... modern warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air.

— Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
*U.S. Navy at War, 1941–1945*
88 Do We Need An Information Corps?  
by Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett

98 Guadalcanal:  
The Naval Campaign  
by H.P. Willmott

107 In Memoriam:  
Matthew Bunker Ridgway

OUT OF JOINT

108 By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know Us  
by Michael Vlahos

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

111 Letters to the Editor

THE JOINT WORLD

112 Doctrine, History, Education, and Documentation

118 A Quarterly Review of Joint Literature

OFF THE SHELF

119 Rethinking Asian Alliances:  
A Review Essay  
by Patrick M. Cronin

123 Chiefs from Across the  
Estuary: A Book Review  
by Walter R. Poole

125 Russia’s Military Past: A Book Review  
by Brian R. Sullivan

POSTSCRIPT

128 A Note to Readers and Contributors
A Word from the Chairman

The Chairman saluting the national colors at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Vietnam Women's Memorial in Washington, D.C., on July 29, 1993.
Before I wish JFQ’s readers fair winds and following seas, dry foxholes, and clear air, let me offer a few thoughts as a parting shot.

The past four years have been historic ones. So many changes have occurred that it is hard to chronicle them without losing a listener’s attention. We have lived through a time that historians will labor over for decades to come, trying to sort out the heroes from the villains, fact from fiction, and momentous from trivial or transient events.

One very real and very relevant change to those of us who serve in the Armed Forces is that we are getting smaller. For the foreseeable future, nothing is going to happen to reverse that trend.

What is important is that we have laid the groundwork to get smaller without losing the high quality that has become the hallmark of America’s military. This should be the continuing mission of all our men and women—officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and enlisted. No matter how small we get, we must keep our Armed Forces the best in the world.

We must provide them with the best leadership, equipment, support, and quality of life. We must also guard against their ever having to answer the call of an uncertain trumpet.

Men and women do not go in harm’s way as a businessman pursues a contract, a lawyer a case, or a professor a research project. The GI goes with his or her life on the line, every time. From that fundamental distinction comes the all-powerful reason to exercise the utmost restraint and good judgment in sending America’s best and brightest into the cauldron of combat.

We are fortunate to have national leaders who understand this basic fact of military power. We are also fortunate because our leaders understand that when they do have to send our men and women in harm’s way they send them to achieve a decisive victory. They should expect no less—and we should give them no less.

Maximum effort to accomplish the mission, to win decisively, demands joint action on the battlefield. If there is a legacy of which I am the proudest, it is that we have come together as a joint team in an unprecedented way over these last four years. I commend all of you for this remarkable achievement—and I challenge you to stay true to this magnificent military family we have built together.

Your new Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, is as dedicated to the team as any man I know. The family will prosper under his wise chairmanship. Give him your full support.

As I depart now, I wish all of you great success in the future. I am proud of every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coastguardsman in the force. You’re the best and you always will be.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

we have come together as a joint team in an unprecedented way over these last four years

---

General Colin L. Powell, USA, is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was previously Commander in Chief, Forces Command, and also served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
In This Issue

Charles Dickens once quipped that after writing *Pickwick Papers* it took six months before the muse stirred him enough to begin work on the next book, *Oliver*. Having received generous kudos for the first issue of *JFQ*, it was a challenge to muster the resources to publish another issue of equal impact. Nonetheless, I believe our editors have succeeded in assembling an issue with the scope, depth, and relevance that lives up to the standards set by the inaugural number of the journal.

In this issue you will find contributions on subjects of some moment. There is an article based on a recent congressional report on special operations that both assesses progress in that field and offers recommendations on enhancing its capabilities. Then in an article calling for joint doctrine to meet future challenges, the author contends that we must rethink the assumptions of traditional approaches to warfare and rewrite the military lexicon to accommodate the ideas that emerge. This is followed by a contribution drawn from the findings of a newly released survey of Gulf War airpower—commissioned by the Secretary of the Air Force—in which the effectiveness of coalition airpower is evaluated in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

*JFQ Forum* examines the conduct of U.N. peace-enforcement in Somalia over the past year in a series of four articles. For those interested in the background of the ongoing military activities in that country—or simply in the implications of such operations on what some see as the dawning of a new era of nontraditional roles for the Armed Forces—a group of distinguished practitioners and specialists offer insightful analyses on the mission to Somalia.

We are also pleased to publish the co-winning entry from the 1993 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition which makes a case for organizational reform that goes beyond the Goldwater-Nichols Act by creating both a national military advisory council and a general staff.

In our first issue we featured an article by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command; in this issue we look to the Pacific and present a contribution by the CINC responsible for tackling the realities of the post-Cold War in that vast region of the world. This is followed by a piece in which two authors, a defense analyst and a naval officer, argue that the military-technical revolution is so rife in its warfare applications that an independent information corps populated by high-tech specialists should be formed. A historian then examines the first U.S. offensive of World War II at Guadalcanal through a case study that reveals the campaign as a serendipitous joint operation. There is also a brief tribute in memory of General Matthew Ridgway who died this summer. In *Out of Joint*, an essay designed to provoke debate over the concepts underlying jointness, the commentator instructs us that being joint may well have real benefits in peacetime, but jointness alone will not prepare us for the next war.

We were pleased to receive the first of what we trust will be a continual flow of letters to the editor, some of which appear in this issue. In addition, you will find professional notes on a range of areas (including joint doctrine, education, history, and documentation), plus book reviews and a survey of joint literature, all of which are regular departments of the journal.

As the Chairman indicated in the inaugural issue, read *JFQ* for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights, and then contribute your own views. We look forward to hearing from you—through letters and contributions on subjects of importance to the Armed Forces that can add to our common understanding of joint warfighting.

STUART E. JOHNSON
Editor-in-Chief
The capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF) had declined severely for more than a decade before 1986 when legislation created both the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict—the ASD (SO/LIC)—and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and also directed the Secretary of Defense to devise a major force program (namely, MFP–11), especially for SOF. Progress was slow at first but soon gained momentum.

Where Are Special Operations Forces?

By JOHN M. COLLINS

Special Operations Forces (SOF) were fragmented and inadequately funded when Congress passed legislation in 1987 that put in place a senior-level Pentagon official, unified command, and defense program to both consolidate and advance the interests of the special operations community. While initial progress was slow, the pace soon quickened and recently SOF have scored a number of notable accomplishments. But there are shortcomings that hamper SOF from achieving their full potential. Command relationships, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue missions, theater staffs, career incentives, Special Mission Unit priorities, and research, development, and acquisition are all areas that require further attention. While institutional changes are essentially complete, military culture is evolving gradually when it comes to accepting SOF. Overall, however, the prospects for special operations are brighter today than they have been for decades.

Summary

This article is extracted and adapted from a report by John M. Collins entitled Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986–1993 issued by the Congressional Research Service on July 30, 1993 and is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.
Subsequent accomplishments have been impressive. Institutionally, the office of the ASD (SO/LIC) as well as SOCOM headquarters and its Army, Navy, and Air Force component commands, theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs), and Army Special Operations Support Commands have been activated and staffed. SOCOM has codified relationships with regionally-oriented unified commands and the services. It also has created a planning, programming, and budgeting system and a research, development, and acquisition system as well as intelligence architectures for special operations. A new series of doctrinal publications guides their employment in peacetime, crises, and war. Teamwork between SOF and conventional forces is much improved. Approximately 2,500 SOF personnel serve in roughly forty countries on a constant basis (see chart on page 11), and they have played an important part in all major contingencies since Operation Desert Storm.

Some residual problems nevertheless prevent SOF from contributing effectively to overall military capabilities. Statutory relationships between the ASD (SO/LIC) and SOCOM headquarters and the former’s responsibility for low-intensity conflict as well as special operations seem to merit review. So do SOF obligations with regard to both humanitarian assistance and theater search and rescue which tend to overload active Civil Affairs units and SOF helicopter crews, respectively. The sparsely staffed SOCs rely heavily on Reserve component augmentation which is not always sufficiently responsive or well qualified. Career progression by SOF officers is severely limited, because conventional officers occupy many SOF posts and promotion ladders within the special operations community stop at two stars, except for one Army billet. The high priorities assigned to Special Mission Units cause morale problems among other SOF. Also, research, development, and acquisition cycles for SOF-peculiar items are sluggish.

On balance, however, all concerned reach one conclusion: SOF today are far stronger than in 1986. Institutional changes are essentially complete, and despite the fact that military culture is changing more slowly with regard to special operations, most prognoses are optimistic.

The Essence of SOF

Congress designated the following activities in the order listed as the focus of SOF insofar as they relate to special operations: direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue (TSAR), and such other activities as specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), consider the first six activities listed above as primary responsibilities. Humanitarian assistance and TSAR occupy a separate category known as collateral special operations activities, together with such disparate duties as antiterrorism (the defensive counterpart of counterterrorism), counterdrug operations, and security assistance.

Unconventional warfare and counterterrorism are strictly special operations. SOF share the other seven specific responsibilities with conventional forces, but low-visibility, low-cost special operations techniques are distinctively different, and thereby expand the range of options open to national security decisionmakers.

SOF often are employable where high-profile conventional forces are politically, militarily, and/or economically inappropriate. Small, self-reliant, readily deployable units that capitalize on speed, surprise, audacity, and deception sometimes accomplish missions in ways that minimize risks of escalation and concurrently maximize returns compared with the orthodox applications of military power which normally emphasize mass. Aircraft, artillery, or combat engineers might demolish a critical bridge at a particular time, for example, but SOF could magnify the physical and psychological effects considerably if they blew that bridge while a
trainload of enemy dignitaries or ammunition was halfway across. Conventional land, sea, and air forces normally patrol specified sectors intermittently, whereas special reconnaissance troops may remain in hostile territory for weeks or months at a time collecting information that otherwise would be unobtainable. Severe misfortunes, however, may accompany failure. Large enemy conventional forces can easily overwhelm small SOF units they manage to corner during clandestine operations, and may be tempted to treat survivors harshly. Adverse political repercussions can be far-reaching.

Nontraditional responsibilities, such as humanitarian assistance, are traditional roles for Army Special Forces (SF) as well as PSYOP and CA units. Their readiness, in fact, improves while they perform foreign internal defense missions, whereas that of conventional forces normally declines, because such duties divert time and attention away from primary responsibilities. Area orientation and language skills attune SF (and some members of Sea-Air-Land Teams or SEALs) to cultural nuances that usually temper humanitarian assistance techniques. Self-reliance allows them to function effectively under austere conditions without the infrastructure that conventional forces often need.

**ASD (SO/LIC) Accomplishments**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has accomplished quite a lot with a relatively small staff since Congress confirmed the first occupant of that office in August 1988. A principal deputy is the second in charge, with a deputy assistant secretary for policy and missions and another for forces and resources. The strength of the office is currently 42 military and 35 civilian personnel including administrative support. The civilians are preponderant in supervisory positions, but several have accrued twenty or more years of experience in SOF while on active duty. The action officers with extensive military service (not necessarily in SOF) outnumber career civil servants by about five to one. Proven interdepartmental and interagency performers who know how to work within the system are among them.

Few ASD (SO/LIC) achievements have been publicized. Most occurred quietly and incrementally behind the scenes. Their cumulative influence on institutional relations, policies, and plans nevertheless is considerable. A few illustrations include:

- Strengthened and clarified organizational relationships between ASD (SO/LIC) and SOCOM by developing ten mutually agreeable principles to improve coordination and oversight and by resolving legal disagreements over defining elements of ASD (SO/LIC) oversight and supervision of SOCOM activities.
- Successfully represented continuing needs for the Sensitive Special Operations Program on matters dealing with operational and policy decisions during the DOD intelligence reorganization. The ASD (SO/LIC) relationship with the intelligence community has proven to be a key ingredient in negotiating sensitive intelligence support for the special operations community.
- Obtained the Secretary of Defense’s approval in March 1993 to designate PSYOP and CA as SOF which helped eliminate fragmentation of CA responsibilities among other OSD offices.
- Obtained Secretary of Defense approval in 1988 to designate ASD (SO/LIC) as the single point of contact for DOD antiterrorism matters, thereby linking efforts of the Joint Staff, unified and specified commands, defense agencies, and the interagency antiterrorism community.
- Developed and promulgated policy directives regarding the planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and acquisition authority granted to SOCOM.
- Developed extensive input for the bottom-up review, a zero-based examination of roles for the Armed Forces in the emerging security environment. The project, aimed at improving SOF effectiveness in accomplishing traditional and new missions, included policy proposals for strategic forward basing of SOF; afloat bases for SOF in regions where land-based presence is not feasible; research, development, and acquisition initiatives to improve SOF contributions to counterproliferation; a range of activities to improve national assistance capabilities; and recommendations concerning such missions as peacekeeping, peace-making, promoting democracy, and nonproliferation.
- Buttressed the national campaign to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by ensuring that current SOF capabilities are being integrated into key strategy documents and policy decisions and by sponsoring multi-year, multi-agency research studies that explore emerging and potential counterproliferation roles for SOF.

(continued on page 12)
Theater-Level Special Operations Commands

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) organizes, equips, trains, and provides Special Operations Forces (SOF) for commanders in chief (CINCs) of regionally-oriented unified commands (European, Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, and Central)—in addition to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Korea—which each of whom, in turn, delegates operational control of the forces to their theater-level Special Operations Commands (SOCs). The six SOCs are the focal point for in-theater SOF, form nuclei for Joint Special Operations Task Forces, and furnish expertise needed to effectively employ SOF independently or in concert with conventional forces.

The regionally-oriented unified commands and SOCs rely upon the same basic sources of doctrine and policy for special operations. Annex E to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan outlines missions, apportions assets to theater CINCs, and provides basic policy guidance. The 3–05 series of joint publications is being developed to dispense fundamental doctrine for special operations. Documents prepared by SOCOM and its component commands elaborate upon other issues while CINCs promulgate policies for their areas of responsibility (AORS). Small special operations staff sections help CINCs plan and supervise all in-theater SOF activities, serve as conduits to and from SOCs, sometimes manage sensitive compartmented black programs, and also assist as required. The regionally-oriented SOCs exhibit unique characteristics such as perceived threats, geographic circumstances, types of contingencies, the intensity of crises, and other factors.

Special Operations Command, Atlantic (SOCLANT)

U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) has an immense AOR mainly covered by water. Of the 39 islands that comprise the land in the area, Greenland is by far the largest with a population half the size of Peoria. The most densely settled islands are in the Caribbean and all—except for Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico—are small. Located in Norfolk, SOCLANT is the smallest of the SOCs designated as subordinate unified commands. No SOF units are permanently assigned and none is forward based, save for one Naval Special Warfare Unit. The LANTCOM staff has responsibility for counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), and black programs.

Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT)

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for an area made up of 18 countries in Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia, plus Afghanistan and Pakistan. CENTCOM headquarters, collocated with SOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base, is removed by no fewer than seven time zones from its AOR, and no SOF are permanently stationed in the region. SOCOM and its component commands provide assets from a pool containing Special Forces, Rangers, Naval Special Warfare Units, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and PSYOP and CA units. An amphibious Ready Group that includes a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), SEALS, and aviation assets is normally in the AOR. That mix is adequate according to SOCCENT, though both PSYOP and CA support depends heavily on the selected call-up of Reservists.

Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is a well-developed theater that enjoyed a top priority during the Cold War. Its AOR, stretching from Norway’s North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope, contains several trouble spots and potential flash points of which Bosnia-Hercegovina, Libya, Liberia, Israel, and South Africa are the most prominent. Refugees from the Balkans, right-wing nationalists in Germany, unrest in Russia and neighboring states, and transnational terrorism are among Europe’s security concerns. SOCEUR is located in Vaihingen, Germany. Forward-based SOF units controlled by SOCEUR include a Special Forces battalion in Germany, a Naval Special Warfare Unit in Scotland, and an Air Force Special Operations Group in England that consists of three squadrons of MC–130 Combat Talons, MH–53J Pave Low helicopters, and HC–130 Combat Shadows. Active and Reserve PSYOP units also provide support and a Reserve CA command periodically augments the CINC’s staff.

Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH)

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has an AOR which includes 20 countries across Central and South America, from the Mexican border with Guatemala and Belize to Cape Horn. Each nation of the region has distinctive characteristics, but the huge area is fairly homogeneous despite great geographic differences (flatlands and mountain chains, jungles, swamps, and arable plains). SOCSOUTH, with headquarters at Albrook Air Force Station, Panama, controls a Special Forces company and an Army special operations aviation detachment equipped with MH–60 Black Hawks as well as a Special Operations Support Command. U.S. Atlantic Fleet Detachment South has both a Naval Special Warfare Unit and a Special Boat Unit at Rodman, Panama, which support SOCSOUTH as directed by CINCSOUTH.

Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC)

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is a watery domain which is three times larger than that of LANTCOM. Its AOR embraces India and the In-
dian Ocean, northeast and southeast Asia, and the South Pacific and Oceania. Strict priorities based on the best possible requirement forecasts are consequently essential, because SOCOM cannot provide enough culturally-attuned, language-qualified SOF personnel for every corner of this extensive region. Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC), at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, is as distant from South and Southeast Asia as SOCCENT is from the Middle East. SOF assigned to this populous and complex area include a Special Forces battalion on Okinawa, a SEAL platoon collocated with a Naval Special Warfare Unit on Guam, and an Air Force Special Operations Group consisting of three squadrons of MC–130 Combat Talons and HC–130 Combat Shadows at Kadena Air Base, Japan, and MH–53J Pave Low helicopters at Osan, Korea. A Special Operations Support Command completes the in-theater assets. In addition, a CA brigade from the Army Reserve is earmarked to assist if required.

**Special Operations Command, Korea (SOC–K)**

Korea is the only theater in which American and allied SOF are institutionally integrated. Located in Seoul, SOC–K is a standing joint task force controlled by the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. It serves the Republic of Korea (ROK)/U.S. Combined Forces Command, is a component of the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, and works closely with the Korean Army Special Warfare Command. Since the Koreans furnish most in-theater SOF, the fact that SOC–K has control over only one Special Forces detachment is not significant. In the event of hostilities SOC–K combines with the ROK Special Warfare Command to form the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force.

**SOF Deployments: A Snapshot of a Typical Week**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of 30 Jan–6 Feb 1993</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM AOR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM AOR</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM AOR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM AOR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM AOR</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
<td><strong>2517</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Initiated and secured agreement from the National Defense University (NDU) and SOCOM on creating, funding, and filling a SOF faculty chair beginning in academic year 1993–94. Follow-on activities include establishing both a SOF archive in the NDU Library and a post-senior service college fellowship within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU.

SOCOM has made great strides since 1986. Procedures and force postures within that headquarters and all component commands are much improved.

**SOCOM Accomplishments**

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). SOCOM created a PPBS from scratch which interlocks with the system in the Pentagon, but SOCOM procedures, unlike those of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, are joint in every respect.

Inadequate intelligence was an initial impediment: input was quantitatively and qualitatively poor. Automated data processing and dedicated communications were nearly nonexistent and outmoded maps contained large blank sections or depicted conditions decades ago. Meteorological and oceanographic intelligence were insufficiently specific for detailed SOF planning.

Prognoses now seem bright in most respects, according to the SOCOM J–2. Interagency cooperation concerning human intelligence (HUMINT) is much better since Operation Just Cause (Panama 1989–90). SOCOM is collaborating with all the services in efforts to prototype and test new, lighter, smaller, interoperable intelligence systems needed for the type conflicts anticipated. The most important initiatives may reach fruition because SOF intelligence programs for FY93 through FY99 are reportedly well supported in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.

SOCOM planners, using scenarios and computer models, seek to answer four fundamental questions: how many SOF and supporting airlift/sealift platforms of what sort are needed to accomplish anticipated missions in specific theaters, subregions, countries, and other areas? What forces will be available to satisfy inferred requirements at particular times in the future? What risks result when projected SOF capabilities appear insufficient? What courses of action might reduce those risks, including actions to employ programmed assets more effectively?

The resultant objective force seems at first glance to be inconsistent with ongoing efforts to reduce force structures and the defense budget. Active SOF personnel strengths continue to climb. So do the inventories of costly weapon systems, most notably HC–130 Combat Shadows, MC–130 Combat Talons, MH–53 Pave Low helicopters, and Cyclone class coastal patrol ships. Conventional forces conversely have been declining since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two conditions explain that anomaly, according to SOCOM spokesmen: first, most conventional forces deployed primarily to deal with Soviet threats during the Cold War while most multipurpose SOF served diversified purposes and, second, SOF are still recovering from the period of neglect that led to the enactment of remedial legislation. Programs and budget requests reflect those realities.

**Force Posture Improvements.** Better weapons, equipment, personnel, and integrating structures are evident in SOCOM and among SOF in unified commands. Concentrated education and training help commanders make the most of available assets. Revitalization continues at modest cost compared with funding for conventional forces. FY94 budget requests for procurement, personnel, operations, maintenance, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction comprise little more than one penny out of every DOD dollar.
All Army and Navy SOF are volunteers. Most demonstrate superior performance during tours with conventional forces before they volunteer. Recruiting practices vary with each service (Navy SEALs, for example, take some volunteers straight from basic training, but Army SF do not), although standards are uniformly high. Strict professionalism thereafter prevails. CINCSOC and component commanders work hard to eradicate misperceptions that Rambo-style snake eaters and reckless, out-of-control individuals typify SOF personnel because discipline and maturity help make SOF unique.

Defense publications in the mid-1980s deplored special operations hardware deficiencies. DOD and Congress validated needs, but few funds were forthcoming. “We’ve got bands that are in a higher state of readiness than some of our special operations assets,” is the way one Pentagon official put it. Such deficiencies have largely been corrected.

Combat readiness is the number one priority. Highly-motivated professionals, well armed, equipped, and supplied, are essential, but proficient units are even more important than skilled individuals. Superior education and training at all levels are key requirements.

SOCOM operates its own school system. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg develops doctrine and conducts courses for all Army SOF and Foreign Area Officers (FAO). The Naval Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg also conducts courses for SOCOM. The Naval Special Warfare School at the Amphibious Base Coronado and the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field do likewise within their respective spheres. All instruct foreign students as well as personnel from other departments and agencies. Intensive, extensive, and diversified courses of instruction cover a wide range of subjects and scenarios. Members of small, self-contained teams concentrate on cross-training (demolition experts may not become fully proficient as radio operators or medics, but must be qualified to perform such duties in an emergency). SOCOM also cultivates linguistic and cross-cultural skills, which many SOF need to accomplish regional security missions in an ever more complex world. Conventional units do not match their competence.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force furnished all logistic support for SOF before Congress created SOCOM. They still provide common weapons, equipment, supplies, and services, while the Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA) has handled low-density, SOF-peculiar needs for the Army since 1988. The Joint Operational Stocks (JOS) Program is a centrally managed repository of some SOF-specific hardware. Its inventory features civilian products that have military applications and demand minimum familiarization before use. Off-the-shelf purchases reduce needs for research, development, test, or evaluation funds.

Residual Problems

The office of the ASD (SO/LIC) and SOCOM still face problems including the following:

**SOCOM Battle Staffs.** Each SOC currently relies extensively on Reserve component augmentation packets for major exercises and emergencies. All eagerly await the formation of SOCOM Battle Staffs.

Two battle rosters list primary and alternate active duty personnel who are assigned to SOCOM headquarters. Members of the first roster must be ready to deploy within 24 hours after notification. They possess operations, intelligence, communications, logistics, and other skills that theater SOCs are known to need most. The maximum number ready to surge is 29. Alternate and selected personnel from SOCOM’s component commands constitute the second roster, whose members could fill additional requests for not more than 29 commissioned and noncommissioned officers. They prepare to follow within one week. Anticipated capabilities, however, will not be available until SOCOM acquires sufficient weapons and makes them immediately available for use by personnel on the two battle rosters.
Career Opportunities. Promotion and advancement vary for SOF personnel from better than average to poor, depending on present rank, service idiosyncrasies, and specialties. Rear admirals, Air Force major generals, Air Force helicopter pilots, and Army SF officers encounter “glass promotion ceilings.” SEALS and Reserve component CA and PSYOP officers, who are few in number and in constant demand, find little time to attend military schools and colleges. SOF in several categories find assignment potential quite limited. Title 10, U.S. Code, tells CINCSOC to monitor such matters, which are parent service responsibilities, but he has little ability to reverse adverse trends.

SOF-qualified flag officers from a multi-service pool of candidates should ideally compete for every senior command and staff position within SOCOM headquarters, component commands, and theater SOCs. A relatively small reservoir now exists, however, partly because SOF generals and admirals find it difficult to progress within the special operations community after they pin on the first star, partly because non-SOF officers fill many key slots.

Language Training. Many members of the Armed Forces are fluent in common foreign languages such as French, German, and Spanish. Sufficient numbers are also well qualified SOF. Those who are conversant in local dialects like Creole, which is common in Haiti, range from few to none. Such problems are hard to correct. The relevance of programs conducted by the Defense Language Center at Monterey and the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, for example, depend heavily on requirements that cannot always be predicted by the intelligence community. Egyptian and Syrian emerged as the most important Arabic dialects after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. As a result only 16 of the Arabic linguists on active duty (less than one percent) had studied Iraqi before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. No one predicted large-scale SOF employment in Kurdistan or Somalia, where Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope took place. Maintaining language skills is just as essential as initial learning, but for most linguists peak proficiency occurs the day they receive their diploma. Unrelated military duties thereafter inhibit further progress.

Civil Affairs. CINCSOC, SOCOM component commanders, regionally-oriented CINCs, theater SOCs, and their respective staffs believe that an undesirable balance exists between active and Reserve component CA forces, which receive important missions in almost every contingency plan and are in daily demand. Some 97 percent are Army Reserve. The one active battalion is chronically under its authorized personnel strength level of 212 but bears most of the operational load. Theater CINCs repeatedly request Reserves because the 96th CA Battalion cannot be everywhere at once and the Reserve component contains many CA skills that it cannot replicate. It is impractical to call entire Reserve units when requestors need only a fraction of their capabilities. Volunteers, who are not universally well qualified, consequently fill most gaps. Recurrent active duty periods of long duration, however, cause domestic difficulties and jeopardize civilian jobs.

Hardware. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact no longer threaten the United States or its allies, but the SOF community must continually improve (in some cases replace) present hardware if it is to retain a sharp edge against lesser, unpredictable opponents who are increasingly able to wage high-tech wars. Critics, however, claim that SOCOM has embraced research, development, and acquisition (RDA) procedures much like the services. Guidelines specifically designed to fill small inventories expeditiously are insufficient. Links between RDA specialists and SOF users in the field allegedly are loose. Few program managers reportedly possess adequate RDA experience; the reverse seems equally true. The relationships among the staff elements of SOCOM responsible for requirements, resources, and program execution may also need tightening. Programs overlook some important requirements and program cycles are overly long (10–15 years for some aircraft).

Peacetime and Wartime Performance

SOF have performed admirably during recent years, despite residual problems like those just discussed. Peacetime engagement is
a prescription for applying political, military, economic, and other instruments of national power to promote regional stability, diminish threats, facilitate combat operations if deterrence fails, foster post-crisis recovery, and otherwise enhance U.S. security. Peacetime engagement concepts employ military forces, but not military force. SOF are especially well suited, because they deter aggression primarily through good deeds, whereas conventional forces promise military retaliation. Low-key SOF maximize U.S. influence in selected countries through military-to-military contacts, information programs, and civic actions; minimize prospects of unpleasant surprise by conducting special reconnaissance missions; and garner good will in the aftermath of natural catastrophes and conflicts by taking care of afflicted peoples. The following are some recent employments:

▼ a Special Mission Unit provided counterterrorism training, equipment, and weapons to security forces in the Republic of Georgia
▼ SOF succored thousands of Kurdish refugees along the Iraqi-Turkish border where all but 3 of 250 children declared hopeless by local doctors were saved by SOF medics
▼ CA specialists entered Kuwait City on liberation day with local counterparts and directed deliveries of food, water, and medical supplies, then restored health and other public services
▼ SOF medical personnel inoculated 60,000 people in Cameroon over a 10-day period during a meningitis epidemic at a minuscule cost by using donated American vaccines
▼ SOF in East Africa teach game wardens how to stop poaching to enhance the political, economic, and social stability of local people who depend upon tourism for hard currency
▼ Russian speaking SOF facilitated safe passage for U.S. military cargo aircraft flying through restricted air corridors during Operation Provide Hope to deliver food and medicine within the Commonwealth of Independent States
▼ SOF assisted relief efforts in Bangladesh after Cyclone Marian, and performed similar duty in Dade County, Florida, following Hurricane Andrew.

SOF combat operations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989–90), and Kuwait/Iraq (1990–91) displayed other capabilities; forces committed to Desert Storm performed all ten statutory missions with positive results.

SOF often are employable where high-profile conventional forces are politically, militarily, and/or economically inappropriate
As a consequence SOF are in demand in peace as well as war, and the potential for overcommitment is constant. Since the root cause is too few forces for too many tasks, senior officials would be well advised to exercise restraint in employing SOF.

**Future Effectiveness**

SOF could contribute even more effectively to U.S. military capabilities if decision-makers along the chain of command corrected shortcomings within their respective spheres of influence. The suggested actions listed below address serious deficiencies.

*The President* might:
- ▼ establish a board on the National Security Council to guide, integrate, and otherwise focus all SO/LIC efforts within the U.S. Government.

*Congress* might:
- ▼ establish special operations panels or subcommittees on the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees to facilitate oversight
- ▼ authorize a three-star deputy CINCSOC and also allocate one star to each theater SOC; a larger pool of well qualified candidates thereafter could compete for senior command and staff assignments within SOCOM
- ▼ authorize additional active duty CA units
- ▼ relax some existing research, development, and acquisition regulations to make SOF-peculiar systems more responsive.

The Secretary of Defense might:
- ▼ nominate a special operations practitioner as the ASD (SO/LIC) and a SOF-qualified individual as principal deputy
- ▼ direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to furnish SOCOM with seasoned SOF.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, might:
- ▼ act as a proponent for SOF
- ▼ direct service schools and colleges to strengthen curricula so that future commanders and their staffs more accurately appreciate the capabilities and limitations of SOF.

*Theater commanders in chief*, who employ most SOF that SOCOM organizes, equips, trains, and provides, might:
- ▼ use shorthanded SOF less liberally if they interpreted requirements as Title 10 intended; humanitarian and search and rescue missions then would call for SOF only *insofar as they relate to special operations.*

**Prognosis**

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., when he was Secretary of the Army and soon to serve simultaneously as acting ASD (SO/LIC), opined that “failure in the past to link special operations with national strategy through the Defense Guidance—and thereby to develop doctrine—has prevented special operations . . . from gaining permanence and acceptability within the ranks of the military.” That deficiency has been corrected. Institutional changes are essentially complete, but military culture is changing more slowly. Mutual distrust and misunderstandings still separate conventional forces from SOF. Not many of the former fully understand SOF capabilities and limitations. Too few special operations specialists have enough Pentagon experience to make the system work for them instead of against them. SOF constituencies on Capitol Hill, in the services, and across the industrial sector remain scant and tenuous. Appropriate acceptance of SOF consequently will come only after all parties concerned complete a learning process and put doctrine into practice.
Successfully developing effective military capabilities is not unlike solving Rubik’s Cube. If individual service assets and strengths are represented by the squares of a cube, then solving the puzzle involves long periods of adjusting military capabilities to reach the optimum configuration. In the wake of the Gulf War many believe that the Armed Forces resemble a completed puzzle, one that took decades to solve but that now fits together as tightly as the classic paradigm of a cube. What actually occurred was that the puzzle was overtaken by technological breakthroughs and the rush of world events. The result is the advent of the kind of turmoil that disrupts the established order and presents the military professional with yet another puzzle to solve.

The Gulf War not only marked a watershed in modern joint and combined operations, but also ushered in another, new type of warfare that is influenced by the course of emerging technology and the pace of world events. Like changes that have followed the development of new weapons throughout military history, doctrine and strategy are undergoing a revolution in the wake of the greatly enhanced stealth, precision, and lethality of fielded systems. As a result, commanders can anticipate that operations will almost always be joint, that distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels will blur, that new centers of gravity will emerge, and that the combat area will be more complex and difficult to delineate. These changes require redefining campaigns and campaign phasing, interdiction, maneuver, close air support, and other time-honored terms.

Summary

The Gulf War not only marked a watershed in modern joint and combined operations, but also ushered in another, new type of warfare that is influenced by the course of emerging technology and the pace of world events. Like changes that have followed the development of new weapons throughout military history, doctrine and strategy are undergoing a revolution in the wake of the greatly enhanced stealth, precision, and lethality of fielded systems. As a result, commanders can anticipate that operations will almost always be joint, that distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels will blur, that new centers of gravity will emerge, and that the combat area will be more complex and difficult to delineate. These changes require redefining campaigns and campaign phasing, interdiction, maneuver, close air support, and other time-honored terms.
There have been other occasions in military history when one puzzle was supplanted by another, particularly as the result of technological developments. The introduction of the machine gun, tank, airplane, submarine, atomic bomb, and ICBM all caused the Armed Forces to readjust their doctrine to meet fresh challenges. More recent innovations brought about stealth, precision, lethality, and surveillance systems that portend other revolutionary changes in military capabilities.

The United States decided to actively pursue particular technologies over the last twenty-five years to provide the Armed Forces with distinct military advantages. Even though the services worked to bring about this dramatic shift in the puzzle, many appear surprised by the outcome. This situation highlights the need to develop new doctrines and strategies that fully recognize and support the spectacular changes that have occurred. The services must dedicate themselves to solving the puzzle. We must also determine if the puzzle is still a cube or whether it has taken on another form better suited to the new environment. What are the changes in the paradigm?

**Future Operations Will Be Joint**

Military history is replete with accounts of campaigns and battles involving participation by only one service. In the new paradigm it is difficult to envision any point on the conflict spectrum where a single service would be committed alone. In the new joint warfare it is very likely that

- naval armadas will do battle on the high seas together with long-range bombers armed with Harpoon missiles
- operations against enemy land forces will involve sea-launched or air-launched, stand-off specialized anti-armor munitions as well as more conventional artillery
- air battles will involve theater ballistic missile defense systems launched by land forces or from off the decks of specialized naval vessels as well as the commitment of aircraft
- even relatively small, covert special operations will involve space-based communications

and be supported by sea or air insertion and recovery of mission personnel.

The first postulate of the new warfare is that the services fight and operate jointly. Even lesser contingencies in the future will almost always involve materiel, C4I, or transport from more than one service. Military professionals must learn to appreciate emerging service capabilities and organize, train, and equip to optimize the employment of decisive joint force.

**Strategy and Tactics**

Distinctions between the strategic and the tactical levels of war are no longer clear. Nowhere is this lack of clarity more pronounced than in designating weapon systems. Long-range bombers destroy ground forces along the forward line of troops as short-range fighters attack and destroy oil refineries. Army helicopters hit strategic air defense control centers as Navy cruise missiles designed for fighting nuclear wars disable electrical grids with specialized payloads. Those who remain prone to “old think” fail to recognize how technology now enables all combat systems and elements to become strategic or tactical depending on their intended objective.

The distinction between strategic and tactical targets is also undergoing change. Influenced by waning doctrine associated with the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and Cold War, military planners have lost track of the fact that the distinction relates to a target’s impact on the CINC’s objective rather than to the nature of the target itself. Thus communication nets, fielded forces, oil refineries, and vehicles have a strategic or tactical implication depending on the desired outcome.

**New Centers of Gravity**

The principle of attacking key centers of gravity (COGs) to quickly achieve an objective is as old as war itself and is taught at each level of Professional Military Education. Unfortunately, traditional COGs may have little impact on the outcome of future conflicts. Global economic and informational interdependencies, for example, suggest new centers of gravity that strategists must consider. These COGs require the military to develop and exploit new ways to attack key points. Destroying or interdicting an en-
emy’s economic infrastructure by computer intrusion may be just as valid as an approach to warfare by the year 2000 as strategic bombing is today.

**Redefining the Combat Edge**

Technology remains the major driving force behind the changing limits of the combat area. When soldiers lined up abreast and maneuvered with spears and shields in sweeping formations to flank an opponent, commanders needed only to primarily consider the breadth of battle. With the advent of artillery, the depth of the battle area (even on the seas) became an important consideration in the development of doctrine, strategy, and tactics. Fewer than twenty years after the first flight of the Wright brothers, the battle area had a significant, expanded vertical dimension. Most professionals recognize current technology is once again dramatically expanding the range of these boundaries. The breadth, depth, and height of the battle area now encompasses the entire globe and extends well into space. The requirement for global situational awareness is more critical than ever before.

The new paradigm points to revolutionary change in the way we think about the battle area. Time—the fourth dimension—may become the paramount factor in modern combat. Prior to the new warfare military leaders measured time (in combat terms) by weeks, months, or even years of operations. The luxury of having the time to think, plan, and react stemmed from the limitations on physical movement of combat forces. It took time for soldiers to march, vessels to transit, and aircraft to deploy, as well as for commanders to gather and assess intelligence.

Ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, hovercraft, and turbocharged light vehicles are characteristic of the new environment. Among the questions that must be asked are:

- **Will future naval commanders responsible for destroyers with cruise missiles capable of striking ground targets a thousand miles away understand the new battle area? Will the missiles recognize Forward Support Control Lines (FSCLs) drawn on a chart or the significant maneuver by friendly forces that has occurred since launch? If not, how can combat power at the disposal of commanders be effectively advocated and integrated into useful operations?**

- **Will Army company commanders in charge of new fire systems with ranges of 200 km fully understand the integration of weapon systems into strategic targeting plans? If not, how can commanders begin to think about improving doctrine, strategy, and tactics?**

The need to identify, target, and attack in near real-time is now a fact of life. Modern warfare demands grasping massive theater-scale operations on a minute-by-minute basis. The possibility of a potential adversary launching ballistic missiles compresses the decision cycle even further and dramatically emphasizes the point.

Aside from the characteristics of new weapon systems, two additional factors influence the criticality of time in the new paradigm. The growing sensitivity of the American public to combat losses suggests that civilian leaders will tend to measure future acceptable levels of U.S. casualties in dozens rather than thousands of lives. The Gulf War set a standard in this regard that could be difficult to meet in future conflicts unless certain technological advantages are pursued. In order to minimize casualties, the Armed Forces must deliver the full range of combat power quickly and decisively. Moreover, prolonged conflicts make it far more difficult to maintain political-military coalitions which are becoming increasingly important and complex in the new environment.

**The New Battle Area**

The ability to conduct simultaneous operations across the depth, breadth, and height of the combat area compels military professionals to change their perspective. The traditional reliance on finely drawn lines on charts must be challenged in order to fully realize the potential of emerging combat systems. The need to identify, target, and attack in near real-time is now a fact of life. Modern warfare demands grasping massive theater-scale operations on a minute-by-minute basis. The possibility of a potential adversary launching ballistic missiles compresses the decision cycle even further and dramatically emphasizes the point.

Aside from the characteristics of new weapon systems, two additional factors influence the criticality of time in the new paradigm. The growing sensitivity of the American public to combat losses suggests that civilian leaders will tend to measure future acceptable levels of U.S. casualties in dozens rather than thousands of lives. The Gulf War set a standard in this regard that could be difficult to meet in future conflicts unless certain technological advantages are pursued. In order to minimize casualties, the Armed Forces must deliver the full range of combat power quickly and decisively. Moreover, prolonged conflicts make it far more difficult to maintain political-military coalitions which are becoming increasingly important and complex in the new environment.

