guns, but the struggle is as unrelenting and desperate, and the result sought for the same.14

Understanding elections as a form of war as deduced from Clausewitz’s theory helps explain why elections held in countries without the benefit of mature democratic institutions and a tradition of peaceful handover of power are often accompanied by some measure of violence.

The extremes on the continuum predict something that looks like thermonuclear war at one end (where the persuasive elements associated with IO would have little influence or role) and something like democratic political elections on the other (where IO wholly dominates political conflict).

What the above suggests may initially be somewhat surprising: in contrast to total war, which is characterized by pure violence, an information operations conflict without violence should be viewed as “pure politics.” In fact, Clausewitz appears to have anticipated a need for a nuanced second definition of politics and has provided a somewhat unflattering description to explain the difference between politics as a broad activity within which war operates, as opposed to specific characteristics of politics as the business of diplomatic wrangling and chicanery:

while policy is apparently effaced in the one kind of war [conflicts tending toward extreme force and violence] and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political. If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but—as it conventionally is—as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more “political” than the first.15

What would be the role of IO in such a conflict? At the extreme end of the spectrum, information operations—if they existed at all—might include activities associated with computer attack, signals intelligence, deception, or PSYOP measures. However, there would be little concern for cultivating through political rhetoric (PSYOP or public diplomacy) some grounds for hope of political reconciliation or postconflict cooperation, as the political objective would be total destruction of the enemy—a war of annihilation (see figure 2).

In contrast, what does the theoretical model of political violence predict at the opposite end of the continuum? In the abstract, the theory predicts a political conflict that would be contested in a manner completely devoid of violence.

Such a conflict would be characterized as totally ideological, a political clash decided exclusively by ideas, words, and symbols—in other words, a contest between pure information operation campaigns.

Clausewitz’s theory appears to specifically predict contests settled mainly by political rhetoric without violence. He obliquely refers to them while observing that when a graduated recession of military force and violence accompanies a change in commitment to political objectives, the conflict decreasingly displays the characteristics of war and becomes primarily political:

[the political object of the war] has been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless [by military force and violence]. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. . . . Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.13

Figure 2: The Universe of Political Conflict

![Figure 2: The Universe of Political Conflict](image-url)
Politics as a negotiating activity that characteristically is “cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force” describes the basic nature of information operations fairly accurately. This supports the conclusion that IO in its most extreme form would be a manifestation of “pure politics.” Such an observation has far-reaching implications that lead to another surprising conclusion supported by the theory: IO is not only the outward communication of information impacting policy, but also a participant in policy formation itself, shaping the overall political character of the conflict. Information operations are involved in the policy formation process along the entire spectrum of conflict, with an increasingly significant role as conflict approaches the “devoid of violence” extreme. The graduated progression away from violence leads to a situation in which the development and formation of policy and the public expression of policy increasingly become one and the same. The emphasis on daily press briefings by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, where policy adjustments seemed to be made from the dais in response to news reporting, illustrates this predicted theoretical tendency.

The two polar extremes established, the next step in developing this theory is to insert types of conflicts along the continuum, categorized by the relative similarity each bears to one extreme or the other. The order reflects a logical sequencing of conflicts according to estimates of the proportional dominance of two factors within each: intensity of violence relative to clarity and strength, and duration of political objective.

A Vaguely Defined Threshold

Conflicts characterized by high levels of focused violence over lengthy periods, and having broad political purposes, occur near the polar extreme of total war, as for example, the First and Second World Wars, due to the amount of extreme violence each generated relative to the expansiveness and clarity of their political objectives and comparatively long duration (see figure 3). In contrast, shorter conflicts involving less violence, and having either less focus or more limited political objectives, tend to occur nearer the center of the continuum and include such conflicts as Operation Just Cause and the Kosovo bombing campaign. Similarly, events with important regional political objectives but with less actual violence and potential for violence, such as elections in Indonesia or the occupation of Bosnia, have been inserted near the devoid-of-violence extreme. A graduated scale of conflicts based on content of violence in relation to political objective appears to be specifically what Clausewitz had in mind as he developed his theory:

"a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation."

Admittedly this is a subjective process, but with a range of conflicts inserted in a more or less logical order along the continuum, the pattern that emerges confirms that IO-related factors are infused throughout the universe of political conflict and along the entire spectrum of violence associated with it. On further inspection of the pattern emerging, the conflicts that populate the area nearer the total war extreme are characterized by achieving political objectives through actions to control geography—for example, decisively destroying military formations or infrastructure for the ultimate purpose of seizing terrain.

In contrast, the conflicts that populate the devoid-of-violence area focus on obtaining political objectives by influencing the opinions and behavior of specific people or population groups. This suggests that a working definition for kinetic operations is accomplishing political objectives through seizing terrain, while information operations amount to achieving political objectives by influencing people. This further suggests that what we understand today as the specialties and disciplines of IO are in orientation and principle what Clausewitz may have had in mind when prescribing measures to deal with the “moral” dimension of war:

total war would mean a condition so violent that it surpasses the ability of policymakers to control it

the moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force. . . . The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole, which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes. In formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that moral factors may play in it. . . . Hence most of the matters dealt with in this book are composed in equal parts of physical and of moral causes and effects. One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."
Additionally, further consideration of the pattern reveals a curious phenomenon. Conflicts grouped nearer the total war extreme are uniformly kinetic operations clearly claiming the dominant/supported role in relation to IO. However, conflicts grouped toward the devoid–of–violence extreme appear to have an equally legitimate claim on being the dominant/supported activity according to the internal logic of their own particular circumstances and place on the continuum of political conflict. This predicts the existence of a vaguely defined threshold somewhere in the middle of the continuum, the crossing of which signals a seminal change in the relationship between information operations and kinetic operations—a line separating areas on the continuum in which either IO or kinetic operations dominate according to their similarity to the characteristics of the nearest “ideal” conflict at the polar extremes.

This dichotomy would predict the need for not only different leadership and management skills, but also units and personnel with different skill sets, training, and equipment for different types of conflicts depending on where they fell on the continuum.

Operations grouped nearer the pure violence extreme in figure 3 would reflect a requirement for leadership, skill sets, training, and equipment of the kind traditionally associated with operations characterized by great violence and destructive activity for the purpose of seizing terrain. As positioned on the spectrum, IO stand in a supporting role.

As conflicts approach the other end of the spectrum, however, the model predicts an increasing requirement for significantly different kinds of leadership training and experience, different skill set requirements from the units involved, and different equipment and training. Moreover, as one considers the environment within which political conflicts aimed at influencing rather than destroying are likely to take place, the theory obliquely implies an increasing need for cultural and human intelligence as opposed to technical intelligence for operations to achieve political objectives through persuasion and influence of people and populations rather than violence. In addition, the pattern suggests that conflicts along this sector of the continuum would properly be conducted as IO supported by kinetic operations rather than the reverse.

**Figure 3: A Line of Demarcation between Kinetic– and IO–dominated Factors**

The long-term effects of this attitude have been under resourcing IO core capabilities and inculcating a tendency into the military culture that invariably causes it to underestimate the depth, resilience, and ferocity of the moral dimension of conflicts that would prudently be regarded as predominantly IO conflicts by nature, especially in unconventional or constabulary environments. Under such circumstances, policymakers and military operators who lack this understanding or appreciation can be counted on to make the wrong decisions at the wrong times in ways that actually undermine the political objectives they are flailing to achieve.

