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Jan. 27, 2017

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons: A New Joint Operational Concept

In two separate keynote addresses at the annual conventions of the professional associations of the Army and Air Force, General Joseph Dunford, Jr., described how he and the other Service chiefs went through a “process of discovery” to develop the new National Military Strategy. He further explained that part of that process included their collective thinking on our national centers of gravity.

Jan. 27, 2017

Mentoring: Civilian Contributions to the Joint Force

This year, in support of the Secretary of Defense’s priority to “build a department and joint force of the future by embracing change,” General Dunford laid out his approach for the future joint force. His three key joint force focus areas include the requirement to develop leaders for Joint Forces Next.

Jan. 27, 2017

Leadership and Operational Art in World War II: The Case for General Lesley J. McNair

The U.S. Army’s reputation for effectiveness during World War II has not fared well over time, particularly regarding the European theater of operations. This is surprising given what the Army accomplished. Just to refresh the reader’s memory, the United States went to war with a small, impoverished Army that conducted maneuvers with wooden weapons and borrowed vehicles in the years leading up to World War II. Yet within 12 months of Germany declaring war on the United States, the Army invaded North Africa and knocked Vichy French forces out of the war. In another 12 months, it knocked Italy out of the war. And 12 months later, the Army was on the border of Germany, having just defeated Adolf Hitler’s last-gasp effort to stop the Allied onslaught.

Jan. 27, 2017

The Imperative for a Health Systems Approach to Global Health Engagement

The military health system is a strategic asset. The Department of Defense (DOD) spends more than half a billion dollars per year on global health engagement (GHE). There is a shift from an exclusive focus on service delivery to information-gathering in order to support community engagement in public health policy development, thus engaging broader elements of the health system. This transition requires DOD GHE efforts to consider how they can contribute to stronger health systems and broader global health objectives. Military GHE is an essential part of a national strategy that recognizes the importance of strong health infrastructure to the stability and health of nations.1 In the context of competing budgetary concerns within DOD, it is even more essential that GHE not only meets the needs of partner nations but also produces maximum benefit to the broader policy objectives of the United States. Systems engagement is more aligned with U.S. projection of soft power as well as improving civic engagement between American health assets and civil society in partner countries.

Jan. 27, 2017

Breaking Through with Your Breakthrough: How Science-Based Communication Can Promote Trust to Accelerate Innovation and Technological Advantage

Naval technology today can trace its origins to Office of Naval Research (ONR)–sponsored research, but in order for breakthroughs to reach the fleet, ONR has a responsibility to communicate warfighting value and foster informed support for implementation. This article shares some insights from decades of innovation and offers seven communication practices that can help innovators and leaders in military science and technology, not only in the Navy but also in the other Services.

Jan. 27, 2017

Toward a Future National Strategy: A Review Essay

What could be more important than a nation’s strategy? A strategy brings together ends, ways, and means. It assesses costs and risks and establishes priorities. It takes basic guidance and direction from national policy, but, in turn, strategy guides subordinate plans and policies. It provides a framework that can help us comprehend contextual developments, which, in turn, can reshape the strategy. A consistent strategy is also a certain trumpet for friends and allies to heed. In our messy democracy, domestic politics and bureaucratic politics will often frustrate strategy, but, in the end, national strategy retains its importance.

Jan. 26, 2017

Hybrid Threat Center of Gravity Analysis: Taking a Fresh Look at ISIL

Debates continue in the media, military, and foreign policy circles about the national strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Imbedded within these debates are fundamental disagreements about ISIL’s strategic and operational centers of gravity. Correctly identifying the center of gravity (COG) of an adversary is critical to designing an operational approach to defeat him. On the other hand, misidentifying the center of gravity is the clearest path to defeat against any foe—especially a hybrid one. An assessment of ISIL’s center of gravity is critical to developing a suitable operational design aimed at its defeat. The first order of business, however, is to determine if ISIL is a hybrid actor and, if so, how that impacts our analysis.

Jan. 26, 2017

Center of Gravity Analysis "Down Under": The Australian Defence Force's New Approach

Given Australia’s position as a key U.S. ally and a much smaller military power, as well as the array of cultural similarities between the two countries, it should come as no surprise that U.S. developments have regularly influenced Australian Defence Force (ADF) thinking about armed conflict.1 Center of gravity (COG) analysis, a lynchpin of campaign and operation planning, is no exception.

Jan. 26, 2017

The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles

Current U.S. military joint and Service doctrine assigns U.S. Army forces, supported by U.S. Air Force forces, the role of being responsible for defeating an opposing mechanized army. But now, thanks to significant advances that have been occurring over the last two-and-a-half decades in the Air Force’s surface surveillance and precision attack capabilities, it is time to reverse these roles.1 Role reversal is an urgent necessity because it would give the Armed Forces the ability to defeat an opposing mechanized army faster with far less risk to U.S. personnel, while significantly reducing the amount of resources the United States needs to devote to countering this threat. Understanding why reversing roles can provide these important advantages requires examining the continuing validity of prevailing assumptions regarding Service roles in defeating such a threat. This examination begins by identifying the rationale behind today’s Army force structure.

Jan. 26, 2017

The National War College: Marking 70 Years of Strategic Education

Seventy years ago, a war-weary Washington struggled with uncertainty and alarm. Exhausted after years of global conflict and still carrying memories of the Great Depression, America yearned for home and prosperity. Yet barely 6 months after victory in World War II, Washington faced troubling signs of danger ahead. A past ally was becoming a threat. Soviet aggression shattered postwar dreams of peace. With the dawn of 1946 we entered a new strategic era—the bipolar struggle with the Soviet Union.