**The New Battle Area**

The ability to conduct simultaneous operations across the depth, breadth, and height of the combat area compels military professionals to change their perspective. The traditional reliance on finely drawn lines on charts must be challenged in order to fully realize the potential of emerging combat systems. Among the questions that must be asked are:

- **Will future naval commanders responsible for destroyers with cruise missiles capable of striking ground targets a thousand miles away understand the new battle area? Will the missiles recognize Forward Support Control Lines (FSCLs) drawn on a chart or the significant maneuver by friendly forces that has occurred since launch? If not, how can combat power at the disposal of commanders be effectively advocated and integrated into useful operations?**

- **Will Army company commanders in charge of new fire systems with ranges of 200 km fully understand the integration of weapon systems into strategic targeting plans? If not, how can commanders begin to think about improving doctrine, strategy, and tactics?**
New capabilities may not be able to operate within the confines of old doctrinal patterns if there is a true desire to optimize utility and exploit synergy. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) will need new ways in the future to delineate the battlefield and more effectively integrate and control service capabilities. Creative doctrines and strategies must emerge, and the vision of commanders must begin to be expanded at all levels.

Old Definitions/New Paradigm

Part of the inability of the services to fully participate in creative discussions about the new joint warfare is the inability to break with definitions belonging to the old model. Hidebound ideas that link certain terminology, weaponry, and/or services inhibit desperately needed innovation.

Campaigns and campaign phasing. Historically the term campaign meant a series of military operations directed by a commander in chief to achieve specific objectives. The campaign is composed of phases that match particular elements of combat power against sub-objectives. Each phase establishes the requisite environment or conditions for the next operation. Developing campaign plans designed to “peel the onion” layer by layer to get to the center of gravity is old thinking. That syndrome often crops up in doctrinal debates and is rooted in the mistaken notion that war continues to resemble giant Napoleonic battles of yore. It envisions masses of Americans fighting masses of enemy troops in bloody combat, battling their way to the enemy’s capital in order to eventually convince their leaders that further resistance is futile.

The new paradigm suggests that simultaneity or what some theorists call simultaneous or parallel warfare (as opposed to serial warfare) is key to future operations. Old-style serial warfare is illustrated by the way air forces struck targets during World War II when commanders massed hundreds of bombers and dropped thousands of bombs against a single important target. The next day they did the same thing against a second target; and on the third day yet another target was hit. It did not take long before the enemy realized that on the following day a fourth target would be struck. By the tenth day the first target was repaired and operational again. Serial warfare on land, at sea, and in the air was necessary to achieve the mass needed to destroy a particular target. The Gulf War demonstrated it is now possible to simultaneously strike hundreds of key targets through the careful integration of land, sea, and air capabilities. The result is the strategic, operational, and tactical paralysis of an enemy in a brief period of time: that ability to bring down the hammer in one gigantic crushing blow is the new joint warfare. In this respect using the term campaign to denote carefully sequenced activities
over a prolonged period of time may no longer be valid. The advent of parallel warfare dramatically reduces the time required to achieve objectives. The net result is that future JFCs can pursue multiple objectives simultaneously. For all practical purposes transitions between campaign phases may occur so quickly that one might consider each campaign as consisting of only a single phase. If so, are there still traditional campaigns or should a new term be coined and added to the military lexicon?

*Interdiction.* Impeding, hindering, or isolating by firepower (typically using short-range aviation or submarines) is the traditional form of interdiction. This old definition, however, is no longer sufficient for the new joint warfare and changing battle environment. Service capabilities now provide for interdiction by computer, electronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse, psychological operations, and a host of other emerging means of denial.

Furthermore, planners have historically viewed interdiction as a function that supports the CINC. But consider the emerging paradigm: could not technology provide interdiction capabilities so complete and effective (read *operationally paralyzing*) that an opponent recognizes the futility of continuing? That was hardly the case in World War II, Korea, or even Vietnam. The high volume of munitions required to strike individual targets—due to weapon inaccuracy—could not support effective, wide-scale interdiction.\(^2\) If it is now becoming possible to achieve operational paralysis quickly, then interdiction could conceivably become the JFC’s primary strategy.

There is also a danger in believing that interdiction is more effective if segmented or divided into geographic regions or areas of responsibility.\(^3\) Interdiction must occur quickly and decisively across the depth, breadth, and height of the modern battle area to fully exploit its synergistic effect. This means controlling interdiction at command levels responsible for theater-wide activities. Allowing control of interdiction activities to reside at a lower echelon of command—or excluding certain capabilities because of service-unique positions—will likely result in missed opportunities and the misuse of integrated land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces.

*Maneuver.* A principle of war generally associated with mass movement, maneuver may become less important in the new battle area. First, being able to see the entire battle area (using JSTARS, AWACS, and emerging space systems) provides JFCs with opportunities to optimize movement. Commanders will move smaller and smaller elements of very lethal systems to counter
larger, less capable enemy forces. This will avoid wasted movement of excess force and thereby negate the need for increasingly complex logistical support. The intricate challenge of keeping fuel flowing to speeding heavy vehicles for the ground assault during Operation Desert Storm, for example, portends the problems traditional weapon systems have in the new battle area.

Second, events in the modern battle area could happen so quickly there will be scant time to react, let alone to plan and execute mass maneuver. The battle area of the future will be the domain of lighter, faster, more lethal land, sea, and air vehicles. The expanded nature of the combat area almost precludes moving traditional systems far enough and quickly enough to keep pace with the tempo of widely-dispersed geographic operations. A major challenge to future JFCs is the ability to provide real-time command and control for small, combined elements of extremely lethal forces moving throughout the battle area at breakneck speed. The famous left hook during Desert Storm (involving almost 50,000 vehicles) may have been the last major large-scale maneuver of its kind.

Finally, developing long-range ground and naval fires and exploiting air-launched stand-off weapons could diminish the need to maneuver for close-in engagements as enemy ground, naval, and air forces are destroyed at greater and greater distances. Assuming strong defensive positions—as more advanced semi-autonomous weapons systems begin to dot the battle area—could be the most advantageous tactic of the future.

Maneuver in the new joint warfare focuses on maneuvering technological strengths against an adversary’s weaknesses to minimize casualties and shorten the conflict. The speed, precision, and increased lethality of emerging weapons will allow commanders the opportunity to concentrate on maneuvering smaller and smaller forces: single ships instead of armadas, companies in place of battalions, and one stealth air vehicle instead of dozens of traditional aircraft.

Fire Support Control Lines (FSCLs). As mentioned previously, the notion of two-dimensional lines on charts as absolute delimiters of responsibility has to be revised. Traditional means of command and control cannot keep abreast with the rapid pace of operations in the new joint warfare. As attention focuses on the development and employment of smaller, lighter, faster, but more lethal weapon systems, JFCs must conceive new methods of deconflicting ground, naval, and air forces. Since the only common point of reference available to all types of forces is time (provided by synchronized space satellites), the new boundaries, perhaps drawn in time, will serve as the dividing lines of the future. Centralized command and control of targeting under the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is only the first step in a process that must exploit new technologies. Eventually communication and computer systems should automatically deconflict combined fires and optimize target-attack sequences by sending signals across the battle area that inhibit or enable weapon systems based upon real-time feedback.

Close Air Support. Another term of art that requires revision as technology changes the battle area is Close Air Support (CAS) which traditionally meant aircraft attacking enemy ground forces in close proximity to friendly troops. The support involved both preplanned and immediate requirements, yet recently the focus tends to be almost exclusively on the immediate. An aircraft has even been designed exclusively to perform this mission. With the development of improved guidance and fire control systems, support to forces engaged close-in can be accomplished just as easily with new forms of artillery, both air- and surface-launched stand-off weapons that disperse cluster and anti-armor munitions, and emerging non-lethal technologies.

Once again each of the services can contribute to these requirements in the new battle area. The true key to success in future joint warfare is to provide forces with sufficient indigenous lethality so that immediate CAS is rarely needed. The generic term used for such support should be simply close support which more accurately reflects the changing nature of weapon systems that
conceivably could deliver munitions or other payloads from land, sea, or air.

These are just a few of the terms and definitions that must be recast in light of the new joint warfare. They also reveal some of the basic elements of this warfare.

**Fundamentals of the New Warfare**

The first basic element of the new warfare is the axiom that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. While technology can provide unprecedented military capabilities, no single weapon or force reaches its full potential unless employed with complementary capabilities. The military professional should recognize the increasing *synergism* of modern forces. In particular, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) must be cognizant of individual service capabilities and enabling characteristics needed to carefully orchestrate quick, decisive actions. The ability to *orchestrate* force capabilities to achieve desired results is the key to success. It does not matter if a symphony conductor once played the flute; the only allegiance is to the strength and power of the synergism.

*Complementary operations* are necessary for any future success. JFCs must form the team so that the appropriate players are in the line-up and ensure the game plan suits the operation. In the new paradigm, it is important that JFCs select the *key force* required to spearhead efforts. That force is the military capability with the greatest potential impact on events. This concept goes well beyond designating a particular service as the key force. In the new warfare special forces or psychological operations may have as much impact on the outcome as traditional combat elements. The key force requires full and unequivocal support from all force elements. The force designated by JFCs may vary in each new scenario.

Another element of new doctrinal development is *organizing to win*. Relationships that exist only in crises have proven to be less and less effective over time. Command relationships of the past cannot be relied on to continue to work in the future. It is necessary to pioneer new command structures for peacetime as well as periods of crisis.

Conflict has achieved truly *global proportions*. It is difficult to envision any scenario affecting only the United States. Because of American troop withdrawals from around the world, conflicts will be fought at greater distances than in the past. This fact requires close cooperation with allied and friendly nations for the use of sovereign airspace, transit of waterways, and benefit of temporary basing facilities. Practically all military scenarios envision political support of allies and other international partners. Greater participation by coalitions in conflicts and operations can be expected. This puts greater emphasis on the expanding role of combined training and exercises. Not only must joint doctrine be capable of accommodating new technology and exploiting service capabilities, but it must be intelligible to both allies and coalition partners. Absent from the current debate are serious questions about improving combined operations. How would Thai forces use U.S. space assets during coalition action? How would U.S. forces exploit future Japanese assets? These are important issues for the new joint warfare.

*Post-conflict operations* in the new joint warfare environment are almost as important as combat itself. Protecting refugees, fostering fledgling regimes, providing humanitarian assistance, and enforcing peace accords are all necessary to ensure stability in today’s world.

**The Challenge for Commanders**

Effective command and control of the most capable military force in history is a daunting task. Not only must JFCs completely understand the synergetic effect of an increasing range of service capabilities, but designated commanders must be enabling forces themselves. JFCs must have authority to direct all available assets at their disposal and the ability to create cohesive teams. Any attempt to undermine or dilute the principle of unity of command by claiming service-unique doctrinal exemptions is counterproductive to the new joint warfare.

Future battle within the new paradigm is more than a team effort. Most team members tend to come together and put aside their individual differences only for the big game, then they part company and revive personal animosities. Resulting friction on the sidelines eventually manifests itself on
the field, thereby denigrating the entire team’s effectiveness. The challenge is to develop a force that respects the strengths of all its components and appreciates the judgment of its JFC.

The delegation of authority is one of the cornerstones of modern warfare. While it may seem at odds with the principle of unity of command, it really is an indication of the level of trust and confidence that JFCs place in the ability of their subordinate commanders to accomplish objectives.

The selection of the key force for a particular operation gets increasingly difficult, but it is nonetheless important. Decisions regarding the key force will affect many factors in the new environment. It determines reaction time, how much and what type of force to unleash, the degree of lethality to apply, how fast an adversary can be defeated, the kind of targets to attack, and the level of casualties that can be sustained. More importantly, when JFCs select the principal combat capability they determine which force will receive the priority allocation of resources.

The command relationships evolving from designation of the key force have come to be known as the supported and the supporting forces. The new joint warfare recognizes that these designations are not indicators of popularity. No negative connotations attach to being designated a supporting force in given operations. The supported commander must be generally able to direct the key force enabled by the complementary capabilities of other components. Such command relationships vary from one scenario to another, and even within particular operations.

Targeting in the new paradigm also deserves a fresh look. Traditional methods of selecting and attacking targets may not be effective in the emerging technological environment. The requirement to identify, target, and destroy mobile missile launchers in Operation Desert Storm suggests the kind of challenge that JFCs will face in the future. Moreover, the significance of a given target vis-à-vis the objective must be better understood. For example, destroying an industrial target as part of an effort to achieve strategic paralysis may severely affect the ability of an enemy to recover economically in the post-war period (which could have significant political implications).

Expanded intelligence gathering and analysis are critical to an economy of effort. Disabling attacks on targets, identified through careful nodal analysis, can enhance operations by strategically and operationally paralyzing an enemy. With fewer resources JFCs must be able to strike hard and fast at the correct targets, with little waste of effort. Advance analyses of key political, economic, military, and infrastructure targets are critical to reacting quickly and decisively. Furthermore, the rapid pace of modern joint operations requires the targeting cycle to have near real-time capability, with the added requirement that target data be disseminated in a form common to all forces.

Success in the new joint warfare requires each team member to recognize significant shifts in technology, appreciate the synergism of capabilities, and develop innovative doctrine and strategy to take advantage of these conditions. Undoubtedly there will be challenges that confront JFCs in the new joint warfare. But force integration is not an issue to take up on the eve of battle. It must be realized prior to a crisis by developing and adopting common joint doctrine, and also by appreciating the effort involved in once again solving the puzzle of Rubick’s Cube. JFQ

NOTES


2 In World War II it took 9,070 bombs dropped by an armada of B–17s to ensure a 90 percent probability of kill (PK) against a single 60-foot by 100-foot building. By the time of the Vietnam conflict, 176 bombs were required. Today it takes only one precision guided bomb to achieve the same PK. (Data courtesy of the Strategic Planning Division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.)

Despite the profound impact of airpower on the course and outcome of the Gulf War, its employment has not escaped controversy. The coalition quickly cleared the skies of Iraqi aircraft, neutralized Iraqi medium and high altitude air defenses, brought Iraq’s entire command structure and military under attack, and systematically struck at the Iraqi field army in the Kuwait theater of operations. As a result, the campaign culminated in a brief, overwhelming ground offensive over a demoralized and shattered Iraqi army. Still, there were doubts concerning airpower’s contributions and effectiveness. Controversy arose during the war over the accuracy of official claims regarding the numbers of Iraqi tanks and mobile Scuds destroyed by air attack. After the war there were attempts by airpower enthusiasts to view the bombing as the harbinger of a new era of precision attacks from the air while skeptics argued that bombing had been far less accurate than claimed, overzealous in its pursuit of fleeing Iraqi troops, or wanton in its unnecessary destruction of Iraq’s civil infrastructure. These various claims drew on evidence that came in many forms: the accounts by participants (including pilot reports) and by visitors to Iraq both during and after the war, prisoner of war...
interrogations, and still photography and videotape of targets either destroyed or under attack. Discounting claims by those who simply marshalled evidence in support of their own agendas, there still appeared to be credible evidence that documented diverse interpretations of what bombing had or had not accomplished. What appeared to be a short, clear-cut victory with airpower playing a leading if not dominant role became another battleground for competing sets of data and contrasting interpretations of events. This later battleground centered on the difficult problem of damage assessment, particularly the proper measures of the damage.

Shortly after the conflict in the Gulf, then Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice initiated a comprehensive survey of airpower employment in an attempt to sort out varying interpretations of its role and effectiveness during the war. Part of this survey—in which the author participated—addressed the effectiveness of coalition bombing.1 Judgments made in the course of that survey and experience gained in analyzing divergent data and differing interpretations of the air campaign form the basis of this article. In brief, research for the survey involved three steps: understanding what happened as the result of bomb or missile attacks, determining the proper measurement of the result, and then relating cause and effect—how actions or results achieved objectives of air attacks. It may be useful to begin with some concrete examples of the complexity of such assessments.

First, consider the evidence available in a photograph of a destroyed tank or aircraft. If the tank’s turret has been blown off the hull or the aircraft reduced to rubble, then the assessment of results is easy: the equipment is unusable. Next, consider the evidence of a photo of a command bunker or aircraft shelter with a hole in the roof of the kind commonly made by a precision-guided bomb with a hard-target-penetrating warhead. Although the bomb obviously hit the target, did it penetrate into and detonate in the interior? And if so, was the structure occupied at the time? The problematic answers to these questions make assessing what happened far more difficult than in the initial case. Finally, consider a situation where there is no photo, only a pilot report claiming that an Iraqi tank or hardened aircraft shelter was hit with a precision-guided bomb. Uncertainty surrounding such results is even greater than in the second case. While somewhat idealized all these cases suggest experiences during and after the Gulf War that confronted analysts attempting to answer the most basic of questions: what happened? In many instances more authoritative data which corrected earlier impressions became available only after the war.

Taking the next step, determining what to measure, requires a knowledge of the objectives sought by the attacks. Not only do numbers or pictures fail to speak for themselves, they might not be the correct numbers or pictures. Consider, for example, a comparison of Iraqi and coalition aircraft shot down as a measure of the effectiveness of the air forces involved, a common indicator used in past wars to determine the performance of opposing air forces. The scorecard would read 33 Iraqi aircraft to 38 coalition, which in isolation suggests a slight advantage in Iraq’s favor. On the other hand the coalition scored 33-to-1 in air-to-air combat, and fixed-wing aircraft

Thomas A. Keaney teaches in the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College. A former B-52 squadron commander, he is the co-author of two reports published as part of the Gulf War Air Power Survey.
flew some 69,000 shooter sorties to an estimate of fewer than 500 for Iraq. Notwithstanding a coalition/Iraqi combat-loss ratio of 33-to-38, the figures indicate that coalition air forces had overwhelming ratios in air-to-air combat and shooter sorties. This illustrates an extreme case, but it also demonstrates the importance of selecting proper measures as well as the case with which legitimate evidence can be used to support widely differing interpretations of what happened. In the end, measurement means little until a sensible and reasonably broad set of measures has been selected.

The third step, determining what the data means, is related closely to the second in that the requirement is to show how results relate to attaining objectives. In this step one must deal with a hierarchy of objectives: from the tactical (destroying tanks) to higher levels (preventing an armored attack or degrading the combat capability of a division or corps). Also note that tactical measures of effects are usually more easily tabulated and understood than operational-level measures—one can count tanks but how is divisional degradation quantified? As a result, quite often operational-level objectives are presumed to be a direct function of tactical damage assessments. That match is not always improper but, as illustrated by the case of aggregate combat losses due to enemy air defenses as a measure of air supremacy, it can be extremely misleading.

Before discussing the assessments, it seems appropriate to provide a brief summary of the operational objectives for the air campaign found in the Operation Desert Storm plan: (1) isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime by attacks on leadership facilities, electric power production, and telecommunications; (2) gain and maintain air supremacy by attacks on the air defense system and the air force; (3) destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare (NBC) capabilities; (4) eliminate offensive military capabilities by attacks on logistical sites, Scud missiles and launchers, oil refining and distribution facilities, and naval forces and bases; and (5) render the Iraqi army ineffective and isolate it in the Kuwait theater by attacks on railroads and bridges and on the units themselves, particularly the Republican Guard. To attain these objectives planners identified twelve target sets, all of which are listed above in the context of the objectives sought.3

Command of the Air

The contest for command of the air over Iraq and the Kuwait theater revealed the difficulty of measuring effectiveness. In the most complex operations of the war the coalition initiated the air offensive by taking down the command and control of the Iraqi air defense network, bottling up Iraqi aircraft on their bases, and suppressing radar-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) through a combination of drone decoys and anti-radiation missiles employed against SAM radar sites. The results were spectacular in terms of what coalition aircraft were subsequently able to accomplish offensively and with slight losses: except for low-altitude antiaircraft artillery and infrared SAMs in a few highly defended areas too numerous to destroy wholesale, coalition aircraft gained relatively unimpeded freedom of action throughout the theater. Since the Iraqis probably never intended to contest air superiority even over Iraq itself at the risk of losing their modern fixed-wing aircraft, bottling them up in supposedly bomb-proof shelters was relatively easy. The crux of the coalition air-control problem lay then in taking radar-guided SA–2s, SA–3s, SA–6/8s, and Rolands out of the fight early in the campaign, a goal achieved as much by intimidation as by destruction. A pivotal measure in this regard was the lack of success recorded by Iraqi radar-guided SAMs in damaging or downing coalition aircraft despite the large number of coalition fixed-wing sorties flown daily. Iraqi radar SAMs damaged or destroyed eight coalition fighters in the first six days of Operation Desert Storm and, for the remaining five weeks of the war, they were only able to hit another five coalition aircraft.

With ground-based defenses suppressed, attention shifted to Iraqi aircraft and an interesting complication that had developed: Iraq decided to fly few sorties, sensing the odds and apparently planning to have its aircraft ride out the war in hardened shelters. More traditional measures of attacking an enemy air force, and of estimating success, had to be rethought. Airfield attacks had begun by targeting runway surfaces in order to limit takeoffs to numbers that coalition fighters could handle, but moved to hardened aircraft shelters when it was decided to eliminate the Iraqi air force’s residual capability. At this point, further attacks on runways...
ceased to be necessary; in fact the plan became one of attempting to lure Iraqi aircraft into the air. The measurable tactical effects were as follows: of the nearly 600 hardened shelters, some 375 were destroyed by coalition aircraft during the war. While some aircraft were without doubt destroyed in shelters, many more either attempted to flee to Iran or were dispersed in the open in Iraq, both on and off airfields. In either place they became of little use as a fighting force. As a result, by war’s end Iraq was able to retain nearly half of its aircraft—an estimated 300 to 375 combat aircraft—but at the expense of forfeiting the use of the air force’s entire combat capability during the conflict.

How do you measure the success? Not by the number of Iraqi aircraft shot down—the Iraqis put very few at risk in the air. Over half of the coalition shoot downs of fixed-wing Iraqi aircraft, in fact, occurred as enemy aircraft attempted to flee to Iran after the shelters came under attack. Success was also not measured by the number of SAM sites destroyed—this number, too, can only be guessed at. It was not possible to prove whether a site was destroyed or just silent (or abandoned) because of fear of attack if radars were employed. Destroyed or not, the radar SAMs were not used effectively which was the effect sought. By the number of shelters destroyed? Only indirectly. Attacks on shelters had forced a reaction by the Iraqis, one that caused the loss of their air arm as a force in being, at least in this war. In the end the most telling measures were those things that did not happen: the number of coalition aircraft not shot down or damaged while flying over 118,000 combat and combat-support missions; the role not played by low altitude antiaircraft and SAMs because coalition aircraft could safely fly at higher altitudes; and reconnaissance and strike missions not flown by Iraqi aircraft, preserving the surprise of the shift west by coalition ground forces with little fear of attack. The freedom from air attack must be a qualified one because of the threat posed by Scud missiles, a subject addressed later.

Strategic Target Systems

Attacks on what can be termed core strategic target sets in Iraq offer some of the greatest difficulties in measuring and interpreting effectiveness. The physical damage to some of the target sets often could not be observed, while in the case of others only access to Iraqi decisionmaking processes (or to the thoughts of the decisionmakers) would provide a complete answer. Analyzing effectiveness against these target sets also would involve a discussion of the rather controversial subject of strategic bombing theory, a subject too broad in scope to be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that the stated objectives of strategic bombing in this war were to isolate and disrupt Iraq’s political-military leadership and command and control, eliminate offensive capabilities, and destroy NBC capabilities. Targets included national leadership facilities, telecommunications, oil, electric power, NBC facilities, Scuds, and military infrastructure. As a point of reference, the air strikes on all these strategic target sets combined accounted for roughly 15 percent of all air strikes (and 30 percent of the laser-guided bombs) during the war. Attacking a target set, of course, seldom had a single, discrete objective, something that was particularly true for strategic air attacks where combinations of targets attacked simultaneously were important to bringing about the desired effects.

Electric power and oil refining and production facilities are two target sets that historically rank high in strategic bombing campaigns, and the Persian Gulf War was no exception. Coalition plans called for hitting particular aim points in an attempt to limit long-term damage to the facilities (transformer and switching yards rather than generator halls), but the war’s objectives were similar to those of past conflicts: interrupt the enemy’s industrial and military strength, bring the war home to the country at large, and disrupt civil and military communications. In both electric power and oil production Iraq had nearly twice the capacity needed for all of its domestic and military needs, so extensive damage had to take place to affect Iraq’s wartime needs.

Compared with the other strategic targets, collection of information on the tactical damage done to electric and oil facilities was a relatively easy matter. These facilities...
were not mobile, able to be hidden, or particularly difficult to target or damage. Also discernable were the indicators of when either electricity or petroleum were in short supply. As a result, fairly complete information is available on the measures and degree of success of attacks in attaining tactical-level or immediate results. For electrical power there was a rapid shut down of commercially generated power across the country, the major loss occurring in the initial days of the air campaign. This took place even faster than anticipated, in part because Iraqi engineers at times shut down plants in order to avoid a system overload. Some residual power, perhaps 12 percent of capacity, remained available from a number of smaller power plants in isolated regions that were not attacked. Therefore the immediate objective of shutting down the national power grid was quickly attained. The degree to which this measurable result led to the desired operational-strategic effects is, however, far from clear. Some friction was undoubtedly imposed on the Iraqis by forcing the national leadership and military systems countrywide to switch to back-up power. Quantitatively it remains difficult to ascertain how much friction was induced from the available evidence; but the national grid remained out of action.

Coalition air strikes rendered 90 percent of Iraqi petroleum refining capability inoperable, based mainly on the employment of a relatively few precision strikes against distillation towers. Air strikes destroyed a far lesser percentage of oil storage capacity because of the nature of those targets, spread over extensive areas and less vulnerable to rapid destruction. The lack of distilled petroleum caused few problems for the Iraqi military, however, through no fault of the attack plan. A fuel shortage may have affected the Iraqi air force if it had not chosen to remain on the ground. Similarly, enemy ground forces in the Kuwait theater had access to local fuel and in any case used only minimal petroleum while dug into static positions. They had more than enough diesel fuel for a 100-hour ground war, but would have soon run into difficulty finding transportation to supply fuel within the theater. Attacks on Iraqi oil supplies were effective not because of their impact on the actual combat, but in limiting Iraq's ability to conduct a protracted ground campaign.

The air attacks on the Iraqi nuclear weapons research program seemed during the war to be as straightforward as those on electricity and oil. The attacks instead provided an illustration of a seemingly good scorecard in terms of aim points hit but poor ultimate results. Reports during and immediately after the war indicated a high level of destruction against the entire nuclear program, based on analysis of damage to known facilities. In fact, later information showed that there was only partial destruction of known facilities, and more importantly, those facilities were only a small portion of the entire Iraqi nuclear program. Coalition intelligence information had underestimated both the size of the program and the Iraqi determination to protect it. Whereas coalition planners began the war certain of only two sites, post-war analysis by United Nations inspectors revealed sixteen main nuclear facilities and another five nuclear-related sites. Furthermore, the Iraqis went so far as to remove both nuclear fuel and machinery from buildings engaged in nuclear research from under coalition bombing and bury the items in fields, making them relatively invulnerable to precision air attacks. Even attacks on known facilities, in other words, were hitting almost empty structures at times. One could look on these poor results simply as an intelligence failure, but the more explicit lesson is the extensive intelligence data needed to successfully target capabilities like Iraq's nuclear program as a system.

The targeting and damage assessments of Scud launchers and support facilities had much in common with the experience against the nuclear program. One difference was that the Scud target set provided an additional measure of success—launch rates of the missiles. As in the case of the nuclear
Iraqi units deployed in the Kuwait theater during January and February 1991. Note the position of the Republican Guard and the armored and mechanized divisions to the rear of infantry divisions (all positions approximate).


What, then, are the best measurements of the anti-Scud attacks, and what do the results show? The number of fixed sites destroyed appears to have little relevance in this case, and if only the number of mobile Scud launchers is considered, the attacks were a failure. The objectives point to other indicators, however, that suggest partial success, or that at least make the operations appear to have been worthwhile. One indicator is the launch rate for Scud missiles during the war, and a second is the degradation of Iraq's longer-term offensive capabilities based on the extensive attacks on production and storage facilities. As the figure on the opposite page indicates, the mobile Scud launchers if not destroyed were at least suppressed after the first ten days; the recovery towards the end of the war also indicates that the threat had not been completely dealt with. In addition, the suppression would have both cut down the number of missiles launched and diminished the accuracy of those actually launched because of a shortened set-up time and rushed procedures. In other words, one can make a strong circumstantial case for the attacks suppressing the launches and, in conjunction with the perceived effectiveness of Patriot, plausibly infer some success both in convincing Israel not to enter the war and in limiting damage caused by Scud attacks.

Attacks against Iraq's Scud missiles and its nuclear program call for subjective judgments about cause and effect in determining the success of the attacks, especially at the operational level and above. At least in these two cases, there were post-war U.N. inspections that threw further light on the levels of actual damage. In examining the evidence of attacks on the Iraqi leadership and communications, there is far less post-war information, and the available measures are just as indistinct. Complete success would have entailed removal of the leadership, particularly Saddam Hussein, in the one case, and the inability of Iraq to control its forces in the Kuwait theater from Baghdad, communicate
with the outside world, and maintain internal control of the population, in the other. While complete success would have been apparent, there are few objective measures for determining how far short of, or close to, that goal the coalition air campaign may have been on February 28, 1991. Measuring progress requires extensive intelligence information on both the systems and communication procedures (how the country works) and an understanding of system limits, and a capability to monitor electronic emissions.

The measures for attacks on leadership and command and communications networks begin with tactical indicators: the amount of destruction to government buildings, command bunkers, and communication sites as well as the level of monitored electronic communications and information derived from intercepts. There were also operational-level indicators, less objective but distinctive enough to show a strong correlation to the effects of attacks on these target sets. On the one hand, Saddam Hussein and his Ba‘athist regime remained in power, able to communicate with the field commanders in the Kuwait theater and to continue to launch Scuds until the final days of the war. On the other hand, the Iraqi leadership was forced to relocate many times, had its communications severely disrupted, and had its control of the Iraqi people severely shaken. There were rebellions by the Kurds in the north and by Shiite Moslems in the south, and Saddam Hussein was criticized openly in Baghdad. Little more can be said. Precisely estimating the degree of dislocation that occurred would require access to Iraqi officials or records. Estimating these effects during the war itself was and probably will remain more difficult for these target sets than for any others.

**Attacks on Surface Forces**

The surface portion of the air war consisted of the attrition of enemy forces in the theater and the routes leading to it rather than the more discrete attacks in Iraq proper that had characterized the air operations against the Iraqi air force, air defense system, or the electric power grid. Bomb damage assessment focused more on measuring the cumulative effort of many sorties than scoring individual sorties. Attacks on surface forces had several components: air interdiction of supplies and transportation to and within the Kuwait theater; attacks on the Iraqi navy; and the main feature, attacks on the Iraqi army while it remained in place during the air war and in engagements during the ground phase. General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, furthermore, had singled out units of the Republican Guard (named a strategic center of gravity) for special attention. That force’s importance derived from its role as the strategic reserve of the Iraqi defensive strategy and from its political role as defender of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The Armed Forces gained experience prosecuting air interdiction operations in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, but this war provided few new twists. The objectives were to cut the flow of supplies to the theater, to stop the movement of forces within the theater, and especially to stop the Iraqi forces from leaving the theater intact. Since most Iraqi ground forces were already in place when the air war began, the need to block reinforcements was limited. Geography provided the attackers some advantages: ter-

---

**Iraqi Scuds launched between January 17, 1991 and February 25, 1991 (Zulu time).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Feb 1991</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rain consisted of broad plains and farmland, providing little cover for vehicle traffic; the principal lines of communications between Baghdad and the theater generally followed and frequently crossed rivers; and the system of roads narrowed as it approached Basra. Bridges, therefore, became the key targets.

The destruction of bridges began in earnest at the start of February 1991 and proceeded quickly thereafter. Overall 75 percent of the bridges along the route to and from the Kuwait theater were damaged or destroyed. Despite the prominent role of bridges in the transportation system, however, their destruction alone was not enough. The Iraqis did not attempt to repair permanent bridges but mounted a massive effort to build earthen causeways, use ferries, and employ pontoon bridges to bypass downed bridges. Iraqi skill in coping with the loss of bridges led Lieutenant General Charles Horner, USAF, after the war to caution: "Anybody that does a campaign against transportation systems had better beware. It looks deceptively easy. It is a tough nut to crack. [The Iraqis] were very ingenious and industrious in repairing them or bypassing them...I have never seen so many pontoon bridges. [When] the canals near Basra [were bombed], they just filled them in with dirt and drove across..." 3

Attacks on bridges were abetted by attack aircraft flying armed reconnaissance missions along sections of the main highways leading to and from the Kuwait theater, destroying trucks and cargo. Iraqi countermeasures included restricting travel to night and shifting from multivehicle convoys to single vehicles. Although this action saved some trucks, it slowed supplies to a trickle. The same tactics succeeded within the theater. With few bridges or choke points to target, attacks on Iraqi army trucks and others making supply runs had a devastating effect on the transportation system. Enemy prisoners of war indicated that over half of the trucks were destroyed or out of service for lack of parts, and that the drivers were no longer willing to travel the roads.

With all evidence on the success of air operations against the bridges, trucks, and entire route system, what conclusions can be drawn on the operational effectiveness of air interdiction? Coalition aircraft attacks served to greatly reduce the flow of supplies, if not sever the supply lines. In terms of the effect on Iraqi ground forces in the theater, the results were not decisive on their own because of Iraqi army inaction. As air interdiction efforts in past wars prove, operations work best when the enemy is engaged in high tempo ground operations and thus consuming supplies at a high rate. The Iraqi army was essentially inert during the air campaign, so that the limited supplies that got through, combined with large stocks positioned in the theater from August 1990 to January 1991, allowed the enemy to remain in place. Whether several more days or weeks of air interdiction operations alone would have eliminated all resupply and shattered what was left of the distribution system is a matter of speculation. What is certain is that the outbreak of large-scale ground combat increased demands for supplies (especially ammunition and petroleum) to a point where the residual flow of supplies was insufficient for prolonged conflict.

While not central to the war, air operations against the Iraqi navy consumed a significant amount of the effort, particularly for carrier-based aircraft in the Persian Gulf, and demonstrated the difficulty of operating in confined waters in the presence of even small enemy forces. Coalition aircraft attacked Iraqi naval targets to secure freedom of action in the northern Gulf, both to make the carrier and battleship firepower available and to allow the amphibious force to be in position for the deception plan and landings, if necessary. Just as in the case of targets on land, a lack of bomb damage assessment information made the threat unclear. The Navy antisurface warfare commander could not declare the threat defeated until February 17, two weeks after later analysis would show the last Iraqi missile boat was destroyed. Even with the Iraqi surface navy all but entirely sunk, however, a serious threat remained for coalition naval forces: mines and Silkworm antiship missiles. An unknown number of mines remained and missile boat destruction removed only one launch method for missiles; the threat of air- or ground-launched Silkworms continued to affect coalition navy operations until the war's end. Repeated strikes against seven suspected Silkworm sites did not remove this
threat. Only two Silkworm launches took place during the war, both from a site south of Kuwait City on February 25, fired obviously just prior to the site being overrun. Just as with the anti-Scud operations, it is difficult to determine if further launches were in fact suppressed or if the Iraqis simply chose to retain the missiles until an amphibious attack occurred.

Air attacks against the Iraqi army in Kuwait comprised well over half of the coalition effort. The objective set for the air attacks was reduction of combat capability of that army by 50 percent. The measurement of attrition was destruction of Iraqi armor and artillery to that level throughout the theater. Air strikes began targeting ground forces on the first day of the war, then proceeded with increasing intensity throughout. All forty-three Iraqi divisions in the theater received some attention, but three Republican Guard armored or mechanized (heavy) divisions received the most, followed by the other eight heavy Iraqi divisions that made up the tactical and operational reserves. Attacks against Iraqi front line divisions (all infantry) peaked just prior to the ground offensive.

In the opening two weeks of the war results of the air attacks fell far behind the projected attrition rate, in part because of a combination of poor weather and lower than planned sortie rates, but principally because of poorer bombing accuracy and weapon performance from the high release altitudes employed. Some adjustments to tactics took place to increase attrition rates, the main one being the employment of laser-guided bombs to target Iraqi armor. Not anticipated before the war, this innovation took advantage of differences in the cooling rates of surrounding sand compared with vehicle metal, making Iraqi vehicles, particularly tanks and armored personnel carriers, stand out as hot spots on aircraft infrared sensors. Night bombing with laser designators on these spots became an extremely effective method of despatching Iraqi armor. Beginning on February 6, the bulk of the F-111Fs were shifted from strategic targets in central Iraq to nightly attacks on Iraqi armor in the Kuwait theater with 500-pound laser-guided bombs. As time went on other aircraft with infrared sensors and laser targeting pods joined in the effort. This increased the rate of Iraqi armor and artillery attrition, but the 50 percent goal for the theater was not attained by the start of the ground offensive. At that time, Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated equipment attrition rates at 39 percent for tanks, 32 for armored personnel carriers, and 47 for artillery.

The amount of equipment attrition suffered by the Iraqi army became a contentious issue at the time, and any post-war reconstruction of the facts can only partially reconcile earlier estimates. Understanding the basis of the dispute requires a review of the
original size of the target base, the counting rules, and the use made of the estimates. The estimates of Iraqi tanks destroyed, the most often cited case at the time of the war, provides the best illustration of the problem. By January 1991 intelligence estimates credited Iraq with 4,280 tanks in the Kuwait theater—a number derived from estimating the standard for equipping 43 Iraqi army divisions. The 4,280 figure had also been validated by spot-checks of some Iraqi units using photo imagery. This tank count remained the baseline for estimating the percentage of tank attrition throughout the war. In other words, when 2,140 tanks were counted as destroyed, the 50 percent attrition would be achieved. Using pilot reports and imagery, CENTCOM compiled daily updates of attrition for briefings in the theater and passed this information on to the Joint Staff. Using satellite imagery as a primary source, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) independently, and in collaboration with one another, prepared their estimates of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces destroyed, figures that soon diverged from the CENTCOM tank count, with the Washington numbers indicating far fewer tanks destroyed. By February 12, for instance, CENTCOM reported 25 percent of the tanks destroyed, while DIA and CIA reported less than half that number. By the eve of the ground offensive, CENTCOM reported 1,688 tanks already destroyed, while intelligence analysts in Washington counted fewer than 700. The counting rules and different estimates developed were important because the percentage of degradation of the Iraqi army was key to determining when the ground offensive would begin. The CIA caused some consternation within government circles when that agency’s figures became publicized in February 1991, and fears were voiced that, as in past wars, inflated damage claims were leading to miscalculation of enemy strength. Partly as a response, CENTCOM attempted to deflate the counting controversy in mid-February through a combat effectiveness model (developed by the Army element of CENTCOM) of enemy divisions that included equipment losses, but also factored in leadership, discipline, health, and so forth. In addition, rules stated that losses claimed by pilots were creditable only when imagery verified the loss. Furthermore, videos from aircraft like F-111Fs showing tank destruction by laser-guided bombs were discounted by one-half, and claims by A-10s discounted by two-thirds, to offset uncertainties. This change perhaps occurred because General Schwarzkopf was so disenchanted with specific estimates of percentages of equipment attrition that he refused to allow such data to be presented at his briefings.