**Practical Utility of the Theoretical Model**

What has been missing in the IO debate—and the root of confusion—is recognition that information operations are not artifices of military culture, but comprise necessary answers to natural dynamics of war that exist in some proportion side by side with the dynamics of violence that are generated by political violence. Policymakers and military operators must understand this because, all too often, the dominant influence of kinetic thinking creates a tendency to dismiss the relevance of information operations even where the circumstances of conflict might make IO not only essential but also predominant.

The model in figure 3, extrapolated from Clausewitz’s theory, provides an intellectual framework in which the military community can consider an appropriate mix of kinetic operations and IO tools for contemplated military campaigns as envisioned along the spectrum of political violence. It demonstrates that IO are intrinsic elements of political policy formulation that will permeate the environment in which conflict is occurring—at times becoming more dominant in influence than kinetic operations, which are better understood as primarily...
tools of destruction directed by policy. It further suggests that IO and kinetic operations are inseparably linked, like strands of a DNA molecule in a gene, and in the same way have a dominant/recessive relationship (for example, one exercising dominance over the other depending on where the conflict falls on the continuum relative to the polar extremes). Thus, among the important issues it highlights, the theory shows the absolute need to refine both the specific political objectives of a campaign as well as their nature in order to determine whether the campaign is predominantly kinetic or informational. This suggests that neglecting consideration of the role of IO and its integration with kinetic operations imperils the entire campaign plan.

Consequently, information operations cannot be prudently conceived as merely added value to an operation, but rather as essential activities that address specific needs associated with the nature of political conflict itself. Perhaps most importantly, the theory points out the potential for defining IO as the main effort of a campaign, suggesting the absolute imperative of a refined commander’s intent that identifies from the outset the main effort of the operation as either kinetic or IO, as well as describing how one should support and complement the other. This may urge, for example, introducing such previously inconceivable measures as subsuming the functions of a J–3/C–3 entirely beneath an IO-oriented staff element headed by a general officer uniquely trained and experienced with IO, or the establishment of linguistically capable and culturally experienced staff elements of political advisers at much lower levels of command than has previously been regarded as appropriate—perhaps to brigade or even battalion level. It also highlights a theoretical basis for increasing reliance on policing skills as opposed to maneuver combat skills the closer one approaches the devoid–of–violence end of the spectrum.

Additionally, the model implies that the political dimension of conflict is so essential that commanders must be prepared to establish their own local operational or even tactical political objectives in the absence of specific policy guidance for which information operations may be the key instrument. Clausewitz appears to allude to these predicted needs:

*Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle. . . . The only question, therefore, is whether, when war is being planned, the political point of view should give way to the purely military . . . or should the political point of view remain dominant and the military [military force and violence] be subordinated to it?*

The political nature of war as reflected along a continuum which graduates in intensity of violence from one extreme to another depending on political objectives, makes Clausewitz’s theory valuable for understanding information operations and their relationship to kinetic operations. What would the role of IO be at various points? The pattern that emerges confirms that IO-related factors are infused throughout the universe of political conflict and along the entire spectrum of violence associated with it.

**NOTES**

2. Ibid., 141.
3. Ibid., 88.
4. Ibid., 75, 87.
5. Ibid., 86–88.
6. Ibid., 77.
7. Ibid., 87
8. Ibid., 605.
10. Ibid., 86–87.
12. Clausewitz, 645.
13. Ibid., 80–81.
15. Clausewitz, 88.
16. Ibid., 81.
17. Ibid., 184–185.
18. Ibid., 606–607.
By Tucker B. Mansager

Future conflicts will likely continue to blur the line between war and peace, necessitating close cooperation between groups previously considered the exclusive practitioners of each—soldiers and diplomats. Just as terrorism crosses military, economic, and criminal spheres, U.S. efforts to counter it must closely integrate the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and reveal no seams the enemy can exploit. Occasionally, the interagency process meant to bring all these elements to bear has worked well. More commonly, the coordination of these elements has been haphazard and ad hoc, particularly at lower levels. Action is required; the system will not improve by itself.

A recent effort to improve lower-level coordination took place with the establishment of Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC–A) alongside the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, resulting in significant lessons learned in the execution of interagency policy that might be applied in other countries and situations. Such basic concepts as collocation of senior military and diplomatic leaders, consensus building, and military planning support to the U.S. Ambassador all contributed to greater integration in implementing interagency policy and increased success in carrying out U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Problems for the Joint Force Commander

Numerous interagency structures are meant to help integrate the efforts of the various executive agencies and departments in their pursuit of foreign policy goals. Unfortunately, they do little to help implement policy on the ground or deal with the overarching integration required of a joint force commander (JFC). Often they are outside the commander’s control, or are de facto limited to one country. Not only do these structures not help, but they also pose a series of problems for the JFC.

The commander in a joint operational area (JOA) has no regional peer from the State Department or any other U.S. Government agency. While joint doctrine notes that Ambassadors operate at both the operational and tactical levels, their authority is effectively limited to their country of accreditation, as explained in Joint Publication 3–08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. The same is generally true of representatives of other executive and intelligence agencies. The JFC’s area, on the other hand, encompasses both the primary country of operation and all or part of neighboring countries; thus, the commander will have to coordinate policy or operations with multiple country teams. The first level at which the JFC may encounter a State Department individual with regional authorities comparable to his own is at the regional assistant secretary level. For example, the Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs has responsibility for U.S. relations with Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, among others. But since State geographic areas, as well as those of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are not aligned with combatant...
commander areas of responsibility, a JFC with a JOA encompassing both Pakistan and Tajikistan might also have to deal with the Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Subsequently, such coordination often must be effected at the combatant command or even Joint Staff level—distant in time, space, and perspective from the area of conflict.

Even inside a given country, with one country team, cultural differences between foreign service and military officers complicate policy coordination and implementation. While military officers are focused on the military element of foreign policy, foreign service officers deal with all aspects of that policy. Detailed planning is a core activity of the military, while general planning is acceptable in the State Department; teamwork is rewarded in the military, while individual achievement is highly regarded in the State Department. Misperceptions and cultural differences add more friction and challenges to the coordination and execution of foreign policy under stressful and often austere conditions.

Cultural differences can also exacerbate the issue of who is in charge and when. In some contingencies, it is clear who has primacy in a given country or operation. Since Washington did not have an Ambassador in Kabul in October 2001 or in Baghdad in March 2003, General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command, was obviously running the show along with his subordinate commanders. In other operations, such as disaster relief, humanitarian support, and noncombatant evacuations, the Ambassador or chief of mission assumes the lead.

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom seem to fall into a category of neither war nor peace. While the initial phases of both were clearly in the military’s purview, a continuing insurgency in the reconstruction phases (greater in Iraq than Afghanistan) has blurred the line between war and peace. Although joint doctrine categorizes counterinsurgency as an “operation other than war” and the Army dubs it a “stability operation,” these constructs may not help the JFC execute his combat mission when mixed with humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and stability operations.1 Who is in charge in such a situation, the Ambassador or the JFC? This nebulous condition could cause further conflict or uncoordinated efforts between the military and civilian components of foreign policy, depending on the Ambassador or JFC.

Some structures exist for developing interagency policy. What configuration or organization translates the policy into coherent, coordinated orders that are executed on the ground? While the Executive Steering Group cited in joint doctrine has the potential to provide such a mechanism within a country, a JFC’s operational area regularly encompasses more than one country. In theory, a commander could gather senior representatives, even Ambassadors, from all the countries in his JOA to serve as a super executive steering group, but since each Ambassador is an authority unto himself, and the JFC has no authority over him, the commander must sell his plan to a group of senior foreign service officers or political appointees who may have divergent ideas on how to implement national policy.

