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Feb. 1, 2007

I-Power: The Information Revolution and Stability Operations

Information and information technology (I/IT) can significantly increase the likelihood of success in stability operations— if they are engaged as part of an overall strategy that coordinates the actions of outside intervenors and focuses on generating effective results for the host nation. Properly utilized, I/IT can help create a knowledgeable intervention, organize complex activities, and integrate stability operations with the host nation, making stability operations more effective.

Dec. 1, 2006

Case Studies – Archive

As a resource for civilian and military classroom instruction, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy—with sponsorship by the [former] Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Transformation and Resources— developed a series of case studies to examine issues of national security transformation. These case studies are considered “living” documents, continually evolving as developments occur in national security transformation and new information becomes available. All of the case studies include an instructors guide at the end of the study for use in classroom settings.

Nov. 1, 2006

DTP-038: Weathering the Storm: Leading Your Organization Through a Pandemic

This document is a guide to help prepare your organization for survival during a pandemic. All organizations have their own culture and character, so no one easy-to-follow guide will provide all the answers for your specific group. Rather, this is designed to provide you with resource materials from which you may pick and choose to tailor a plan that is best suited to your circumstances.

Oct. 1, 2006

DTP-037: Army Science and Technology Analysis for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

This study assesses the technology capability gaps in the U.S. Army’s ability to conduct S&R operations. The purpose of this study is to identify the technological shortfalls, identify capability gaps and needs, and highlight technology opportunities for consideration by Army S&T leadership.

Sept. 1, 2006

DTP-035: Critical Technology Events in the Development of Selected Army Weapons Systems: A Summary of ‘Project Hindsight Revisited’

This report collects and summarizes the findings from prior studies regarding the effectiveness of the Abrams tank, Apache helicopter, and two-man portable missile system. This report compares these findings to the findings from the original Project Hindsight and then offers recommendations based on the four systems for managing today’s Army science and technology work.

Sept. 1, 2006

DTP-036: Overcoming the S&T Assessment Uncertainty Principle: An Approach to Enterprise-Wide Assessment of the DOD S&T Program

This study examines why the sum of all the reviews of the relevance, viability, and productivity of the S&T program of the DoD does not constitute an assessment of the entire DoD S&T enterprise and examines the prospects for rectifying this situation.

Aug. 1, 2006

Lee’s Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett’s Charge

At the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee made a mistake that doomed the hopes of the Confederate States of America to compel the United States to sue for peace. Why one of the great generals of his time made such a blunder continues to be a topic of research and intense debate. Lee said little at the time or afterward to justify his decision to launch what has become known as Pickett’s Charge, so analysis must be inferential and inconclusive. Our aim is to explain Lee’s fateful decision not with new facts but with new analytical methods to illuminate decisionmaking in combat.

Aug. 1, 2006

DTP-034: Solutions for Northern Kosovo: Lessons Learned in Mostar, Eastern Slavonia, and Brcko

This paper examines three similar cases to the issues in Kososvo that were managed by the international community. By looking at the results of these three cases a decade or more after they began, this paper attempts to shed light on the options for Mitrovica, Kosovo. In order to do this, members of the CTNSP staff traveled to these areas to gather firsthand information relating to this problem.

July 1, 2006

Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?

Differences in strategic vision and concepts of security are central to the U.S. and European Union (EU) approaches to counterterrorism. While the United States conceives of a war against terrorism, Europe does not. As a result of different perceptions of the threat, both sides of the Atlantic take divergent approaches to homeland security. Europeans tend to favor the use of a law enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration believes that a quasi-militaristic, overtly proactive, and highly vigilant stance will serve as the best deterrent to future attacks. By their own standards, Europeans are doing more to counter terrorism since September 11 and even more since the attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and in London (July 7, 2005); by U.S. standards, these measures sometimes appear inadequate. As a result, there are significant transatlantic divergences on the best methods for halting the spread of terrorism.

July 1, 2006

BATTLE WISE: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare

This book is an inquiry into the possibility of improving the operational thinking and decisionmaking of U.S. military individuals, teams, and forces who fight for their nation.