Following the war and further analysis of available imagery and prisoner of war reports, some updates of the estimates were possible. First, a count of Iraqi tanks in the theater just prior to the war revealed that there were 800 fewer than earlier estimated. This error, however, was soon offset by subsequent over-counting of tank attrition, making the CENTCOM wartime estimates of attrition percentages on the eve of the ground war (February 23) approximately correct, although only due to offsetting errors. Second, imagery showed that many of the 800 Iraqi tanks escaped from the theater at the war’s end, making the number of tanks destroyed—since few, if any, additional Iraqi tanks entered the theater in that period—through both air and ground action approximately 1,000 less than CENTCOM claimed at the end of the war. Finally, tank attrition on the eve of the ground offensive was about 40 percent for the Iraqi army overall and just over 20 percent for Republican Guard units; and the total wartime Iraqi tank attrition was approximately 75 percent and 50 percent, respectively. In other words, the most important Iraqi units got off with the least damage. Although far from the least attacked, Republican Guard tanks were better dug in and defended. Another contributing factor was that these tanks were far enough to the rear to escape the theater; tanks farther forward, even if functioning, had to be abandoned.
Measures and the use made of them had a number of flaws. The most obvious problem is with the size of the target base. While the number of tanks in the theater continued to be reported as 4,280, there were widespread reports during the war that the numbers were wrong. Intelligence reports from autumn 1990 and prisoner of war debriefings during the war indicated that many units had deployed with far less than a full complement of men or equipment (intelligence reports in a similar way had also overestimated the number of Iraqi soldiers in the theater, but accounts of Iraqi personnel attrition, body counts, were scrupulously avoided).

Even if the number of tanks was correct, too much attention attached to it as a measure. When the attrition goals were set in September 1990, the tanks represented what would have been the vanguard of an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia. By January 1991, no ground commander set a particular premium on destroying tanks from the air. By then, it was artillery since Iraqi artillery represented the chief danger for blunting the ground attack through use of chemical weapon shells during the breaching effort. The Army corps commanders, Lieutenant Generals Gary Luck and Frederick Franks, and Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, USMC, commander of Marine forces, pointed to artillery as the chief obstacle. Boomer even went to the extreme of talking with his airborne Marine pilots to direct their energies toward attacking artillery instead of armor. Iraqi tanks were not in the front lines in any numbers, and the corps commanders were confident in being able to handle them in a war of movement, both by air—since tanks on the move were more vulnerable—and by using the superior range of the M-1A1 tank.

Ironically, the loss of equipment, the key index of damage assessment during the war, was not decisive in any direct way. The key to the defeat of the Iraqi army was not the specific targets destroyed, but the combination of targets attacked and the intensity with which attacks took place. Enemy soldiers were affected by the bombs that hit their targets as well as by those that missed. The air interdiction effort, damage to communications and supply systems, along with equipment attrition during the air war, affected the Iraqi soldiers beyond the direct inflicting of casualties. The Iraqis did not defect or surrender in droves during the air and ground war because their armor and artillery were being destroyed—in fact, statements by prisoners of war indicated they appreciated the discrimination of coalition air forces in aiming at equipment instead of at them—but because of shortages of food, water, and confidence that their equipment was going to do them any good. The Iraqi army did not run out of tanks, armored personnel carriers, or artillery; in fact, much of the equipment intact at the start of the ground offensive was abandoned, or at least unoccupied, when coalition ground forces arrived. The total number and operability of tanks had less meaning under these conditions.

Reviewing the disintegration and rout of the Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm, one becomes suspicious of the value of relying on discrete indicators to measure results. Even in such a brief, recent, and militarily lopsided campaign, broader problems of assessing (not measuring) operational and strategic—as opposed to tactical—effectiveness remain difficult, controversial, and plagued by subjectivity. While tactical effects and effectiveness are seemingly more amenable to quantitative measures, the need to take into account the actual, real-world objectives of operational commanders and planners suggest that operational-strategic effectiveness is, in the end, essentially a qualitative issue. The fact that coalition air forces did not destroy the promised 50 percent of Iraqi armor and artillery in the Kuwait theater prior to the beginning of the ground offensive does not lead to a conclusion that coalition airpower failed to create the circumstances under which the 100-hour blow-out on the ground was possible.
The lessons derived from assessing bomb damage in the Gulf War involve both improving methods and facing the inherent messiness and uncertainty of real war. Methods for determining the tactical effects of bomb damage can be improved. This will require both better skills on the part of interpreters of bomb damage and better equipment. In the age of dumb bombs pilot reports of estimated damage were often only one small piece of a picture of how attacks were progressing that built up over weeks or longer. In our age of hundred-thousand, even million-dollar munitions in which numerous revisits to the target are no longer desirable or affordable, there is no alternative to a high-quality damage assessment capability on the attacking aircraft or the weapon itself. The F–16 and F/A–18 aircraft, among others used in the Gulf, had no such capability.

Improved capabilities to hit within 8–12 feet of aim points with precision-guided weapons represented unprecedented advances in theater-level bombing accuracy. The problems of grasping the vulnerability and functioning of entire target systems vis-à-vis operational-strategic objectives, however, may well have been as riddled with uncertainty in the cases of the Iraqi nuclear program and mobile Scud missile capability during World War II. Hitting aim points is getting easier, but knowing what aim points to go after across an entire target set remains, in general, open to uncertainty when facing a dedicated, reactive adversary.

Finally, there are the difficulties of assessing effectiveness across diverse but interrelated target systems as well as the impossibility of finding measures that can be readily applied across all target sets. There was nothing in the Gulf War data that supported the existence of universal or quantifiable measures of operational, much less strategic, effectiveness. In other words, you can never have information available during the war to know exactly how you are doing. In this sense Clausewitz had it right when he observed:

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment. . . . He should be guided by the laws of probability. These are difficult enough to apply when plans are drafted in an office, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes infinitely harder in the thick of fighting itself, with reports streaming in. At such times one is lucky if their contradictions cancel each other out. . . .

The principal audiences for these lessons are not analysts and historians of past campaigns, but planners and commanders who must assess the effects of air bombardment, make adjustments, and draw conclusions long before complete information becomes available. For them the lessons of this survey may seem particularly bleak, but there is a certain cold comfort in truly understanding the nature of the task at hand rather than trying to find certainties where none exist.

NOTES
3. Interview with Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, USAF, conducted at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (March 4, 1992), by Perry Jamison, Richard Davis, and Barry Barlow of the Center for Air Force History.
The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia is a typical post-Cold War mission and a radical approach to peace-enforcement by the international community. The military undertook Operation Provide Relief to halt mass starvation in an anarchic state. Soon afterward international forces joined Americans in the United Nations Operation in Somalia or UNOSOM. By year’s end, as the magnitude of the task became clear, the United Nations enlisted international support under U.S. leadership to mount Operation Restore Hope. Successful completion of that effort marked the beginning of the present phase of activity. To assess the overall situation in Somalia JFQ has sought contributions from four Americans with unique qualifications. In the first article a leading academic specialist on military affairs observes that Somalia may be a new contingency, but it is a well-worn role for our forces. He warns against using largely noncombat operations to determine military requirements. In the second article, a former Presidential envoy to Somalia reviews U.S. and U.N. decisionmaking, and assesses the mission thus far. Next, the CINC with responsibility for operations in Somalia provides a detailed survey of what U.S. forces have done in the past year and offers some thoughts on future humanitarian missions. And as a conclusion, the last American ambassador to Somalia praises Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope while cautioning that assertive peace-enforcement may set a dangerous precedent.

These contributions were completed in September 1993 as events in Somalia grew more violent and doubts were raised in many quarters over the mission.
Few issues are more important than the roles and missions of the Armed Forces in the post-Cold War era. We are in the midst of major changes in the structure of the international system and of serious challenges to national security. This is not, however, the first time the Nation has faced such challenges. At the birth of the Republic we had to establish the military and naval forces to deal with threats from Europe. With the end of the Napoleonic era our national defense changed dramatically as did the Armed Forces. This situation remained fixed in its essentials until the close of the 19th century when America emerged as a world power. At that time the Nation consigned the Indian-fighting Army and the commerce-protecting Navy to history and in their stead created an Army designed for big wars and a Navy for big battles. That system served us well throughout two world wars. But by the late 1940s with the advent of the Cold War we needed a new Defense Establishment. Now that conflict is over, and once again the Nation must debate the nature of our national interests and the roles of the Armed Forces, just as earlier generations did in 1784, 1815, 1898, and 1946. In effect, we have to move on to a fifth phase of American defense policy.

Nontraditional and Nonmilitary

The term nontraditional roles obviously implies a distinction between traditional and nontraditional military roles. The traditional roles of the Armed Forces will presumably continue, but in this fifth phase of American military history the services will perform new nontraditional roles. Some new roles...
have evolved, others have been promoted by the Congress, in particular by Senator Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is largely due to his leadership that the Defense Authorization Act of 1993 encouraged the Armed Forces to conduct an anti-drug campaign targeted at inner-city youths, to provide role models for youth and health care to underserved communities, and to address domestic ills by improving the environment and economic and social conditions. In a speech in the Senate, Senator Nunn stated:

While the Soviet threat is gone, at home we are still battling drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment, and racism. The military certainly cannot solve these problems. . . . But I am convinced that there is a proper and important role the Armed Forces can play in addressing these pressing issues. I believe we can reinvigorate the military’s spectrum of capabilities to address such needs as deteriorating infrastructure, the lack of role models for tens of thousands if not millions of young people, limited training and education opportunities for the disadvantaged, and serious health and nutrition problems facing many of our citizens, particularly our children.¹

These clearly seem to be nontraditional roles. But are they really? The fact is that there are almost no conceivable roles in this new phase of our history that the Armed Forces have not performed in the past. The distinction to be made is not between traditional and nontraditional roles but between military and nonmilitary roles or, more precisely, between combat missions and noncombat missions. The purpose of the Armed Forces is combat: to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. That is their principal role or raison d’être, the justification for expending the resources needed to establish and maintain them. Forces created to perform that role, however, can be—and have been throughout our history—employed in noncombat, nonmilitary uses.

For over three decades the United States Military Academy at West Point trained all of the Nation’s engineers, civilian as well as military. Throughout the 19th century the Army engaged in the economic and political development of the country. It explored and surveyed the West, chose sites for forts and planned settlements, built roadways, and developed waterways. And for years the Army performed roles that now are performed by agencies like the National Weather Service and the Geological Survey. In the latter part of the last century, the Army Signal Corps pioneered the development of the telegraph and telephone. The Navy was equally active in exploration and scientific research. Naval ships explored the Amazon, surveyed the coastlines of North and South America, laid cables on the ocean floor, and gathered scientific data from around the world. They also policed the slave trade. Naval officers negotiated dozens of treaties and oversaw lighthouses, life-saving services, coastal surveys, and steamboat inspection. The Army ran civil governments in the South during Reconstruction and at the same time governed Alaska for ten years. It was, of course, frequently called upon to intervene in labor strikes and domestic unrest. The Army Corps of Engineers constructed public buildings and canals and other civil works including the Panama Canal. Soldiers helped to combat malaria in Panama and cholera, hunger, and illiteracy in Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua. They also established schools, built works projects, promoted public health, organized elections, and encouraged democracy in those countries. In the 1930s the Army took on the immense task of recruiting, organizing, and administering the Civilian Conservation Corps.

After recent hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii many people hailed the superb contributions of the Armed Forces to disaster relief as evidence of a new role. Nothing could have been more incorrect. The services have regularly provided such relief in the past. As an official Army history puts it, in the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, “The most conspicuous employment of the Army within the United States . . . was in a variety of tasks that only the Army had the resources and organization to tackle quickly. In floods and blizzards and hurricanes it was the Army that was first on the spot with cots, blankets,
This has been true throughout our history. It is hard to think of a nonmilitary role without precedent for such roles are as American as apple pie.

**Future Roles and Missions**

Throughout our history, however, nonmilitary roles have never been used to justify maintaining the Armed Forces. The overall size, composition, and organization as well as recruitment, equipping, and training of the services have been based on our national interests and the missions—the combat missions—to be performed. In this fifth phase of American defense policy the roles of the Armed Forces remain as important as ever. There are three roles that present themselves today.

**Maintaining Superiority.** For the first time in sixty years, no major power, no rival, poses a national security challenge to the United States. We need defense policy and the capability not to contain or deter an existing threat as was the case during the Cold War, but rather to prevent the emergence of a new threat. To accomplish this goal, we must maintain a substantial, invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability and deploy forces in both Europe and Asia to reassure allies and to preclude German or Japanese rearmament. We must also maintain both technological and maritime superiority, and provide a base for the rapid and effective development of a new enhanced defense capability if a major threat should begin to emerge.

**Regional Security.** Significant threats exist to our national interests in Southwest and East Asia, and we must have the capability to deal with them as we did in the Gulf War. To deter or defeat regional aggression the United States needs light and heavy land forces, tactical aviation, naval and Marine forces designed to fight from the sea against enemies on land, and the sealift and airlift to deploy forces rapidly to the scene of combat. Ideally the United States should be able to fight the equivalent of the Gulf War. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s “Option C” purportedly would provide this capability. Whether in five years the Armed Forces will be able to mount an operation like Desert Storm against an enemy similar to Iraq remains to be seen.

Our decisive victory in the Persian Gulf, however, makes it unlikely that we will be able to repeat that victory. Major regional aggressors in the future are likely to possess and use nuclear weapons. This reality was reflected in the reply of the Indian defence minister who, when asked what lesson he drew from the Gulf War, said: “Don’t fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons.” Likely aggressors—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, et al.—are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. But until they get them the probability of stability in their respective regions is reasonably high. Once they do acquire these weapons, however, the likelihood they will use them is high. In all probability the first sure knowledge the world will have that such powers possess a usable nuclear weapon will be the explosion
A new force is needed. Such an act is likely to be accompanied by a massive conventional offensive to quickly occupy Seoul, Saudi oil fields, or whatever other target the aggressor has in mind. That is the most serious type of regional threat that we may confront, and perhaps the most probable.

Coping with that kind of aggression will place new demands—nontraditional demands—on the Armed Forces. They will have to fight an enemy who has a small number of nuclear weapons and little or no inhibition to use them. To deter this first use by a rogue state, the United States will have to threaten massive retaliation, possibly nuclear. The principal role of Strategic Command in the coming years will be to maintain nuclear peace in the Third World.

**Foreign Internal Defense.** The Armed Forces may have to intervene quickly and effectively in countries important to our national security interests in order to restore a government to power that has been overthrown, remove a hostile regime, protect American lives and property abroad, rescue hostages, eliminate terrorists, destroy drug traffickers, or engage in other actions which normally fall under the rubric of low intensity conflict. Whether or not a state is aggressive or pacific, reasonably decent or totally threatening, depends overwhelmingly on the nature of its government. Whether or not a state is aggressive or pacific, reasonably decent or totally threatening, depends overwhelmingly on the nature of its government. President Clinton has appropriately said that the promotion of democracy should be a central, perhaps even the central, theme of U.S. foreign policy. In those areas critical to our national security, the United States has to be prepared to defend governments that are friendly and democratic and to overthrow those that are unfriendly and undemocratic.

This requirement also emphasizes a new role for the Armed Forces: targeting dictatorships and their leaders.

In the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition degraded by more than 50 percent the capability of the Iraqi military, and also brought Iraqi society to a virtual standstill. But that tremendous use of force failed to eliminate the true villains of peace, Iraq’s government. The elimination of Saddam Hussein was an established U.S. objective, although not one endorsed by the United Nations, and it was not achieved. Indeed, during the last decade, we have attempted to eliminate three hostile dictators: Khadaffi, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein. We only succeeded in the case of Noriega, and that took time and caused us some embarrassment because it involved a tiny country about which American intelligence must have been the best in the world. Targeting and incapacitating dictatorial governments will be an important role for the Armed Forces in the coming years, and it is one with respect to which our capabilities are now sadly deficient.

**Future Challenges**

Besides the military roles which the Armed Forces can expect to perform in the post-Cold War world, what are the appropriate nonmilitary—or civilian—roles that loom on the horizon? As indicated previously, these roles have been historically numerous and diverse, and no reason exists to suggest that they will not be continued. Future missions could involve the following:

- domestic activities as highlighted by Senator Nunn and in the Defense Authorization Act
- humanitarian assistance at home and abroad when welcomed by local governments
- peacekeeping at the invitation of the parties involved in the conflicts.

There is another type of mission—one about which questions have arisen—illustrated by the crisis in Somalia. Should the Armed Forces provide humanitarian assistance in those situations where such efforts are likely to be opposed by one or more of the conflicting parties? Clearly some form of international authorization, presumably approval by the United Nations, is a prerequisite.

---

**Nontraditional Roles**

What do the Armed Forces need in order to carry out nontraditional roles? More training, equipment? New doctrine? Different organization? Nontraditional roles are really crisis response roles. It is fine to call a role nontraditional, but one also ought to talk about crisis response.

The military is taught to respond to crises, to make decisions when all the facts are not in. This is what service schools teach: to take action under pressure, work as a team, and troubleshoot; to organize, reorganize, establish task forces, and do task reorganization and tailoring. So in many respects the military is already prepared, no matter what the service: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. Some additional training may be needed, but one should not get hung up on the idea that somehow a whole new force is needed.

—General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.)
it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the Armed Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another.

for action by the United States. This occurred with the precedent-breaking U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 that authorized intervention by U.S., British, and French forces in order to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The United Nations has also given approval to deploy outside military forces in Bosnia as well as in Somalia to assist with the provision of humanitarian assistance to the innocent victims of civil war and anarchy.

Defining the Limits

The goal of our involvement in such situations is presumably to ensure that relief supplies reach the intended beneficiaries. This means that the Armed Forces should be able to act militarily to prevent or eliminate hostile action against efforts to deliver relief supplies. While that is certainly an appropriate response, there is a need to define the limits of U.S. involvement in such missions, and this gives rise to two problems.

First, so long as the conditions in the country concerned remain violent, external military force will be required to ensure that food and medical supplies reach their intended recipients. If the United Nations is unable to provide those forces, this could mean an extended if not indefinite American commitment. This is not a Gulf War-type situation where it was possible to drive the invading Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and then pack up and go home. In the case of Bosnia it could mean waiting for the South Slavs or other conflicting parties to resolve their differences by political or military means before extricating ourselves. And that could take a very, very long time.

Second, there is the problem of becoming an active participant in the conflict in the country concerned. One or more parties in that conflict may perceive any outside involvement as a hostile act. Thus by deploying American troops, from the viewpoint of the local combatants, we become the enemy. Inevitably while we are there for humanitarian purposes our presence has political and military consequences. The United States has a clear humanitarian interest in preventing genocide and starvation, and Americans will support intervention to deal with such tragedies within limits. When Somali clans or Slavic factions fight each other, we may attempt to mitigate the horrendous consequences that flow from the violence. Under such circumstances the Nation may even accept some American casualties. But the United States has no interest in which clan dominates Somalia, or where boundary lines are drawn in the Balkans. Americans will not support intervention which appears to be directed towards political goals. It is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the Armed Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another.

The Armed Forces can and should, if it is appropriate, be put to a variety of civilian uses, including domestic social and economic renewal, humanitarian and disaster relief both at home and abroad, and peacekeeping operations. The military should only be given military missions which involve possible combat, however, when they advance national security interests and are directed against a foreign enemy of the United States.

The possible nonmilitary roles of the Armed Forces have recently received a good amount of attention. Arguments have been made that the military should be organized and trained in order to perform such roles. A proposal has been made, for instance, that a...
A unified command should be established for humanitarian assistance operations. In a somewhat similar fashion, a commission of former government officials has proposed creating a military command headed by a three- or four-star officer to provide support for U.N. peacekeeping operations and to develop doctrine, carry out planning, and train U.S. forces for such operations. The United States, another group argued, “should retain and promote officers whose expertise includes peacekeeping, humanitarian administration, and civilian support operations. . . .”

Such proposals are basically misconceived. The mission of the Armed Forces is combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. The military must be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and should, be used for humanitarian and other civilian activities, but the military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles. A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible. That is why nations have traditionally maintained armies and navies. Should the military perform other roles? Absolutely, and as previously stated they have done so throughout our history. Should these roles define the Armed Forces? Absolutely not. All such roles should be spillover uses of the Armed Forces which can be performed because the services possess the organization, training, and equipment that are only maintained to defend the Nation.

NOTES

AN ENVOY’S PERSPECTIVE

By ROBERT B. OAKLEY

This article is adapted from a forthcoming book by Robert B. Oakley and John Hirsch entitled Restore Hope.
By the fall of 1992, the combination of civil war, total governmental collapse, famine, and disease in Somalia had taken the lives of between 300,000 and 500,000 people, and more than twice that number were in urgent need of food and medicine to avoid additional deaths; and there were some 800,000 Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. In some places, more than 70 percent of children had died, despite heroic efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relief agencies, as well as a large-scale airlift of food spearheaded by the Air Force. Attempts by the United Nations at political reconciliation, delivering aid, and traditional peacekeeping failed. Public opinion and conviction led President George Bush to call for a more active U.S. role.

The deputies committee of the National Security Council, a group of senior officials who rank just below Cabinet level, convened four times during the week of November 20, 1992. The atmosphere at committee meetings changed dramatically. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia had come to be seen as a challenge in which the United States could rapidly make a significant and tangible difference. The previous opposition by the Pentagon to use the Armed Forces had been replaced by quiet internal contingency planning to determine what realistically and effectively could be done. A definable, doable mission had emerged and no other country either could or would undertake it. The inability to do anything meaningful for Muslims in Bosnia, together with a perception that we could actually help in Muslim Somalia, added to the media-driven desire for a fresh look at the options. Thus the deputies committee developed three options: increase support of U.N. peacekeeping efforts; create a U.S.-organized coalition without participation by American ground troops; or assemble a multinational military coalition in which U.S. troops would take the leading role, as in Operation Desert Storm.

At the start of the week, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had appealed to Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner for help, but had not raised the issue of ground forces. The Pentagon had for months expressed strong reservations about using ground forces, resisting such proposals from the Department of State and the NSC staff. Therefore most participants at the meeting on November 20 did not consider use of the Armed Forces to be a likely option. But the following day the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah, startled the group by saying, “If you think U.S. forces are needed, we can do the job.” His plan called for deploying two divisions. At the end of the deliberations an interagency options paper was sent to the President without a recommendation. It would be up to him to make the decision.

The President met with his senior advisors on the day before Thanksgiving, November 25. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who was certain in his own mind that the dispatch of a sizable ground force was necessary but wanted to be sure that the pitfalls were clearly identified—questioned whether conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth handoff to a U.N. peacekeeping force after a relatively brief deployment of U.S. troops. (His question was prescient: it became a key issue that later faced the United Nations and the Bush administration.) After a far-reaching discussion, the President decided that if the Security Council concurred and other nations agreed to join, the United States would lead an international force to stop death and famine in Somalia. He chose the strongest option and the United States embarked upon a major humanitarian intervention.

Consultations on Intervention

The President sent Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to New York that afternoon to inform the Secretary General. During the next week the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Edward Perkins, and

Robert B. Oakley was the President’s Special Envoy for Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993. A retired career diplomat, he served as U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Zaire, and Pakistan, and also headed the Department of State’s Office of Combating Terrorism.
his staff consulted intensely with the Secretary General, permanent members of the Security Council, and other parties, including delegates from African and NATO countries. They confirmed strong support for the U.S. proposal. President Bush made personal telephone calls to 13 heads of state asking for participation in or support for the United Task Force. All except the British Prime Minister, John Major, pledged to send troops or provide assistance.

On December 3 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794, endorsing the offer by a member state to constitute and lead an international force for the purpose of protecting humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. It was not a U.N. force but rather one endorsed by the Security Council, much like the U.S.-led force for Korea in 1950 and the U.S.-led force for Kuwait in 1991. Neither Boutros-Ghali nor the Security Council was ready for an unprecedented humanitarian peace-enforcement mission.

U.S. forces were to be deployed on a finite mission: to end clan fighting and protect humanitarian operations in the famine belt of southern Somalia where the death toll and numbers of endangered people were the highest. There would be overwhelming force available at the outset. As Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said at an important press conference with General Powell on December 4, “There will be no question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable situation if it came to that, without their cooperation.” Cheney went on to say that the U.S.-led operation would be limited in duration as well as mission: “We believe it necessary to send in U.S. forces to provide U.S. leadership to get the situation stabilized and return it to a state where the normal U.N. peacekeeping forces can deal with the circumstances.”

American and allied forces were designated as United Task Force (UNITAF) and placed under Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, Commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, who in turn reported to General Joseph Hoar, USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Johnston had served with distinction in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, and been chief of staff to General Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm. The President was also urged to name a senior political representative who would complement the military commander. That job fell to me.

Consultations in Mogadishu

On December 7 and 8, I met separately in Mogadishu with the two most powerful Somali faction leaders, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, to enlist their cooperation in assuring the arrival of U.S. forces went unchallenged. Both promised to use radio stations and political-clan organizations to urge people to stay away from the port and airport. Aideed also intervened with the Murasade, an allied Hawiye subclan, to move several hundred armed fighters away from the barracks adjacent to the airport. I asked both leaders to meet with General Johnston, Ambassador Ismat Kittani (the Special Representative of the Secretary General), and me on December 11 at the U.S. Liaison Office to discuss the potentially disastrous results if their followers unintentionally clashed with U.S. forces. I reminded them of the massive firepower that had been used so effectively during Desert Storm. I remarked that it would be better if
they discussed security problems with General Johnston—since separate meetings would not do. The American flag would fly over what had once been the CONOCO compound to ensure neutrality and security.

Although Aideed initially objected to the presence of Ambassador Kittani, and Ali Mahdi claimed the venue was too dangerous because of its proximity to Aideed’s headquarters, agreement was reached and the meeting took place as proposed. They listened to Johnston, Kittani, and me over lunch and then surprised us by having their delegations join them for a two-hour discussion with no foreigners present. Following that session they proudly called for the U.S. and U.N. representatives to witness the signing of an agreement (including a cease-fire) after which they held a joint press conference to announce it before the international and domestic Somali press corps.

This was the starting point for developing a strategy which General Johnston and I could use to create a benign security environment. As far as possible, our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and cooperation, using implicit threats of coercion to buttress requests for cooperation among the factions and with UNITAF. They could do this by taking specific steps: first, stop fighting and allow for humanitarian activities and, second, try and solidify an end to the civil war and begin the process of national reconciliation. This was explained as the best means of obtaining much-needed international support for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

Once the Somali leaders concluded an agreement on specific steps, our approach was to insist on implementation—if no action was taken after a decent interval. Should the leaders not act on their own, they should be ready to have UNITAF impose it on them, by force if necessary. Aideed and Ali Mahdi soon became rivals in projecting themselves as responsible leaders worthy of U.S. support (and therefore suited for national leadership). They wanted to avoid conflict with UNITAF and also save face at home. Therefore they could usually be persuaded, pressured, or cajoled into reaching agreements and cooperating for at least partial implementation, even if they did not meet their expectations.

In the case of the December 11 agreement, it was critical for UNITAF to obtain and hold the leaders and their militias to the cease-fire and to an explicit undertaking to move heavy weapons from the streets of Mogadishu into designated compounds. Other aspects of the agreement such as removing the green line could be implemented later when conditions were right. While the cease-fire in Mogadishu, which was already tentatively in effect, took firm hold, it was only on December 26 that both sides began putting their heavy weapons under control. They had finally accepted our proposal on this deadline for each side moving 30 technicals (vehicles armed with heavy weapons) out of Mogadishu to their respective designated cantonments as a first step.

In mid-February 1993 Ali Mahdi turned over all his technicals to UNITAF. This signalled his intent to play an essentially political game. But by this time technicals had disappeared from Aideed’s designated compound: a warning, in retrospect, of the confrontation with the follow-on U.N. peacekeeping force (UNOSOM II) which erupted after Aideed moved his weapons back into the city. He moved them from Mogadishu toward Galacio for fear of confiscation. The key operative point for UNITAF, however, was not this violation of the December 11 agreement. Rather it was that the technicals were peacefully removed from Mogadishu.
and the main supply routes, and that any technicals spotted after December 26 were vulnerable to immediate capture or destruction. The same principle was then applied up-country, and a number of technicals were captured or destroyed. Given the limited UNITAF mandate, which deliberately excluded general disarmament, there was no perceived need to confront Aideed over the disappearance of weapons as long as they posed no threat to UNITAF forces or humanitarian operations.

My staff and General Johnston’s quickly established a pattern that became routine over the next three months, meeting regularly several times each week to coordinate planning and activities. I also convened a meeting each evening of my staff and key UNITAF representatives to review activities and generate suggestions for future military, political, and humanitarian activity. Similar combined but unstructured discussions took place over breakfast before 0800 daily. Ideas were then developed for use in dealing with UNITAF, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the Somalis. Such meetings—including those my deputy and I had with General Johnston, the UNITAF senior staff, and commanders of non-U.S. forces—were the basis for informal but remarkably close and creative collaboration among the military, political, and humanitarian components of Operation Restore Hope.

Humanitarian-Military Coordination

In order to develop relations of mutual confidence and understanding between the military and humanitarian relief community in a systematic way, and to maximize operational coordination, Johnston and I helped the Department of State’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance establish a Civilian-Military Operations Center at UNOSOM headquarters. The leadership of the center was entrusted to two Marine combat veterans with experience in relief activities and representatives of civilian agencies from Operation Provide Relief (the airlift to Somalia which preceded UNITAF) who were joined by members of the Office of Foreign Disaster Relief. The third player in this humanitarian leadership troika was the UNOSOM coordinator of humanitarian operations who was on loan from CARE where he served as president of that relief organization.

From December onwards the center held a daily morning briefing attended by close to 100 participants from the United Nations and relief agencies, as well as UNITAF headquarters and its major military components—that is, those who commanded the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS)—into which the UNITAF area was divided. The threefold objective was to share information on security, explain UNITAF ground rules and plans, and coordinate protection and escorts for food convoys within Mogadishu, and subsequently for those moving into the interior. Together with my staff I gave periodic briefings on political developments. The center was an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational coordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions. By developing good personal relationships the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief community.

The only serious unresolved problem was the extremely complicated and dangerous one of protecting relief personnel and facilities, including the disposition of heavily-armed private guards hired at high prices by most relief organizations prior to the arrival of UNITAF. On the one hand, UNITAF believed it could not allow guards to brandish their weaponry—including “technicals” or heavily armed vehicles—in public, especially since most of them were actually members of one militia faction or another, and some also moonlighted as bandits. On the other hand, relief workers felt the guards provided extra protection, or were afraid to fire them because of reprisals, which was a common fear. Despite a lot of dialogue and much study, UNITAF and the relief agencies—and later UNOSOM II—were unable to come to terms with this problem.

Extending UNITAF’s Reach

On December 15, I flew to Baidoa, the center of the famine belt, to meet with community leaders—including clan elders, religious figures, women, and local political leaders. The purpose of the meeting was twofold: to defuse potential resistance to the Marine helicopter landing the next day and to lay the groundwork for the revival of local political institutions. The people of Baidoa were assured that the Marines were coming
in peace and as friends to help Somalia save itself, and not to impose any particular form of settlement. The United States respected Islam and would seek to honor local values and traditions. (In response to the fears of the senior Sheikh, I arranged for a marine of the Muslim faith to meet with him the next day as U.S. forces arrived; a few days later, the Catholic Relief Service was helping the Sheikh repair damaged mosques.) UNITAF intended to restore normalcy by banning technicals and confiscating arms belonging to local troublemakers. It was time for Baidoa’s traditional community leaders, long suppressed, to take charge again.

Looking hard at the putative local authorities—representatives of Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA)—who had been installed as governor, deputy governor, and police chief at gun point, I told everyone that leadership would no longer be imposed from outside but selected by the people themselves by local tradition. They were reminded that Siad Barre had imposed his will by force, which had caused people to rise up and organizations like the SNA to fight hard to oust him. Now that peace had been restored thanks to UNITAF, I said, surely Somalis would not like to see a return to imposed rule instead of making their own decisions and choosing their own leaders. The SNA representatives sheepishly said nothing while all the others enthusiastically agreed.

The Baidoa landing at dawn on December 16 went off without resistance, two weeks ahead of schedule in response to appeals from relief organizations which felt under increased threat once UNITAF arrived in Mogadishu. One of my political officers and a relief official worked with the military to involve local Somali leaders in security as well as other activities. Their efforts were coordinated by a combined civil-military Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), and the people of Baidoa created a regional council with security and humanitarian committees as a counterpart to the center.

Within several weeks the situation in Baidoa turned around. Local hospitals were dealing with a few gunshot wounds from isolated incidents rather than large numbers of victims of civil war, mass starvation, and unchecked disease. Markets and streets, once deserted, again bustled with activity. The military as well as NGOs, U.N. agencies, and the Red Cross provided food, medicine, and health care, repaired clinics and schools, and built roads and dug wells. Planning began to provide farmers with seed and agricultural equipment and herdsmen returned to their flocks.

Baidoa became a model for UNITAF deployments in the other humanitarian relief sectors: Kismayo, Bardera, Oddur, Jalalaqsi, Baledogle, Belet Uen, and Merka. In each case my advance team met a broad cross-section of the local population in advance to explain UNITAF objectives. The UNITAF commanders and our political officers encouraged local leadership to come forward. HOCs were established and local and regional councils sprang up. The vast majority
of local residents welcomed the coalition forces, the food situation improved, and child mortality rates dropped rapidly in all sectors. Relief workers welcomed the enhanced security, humanitarian help, and logistics support provided by UNITAF forces. Local cooperation was mixed; it was better in Baidoa and Merka than in Bardera and Kismayo where the residents feared retaliation from the still potent faction leaders. A common thread of concern by relief workers and Somalis alike, however, was that improvements would only be temporary; the departure of foreign forces would be followed by the return of intimidation and violence from the factions and militias.

An International Force

Essential to UNITAF’s effectiveness were the non-U.S. forces in the four critical sectors. In Kismayo, the 10th Mountain Division worked closely with the 850-member Belgian paratroop battalion. The 2,000 French troops did an outstanding job in Oddur, as did 2,500 Italians based first at Jalalaqsi and later at Jowhar and parts of north Mogadishu. (Initial differences over the location and role of Italian forces were quietly and quickly resolved by military-to-military talks in Mogadishu and among senior officers in Rome and Washington and at CENTCOM headquarters.) The 850-man Canadian unit operating from Belet Uen, and the 650-man Australian unit, which took over from American forces in Baidoa in mid-January, performed admirably. The Canadians, French, and Australians conducted extensive patrols in their respective sectors to control technicals and arms caches in remote locations as well as to protect relief activities. The Italian forces worked closely with the Marines in Mogadishu and also in protecting relief convoys along supply routes to the interior. Belgian forces and the U.S. Army coordinated effectively in Kismayo but encountered ongoing problems with periodic violence between two Somali factions.

Non-U.S. forces were notably active, engaging in community development projects (such as building schools and roads and repairing irrigation canals and tube wells) which went beyond their official responsibilities to escort the food convoys. The Canadians, French, and Australians worked hard to revive broad community leadership, encouraging creation of, and then cooperating with, local councils on security and humanitarian matters and forming local Somali police units. Taking the lead from the Baidoa model, they called frequently upon our political officers and relief representatives for help. The Italians worked closely with Americans in encouraging the former Somali police to recreate an interim force for Mogadishu of some 3,500 men and 60 women. The Moroccan battalion was given responsibility for Baledogle, taking over from the U.S. Army, and for guarding installations in Mogadishu. The Moroccan hospital became a major asset, as did the Swedish. A new Pakistani battalion took over part of Mogadishu from the Marines and did very well. General Johnston also utilized smaller contingents in Mogadishu: forces from Botswana, Zimbabwe, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, and other nations which contributed troops provided security at selected locations or for specific operations such as feeding programs.

Overall, U.S. and foreign forces in Mogadishu and the interior conducted themselves with a high degree of discipline and dedication, exercising considerable restraint under arduous conditions. Johnston skillfully managed disparate national contingents that had joined UNITAF in response to President Bush’s appeal, despite the fact that there had been no advance planning regarding the particular capabilities needed. There were added complications affecting several units which lacked a common language or training, or which were woefully under-equipped. Despite these obstacles, Johnston and his staff were able to develop a surprising degree of cohesion and common purpose, assigning permanent liaison officers to the various units who kept in
constant communication with his headquarters. He also had weekly meetings with the commanders of all national units at which strategy, plans, tactics, and problems were discussed. Johnston allowed the commanders of national units considerable discretion in how they carried out common mission objectives, taking into consideration differences in doctrine, training, and equipment, as well as the extent of territory in the humanitarian relief sectors and the degree of the threat.

**UNITAF’s Accomplishments**

By late January there were almost no light weapons visible on the streets of Mogadishu, night helicopter patrols had stopped, and little shooting was heard in the night. Searches for arms caches in the city were gradually increased with Botswanan and Pakistani forces, who impressed U.S. officers with their proficiency and discipline, participating with Americans and Italian forces. A great deal of commercial activity had resumed; streets outside the green-zone no-man’s land were crowded and schools began to re-open. By late February 35 dry feeding stations were providing two-kilogram rations to one million people a week, and neither starvation nor food theft were any longer problems. A UNITAF-Somali soccer championship attracted a crowd of more than 30,000 who ignored scores of graves outside the stadium. By April a uniformed Somali police force of more than 3,000 was on the streets with UNITAF liaison officers.

Except for a minor uprising by Aideed’s supporters in late February the Oakley/Johnston strategy of seeking cooperation, avoiding direct confrontation if possible, and gradually increasing pressure on all factions was working. UNITAF suffered very few casualties in Mogadishu during its five-month deployment. Somali casualties caused by UNITAF cannot be accurately determined due to the customary practice of carrying away the dead, but they were probably fewer than fifty. Compared with the numerous incidents in which UNITAF forces encountered sporadic shooting or mass stone-throwing, the low casualty rate among Somalis shows how hard and how successfully UNITAF commanders worked to instill restraint and discipline into the behavior of troops from all nationalities and at all levels. Similar progress took place in the countryside with the exception of Kismayo where an ongoing feud between the faction of Colonel Omar Jess (Aideed’s ally) and the forces belonging to Colonel Hersi Morgan (Siad Barre’s son-in-law) resulted in periodic, low-level skirmishes despite UNITAF’s best efforts. But even here there was no return to major conflict, since most Somalis were eager for peace and the local leaders were struggling to assert themselves.

UNITAF focused on putting weapons out of circulation primarily to facilitate the movement of the relief convoys and to gradually weaken the power of the faction leaders by immobilizing their militias and precluding the use of force for political purposes. This approach to disarmament or arms control was deliberately planned to have a positive impact on the embryonic process of building governmental structures from the ground up, centered on the local and regional councils. Baidoa represented the most successful example of resurrecting a municipal council not under the thumb of a faction leader, but progress in this direction was also achieved in Merka, Belet Uen, Oddur, and to a lesser degree in Bardera.

By the time UNOSOM II assumed control and UNITAF was disbanded, large-scale famine and disease had been overcome in southern Somalia, there was virtually no clan warfare, and relief agencies were cutting back on feeding programs as local harvests returned to near-normalcy. This happened only because of international help with tools, seed, and irrigation—as well as protection so that farmers could go back to their fields. In several regions, councils with civilian leaders, including women and tribal elders and religious leaders, were operating. Some schools and clinics had reopened as had some businesses. Problems of banditry persisted, however, directed mainly against foreigners and those few Somalis with material wealth (such as cars, radios, watches, and cameras). Several major militias had not been demobilized, and hidden weapons were abundant. Personal and clan tensions remained high, but peace was only threatened in Kismayo.
Lessons of the Past

American military and civilian leaders in Somalia benefitted from the experience in Vietnam and Lebanon. Having been involved in both, General Johnston and I were determined to avoid the mistakes of these earlier conflicts. A better political-military understanding of the local situation and U.S. objectives—including how best to combine political, military, and humanitarian actions—was needed.