Afghanistan as a Case Study

Many in Bagram and Kabul felt that Operation Enduring Freedom had nominally transitioned to stability operations in May 2003, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that “major combat activity” had changed to “stability and stabilization.” Yet Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–180

1. Commander Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan LTG David Barno, USA, meets with Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai during visit by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

**Numerous interagency structures do little to help implement policy on the ground or deal with the integration required of a joint force commander**
remained focused on combat operations in country, to the detriment of implementing an integrated U.S. military effort to help rebuild Afghanistan. The most senior U.S. military leaders were in Bagram, physically and perhaps psychologically separated from Afghan political and international diplomatic efforts in Kabul. In October 2003, U.S. Central Command began to form CFC–A to put more emphasis on the political-military aspects of efforts in the country; then Major General David Barno, USA, arrived early that month to assemble a staff and structures to knit together the military and political work. Originally conceived as a “pocket staff,” CFC–A soon took over all higher level aspects of political-military coordination, as well as overall direction of military activity in the JOA, allowing CJTF–180 and later CJTF–76 to focus on tactical warfighting and stability operations.

Locating CFC–A headquarters close to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul was critical to helping integrate diplomatic and aid efforts with military operations. Until that point, Embassy officers had to travel to Bagram to consult with military planners or operators, and vice versa. This trip required numerous security measures on the part of the military and an even greater effort on the part of the unarmed Embassy members, making it so difficult that the two organizations often worked without interaction. To further integrate the military and diplomatic aspects of the mission, the commander (COM CFC–A) maintained his office and personal staff in the Embassy, two doors from Zalmay Khalilzad, who became U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan in November 2003. Numerous high-ranking visitors to Kabul praised the team’s progress, which resulted in a number of lessons learned on how to improve interagency cooperation at the lower end of the operational level.

Lessons to Learn

**Collocate the Senior Military and Diplomatic Leaders.** The benefit of physical collocation of senior military and diplomatic leaders and their staffs cannot be overemphasized; nearly all other lessons learned were influenced by physical proximity and its beneficial effect on personal interaction and coordination. Being in the same place allowed more agility and speed in dealing with rapidly developing crises. Additionally, locating the senior military commander in the Embassy made a clear statement to allies, the Afghan people and government, and the world that the United States was entering a phase of Enduring Freedom focused on reconstruction and stability.

Senior leadership presence in the Embassy allowed military representation in what was referred to as “Core Group,” a smaller meeting of top Embassy officers, instituted by Ambassador Khalilzad and hosted by the Ambassador or, in his absence, the Deputy Chief of Mission. Attendance regularly included COM CFC–A; Chief, Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan; CIA Chief of Station; and sometimes the USAID Mission Director and a few other selected parties. Sensitive information was shared and critical decisions were often made in the Core Group Meeting. Collocation allowed regular participation and input into this vital forum.

**Build Consensus.** Proximity made it easier to build consensus. With no command authority between military and Embassy staff, and with questions about who was in charge, CFC–A relied on extensive efforts at consensus-building to develop and implement coherent, cohesive plans and policy. In fall 2003, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi requested development of a plan to increase stability in strife-torn southern and eastern Afghanistan. In response, the CFC–A staff began work on a political-military strategy to implement ideas from a discussion paper entitled “Provincial Strategies,” written by Brahimi’s deputy, Jean Arnault. Thus, CFC–A developed what became known as the “Strategy South and East” through an intense consensus-building process.

The initial framework of the strategy was developed within the military staff, based on guidance from the commander. Once it was framed, the Director of Plans and Policy (CJ–5) first presented the concept to senior Embassy leaders without the Ambassador present. The Deputy Chief of Mission, USAID Mission Director, and others provided insights to the concepts; more importantly, they took away a sense of ownership in the strategy. After making adjustments based on the feedback from the senior Embassy staff, the CJ–5 and COM CFC–A presented the strategy to the Ambassador, making adjustments based on his suggestions and receiving his support and concurrence before proceeding. This process continued in widening circles to brief and gain support from Brahimi and Arnault, the five lead nations in security sector reform (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Italy), and ultimately President Hamid Karzai and appropriate officials in his government. The interagency consensus building within the Embassy helped iron out initial problems in the plan, making it more acceptable to the other non-U.S. organizations,
and convinced senior leaders in the Embassy to support the plan even though they answered only to the Ambassador, not the military commander.

**Provincial Military Planning Support.** Early in his tenure as COM CFC–A, General Barno directed that the staff provide a small group of field grade officers, led by a colonel, to form the Embassy Interagency Planning Group. As noted, detailed planning is not generally recognized as a State Department core competency; furthermore, an Embassy staff has no plans section per se. The planning group was envisaged to provide the Ambassador with this type of capability, but it had effects beyond the initial concept. The seconding of military officers to the Ambassador helped further integrate political and military efforts through closer and more continuous coordination. This dedicated group provided the Ambassador military expertise for which he might otherwise have turned to the CFC–A staff, distracting it from its other missions. For example, the group was able to collect and collate information about nearly all U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, be they military, USAID, or nongovernmental, to give the Ambassador an overall vision and indicate gaps or overlap. That, in turn, allowed him to adjust efforts and seek more support for others. Choosing to form, staff, and maintain this group built goodwill with the Embassy staff and especially with the Ambassador—an advantage when cooperation, rather than command, is the normal mode of operation. Additionally, it can help salve wounds or recoup lost confidence when necessity or mistakes on one side result in bad feelings on the other.

**Practice Shuttle Diplomacy.** Having no peer with comparable geographic responsibilities, COM CFC–A made a point of visiting the other countries of the JOA, particularly Pakistan, to build consensus with senior U.S. diplomats, show interest in the situation in those countries, and familiarize himself with the senior leaders and issues. Because of the importance of Pakistan to efforts in Afghanistan, Islamabad was a monthly destination. Although much of a given visit might be spent with the Pakistani military leadership, the trips regularly included a visit with the U.S. Ambassador and other senior civilians in the Embassy. While the U.S. Office of the Defense Representative–Pakistan is headed by a flag officer, regular visits and briefings by the senior U.S. officer in the region contributed to understanding and trust and helped resolve issues early. The same concepts of consensus and confidence-building that CFC–A applied in Kabul were replicated by visits to U.S. Embassies in other countries.

By the time of his appointment, Ambassador Khalilzad had spent extensive time in the National Security Council and Department of Defense, as well as with the Department of State. That background provided him a deeper and broader understanding of political-military interaction, particularly the capabilities, limitations, and workings of military force. Other Ambassadors, political appointees or career foreign service officers alike, might possess less experience with military subjects and issues. General Barno did not have the same breadth of experience in national-level organizations, although he did have political-military experience as the commander of Task Force Warrior, which trained free Iraqi forces in Hungary during the buildup to the invasion of Iraq. More importantly, he came to the position with a cooperative mindset, dedicated to working with the Embassy in Kabul to further U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The two senior leaders began building a relationship in Washington before they arrived in Afghanistan, with Barno attending Khalilzad’s swearing-in and the two returning to Kabul on the same flight. Their mutual respect and cooperation guaranteed that the disparate foreign service and military cultures would get along.

