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Sept. 1, 2015

Chapter 3 | National-Level Coordination and Implementation: How System Attributes Trumped Leadership

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Sept. 1, 2015

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.

Sept. 1, 2015

Chapter 4 | Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq

Security force assistance played a leading role in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where local security forces were often spoken of as “our ticket home” or “our exit strategy.” The effort to raise, train, equip, field, and advise army and police forces eventually became the center of gravity in both theaters. Yet for some years, the effort was ad hoc, under-resourced, and complicated by internal bureaucratic struggles in Washington and by corrosive corruption and mismanagement within host-nation governments. If the United States were to undertake similar efforts in the future, the quality and effectiveness of its security force assistance programs will again play a decisive role in achieving successful outcomes.

Sept. 1, 2015

Chapter 5 | 9/11 and After: Legal Issues, Lessons, and Irregular Conflict

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Sept. 1, 2015

Chapter 6 | Reflections on Lessons Encountered

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Sept. 1, 2015

Annex A | The Human and Financial Costs of Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

This annex provides both an assessment of the human and financial costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a baseline for assessing broader strategic gains and losses from a decade-plus of war. It reviews official U.S. Government data and private studies that attempt to capture the direct costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as some of the related and projected costs associated with the operations such as healthcare and disability costs for veterans and interest on the debt. While the annex focuses specifically on U.S. costs, it also briefly reviews costs incurred by our allies, host-nation security forces, and local populations.

Sept. 1, 2015

Annex B | Afghanistan Timeline

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Sept. 1, 2015

Annex C | Iraq Timeline

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Sept. 1, 2015

Contributors

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Aug. 1, 2015

An Empirical Analysis of Claimant Tactics in the South China Sea

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim some or all of the land features and maritime territory in the South China Sea. One notable aspect of the South China Sea dispute is that its advocates argue past one another with little reference to a common set of facts. Another is the absence of comprehensive data on the actions claimants have taken to advance or protect their claims. The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University (NDU) set out to create a comprehensive database documenting the various tactics pursued by South China Sea claimants over an 18-year timeframe (1995–2013). This paper draws upon that data to analyze what tactics South China Sea claimants are employing and to present some potential considerations for U.S. and allied policymakers.