In Vietnam the United States had tried to run everything and had progressively sidelined the Vietnamese, turning them essentially into passive onlookers in their own country. Washington had actively pressed a new form of government, elections, and a constitution on Saigon, very closely modeled on the American system. Institution-building had civilian and military advisors taking the lead in both planning and carrying out social and economic and development programs, creating local militia and police forces, and assuming responsibility for political reconstruction from village level up. U.S. military forces took over most combat operations, relegating the South Vietnamese military to pacification, thus killing the incentive of the best officers to fight for their own country. Although well-intentioned, the intrusive approach failed, leaving the South Vietnamese ever more demoralized and ineffectual. When the United States departed these programs collapsed overnight.

This general approach would not be repeated in Somalia. Even though the situations were not comparable, America would not take responsibility, unilaterally or through the United Nations, for running Somalia or imposing specific solutions on its profound social, political, and economic problems. To say that Somalia had to save itself could not be just a slogan. Our insistence that interim Somali police forces be established as soon as possible was derived directly from the basic approach to helping the Somalis and minimizing the U.S. and UNITAF roles whenever possible. It also had a very desirable secondary result of minimizing contact with the Somali population in situations that were apt to create friction, thereby reducing both Somali political opposition and the risk of UNITAF casualties. Ultimately it would be up to Somalis at all levels to develop viable political and administrative institutions. UNITAF could help get this process off to a good start and provide long-term help.

In Lebanon during the early 1980s, American intervention was intended to act as a neutral agent to end fighting between Christians and Muslims in Beirut as part of a larger effort to broker an Arab-Israeli settlement. When Navy ships offshore were ordered to shell Syria and Lebanese Moslem targets in East Beirut, however, marines on shore suddenly became the target themselves. Flawed understanding and management of underlying political conditions had inadvertently turned U.S. intervention—in the eyes of Syria, Iran, most Palestinians, most Lebanese, and virtually the entire Arab world—from neutrality to partisanship in the Israeli occupation. Retribution was not long in coming and a suicide mission took the lives of 241 marines in barracks near Beirut airport. The United States then pulled out.

For the U.S. political and military leadership in Somalia, the lesson of Lebanon was loud and clear: don’t take sides, and proceed carefully. If anything, the message was more pertinent in Somalia because of complex clan rivalries, struggles among a gaggle of faction leaders, and the great sense of pride and independence of the Somali people. Faction leaders at first vied with each other for U.S. support even though later the mood of the Aideed faction soured. Americans would not pick a winner or designate a favorite, but rather would turn all factions away from using force and intimidation and toward joining together in the civil society to pursue a political remedy.

UNITAF decided to avoid direct confrontation in favor of the gradual disarmament of all the faction leaders, working whenever possible to implement agreements which the leaders had reached and holding out the promise of rehabilitation aid as well as relief. This, as well as a demonstrated readiness to respond with overwhelming force against those who broke the cease-fire or attempted to use force for political purposes, caused the faction leaders to avoid confronting UNITAF. It also put an end to clan conflict except for sporadic problems between
Colonels Jess and Morgan centered on Kismayo. Combined with the rapid arrival of humanitarian assistance, this generated overwhelming popular support for UNITAF (except for Aideed’s Habr Gedir subclan). The political-military-humanitarian strategy enabled us to achieve the objectives of facilitating humanitarian operations, stopping death and destruction, and not becoming the target of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Aideed’s Challenge

It was probably inevitable that Aideed would confront and challenge UNOSOM II. By late February he had already recognized that international peacekeeping—whether U.S.- or U.N.-led—would not dovetail with his interests. Aideed was obsessed with what he fully believed to be his destiny to become Somalia’s leader, a belief acquired by success in driving Siad Barre out of the country and enhanced by ruthlessness, cleverness, and leadership traits. His protestations about adhering to a political process were coupled with repeated attempts to subvert it whenever his SNA faction seemed to be losing out. However, UNITAF’s close surveillance, firm hand, and reputation for decisive action kept him in check, except for a brief protest in late February. Following that short-lived action, we had a very private, very pointed talk with Aideed about what would happen to him if there were to be a repeat. Although seething, Aideed took no further anti-U.S. action at that time.

After May 4 and the departure of American combat forces (except for a 1,200-man quick reaction force), UNOSOM apparently concluded that its depleted strength and expanded missions—inter alia covering all Somalia—did not permit frequent patrols and tight control of Mogadishu. High-level dialogue with Aideed and his faction ceased. Aideed began to move men and weapons back into the city, and stepped up anti-U.N. vitriol over his radio. The challenge to U.N. authority exploded following the ambush of Pakistani troops on June 5 by Aideed supporters, the Security Council call for punishment of those responsible, and the UNOSOM decision to seek Aideed’s arrest and destroy his command center.

A cycle of violence has ensued in which scores of Somalis, U.N. troops, journalists, and others have been killed or severely injured. U.N. relief agencies and NGOs moved their top staff out of south Mogadishu to Nairobi and UNOSOM II seems bogged down in south Mogadishu by fruitless attempts to capture Aideed and vicious urban warfare, including the deliberate use by the Aideed faction of women and children against UNOSOM forces. As the Department of State has acknowledged, Aideed was clearly winning the public relations battle abroad and casting doubt on UNOSOM among Somalis who in no way supported him. He began to deliberately target U.S. troops, thinking that he can energize public opinion in the United States against keeping Americans in Somalia as happened in both Vietnam and Lebanon. This challenges the UNOSOM mission—humanitarian relief or peace-enforcement—and also the competence of its command and control. It created new dilemmas for humanitarian relief, and raised the larger issue of how peacekeepers with a mandate to use force should function where there is a strong local challenge to their mission, and where casualties
are inevitable among the uninvolved indigenous population, opposing forces, and U.N. personnel.

Focusing on Aideed seems to have caused a temporary memory loss about what UNITAF, the United Nations, and international relief agencies accomplished in Somalia since last December. Death and destruction outside of south Mogadishu have virtually ended; there has been continued evolution toward peaceful resolution of disputes and a more normal agricultural and pastoral life. Even in Kismayo, traditional leaders have come to the fore and concluded a peace agreement after four weeks of talks and despite the opposition of Colonels Jess and Morgan.

It is clear that Somalia absent a national government remains split along clan and subclan lines and that there is a pressing need to move ahead with a political and economic agenda which addresses national reconciliation and reconstruction. Aideed has received no support from the other faction leaders except for his SNA ally, Omar Jess. Moreover, apart from confrontation in south Mogadishu, there is real interest and some progress elsewhere in advancing the framework for reconciliation laid down in the Addis Ababa accords.

Reflections

Some contend that the Aideed problem was caused by a refusal on the part of United States and UNITAF to carry out a comprehensive disarmament program and/or the premature withdrawal of U.S. forces before adequate replacements arrived to bring UNOSOM II up to its goal of 28,000 personnel. However, President Bush had taken an absolutely categoric position in early December against taking on this or any other long-term nation building responsibilities, and made it clear that U.S. forces and UNITAF should be replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping force in early 1993.

President Clinton endorsed this position with equal firmness and communicated it clearly to the United Nations. U.S. forces with UNITAF were prepared to help with additional disarmament during the transition, had the U.N. commanders and staff arrived as expected in April. However, the U.N. Secretariat and Security Council were not working from the same timetable.

While no one can confidently claim that another approach by UNITAF or UNOSOM II could have prevented a confrontation with Aideed, several observations can be made. First, the importance of UNOSOM II applying sustained pressure on other faction leaders, and maintaining momentum generated for concerted political-military-humanitarian action, cannot be overemphasized. This principle will also apply in other peacekeeping operations. Second, it was critical to have adequate forces, equipment, and command and control procedures agreed on by both the political and military authorities of troop contributors. The latter needs to be assured not only at the outset but also in the event of changing circumstances on the ground by a suitable consultative mechanism. And third, one must recognize the soundness of the traditional U.N. peacekeeping stance against taking sides or making permanent enemies, in contrast to an immediate response to attacks on U.N. forces or employing force when necessary to achieve the mission. Obviously individuals directly involved in armed, unprovoked attacks on U.N. forces are beyond the limits of dialogue. The most effective approach would seem to be that under consideration by the United Nations and explicitly called for by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in late August: a renewed, broad-based approach to all clans and subclans, including Aideed’s Habr Gedir, and to traditional as well as faction leaders; an effort to revitalize the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation agreed to by Somalis at the Addis Ababa conference; and the continued improvement of the security situation, including disarmament of heavy weapons and strengthening the fledgling, interim Somali police force.

Lessons for Peacekeeping

The traditional distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in largely internal conflicts (humanitarian peacekeeping) is being eroded. The concept of peacekeeping operations as minimal in terms of personnel and armament—requesting permission from local authorities before taking action pursuant to the mission, and using force only in response to direct threat
or attack—is coming to be recognized as often inviting failure, rather than always demonstrating peaceful intent. There is a growing recognition that in many situations, the United Nations must be perceived as having the military capability, the will to use it, and the decisiveness to win armed confrontations. There is also recognition that peacekeeping, theoretically conducted under chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, can quickly become peace-enforcement under chapter VII as events on the ground evolve.

The U.S. doctrine of overwhelming force from the outset is increasingly understood as the best means in certain situations of achieving a peacekeeping mission and minimizing confrontation and casualties on all sides. Comparing the results of the U.N. Pakistani peacekeeping contingent deployed to Somalia under UNOSOM I with the results of the U.S.-led coalition force deployed to Somalia as UNITAF, the Security Council decided to empower UNOSOM II with essentially the same military powers, rules of engagement, and command and control.

However, the experiences of UNOSOM II and other recent peacekeeping operations show the need for better, more detailed agreement by troop contributing nations on command and control procedures, advance planning, and ensuring adequate forces and material are on the ground when operations begin. They also indicate the need for ongoing high-level consultation and flexibility—present for operations in Cambodia (UNTAC) but absent from UNOSOM II. And there is need to provide for ending U.N. involvement and shifting responsibility to local leaders and the people.

Peacekeeping operations often involve more than simply keeping the peace or promoting political settlements; they also involve extensive humanitarian relief and rehabilitation; repatriating refugees and displaced persons; developing infrastructure; building institutions (such as elections and political structures); demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating local armed forces and militias; and creating effective, impartial police and indigenous security forces. Each of these elements is vitally important for the success or failure of the overall mission.

The political, military, and humanitarian elements of many peacekeeping operations cannot be logically disjoined. Peacekeeping operations are essentially political operations carried out by military means. Political preparation and continuing dialogue can reduce casualties and increase the chances of military success. The converse is also true. The leverage of political efforts to broker peace agreement is bolstered by sufficient military strength. (In Somalia, UNITAF had adequate strength; in Angola, the U.N. force—UNAVEM II—did not.) Humanitarian and economic thrusts complement and reinforce political-military thrusts if used in concert, or they can complicate them if not used properly. The United Nations, its member states, and NGOs should take the needs for this sort of coordination explicitly into account in their initial planning.

The U.N. Secretariat must be substantially strengthened to organize, manage, and support peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Organization in the field must be able to coordinate and lead multifaceted, civil-military operations, not merely exhort. The right combination of command structure, personnel, and logistical support are needed for U.N. headquarters and the field. This means that member states must contribute more funds, people, and equipment as well as cooperate more closely with U.N. and non-governmental agencies.
The humanitarian assistance operations undertaken in Somalia by the Armed Forces during the last year have brought relief to millions of people who faced famine or even starvation. They have also presented a number of challenges that are likely to confront the commanders of similar nontraditional military operations in the future.

U.S. activities in Somalia fall into three phases. Operation Provide Relief began in August 1992 as an emergency airlift of food and other urgently needed materials through Kenya to supply starving Somalis. By November, it had become apparent that the magnitude of the task, coupled with U.N. organizational deficiencies and a lack of security within Somalia, precluded delivery of sufficient supplies. Hence the United States offered to lead a U.N.-sponsored operation, Restore Hope, which ultimately involved contributions by more than thirty nations. The final objective of that effort, to transition to a U.N.-led operation, was subsequently realized in May 1993, when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), commanded by a Turk, Lieutenant General Bir, assumed control of military activity in central and southern Somalia.

Each phase has required innovative solutions by commanders and their staffs, both in CONUS and deployed. This account offers some insights into both Operation Provide Relief and UNOSOM II, but primarily focuses on Operation Restore Hope which had the most extensive U.S. involvement.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) began preparations for nontraditional operations in earnest four years ago in the aftermath of a lengthy search to locate Congressman Mickey Leland and his party who were lost when their aircraft crashed en route to visit a refugee camp in Ethiopia. The effort underscored the need to get a commander on the scene with the requisite equipment and staff to assess the situation quickly and initiate action. Toward that end the CENTCOM standing plan for conducting humanitarian assistance in an austere environment was revised to include a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). CATEX 92–3, an exercise designed to evaluate the concept in 1992, was developed with the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance of the Department of State. The First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF), the CENTCOM Marine component, was designated a Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Joint Task Force (JTF) for future operations and was tasked to conduct an exercise in California simulating bare-base conditions in a nonpermissive environment. Just as Internal Look 90 helped prepare for Operation Desert Shield, CATEX 92–3 ended shortly before the deteriorating situation in Somalia required U.S. action. The lessons learned and the validated HAST concept allowed us to rapidly react to President Bush’s
order to commence Operation Provide Relief in August 1992.

**Operation Provide Relief**

Numerous private international relief organizations had attempted to provide aid to Somalia in the wake of the 1991 fall of the Siad Barre regime despite a tenuous security situation in which bands of armed gunmen preyed on each other and innocent civilians in a struggle for dominance. Recognizing the need to stabilize a country where anarchy and starvation were rampant, the United Nations passed Resolution 751 in April 1992 which provided for the presence of fifty observers in Mogadishu to be followed by additional peacekeepers to maintain order. In an effort in September 1992 apart from Provide Relief, the United States supported this new UNOSOM by transporting a security force of 500 Pakistanis and their equipment to Mogadishu. The Pakistani battalion was the first increment of what was to be a larger force, but it was soon clear that peacekeeping forces were not the answer.

Provide Relief was set in motion on August 16, 1992 with the dispatch by CENTCOM of a HAST which became the nucleus for a JTF which was established within days to both organize and operate the airlift of humanitarian relief supplies. The operation set an important precedent for U.S. military involvement in relief operations in a semi-permissive environment and not pursuant to a natural disaster. It also surfaced problems in several important areas. The need for a host-nation agreement to provide bases for the airlift immediately became apparent. Initial reluctance by Kenya to support the staging of the operation from Mombasa was overcome by assurances that the efforts would be limited in scope, that the JTF would withdraw on completion, that relief efforts would start with flights to refugee camps at Wajir in Kenya, and that there would be appropriate reimbursement for use of or damage to facilities.

Early efforts on the part of governmental agencies and the country team were key to making our intentions clear to the host government to allay misunderstandings. Additionally, working in concert with AID and other agencies was essential to success. For future operations the integration of the full range of political, humanitarian, and security efforts needs to be planned and exercised. Even today, after more than a year in Somalia, full integration has not been achieved.

Dealing with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the principal donors of relief aide, proved challenging. NGOs are staffed by spirited frontline relief workers, many of whom are true heroes of humanitarian assistance. To minimize fear expressed by NGOs over the involvement of the Armed Forces in humanitarian operations, JTF leadership must ensure that NGOs understand the military mission. It was also crucial that the military appreciated the culture and central role of NGOs and establish a team effort built around a Relief Coordination Committee and a Centralized Airlift Coordination Committee. Once operational both committees soon demonstrated the added value of the JTF in organization and efficiency, plus much improved throughput offered by 14 C–130 aircraft.

Security was also a complex problem, requiring both arrangements for U.S. forces and the added dimension of security for relief supplies—the most valuable commodity in Somalia and the target of bandit gangs. Providing adequate security for C–130 delivery missions was complicated by a firm policy of the International Committee of the Red Cross prohibiting weapons on aircraft transporting relief cargo. The solution was an airborne reaction force to accompany each flight and be available *in extremis* if conditions on the ground deteriorated. In addition to providing security in Somalia, a threat assessment was made and appropriate precautions were taken at both airfields and JTF headquarters in Kenya. Future operations will likely face similar security conditions, and force protection must remain among the commander’s top priorities.

---

*General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, is Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. He served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations at Headquarters, Marine Corps, immediately prior to assuming his present position.*
Finally, media coverage of the spreading famine in Somalia had an impact on the operation, though not as great as reports may lead one to believe. The news media influenced public opinion which resulted in a largely favorable response to the airlift. An open media policy encouraged the full participation of journalists by providing logistic support per DOD guidelines.

Operation Restore Hope

Although shipments of food vastly increased—Provide Relief ultimately delivered 28,000 metric tons of supplies or 112 million meals—the magnitude of the famine and breakdown in order meant that the airlift alone could not ameliorate the widespread starvation in Somalia. The problem was addressed by the United Nations in December 1992 with the passage of Resolution 794 which authorized U.N. military action in response to the President’s offer to assume leadership of a U.N. coalition to establish a secure environment for relief operations. Selective “disarming as necessary” became an implied task which led to the cantonment of heavy weapons and gave UNITAF the ability to conduct weapons sweeps.

Operation Restore Hope was conducted in that twilight area between peace and war—an environment of political anarchy, with no Somali government or normal state institutions, and an unprecedented U.N. chapter VII mandate authorizing peace-enforcement by all means necessary. This required rules of engagement tailored to allow the on-scene commander maximum flexibility to determine what constituted a threat and what response was appropriate, including first use of deadly force. Near-universal acceptance by coalition partners of the U.S.-crafted rules of engagement helped to minimize casualties on all sides by clearly demonstrating U.S. and U.N. will to restore order.

Another operational issue was the development of an appropriate force structure for the mission. Naval forces already in-theater were first on the scene. An Amphibious Ready Group with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit provided the initial building block for constructing the JTF, which required a sufficient U.S. capability to go it alone and the flexibility to accommodate coalition contributions as they materialized. Elements of both deliberate and crisis action
planning were incorporated into an iterative process to produce the operations order. Face-to-face contact at both the commander and the staff level was useful in arriving at a balanced, joint force structure matched to the operational requirements. It included elements from the First Marine Expeditionary Force, 10th Mountain Division, Air Force and Navy units (such as critical support from reconnaissance-capable, carrier-borne F–14 aircraft), a team from the Joint Communications Support Element, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) including both Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units. Detailed discussions were held with the commanders being committed, component commanders, chiefs, the Chairman, and National Command Authorities, plus senior representatives from the Department of State and other governmental agencies as well as the President’s Special Envoy for Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley.

With an approved mission, rules of engagement, and force structure, the focus shifted to the execution of Restore Hope. The concept of operations designated Mogadishu as the center of gravity; the city had to be relatively secure prior to expanding to the interior where the humanitarian need was most acute. In view of difficulties experienced by the outnumbered Pakistani battalion at the Mogadishu airport, the application of overwhelming force was prescribed to intimidate lawless gangs and rival clans, force their cooperation, and ensure the rapid seizure of all key terrain.

Another element critical to overall success was the integral role of Ambassador Oakley in the political preparation of the humanitarian battlefield. He preceded the military into each planned relief sector to confer with the elders and reassure them of the neutrality and strictly humanitarian intentions of the U.S./U.N. forces about to arrive, but left no doubts about the consequences of failing to cooperate. This courageous personal political campaign was key to turning the tide in the psychological contest for the respect and confidence of the Somalis, and it began the process of breaking the strangle hold of the warlords and bandits.

Also crucial was the effective application of other information-related resources, including intelligence, PSYOP and CA expertise, and the public affairs effort. Embarking on an operation in a locale which had previously been a low priority intelligence target required an all hands effort by the intelligence community. A shift in resources to focus rapidly on Somalia was required to both create new architecture and build a detailed database. Initially, a lack of human intelligence forced reliance on technology-based systems; the speed with which the intelligence apparatus was formed reflected lessons learned from the Gulf War.

CA personnel established links with local leaders and gained information on the needs of the Somalis. This was useful in addressing those needs and tailoring PSYOP campaigns, efforts that combined leaflets and radio broadcasts to spread the message that UNITAF was there to help. The public affairs effort was also essential to success. Working closely with the media in Somalia the military publicized the good work being done by UNITAF forces. Media coverage is virtually real-time, driving public opinion on the critical issues of the day. Thus the attention to the media was crucial not only for success on the ground in Somalia, but to sustain public support for the operation in the United States and internationally. The combined information effort contributed significantly to the virtually unopposed UNITAF occupation of all sectors, and helped to maintain firm control in southern Somalia.

The final operational concern was the need for close coordination with relief agencies for which we were tasked to provide security. Necessary coordination with the agencies was achieved by the Civil-Military Operations Center which was manned by UNITAF personnel from both U.S. and coalition forces. A similar organization, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center in the Central Command Plans and Policy Directorate, was comprised of a representative from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Reserve augmentees. Both centers paid big dividends...
in facilitating the information flow and keeping operations in tune with the needs of the humanitarian relief community.

Deploying 28,000 people 8,000 miles to an austere environment was as formidable as the operational challenge. Somalia had primitive airfields, barely usable seaports, disintegrating road networks that did not link population centers, and roadways rendered impassable by fallen bridges and washouts. There was no electricity, no water, no food, no government, and no economy. Additionally, our forces had to provide security for NGOs which were attempting to save millions of Somalis from starving. Deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon: everything needed had to be brought in or built there. Every scrap of lumber, drop of fuel, drink of water, and slice of bread had to be brought in from outside. From a logistics perspective, Somalia was a nightmare. The ultimate bare-base environment created four primary logistics challenges: projecting major force, establishing the airbridge, building an expeditionary infrastructure, and managing coalition logistics support.

Somalia was the first major force projection in an operation other than war. To meet this logistical challenge, we had to rely on a variety of resources. In selected cases, critical life support equipment and materiel handling equipment prepositioned in the CENTCOM area of responsibility was drawn on to reduce time and cost of deployment. Air Force prepositioned materiel was used at en route basing sites and in Somalia. The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force provided initial unit equipment and sustainment for forces ashore. Army materiel prepositioned afloat also contributed although pierside offloading was prohibited by ship size and draft. Another challenge was the high sea state which precluded in-stream offload. The Offshore Petroleum Distribution System provided immediate and continuing fuel storage and distribution capability otherwise not found in Central Somalia.

Establishing the airbridge to Somalia also presented some unique problems. Strategic air flow was slowed by an extended 8,000-mile transit, limited availability and capability of en route basing sites, and poor in-country airfields. All this was compounded by maintenance difficulties and weight restrictions that plagued our aging strategic airlift fleet. The shortage of ramp space at Mogadishu, the deterioration of the runway at Baledogle, and lack of lighting and navigational aids (with the need for FAA airfield certification), exacerbated the problem in the initial phases.

Sealift was similarly hampered by problems such as a harbor that had not been dredged for more than two years, limited berthing space, sunken vessels in and near the port, a near absence of port services (operational cranes, lighting, electricity, etc.) and high sea states. A lack of proper handling equipment restricted cargo flows to 20-foot containers and only permitted self-sustaining vessels to make port calls. Nevertheless the expert management of the port of Mogadishu by the commander of the Maritime Prepositioning Force and the 7th Transportation Group from the Army avoided the disastrous bottlenecks some had predicted and maximized cargo throughput.

Austere conditions required the deployment of nearly four thousand engineer personnel to provide expeditionary infrastructure to support the operation. They opened main supply routes and airfields as well as constructing such facilities as fixed tents, heads, showers, kitchens, and wells. Mission-related necessities were given priority over nation building. Nevertheless much of the construction served both purposes. Many other needs were satisfied early in the deployment when other sources were not yet available through the extensive use of the Logistics Contract Augmentation Program, an Army-managed program that centralizes contracting with single sources to streamline the process and reduce response time.

Some logistic issues were endemic to the nature of coalition operations. Legal restrictions prohibit giving away DOD supplies and services, even to coalition members. Yet
many coalition members required logistical support. To meet this need we pieced together a system that relied on a variety of techniques, including foreign military sales cases, cross-servicing agreements, and special agreements under the Foreign Assistance Act. Although this system ultimately worked, the streamlined system embodied in the draft legislation submitted by CENTCOM, supported by DOD, and now working its way through Congress would be invaluable in future coalition operations.

The success of coalition logistics relied heavily on the roles of defense attachés and liaison officers from contributing nations in relating specifics on capabilities and support requirements that deploying forces would bring to the effort. They coordinated operational preferences through CENTCOM, relieving the JTF commander of some administrative burdens. Coalition attachés and liaison officers played other important roles as well. Attachés assigned to coalition embassies in Washington were invited to CENTCOM headquarters for orientation briefings and liaison officers were able to remain with the headquarters and operational staffs in Somalia. Also, SOF Coalition Support Teams were initially fielded to help participating forces facilitate liaison with UNITAF. These measures maintained coalition involvement and provided a smooth flow of information.

Coalition operations raised other concerns. Although willing to take the lead and provide the bulk of forces and logistical support, the United States recognized that the operation would be conducted under U.N. auspices and that only with the involvement of the international community would it seem legitimate and successful. Accordingly, the participation by Somalia’s African neighbors with similar regional interests as well as by both Middle East and Southwest Asian countries with cultural and religious affinities was a necessary ingredient. This mixture of forces was further strengthened by several of our Western allies with advanced equipment and valuable experience in both NATO and U.N. operations.

The large number of countries offering immediate deployment of military forces presented further challenges such as how best to employ varied resources, organize such a force and maintain unity of command, and deal with logistic support requirements and varying levels of interoperability. To handle an almost overwhelming number of potential coalition offers, CENTCOM headquarters retained approval authority and screened each offer in order to lift some of the administrative and coordination burden from UNITAF. The capabilities of contributors—including self-sufficiency, mobility, and willingness to adhere to American operational control and rules of engagement—were weighed against the operational requirements of the mission. Political considerations were also taken into account. In order to screen international offerings CENTCOM developed a questionnaire which was disseminated by the Department of State via defense attachés. Nations wishing to participate returned the completed questionnaires through diplomatic channels. After deployment approval, requirements for strategic lift, support, and funding were completed.

The unique problems of Restore Hope demanded an effective command structure. Unlike the coalition during the Gulf War, potential contributors were asked to place their participation by Somalia’s African neighbors as well as by both Middle East and Southwest Asian countries was a necessary ingredient.
forces under the operational control of the U.S. commander. National representation was done through contingent commanders to UNITAF and a full-time liaison section which was part of a larger collective cell. Consequently, throughout Restore Hope, unity of command and unity of effort were retained. In addition, an effective and reliable communications network at all echelons of command greatly enhanced command and control of deployed forces.

From the outset the mission remained to provide a secure environment in which to deliver relief supplies to break the famine and to establish conditions for a rapid transition to U.N. control. By March 1993 UNITAF forces had succeeded in the assigned mission. Starvation was no longer an overriding problem and security was sufficient to allow transition to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II phase of the operation.

In planning for that transition, the United Nations accepted Turkey's offer to provide a commander, and American and Canadian offers to provide the deputy commander and chief of staff, respectively. The United Nations secured commitments for an international staff to replace the U.S. UNITAF staff and for longer-term troop contributions which eventually totalled 28,000. The United States agreed to commit a logistics support command for the general support of U.N. forces. In addition, for added stability during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM, the United States would provide a quick-reaction force and information support to the UNOSOM staff. These forces would support the United Nations but remain under CINCCENT operational control, with tactical control delegated to Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMUSFORSOM), who is also the deputy commander, UNOSOM II.

Terms of reference between CINCCENT and the UNOSOM II commander were developed for participation of the quick reaction force and information cell. Specific guidance for the use of these U.S. forces was spelled out to preclude confusion.

Efforts to effect an expeditious and seamless turnover were delayed by differing views that arose in part over the UNITAF success. Fortunately the unambiguous UNITAF mission statement precluded “mission creep” and clearly demarcated the difference between UNITAF and UNOSOM II roles. Longer-term U.N. efforts to promote national reconciliation and the desire to establish a presence in northern Somalia were appropriately left to UNOSOM II with its broader political and economic rehabilitation mandate. CENTCOM, however, raised concerns from the beginning with regard to the U.N. ability to logistically support a Somalia-wide operation, since the U.S. logistic support package was designed only for forces in southern Somalia and could not expand its role to other parts of the country without substantial augmentation.

UNOSOM II

The long-term solution for Somalia requires a fully developed humanitarian, economic, and political effort in addition to the military requirement. The seeds for these were sown in UNITAF, but their success depends on the necessary vision, commitment, coherent planning, and resources to follow through under UNOSOM II. CENTCOM facilitated the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in several ways. Operational and logistics planners were at work in New York as early as January 1993 to assist the under-manned U.N. Military Staff Committee in developing its concept of operations and list of logistics requirements. These planners remained available to the United Nations while it stood up a functional staff in Mogadishu in April.

Within CENTCOM headquarters, the Somalia working group shifted its focus to support interagency efforts, including working to resolve issues related to the transition and drawdown of U.S. forces. At the same time the Central Command Personnel Directorate assisted in assembling and rapidly deploying the U.S. contingent to UNOSOM II where the 47 Americans provided critical skills in the early days when the fledgling staff was operating at 30 percent strength—which emphasizes the need for new procedures to people U.N. military staffs in contingency situations.

Since the official turnover to UNOSOM II on May 4, 1993, CENTCOM has continued...
to play a pivotal role in the ongoing operation. The maintenance of security and continuation of relief operations within Humanitarian Relief Sectors created under Restore Hope required self-sufficient brigade size units or equivalent combinations. Thus a seamless transition to the U.N. operation depended on the active recruitment of international support to provide forces which would operate under UNOSOM II in accordance with a chapter VII mandate. Most nations with forces committed agreed to remain through the transition, and several new contributors were identified. Retaining a U.S. combat force presence was critical to keeping several contributors in the coalition. To some, only U.S. combat troops symbolize American resolve. The presence of the quick-reaction force, along with U.S. leadership in some key UNOSOM II positions, has not only done that but also encouraged other countries to follow through on their pledges of support. Efforts by CENTCOM, as executive agent for UNOSOM logistics support, to facilitate strategic lift and to outfit potential contributors have also helped to hold the coalition together. Another vital role for CENTCOM in the UNOSOM II operation has been to maintain close communications with COMUSFORSOM to ensure that the support needs of U.S. forces are being met.

A U.S. force of approximately 4,000 was tailored to stay in Somalia to support projected UNOSOM II needs. However, unanticipated shortfalls caused by the changed security situation, coupled with the slower than anticipated arrival of coalition forces and contributor support, have required adjustments. The challenge has been to modify the composition of our force to meet these new needs without significantly increasing its total size. Raising the profile of the Armed Forces in Somalia would undermine the perception of U.N. military forces as truly international and capable of meeting the task at hand. A highly visible American presence is not in the best interests of the United States or the United Nations.

Several important lessons have been validated through our experiences in Somalia over the past year that are key to success in humanitarian assistance operations. Their application is far-reaching in today’s volatile world. In the operational area there are three key lessons. First, the formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which defines measurable and attainable objectives is paramount. Second, the application of decisive, rather than just sufficient, force can minimize resistance, saving casualties on all sides. Finally, developing a comprehensive strategy that coordinates all instruments of national power—not just the military—greatly enhances the probability of achieving the stated objectives.

Equally important to humanitarian assistance is the logistical capability of the Armed Forces—a capability unmatched by any other military in the world. Prepositioned stocks and equipment afloat and ashore, along with strategic lift, constitute a unique capacity to support the massive force projection that future international actions may require. As fiscal realities result in a smaller force, we will need to exercise and refine our logistics capability to be sure that it does not atrophy. At the same time the United Nations must be encouraged to develop its own ability to rapidly contract logistics support for U.N. operations.

As seen in the central region over the last few years, we are unlikely to have the option of going it alone. A significant military action in support of humanitarian assistance will require an international coalition with each country contributing within its means. Then there will be a need to organize and maintain that coalition during operations.

Finally, the mission to Somalia has reaffirmed the unparalleled professionalism, dedication, resiliency, and valor of men and women from many nations who once again rose to a challenge and performed magnificently under trying conditions. These heroes, serving in or out of uniform, Americans as well as their coalition partners, are the reason that hundreds of thousands of Somalis were saved from starvation and that the foundation has been laid to restore their country.
The United Nations is conducting a major experiment in Somalia, one whose implications reach far beyond the Horn of Africa. Its aim is to determine whether collective military means can be successfully applied to halt fighting and restore order in countries torn by ethnic conflict, political chaos, or civil war. If it works, the world community will have a new tool among its multilateral peacekeeping instruments, an approach now being termed peace-enforcement.

Unfortunately, the results of the experiment so far are not encouraging and suggest a need to examine the lessons of Somalia carefully before peace-enforcement is attempted elsewhere.

Growing Frustrations

Internal conflicts like Somalia have historically been off-limits to U.N.-sponsored military forces, except when all the parties to the conflict agree to their deployment. In such cases, neutral mediators (U.N. officials...
or others) usually first persuade parties to stop fighting and agree to a truce. Once the situation stabilizes, U.N. observers or peacekeeping forces are asked to monitor ceasefire arrangements to reassure all parties that truce terms are being respected. Rarely have U.N. peacekeepers been expected to preserve the peace or restore order by force.¹

Over the years, lightly-armed U.N. forces have intervened in at least two dozen conflicts, always at the request of the parties concerned or with their tacit consent. Although peacekeeping tasks often placed these troops in the line of fire, force has largely been limited to self-protection. Despite this distinctly passive approach, traditional peacekeeping has for a generation contributed significantly to damping down conflicts and securing peace. Recent successes include deployments in Namibia, El Salvador and Nicaragua, Iran and Iraq, and Mozambique. In 1988 U.N. peacekeepers were collectively awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

But traditional-style U.N. peacekeeping has by no means always succeeded in keeping the peace, much less in bringing an end to fighting when the parties themselves were unwilling to lay down their arms. In an increasingly disorderly and chaotic world, scrupulous respect for national sovereignty and the consent of parties in conflict has grown harder to rationalize. Neat distinctions between international and internal conflicts have become blurred, while the collapse of authoritarian control in many states has unleashed violent ethnic rivalries and pressures for self-determination. Increasingly, frustrated statesmen have called for more robust instruments for applying multilateral pressure on parties in conflict.

Among many frustrating cases, Somalia is a classic illustration of the weaknesses of the traditional approach: when the United Nations attempted in mid-1992 to introduce a peacekeeping force to restore order and safeguard humanitarian relief operations there, its efforts were thwarted largely by the stubborn refusal of one faction to cooperate, namely, the United Somali Congress headed by General Mohammed Farah Aideed. A lightly-armed battalion of Pakistani troops who led the effort promptly became virtual prisoners in their own camp, unable to control food warehouses and key transport facilities and dependent on General Aideed’s troops even for their own security. The ill will between Pakistani soldiers and Aideed’s supporters continues to poison U.N. efforts in Somalia to this day.

Similar frustrations encountered elsewhere—most notably in the former Yugoslavia, but also in Cambodia, Angola, Lebanon, and on the fringes of the former Soviet empire—had already led members of the U.N. Security Council to ask Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali early last year to suggest ways of strengthening the organization’s ability to intervene in such conflicts, halt fighting, reduce innocent suffering, and promote recovery. The Secretary General accurately gauged the mood of the membership and recommended a tougher, more interventionist approach to peacekeeping. His recommendations were contained in a major report which called for deploying well-armed, combat-ready peace-enforcement units under U.N. command, within the framework of the collective security provisions of chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, if more traditional means failed to preserve international peace and security.² To a large extent the operation in Somalia—in its military as well as civil aspects—embodies these measures advanced by Boutros-Ghali.

Testing Peace-Enforcement

Circumstances combined to make Somalia the obvious test case for the Secretary General’s more assertive and muscular approach to multinational peacekeeping for a variety of reasons:

▼ Its collapse into anarchy had been so complete that the usually vexing issue of national sovereignty seemed irrelevant.

▼ Traditional peacekeeping had already proven inadequate as a means of restoring order and alleviating human suffering (the parallel crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina had exacerbated the sense of urgency and frustration which the Security Council felt about the traditional approach).

▼ America had taken matters into its own hands with Restore Hope which showed that a massive deployment of force could halt factional fighting and safeguard relief operations, thereby saving thousands of innocent lives while suffering almost no casualties.

▼ Some 19 other nations, recognizing the success of the U.S.-led humanitarian operation, eventually offered to contribute contingents, and most were prepared to leave them in place when the United Nations took charge.
The Clinton administration came to office determined not to be distracted from domestic economic issues by foreign crises where vital U.S. interests were not at stake, and it was anxious to find ways of sharing responsibility with other nations for managing nuisances like Somalia.

This resulted in intense negotiations during February and March 1993 between the Clinton administration and the U.N. Secretariat over the terms and timing for handing over responsibilities in Somalia. Ultimately it was agreed to seek a Security Council mandate for the successor U.N. operation (UNOSOM II) in order to give it unprecedented peace-enforcing authority to intervene, halt fighting, and impose order that the U.S.-led forces had enjoyed during Restore Hope. There was also insistence that the Security Council provide UNOSOM II with the weapons, equipment, and personnel needed to exercise that authority.

In addition Washington and New York agreed that America would remain directly engaged and fully committed to the success of the operation, by providing senior officers for UNOSOM II, a logistic capability with some 1,500 personnel to provide vital support, and a quick-reaction force of 1,200 troops to intervene in emergencies.

The Security Council unanimously approved the plan (Resolution 814) on March 26, 1993, and the new doctrine of peace-enforcement was scheduled be put to the test beginning on May 1.

UNOSOM II: Dramatically Different

The transition to U.N. authority marked the start of a much bolder and broader operation intended to tackle underlying social, political, and economic problems and to put Somalia back on its feet as a nation.

With strong U.S. backing the Security Council had approved an ambitious, experimental, and virtually open-ended mandate for UNOSOM II that would inevitably plunge the international community far more deeply into Somalia’s internal affairs than any previous case since the Congo. In addition to humanitarian relief UNOSOM II was to assist in “rehabilitating political institutions and the economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.” Its sweeping agenda for Somalia encompassed:

- economic relief and rehabilitation
- national and regional institutions
- police and law and order
- international humanitarian law
- refugees and displaced persons
- the clearing of land mines
- public information programs to support U.N. activities.

To the point of recent incidents, the resolution authorized, even expected, UNOSOM II to accomplish its goals by force if necessary. By declaring the Somali crisis “a threat to international peace and security,” it explicitly opened the way for applying forcible collective security measures provided for in chapter VII of the Charter. Accordingly, the Security Council voted to increase troop levels, tighten the arms embargo, and strictly enforce cease-fire and disarmament measures that Somali faction leaders had agreed on at the Addis Ababa peace conference earlier in the year.

Restore Hope had indeed left much undone that both Somalis and many others hoped it would do to correct the country’s ills and repair the damage done by two years of fighting. But the key to the operation’s obvious success may have been its very limits: it was explicitly not intended to pacify the country, disarm the warlords, demobilize armies, restore civil government, or solve the country’s accumulated political and social problems.