**Unity of Effort**

The interagency process has received increased scrutiny and has room for improvement. Changes to increase efficiency and synergy in the system are necessary to deal
with today’s multifaceted and asymmetric threats. While the United States has a fairly established way to coordinate the interagency system at the national level, the leaders on the ground in a country in conflict have only general guidance and concepts. Some of these ideas, such as the Executive Steering Group, do not seem to take into account that today’s JFC will likely command operations in a number of countries. Yet this is the commander who may need the most help, as he is likely responsible for political-military activities on a large scale with a minimal, and possibly ad hoc, military staff with limited interagency representation.

There are organizational problems with State, Defense, and CIA relationships in areas of conflict. The JFC will likely be responsible for furthering U.S. efforts in an area of conflict would go a long way toward improving unity of effort among the various practitioners of foreign policy there. Misalignment of geographical areas of responsibility will not ease the interagency friction that occurs in any area of conflict. A National Security Council review and realignment of the geographical regions of the major foreign policy players could streamline the efforts of these agencies by easing coordination and eliminating redundant efforts.

The United States is involved in a conflict with an elusive, transnational foe who will use terror, armed force, propaganda, and even diplomacy to achieve goals. Already heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a lesser degree in places like the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia, Washington must look for ways to do more with limited resources. The massive U.S. humanitarian relief operation following the December 2004 tsunami in South Asia reemphasizes the imperative of improving interagency cooperation and the synergies and economies to be gained. One way to get the most out of the system is to improve the cooperation among the major participants in the execution of foreign policy, particularly the Department of State officials and the uniformed military interacting in the area of conflict. Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan established and proved the value of several best practices that could help improve this coordination in a region in conflict. It is time to enhance the effectiveness of our national security team abroad and hence the security of the United States and its allies. JFQ

NOTES


3 This and the following accounts of activities in Afghanistan come from the author’s experiences as the political-military officer for the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan, then the Political-Military Division chief for CFC–A from July 2003 to July 2004.
The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet

By NICHOLAS E. SARANTAKES

In the long and proud history of the Royal Navy, the largest formation ever to see combat fought under the operational command not of Drake, Nelson, Jellicoe, or Cunningham, but rather of Americans Raymond Spruance and William Halsey. The British Pacific Fleet was massive and today would be the largest navy on the planet, but in 1945 it fought the Imperial Japanese Navy as a component of the U.S. Fifth and Third Fleets. Present-day warfighters, quartermasters, strategists, and commanders should keep this case study in coalition operations in mind when dealing with allies, since the operational distribution of power is similar. Even though the U.S. Navy had the immediate resources to defeat the enemy on its own, and although there were drawbacks to engaging with allies, the British presence provided diplomatic, political, and operational advantages that far outweighed ensuing complications.

The Political Issues

In 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee under the leadership of Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, forcefully argued that the United Kingdom should take part in the final operations against Japan in order to preserve its close relationship with the United States. Brooke explained that an operation designed to retake colonies would have been the "easiest to stage but limited itself to the recapture of British possessions without any direct participation with American and Australian

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forces in the defeat of Japan. I felt that at this stage of the war it was vital that British forces should participate in direct action against Japan in the Pacific.” The British Ambassador in Washington, the Earl of Halifax, noted, “Even if British participation were of necessity small or comparatively so, there would be an overwhelming difference between this and total absence.”

A related issue requiring explanation is why the Americans accepted this detachment. Diplomatic considerations, rather than enhancement of operational performance, were clearly the main factor behind American interest in having the British join the effort in the waters off Japan. At the second Quebec conference codenamed Octagon, Winston Churchill broached the subject of a British contribution. He explicitly offered the services of the Royal Navy to the ongoing crusade against Japan, noting that there were factions in the United States hostile to Great Britain and that the British wanted to take part in the defeat of their Japanese enemy. Once the matter was out in the open, President Franklin Roosevelt could hardly say no. The American public was likely to be outraged if it discovered that only Americans would have the privilege of dying in Japan and that the President was responsible for increasing their numbers while he kept allies out of the fight. Even before the conference, John Winant, the U.S. Ambassador in London, argued:

If we allow the British to limit their active participation to recapture areas that are to their selfish interests alone and not participate in smashing the war machine of Japan, if British soldiers don’t cross the Atlantic to our ports and entrain for our Pacific ports, and if we shuck the British air force in order to prove our own dominance in the air, we will create in the United States a hatred for Great Britain that will make for schisms in the postwar years that will defeat everything that men have died for in this war.

As the U.S. minutes of this meeting state, “The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest scale.”

The Burden of Logistics

The commander of the new fleet, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, served British interests well. Fraser realized that his fleet had an important operational mission. In his report to the Admiralty after the war, he declared, “On purely strategic grounds it is clearly the best policy to employ the largest forces possible against the centre of the enemy’s power, and it would be uneconomical to dissipate one’s total forces in areas away from the centre.”

The Admiral also realized that the deployment of the fleet served British diplomatic interests:

From a point of view of national prestige, it has been of the utmost importance that our Dominions should see the British navy engaged, if not in equal numbers, at least on an equal footing, with the American forces in the Pacific, and it would have been disastrous from this point of view if the British Pacific Fleet, after being sent to the Pacific, had been relegated, as the Australians consider their own forces to have been relegated, to a ‘back area.’

Fraser was determined to integrate his command into the U.S. Pacific Fleet with as few complications as possible. Since the two English-speaking navies had very different ways of maintaining contact with their ships, he realized early on that the British would have to adopt American methods. “They won’t accept us unless we use their signal books; it won’t work,” Fraser’s communication officer told him. The Admiral concurred, and in an agreement he negotiated in Hawaii with Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, he committed his fleet to the American system. Nimitz distributed codebooks to the British and provided a liaison team to each of His Majesty’s ships.

Churchill offered the services of the Royal Navy to the crusade against Japan, noting that the British wanted to take part

At Quebec, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King, accepted the British Pacific Fleet only under the provision that it be self-sufficient in supply. Although a recent study shows that King had legitimate reasons for imposing this requirement, many American naval officers in the Pacific did their best to ignore it. In fact, a good number of admirals had problems with this stipulation as well. “Undisturbed by any logistic responsibilities, they have frequently denounced the rule of self sufficiency as uneconomical in overall effort, as it most certainly is, and quite unworkable, which in fact it has not proved to be,” Fraser recorded. The requirement had to be heeded, though, at least on paper. The Americans were quite willing to provide the British with surplus items. Commanders and supply officers, however, had to turn down requests that
would go to Washington, at least officially. American officers told Rear Admiral Douglas Fisher, commander of the British Fleet Train, that he could have anything and everything “that could be given without Admiral King’s knowledge.”

Another area in which the allies worked together was sea rescue. The Americans had developed a system of submarines, flying-boats, and destroyers designed to rescue the crews of downed planes. The British contributed resources to this network as well, but the operation was primarily American. Admiral Sir Philip Vian, the British carrier commander, observed, “The knowledge that there was every chance of being picked up if they were forced down in the sea was a vital element in the upkeep of the aircrews’ morale.”

Despite American assistance, the British still faced a huge problem. Naval architects had designed British ships for duty in the confined waters around Britain, not in the vastness of the Pacific. “The distances were staggering to those of us accustomed to the conditions of the European War,” Vian stated. The Royal Navy also had little experience in resupplying ships under way. The British transferred fuel at sea using hoses that trailed astern of the tankers since they lacked catamarans to keep ships apart and the appropriate block and tackles to sail side by side while fueling. Vian called this method “an awkward, unseaman-like business.”

