Joint Force Quarterly 77

Joint Force Quarterly 77

(2nd Quarter, April 2015)

The Cyber "Domain" and Deterrence

  • Ethics of Big Data
  • Operational Leadership

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Executive Summary

By William T. Eliason

A century and a half has passed since the end of the American Civil War and reminders both physical and cultural surround us, especially here in the Nation’s capital. So let us reflect on one important idea of that time that today all Americans should consider, one that President Abraham Lincoln himself held in the front of his mind throughout the war: the value of seeking unity from diverse opinions.

Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence

By Dorothy E. Denning

As the Department of Defense (DOD) formulates strategy and doctrine for operating in cyberspace, it is vital to understand the domain and how it relates to the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space.

Framing the Big Data Ethics Debate for the Military

By Karl F. Schneider, David S. Lyle, and Francis X. Murphy

Big data is everywhere these days. It shows up in many realms of contemporary life, ranging from how people are guided to potential purchases as they shop online, to how political campaigns win elections, and even to when farmers plant crops and apply fertilizer to their fields.

Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis

By Chandler P. Atwood

The vast amount of information that the Intelligence Community (IC) collects demands a transformation in the way the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and presents data.

Five Examples of Big Data Analytics and the Future of ISR

By Jon A. Kimminau

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The Defense Innovation Initiative: The Importance of Capability Prototyping

By Edie Williams and Alan R. Shaffer

The recently unveiled Defense Innovation Initiative aims to “pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century” by finding “new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources.”

The Quantum Leap into Computing and Communication: A Chinese Perspective

By Cindy Hurst

For a few decades, nations have been relying on encryption systems to protect a wide variety of computerized transmissions ranging from commerce to government to military communications. While today’s encryption systems are considered reasonably secure, the possibilities of quantum cryptography and quantum computing offer a whole new dimension and threat to computerized secrecy.

JPME Today

Writing Faculty Papers for Joint Professional Military Education

By Thomas P. Galvin

In joint professional military education (JPME), there is no tool more powerful than the written word. Whether in the form of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, or course papers, students and faculty members demand high levels of intellectual rigor and reflection in both the products they read and the ones they produce.

Joint Professional Military Education: A Retrospective of the Skelton Panel

By Anna T. Waggener

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On Operational Leadership

By Milan Vego

Success of any military organization depends on the experience and good judgment of its leaders. Ideally, all commanders should have a high level of professional education and training in addition to some critically important character traits. Moreover, the higher the level of command, the more important it is that commanders and staff meet these requirements. Wars are not won or lost at the tactical level but at the operational and strategic levels. Hence, it is critically important that operational commanders are selected based solely on their proven or potential warfighting abilities and not their political connections or management skills. Operational commanders are not managers but should be first and foremost warfighters.


Relying on the Kindness of Machines? The Security Threat of Artificial Agents

By Randy Eshelman and Douglas Derrick

Modern technology is a daily part of our lives. It serves critical functions in defense, responding to natural disasters, and scientific research. Without technology, some of the most common human tasks would become laborious or, in many cases, impossible. Since we have become dependent on technology and its uses, and technology is becoming ever more capable, it is necessary that we consider the possibility of goal-driven, adaptive agents becoming an adversary instead of a tool.

Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?

By Andrew Herr

Much of the future-looking discussion in national security circles today focuses on autonomous systems and cyber weapons. Largely missing from this discussion is a place for humans on the battlefield. Do today’s emerging and potentially disruptive technologies mean that humans will no longer be important in future warfare? A look at historical military operations and current technologies suggests the proper response is that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of man’s obsolescence have been exaggerated.

DOD Response Under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action

By Richard J. Hayes, Jr.

Hurricane Katrina revealed our nation’s lack of preparedness to respond to a complex catastrophe in a rapid, efficient, and effective manner.1 This catastrophe forced a reevaluation of how we plan for and respond to natural disasters and/or emergencies. Over the last 10 years, efforts have focused on new response frameworks and building capacity to respond to such events, but little consideration has been given to capitalizing on a process that would rapidly generate and deploy Title 10 Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities, especially the Reserve components. DOD needs to revise processes in the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) to recognize and capitalize on the inherent advantage of using Reserve forces in closest proximity to incidents. The current process is cumbersome, inefficient, and potentially leads to unnecessary loss of life and human suffering. History has illustrated over and over again that the first 72 hours of any catastrophe is the window in which we are most likely to save lives. Squandering time to run mobilization of Reserve units through the current force generation process is unacceptable.


After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia

By Vincent A. Manzo

The United States has never fought a conventional war against a nuclear-armed adversary. Yet the United States and its allies must prepare for a range of military contingencies with both North Korea and China, and avoiding nuclear escalation would be a U.S. objective in all of them. Developing strategies for managing escalation will be an essential part of U.S. efforts to extend deterrence and assure its allies in Northeast Asia.

Fighting More Fires with Less Water: Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design

By Tyrone L. Groh and Richard J. Bailey, Jr.