Everyone understood, of course, that fundamental problems—notably the root problem of guns in the hands of warlords and their followers—would have to be faced at some point down the road. U.N. officials
in particular, embarrassed by the failure of their initial attempt at peacekeeping in Somalia (and increasingly disturbed by General Aideed’s hostile behavior and rhetoric), hoped that his and rival factions would be disarmed and the country pacified before U.N. forces took over from the Americans. A great many Somalis echoed that hope and warned that the country would fall back into chaos if root problems were not addressed. But in its waning days, the Bush administration had been content to leave the longer-term problems to others.

UNOSOM II, on the other hand, was mandated to go directly to the causes of conflict and seek solutions that would optimize chances for real recovery. Not surprisingly, it was immediately challenged by the very warlord who had earlier adamantly opposed U.N. intervention. Predictably it has been plagued by command and control problems, organizational confusion, administrative weaknesses, funding shortfalls, and national policy differences that one might expect in such a novel multinational operation. But it has proven to be seriously weak just where Restore Hope was strong: its objectives were vaguely defined, its reach is exceedingly ambitious, and its results are difficult to measure.

**A Flawed Concept?**

Many of the difficulties that UNOSOM II has encountered to date are workaday operational problems that the U.N. experiment can help resolve. A much more serious weakness—perhaps a fatal flaw—lies in the very concept of peace-enforcement, the notion that peace can be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of outsiders.

Despite carefully laid transitional plans, UNOSOM as an experiment in peace-enforcement got off to a rocky start. Well before the transfer of responsibility in May,
teams of civilian experts began deploying to implement a series of agreements that Somali faction leaders had concluded at U.N.-sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa earlier in the year: committees were convened to draft an interim governing charter, groups assembled in towns and villages to organize local governing bodies, plans were drawn to create community-based police forces, and individuals were identified to be judges in a temporary court system.

But discord quickly arose when U.N. officials attempted to impose their views on how the Addis agreements should be implemented, what form the new governing charter should take, and how best to disarm and demobilize the factional militias. The reasons for the dispute are not entirely clear to outside observers. U.N. officials charge that General Aideed, after signing the agreements reluctantly, torpedoed them deliberately because he correctly feared his political power would be eroded. Habr Gedir supporters of Aideed, on the other hand, claim that it was U.N. officials who refused to honor the agreement terms or applied them unfairly, and who attempted to disarm Aideed’s militias more quickly than others.

Disagreement also broke out over whether the factions were compelled to conform to the UNOSOM program of meetings and negotiations or were free to deal among themselves. Early in June, in what now seems to be a watershed event, Aideed and some 200 representatives of rival clan factions met in Mogadishu to sign a peace agreement ending months of skirmishing between Habr Gedir and Majertain militias along territorial borders in central Somalia. At least on paper their agreement appears to reflect a commitment to peace and national unity—but it also proclaimed the intent by allied factions to work outside the UNOSOM framework, and it called for the speedy departure of the United Nations from Somalia. UNOSOM labeled the conference unauthorized and stigmatized the peace agreement as illegitimate.

Almost immediately thereafter shooting erupted in Mogadishu when U.N. forces acted to neutralize the radio station from which Aideed followers had ballyhooed the peace conference and previously had broadcast vitriolic attacks against UNOSOM. Before dawn on June 5 Pakistani troops together with American peacekeepers were dispatched to inspect depots where the forces of Aideed were to have deposited weapons for eventual U.N. safekeeping. Shooting broke out—it is not clear (or even material now) who fired the first shots, or where—and in the course of the day’s fighting 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed, along with an undetermined number of Somali fighters.

The Security Council response to the “premeditated armed attacks” on U.S. peacekeepers was swift and extraordinarily stern. Unanimously, its members embraced the preliminary version of events as reported by Boutros-Ghali (although he was instructed to investigate the incident and the faction leaders’ role in it). In angry terms, the Security Council:

▼ condemned the attacks as “part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate”
▼ demanded that all parties “comply fully with the . . . agreements they concluded” at Addis Ababa, in particular the cease-fire and disarmament agreements
▼ stressed the “crucial importance [of] neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks against UNOSOM II”
▼ authorized the Secretary General to arrest and detain “for prosecution, trial, and punishment” persons responsible for the attacks, and to take “all necessary measures . . . to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia.”

68
JFQ / Autumn 1993
Sobering Reports from Somalia

Media reports have amply covered the fighting and tension that have plagued Mogadishu since June. Aideed has not been apprehended, but scores of his Habr Gedir followers have been detained and dozens killed or wounded in punitive UNOSOM attacks on his headquarters and in other confrontations. More than fifty peacekeepers also have died with others wounded in what has become daily urban warfare in the streets and neighborhood around the UNOSOM compound.

Whatever else is said about the performance of UNOSOM, it is clear that its chief, Admiral Jonathan Howe, has done no more or less than what the Security Council authorized and expected him to do by attempting to capture Aideed and destroy his command structure. How UNOSOM would in fact carry out its mandate to try and punish the warlord if he were apprehended—and on what legal grounds—are unanswered questions in the context of Somalia’s anarchy.

Unfortunately, the UNOSOM preoccupation with neutralizing Aideed and his followers has distracted attention and resources almost completely from the rest of its vast agenda for Somalia. Despite UNOSOM claims to the contrary, continued fighting in the streets of Mogadishu between militiamen and peacekeepers has rendered them unsafe for normal civilian life, and there is ample evidence that the feud is delaying recovery in much of the rest of the country as well.

Admittedly, it is difficult to judge from afar the circumstances that led to the present feud between UNOSOM and Aideed’s Habr Gedir subclan. Media reports are sketchy, and accounts by both U.N. officials and Aideed supporters are influenced by self-interest. Certainly Aideed, who makes no secret of his political ambition or contempt for the United Nations, had long been a thorn in the side of U.N. commanders. But reports of unprovoked attacks and terrorist ambushes by Aideed loyalists leave many unanswered questions. Why, for instance, did UNOSOM attempt to take over Aideed’s radio station and inspect arms depots on June 5—the day after the controversial peace conference concluded—with only a few lightly-armed forces when it might have anticipated an angry reaction from Habr Gedir?

In the absence of independent clarification, one is forced to ask whether the heavy-handed response mandated by the Security Council and forcefully carried out by UNOSOM has not been out of proportion to the threat posed by Aideed. At a minimum, the campaign to punish him has been counterproductive in at least some respects: it has unquestionably made Aideed a hero among fellow clan members, who had grown tired of his antics and might have abandoned him; and it has seriously undercut prospects for achieving political accommodation between those factions allied with Aideed and their rivals.

Worrisome Implications

The UNOSOM attempt to impose peace by force on recalcitrant Somalis has also shaken the coalition that provides U.N. manpower and resources. The Italians, who have historic reasons to understand Somalis better than most, strongly differ with UNOSOM over its predilection for using force against a people notorious for their stubborn national pride. The Germans, concerned about being drawn into combat on what was to have been a humanitarian mission, are also having second thoughts. Governments of smaller nations that traditionally supply troops for peacekeeping duties are meanwhile questioning whether peace-enforcement could spell problems at home.

Events since June have also raised doubt about the new, more activist role of the Security Council itself—composed of less than one-tenth of the U.N. member nations, with five members permanently occupying seats—in overseeing the test application of peace-enforcement in Somalia. By exactly what legal or moral authority, for example, is the United Nations entitled to exercise force in Somalia or anywhere else? In addition, are sufficient checks and balances operating to govern Security Council actions and decisions?

Experience to date with peace-enforcement thus suggests the need to be skeptical...
about the approach and extremely cautious about applying it elsewhere. Most obviously for Americans, who overwhelmingly supported Restore Hope, it casts our Armed Forces in a far more controversial role as law enforcement agents, in an environment where law has ceased to exist, courts have collapsed, police are powerless, and standards of behavior are purely arbitrary. In the process, it has made them party to the underlying clan conflict while disrupting humanitarian relief efforts, short-circuiting attempts to rebuild Somali civil institutions, discouraging political dialogue among contending factions, and seriously delaying attempts to rebuild the ravaged economy.

These are not encouraging signs for a new approach to multilateral peacekeeping. If the United States and United Nations are to avoid becoming endlessly mired in the swamp that many predicted Somalia represented last year, the peace-enforcement experiment must be reformulated to meet the realities of the country, its people, and their problems. Here, by way of conclusion, are steps that UNOSOM could take to redress the dilemma of peace-enforcement in Somalia:

▼ Institute a unilateral cease-fire and appeal by radio to all Somali faction leaders to do the same; this could serve to make clear that the United Nations is not just another warring faction but in fact opposes the use of force to solve the country’s problems.

▼ Suspend efforts to arrest General Aideed and release the scores of Habr Gedir clan members detained as his followers pending restoration of an authentic Somali judiciary and penal system that might more credibly prosecute the case.

▼ Abandon, at least for now, unilateral attempts to enforce the Addis Ababa cease-fire and disarmament agreement, and instead encourage the faction leaders to meet and work out modalities and a timetable for disarmament to include an agreement on a verification role for UNOSOM.

▼ Call the attention of faction leaders to the renewed humanitarian problem that fighting in Mogadishu is causing and appeal for cooperation to move relief supplies to those who need them; declare an intention to escort relief convoys and warn that fire will be returned if the convoys are impeded or come under attack (thereby applying traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement).

▼ Schedule a new round of political talks among faction leaders, elders, politicians, and intellectuals at a neutral location, with a view to putting the political process securely back on track.

▼ Invite a neutral intermediary to visit Somalia immediately, investigate the circumstances surrounding recent incidents involving hostilities, interview all parties concerned, and then report the findings to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Such a mission would not only help to clear the air but would provide a cooling-off period to reopen a dialogue.

NOTES
1 The most dramatic exception occurred in the Congo during the early 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, when U.N. troops succeeded in preventing the secession of mineral-rich Katanga province. That controversial and costly experience nearly shattered the organization, however, and set a more modest tone for peacekeeping that prevailed until the collapse of the Soviet empire.


4 Ibid.


6 The UNOSOM attempt to corner and arrest Aideed is reminiscent of the British frustration during the period 1898 to 1920 with the so-called “Mad Mullah,” Mohammed Abdulle Hassan, a charismatic renegade and troublemaker (now a Somali folk hero) who repeatedly eluded colonial pursuers for more than two decades and finally died in bed of pneumonia.

7 See Resolution 837 which reaffirms the Secretary General’s authority under Resolution 814 to “take all necessary measures . . . to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia,” although the earlier resolution asserts no such authority.
critical of JCS. Eisenhower named the Rockefeller Committee to study defense organization. In 1957 the committee said there was an “excessive workload... [and a] difficult mix of functions and loyalties” and blamed “the system and not the members” for the poor quality of advice [the JCS] provided to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

Eisenhower could not initiate reform. It took two unsuccessful wars (Korea and Vietnam), a failed hostage rescue mission (Desert 1), and criticism from a sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to bring about major reorganization. When the House of Representatives began hearings on defense reorganization in 1982, the United States was engaged in the largest and most costly peacetime military build-up in the history of the Nation.

Toward Goldwater-Nichols

Three months before he retired as CJCS, General David Jones, USAF, proposed reforms in an article entitled “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change.” At a minimum, he indicated, the United States needed to strengthen the Chairman’s role, limit service staff involvement in the joint process, and broaden training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. The Jones plan was moderate yet significant in that he was still serving as Chairman at the time.

One month later, General Edward Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, announced his support for the Jones reforms and went even farther. Meyer called for abolishing JCS.
and replacing it with a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) composed of senior flag officers from each service, one civilian, and the Chairman. NMAC members would be distinguished retired or active four-star flag or general officers serving on terminal assignments.

Meyer thought it imperative to end dual-hatting and free the chiefs to focus more clearly on service responsibilities. The make-up of the NMAC would preserve the preeminent role of military leaders in advising the NCA. The members would not be dependent on, and never return to, their respective services. This stipulation would ensure military participation on the NMAC and largely eliminate the perceived conflict of interest present in dual-hatting.

Under the Meyer plan the Office of the Secretary of Defense would relinquish its leading role in policy and program development, although it would assume a major implementation role in both peace and wartime. In addition, the three service secretaries would lose some voice in policy matters but would have a stronger position in developing current and future force capabilities. The commanders in chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands would present their requirements in a series of continuous exchanges with the NMAC to initiate change. Meyer thought the arrangement would allow CINCs to exercise considerable influence on near-term programs.

The proposals by Jones and Meyer prompted hearings by the House Committee on Armed Services which opened in 1982, and the Senate Armed Services Committee began parallel hearings in 1985. A review of the testimony shows that service affiliation was the most reliable predictor of support for reform. The Army witnesses were more likely to advocate reform than those from the Navy, as suggested by the testimony of one former CJCS, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer:

...just as surely as the swallows return to Capistrano, the studies and recommendations

Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, is assistant chief of staff (G3), 1st Cavalry Division. An armor officer, he has taught at the U.S. Military Academy and is the coeditor of a book entitled *The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis*. 
concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff crop up at periodic intervals. . . . This makes about as much sense as reorganizing Congress or the Supreme Court to stop disagreements. . . . Everyone fancies himself a field marshal.\(^1\)

The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, also opposed reforms despite the fact that various independent reports were nearly unanimous in calling for strengthening JCS. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for instance, mirrored the Jones proposals. The reports and hearings increased reform momentum in the face of Reagan administration opposition. Congressman Ike Skelton introduced a resolution which paralleled Meyer’s plan, and a Senate staff study examined DOD organizational structures and decisionmaking procedures. These initiatives clearly signaled that some type of JCS reform was in the offing as the services mobilized witnesses and considerable political power in efforts to minimize change. Among other things, the military witnesses testified that strengthening the Chairman’s role would somehow threaten civilian control of the military; but this man-on-horseback ploy was generally discounted by the civilian witnesses who had far more to lose in a shift in power. The result was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which among its many provisions:

- revised and clarified the DOD operational chain of command and JCS functions and responsibilities to provide for more efficient use of defense resources (Title I)
- assigned the CJCS the role of chief military advisor, including responsibilities currently assigned to JCS collectively, established the position of Vice Chairman, and revised Joint Staff duties and selection procedures (Title II)
- established a joint officer specialty occupational category and personnel policies to provide incentives to attract officers to joint duty assignments (Title IV).\(^4\)

While not abolishing JCS, creating a National Military Advisory Council or a general staff, or ending dual-hatting, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made CJCS the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Title I strengthened the CINC’s role as commander of all assigned forces, regardless of service. Finally, Title IV attempted to strengthen the Joint Staff and the staffs of unified and specified commands by improving the quality of joint duty officers.

**Generating Reform**

Since World War II there have been several attempts at defense reorganization, but only two succeeded. In January 1947, the Army-Navy Compromise (or Norstad-Sherman) Plan fell short of the integration that many predicted would follow the war. The Armed Forces mobilized from little more than a cadre force in the interwar years to the largest and most powerful military machine in the history of the world. It experienced operational success in every theater. However, there were many who argued that inter-theater, intra-theater, and intra-service rifts both prolonged the war and cost lives (vis-à-vis Nimitz versus MacArthur, Navy versus Army, and Pacific versus European
The Army-Navy Compromise Plan in 1947 did little more than create a loose confederation among the services. America abandoned isolationism and emerged as a superpower following World War II. At the same time the Armed Forces shrank from wartime strength levels and industrial conversion preoccupied the defense base. In addition, there was considerable pressure to cut defense budgets to fund civilian programs neglected during the war. The result was increased reliance on strategic nuclear weapons as opposed to large and expensive conventional forces.

The Army-Navy Compromise Plan in 1947 did little more than create a loose confederation among the services. Rather than integration, the Air Force became a separate service which further complicated attempts to institutionalize joint warfare. Legislation enacted in 1949, 1953, and 1958 strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense and increased his staff. Between 1958 and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act the only significant organizational change occurred when the Commandant of the Marine Corps became a full member of JCS in 1978. Pressure to preserve service autonomy squelched all attempts at reform before the Jones and Meyer proposals.

Throughout many hearings that led to Goldwater-Nichols, operational failures in Vietnam and Desert I were cited as evidence of a need for reform. Even Grenada, where the United States won, gave serious concern over the lack of progress in executing joint operations. Inadequate joint doctrine, equipment interface problems, and more casualties than anticipated caused many within the Armed Forces to rethink the need for increased jointness. Listening to military leaders today it is difficult to believe there was ever opposition to JCS reorganization. Overall Goldwater-Nichols is regarded as a success, given subsequent joint operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia.

The Post-Cold War Era

For over two years the services have been downsizing to meet force levels recommended by CJCS and adopted by the Bush administration. Added budget savings proposed by the Clinton administration mean more cuts. Thus, while the military has enjoyed operational successes since 1986, shrinking budgets and force structures will make future operations more challenging. This is not unlike the situation in 1947 which was difficult for defense planners and placed pressure on the military to address “difficult questions being asked by Congress and the American people about their Armed Forces.” If the President, Congress, and citizenry perceive the Chairman is unable to provide direction, they will go elsewhere for answers. Few, if any, senior officers will advocate further JCS reform because they believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act fixed what needed to be fixed. Nevertheless, that legislation—like the National Security Act of 1947 which formally established JCS—was a compromise. Both stopped short of instituting far-reaching proposals. Before asking whether further reforms are necessary, an evaluation of Goldwater-Nichols is in order.

What Goldwater-Nichols Achieved

One seasoned congressional staffer, who was an architect of Goldwater-Nichols, contends that the most effective aspects of the 1986 law were directed at improving operational matters. This view is confirmed by both General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Merrill McPeak, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who have emphasized that successful operational employments are proof that Goldwater-Nichols achieved what it intended to. When comparing the performance of the U.S. forces in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort with Vietnam, Desert I, and Grenada, it is hard to argue that change was not for the better.

The legislation specifically prohibited CJCS from exercising military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Armed Forces; that is, the Chairman is not in the chain of
command between the President and CINCs. Nevertheless, two features of Goldwater-Nichols enable the Chairman to assert considerable operational authority. The law specifically designates CJCS as the principal military advisor to the NCA. He is encouraged, although not required, to seek the advice of the chiefs and CINCs. If the chiefs are not unanimous, in the words of Goldwater-Nichols, “the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.” Furthermore, the President may—as Reagan and Bush did—“direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and [the CINCs] be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

In general civilian experts and military leaders seem convinced that the Chairman’s role was buttressed by Goldwater-Nichols. But few could state with any certainty whether the legislation has improved the quality of advice provided to the civilian leaders. According to one former senior DOD official, JCS “frequently arrive with their advice after the train has left the station. Events in the real world do not wait for the present JCS system, which is four layers of staffing to reach a compromise acceptable to each of the four services.” Others counter that because CJCS has more autonomy he no longer has to gather individual service views and develop a corporate position.

While reorganization is credited for operational improvements, some debate over whether it is structural change alone or the persona of General Colin Powell, USA—the current CJCS who is regarded as the most powerful Chairman since General Maxwell Taylor—that has been the more significant. But despite Powell’s accomplishments, or perhaps because of them, others voice the concern that power may have shifted too far in the direction of CJCS and the Joint Staff as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. To be sure, the legislation both enlarged the Joint Staff and gave it greater autonomy and enhanced responsibility. However, it specified that “the Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces general staff and shall have no executive authority.” Yet some complain about an “imperial Joint Staff” and the direct access which CINCs have to the NCA, Congress, and the Chairman without going through the service chiefs and their staffs.

**Resource Advice**

In contrast to operational matters, Goldwater-Nichols did little to help resource allocation according to one observer:

> My biggest disappointment is the Chairman’s failure to be more involved in resource allocation. Resource allocation is what the services do 90 percent of the time. We expected the Joint Staff to put together resource requirements from the CINCs and compare that list against the service POMs [Program Objective Memorandums]. The Chairman does not have the power to modify service POMs; however, he can use his position to recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense. That has not happened. It is the name of the game in peacetime. I think it is time we went to a single joint POM.  

General Meyer’s proposal in 1982 for reorganization was based in part on the inability of JCS to do a horizontal, rather than vertical, examination of resource issues. Today, Meyer cites reports that the Air Force would recommend a delay in C–17 procurement to satisfy a portion of its budget cut as proof that Goldwater-Nichols did not go far enough. He believes a recommendation to delay or scale back this program should not be the Air Force’s alone: “The C–17 is being developed by, not for, the Air Force.” General McPeak expands upon this point:

> There may be a conflict in programmatic issues. Today the services rely on each other. If the Navy cuts increased sealift out of their budget, I have a problem because I can’t get everything the Air Force needs to the war. The Air Force relies on sealift to move much of its equipment. If I give up on the C–17, the Army has a problem. I could get along without the C–17, but the Army can’t.
Lieutenant General N. E. Ehlert, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, at Headquarters, Marine Corps, also voices concern about the expanded role of CINCs and their staffs as contrasted with the reduced role of service staffs in POM formulation: “I worry that when you serve on a CINC’s staff you don’t have a long-range view—you are more concerned about short-term, day-to-day problems that can quickly become a crisis.”

**Roles and Missions**

Some of the foregoing concern was echoed in bipartisan criticism of the Chairman’s “Roles and Missions Report.” (Goldwater-Nichols requires submission of such a review to the Secretary of Defense every three years.) Senator Sam Nunn had called for a thoroughgoing review aimed at cutting the “tremendous redundancy and duplication” in the military. After being briefed on the report, Representative Floyd Spence warned that the services “may have missed a chance to direct their own fate. . . . Efforts to further reduce defense spending may lead to a politically driven outcome that neither the military or the Nation can afford.” Even Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry said the report “was a good plan as far as it went, but it didn’t go very far.”

At issue is distributing power among senior decisionmakers. As a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy characterized this problem more than a decade ago:

> The system is simply out of balance between service interests and joint interests. Because of the way it is set up there is a basic, built-in conflict of interest between the role of JCS members and the role of service chiefs. Indeed, it was deliberately designed that way to protect parochial service interests even at the expense of the joint interests of the Nation, the President, the Congress, and the Department of Defense.

This argument is central to those who have criticized the “Roles and Missions Report.” Although General Powell is adamant that his report to the Secretary of Defense “presents my views and is not a consensus document,” others suggest that it tackles few service sacred cows. In support of the Chairman’s view, however, Generals Sullivan and Ehlert cite the report’s proposal to designate Atlantic Command as headquarters for CONUS-based forces as proof the report is not a consensus document. Under this recommendation, Forces Command—a specified command responsible for all Army forces in the United States—would relinquish those forces to Atlantic Command: “While the services would retain their Title X responsibilities, the training and deploying of CONUS-based forces as a joint team would be a new mission for this expanded CINC. Unification of the Armed Forces, which began in 1947, would at last be complete.”

General McPeak has dubbed the report a consensus document which is “at best tinkering at the margins.” He also said that “since there is a new administration with a new set of assumptions, we—or someone—will soon be preparing a new report. I’m afraid the military may not take the lead in the next review.” When compared to the other services, the Air Force had more at stake. The report looked at possibly consolidating space and strategic commands as well as at continental air defense, theater air defense, theater air interdiction, close air support, and aircraft requirements. These are all Title X functions that the Air Force wants to maintain, assume, or take the lead on. Recommendations perceived as consensus building by McPeak were likely viewed by Powell as what was needed “to maintain the maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.” The question is not dissension when JCS formulates resource advice; it is whether those disagreements translate into predictable advice due to inherent conflicts of interest. If predictable—or perceived as such—the utility of the advice to the civilian leadership is diminished.

Goldwater-Nichols did not erase the view that the chiefs are prone to being parochial when providing resource advice. Now that the Chairman is the principal military advisor to the NCA, parochialism is only important if civilian leaders question CJCS advice. Asked to evaluate whether the
report “stifled” his call for a review of roles and missions, Senator Nunn responded:

No, I don’t think the problem is Colin Powell. I think there are two Colin Powell reports. Phase one report really was what I think he believed and phase two was what he compromised in order to get it through the chiefs. So it’s not a matter of one individual of Colin Powell [sic]. It’s got to be every member of the chiefs.24

The Joint Staff

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols the Joint Staff was not perceived as elite and assignment to it was not considered a desirable career step. The system was characterized as stifling initiative since Joint Staff officers were dependent upon their services for advancement. But Title IV instituted the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation among provisions intended to improve the Joint Staff and foster joint culture. Prerequisites for JSO designation are graduation from an accredited Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program and completion of a joint duty tour. The legislation approved a limited number of designated joint duty assignments. In addition, Goldwater-Nichols contained two other provisions to improve the Joint Staff:

▼ officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments are expected as a group to be promoted at a rate not less than that for all officers of the service in the same grade and competitive category

▼ officers may not be selected for promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless they have served in a joint duty assignment.

General Powell credits Title IV with making the Joint Staff one of the best staffs in the world, and he sees JPME and joint tours as key to improving the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff. Furthermore, he states that “the authority given to the Chairman to review promotion lists from a joint perspective has paid enormous dividends in enhancing jointness. I am confident that without the power of legislation, we would not have seen the progress made over the past six years.”25

Many observers agree with the Chairman and are convinced that Title IV has improved both the quality of the officers serving on the Joint Staff and their work. General Ehlert has noted that: “[The Marine Corps] used to send officers who were retiring to work on the Joint Staff—not since Goldwater-Nichols. Now we send our sharpest folks and do the other services.”26

Nevertheless, the provision requiring completion of a joint assignment before promotion to flag rank will if it is not amended soon cause some potentially serious problems for all services. Congress enacted temporary exemptions and waivers during the transition to full implementation of Title IV. The two most important waivers, joint equivalency and serving-in, expire on January 1, 1994. Without these waivers “the current trend suggests that in 1994, nearly one-half of those selected for brigadier general will not be qualified to serve in an Army position in their initial tour as a general officer. Instead, they must serve an initial two-year joint tour.”27 This is not just a single service issue; in fact the Army is in the middle of the pack compared with other services. The only way to promote officers in this situation is by “good of the service” (GOS) waivers from the Secretary of Defense. If not, as Title IV goes into effect, their first assignment as flag officers will be a two-year joint tour. Unless service cultures change, such officers would fall behind their joint qualified contemporaries who go into service-specific operational assignments (e.g., assistant division commanders). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the segment of the population given credit for JSO qualification includes those exempted from joint duty based on scientific or technical waivers which do not expire, such as those in fields like civil engineering, military police, and public affairs. Thus many of those who would require GOS waivers are warfighters, namely, combat arms officers, pilots, and naval line officers.

Supporters of Title IV claim that it has corrected serious defects in the Joint Staff system. All agree that high-quality officers are being assigned to joint billets and the quality of Joint Staff work has improved dramatically. If one purpose of the legislation was to force officers to regard joint duty as important, Goldwater-Nichols is an unqualified success. For any who missed this aspect of congres-
sional intent it will become abundantly clear as transitional waivers expire. Many who thought they were competitive for promotion to general/flag rank may be passed over because they did not complete a joint assignment.

Nevertheless, there is concern that Title IV may not be the best way to foster joint culture. Officers that Title IV targets—warfighters—have an aversion to serving on any staff. Nevertheless a tour on a service staff is usually considered a prerequisite for anyone with aspirations. Exposure to service leaders can help to make officers competitive for command or selection to flag rank. The framers of Goldwater-Nichols were unwilling to establish a general staff with promotion authority and instead used Title IV as an incentive to stop high-quality pilots, combat arms, and line officers from avoiding joint duty. They wanted to create an environment in which duty on the Joint Staff would be accepted as analogous to duty on a service staff.

But Title IV did not create a joint culture capable of attracting the best-qualified officers to joint duty assignments. Officers do not compete for joint duty assignments; they go because they are required to by law. Once they finish their qualifying tours, they return to their service and jobs that will keep them competitive with their contemporaries for future promotion. Furthermore, they generally believe that if they support jointness to the detriment of their service while in joint billets, they will not get those all-important follow-on service jobs.

During the Vietnam War, Congress accused the services of promoting the practice of ticket punching whereby officers managed their careers by seeking assignments that helped their chances for promotion without considering the needs of their service. Once assigned, officers stayed only long enough to get credit for the assignments before they moved on to carefully selected positions. Joint duty should not be something officers are forced to do. If joint warfare is indeed the future, as senior military leaders since Eisenhower have claimed, then joint duty should attract the best and the brightest in the military on its merits. There is more than a little irony in the fact that Congress reinvented ticket punching for the sake of jointness.

Goldwater-Nichols is like the Articles of Confederation—each is better than what went before; however, each failed to endow the new order it created with the authority needed to unify its parts. The Articles of Confederation created a weak national government where citizens of individual states invested legitimacy in their state first and Washington second. Goldwater-Nichols failed to go far enough in strengthening the Chairman, JCS, and the Joint Staff. The successor to Goldwater-Nichols must not legislate joint culture; it must ensure jointness is legitimate.

The value of this analogy ends here. The sole purpose of the services is to provide for the national defense; they are not persons or minorities to be provided with constitutional protections. Funding, organization, and integration decisions must be made based on what is best for defending the Nation, not on what is acceptable to any given service. We must move beyond Goldwater-Nichols so that critical decisions in the post-Cold War era support building the best military for the future.

**Meaningful Reform**

The end of dual-hatting must be the beginning of any future reforms. Expecting the chiefs, who are required by law to organize, train, and equip forces, to cut programs or personnel when they also represent service interests is unrealistic. Even when the chiefs provide truly joint advice on resource issues, the political leadership will often discount their recommendations. The Meyer proposal, as well as bills introduced in the House and the Senate in 1985, recommended abolishing JCS and replacing it with a National Military Advisory Council or NMAC. Goldwater-Nichols did little to change the conditions that prompted this proposal. In fact creating a NMAC remains more relevant today than it was a decade ago as one of its original advocates reminds us:

> In 1982 it was difficult for me to find the time to wear both hats. The Cold War and a bipolar world was less complicated than a world where the United
States is the only superpower and there are many “hot spots.” The bipolar world provided a framework with which to quickly and accurately evaluate conflicts and their impact on U.S. vital interests. Minus that framework, this process is much more complicated and time consuming for JCS and the National Command Authorities. This problem is exacerbated by the time and effort required to downsize the Armed Forces. Expert military advice is more critical because fewer members of Congress, the President, and his advisors served in the military.

The NMAC would be made up of one four-star flag officer from each service—not current service chiefs—selected from the retired list or on a final assignment prior to retirement. Possible prerequisites might include duty as a CINC or on the Joint Staff. Former service chiefs would also seem particularly well qualified. However, membership could prompt accusations of parochialism—charges that the NMAC constituted nothing more than a repackaged JCS.

Originally Meyer included one senior career foreign service officer as a NMAC member; today he would expand that interagency approach by adding a second civilian, an economist. That emphasis coincides with Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s view that the poor performance of the U.S. economy is one of the major threats facing the Nation. Although trained as an economist, General Meyer thinks few senior officers are schooled in economics to the extent necessary for high-level defense decisionmaking. In addition, civilian representation facilitates the interagency perspective required for many of today’s nontraditional missions.

The NMAC would allow the chiefs to totally focus on Title X responsibilities such as organizing, training, and equipping their individual services. They and their staffs could propose and lobby for initiatives designed to support the national military strategy. The NMAC, with input from CINCs, would evaluate the proposal, prioritize it along with other initiatives, and formulate the final resource advice for the NCA. Meyer added that “a recommendation from the NMAC would add credibility to the chiefs’ program or proposal.”

The major advantages of the NMAC over the current JCS system are threefold. First, the make-up of the council would end the perception that joint advice—especially resource advice—is inextricably linked to service parochialism and ignores economic realities. Second, it would offer cross-service operational resource advice to CJCS and civilian decisionmakers. Third, it would be a full-time body whose members focused on the formation, implementation, and resourcing of a viable national military strategy designed to protect U.S. interests in the post-Cold War world.

Goldwater-Nichols established joint officer management policies to attract or compel high-quality officers to duty on the Joint Staff. Title IV was a compromise between the supporters and opponents of a general staff. The traditional argument against a general staff has been that it would jeopardize civilian control of the Armed Forces. The German experience—especially under Hitler—is raised as an example of a general staff run amuck. During four years of Goldwater-Nichols hearings historians pointed out that Germany never had a general staff and emphasized that civilian control of the military is such a strong, consistent, and essential tenet of American culture that the Nation would not be threatened by a general staff.

The NMAC should be supported by a general staff which is independent of all the services. It must be responsible for managing personnel and assignments and be given authority to evaluate and promote general staff officers. This would attract the best and the brightest from all services to a career offering upward mobility, that is, promotion and positions of responsibility comparable to those within the services.

The Acquisition Corps is a helpful, albeit incomplete, model for creating a general staff. Officers could volunteer or be requisitioned at various stages in their careers: some after command tours as lieutenant...
colonels or commanders, others as colonels or captains, and a few after being selected for flag rank. There would be two tracks, service and general staff. General staff officers would be assigned to the field or the fleet for a service sabbatical designed to ameliorate the ivory-tower syndrome and regain operational currency while service officers could move onto the general staff to offer operational expertise and develop a general staff perspective to take back to the field.

CINCs and deputy CINCs could be service or general staff officers. If a CINC came from the general staff track, the deputy CINC would be drawn from the service track. One portion of unified commands would be designated as general staff commands, the others as service command billets. The command of divisions or corps—and comparable naval and air commands—would be filled by flag officers from the service track. However, general staff flag officers could retain their service currency through assignments as deputy or assistant commanders (for example, as assistant division commanders, maneuver or support). Chiefs would be selected from among those officers who remained on the service track and the Chairman (a former CINC) from the general staff track.

Given that the general staff took the lead in resource issues, it would be larger than the existing Joint Staff. If the joint career track did not attract the quantity and the quality of officers needed, the general staff could access personnel data and requisition candidates from the services.

Congress has been and will remain a major obstacle to JCS reform since it may have the most to lose. As a former special assistant to the Secretary of Defense has stated:

*The attitude of the Congress towards JCS has been essentially opportunistic. When it has appeared that there might be profit in it, members of Congress occasionally have tried to play off the chiefs against their civilian superiors, though usually without much success. As a whole, the Congress has appeared happy to have JCS remain a weak compromise organization.*

That observation, made over a decade ago, remains valid today. While Goldwater-Nichols made CJCS and the Joint Staff stronger, JCS was weakened. Will pressure to reduce the budget deficit and maintain an adequate defense allow the Congress to support the reorganization proposed here?

There is a recent precedent set by Congress with regard to the relinquishment of its power. To depoliticize base closures, which are essential to downsizing and cutting the budget, Congress established a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and ceded authority to this body because experience indicated that it was necessary to “shield members from the anguish and the political hazards of picking which bases to close.” The NMAC would not have the autonomy of the Base Closing Commission, but it would be difficult for partisanship to discredit the advice of a distinguished council of military and civilian leaders. The politics of resource issues could require that a select group of members criticize advice formulated by the NMAC. However, a majority in Congress could hide behind its prestige when compelled to make difficult resource decisions.

The most likely hurdle to meaningful reform is the Secretary of Defense. If a general staff were established, it would take the lead in defense policy and program development, and the role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be relegated to implementation. It seems doubtful that Secretary Aspin would instigate reforms that led to this kind of realignment. If reorganization is going to occur, the current leadership of the Armed Forces—just like Generals Jones and Meyer in the early 1980s—must take up the banner of reform.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act made CJCS the principal advisor to the NCA and strengthened the Joint Staff. But negative reactions to the “Roles and Missions Report” indicate that this advice is discredited by perceptions that JCS is incapable of making difficult decisions. The challenges of the post-Cold War era call for replacing both JCS with an independent NMAC and the Joint...
Staff with a general staff. The end of dual-hatting would allow the service chiefs to devote their time to parochial responsibilities. A full time NMAC could evaluate nontraditional threats and also provide credible, uninhibited advice to CJCS. Title IV improved the quality and output of the Joint Staff. Nevertheless, it has not fostered a joint culture capable of competing with diverse service cultures: a general staff would create a separate career path and develop a credible joint culture.

Neither Congress nor civilian leaders are likely to initiate reform. The Secretary of Defense commissioned a bottom up review of force structure and Congress is planning to look into service roles and missions. If the Armed Forces are to serve the Nation in confronting the challenges that lie ahead, perceptions of a military unable or unwilling to entertain any idea which is not supported by a consensus of all the services must be put to rest now and forever. The world is changing and it is time for the military to do the same through reform that goes beyond Goldwater-Nichols.

NOTES

1 This idea is also proposed by Edward C. Meyer in “The JCS: How Much Reform Is Needed?,” Armed Forces Journal International (April 1982), pp. 82–90.
5 HASC Hearings 1982, p. 538
6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993), p. x.
7 Interview with Archie D. Barrett.
8 Interview with General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (March 12, 1993), and with General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (March 8, 1993).
10 Barrett interview.
11 Barrett interview.
13 Interview with General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) (February 22, 1993).
14 McPeak interview.
By virtue of geography and history, the United States is a Pacific power with enduring economic, political, and security interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. For the United States, the Pacific and Indian Oceans constitute major commercial and strategic arteries—vital parts of America’s lifeline to markets and resources overseas. Our national interests and stake in this dynamic region are substantial and growing. As Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,

---

**Summary**

The Asia-Pacific region claims attention on geographic and historical grounds, but American interests are intensifying because of complex economic, political, and security challenges. Part of the region’s importance derives from its sheer strategic dimensions: covering 52 percent of the earth’s surface and encompassing a wide diversity of peoples, cultures, and religions, and hence disputes. Another factor is the phenomenal economic growth of some Pacific economies, leading to the rapid modernization of regional military forces. Under the strategic concept of *cooperative engagement*, the Pacific Command applies military assets, funds, and programs, to achieve three objectives: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response. Because of the vastness of Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Armed Forces play a significant role through *adaptive forward presence* in sustaining the U.S. military commitment to regional stability.
observed, “Today, no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region will be as important.” The Nation must remain engaged in the region to support and promote its interests.

Amidst the current transformation of the international order, it is helpful to remember that American interests in Asia have been markedly consistent over the last two centuries. They include access for trade, freedom of navigation, and preventing the rise of hegemonic powers or coalitions.

Economic, political, and security engagement by this Nation in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region since the end of World War II has been a dominant factor in its emergence as one of the engines of global growth and a major market for our exports. The forward deployment of the U.S. forces in the region contributes significantly to maintaining stability, enhances our diplomatic influence, and promotes an environment conducive to the growth of our economic interests there. In President Clinton’s words, our military presence forms “the bedrock of America’s security role” in the Asia-Pacific region.

We must seize the opportunity offered in this new era to shape a better world—one built on shared ideas, interests, and responsibilities. Our priorities for Asia-Pacific security are clear. As laid out by President Clinton in Seoul, they are: first, a continued American military presence in this region; second, stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; third, new regional security dialogues; and last, support for democracy and democratic values, and by supporting regional security and stability through our forward military presence. With continued engagement, we can advance vital U.S. interests, while shaping a prosperous and secure future.

National power ultimately rests on the strength of the economy. As we seek to reinvigorate our economy and rekindle prosperity, we will look to Asia which still leads the world in economic growth. Already more than 36 percent of our international two-way trade is with the Asia-Pacific region. We trade more with this region than with any other in the world, including the European Community and our North and South American neighbors. Approximately 30 percent of our $448 billion in exports in 1992 were with this area. Today, 800 U.S. firms have business connections in Singapore alone. Furthermore, approximately 2.5 million American jobs are directly dependent on export markets in Asia and the Pacific.