Only the assistance of the U.S. Navy prevented these problems from affecting the combat performance of the British Pacific Fleet. “I have found that the American logistical authorities in the Pacific have interpreted self-sufficiency in a very liberal sense,” Fraser commented. Vian agreed: “Indeed, the Australian base never was able to supply and maintain us properly. Without the generous help of United States bases, fueling facilities, and spare parts, the fleet would have been hard set to keep going.”

In his report, Fraser asserted that his command did a good job in responding to these logistic problems. The U.S. Navy had taken years to build up to its current level, whereas the Royal Navy had to change quickly after doing battle against the U-boats. “The entry of a British Fleet into the Pacific operations has been an exacting test which the Navy can reasonably congratulate itself on having passed satisfactorily,” he concluded.

The Divine Wind

Despite the many supply problems, the British Pacific Fleet did see combat in Japanese waters in three different periods. The first was from March 26 to April 20, during Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. The fleet steamed out of Sydney on February 28 under the seagoing command of Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings. To avoid command complications with the Americans, Fraser decided he would be a shore-based commander.

The British ships became Task Force 57 and operated as part of the U.S. Fifth Fleet under Spruance. The Americans assigned the British to the southwestern flank of the fleet. Their mission was to neutralize Japanese airfields in the Sakishima islands, which were between Okinawa and Formosa, but they faced a serious threat from the kamikaze onslaught. These suicide attacks turned Okinawa into the bloodiest battle in the history of the U.S. Navy. Nimitz later explained, “This was not a battle by vast opposing forces, but an unending series of small fights.”

Task Force 57 quickly proved itself a worthwhile commodity to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. British and American officers soon learned that the carriers of the Royal Navy stood up to the suicide attacks better than their American counterparts. Designed to take a beating from enemy aviation, the British carriers had more defensive plating. “The armoured decks of our C.V’s have caused a great sensation among the Americans and have certainly proved their worth against suicide aircraft with their comparatively small penetrating power,” Fraser observed. The U.S. liaison officer on the Indefatigable was impressed at the resilience of the ship. “When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl. When a
American admirals were glad to have the armored decks of the British carriers. Vian described what followed on that first day back as “the most serious kamikaze attack we had yet suffered.” The Japanese hit the British hard. Decoy planes drew off the combat air patrols and allowed some kamikazes to reach the carriers. Vian acknowledged that enemy pilots had bested his command: “The first knowledge we had of their presence was when one of them was seen diving from a height straight down on Formidable.” The carrier turned and forced the kamikaze to make a second run after flying over the full length of the flight deck at an elevation of 50 feet. The plane banked and returned to the starboard side, flying straight into the carrier’s island. The explosion that followed punched a hole in the flight deck and started a series of fires among the planes on the deck with full fuel tanks.14

Three minutes later, another kamikaze attacked the Indomitable, Vian’s flagship. Despite taking numerous hits, the plane continued on its descent, but the angle of approach was low enough that it skidded across the flight deck before slipping into the sea. The damage was so light that Vian had no idea the carrier had been hit until someone told him. Gunfire tore apart a second plane that attacked minutes later, and it crashed into the sea 30 feet short of the ship.15

The British recovered quickly. The heavy armor minimized the structural damage. Using quick-drying cement and a steel plate, repair crews on the Formidable had the ship back in operation 6 hours later.

The next few days were uneventful. Then, on May 9, the carriers Victorious and Formidable came under kamikaze attack and suffered moderate damage. One kamikaze holed the flight deck of the Victorious. Another dove on the Formidable while it was readying planes for takeoff. The explosion killed many pilots trapped in their cockpits and started fires that penetrated one hangar, but within an hour the flames were under control.16

As it was, these kamikaze strikes were the last major tests of Task Force 57. When the British departed Okinawa on May 25, they and their American allies could take pride in the operational work of the task force and the harmony in which the coalition partners had functioned. As the British Pacific Fleet steamed to Australia, Spruance saluted his allies: “I would express to you, to your officers and to your men, after 2 months operating as a Fifth Fleet Task Force, my appreciation of your fine work and cooperative spirit.” Rawlings had similar feelings about the U.S. Navy: “It will not, however, be out of place to remark on the helpfulness of the American authorities at Manus and Ulithi; I trust we did not ask for their assistance until we were faced with problems which frankly seemed beyond us, but whenever we did so appeal it was responded to with the utmost vigour.” Every British carrier suffered kamikaze hits, but all of them had remained operational. Task Force 57 flew 5,335 sorties and dropped 958 tons of bombs. The Royal Navy had made a worthwhile contribution to the Okinawa campaign.17

To the Shores of Japan

The British rendezvoused with the Third Fleet a month and a half later on July 16. Starting in mid-1944, Nimitz had adopted a practice of rotating command of U.S. ships operating in the Central Pacific between Spruance and Halsey. When Spruance was in command, the ships were designated the Fifth Fleet, and when Halsey was in command, they were the Third Fleet. As a result, the British ships became Task Force 37 instead of 57. Halsey knew Rawlings and Vian only by their reputations, but he was reluctant to meet with them. The source of Halsey’s reservation was the issue of full operational control of the British fleet. Without that control, he realized that the inclusion of the British in his command would be a difficult matter. He tried to rectify the issue with a message to Nimitz proposing that he use the British Pacific Fleet on the flank of U.S. naval forces.18

Nimitz rejected this proposal. His agreement with Fraser and King that the British be self-sufficient made it impossible to accept Halsey’s idea: “Operate TF 37 separately from TF 38 in fact as well as in name.” Nimitz was being rather legalistic in his view of his agreement with Fraser: “I myself did not mean this to preclude the possibility of a British task group operating in an American force,” Fraser informed the Admiralty, “but the commander in chief Pacific appears to have taken it to mean that.”19

Halsey began a conference of naval leaders aboard his flagship by explaining that the strikes against the islands were designed to weaken enemy resources before the invasion started. Then he gave Rawlings three options. First, the British could operate as a component element of the fleet; Halsey would provide them with the orders he gave his U.S. detachments, which the British were strongly recommended to consider as “suggestions.” That would allow the Allies to concentrate their power against the Japanese and make the British ships for all practical purposes a task force under U.S. command. Second, Rawlings could operate as a semi-independent force separated by 60 to 70 miles of ocean from U.S. ships. Third, the Royal Navy could operate totally on its own. Halsey recalls that Rawlings never hesitated in his response: “Of course, I’ll accept number 1.”20

The British admiral impressed Halsey. A British liaison officer assigned to Halsey’s when the British departed Okinawa, they and their American allies could take pride in the harmony in which the partners had functioned.
of our difficulties, and from that moment onwards, by kindly word or deed, he availed himself of every possible opportunity to offer encouragement and to smooth our path.\textsuperscript{21}

Fraser thought the minor dispute reflected differences between the two cultures. While the first option that Rawlings had accepted met the letter of the Nimitz-Fraser agreement, for all practical purposes Halsey had made the British Pacific Fleet part of his command. “It is an interesting sidelight on the American way of thought, particularly on their rigid acceptance of the written word, that the Commander in Chief, Pacific, considered it necessary to enforce the small restriction,” the admiral stated. Fraser thought Halsey’s action was reflective of U.S. culture: “Provided he obeys the letter of the law, even if he completely disregards its spirit, every American is quite happy that the right and sensible action has been taken.”\textsuperscript{22}