Imagine that you are the fire chief for a mid-sized community. The city council informs you that it is reducing your budget this year by 30 percent. It is redirecting these funds for community outreach and fire-prevention education programs. Ironically, the council has also instructed you to organize and conduct these programs. In every previous year, you have used the entire budget to train and equip your firefighters and to respond to fire emergencies in the city. You know that outreach is important and may indeed help to lower the incidence of fires in the city—assuming, of course, that your city is not rife with arsonists. However, will you now have sufficient resources to accomplish your primary mission? Put another way, is putting out fires or preventing them a better use of your resources?

Distributed Common Ground System–Future: Moving into the 22nd Century Today

By Eugene Haase

While supporting a free medical clinic in western Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces question local villagers about an increase in recent enemy activity. They learn of unusual vehicle movements and a larger number of fighters in the village over the past several weeks. After returning to base, this information is passed to the unit intelligence officer who annotates it in an initial report that is made available through a shared intelligence database. Several hours later, a known enemy signal is intercepted not far from the village and is passed by way of secure joint chat rooms and product reports. At nearly the same time, advanced imaging data from a Navy Triton unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) shows unusual disturbances in the same area. Shortly thereafter, an Army unit begins a patrol in the vicinity with a Shadow UAV performing overwatch. As the patrol reaches the area where the disturbances were noted, they are ambushed and take significant losses.

I Corps: U.S. Pacific Command's Newest Asset

By Robert B. Brown and Jason N. Adler

In January 2012, the United States redefined its global security priorities with the words above. The changing global environment, signified by the rising political and economic power of Asia, necessitated an adjustment of national strategic goals. On the surface, little may appear changed in a region mostly covered with blue water. Army forces are still in Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. That surface view belies the strategic, operational, and tactical changes that have occurred as the Army’s direction has shifted to the Pacific, spearheaded operationally by I Corps.

The Military's Role in Rule of Law Development

By Patrick J. Reinert and John F. Hussey

As Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan transitions to the Resolute Support Mission, many believe that military engagements abroad involving the United States will decrease and that the Nation will become a disengaged actor on the world stage. Given the complexity and volatility of relationships among nations, however, as well as the continual rise of hostile transnational groups, it appears the United States will remain substantially engaged on the international stage for the foreseeable future. As part of its future engagement strategy, the United States must consider and plan for conducting operations in states at risk of failure, in failed states where the central government is so weakened that the people have virtually returned to the natural state described by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan, in states emerging from long periods of conflict such as Afghanistan, and in states in peaceful postconflict rebuilding periods.


Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders

By John Erath

On April 10, 1865, Robert E. Lee wrote a letter to the soldiers of his army that began, “After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been forced to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.” At this moment, the Civil War essentially ended in victory for the Union, and the process of reuniting the United States of America began. Lee’s immediate view of the circumstances, that the Confederate armies had done everything possible but were overmatched by Northern numbers, provided a means by which his veterans could feel that they had served honorably, but it was challenged almost immediately by other Confederate military and political leaders who blamed instead such factors as incompetent government, social divisions, and political squabbling for their defeat. The Confederacy, many felt, would not have embarked on a war it could not win. Indeed, its success in repelling invasions over the first 2 years of the war led many to believe that the war had almost been won.

Book Reviews

Book Review: World Order

Reviewed by David A. Anderson

Henry Kissinger, the scholar, statesman, and philosopher, writes a fascinating, insightful, and thought-provoking history of the concept of the state, statecraft, grand strategy, and international cooperation in the pursuit of order and stability among nations. Although no true universal arrangement among states has ever existed, he asserts the order that does exist is at risk because of developing forces beyond the control of states themselves. So we must ask whether collective state order can be achieved while maintaining individual state freedom in an increasingly intricate and turbulent global environment.

Russia and the Relationship Between Law and Power

Reviewed by Alice A. Booher

Winston Churchill stated, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” James Terry patiently peels away each of those layers to hypothesize an unrelenting consistency and prevailing logic to Russian behavior as it seeks power, for myriad reasons, over those who dwell within and without its self-defined boundaries. The release of this compact yet intricate work by Dr. Terry, addressing the long and convoluted history of Russia and its recurrent international “habits,” could not be timelier in multiple contexts.

The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur

Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa

Douglas MacArthur and Franklin Roosevelt first met in 1916 when both were involved in planning prewar mobilization for the Woodrow Wilson administration. Two years later, MacArthur was commanding the Rainbow Division in France where he earned seven Silver Stars for courage and bravery in leading his troops in battle against the Germans, while Roosevelt was serving as President Wilson’s assistant Secretary of the Navy. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, MacArthur was the Army’s chief of staff (having been appointed by President Herbert Hoover). Roosevelt, mainly for political reasons, extended MacArthur’s term as Army chief of staff, but the two repeatedly clashed over budget matters. During World War II, Roosevelt as commander in chief selected MacArthur to lead the U.S. war effort in the Southwest Pacific.

Joint Doctrine

The Way Ahead for Joint Operations and Planning Doctrine

By Rick Rowlett, Carl A. Young, Alan F. Mangan, and Steve M. Townsend

Two of joint doctrine’s keystone1 joint publications (JPs) have entered the window for revision—JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Both publications received comprehensive assessments in 2014, which generated a wide variety of recommended changes from combatant commands (CCMD), the Services, National Guard Bureau, Defense agencies, and the Joint Staff. This article describes the more significant of these.

Joint Doctrine Update

By The Joint Staff

DOWNLOAD PDFJoint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)JP 1-0, Joint