As economic issues move to the forefront and the pace of international trade quickens, our economy and our future are becoming intertwined with other nations in this region. There are increasing opportunities for U.S. prosperity through trade and investment and, despite the challenges of the region, we hope to maintain the regional stability essential for that trade to flourish.

Regional Challenge

As a theater of operations the Asia-Pacific region poses a number of major challenges for the United States. Its tremendous size—from Arctic waters and frozen tundra to tropical isles, the region comprises about 105 million square miles or 52 percent of the earth’s surface—creates some critical time and distance problems. We often refer to this challenge as the tyranny of distance. It takes about three weeks for a Navy battle group or Marine amphibious ready group to cross the region. A jet transport carrying troops to a crisis needs more than a day. A fighter plane may have to refuel more than a dozen times just to get to a trouble spot. If North Koreans invaded the South today, as they are poised to do on a few hours notice, it would take about 21 days for forces to get there from the U.S. mainland with large numbers of ground reinforcements and heavy equipment. More immediate help would have to come from forward forces in Japan, Alaska, and Hawaii.

Another major challenge of the region is diversity: among nations as well as within them. Diversity of history, culture, and reli-
it takes about three weeks for a Navy battle group or Marine amphibious ready group to cross the region, as well as territorial and boundary disputes and historic animosities, color the perspectives of regional leaders.

The third major challenge is change: political change, as the peoples of the region demand more open and democratic forms of government; economic change, as growing Asian economies continue to outstrip the rest of the world; and military change, as modern weapons proliferate and nations seek to adjust their security arrangements with the demise of the old bipolar world. Today, the most rapidly modernizing armed forces in the world are found in the Asia-Pacific region.

Strategic Framework

To meet the challenges and address the issues confronted in this theater, our strategy must be consistent with the three pillars of foreign policy outlined by the President and articulated by the Secretary of State. These include making our economic security a primary goal of foreign policy, basing policy on a military structure that meets new and continuing threats to our security interests and international peace, and promoting democratic principles and institutions worldwide.

Our strategy must also address the threats of both today and tomorrow. Recently Secretary of Defense Aspin identified four dangers in the world:

- the rising tide of regional, ethnic, or religious conflicts
- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- the possible failure of democratic reform (especially in Russia)
- the pursuit of security interests in ways that do not protect economic interests.

Cooperative Engagement Strategy

In synthesizing the proposed elements of the strategic framework I developed a strategy for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) which I call cooperative engagement. This is a process of aggressively employing means available to PACOM—namely, military assets, funds, programs, and forces—to realize three strategic goals: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response. This process aims to achieve engagement and participation in peace, deterrence, and cooperation in crisis, and unilateral or multilateral victory in time of conflict.

Cooperative engagement not only advances security, but as a by-product promotes stability, political and economic progress, democratic ideals, and American values through bilateral relations with more than forty nations.

Under cooperative engagement PACOM forces are organized on three tiers: forward deployed, forward based, and CONUS-based. At the core of forward deployed forces is a modest number of forward-stationed forces in Japan and Korea (with stationing costs largely underwritten by our allies), along with maritime forces continuously afloat in the Western Pacific. We deploy additional forces on a rotational basis, such as Marines to the Indian Ocean or Air Force units to Singapore. And we temporarily deploy forces forward for exercises or projects. This provides all the benefits of forward presence—engagement, deterrence, influence, and rapid reaction—together with the flexibility to adjust rapidly.

We can tailor forces for specific challenges by pulling them from forward American bases (viz., Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam), units afloat in the Eastern Pacific, or PACOM forces based in the continental United States. We can even draw on the forces of other CINCs. I call this process of rapidly tailoring forces to a specific mission adaptive forward presence.
Adaptive Force Presence Key

Because of the region’s size, savings in time, distance, and the cost of deploying forces forward are enormous. This presence underscores the vitality of existing alliances: it promotes new friendships as host nations observe the benefits of training with the U.S. Armed Forces in an atmosphere of trust and confidence; it encourages and helps sustain a stable geopolitical climate in which to promote economic growth; it assists not only nation-building efforts but the advancement of democracy by illustrating the apolitical role of the American military; and it increases the readiness of both U.S. and friendly nations. Most importantly, forward presence demonstrates the continued American commitment to remain an Asia-Pacific power on a daily basis.

Quite simply, a continued credible military presence is the cornerstone of our successful strategy for regional peace and prosperity. Our modest forward presence provides the opportunity to reap the economic benefits of Asian dynamism through trade and investment, and allows us to avoid the enormous financial costs of conflict that instability would almost certainly generate.

Furthermore, we rely on forward presence and the international cooperation it engenders to build coalitions for collective action in time of crisis. As we draw down our forces in a more competitive world, it is imperative to do so wisely, with our national interests in mind, in order to continually play a positive role in the region during peacetime, crisis, or conflict.

Cooperative Engagement in Peacetime

In peacetime our goal is to achieve engagement and participation. PACOM endeavors to do this by engaging virtually every nation of the region in military-to-military relations. Their active participation is sought through forward deployed forces as well as a variety of military programs.

PACOM sponsors joint and combined exercises which emphasize everything from tropical medicine and basic seamanship to amphibious operations and computer-simulated war games. This offers a chance to reinforce treaty relationships with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, and Thailand by increasing interoperability with allies and opening channels to friendly countries. For example, last year we conducted successful naval exercises with both India and Russia for the first time.

In addition, we run one of the most effective education exchange programs in the world. More than 4,000 foreign military personnel trained with us during 1992. Participation in seminars and conferences is growing: 24 nations joined us for a logistics seminar in Sri Lanka recently, and 29 attended a disaster relief conference in Honolulu. One Security Assistance Program which has proven especially beneficial is the International Military and Education Training (IMET) Program. In FY92, 718 foreign students, civilian as well as military, received training under IMET.

At the same time PACOM promotes a range of contacts with senior leaders, not
just from traditional allies (such as Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea), but from those nations with which we are developing relationships (such as Russia and Mongolia). The Russian initiative has been so successful that it is being expanded to include junior officers to foster future cooperation among the next generation of military leaders in the region.

PACOM provides a positive influence in the theater in many other ways. Our ships make hundreds of port visits each year, from a carrier battle group visit to Australia to a salvage ship to Micronesia. We also assist developing countries with humanitarian aid under cooperative Title 10 programs. And we currently have five 13-person civic action teams composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel providing continuous assistance to South Pacific nations.

The end product of our peacetime effort to reach other countries is a network of bilateral military relations that span the Pacific, a framework for stability which promotes our own interests and encourages economic prosperity, political progress, and stability across the region.

Cooperative Engagement in Crises

We work to deter aggression and encourage cooperation with friends and allies in times of crisis. Our strategy is to build on the solid military relationships that we develop and the tough, realistic joint training that we coordinate in peacetime. We want to be able to react promptly and decisively—and to build a coalition if necessary. In the past two years we have developed a joint task force (JTF) concept at PACOM to respond to any contingency with the appropriate force.

Under this new concept an existing single-service unit is designated a JTF in time of crisis and its commander reports directly to CINCPAC. Multiple service components provide forces and logistical support tailored to meet a specific challenge at hand. A small deployable contingent from the CINCPAC staff also augments the task force to provide joint expertise.

We have practiced this concept in exercises and employed it in crises. It may take many forms as when a massive storm both killed 139,000 people in Bangladesh in 1991 and rocked a democratic government just 39 days old. On short notice we activated a Marine Corps general and his staff from Okinawa, assigned an Air Force Special Operations colonel as deputy, and provided forces from all services to include Army helicopters from Hawaii and more than 7,000 sailors and Marines from the 7th Fleet. No intermediate headquarters was allowed to intrude between the JTF commander and CINCPAC headquarters. We used this same streamlined approach to tailor forces when Mount Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines. A JTF was activated with an Air Force general in command, an Army general as deputy, and Navy and Marine Corps forces from as far away as Japan to evacuate 18,000 Americans some 6,000 miles in eight days from a standing start. Most recently we used the JTF concept during Typhoon Omar on Guam, Hurricane Iniki on the island of Kauai in Hawaii, and during Provide Refuge (the rescue and repatriation of more than 500 Chinese nationals) at Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands. Training forces for flexibility and adapting their employment to the mission with a chain of command that reports directly to the CINC also works in support of continuing missions such as POW/MIA accountability and counterdrug operations.

Of course our goal in any crisis is to prevent the situation from deteriorating into conflict, not only by deterring aggression by the use of force, but by cooperating with friends and allies. We expect others to share the responsibility for maintaining the peace, but history reveals that coalitions coalesce around winners, and cooperative engagement enables PACOM to provide quick, decisive responses that let friend and foe alike know that we mean business.

Cooperative Engagement in Conflict

Finally, if conflict cannot be avoided, we are ready to fight and win—through a multilateral operation if possible, or with unilateral force if necessary. Here the JTF concept
is again employed and, more importantly, will work. Last year we practiced it with a force of 22,000 deployed in and around Southern California, in an operation that duplicated every aspect of regional conflict, from Special Forces deployments, airborne drops, Marine amphibious assaults, and submarine and carrier operations to multiservice air strikes. All services had forces under the 3rd Fleet Commander who worked directly for me. It was a remarkable exercise in terms of flexibility with Army operators in combat information centers afloat and Air Force planners scheduling carrier strikes. We have successfully tested the concept again, this time in an international context, during Exercise Cobra Gold ’93 in Thailand with the I Corps commander serving as my JTF commander.

Exercises such as these demonstrate that we are not just recasting our Cold War strategy or realigning our Cold War force structure. Fundamentally, we have a new force and a new vision.

As I look to the future I see Pacific economic prosperity, regional stability, and political progress, all vital to U.S. national interests, depending on cooperation and engagement with others—and all continuing to rest on the reality of American power. In cooperative engagement we have a sound military strategy to achieve national objectives in peacetime, crisis, or conflict.

The Pacific is important to our future. We must remain actively engaged in the region to promote democratic values and economic growth. And as we restructure our Armed Forces for the post-Cold War environment, we must remember that remaining engaged with an adaptive forward presence is essential to maintaining our national security.

In his first State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton said, “Backed by an effective national defense and a stronger economy, our Nation will be prepared to lead a world challenged as it is everywhere by ethnic conflict, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by the global democratic revolution, and by challenges to the health of our global environment.” All those challenges certainly exist in the Pacific theater. With American presence and participation, allies are reassured, potential adversaries are warned, and our commitment is assured. With an adequate force and modest forward presence, the United States will remain a leader, partner, and beneficiary of this dynamic region.
Warfare is a changing art, a fact clearly illustrated by the events in the Persian Gulf during 1990–91. The type of human behavior reflected by the Hundred Years War can now be manifest with modern technology in one hundred hours as Operation Desert Storm. Yet in the Gulf, for all the modern dimensions of that conflict, military operations were conducted with weapon systems that had been designed and fielded in the 1970s: Patriot missiles,

Warfare is about to enter a new phase that will upset the traditional balance between information and force. As firepower becomes an appendage to information, organizational transformations will begin to underpin a new architecture. A separate Information Corps could guide this revolution, create common doctrine for the diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian information agencies. Such a corps could also obviate the need for the services to integrate their data systems because standardization would exist from the outset. Moreover, the corps could foster innovations more consonant with the logic of the information revolution than would be the case if the services were left to their own devices. But even though the proposal for such a corps has merit, a number of issues concerning its likely impact on operational autonomy, the critical functions of operational units, and certain joint imperatives must first be addressed.
Abrams tanks, Aegis cruisers, a suite of fighters (F–14s/–15s/–16s/–18s), Apache helicopters, and even the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). At the same time, the operation of those platforms, and their augmentation by powerful information systems, suggests that the revolution in warfare is about to enter an entirely new phase. Future changes will be most successfully adopted by systems which have been the most thoroughly structured.

Information, in sum, is the principal difference between eras. Granted, the benefits of both strategic and tactical information have never gone unnoted; they have been decisive in many battles. What is new is the sheer size, speed, and volume of the information flow needed to achieve superiority in combat. Information superiority is emerging as a newly recognized—more intense—area of competition. The result may be the up-ending of the relationship between information and force. Thus it may be the time to form a *future force* to examine future warfare issues, like how to best deal with the information revolution by developing the requisite strategies to exploit it.

The existing relationship between weaponry and information is similar to the relationships among weapons systems and other supporting elements such as command and control, logistics, and personnel. Operations sit atop; all else supports them. Current weapons have accommodated the information revolution by taking advantage of additional data inputs, but the military remains organized around units of force. This architecture may soon become obsolete. Instead, those who prevail tomorrow may build their forces around a central information processing core. Such a core would launch information probes into the media of war (that is, in land, air, sea, or space warfare, or the entire spectrum), gather, transform, fuse, and harness the returning stream and ladle results in strategic synchrony directly to fire-control units or indirectly to operators. In either case, the traditional relationship between information and force will be turned on its head. Information no longer serves units of force—rather units of force are fire support for information systems.

The necessary and sufficient corollary to this transformation is about organization. Current structures are built around legions of operators, served by lesser communities, such as intelligence (as well as logistics, engineering, communications, etc.). In this context lesser is not meant in a strictly pejorative sense. However, in any unit which combines this discipline, the operators take command. Moreover, although career tracks are similar up to a certain level, operators clearly make up a much higher percentage of the top ranks (O8s and above) than they do of the officer corps as a whole. On the other hand, if information warriors belonged to a separate organization (be it a corps, service, or command), their relationship to the whole would undergo a concomitant and perhaps necessary adjustment.

**Rationalizing a Corps**

The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win wars. Winners in the future will take advantage of the fruits of the information revolution—including global positioning systems, global surveillance, and space-based sensors—while the losers will not. To win one must be organized to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the information revolution.

A separate corps and an associated command structure linking operations and intelligence will facilitate effective joint operations, promote the information revolution in warfare, unify the disparate information elements and give them an identity, create a common ethos for information warriors, and provide a unified interface with civilian information infrastructures.

**Jointness.** The farther platforms can see and shoot, the larger their battlespace, and the more service-specific battlespaces intersect with each other. Aircraft of the Navy and Air Force use the same Air Tasking Order. Data collected by Air Force assets guide Army movements. National sensors alert anti-tactical ballistic missile forces of missile launches.

---

**Martin C. Libicki and Commander James A. Hazlett, USN, are both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.**
All the services use the same satellite systems. Another factor that demands interoperable, or single, information systems is the tremendous annual increase in the volume and variety of data collected.

Most importantly, there is transition in how wars are fought and the diminished local ties between seeking and shooting. Today the two usually are closely linked. Although prepped by intelligence reports, a tank must both find and kill the target itself. Yet, other forms of warfare have already experienced the separation: strike operations are planned from externally collected data; anti-submarine warfare operations use an elaborate localizing program prior to administering a coup de grace. The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and AWACS support an efficient cue-and-pin-pointing system. The advent of precision-strike systems that use both absolute and relative positioning (that is, latitude, longitude, bearing, range, course, and speed) is at hand. The growing proliferation of sensor systems implies that the targeting systems of tomorrow must be able to fuse data collected from a wide variety of sources. Such fusion means that seamless interoperability is being demanded for missions ranging from single-shot targeting all the way to situational awareness by CINCs.

To illustrate the value of an integrated perspective consider a hypothetical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor package and how it might be developed—not only its hardware, but also its software, communications, integration with other data units, and most importantly its doctrine and concept of operations.

UAVs can serve all services, and on their own each service would develop a package to fit its own mission profiles and support their own platforms. Yet it can be expected that the data flows from UAVs would go to common data receptors and would have to meld with other joint data collection assets including ground-based sensors, higher-altitude aircraft, and space sensors. To the extent that each sensor package performs its own on-board processing, it may wish to take advantage of common neural training regimens and pattern recognition tools. Data from the various sensor packages—which could come from any of the services—have to be analyzed in real time to determine where follow-on data collection efforts have to be focused, or whether and when fire control solutions have to be generated. The interoperability requirements of such a package are therefore demanding.

The need for interoperable information systems has been widely recognized by the senior leadership within DOD. Earlier this year Secretary of Defense Les Aspin observed in a graduation address at the National Defense University, “Most of our systems for the dissemination of intelligence imagery cannot talk to each other.” The principal joint command and control initiative (“C4I for the Warrior”) is exclusively about interoperability, and all new information systems must be able to communicate jointly. Unfortunately, history suggests that after-the-fact standardization frequently leads to unsatisfactory results. Why?

\[\text{Standardization is a long-term process that accommodates new developments only after long delays. Over the next twenty years the percentage of new applications to existing ones is apt to grow greatly; intelligent filters that correlate and process multispectral and nonelectromagnetic sensory data are on the threshold of major growth.}\]

\[\text{Standards developed by competing interests often choose a least-common-denominator approach, letting each side agree to disagree at the expense of interoperability.}\]

\[\text{Emphasis on data interoperability ignores the growing role of software interoperability.}\]

Therefore, in the case of the sensor package, development by different platforms groups increases the possibility that each system stands alone and makes complete data fusion that much harder to achieve.

An Information Corps is an alternate route to data integration. Instead of the services and DOD agencies (and the multiple communities within them) attempting to merge information collection and dissemination systems, the functions would be carried out by a single organization that operated under centralized doctrine and command. Data would be standardized from the start; internecine politics that allowed components to disagree would be, if not eliminated, then substantially muted. What would otherwise be a conflict between
the need for innovations in data collection, and the subsequent need to report only that which has been standardized, would be muted as well. Successful innovations would be integrated into the whole much earlier in their development.

A related rationale emerges from the emphasis on Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Today and in the future the services will be increasingly cobbled together by JTFs. Such organizations, which usually are made up of a chunk of this and a chunk of that, demand that most chunk commanders (and key staff members) know each other beforehand. A coterie of information warriors whose specialty is preparing the battlefield image but who are attached to different operating units is already integrated. Acting as the glue, they can help bring together far more fine-grained units.

Innovation. The information revolution is almost a cliche. Less well accepted is the threat that it will pose to the concept of putting men and women in steel, titanium, or ceramic boxes to fight wars. Why are platforms at risk? As more data is collected over the battlefield, the grid atop it grows tighter, smaller, and stealthier. Objects can be found faster and tracked more reliably. True, today’s weavers—and the United States has the best—are themselves large platforms and are thus tomorrow’s targets. Yet as sensors, processors, and communicators grow smaller and cheaper, comparably effective grids can be built from networks of distributed sensors which collectively would be more robust than complex platforms (e.g., it is harder to take down a million balloons than a dozen JSTARS). The contest between industrial-era platforms and information-era networks will increasingly favor the latter (even though stealth will postpone the inevitable for some). Forces with fewer manned platforms suggest radically different capabilities for the military of today. History suggests that organizations may resist change but to their ultimate disadvantage.

No one questions the overwhelming relative superiority of the U.S. Armed Forces, and for that reason our manned platforms would logically be the last to be threatened or copied. A potential competitor would be foolish to challenge our dominance by a strategy...
that copied our force structure. Forces built around information systems constructed from commercially available components, however, would pose a more serious threat—one which contests our reigning paradigm. Thus, it would be far more attractive to challenge us in that way.

Although an Information Corps may not be inherently more innovative than the services, it is more likely to pursue the kinds of innovations that accord with the logic of the information revolution. Left to themselves, the Armed Forces will incorporate information into weaponry, but with information technologies as platform support rather than with platforms as fire support to an information grid. An information Corps, however, would take an entirely different approach from the outset, emphasizing the information grid as central. Constituent elements and doctrine for such a grid would be evaluated on their ability to locate, track, and evaluate objects and events passed for conversion into fire-control solutions and servicing. Such a service or corps would be an institutional advocate for a paradigm shift, and would, by its advocacy, better prepare for a threat which comes from a different direction.

Unity. The common argument against creating a completely new organization is that its planned functions are all being done by someone else. When this question is posed, however, the composition of the group varies widely: the Director for Command, Control, Communication and Computer Systems (J–6) on the Joint Staff, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Space Command, and intelligence agencies—all without going into the services. Under the latter are functions such as command and control, electronic warfare, meteorology, oceanography, information processing, and high-information platforms such as Aegis, AWACS, JSTARS, and UAV contingents. Other functions which technology may soon enable are not even listed for obvious reasons; when they do emerge the soup will be even thicker. This is just the point. The various sub-communities in the information-based warfare community see themselves as disparate players. Each relates to one or two others at most, and they all lack the common unifying doctrine of operations. Information warriors are more than simply communicators, data processors, or intelligence agents. They are all part of a global structure that would become apparent with the creation of an Information Corps.

Culture. A related reason for integrating various DOD informational elements into a single corps is to provide information warriors with status, culture, and an ethic. The issue of respect is relatively straightforward. As information becomes more important, so does cultivating the ability to develop and
manipulate it. DOD needs to attract these people not only as contractors but more importantly as operators. Successful military organizations must deploy not only superior information systems, they must also be able to fix, adapt, and maintain them in battle in real time. Yet an aspiring officer today would be advised to specialize not in information but in operations. Even the Air Force—the most information-intensive service—is oriented toward its fighter pilots as the Navy is to ship and submarine drivers and naval aviators. Top echelons in other specialties such as administration, material management, and command and control are often assigned from the ranks of operators. This procedure makes sense if various specialties call for similar skills and the best are attracted to operations; an elite is an elite regardless of what it does, and it could as easily be mergers and acquisitions. However, if the skills required to be a good information warrior are different from the qualities and ethos needed to be an operator or these skills require long, specialized training, then the system makes less sense. The best people avoid information and those who remain do not get the consideration their views deserve.

An Information Corps offers the possibility of separate and more appropriate training and career management as well as an ethos for an information warrior. As computers get more sophisticated, training necessary for their effective use may get longer. The information warrior must know not only programming but systems integration and systems theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence, logic in all its many forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and statistical techniques. The information warrior must also know the customer’s needs: the commander’s intent, doctrine, and strategies. In addition, the information warrior should know something about specific media (land, sea, and space). Sending a college graduate to the field for a few tours of general expertise interspersed with training classes and then expecting first-rate information techniques in a more specialized tour later may not be adequate. The amount of information necessary to be an information warrior is immense, and the time required to master it
The amount of information necessary to be an information warrior is immense will have to be at the expense of more general command instruction. If this tradeoff is to be made voluntarily, the results have to be rewarded commensurately. An integrated Information Corps with clear career paths and opportunities for command and success would do this.

As for ethos, a divergence between operators and information warriors must be expected. Discipline under fire places a premium on certain qualities: courage, decisionmaking, instinct, self-control, loyalty, and so forth. The information warrior, by contrast, must be highly intelligent, creative, independent, flexible, tenacious (to counter infamous 3 a.m. computer bugs), and maybe somewhat eccentric. The example of Admiral Grace Hopper will not excite a tank commander any more than General George Patton excites a bit twiddler. These qualities are not necessarily antithetical, and some qualities—common sense, judgement, contrapuntal thinking, decisiveness—are uniquely common to all warriors regardless of weapons. To seek such qualities in operators and not information warriors further relegates the latter to subordinate status.

Ethos, status, and training issues suggest the need for an Information Corps as well as a unified or specified information command. The latter could produce unity of operation, advocates for change, and liaison, but not doctrine, status, or continuity (e.g., information warriors who are evaluated by other information warriors) that such a corps needs.

Liaison. Just as the information space of the various services is converging, so too is the information space of the defense and commercial sectors. DOD uses commercial communications satellites and bought the bulk of Spot’s imagery in the Gulf War; and boaters use the DOD Global Positioning System. The defense and commercial sectors swap weather data, and the DOD Global Grid is the military version of the National Information Infrastructure (which is a component of a global infrastructure). An Information Corps would play a major role in the development of a national information strategy and a complementary national military information strategy.

Like the sign which reads “Call Miss Utility Before You Dig,” both communities will have to shake hands before one or the other adds, subtracts, or alters its infrastructures. DOD used to formally liaise with AT&T when the latter was still dominant in telephony in the United States. Since then, the number of information players has multiplied, and not just because AT&T has been rent asunder. In addition, as the DOD need for information intensifies, and its assets commingle with commercial systems, the volume of interaction will greatly exceed what one community can cope with. A common point of contact on the civilian side—with its public and private players—will never happen; but a common point of contact on the military side is quite possible. A separate Information Corps would provide not only a common point of contact but common doctrine and outlook. With a national information strategy and a national military information strategy human protocols would not have to be reestablished every time the two worlds come in contact.

Functions of a Corps

Determining what an Information Corps does (on formation, its duties will be those of the units which comprise it) is thus tantamount to delineating the borders between the corps and the services from which it would grow. The first concern is doctrine. The transformation of the Army Air Corps into the Air Force was more than a catch-all for those who flew planes; it was also an expression of a theory of war, to wit: the ability of airpower to transcend the ground situation and transform strategic conflict through
aerial bombardment. The Marine Corps, in its evolution as a separate service, similarly has built a doctrine of amphibious warfare. Each service maintains its ability to comprehend war from its perspective.

An Information Corps would also have its doctrine. As alluded to above, the doctrine would support a primary mission of the Armed Forces: to develop and exploit a common integrated image of battlespace. This integrated image would, of course, be divided and apportioned to meet the needs of various warfighters. Slicing and dicing would entail analysis, filtering, enhancement, correlation, data fusion, and whatever else is required to assist decisionmaking. The image, in turn, is an important component for decisions which range from strategy to weapons control. The bounds of such a system would vary from situation to situation. In some cases a coherent image would be used for centralized decisionmaking (such as an Air Tasking Order); in other cases an image would call forth efforts to collect further information (launching sensors). Some fire control solutions would be automatic, to take advantage of evanescent opportunities that a decisionmaking hierarchy would only slow down. Other images are background to on-the-spot decisions (tanks should not have to relay pictures of targets to a central grid for a go-ahead before engaging them). Clearly the usefulness of a unified image depends on what percentage of the information involved in making a decision is generated by the shooter (coupled with what share of the processing necessary to transform data into decision is supplied by external algorithms). The doctrine is predicated on the assumption that nonlocal information (from other units or remote sensors) and analysis (from artificial intelligence) will rise in relative importance.

Two other reasons for organizing an Information Corps are only now beginning to emerge. One is the concept of information as a realm of battle; just as tanks fight tanks, and subs fight subs, so too would data corpsmen on one side fight those on another. More specifically, data corpsmen would spend their time confounding the other side’s operations in the electromagnetic spectrum or disrupting the operations of their net. This concept alone may be too narrow a basis for a corps and is susceptible to improvements in telematics technology, which may make it harder to interfere with information systems. A second and contentious notion is that any operation that involves information, or alternatively command and control, in its broadest context should be part of a corps. But this is too broad a definition. Not only does everyone deal in one respect or another with information, but command and control tends to involve the top level of a hierarchy. To suggest an Information Corps would become the top-level corps within DOD to which the services must report is presumptuous. However to use such a corps to collect, process, transmit, and present information and then convey the resulting orders is not.

The core of a compact corps and its associated command would consist of elements which gather, assess, and distribute both silicon- and human-based information: an infosphere (see figure on page 93). Space would be a central component, since virtually every current use of space (viz., surveillance, communications, navigation) is directly involved in information. Added to that would be chunks of the intelligence business, and the creation, operation, and maintenance of fixed-site command and control assets, information collection such as ground-based radar and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), mapping, and meteorology.

How far an Information Corps should extend into mobile information collection, in the infosphere, is a difficult question. Platforms as diverse as AWACS, JSTARS, Aegis, P–3 squadrons, unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery trajectory indicators, portable radars, and the like are information-intensive and thus similar to fixed-site information systems; but not every function (like airplane driving) on such platforms is appropriate for the data corps. Consider an Aegis cruiser: it certainly collects a considerable volume of data, and much of it could be transformed into actionable targets for other platforms, but most of its functions call for
other skills. Which among equipment maintainers, screen watchers, situation assessors, and communicators should be data corpsmen? Should they be permanently or temporarily assigned?

A tougher question will involve the mix of military and civilians in an Information Corps. Should it be a defense or joint organization? Some functions of an information service can be best performed by military personnel with varying degrees of expertise and experience of the weapons systems with which they must interface. Other positions will have to be filled by computer geeks who are not disposed to military service.

Objections to a Corps

The difficulty in delineating an Information Corps suggests that creating one is somewhat problematic: it must interface with other command and control organizations, will remove critical functions of an operational unit, and may perhaps relieve some of the pressure of jointness.

Autonomy. Single-service cohorts are generally capable of operating autonomously in tactical environments, with little help needed from the others. For the most part an Information Corps could not. If the corps would be limited to fixed-site facilities, it could at least function autonomously, but its value would depend on its ability to provide data to others—it could complete few military missions on its own. But with dispersed sensors and emitters (e.g., UAVs, buoys, listening posts) gathering a larger share of the total data, a fixed-site data corps would become increasingly marginal. It would be valuable for strategic surveillance and distributed interactive simulations.

Including mobile elements in an Information Corps introduces command problems. Each unit of an Information Corps would have to report through its administrative chain of command, but it would have to respond to the operational chain of command as well. Who, below the CINC or JTF commander, determines, for instance, where and when to deploy sensors? Who determines whether an aircraft is used for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, strike operations, or emitter dispersion? Do such needs respond to the requirements of the travelling unit (ship) or the deployed units of some information command (or under centralized control if not command)? All of these issues can be resolved over time or may be eclipsed by circumstances (if ships disappear from the inventory, shipboard problems do also), but that will take some effort.

A related objection is that even platforms whose exclusive mission today is to gather information may not necessarily retain that character. Consider the vignette about UAV sensor packages. If the developers of this hardware and doctrine are information warriors rather than operators, they may not appreciate the potential of a UAV as a weapon rather than simply as a data collector. This problem can be managed and should be addressed as the acquisition process is adjusted to the post-Cold War era.

Criticality. Every organization is an information organization; moreover, information is power. Removing information cadres from such an organization could lead to several unintended consequences. The latter may be tempted to duplicate its lost capabilities—no important organization in the Federal Government, for instance, leaves policy analysis to others. Besides wasting resources it reintroduces the very coordination shortfalls an Information Corps was designed to overcome. Alternatively, affected military units may simply ignore the information
they cannot control, relying on time-proven but obsolescent means of gathering information (reconnaissance in strength) rather than methods which technology makes more appropriate (sophisticated sensors). Thus, the very modernization that an Information Corps was meant to induce would be retarded by its formation. To avoid this strong leadership will be required inside and outside the corps.

**Jointness.** Finally, while creating an Information Corps may promote a joint battlespace image, it may retard other aspects of jointness. Having removed the most important reason for the services to work together (they would instead liaise with an Information Corps) removes a large part of the impetus for operational units to work and meet across service lines. The need for joint deployment, joint operations, and, most important, joint thinking, remains, but the day-to-day practice of working jointly would be undercut by the act of shoving off certain joint duties to separate organizations. When the time came to act jointly, the various components would be far less prepared than if they had interacted on a day-to-day basis. Again, good leadership should overcome this problem. An Information Corps and the efficiencies it offers can be made to enhance rather than retard jointness.

When it comes to radical reorganization—and forming an independent Information Corps certainly qualifies—a first rule of thumb may be: when in doubt, don’t. As wars are currently fought, the need for a data corps is, while perhaps inevitable, not necessarily urgent. Unlike, say, the Army Air Corps, which was a single identifiable operational arm, an Information Corps would have to be merged from several disparate organizations. By taking from all services, it would be opposed by all. This will be difficult to overcome.

The logical conclusion is that DOD should form an Information Corps. The argument is that a corps would promote jointness where it is critically needed (information interoperability), elevate information as an element of war, develop an information warrior ethos and curriculum, and heighten DOD attention to the global civilian net. When threatened with the loss of personnel and resources, the services may respond that they are doing all of this and more. The greater the threat, the more meaningfully the services may respond. But their response is likely to address problems—integration, doctrine, or ethos—that would otherwise call for an Information Corps. Solving these problems, after all, was the original point. But they cannot do it as effectively as an Information Corps.

One approach to mastering future warfare that should be considered is the creation of a future force cell of forward-thinking officers and civilian specialists charged with taking a long-term look at the nature of warfare and how best to cope with it. To attract, recruit, and maintain what would have to be a highly talented and motivated group of individuals, a separate career field should be established (not unlike the acquisition corps) that breaks off officers and civilians from their contemporaries at the O4/O5 and the GS–13/GS–14 levels and provides them with requisite guarantees of promotion and career enhancement (probably with certain limits like time-in-service). Such a group could ultimately form the nucleus of a corps, draft a national information strategy, and bring the fruits of the information revolution to the Armed Forces. These men and women would serve a unique role in the Department of Defense and provide a joint, quality test-bed for future ideas and concepts.

An Information Corps would increase the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. It would allow us to do the job better, cheaper, and faster. It would give us an edge that would be hard to beat or even challenge. It would keep the United States in the forefront of the ongoing revolution in military affairs.
To borrow and amend a saying, some are born joint, others achieve jointness, and some have jointness thrust upon them. It sometimes appears that the search for a joint approach to warfare has become an end in itself, a mantra that substitutes for serious thought. One suspects that much of what is written or spoken on this subject—paraded as authoritative and deserving of serious consideration—would fail rigorous scrutiny, yet at the same time one would not seriously question the importance and relevance of joint warfare.

At a lecture given in summer 1942 at Camberley, the British army staff college, an officer lately returned from Washington remarked that Britain was light years ahead of the United States in terms of joint planning, a state of affairs he attributed to the fact that America lacked a Royal Air Force. The establishment of an independent air service in April 1918 forced joint planning on the British military because thereafter no single operation could lie within the private domain of a single service. Across the water the U.S. Navy, however, by virtue of possessing

**Summary**

The Guadalcanal campaign in the lower Solomons is a paradox in the history of joint warfare. It was the first American offensive of World War II and purely Navy in design. Yet the impact of the campaign in the southwest Pacific on joint operations was far-reaching. Above all, it underscored the real interdependence of the services: the supply of forces on land relied on escorts; the cover of escort forces depended on fleet units; and the denial of enemy sustenance of their troops ashore was largely accomplished by shore-based airpower. Thus, to a surprising degree, Japanese forces were displaced from the lower Solomons by virtue of a singularly joint effort.

This article is based on a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the National War College on April 1, 1993.
its own private army and air force, had the means—not to mention the will—to go its own separate way and to frustrate the cause of interservice cooperation.

Guadalcanal stands as the first American campaign of World War II. As a Britisher it has always been a source of wry amusement to me that the initial U.S. offensive of the war was staged in the southwest Pacific. American condemnation of an alleged British predilection with peripheral campaigns, so unacceptable when it came to crafting strategic policy for the war against Germany, would seem to sit uneasily alongside this offensive: few theaters can be more peripheral to even the war against Japan, still less the European war, than the southwest Pacific. More relevantly, however, this first American offensive was most certainly never considered in terms of joint warfare: indeed, at least in part, the Navy sought offensive action in the southwest Pacific for interdepartmental, bureaucratic reasons to forestall its sister service both in Washington and in the Pacific. The move against Japanese positions in the lower Solomons was perhaps the means whereby joint warfare could be avoided or crafted on terms dictated by the Navy, yet it was a campaign in the course of which concepts of joint warfare were imposed upon the services by effect and need. The campaign brought home two inescapable facts, that the services could not achieve their missions by separate efforts but were interdependent—even in their specific areas of competence and responsibility—and that when the American high command authorized landings in the lower Solomons it had no understanding of the nature of the campaign on which it embarked.

Perhaps the simplest and most obvious example of this lack of understanding can be gauged by reference to the fact that in 1943 when the combined planners in Washington considered plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands their provisional estimates suggested the use of between 120 and 157 fleet, light fleet, and escort carriers. These calculations were committed to paper at a time when every fleet action had cost the Navy a carrier, either sunk or badly damaged. Undoubtedly these figures to some extent reflected an overstatement of requirements based on this experience. At this stage, in September and October 1943, the Navy had yet to become familiar with “the-more-you-use-the-less-you-lose” formula. But the main interest in the 1943 figures lies in the fact that they were calculated in the aftermath of the Guadalcanal campaign and, perhaps even more importantly, on the premise that the invasion of Japan would come about after the Pacific Fleet had fought its way into the western Pacific, and would have won control of the skies over, and the seas that washed, the home islands in the process. When U.S. forces came ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, at a time when Americans had not won air superiority over the lower Solomons, the Navy had an order of battle in the southwest Pacific that consisted of the fleet carriers Saratoga, Enterprise, and Hornet and the escort carrier Long Island. In other words, and even allowing for differing scales of anticipated resistance and the obvious differences between a campaign in the southwest Pacific and one off the home islands, four carriers in 1942 were to do with respect to Guadalcanal what planners in 1943 believed would require the services of 157 carriers when it came to Hokkaido and Honshu.

H.P. Willmott is on the faculty of the National War College and formerly taught at RMA Sandhurst. He is the author of The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War, Empires in Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, and June 1944.
Although the United States both moved some aviation fuel to and evacuated some wounded from Henderson Field by air, the Americans and Japanese moved every soldier, ration, basic load, and gun to Guadalcanal by sea. It was the U.S. ability to maintain convoys to Lunga Point and the Japanese inability to sustain their forces on Guadalcanal that decided the outcome of this campaign. In the course of the campaign American ground forces on the island remained fed, medicinally treated, and supplied with ammunition whereas the Japanese were not. U.S. units on Guadalcanal were reinforced and rotated on a full-strength basis unlike the Japanese. American air units at Henderson Field were maintained and however weak (with the possible exception of October 13) were never prevented from meeting the enemy in the air. In the crisis of mid-November it was air units operating from Henderson Field in conjunction with carrier groups that inflicted prohibitive losses on Japanese shipping: discounting seaplane operations based at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel the Japanese had no air units closer than Rabaul—and after October 11, Buin, though it is hard to believe that the haste with which the airfield was prepared, rendered it anything other than marginal to requirements—and never had the opportunity to develop forward bases for units. These facts of life which define the difference between victory and defeat in the lower Solomons provide terms of reference for examining three aspects of the conduct of operations at sea: the supply of forces on land which essentially involved escorts; the provision of cover for forces from enemy attack which necessarily called on fleet units; and the denial to the enemy of the means to sustain forces on the island which concerned primarily shore-based airpower, although it should be noted from the outset that this airpower—or rather its most effective single part—consisted of naval airpower.

Supply

With regard to maintaining the flow of supplies and reinforcements the interdependence of forces is obvious. Although the main task of shepherding shipping from New Caledonia and other places fell to the escorts, the period of maximum danger for this shipping came in the waters that washed Lunga Point which were exposed to attack by enemy aircraft and warships; throughout the campaign U.S. transports and supply ships took losses in these waters. But in making their way forward from New Caledonia the transports and supply ships enjoyed immunity from loss in part because of the effectiveness of their escorts, and losses incurred off Guadalcanal fell primarily on warships or destroyer-transports. Thus Japanese warships accounted for the destroyer Blue and APDs Gregory and Little off Lunga Point on August 22 and September 5, respectively, while APD Calhoun was sunk by Japanese aircraft on August 29. Damage to
Alhena on September 29 and accounting for Alchiba and Majaba in November were exceptions rather than the rule, and the effectiveness of escorts and fleet units in ensuring the safe and timely arrival of shipping can be gauged by the landing of reinforcements on September 18 and November 11, the former involving the 7th Marines and consisting of six transports escorted by three cruisers and seven destroyers. The point would seem clear: even in a period of Japanese superiority the combination of escort forces and shore-based patrol and escort aircraft ensured the security of shipping to Guadalcanal while off the island shore-based airpower conferred a large degree of immunity from losses during daylight hours while fleet units ensured the same in hours of darkness. In fact, U.S. shipping off Guadalcanal enjoyed a high degree of immunity from loss: the Japanese were remarkably ineffective in accounting for shipping in Ironbottom Sound, in part because their forces—whether air, fleet, or submarine—had to divide their respective efforts against different targets.