The missions of the U.S. Third and British Pacific Fleets were fourfold: to reduce enemy tactical air forces, attack strategic targets on the mainland, explore Japanese defenses in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, and destroy Japanese shipping. The British had a fifth mission that was political and diplomatic: to support the alliance with the United States. Merely taking part in military operations met this goal, according to Hanson Baldwin, a defense correspondent for The New York Times: “The participation of the British Fleet in the great naval blows against the Japanese homeland represents a psychological, as well as a military, blow to the enemy.”\textsuperscript{23}

The third period of combat operations for the British Pacific Fleet started on July 17, the day after it joined up with the Third Fleet. While bad weather forced the Americans to cancel their attacks, Task Force 37 had better luck. Planes from the Formidable and Implacable bombed and strafed airfields and rail facilities on the east coast of Honshu, the biggest of the home islands. No fighters greeted these planes, but antiaircraft fire from the ground was heavy.\textsuperscript{24}

As always, logistics was a problem for the British, and nothing changed in and around the home islands. Halsey was glad to have allies in the fight and was more than willing to help when possible. In fact, he found that the redundancy of requiring two supply lines reduced the combat effectiveness of the fleet. If British ships fueled from U.S. tankers, they could deliver as many combat strikes as U.S. ships. “One of my most vivid war recollections is of a day when Bert’s flagship, the battleship King George V, fueled from the tanker Sabine at the same time as the Missouri,” Halsey stated in his memoirs. “I went across to ‘the Cagey Five’, as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast.”\textsuperscript{25}

One of the missions of the Third Fleet during the attacks on the home islands was to destroy what remained of the combined fleet, the seagoing element of the Imperial Navy. On July 18, U.S. planes attacked Yokosuka to sink HIJMS Nagata, one of the last Japanese battleships. The effort failed, the Nagata survived the war, and Halsey lost 12 planes. Then on July 24, 25, and 28, U.S. planes attacked the Kure naval base. Halsey enthusiastically declared in his memoirs, “Kure is the port where Jap warships went to die.” The Americans sank a carrier, three battleships, five cruisers, and a number of smaller ships.\textsuperscript{26}

In an often-quoted passage from his memoirs, Halsey explained that his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Robert Carney, argued that the British should be excluded from the Kure strikes:

Mick’s argument was that although this division of forces violated the principle of concentration and superiority, it was imperative that we forestall a possible postwar claim by Britain that she had delivered even a part of the final blow that demolished the Japanese fleet. I hated to admit a political factor into a military equation—my respect for Bert Rawlings and his fine men made me hate it doubly—but Mick forced me to recognize that statesman’s objectives sometimes differ widely from combat objectives, and an exclusively American attack was therefore in American interests.

Vian wrote his memoirs after Halsey and, in fact, quotes the above passage. He thought the Japanese ships were not worth the effort; they were “immobilized for lack of fuel, heavily camouflaged, and no longer military units except as antiaircraft batteries.” Even with fuel, some of the ships sunk at Kure were targets of no real value. Two were built at the turn of the century and used only as training facilities.\textsuperscript{27}

Halsey acted stupidly twice. First, in excluding the British, he clearly confused the institutional interests of the Navy with the national interests of his country. There might have been an exceptionally important reason to have the British involved in this operation.

\textit{HMS King George V with USS Missouri in background}
More importantly, the operation itself was a mistake. What was left of the combined fleet no longer posed an offensive threat to U.S. forces. Its destruction was gratuitous. Halsey addressed this issue in his memoirs, saying he had four main reasons for rejecting Vian’s advice: national morale demanded revenge for Pearl Harbor; the Navy had to have total control of the waters of the North Pacific if it was to have regular supply lines to the Soviet Union for invading Japan; and the Americans had to eliminate the fleet to prevent the Japanese from using it as a bargaining point at a peace conference as the Germans had after World War I. As for the fourth reason, “[Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet] had ordered the fleet destroyed. If the other reasons had been invalid, that one alone would have been enough for me.” Perhaps, but as Halsey’s actions in establishing command arrangements with Rawlings showed, there were orders, and there were orders.

The British Pacific Fleet fought to the very end and suffered some of its heaviest losses on August 9, just days before Japan announced its surrender. The main targets were airfields. The British also came across a number of ships and attacked them as targets of opportunity. The results were good. Royal Navy planes sank three destroyers and damaged a number of others. The pilots showed exceptional skill and courage—none more than Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray of the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve, who posthumously received the last Victoria Cross awarded in the war for leading an attack that destroyed HIJMS Amakusa.

Despite the problems the British faced in operating in the Pacific, they made a credible showing, increasing the number of sorties launched per fighter on each strike day. During operations near Okinawa, the Royal Navy averaged 1.08 in March and April, then 1.09 in May. In July and August, the number jumped to 1.54. “Thus, fighter effort was some 40 percent greater in the British operations against Japan than in the operations against Sakishima Gunto,” Fraser observed in his report to the Admiralty.

The Lessons of History

When the war ended, Admiral Fraser represented Britain on the deck of the USS Missouri. He and his command had earned the honor. The ships flying the White Ensign of the Royal Navy had operated successfully at the end of an exceptionally long supply line. King’s concerns about logistic problems in matters of spare parts, refueling, and the speed of fleet movements were legitimate. British assets, however, outweighed liabilities in these areas. How this was accomplished lies in the fact that all forces have strengths and weaknesses, and the Japanese with their kamikaze attacks had stumbled onto a vulnerability; these suicide planes were
a deadly threat to U.S. carriers, but one to which the British were largely immune. This niche contribution would have grown in importance had the war continued. The British presence also increased the weight the allies could apply against the home islands. Moreover, the British were a morale booster to Americans serving in the Pacific. The presence of His Majesty’s ships and sailors meant that the burden of combat in Japan would be shared, minimizing to some degree the losses the United States would suffer and helping sustain public sentiment on the home front. Put simply, friends are good to have in a fight. Finally, the British presence serviced the political interests of both nations. The leadership in each capital realized they were stronger with an ally than without one.

The experiences of the British and American Navies in the Pacific show that commanders must keep two considerations to their actions. Halsey’s decision to attack Kure without the British was the biggest exception. Putting the interests of the U.S. Navy before the national interest was wrong. His bigger mistake, though, was spending the lives of his pilots on targets of little value.

The experiences of the British and American Navies in the Pacific show that commanders must keep two considerations in mind. First and more obvious, they must make sure they accomplish the mission specific to their unit. Second and more complex, the method that commanders use to reach their immediate goals can work against the larger objective. Sometimes you need to take one step back to take two forward, and that is the norm when operating with allies. JFQ

NOTES

1 David Fraser, Alanbrooke (New York: Atheneum, 1982), 414; Halifax to Foreign Office, July 5, 1945, FO 371 46440, British National Archives, Richmond, Surrey.
4 “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches.”
9 “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches”; Vian, 188.
10 “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches.”
11 Humble, 256; “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches.”
14 Morison, 251–255; Vian, 185; Gray, 219; Smith, 138.
15 Vian, 185; Gray, 220.
16 Vian, 185; Smith, 138, 144–147.
17 Vian, 187; Gray, 224; Rawlings report, May 9, 1945, and Spruance to Rawlings, May 25, 1945, in Fraser.
20 Halsey, 261–262; Vian, 193.
22 Fraser, quoted in Vian, 194
24 Winton, 316; Vian, 203; Ministry of Defence (Navy), Advance to Japan, 220–221.
26 Halsey, 264.
28 Halsey, 265.
29 Winton, 335–338; Gray, 250.
30 “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches.”
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**Surprise, Security, and the American Experience**
by John Lewis Gaddis
Harvard University Press, March 2004; paperback, October 2004
150 pp $18.95 [ISBN 0–6740–1174–0]

With a focus as defined as Maxwell’s is broad, and a purpose as theoretical as Maxwell’s is concrete, Gaddis uses three case studies to examine the effect of surprise on American national security and grand strategy: the British attack on Washington in 1814, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the terrorist attacks of September 11. Gaddis traces the pendulum swing of U.S. strategy from one of preemption, unilaterism, and hegemony (followed by John Quincy Adams after 1814) to one of cooperation and alliance (employed by Franklin D. Roosevelt after 1941) and back again (but now applied on a global scale by George W. Bush since September 11). This pendulum swing has coincided with American perceptions (or at least those of America’s leaders) of the likelihood of attaining national security by either expanding or contracting the U.S. circle of responsibility in the world. Gaddis attributes the fact that the circle is presently expanding to prudence, capability—and arrogance. Whether his conclusion intrigued or angers you, Gaddis packs a lot of thought into this small book.

