Feb. 16, 2024

From “Made in China” to “Created in China”: Intellectual Property Rights in the People’s Republic of China

Friction between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on technology captures the headlines regularly. While there continue to be intellectual property rights (IPR) violations in China, China analysts need to be more mindful of China’s rising influence in generating intellectual property. The reality is that China’s growing influence in patent applications and innovation is the real threat.

Feb. 15, 2024

Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates

This article proposes an approach to nuclear force sizing debates based on a framework built on four analytic dimensions: overarching risk management approaches; deterrence and assurance objectives; strategic force employment guidance; and operational constraints. The answers to key questions across these dimensions provide a structure to inform debates about the appropriate size and characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces. Only after clarifying U.S. objectives across these dimensions and focusing on key considerations therein should policymakers enter nuclear force sizing debates. The resulting analysis does not advocate for any policy position or hypothesize the “correct” number of nuclear forces. Instead, the purpose of the framework is to focus nuclear force sizing debates on more fundamental assumptions regarding the role of nuclear weapons in achieving U.S. national security objectives.

Feb. 15, 2024

Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation

Today, most people do not remember a time when the United States was not allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. As these alliances span over seven decades, it is easy to take for granted that the relationships will continue as they always have into the future. The changing security landscape and the emergence of the two-peer nuclear environment will challenge extended deterrence in ways not yet well understood. This requires reexamining deterrence strategies and potentially acquiring new capabilities to effectively assure allies and close the growing “assurance gap.”

Feb. 15, 2024

New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges

Decades of fighting militarily inferior adversaries with little to no concern of strategic escalation have atrophied the intellectual frameworks required to deter and, if necessary, fight today’s potential adversaries. Paths to nuclear use, strategies that simultaneously account for prevailing conventionally while deterring strategic attacks, and concepts to restore deterrence should an adversary choose strategic escalation are among the most important considerations the United States must contend with in an era of intensifying Great Power competition. So along with modernizing the hardware and software of the U.S. nuclear enterprise, we are called to revitalize our cognitive approaches. This requires the national security community to understand the character of today’s security environment, revisit and refresh enduring deterrence truths, and explore new deterrence frameworks necessary for modern-day challenges.

Feb. 15, 2024

Wicked Deterrence Challenge: The Changing Strategic Landscape

The National Security Strategy of the United States laid out that the Nation is entering a decisive decade—not only for itself but also for the world. The current era of strategic competition is characterized by the reemergence of a geopolitical contest between powerful states over the shape of the future global order. After World War II, the Allies established a rules-based international order rooted in cooperative values and predicated on a framework of diplomatic and economic rules, led and enforced by like-minded nations. This system has enabled decades of prosperity for all nations that have elected to participate, but it is now under stress by revisionist nations. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and North Korea are each intent on changing the international order to achieve their national ambitions. The changing strategic environment has created a wicked deterrence challenge that will test the United States and its allies.

Feb. 15, 2024

An Interview with Anthony J. Cotton

Our threats are not isolated to one command or nation. These global challenges require a concerted effort to strengthen not only deterrence but also partnerships with our allies and partners. For the first time, the United States faces two major nuclear powers that could operate at any level or domain of conflict to meet their national objectives. We are now in a multipolar world with potential adversaries that could threaten the United States, our allies, and our partners with nuclear weapons and nonnuclear capabilities that could have devastating impacts.

Feb. 15, 2024

Accelerating Cyber Leader Development: A Call to Action for Service War Colleges

Cyber leaders find their organizations under constant cyber attack from millions of daily intrusions disrupting everything from our electoral system to our social media feeds. Today, cyberspace provides both technological opportunity and vulnerability. The frightening reality is that the Nation is adrift in a dangerous cyberspace domain, a warfighting domain that stores, processes, and analyzes data under the uncertain eye of ill-prepared senior cyber leaders. This article is squarely focused on a recommendation to deliberately develop senior cyber leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD) to win in this dangerous battlespace.

Feb. 15, 2024

A New Form of Accountability in JPME: The Shift to Outcomes-Based Military Education

The programs responsible for teaching joint professional military education (JPME) Phases I and II are undergoing a significant transformation in demonstrating their mission fulfillment. Governed by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), particularly OPMEP-F, implemented on May 15, 2020, these institutions are moving towards outcomes-based military education (OBME). Unlike previous versions, OPMEP-F requires programs to prove achievement on defined learning outcomes, marking a departure from merely demonstrating coverage of mandated content. This shift reflects a comprehensive change in validating JPME program success and ensuring graduates reach specified levels of achievement on defined learning outcomes.

Feb. 15, 2024

Microgrids for the 21st Century: The Case for a Defense Energy Architecture

The Department of Defense (DOD) needs a new approach to electrical grid infrastructure to maintain security and access to operational energy. Recent natural disasters and cyber attacks have exposed the vulnerability of the current system, posing threats to military operational readiness. Strategic military facilities currently acquire most of their electric power directly from the national grid, which is increasingly vulnerable to failures. The problems experienced to date could be exponentially worse if targeted by a sophisticated adversary.

Feb. 15, 2024

Position, Navigation, and Timing Weaponization in the Maritime Domain: Orientation in the Era of Great Systems Conflict

The jamming and spoofing of Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) information has escalated in the last half-dozen years from simple demonstrations of capability to truly dangerous situations where misperceptions could ignite a major conflict. Because of the grave danger that GPS and AIS weaponization entails, it is essential that policymakers and maritime operators understand not only the risks and implications of these threats, but also the mitigation techniques and countermeasures that add resilience to the warfighter.