**Cover**

The support of the beachhead against enemy bombardment was obviously the least satisfactory part of the proceedings from the American point of view. The effectiveness of the cover provided for forces...
ashore and the issue of superiority were obviously linked: satisfactory cover could not be provided unless and until U.S. fleet formations met and defeated their opposite numbers in battle. Once they did and Americans gained command of the waters north of Lunga Point the problems of cover resolved themselves. From this premise two matters would seem to arise. The first is the interdependence of the naval effort involved in wresting the initiative away from the Imperial navy. Carrier forces neutralized their opposite numbers and were themselves neutralized in the process, and surface forces, in the climactic battles of mid-November, broke the back of the Japanese effort. Nevertheless, the issue of superiority was resolved over a three-month, not a three-day, period.

The second point, obvious though it might be, nonetheless demands recognition: the cover provided from Henderson Field limited Japanese freedom of action in the lower Solomons in that they could not operate en masse or in daylight and were restricted to night operations that in the final analysis were of limited effectiveness. For all the superiority the Imperial navy exercised in the first three months of the campaign, the degradation of American capacity as a result of fleeting, furtive bombardments in these months was small. This was the result in part to other tasks that surface forces were called on to discharge and because Japanese ships did not have time for the deliberate systematic bombardment that might have worn down American resistance. But in the interest of balance the effectiveness of individual Japanese actions and the narrowness of the margin by which the Imperial navy failed to neutralize Henderson Field in October should be noted. It is probably accurate to state that in terms of action by surface warships against airfields the Japanese operations of mid-October were the most effective by any navy during World War II, although it should also be noted that these operations were directed against a single airfield and that the naval efforts with which comparisons can be made were seldom orchestrated in that way.

The Japanese lacked time for this effort mainly due to the broods perched on Henderson Field. Admittedly the willingness of
U.S. surface forces to contest the Japanese superiority in Ironbottom Sound at night was a growing factor, but it was not until November that this was properly recognized as a result of a defeat that was critically important to breaking the will of the Imperial navy. But the fact was that from August 20—and certainly after August 28—the Japanese were fighting a losing battle not so much with the Americans as with time, and as time worked to the Japanese disadvantage so the cohesion of their forces and efforts was dissipated. While this was not obvious then, the effectiveness of the threat presented by U.S. shore-based airpower at Henderson Field to Japanese operations off Guadalcanal undoubtedly was apparent to both sides.

**Interdiction**

In terms of disrupting Japanese lines of supply, the importance of shore-based airpower is self-evident and well known, hence the need to examine the reverse side of the coin. From the fact that between August 1942 and February 1943 Japanese shipping losses in the southwest Pacific amounted to 60 ships (285,419 tons) out of the total of 214 ships (979,190 tons) lost in all theaters and from all causes, two points immediately emerge. First, U.S. warships and submarines played only a minor direct role in ensuring the isolation of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. Carrier-based aircraft accounted for just two merchantmen in this period, the only two that carrier-based aircraft sank between May 1942 and October 1943, while warships accounted for three and shared in the destruction of a fourth during this same 18-month period. Second, the role of U.S. submarines, though obviously more substantial, was nevertheless marginal to the outcome of the campaign: crucially, the 24 submarines deployed to the Solomons failed to account for a single merchantman in the critical month of November 1942. Their real value lay not in this theater but elsewhere: in a 7-month period U.S. submarines accounted for 120 ships (578,210 tons) or, in percentages, 56% of Japanese losses in this seven-month period, both by ships and tonnage.

The submarine returns are of interest in that within one or two points they are the same as those for the entire war; in other words, between August 1942 and February 1943, the submarines maintained a rate of sinkings that accorded with their overall returns despite a major and, for much of the time growing, commitment to the Solomons where they were singularly ill-suited to conduct operations. Narrow and restricted waters—although the subs were not committed in the slot—and fast-moving enemy ships were a hard combination with which to contend, not to mention poor intelligence, questionable doctrine, and unreliable torpedoes. Perhaps significantly it was not until January and February 1943, when the main Japanese naval effort had passed its peak and shipping was reduced and less well defended, that U.S. submarines recorded 12 of their 18 sinkings in the southwest Pacific theater between August 1942 and February 1943.

Nevertheless, the main effort against Japanese shipping was borne by the aircraft based at Henderson Field, and it is worth noting from the outset that shore-based air affected the integrity of organization more than causing physical damage. The Japanese forces put ashore on Guadalcanal were fed piecemeal, without proper support and with minimal, erratic supply, while the Imperial navy only maintained even this line of communication at the expense of time and the cohesion of formations. Attrition invariably involves seldom-acknowledged aspects of war such as time, distance, and the balance of formations and command. They are complemented by more obvious and no less important aspects though in the end, of course, the process of attrition must be physical. Thus the significance of the battles of November 12 through 15 was the defeat in a short time of the main Japanese attempt to use heavy transports to bring forces to Guadalcanal after the main workhorse of this effort had traditionally been destroyers of very limited logistical capacity. Between October 1 and 20, for example, the delivery of nearly 10,000 Japanese troops involved 92 destroyer, 7 cruiser, and 4 seaplane/carrier missions, and however great the handicaps under which American ships
operated the presence of U.S. airpower at Henderson Field ensured that the handicaps under which the Imperial navy operated were greater—and in the long term that Japanese capital resources were smaller.

The extent of these problems can be understood by considering two sets of data. First, although it was estimated that a 5,000-ton transport could move 2,000 second-echelon troops with equipment or a full regiment with personal equipment, the 5,458-ton Oyo Maru was able to carry only 987 soldiers and assorted munitions between Rabaul and Kolombangara in January 1943—such was the erosion of capacity imposed by the haste of loading and the lack of handling facilities at the destination. Second, the circumstances under which the Japanese abandoned the struggle for Guadalcanal—the unacceptable losses sustained in November—is deceptive. In November 1942 the Japanese lost 15 transports of some 94,000 tons in the southwest Pacific, and the fact that most of the losses were concentrated over a matter of days and among some of the better ships available made the losses grievous. The Japanese most certainly could not have tolerated such losses had they been repeated over a protracted period of time but the loss of 15 transports was small when compared with the British loss of 44 transports, supply ships, and auxiliaries (222,824 tons) in April and May 1941 during the course of the evacuation of Greece and Crete.

The real blow lay in the fact that, according to Japanese sources, the losses in October and November 1942 totalled some 345,000 tons of shipping and that in January 1943 operations in the Solomons required 710,000 tons. One must admit a certain disbelief in these statistics: my own calculations indicate that the statement of Japanese losses of 345,000 tons of merchant shipping in October and November 1942 is overstated though not by much, and one suspects that the figure of 710,000 tons of shipping refers to all operations based on Rabaul, not just those in the Solomons. But accepting these figures at face value, one can note the aspect of attrition imposed by time and distance because such shipping had to be found from a total of some 5,900,000 tons available to Japan at a time when she could not meet her import requirements and, for the first time, her losses exceeded replacement capacity in October or November 1942. Shipping tonnage showed the first real decline since the start of the Pacific war. Moreover, in November 1942 the Imperial army, having returned shipping to trade throughout the early summer but thereafter having stopped transfers, for the first time had to requisition merchant shipping to cover its losses. Herein, one suspects, is the real reason why the losses of November 1942 were so unacceptable, not so much for themselves as for the loss relative to later resources and to national requirements.

In conclusion, a number of points could be made about the naval campaign off and over Guadalcanal, some relating to wider aspects of war and others to aspects of joint warfare. The only World War II campaign with which Guadalcanal can be compared is Malta, and whereas the Americans triumphed in the lower Solomons in large measure because of the successful employment of different aspects of operations, in the Mediterranean the fate of Malta was to be decided in very large measure because the Axis powers were unable to do the same. With regard to wider aspects of the war, the period of maximum danger for a fleet is
when it is tied to the operations of forces ashore: the danger exists irrespective of whether the army advances or retreats, but the period of greatest peril is when the army is not moving at all. Obviously this was the case for both the American and Japanese navies, and one is tempted to consider the Japanese naval effort against Henderson Field in an historical context framed by the Nelsonian dictum that only a fool attacks forts. To assert this, however, may stretch certain definitions, especially when there are other more immediate and important matters at hand. One vital factor would be the critical importance of position and time in deciding the issue of battle, and it could be noted that the U.S. victory was not a result of strategic or tactical superiority—quite the contrary—but of an adherence to basic principles of concentration, offensive action, and maintaining the objective. The Americans traded ships for the security of the airfield and safety of its transports, just as the Serapis had done so successfully long ago. American forces ensured victory through loss. The United States achieved this in part because of what today would be called "reconstitution" in the form of the new warships that were to come into service in 1943; but if victory in the Pacific was the result of supremacy in 1942 that supremacy was to be gained by victory.

In terms of joint warfare the points that emerge from any consideration of the naval aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign would be the critical importance of the integrated effort involving warships, submarines, and both carrier- and shore-based airpower; the elusiveness of the single "decisive battle"; and the relevance of recognizing in the search for a joint approach to war the importance of diversity. With regard to the latter, and at a time when budgetary stringencies stress the attractiveness of general-purpose aircraft, the significance of air operations from Henderson Field is too easy to miss: the American aircraft which carried the burden of operations against Japanese warships and
transports were purpose-built naval strike aircraft operating from a base ashore, not land-based Army Air Force aircraft. These points aside, the actions of November 12-15 were the most important single episodes of the Guadalcanal campaign—in terms of their psychological importance in that American forces for the first time outfought the Japanese at night and in terms of these actions coming at the end of a 3-month period in which the Japanese skin had been drawn ever more tightly over an American drum. To the warships, most obviously to the Washington, went the final credit for the destruction of the Japanese effort in the lower Solomons, but perhaps more significant than the sinking of the Kirishima was that of the Hiei. She may well have been saved had it not been for incessant attacks by carrier- and shore-based aircraft on the day after being mauled in the course of a night action with U.S. cruisers and destroyers. Somehow, that the action which marked the ebbing of the Japanese tide in the lower Solomons saw the destruction of an Imperial navy battleship as a result of the combined efforts of warships, carrier-based, and shore-based aircraft seems an appropriate, even ecumenical, comment on the naval dimension of the Guadalcanal campaign.
IN MEMORIAM

General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, USA
(1895–1993)
U.S. and Supreme Allied Commander, Far East
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

VITA


THE SOLDIER

...when he had commanded troops, Ridgway had excelled. In this, his true element, he demonstrated a pronounced talent for getting men to pull together and fcr inculcating unit pride. One reason was that he was no tent hog grinding out orders. He was out front all day, exhorting, cajoling, teaching. He drove himself tirelessly from dawn to dusk and often late into the night. His working motto, delivered in a deep commanding voice tinged with a New York accent, was ‘Haven’t got time?’ Well, get up earlier... stay up later at night.’ He had little patience with human failings and was notoriously outspoken and short-tempered. His dedication, zeal, and intensity led his sweating GIs to joke: ‘There’s a right way, a wrong way and a Ridgway. The Ridgway was the Army way raised to perfection.’

—from Ridgway’s Paratroopers by Clay Blair.


Autumn 1993 / JFQ 107
We all need orthodoxy. In America the word orthodoxy smells of rigidity and righteousness, of small thoughts. But the definition sounds all right: belief in, and agreement with what is, or is currently held to be right.

What’s wrong with having common ground for reality, what is more important than having shared values and beliefs? Group members must experience things together, or else they make a pretty sorry group. This is true for what we call society, and it goes doubly for military culture.

So it’s all right for us to move along the same path, to march to the same drummer. How do we do it? Partly by following a good script and, as any movie producer can tell you, what sells a good script is good language.

But how are good movies remembered and understood? Do we rely upon tabloid reviews or publicity blurbs? No, we repeat the one classic line that captures the spirit of a film forever. Now think of the real world as a movie, and we are in it. How do we tell others—as well as ourselves—who we are and where we are going? Remember, we too have a script, even if it’s shelved in our unconscious. We read from it every day. And we constantly use words or special phrases to communicate with one another about who we are as a group in the here and now. Call these grail words.

I don’t mean mottoes like Semper Fi, which are almost sacred markers of military culture. They resound across time and space, they are forever. No, I am talking about who we are right now, in our movie. For what we are about is our story line. Hence the grail metaphor. It’s what drives and defines us, and it gives our story coherence and focus.

Grail words provide a better insight into ourselves than actual orthodoxy which, after all, is just the official documentation of what we believe. Grail words are actual expressions of belief.

What are some of the grail words of the past?

- for the Navy of the 1890s, it was steam engineering
- for the Army during the 1920s, mechanization
- for the Air Force in the 1950s, strategic
- for the Army during the 1950s, atomic
- for the Navy of the 1950s, nuclear power

Today our grail word is jointness. So what’s the point of all this? What import do these words have for us? They tell us how we
relate to society, where America is going, and whether our vision is moving in step with the society around us.

It is important to understand that grail words have far greater substance than they appear to. In the 1890s, *steam engineering* didn’t mean just naval engineering. It meant a new world view—professionalism—and a new identity that fit the spirit of the age. It was the Progressive Era, and the Navy was changing along with the scientific (take a look at the number of naval articles in the *Scientific American* circa 1912), forward-looking, reform agenda of American society at large.

And grail words tell us how the Army, Navy, and Air Force imagine their special place in a changing national agenda. In the 1950s, for instance, the Air Force liked the word *strategic* since it signified that it was the premiere, necessary service—the instrument of victory. American strategy was the Strategic Air Command.

During the same period the Army, once the centerpiece of American arms, was fighting marginality. The word *atomic* announced, “we’re relevant; we use the same big weapons.” And it also said, “we can survive and play a role in war, even on an atomic battlefield.”

The Navy following World War II was suddenly the old-tech service. It had to show that it was on the cutting edge just like the Air Force. What better way than to link the future of the Navy to the American way of life: were not our entire lives about to be reborn through the miracle of nuclear power?

What does *jointness* say about military culture today? First, jointness is about peacetime. Its meaning is more like the grail words *steam engineering* than *strategic or atomic* in an earlier age. Strategic and atomic were once part of society’s grail words: *the Cold War*. America’s vision of itself in the 1950s was of a world-on-a-string, and it was a warlike vision. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were at the center of that vision. But at the turn of the century, America’s vision was all about renewal: the Nation transforming itself, becoming modern, more civilized. Steam engineering was the Navy’s path to sharing in that vision.

Second, jointness is about an America looking inward. Jointness is a concept steeped in self-improvement, in the process of becoming better (like Clinton’s revealing statement, *we can do better!*). America’s spirit today is intent on getting the national act together or—in more traditional language—in reforming itself. In this quest the services will follow, not lead; for the military lives at the margins, not at the center. America’s center will be, at least for the next decade, itself.

Third, jointness is about the survival—of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—as a single military culture. It strongly suggests an awareness that interservice squabbles cannot be brooked in a long peace unless the services are willing to risk mutual evisceration. There is also a sense—even if unspoken—that military power as we have known it may wither away. A single, unified military culture will survive longer, be able to make its case longer, stay healthy longer than if the services bicker over ever-thinner gruel.

This may be interesting but again, so what? What’s wrong? Is there a real problem? In a word, yes. If jointness is our grail word, if it corresponds to the spirit of a new age, if America’s spirit is inward-looking, then it means by implication that we are not thinking about the next war.

Sure, we talk about responding to future conflicts, but enshrining jointness means that the outside world and its problems are defined down. An era dominated by a quest for jointness means that we are allowing ourselves the mental luxury of thinking in terms of a stable world; we are assuming that serious military challenges will remain moderate for the near-term and generic for the long-term.

The problem is simple: we are defining who we are and what we do according to the agenda of society. This is good in a certain sense because American military culture must mirror the Nation as a whole. But it is bad in another, because it quietly encourages us to see the world as a constant so that we can be part of the big change at home. America today isn’t worried about the world because for now the world is not big and bad enough to really preoccupy us.

The problem is that the world is changing faster than we are able to grasp. And perversely the greatest push for change is coming

**if jointness is our grail word, then we are not thinking about the next war**
from the United States—in two ways. First, change in this country could become turbulent, with real political and social upheaval. What happens here will be closely watched abroad, and the international scene will be affected by how that change turns out.

But there is a second effect. Right now we are quitting the stage as the world’s leader, and it is probably not possible to reverse that decision. The American people have made it, and there is no Stalin around to change their minds. Nor will the rest of the world hang around waiting for us to have a change of heart; they will watch what happens and go their own ways. In ten or twenty years we will find a very different world, and we may not like what we see.

You will find no predictions here; I don’t know who might challenge us decades hence, I don’t know how a grand crisis might arise. But I do know three things:

- there will be some very big powers out there with a military potential that grows closer to ours each year and over which we have little influence
- the technological revolution will mean that if those powers want they will be able to own weapons as wonderful and hideous as our own
- the only thing which will keep countries from hurting us will be their attitude toward us, and shifts from friend to foe could come as quickly as a new idea taking root or a new movement igniting opposition against us.

Jointness is not the wrong vision—by all means, be joint. Let jointness be a grail word for the next twenty years. But let’s be clear: jointness does not focus our minds on the next challenger or the next war.

My suggestion is to find a second grail word for this period of peace, however long it lasts. And let’s make sure that it focuses our attention on the future, to real challenges to the United States—not to the residual gunboat chores that the Cold War left behind.

This means bucking the spirit of the age a bit. But we are not paid to enjoy peace-time—even if urged on by the benefits of self-improvement. Hard as it is, our real job is the next war.
Letters...

To the Editor—Although I tend to agree with Stephen Rosen’s basic theme (see “Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability?,” JFQ, Summer 1993) that inter/service rivalry is not necessarily bad unless it degenerates into parochialism, many of the examples he chooses to buttress his argument are flimsy. Here are a few specifics:

Roughly proportional cuts to all services is a good way to effect downsizing. Few people really believe that equal reductions are the right thing to do, simply the easiest.

America benefited during World War II by not giving the mission of homeland defense to a single service. His reasoning introduces a non sequitur in that there is no reason to assume an independent Air Force would have hurt the Army’s P–38 or B–17 aircraft. Besides, the P–38, as Rosen notes, was designed as an interceptor. But it was never used in this role and it was sheer luck that it was useful as a long-range escort fighter. This leaves one to wonder if Rosen advocates building weapons serendipitously because we might get lucky again.

Had the Marines been absorbed into the Army in the interwar years, “the invention of amphibious assault would not have come about until World War II broke out—inevitably at considerable strategic and human cost.” But some would question whether it was even necessary to storm most of those Pacific islands. Besides, the largest amphibious operations of the war were actually conducted by the Army in Europe and North Africa. I seriously doubt it took a great deal of training to teach soldiers how to climb down rope ladders and hit the beach.

“We afforded redundant Air Forces and a redundant Marine Corps during the 1930s when defense spending as a whole was, at most, 1.5 percent of GNP . . . .” However, just because we may have been foolish enough to buy redundant forces during the 1930s it does not mean that we should repeat that mistake in the 1990s.

Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF
Dean, School of Advanced Airpower Studies
Air University

To the Editor—In an otherwise well-written article about whether the Persian Gulf War represented joint control of air assets or joint command, Winnefeld and Johnson (“Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf,” JFQ, Summer 1993) miss some of the important lessons.

The authors go too easy on the Navy, which made some big mistakes in the 1980s regarding jointness. The Navy consistently refused to participate in serious joint efforts because doing so would have interfered with its “war at sea” concepts. The recent shift to “war from the sea” seems to tacitly recognize that the Navy almost made itself irrelevant by the time of the Gulf War. Moreover, the authors missed one of the Navy’s most glaring mistakes: the failure to develop any realistic mine warfare capabilities. That, more than anything else, endangered both naval air and Marine operations and could have been a real problem for sealift as well, had Iraq’s mining been more extensive.

Regarding the Strategic Air Command, the authors again avoid the key lesson of the Gulf War for the future of the Air Force: neither of SAC’s modern intercontinental bombers (B–1B or B–2) were available. More importantly, General Horner’s post-war statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee among others notwithstanding, no one missed them. As almost happened to the Navy, SAC’s insistence on remaining the “first line of defense” left it a dinosaur when the Soviet threat collapsed.

Finally, the authors’ discussion of allies misses two important points. First, was there really any payoff from all those years of interoperability within NATO? And, second, what if we had not convinced the Saudis to rebuild their military infrastructure?

Despite these points, the authors ultimately make a valuable point: does employing assets from various services to implement the concepts of only one really make an operation “joint”?

Caroline F. Ziemke
Institute for Defense Analyses

To the Editor—While the authors of “Operation Weserübung and the Origins of Joint Warfare” (JFQ, Summer 1993) succeed in presenting the German invasion of Norway as a study in maneuver warfare at the operational level, they do not live up to the title of the article on several counts.

First, they fail to define operational art, instead linking it to maneuver warfare. Exception must be taken to calling Operation Weserübung “the first ever joint operation involving significant land, sea, and air forces under unified command.” Perhaps it may qualify as the first modern operation, but it was not under unified command, unless Hitler is to be seriously considered as the unified commander.

Second, the relationship of strategic and operational planning is confused. While the strategic objectives are identified as securing raw materials, protecting the “northern flank for subsequent operations in the west,” and keeping German naval forces free for operations in the open sea, the operational objectives that they cite are geographical entities. This does not tie the strategic goal to the military aim of the campaign. It represents a failure to adhere to the paradigm of the operation being a campaign.

Third, even though they provide useful insights, particularly on German planning and the need to quickly attain objectives, the authors omit any discussion of strategic and operational decisionmaking. Was this an extemporized campaign as some historians claim?

Despite these criticisms, the authors do provide a very useful summary of a neglected chapter in joint history. This rare German campaign should be contrasted with Allied joint and combined planning carried out later in World War II.

COL Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.)

To the Editor—Allow me to compliment you and the staff of JFQ for producing an excellent addition to the ranks of military journals. Your new publication fills an immense void that has existed since at least World War II. Finally there is a forum where joint issues can be addressed from a joint perspective.

Having had the opportunity to look through the inaugurual edition, I am doubly impressed by the list of distinguished authors and the range of topics covered. You have properly set very high standards for JFQ. At this time of great change—at home, overseas, and in the American military—your new publication can make a significant contribution to improving coverage of joint matters. I especially applaud the inclusion of articles dealing with jointness from an historical approach.

Lord Ernest Rutherford, the British nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner, was once quoted as saying “We are short of money, so we must think.” As defense budgets get smaller, the premium on thinking will increase. Your new journal should help promote the kind of original, even controversial, thinking on joint matters that will help maintain today’s Armed Forces as, in the words of General Powell, “the finest in the world.”

Ike Skelton
Chairman, Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee
U.S. House of Representatives

JFQ welcomes your letters and comments. Write, or FAX your communications to (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012.
JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER

In an era of dwindling resources and shrinking budgets, the military is working hard to get the most out of every dollar. This process has many names, among them, right sizing, reshaping, and building down. Although readiness must be maintained, it is no longer business as usual—efficiency and innovation are the norms. Toward that end, the Chairman approved creation of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) as a cost-effective, forward-thinking combat multiplier for joint warfare. It will facilitate joint doctrine development and support joint training and exercises.

The genesis of JWFC can be traced to Congress. The Senate Armed Services Committee believed that a warfighting center would be beneficial for developing doctrine and concepts for joint operations. The Senate considered it possible to develop joint tactics and procedures, and to exercise joint operations through extensive simulation. In fact, it directed the Chairman to report to Congress on plans for establishing such a center.

A study group was formed to determine functionality and to set an azimuth for the center. The Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Staff, chaired the group which had representation from the combatant commands, the services, other elements of the Joint Staff, and the National Defense University. While the CINCs and service chiefs unanimously supported creating a center, their perspectives varied. The primary concern of CINCs was training and exercise support; the services focused on doctrine. In the final analysis the Chairman chartered JWFC to do both, as embodied in its mission statement and functions (see insert).

It is somewhat intuitive to suggest that the development of joint doctrine will enhance our ability to fight jointly. Military doctrine is the language of warfighters and, as with any language, if proficiency is lacking one’s ability to communicate is impaired. By facilitating the development of joint doctrine, JWFC will be a significant combat multiplier.

The importance of doctrine to operations was succinctly stated by General Curtis LeMay: “At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. . . . It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.” General Robert RisCassi recently gave a joint flavor to the role of doctrine in these pages by pointing out that “to achieve the full synergistic effects of joint combat power, the warfighting doctrine must be common to all arms” (see “Principles for Coalition Warfare” in JFQ, Summer 1993).

In 1992 Dr. John Hamre, a Senate staffer, noted that unless an organization was charged to foster the development of joint doctrine, the Armed Forces would be condemned to fight the next war with the doctrine of the last. JWFC will become that focal point for joint doctrine. The center will develop, assess, and revise joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). Its focus will be to support the combatant commander’s doctrinal needs.

JWFC will integrate emergent technologies and the doctrinal process. Tactics, techniques, and procedures of operational employment will grow as a piece of equipment is developed from concept to prototype and full operational status. The goal is to ensure that systems are not fielded before doctrine is developed for them. Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of systems deployed without doctrine. Even a system as powerful as JSTARS was handicapped by the lack of a doctrinally based employment strategy during Operation Desert Storm.

The worth of any joint doctrine corresponds directly with the degree to which it is known and understood. All Professional Military Education (PME) institutions, and especially the National Defense University, are charged with assimilating joint doctrine. JWFC will link emergent doctrine with joint PME. Doctrinal concerns also influenced the site selected for JWFC. The synergism of the Tidewater area, with its proximity to both the Armed Forces Staff College and service doctrine centers, offers enormous potential benefits.

JWFC will enhance our ability to fight jointly by supporting joint training and exercises. As the center of excellence for joint training program development, JWFC will build upon existing theater-specific training initiatives. Its training goal is to assist CINCs in bringing individuals to joint exercises who are better prepared to do their jobs—thereby ensuring a more effective use of these exercises. Joint Task Force (JTF) staffs will be able to concentrate on important lessons from joint operations rather than on honing personal skills.

The center will provide expertise to support CINCs in developing, planning, and executing joint training programs. Mobile training teams—composed of military, government civilian, and contractor personnel—will assist in preparing designated trainers for CINCs (or training the trainers). An academic training program based on joint doctrine will guide joint academics, seminars, and war games. The program will be modified as necessary to accommodate training requirements that are unique to specific areas of responsibility.

In response to direction from the Chairman and CINCs, JWFC will

Joint Warfighting Center

Mission
Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and chiefs of the services in their preparation for joint warfare both in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint exercises and training.

Functions
Facilitate the joint doctrine development process and provide a focal point for the consideration of emerging warfighting concepts.
Provide core expertise to assist in the planning, execution, and assessment of joint exercises and training activities.
assist in designing joint exercises. The center will serve as an institutional memory with a global perspective that will enhance the design of exercises, and play a supporting role in training control teams, role players, and opposing force teams. Also, JWFC will catalog and disseminate joint lessons learned.

The center will be limited only by the imagination of a CINC’s staff. The capability will exist to construct operational environments in which to train forces for traditional warfighting missions as well as for operations other than war. These will include but not be limited to peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and disaster relief. Liaison will be developed with the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency).

JWFC will use modeling and simulation technology to create valid operational environments. One vision is to enable CINCs to train and exercise by transparently linking multiple simulations (and units at multiple locations) together in a single, seamless, synthetic operational environment. It is important to clarify the meaning of simulation—everything except combat is simulation. There are three types of simulation: live, constructive, and virtual. Live simulations are operations with real equipment in the field, such as those conducted at the National Training Center, Red Flag, and Strike University. Constructive simulations are war games and models, such as the Corps Battle Simulation, Enhanced Naval Wargaming System, and Air Warfare Simulation. Virtual simulations are systems andtroops operating in computer-generated environments such as SIMNET, aircraft simulators, and virtual prototypes. JWFC will explore linking these simulations into one seamless operational environment in which CINCs can train JTF staffs.

Distributed technology, though still not fully mature, will link these simulations. The goal is to make the connectivity transparent to operators in the field, on the sea, or in the air. Weapons and equipment will provide input as opposed to special computer workstations. Operators will fight with their organic, assigned equipment.

The long-term vision for JWFC includes sending electrons on TDY more often than people. Potential dollar savings are enormous. Given the direction of the defense budget, this could be an important method of training and exercising JTF staffs. Aside from fiscal realities, two other reasons exist for training with simulation. First, the replay capability will enhance both learning and analysis. It takes much less time and energy to reset a simulation than it does to separate the blue and orange forces during Team Spirit. The second consideration is minimizing environmental damage by maneuver forces. Of course, units will still deploy for maneuvers—just not as often.

In an era of bottom-up reviews the expenditure of every defense dollar must be scrutinized and hard choices made about many worthwhile programs. The center is a cost-effective combat multiplier for joint operations whose time has come.

—Contributed by MAJ Bill Graham, USA Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J–7) Joint Staff

Doctrine

**NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND**

...there is a vital difference between our naval manuals which prescribe minor doctrine and those of the modern army. Ours do not flow from anything higher up, but represent merely a detached work unrelated to the other branches of the profession. Almost invariably they are prepared by a board of officers, many of whom have no greater qualification for the task than that of being good all around officers. The product of this board is normally the personal opinion of one or two of its best prepared members, based upon their own study and experience, which is necessarily limited and incomplete. Consequently our manuals are not comprehensive and do not possess the close relationship which is desirable. The revisions do not develop the subjects in an orderly, logical and systematic manner but, due to variable conceptions and doctrines, produce confusion of service thought and practice.

It is often said that there is nothing new under the sun. The above words are as true today as when they appeared in a U.S. Naval Institute prize-winning essay by Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox entitled “The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare” in the March–April 1915 issue of the Proceedings. Naval doctrine means many things to many people, yet a published definition cannot be found. The consensus at the deckplate level indicates that it generally refers to guidance, tactics, and procedures in the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) System. A marinized application of the DOD definition has generally been accepted in the past, but the advent of a new world order and continual institutional change have mandated a new look and rethinking of the role, missions, and structure of the Department of the Navy.

The establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) in March 1993 was intended to ensure that naval doctrine is not only alive and well, but that all naval personnel,

**Symposium on Peacekeeping**

the other services, and Congress understand the methodology behind the Navy and Marine Corps team conduct of operations in support of national military strategy.

The Relevant History

Until now, the Navy doctrine development process at all levels was a fragmented, bottom-up, fleet-driven approach. The fleet or a center of excellence (Naval Strike Warfare Center, Naval War College, Space and Electronic Warfare Center, etc.) identified doctrinal deficiencies, assigned primary review authorities (PRA), evaluated solutions, and drafted and coordinated the publication in question. As deficiencies were identified or new concepts envisioned the impetus for revising or initiating a publication was related more to the resources allocated than to the need. Not even at the highest level of doctrine was there a single organization providing top-down guidance. The Naval Tactical Readiness Division and the Navy Tactical Support Activity played largely an administrative role, providing oversight, resources, and production capabilities rather than substantive document review. Historically either the fleet or centers had performed the PRA document function but, while they will continue to prepare some doctrinal publications, NDC will develop and implement a new, top-down approach to doctrine development to assure a centralized focus in dealing with the consistency, development, dissemination, and evaluation of doctrine.

Naval doctrine should be more than simply a guide to naval forces since effective doctrine is the cornerstone for all naval tactics, techniques, and procedures. Although the Marine Corps has had a doctrine development organization at Quantico since the 1920s, the Navy is a latecomer to the field and has not until now had a resident cadre for the sole purpose of developing doctrine. Since procedures were not standardized and there was no central agency for ensuring doctrinal compatibility, the plethora of commands could not always reach accord, initiate working dialogues, or find common ground on which to base doctrinal discussions or joint operational philosophy. Lacking a central coordinating authority it has not always been simple to get the fleets to agree on doctrinal matters. The different foci of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets offer the clearest example: the Atlantic Fleet, working closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), conducted operations differently from the Pacific Fleet, for whom NATO is an unknown quantity. The inherent link between the requirement for doctrine, equipment, training, and force structure was not always specified; nor was the rudimentary truth that doctrine was absolutely essential to warfighting capabilities.

While high-level attention to naval doctrine and doctrine development has been somewhat sporadic throughout Navy history, recent experience and events have spurred a respect for joint operations. Foremost was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act which directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a joint warfighting capability. This legislation was the genesis for the Joint Publication System as well as the process for both developing and codifying joint doctrine. In delineating this system the services were assigned lead agent responsibilities for developing joint doctrine and the legislation itself mandated the alignment of service doctrine with joint doctrine.

Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the world order dramatically changed. With the removal of the cornerstone threat the relatively stable basis of Navy doctrine and tactics was shaken, left with outdated strategic concepts embodied in Naval Warfare Publication 1, and a development process totally unsuited to the pace of evolving national strategy. Yet the Navy remained committed to a blue water, war-at-sea mindset. While both sorely needed and inevitable, change was slow in coming.

Naval Doctrine Command Evolution

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm highlighted deficiencies and shortcomings in Navy doctrine, particularly with regard to joint operations. Training in, and the understanding of, joint doctrine were inadequate, equipment and procedures for joint operations were not in place, and due to inattention doctrine had been developed that was ineffective or in some cases unexecutable by naval forces. Combined doctrine employment fared somewhat better in maritime operations, but inadequate training, limited previous interaction with non-NATO coalition forces, and the lack of a common command and control system only served to worsen the deficiencies.

In examining the lessons of the Persian Gulf conflict it became only too obvious that Navy doctrine and its inherent developmental and review processes needed restructuring. While a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) code was assigned oversight in developing tactical doctrine as well as naval and allied warfare publications, its small staff was only administrative and managerial; there was little capacity to thoroughly evaluate standardization and joint or allied congruency. Dispersed and bottom-up development of Navy doctrine had produced inconsistent doctrine and procedures. The Navy had been somewhat aloof in the development of joint, and to a lesser degree, combined doctrine. In some cases, this resulted in less than optimum joint employment concepts for naval forces, highlighted by Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) procedures and execution in the Gulf War. Operational level naval forces were not completely conversant with joint and combined doctrine; it was nominally understood at the Battle Group staff level and higher, but, for most operators, it was a painful lesson-of-necessity.

Most importantly, the Navy learned a somewhat bitter lesson— it could ill afford to proceed without repairing the doctrinal gap between its traditional single-service,
independent operations and the larger scheme of joint operations. This gap hindered the optimum utilization of the Navy and its complete integration across the spectrum of modern warfare.

Following Desert Storm doctrinal deficiencies were voiced and various solutions surfaced. In early 1992 at the Fleet Commander-in-Chiefs Conference, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, presented the idea of a central Navy doctrine organization. In April 1992, direction was given by CNO for formation of a working group to develop a proposed charter and organization for a naval doctrine center. Enthusiastic Navy and Marine Corps representatives pursued Admiral Kelso’s initiative, developing the structure and organization for a new command.

In September 1992 the Navy published a white paper entitled “...From the Sea” which provided a new direction for the naval service and increased the impetus for creating a centralized doctrine coordinating authority. Concurrently, both Admiral Kelso and General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), met with the Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe to discuss establishing a naval doctrine command. Mr. O’Keefe liked the concept and asked that a Secretary of the Navy instruction be developed in order to codify the mission of the command and its chain of command. On September 25, 1992, an instruction entitled “Naval Doctrine Command” was issued establishing NDC. It would be commanded by a two-star flag or general officer, normally assisted by a one-star deputy of the sister service. NDC would have four core divisions: strategy and concepts; naval doctrine; joint and combined doctrine; and evaluation, training, and education.

With the decision to establish the command in the Norfolk area, the NDC working group refined Manning plans, developed a budget, coordinated communication and computer support, and continued to process the myriad of paperwork required to establish a new Navy command. Permanent personnel began arriving in November 1992 and NDC anticipates full manning of fifty military and civilian personnel by late 1993.

Organization and Mission

On March 12, 1993, the formal establishment ceremony of the Naval Doctrine Command took place at Norfolk Naval Base and ushered in a new era for the development of Navy and naval doctrine. NDC is an echelon 2 shore command reporting directly to CNO and CMC for all matters related to developing naval concepts and integrating naval doctrine, and to CNO for matters relating to Navy service-unique doctrine. The NDC commander has broad authority to establish liaison for doctrinal matters with the Coast Guard; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; joint, combined, and other service doctrine centers; Navy and Marine Corps centers of excellence; and appropriate Navy and Marine Corps training commands. In addition, the Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard have assigned liaison officers who further attest to the jointness of the command.

NDC is chartered to be “the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine; serve as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy service-unique doctrine; provide a coordinated USN/USMC naval voice in joint and combined doctrine development; and ensure naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations, exercises, and war-games.” The command will also examine trends, keeping its eye on the future to meet the needs of joint warfighting while forging viable naval strategies. NDC works directly for CNO and CMC, and its Command Assist Official (CAO) is the Deputy Chief of Navy Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations.

Current Priorities

Since it was formally commissioned NDC is underway at flank speed and accelerating. Expanding on the initial tasks and doctrinal priorities provided by CNO, a number of initiatives have been undertaken to create and develop doctrinal precepts for the naval forces of tomorrow, to close the gap between Air-Land battle doctrine and Naval Expeditionary Warfare, and to enhance the knowledge and understanding throughout the naval service of existing and future doctrine and the doctrinal system. To provide the focus and guiding vision for these efforts, the following list of top priorities was established for NDC in the near-term:

Capstone Publications. Develop a series of six Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs) to translate the strategic direction found in “...From the Sea” into doctrinal reality and provide a top-down focus to ensure consistency between naval and joint doctrine, increase fleet awareness and understanding, and provide standardization for naval operations. They include “Naval Warfare of the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps” (NDP–1), “Naval Intelligence” (NDP–2), “Naval Operations” (NDP–3), “Naval Logistics and Force Sustainment” (NDP–4), “Naval Planning” (NDP–5), and “Command, Control, and Surveillance” (NDP–6).
Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Concept. Review existing composite warfare commander and amphibious doctrine and develop a NEF commander concept paper.

Joint Doctrine Development. Assume the Navy coordinating review authority for developing, reviewing, and evaluating all joint doctrine, and participate in every step of the joint process and serve as a Navy representative on joint doctrine working parties.

Naval Education and Training. Ensure capstone documents are used throughout Navy and Marine Corps curricula and become part of the training continuum in all warfare communities.

Littoral Warfare. Conduct a detailed study of warfighting in the littorals, particularly in the areas of adaptive force packaging, forward logistics support, strike and close air support operations, theater missile defense, multi/anti-ship missile defense, and shallow/very shallow water mine and anti-submarine warfare.

Combined Forces Operational Doctrine. Assume responsibility for all standardization, allied publication, and NATO working party support and, also, collaborate in developing doctrine to fill the void in multilateral operations with other than NATO nations.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). Develop follow-on doctrine to make maximum use of the systems available and future architectures.

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) System. Review the NWP system to align it with the Joint Publication System, shorten NWP production and revision time, reorganize NWPAs to better support assigned roles and missions, and transition these publications onto CD-ROM.

Modeling and Simulation. Ensure naval wargaming models accurately reflect doctrinal guidance as well as present and future operational capabilities and are compatible with other service models.