Finally, two new scholarly journals—one electronic and one print—recently have joined the ranks of literature contributing to the homeland security discourse and are worth a look. Homeland Security Affairs, an online quarterly journal from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, debuted with the Summer 2005 issue. The center, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness, is part of the Naval Postgraduate School. The premiere issue highlights the theme of “Prevention”; future themes include “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” “Intelligence and Information Sharing,” and “Border Security.” You can access the journal at <www.hsaj.org/hsa/>.

The second new player is from the Institute for Law and Public Policy at California University of Pennsylvania. Homeland Security Review is intended to be “an intellectual sounding board and research center for the many facets of homeland security.” Publication was scheduled to begin in fall 2005.

**War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power**
by James Kitfield
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005
386 pp. $27.50

**Reviewed by JOSEPH J. COLLINS**

James Kitfield’s War and Destiny joins a growing number of books on the national security policy of the George W. Bush administration. The subject has attracted the talents of such notable writers as Bob Woodward (Bush at War, Plan of Attack), Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay (America Unbound), and James Mann (Rise of the Vulcans). War and Destiny will rank with the best of them. It is the first book that encompasses Bush’s foreign policy, defense policy, and defense transformation, and integrates them with a detailed first-person look at the war in Iraq.

Kitfield, a National Journal correspondent who was embedded with V Corps’ main attack units in Iraq, has nearly two decades of national security experience and is the author of Prodigal Soldiers (1997), an artful chronicle of how the Army rebuilt itself after Vietnam. War and Destiny, his most recent book, is well written, comprehensive, and complex. It covers the gamut from high policy to the down-and-dirty aspects of war. Kitfield finds the Bush administration imprudent in its decision to fight in Iraq, insensitive to allies, intolerant of internal criticism, and harsh even toward its own generals. He is particularly critical of what he calls Bush’s “revolution in foreign affairs”—the doctrine of preemption, downgrading of traditional allies in favor of coalitions of the willing, and rejection of multilateralism. These factors have, in his view, characterized Bush’s approach to the world.

Another target is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his efforts at transformation and the creation of a new model of warfare. Kitfield charges that micromanagement in the Pentagon left us too few troops in Iraq and poorly postured for the vital post–conventional combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Kitfield reserves most of his criticism of the war for the failure to plan for stability operations, the phase of peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction in which U.S. forces have taken over 90 percent of their casualties. He reminds us of the stability operations planning failures both in Washington and in the field. About the 3rd Infantry Division, the spearhead of the coalition’s offensive, he notes:

There was no plan for occupying the city itself and transitioning to stability operations. There were no predetermined rules of engagement that would have allowed them to step in for absent police and put a halt to the rampant looting still under way. . . . Instead, there was a palpable sense of drift in those critical early weeks of liberation, as a vacuum of power settled over Baghdad like a low pressure zone (p. 226).

In the end, the United States and its coalition partners had enough troops to defeat
the Republican Guard, but not enough to deal with an insurgency. Kitfield sees gross strategic miscalculations, followed by slow adaptation to realities on the ground, as the root of the problems.

The author concludes that the war in Iraq, important as it may be, has cost the Nation political support abroad, huge amounts of money, 12,000 casualties, and precious credibility. Given the Pentagon’s missteps in Iraq and its treatment of dissenters, Kitfield also finds its transformation plan suspect. His judgment of the substance of the Bush revolution is even more blunt:

[The Bush revolutionaries] failed to see how the perception of a superpower run amok would diminish the greater source of American power: the principles and ideals that others freely embraced and by which our good intentions and leadership are judged. At a critical moment in the history of the West, with storm clouds gathering all around, America’s beacon flickered (p. 346).

If there is a limitation to the utility of Kitfield’s analysis, it is that his eloquently written book is focused on a moving train. The war on terror demands that the Government plan and execute perfectly in a murky environment. Not only can we not accurately see the future, we also cannot know the consequences of what might have been. For example, what would have transpired if the United States and its coalition partners had not attacked Iraq? Would the world or the Iraqi people have been better off? Kitfield’s analysis helps us to understand where we are today, but the complete record is more mixed, and the train has moved on.

There is much good news in the war on terror even if it often does not make the front page. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 50 million people have been liberated from horrid regimes that supported terror at home and abroad. In both countries, there have been democratic elections, and new governments grow daily in depth and effectiveness. New security forces have been trained that will one day replace American and coalition forces. Reconstruction has inched forward despite the hazards of insurgency. And in both countries, traditional U.S. allies are finally moving to do more, not less.

Elsewhere, the Bush revolution has sparked or influenced a number of democratic developments. Georgia, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have all profited from the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan and the administration’s emphasis on the spread of democracy. Much of this happened after Kitfield’s book went to press, but it testifies to how fast the train is moving, and it certainly impacts on any future cost-benefit analysis of the war on terror.

Kitfield notes that the administration has been slow to learn and adapt—a fair critique—but seeing a problem and fixing it is easier to coach from the sidelines than it is to do in the arena of public policy. Many of the key tactical and logistic problems that arose after the combat phase of Iraqi Freedom have been or are being fixed. Our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting harder and smarter. The training of competent Iraqi security forces is well under way. Both the State and Defense Departments are working on how to adapt their organizations and future policy to the necessity of stability operations.

Even defense transformation is moving ahead in all the services. Criticizing Secretary Rumsfeld may be fair, but we must also note the difficulty of his enterprise. The challenge of major structural, procedural, and organizational changes in the world’s most powerful military force is daunting: doing it in wartime is as unprecedented as it is necessary.

Despite Kitfield’s tough critique, the stakes must be kept in perspective. He would be the first to admit that Iraq is a “must-win” situation for the United States and the people of southwest Asia. The key to victory is the will of the American people. Senator John McCain, speaking in 2004 at the Council on Foreign Relations, made a prescient assessment:

If we fail in Iraq, we will have taught our adversaries the lesson of Mogadishu, only a hundred fold: If you inflict enough pain, America will leave. Iraq will then descend into chaos and civil war. . . . We will have energized the extremists and created a breeding ground for terrorists, dooming the Arab world. . . . I fear U.S. public support is eroding. So I think we need to admit that serious errors have been made, increase . . . troop strength in Iraq, and do what is necessary to turn this thing around (p. 320). JFQ

Thomas G. Mahnken is a professor of strategy at the Naval War College and a visiting fellow at the Phillip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
that the struggle with Soviet communism has much to teach us about the nature of the ongoing conflict with Salafist Islam. They further feel that figures of the early phases of the Cold War, such as Dwight Eisenhower, Paul Nitze, and particularly George Kennan, have much to teach us about how to wage and win protracted wars. Just as Kennan’s “Long Telegram” provided the intellectual blueprint for the strategy of containment, Carafano and Rosenzweig mean to provide an overarching strategy for the current war.