Future Challenges

With the inception of NDC, the naval services finally possess the capability to provide complete coordination and standardization for naval and Navy doctrine. NDC will provide the direction and coordination to ensure that naval doctrine reflects the concepts identified in “...From the Sea” and enhances the integration of naval forces in joint operations. This centralization will give the naval service the top-down focus the other services already utilize, ensure consistency between naval and joint doctrine, and provide the necessary structure for a complementary doctrine continuum. NDC will provide increased fleet awareness and understanding of Navy, naval, joint, and combined doctrine, from sailors on other deckplates through senior flag policymakers and decisionmakers. And while not currently involved in the requirements process, NDC will help provide the long-range strategy from which to derive platform requirements and systems.

Doctrine translates ideas into comprehensive ways of thinking and, ultimately, fighting. As the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine, and the coordinating authority for developing and evaluating Navy service-unique doctrine, NDC will assist naval forces in achieving necessary flexibility while providing standardization essential to the process. Through the establishment of NDC, the Navy and Marine Corps have clearly signalled their intent to enter the 21st century with doctrine that addresses a new geostrategic environment, the integration of naval forces in joint and combined operations, and possibly more importantly an acute awareness that naval doctrine must be uniformly understood not just by naval personnel but by all the services and Congress as well.

Contributed by

RADM Frederick L. Lewis, USN
Commander, Naval Doctrine Command

Humanitarian Assistance. The Joint Action Steering Committee which directs ALSA’s activities, approved development of a multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual on humanitarian assistance (HA) for decisionmakers and planners to include concepts, roles, and responsibilities. It will outline the relationship between the services and governmental agencies and be designed for use by service major commands, joint task force commanders, Special Operations Forces, Federal agencies, and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) participating in humanitarian assistance operations. This project will fill the void in operational TTP in the area of humanitarian assistance and also provide a baseline for developing a Joint Humanitarian Assistance manual which has been assigned to the Army by the Joint Doctrine Working Party. The Marine Corps and Naval Doctrine Command will support the Army as technical review authorities in that effort. ALSA will support the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with research, information, and writing.

Joint Close Air Support. ALSA has recently been assigned a project to develop a multiservice Close Air Support (“J–CAS”) TTP to eliminate differences in procedures among the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. It will coordinate service perspectives and procedures for CAS to enable any fixed or rotary wing aircraft to support any ground force. This effort should jump start the joint effort. The Joint Doctrine Working Party approved a joint TTP for CAS (Joint Pub 3–09.3) at its April meeting; the Marine Corps was subsequently assigned as the lead agent. ALSA will support the Marine Corps with the multiservice TTP as the basis for the joint manual. ALSA is striving to have the TTP available for review evaluation in the autumn. This will give the Marine Corps a top quality product to submit in January and hopefully reduce the coordination time required to produce a joint publication.
Further information on the status of ALSA projects is found in *The Air Land Sea Bulletin* which is available by either writing: ALSA Center, 114 Andrews Street, Suite 101, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665–2785; or calling (804) 764–5936/DSN 574–5934.

## History

### OFFICE OF JOINT HISTORY

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, activated the Office of Joint History on July 27, 1993 to record the enterprises of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff, and to support the documentation of selected joint and combined operations. Accepting the certificate of activation was the newly appointed Director for Joint History, BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.). The program of compiling accounts of joint and combined operations and exercises will rest on the participation of the Reserve components. Historical teams made up of Reservists will assist the combatant commands by providing coverage of joint operations, a concept that has already been tested successful in both Somalia and Europe.

## Education

### JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

The Defense Intelligence College was redesignated the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) on June 1, 1993. Operated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the college has been reorganized to reflect changes in DIA by realigning the departments with basic military intelligence activities and establishing centers on collection, production, and systems.

The mission of JMIC, however, is unchanged: namely, to provide professional intelligence education for the services and intelligence community. The college functions as a joint institution with faculty and students from all services together with civilians from the intelligence community.

JMIC offers programs on the undergraduate and graduate levels, and a master’s degree can be earned in conjunction with the Postgraduate Intelligence Program. In addition, the college is in the process of becoming a degree-granting institution at the baccalaureate level. Programs are open to the active and Reserve components and to civilians in the fields of intelligence and operations.

For further details, contact Mr. Vince Tranchitella in care of the Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20340–5485, or at (202) 373–2767/DSN 243–2767.

## Documentation

### THE JOINT STAFF OFFICER’S GUIDE

Since the first edition was published in August 1960, *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*—also known as Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1—has become a standard reference within the joint community. Beginning as a text for students at the Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1 now has been adopted by other institutions for classroom use and established as an indispensable desk reference for staff officers across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

The popularity of AFSC Pub 1 stems from its perspective on the joint planning process and the systems which support it. The volume extracts basic guidance from various primary sources, blends that documentation with proven procedures used by expert planners, and then packages the resulting information with a helpful assortment of charts, diagrams, and sample formats. Although its audience extends far beyond the walls of the school house, the original and primary purpose of the text is to support the curricula of the Armed Forces Staff College. Pub 1 was never intended to serve as a substitute or replacement for joint or service doctrinal publications, nor is it part of the Joint Publication System (AFSC Pub 1 should not be confused with Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*). However, this original purple book does offer practical insights into the interaction of doctrine and process, and is particularly helpful in referring readers to relevant official documentation on a wide range of joint issues.

By the mid-1980s the press run for AFSC Pub 1 passed the 15,000 mark. This year a new edition of AFSC Pub 1 appeared in over 57,000 copies. The text is issued to resident students at the Armed Forces Staff College who attend the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School; the JPE Phase II Senior Course; the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School; and the Joint Planning Orientation Course. In addition copies are distributed to the Joint Staff, service staffs, combatant commands and component commands, subordinate unified commands, and the various elements of the National Defense University. Some commands and agencies attach their requirements for copies of AFSC Pub 1 to the initial printing contract which can result in significant cost savings. Efforts are underway to make AFSC Pub 1 available through the Joint Electronic Library (see the Summer 1993 issue of *JFQ* for details on JEL).

One of the strengths of *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide* is its dependence on the members of JPEC for updates, corrections, and accuracy. Since AFSC Pub 1 is revised and published every two years, the greater the information received on joint and combined planning, doctrine, and operations, the better each subsequent volume will become. Comments on the latest edition may be sent to Lt Col Boyce Burley, USAF, (804) 444–5591/DSN 546–5591, and questions on distribution may be passed to MAJ Hector Rivera, USA, (804) 444–5591/DSN 546–5591.

AFSC Pub 1 is also available for sale from the Superintendent of Documents at $24.00 per copy.
The annual Commanders in Chief (CINCs) Conference was held at the Pentagon on August 10, 1993, with the following in attendance: (front row, from left) General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps), General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Chief of Staff of the Air Force), Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Colin L. Powell, USA (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, USN (Chief of Naval Operations), General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army), and Admiral William Kime, USCG (Commandant of the Coast Guard); (second row, from left) General Dennis Reimer, USA (Forces Command), General George L. Butler, USAF (Strategic Command), Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN (Pacific Command), General George A. Joulwan, USA (Southern Command), Admiral Paul David Miller, USN (Atlantic Command), and General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Central Command); (third row, from left) General Gary E. Luck, USA (United Nations Command/U.S. Forces, Korea), General Ronald R. Fogelman, USAF (Transportation Command), General John M. Shalikashvili, USA (European Command), General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Space Command), General Wayne Downing, USA (Special Operations Command); Admiral William Smith, USN (U.S. Military Representative to NATO).

**BOOKS**


**MONOGRAPHS**


**ARTICLES**


Lawrence Di Rita, “I Went Joint (But I Didn’t Inhale),” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 119, no. 7 (July 1993), pp. 66–70

Scott A. Fedorchak, “It Must Be Joint,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 64–65


Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” *Parameters*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 74–85

Wallace Thies and James D. Harris, “An Alliance Unravels: The United States and ANZUS,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 96, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 98–126.
Alliances usually are marked by formal treaties whereby signatories pledge to defend each other against external threats. But many Cold War alliances were so dominated by U.S. power, especially military power, that reciprocity was supplanted because of asymmetrical contributions. Today America has five treaty partners in Asia and the Pacific: Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the past these allies helped form a cordon sanitaire against the spread of communism. The demise of the Soviet Union has forced the United States to review its security arrangements in Asia as well as other regions. But the old alliances must be recast not scrapped. As policymakers look for ways to rebuild valuable security frameworks they should return to the original intent of their architects—to men like Dean Acheson—and emphasize the critical role of alliance structures to the economic well-being of America.

Alliance Formation

When American leaders appraised the world in 1945 an astonishing number underscored the need for a robust Asian order. Close teamwork with Australia and New Zealand ensured that those two nations would emerge as the southern anchor in the postwar era. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, where Filipinos fought side-by-side with Americans at Bataan, on Corregidor, and in other battles, Manila figured large as a subregional mainstay of postwar security. It is ironic, however, that because of its wartime potential, Japan—a vanquished foe—became the linchpin for long-range reconstruction of the Asian-Pacific region, a fact that gnawed at the Philippines and other allies.

America lost no time in cultivating Japan. In Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia, Ronald McGlothlen recounts how statesmen laid the foundations for U.S. interests in the wake of World War II. Above all, they rehabilitated Japan as a bulwark from which, in Acheson’s words, the United States could “control every wave in the Pacific Ocean.” Similarly, John Davies wrote: “The central American objective [is] a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the United States and . . . a ready and dependable ally of the United States.” But it was Acheson, as Under Secretary and later Secretary of State, who was the “extraordinary chief architect” of a postwar U.S.-centered order. Dean Acheson—working with perspicacious analysts like Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, and George Kennan—foresaw reconstructing Japan as the “workshop of Asia” whose trade with Korea, Taiwan, China, and Southeast Asia would be the engine for powering regional economic recovery.

Writes McGlothlen: “From the early 1930s through the end of World War II, Japan aggressively pursued economic ascendancy in the Far East under the guise of creating a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ In the postwar years, Acheson sought a surprisingly similar ascendancy for Japan, but one in which Japan exchanged its failed militarism for American tutelage, protection, and domination.”

Acheson leaned heavily on the analysis of Nitze, who was then Deputy Director of the State Department Office of International Trade. Although Kennan and others in Foggy Bottom argued for a Europe-first strategy, Acheson and Nitze believed that Japan and the rest of Asia needed to be included in a recovery program akin to the Marshall Plan. Nitze noted that the region’s percentage of global trade had been virtually halved (from 15 to 8 percent) in the span of several years, and...
Japanese exports had sunk to a measly 4.3 percent of prewar levels.

McGlothlen’s portrayal of Acheson as a prescient geoeconomist is somewhat hyperbolic. Nonetheless, he assembles a compelling case that Acheson saw the need to reconstruct an Asian economic system that featured Japan at its apex. With more than $16 billion in annual exports, Acheson figured in mid-1947, America’s future hinged on foreign trade, which in turn required rebuilding the economies of both Europe and Asia. Accordingly, Acheson steadily worked to craft a beneficial assistance plan for Japan, slacken restrictions on industry, foil any stringent reparations settlement (which countries like the Philippines coveted), negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty, and reconstruct Japan’s trading network. In each endeavor he finally triumphed and, partly as a result, modern Japan sprang from the ashes of the Pacific war like a phoenix.

To a significant degree Acheson was responsible for the commitment to Korea, if only because he saw it as indispensable to Japan’s recovery. He reversed a policy of withdrawing troops from Korea and overcame military resistance to a long-term alliance with Seoul. In 1947, as Under Secretary of State, Acheson successfully set in motion a policy aimed at underwriting the Korean economy. Unfortunately, the commitment in Korea was feeble, and it deteriorated after Acheson’s departure from the scene in mid-1947. At that time, in response to a Soviet demarche demanding a withdrawal of foreign troops, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to estimate the impact of extracting all Americans from the Korean peninsula. Reaching a conclusion that anticipated that of Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter in The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change, the Joint Chiefs led by General Dwight Eisenhower provided an unequivocal response: “The United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops based in Korea.”

In fairness to the Joint Chiefs, President Truman had cut the defense budget 85 percent (from $81.6 to $13.1 billion). Naturally, removing the two divisions stationed in Korea was seen as a step toward matching ends and means. As McGlothlen indicates, retrenchment was supported by the father of containment, George Kennan, who noted that the time had come to “cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully as possible.” The policy, codified in NSC 8 of April 1948, specifically precluded direct U.S. intervention in Korea. In determining America’s vital interests the military consistently excluded Korea, instead relying on MacArthur’s island perimeter—across the Pacific from the Philippines through the Ryukyu Archipelago and Japan to the Aleutians.

NSC 8 did not long survive Acheson’s return as Secretary of State in 1949. But while he quickly implemented a policy that again committed the United States to the economic rehabilitation of Korea, troop withdrawals lunged ahead with calamitous results. Few doubted that the North Korean army of 125,000 was a lethal threat to the lightly armed South Korean force half its size. Indeed, McGlothlen maintains that in February 1949 some CIA analysts predicted North Korea would pounce across the 38th parallel just as soon as America’s retreat was complete. When the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, queried his staff about possible contingency plans, they replied that a U.N. “police action” would be the only feasible option. Alas, the notion of a U.S.-led “police action” was dismissed by the JCS as totally impractical. Hence, when the last troops left Korea in June 1949, the United States had neither established a sufficient South Korean army nor developed contingency plans to deal with the real possibility of a North Korean invasion. Given this attitude it is astounding that just months later American troops were dying in the defense of an ally “of little strategic interest.” The impact of the Department of State on military strategy and policy toward Korea, as well as the resolution to defend South Korea, is lucidly communicated by D. Clayton James in Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950–1953.

As threat perceptions grew more alarming, the United States needed an eastern mooring to check communist expansion. In marking the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1946, MacArthur noted that Japan could be “a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war.” Balance-of-power considerations reigned supreme. In the 1950s President Eisenhower repeatedly told the NSC to go gently on Japan, because “even a nation of America’s preeminence would be highly vulnerable without allies in Europe and Asia.” John Foster Dulles, then arranging a peace accord in the Pacific, warned that it would be “extremely unpleasant” if Japan was dominated by the Kremlin: “[Should Japan] become a captive Soviet country, that would involve a major shift in the present power position in the world today.” Echoing this zero-sum mentality Vice President Richard Nixon gave a clear indication in 1953 of why close relations with Japan were necessary, “if Japan falls under communist domination,” he reasoned, “all of Asia falls.” America’s role in the Korean War, and thus in the postwar U.S.-Korean alliance, was one consequence of the belief that military defeat anywhere could undermine the Free World’s struggle. Consider the words of General Matthew Ridgway speaking to the Eighth Army in the dark hours of January 1951 about the purpose of the war: “The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization . . . shall defy and defeat communism.” This East-West contest became the foremost reason for formalizing security arrangements with the Philippines and Thailand. As superpower rivalry grew more intense and Washington became more obsessed with Munich—that aggression must not be appeased—a scramble for allies known as “pactomania” erupted during the 1950s.
This was the larger context of the alliance structure in Asia, in which the Philippines played a significant part. Strategically the archipelago was a vital link in the island chain that constituted America’s line of defense against communism. The long relationship between the United States and the Philippines is well chronicled by H.W. Brands in Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines. From Commodore Dewey’s victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the subsequent annexation of the Philippines to the closing of the Subic Bay naval base last year, America has alternately treated the Philippines as a special partner or a colony. In its association with the Philippines, the American failure to match global security concerns with more localized responsibilities provides lessons for future alliances with smaller partners.

Because the main objective was to align states against the Soviet bloc, U.S. officials tended to disregard corrupt, autocratic regimes in Manila. As a consequence, argues Brands, Washington let the Philippines be governed by a cabal of “privileged collaborators.” He opines that a more value-based foreign policy might have impelled changes on the Filipino ruling classes. Power, not ideology, was the criterion of greatest import for security planners. In November 1950 Truman approved an NSC paper defining policy toward the Philippines. Written against the backdrop of Mao’s victory in China, the conflict in Korea, and France’s deepening predicament in Indochina, the paper dubbed the Philippines an essential part of the island chain encircling communism in the Far East. Thus, by 1951, the basic structure of the U.S. alliance system in Asia had been born.

**Growth and Adaptation**

Brands pulls few punches in recounting the volatility of Philippine relations in the 1960s as President Lyndon Johnson escalated involvement in Vietnam. With Saigon under siege, Johnson pressured allies, among them Manila, to show solidarity with the Free World in the fight against communism. But when Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal tried to dispatch a token force to Vietnam, he was bitterly opposed by the then senate president, Ferdinand Marcos. Some months later President Marcos made an ostentatious state visit to the White House where he persuaded Johnson to extend $80 million in aid for sending a 2,000-man Philippine unit to Vietnam. The more the United States thought they needed a show of alliance solidarity, the more allies took advantage of American largesse. After all, quips a sardonic Brands, that is “what allies are for.”

Turning to another aspect of alliance management, the books under review demonstrate that domestic or bureaucratic considerations can affect alliances. For instance, Buckley analyzes the rift between the Departments of State and Defense over how to incorporate a peaceful Japan into the U.S.-engineered postwar world. Due to the occupation, the military tended to have an advantage over diplomats when it came to Japan. As Ambassador Edwin Reischauer noted in 1960 when he left the banks of the Charles for Tokyo, “To many Japanese, an American general or admiral seemed much more a genuine American than a Harvard professor.” Thus, even before policymakers had been forced to take the Japanese defense industry out of mothballs because of the Korean War ($4 million in munitions were purchased from a former enemy), U.S. forces were quietly molding the embryonic Japanese security forces. In effect, the Armed Forces were forging a special relationship with their fledgling counterparts, more modestly but not unlike the British-Japanese alliance of naval secretariats some five decades earlier. While the results of this military influence on Japan proved to be salubrious, the early years of U.S.-Japan relations aptly demonstrate how different agencies within the same government can pursue and implement alliance policies quite autonomously of one another.
Managing alliances also centers on operationalizing military cooperation, that is, planning and conducting combined operations. Notwithstanding some limited successes, Joseph Kedell in *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* explains why Japan has been so reluctant to undertake a greater role in regional and global security. Throughout the Cold War, Japanese defense policy was principally designed to manage conflicting American and Japanese domestic political pressures; the United States tried to measure the international military balance while Japan saw things through the prism of mutual security. This proved dispiriting to Japanese who sought a defense role for their country, but in the 1950s Prime Minister Shigeuro Yoshida deliberately subordinated Japan to the alliance to concentrate on economic expansion.

Although Japan took steps toward a larger defense role in the 1980s under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, it was the Gulf War that finally jarred Japan out of postwar insularity. Tokyo belatedly contributed $13 billion to coalition coffers, but questions lingered about whether Japan was pulling its fair share within the alliance and international community. Only after the Gulf War did the Diet pass the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations bill which authorized the creation of a 2,000-person civilian and military organization. This unit could, under specific conditions, serve in noncombat roles in U.N. missions. Shortly thereafter the first ground forces deployed overseas to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. While the peacekeeping bill and the Cambodian deployment represent a watershed in Japan’s postwar military posture, they are modest, sharply-circumscribed events. Kedell elucidates why these incremental steps were almost pre-determined by Japan’s postwar political system, given its built-in, multi-layered conservatism.

Whether Japan’s defense posture of the future will change radically is doubtful. In *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990*, Roger Buckley states that we may never know the actual strength of the alliance unless a conflict leads to the ultimate decision that befalls allies: “...[t]he alliance has not yet been called upon during its history to confront the ultimate justification of any international pact—solidarity in the council chamber and on the battlefield.”

The future of the U.S.-Japan alliance is a matter of some speculation. The past, however, provides a grounding for forecasters and policymakers alike. In particular, understanding why Japan remained a military midget while becoming an economic giant goes far toward appreciating the impact of domestic politics on alliance management and on this bilateral alliance in particular.

**Termination or Transformation?**

In *A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After the Cold War*, Ted Galen Carpenter argues vehemently for disengagement or, more euphemistically, for “selected engagement.” Asian alliances, as well as others like NATO, are anachronistic. What Washington must do, Carpenter contends, is stand up and declare strategic independence from these vestiges of the Cold War. He faults President Bush’s New World Order in which U.S. forces undergird global stability as wooly-minded conservatism: it only perpetuates an outdated alliance structure at excessive cost. Carpenter calculates that even a vastly scaled-back NATO commitment of 100,000 troops will cost at least $90 billion a year, and 98,000 or so troops afloat and ashore in the Asia-Pacific region will cost another $40 billion. This presumably means that every dollar spent only redounds to the advantage of others, not to the United States. Further- more, Carpenter prefers surgical responses to commitments that are just as Manichean as those proposed during the Cold War, for instance, when Eisenhower dubbed the Japanese “indestructible partners” (read “permanent allies”).

Ignoring the more dyspeptic criticisms of current alliances, Carpenter seems to be on surer footing when reassessing U.S. interests. After all, American (and, undoubtedly, allied) military analysts should be haunted by the vacillation toward Korea in the early postwar period and the Philippines at various times during this century.

As the United States is pressured to assume a greater role in peace-enforcement missions, Carpenter’s guiding rules merit deliberation. First, we must define vital security interests more narrowly than during the Cold War. Unimpressed by the lessons of Korea, Carpenter asserts that vital national interests should have direct, immediate, and substantial consequences. Second, in formalizing alliances decisionmakers should have greater latitude to avoid commitments with imprecise, long-term obligations that can limit American options when significant interests are at stake or that lead to entanglement in irrelevant conflicts. Third, the United States should resist pursuing ambitious international *milieu* goals like stability which are unattainable at acceptable cost or risk. Though desirable, in the final analysis such goals are not essential to American security.

What is striking about these books, however, is not the picture of irredeemable decay, but rather the impressive resiliency of American alliances in overcoming adversity. The essential glue that held the alliances together was a willingness and ability to lead on the part of the United States. The leadership question is accentuated by the recent quest of the Clinton administration and others throughout the Asia-Pacific region to establish a multilateral mechanism for security dialogue and cooperation. Just as we need to be cognizant of our own limitations, so too must we be aware of the limitations of multilateralism in Asia. For instance, it is doubtful that the United States can use its bilateral ties as building blocks for a nascent Pacific defense community. Theoretically alliances may provide a bridge for regional institutional building; practically speaking, military alliances tend to be inferior instruments for integration. Economic means seem to carry more weight throughout the region. But
given the difficulties nowadays in separating economic and military security, the United States has wisely stepped up support for multilateral approaches in the Asia-Pacific region—not only through participation in both the Association of Southeast Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, but also by helping to establish a pan-Pacific security debate.

There also is a fundamental incompatibility between alliances and collective security. That is why the current move toward Asian multilateralism should not strive for collective security but simply cooperative security—or basically, confidence building. For the foreseeable future, a mere forum for security dialogue cannot replace an alliance. Among other things, in the event of war, an infant multilateral organization would face the traditional problem of leadership.

Today, economics is the engine of international politics. Alliances support stability in order to allow economic progress to continue to bring more nations of Asia into the industrialized (if not necessarily democratic) world. Economic concerns were central in the postwar years; they remain of paramount concern in contemporary Asia. And just as Acheson recognized a half century ago, Japan remains at the heart of regional economic prosperity. This could easily lead one to embrace the conclusion offered by Robert Sutter in East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy, that our interests argue for maintaining traditional ties with Japan and other nations in Asia and the Pacific region whose interests coincide with those of America.

U.S. alliances in the Pacific are being reexamined in light of the end of the Cold War. The critical question is whether the typhoon-like winds of the post-Cold War world will completely rip apart the U.S. military umbrella which, although tattered, still stands over several Asian allies. Conversely, will Washington feel compelled to identify a new enemy such as China around which to recast old alliances and forge new commitments to Singapore and other nations of the region? Or will the United States perhaps agree on a more positive cooperative security agenda than the traditional threat-based concept and thus seek the prospect of a meaningful multilateral security community? While the books reviewed offer some conflicting answers to these questions, they will equip the reader to better appreciate the significance of Asian-Pacific security issues.

CHIEFS FROM ACROSS THE ESTUARY

A Book Review by WALTER S. POOLE

You may take the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman, and the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together—and what do you get? The sum of their fears!

Winston Churchill’s words still have a ring of truth about them despite decades of effort in London and Washington to foster crisp but truly joint decision-making. In The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff the British side of that effort is well presented. The authors of this work have unique qualifications: General Sir William Jackson was Assistant Chief of General Staff and Quartermaster General before becoming a reputable military historian, and Field Marshal Lord Bramall served as both Chief of General Staff and Chief of Defence Staff. It is a tribute to the authors, particularly Bramall, that they do not flinch from pointing out short-comings in the system they helped shape and some of those under whom they served.

In Britain, as The Chiefs makes clear, military reforms often occur in response to failure. The Committee of Imperial Defence was established in 1904 after embarrassing reverses during the Boer War. The Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee was formed in 1923 in response to the nearly disastrous clash of what the authors call “political dictatorship versus professional judgment” in World War I. One chief was selected to double as the chairman of the committee, but without a separate supporting staff. The COS worked so well that no serious reorganization was attempted for almost twenty years. The rise of the Chief of Defence Staff to pre-eminence took place gradually, through changes launched by Admiral Louis Mountbatten in the 1960’s, and continued during the 1980’s under two Secretaries of State for Defence, John Nott and Michael Haseltine.

It is illuminating to compare the post-1945 evolution of the British COS with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in this country. The United States acquired a Secretary of Defense in 1947, whose staff and authority expanded enormously over the following two decades, and a JCS Chairman in 1949, whose influence soon outgrew formal limitations imposed by law on the post. During the same period in Britain, the Minister of Defence had a tiny staff and imprecise, non-executive coordinating functions that did not impinge upon the powers and responsibilities of the chiefs or service ministries. It was not until 1957 that Marshal of the RAF Sir William Dickson became Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as well as Chairman of the COS Committee. Yet, with only a small briefing staff of his own, Dickson was really a toothless tiger.

Although a Defence Ministry was created in 1964, management remained decentralized in the services. The army, naval, and air staffs remained separate but were brought
together in joint committees—an approach attempted by the United States in World War II and judged inadequate. Admiral Mountbatten was the first CDS to outshine the service chiefs, and he did so by exploiting his close ties with the political establishment and by resorting to devious, even deceitful methods. Bramall was on Mountbatten’s staff and writes bluntly about his chief’s foibles: “I was staying at Windsor last weekend,” he would say benignly at the start of a chiefs’ meeting, “and she said how glad she was that we were going to do so and so. . . .” The fact that the particular subject was of such complexity or triviality that the Queen could not be expected to have an opinion or interest in it, destroyed the story’s credibility, but that seemed to concern him very little.” Unlike the situation within the U.S. Armed Forces, where the Navy usually opposed centralization while the Army and the Air Force advocated it, Mountbatten found no allies among the service chiefs for a more centralized system of control. Even adding a Director of Plans to the CDS’s staff provoked intense opposition. Mountbatten’s successor as CDS, an Army officer, moved back toward a consensus and corporate approach to decisionmaking.

In the 1980’s, however, major reforms in both the United States and the United Kingdom moved their respective defense establishments in precisely the same direction. John Nott pushed through changes making the CDS alone the principal military advisor to the government as well as making central operational and military policy staffs responsible to him. Michael Haseltine later stripped the services of their vice chiefs, reduced executive staffs, and shifted management responsibility to the commanders in chief (CINCs) in the field. Similarly, the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military advisor to the President and directed that the Joint Staff respond to the Chairman alone, not the corporate JCS. Jackson and Bramall contrast the way in which the corporate COS waged the Falklands War of 1982 with how the CDS alone made decisions during the Gulf War ten years later, leaving the chiefs to supervise deployments and logistic support. Within the Pentagon, in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman, General Colin Powell, was performing in exactly the same manner, first acting and then calling the service chiefs into his office to explain what he had done.

But Jackson and Bramall see danger in the new dispensation: “At the heart of the matter lay the degradation of specialist Land, Sea, and Air advice in the formulation of Defense policy and decisionmaking.” In 1982, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Henry Leach, was the only chief on hand when Prime Minister Thatcher received her first briefing on the impending Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Leach’s judgment that the Navy could respond, the authors recount, gave her the courage to act. Yet, under the post-Haseltine organization, the First Sea Lord could not have dealt directly with and advised the Prime Minister. This seems like a plausible argument, but we must bear in mind that specialist advice is not always sound, as illustrated by U.S. military history. During the winter of 1970–71 a major incursion into Laos, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, was under consideration. The Chairman, Admiral ThomasMoorer, naturally did not feel qualified to render judgment and queried the Army Chief of Staff, General William Westmoreland, who was a former commander in Vietnam as well as other senior Army officers. Their opinion was that the South Vietnamese Army had improved sufficiently to carry out the operation. So Admiral Moorer recommended to the civilian leadership that the operation should...
The past can often provide the best guidelines for an uncertain future. With the collapse of Soviet power, those who are curious about future Russian strategy would do well to read Strategy and Power in Russia by William C. Fuller, Jr., who is a specialist on Russian military history and a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. In this absorbing book, Fuller applies the analytical method developed at Newport which uses historical case studies to critique approaches to Russian strategy. Strategy and Power in Russia provides brilliant explanations of how the tsars employed force to achieve political goals from the early 16th century up to the eve of World War I.

Although Fuller has produced neither a military history of imperial Russia nor a study of its military theory, there is much to learn about both from this well-written book. It is an expertly-led tour across three centuries of war and military policy from which a clear pattern emerges. In sum, effective Russian strategies applied native genius and indigenous resources to strategic challenges, while attempts to adopt purely Western methods usually failed.

The book begins its account in a period when the extinction of the ruling dynasty had left Russia without national leadership, plunging the country into civil war and anarchy.
Its neighbors stripped huge territories from the carcass of what seemed to be a dying land. When the Romanovs seized the throne, they bought peace at home by acknowledging these foreign conquests in order to consolidate their power. But the Romanovs planned to win back the lost lands and then expand their realm.

However, subsequent Russian campaigns to recapture Smolensk from the Poles in 1632–33 and seize the Crimea in 1687–89 failed. Despite investing vast resources and importing foreign military experts and technology, tsarist armies were repulsed with huge losses. After Peter the Great came to power in 1689–90 he did have some success against the Turks. But when a small Swedish force shattered his army at Narva in 1700 Peter realized the need for a new approach to war. He did not adopt Western methods. Instead, as Fuller shows, he did the opposite: in desperation, he studied the peculiarities of Russian society and adapted them to the situation.

Peter took advantage of his defenseless serfs by squeezing them for taxes, as well as for manual labor and military service. He dragooned serfs to create naval shipbuilding and weapons industries, build canals and roads for military transportation, and construct a network of frontier fortifications. Every spring, more serfs were drafted to replace the tens of thousands lost the previous year in battle, and through disease, exposure, and exhaustion. The serf-soldiers that survived their years of service formed an autonomous military society rigidly obedient to imperial command. Given the size of the population and the tsar’s sacred authority, Russian conditions were amenable to a system that spent untold lives and caused enormous human suffering.

Of equal importance, Peter insisted that strategic and operational issues be debated openly and that proposals be reached collectively in councils of war with his generals. The tsar made the ultimate decisions himself but his discussions of military affairs served as extraordinary seminars on war for Russian commanders, provided for the widest possible play of imagination, created a broad range of options, and prevented the stagnation of dogmatic thinking.

National backwardness and native genius produced an army of considerable, albeit hardly overwhelming, power. Peter employed this military force carefully, not aiming to achieve the impossible goal of total overthrow of the Swedes but at acquiring territory along the Baltic of strategic or economic value. He was prepared to endure operational defeat, retreating into the vast interior to gain strategic superiority by use of Russian geography, in order to draw the Swedish King Charles XII after him. Only when the enemy was severely debilitated by several months of campaigning did Peter offer battle, winning the crucial victory at Poltava in June 1709.

Peter still had to batter the Swedes for twelve more years. After shifting the fighting north to the Baltic, the Tsar built a navy and learned to conduct combined operations. The Russian fleet smashed the Swedes at Cape Hangö in 1714. Thereafter, the Russians launched major amphibious raids that culminated in landings between 1719 and 1721 in Sweden. These punitive expeditions ravished the Swedish economy and finally forced the Swedes to cede the Baltic coastline Peter had fought the war to acquire. Along the way, Fuller argues, Peter the Great haphazardly created what can be called the Russian way of war. In the seventy years following Peter’s death in 1725, his successors,
especially Catherine the Great, formalized this improvised military system to conquer huge new provinces in the course of nine major wars. The Russian army even defeated Frederick the Great, only to surrender its gains on the orders of the mentally unbalanced Peter III. The history of Europe from 1689 to 1815 is often described as a struggle for supremacy between England and France. But Fuller makes clear that such a perspective is a purely Western interpretation. In fact, it was really France and Russia that were dueling for continental dominance.

Napoleon seemed to decide the contest when he entered Moscow in 1812. Within three months, however, the Russians under Alexander I drove out the French, employing basically the same methods that had brought Peter victory over the Swedes a century earlier. (In detailing this victory, Fuller offers an engrossing description of the 1812 campaign.) At the time of Napoleon’s downfall, the Russian empire had reached its apogee. Russian armies marched into Paris, a feat which Stalin later grumbled even his victorious Red Army of 1945 was unable to match.

The second half of Fuller’s book is devoted to the rapid decline of Russian strength after 1815. The tsars of the 19th century clung to the system created by Peter—victory over Napoleon had given it an invincible aura—but they demolished the real pillars of Russian strength. To the already conquered peoples of East Europe, later tsars added the tribes of the Caucasus and Central Asia. If the Russians had been victors in the wars of 1853–56, 1877–78, and 1904–05, they would have also annexed millions of Turks, Kurds, Manchurians, and Koreans. As it was, the monarchy was transformed into a restive empire of rebellious nations. Policing so many non-Russian lands pinned down tsarist armies on garrison duty or in frequent counterinsurgency campaigns. By the mid-19th century maintaining the empire taxed Russian military capacity to the limit.

Even worse, the tsars discarded the strategic planning system that had served them so well. Debate gave way to autocratic decisions at the center and competitive, uncoordinated expansion on the borders by semi-independent provincial military governors. Territory was grabbed for hollow reasons of prestige, with little thought to its strategic value or the geopolitical consequences. Such pointless greed led to Russian military disasters during the empire’s last century.

The defeats which Russia suffered also were the result of other weaknesses. Technological backwardness, combined with the rapid developments of Western military and naval technology after 1815, presented the tsars and their armies with an apparently insoluble contradiction. The imperial system was based on war and expansion but, from the mid-19th century on, it could only acquire territory of value by fighting enemies of superior strength. Defeat in the Crimean War sent a tremendous shock wave throughout the Russian imperial system and directly led to the abolition of serfdom and a policy of modernization. But the force unleashed by reform disrupted the entire system; for example, a law abolishing the military enslavement of serfs injected politically discontented conscripts into the main institution which had supported the monarchy. Meanwhile, Russian expansion continued, even though it led to new military disasters. Paradoxically, a fear of revealing weakness created a psychological imperative to project the appearance of irresistible strength. But instead, Russian attempts at territorial aggrandizement in East Asia led to defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.

Growing Russian fear of Germany and Austria-Hungary, prompted by rivalry for influence over the Balkans, led Tsar Alexander III to form an alliance with France in the 1890s. It had become painfully evident to Russian officials that the empire was too weak to defend itself. Yet they retained a system that forced expansion. Even the French alliance actually increased Russian weakness by placing additional strategic demands on the Russian army. And yet, Fuller argues, the empire’s collapse in 1917 was not inevitable, although to have avoided it would have required a long period of peace, entailing painful concessions to Russia’s enemies. This Nicholas II and his officials were unwilling to do and thus they marched to catastrophe in the summer of 1914 rather than back down during the Serbian crisis.

Fuller’s analysis of imperial Russia’s military strategy suggests parallels with the communist era. One can see Stalin as compressing the accomplishments of Peter the Great and mistakes of the later tsars into a 25-year period, first creating a powerful military machine, then using it to expand the Soviet empire beyond Russian ability to control it. The Soviet technological decline in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by defeat in Afghanistan and revolt of the subject peoples, adds weight to the appearance of history repeating itself.

Whether or not such analogies are accurate, the history of Russian military strategy does raise serious questions about the future. How far will Russians go to regain those territories lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union? Will they limit their ambitions to Russian-inhabited lands or seek to reincorporate potentially rebellious regions? Indications are that Russians will establish volunteer forces. But will this mean emulating tsars and communists by creating aggressive, ideologically committed legions or establishing a military devoted to Western ideas of constitutional order and territorial defense? How will the Russian government overcome technological backwardness? Will Russia remain strategically isolated or seek allies?

Strategy and Power in Russia does not answer all of these questions. But it does provide a historical perspective for making educated guesses about the future. Despite present difficulties, the Russian people remain by far the largest national group in Europe and possess great reserves of human strength and genius. When those resources are once again harnessed to an effective strategy, Russia will regain the status of a great military power.
A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is published four times a year and distributed to officers of the Armed Forces. One copy is provided for every two officers serving in joint assignments and one copy for every four majors/lieutenant commanders and lieutenant colonels/commanders across all services. Bulk distribution to the field and fleet is made through service channels. Units, ships, and installations are provided with JFQ through the following activities:

Army AG Publication Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21220
Aviation Supply Office
ATTN: Physical Distribution Branch
5801 Tabor Avenue
Philadelphia, Penna. 19120–5000

CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions on all aspects of joint and combined warfare from members of the Armed Forces as well as defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including foreign military personnel. While there is no standard length for articles, contributions of 3,500 to 6,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the editor and longer...

KUDOS

As the inaugural issue of Joint Force Quarterly came off the presses on June 25, 1993 (right), it marked the beginning of the end of a period of gestation that stretched from a concept briefing presented to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 4, 1992, to the publication date of July 2, 1993. While getting there may not have been half the fun, launching a journal has been rewarding. The satisfaction that the editors experienced on receiving the first copies of JFQ was likewise shared by others outside the precincts of Fort McNair who helped to turn a concept into a reality. Among them are members of the Government Printing Office and Gateway Press.

The editors wish to acknowledge the outstanding contribution of William Rawley, Typography and Design Division, Government Printing Office, who designed and laid out the first issue. Thanks also go to...

MISCELLANEA

The F–5E pictured alongside the Air Force F–16C on page 22 of issue 1 (Summer 1993) is Jordanian, not Saudi Arabian as indicated in the caption. Thanks to Colonel Bander Al Saud, Royal Saudi Air Force, for pointing out the error.

The caption on page 28 of issue 1 should have read “A GBU–27 prototype laser guided bomb being dropped from an F–117 stealth fighter”—a correction provided by Capt J.D. Ramsey, USAF.

The Marine Corps aircraft shown launching a missile in the photo on page 35 of issue 1 is an F–4, not an A–4.

The JCS medal depicted on the back cover of issue 1 was presented by General Earle G. Wheeler, USA (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), in May 1968. (Medal loaned by Special Collections, National Defense University Library.)
items of commentary on articles published in previous issues are invited. Copies of supporting material (such as charts, maps, and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts citing the full source and indicating applicable copyright information if known. To facilitate the editorial review of your contribution, please provide two copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place all personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and avoid identifying yourself in the body of the manuscript. You may follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used; both the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

If possible, submit your manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version to facilitate editing. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks prepared in various formats can be processed, Wordperfect is preferred. (Disks will be returned if requested.) Additional information on submitting contributions is available by either calling: (202) 475–1013/DSN 335–1013, or addressing queries to:

Managing Editor
Joint Force Quarterly
National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319–6000

The back cover photo shows the JCS identification badge worn by General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, (courtesy of Special Collections, National Defense University Library).