A central challenge any democracy faces in a protracted war with an authoritarian adversary is how to win without assuming the characteristics of its enemy. How can a liberal democracy survive and even triumph while preserving liberty and prosperity? Turning to the early Cold War, the authors argue that Eisenhower devised a strategy for waging a protracted conflict that rested on four pillars: providing security, building a strong economy, protecting civil liberties, and waging a war of ideas (pp. 9–10). They argue that these building blocks remain as useful today as they were during the Cold War. The priorities for today’s policymakers are to organize to fight over the long term, be patient, and get started (p. 12).

There clearly is much the Cold War can teach us about the struggle with Salafist Islamic terrorist groups. However, distilling that experience into a series of maxims can be simplistic and even dangerous. There is an understandable tendency to impose greater order on history than was apparent at the time, to see a straight, unbroken line extending from the Long Telegram to the collapse of the Soviet Union more than four decades later. That would be a mistake. The path that led to victory in the Cold War took many turns and led to detours and even such dead ends as détente. And containment of Soviet expansion took many forms. It is worth remembering that the title of John Lewis Gaddis’ famous book refers to strategies, not the strategy, of containment. Indeed, the causes of the Soviet collapse and the role of the United States remain controversial to this day.

Carafano and Rosenzweig organize the book around a series of chapters that address the central strategic issues facing Washington today: offensive operations against terrorist groups, homeland security, the need to provide security while preserving civil liberties, budgetary priorities, trade, and the war of ideas. In each case, the authors discuss the topic in the context of the Cold War before exploring it in a contemporary perspective and concluding with recommendations for policymakers. As one would expect from Heritage Foundation analysts, their policy prescriptions favor muscular defense, free markets, and restraints on government interference.

The book’s breadth at times comes at the expense of depth. For example, its discussion of the force structure requirements of the current war is cursory. In the space of two pages, the authors argue against such “dumb” ideas as increasing the size of the Armed Forces and introducing conscription. Their argument for robust defense spending, ending the “nonessential” deployment of troops in the Balkans, shifting more troops to operational assignments, and continuing the base realignment and closure process takes another two pages. One would hope for a more extensive discussion of such important—and controversial—topics. When it comes to transforming the Armed Forces, the authors argue for reforming professional military education, restructuring combatant commands, establishing new organizations, and rethinking the equipment the Defense Department procures (pp. 42–43). It is hard to disagree with such broad recommendations. But the devil is in the details.

Carafano and Rosenzweig have written an accessible book that touches on the most important topics facing policymakers and the public. Let us hope that it triggers broad national debate over the ends, ways, and means of the current conflict. Such a discussion is very much needed. JFQ

**Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space**

by Michael E. O’Hanlon


120 pp. $16.95


Reviewed by JOHN M. LOGSDON

John M. Logsdon is director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington University.

This short book attempts to strike a middle ground between those who see space weaponization as inevitable and desirable, arguing that the United States should take the lead in developing capabilities to project force in and through space, and those contending that space should remain a weapons-free sanctuary. Michael O’Hanlon characterizes the 2001 report of Donald Rumsfeld’s Space Commission, and especially its argument that the United States should move toward space weapons to prevent a “space Pearl Harbor,” as “alarmist” (p. 120). He also calls the pressure from the arms control community for wide-ranging multilateral bans of space weaponry “unjustified” (p. 121). Rather, O’Hanlon calls for a “moderate and flexible U.S. military space policy” (p. 120).

O’Hanlon is not a space or arms control specialist. Rather, he is a national security generalist and brings that perspective to his analysis of the pros and cons of developing space weapons, which he defines to include “destructive” systems intended “for use against space or Earth targets” or “ground-based weapons designed explicitly to damage objects in space” (p. 8). His core argument is that it is in the interest of the United States, as today’s dominant military space power, to adopt policies that delay the development of space weapons, without taking actions that would foreclose a future decision to develop such weapons.

The author develops his analysis in a straightforward manner. He first summarizes the current state of the argument about the future military uses of space. Then, since his study is intended for the nontechnical reader, he
includes an excellent "brief primer of space and satellites." He reviews the current and likely state of those technologies most relevant to developing space weapons and assesses probable threats to the current U.S. dominance in space. While he questions both the technological feasibility and desirability of some of the most ambitious proposals, such as space-based lasers and space-to-ground weapons, he suggests that developments in such areas as ground- or air-based high energy lasers and microsatellites could change the context for developing military space policies in coming years, particularly in terms of increasing the vulnerability of low orbit satellites.

As a useful means of demonstrating the complexities of the space weaponization issue, O’Hanlon presents a brief case study of the role of space systems in a possible conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan in the 2010–2015 time period. He asks whether, if China developed space capabilities that allowed it to track and target U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, it would not be in U.S. interest to have the antisatellite (ASAT) ability to deny those capabilities. And he raises the possibility that China in the coming decade could develop ASAT means of its own and thus be able to threaten space capabilities essential to current and planned U.S. approaches to warfighting. Without being faced with countervailing American ASAT threats, O’Hanlon fears that China might see its satellite capabilities as “war winning” (p. 103).

While China develops its space capabilities, it has also taken the lead within the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and General Assembly in proposing a comprehensive international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has argued that no such treaty is needed. O’Hanlon examines the case for arms control initiatives in space and concludes that a comprehensive ban on space weapons is neither feasible nor desirable. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to verify whether a particular satellite possessed ASAT capabilities. He notes that space-based ballistic missile defenses could also be used in an ASAT role. Finally, as the Taiwan scenario suggests, there are situations in which the United States would not wish to be bound by such limitations. O’Hanlon does conclude that there are a number of “fairly narrowly construed” space arms control measures that make sense. For example, he argues the merit of an international treaty banning debris-causing activities in space, including the testing of ASAT measures against actual satellites.

The core of O’Hanlon’s analysis is his final chapter, “Preserving U.S. Dominance While Slowing the Weaponization of Space.” In addition to setting out several specific recommendations for achieving this objective, he warns that the United States is “probably entering an era when it should no longer count on its satellites remaining safe and secure,” and cautions against “blind optimism” regarding the availability of space assets in future conflicts (p. 129). Because this country “should assume that many types of military satellites may not be available in future wars” (p. 124), dependence on space capabilities should not be total; alternatives for carrying out crucial missions should be retained. He also points out that national security satellites no longer “function primarily as the great stabilizers and arms control facilitators of the Cold War”;

O’Hanlon calls for a “prudent hedging strategy” that makes sure the United States is not taken by surprise and technologically outdistanced by advances in military space, particularly those related to ASAT capabilities. The core principle of such a strategy is to “lead, but with restraint” (pp. 133–134).

Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary is a very sensible book, successfully charting a middle ground between the poles of the space weapons debate. Actually, the debate does not really exist today. Advocates and skeptics of the advantages for this country developing force-application capabilities for use in space are not yet talking to one another, and the “space weaponization” issue has not become a focus of overall national security discussions. This should change, and when it does, Michael O’Hanlon’s book will be a valuable starting point. JFQ

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