April 1, 2015

The Quantum Leap into Computing and Communication: A Chinese Perspective

For a few decades, nations have been relying on encryption systems to protect a wide variety of computerized transmissions ranging from commerce to government to military communications. While today’s encryption systems are considered reasonably secure, the possibilities of quantum cryptography and quantum computing offer a whole new dimension and threat to computerized secrecy.

April 1, 2015

Writing Faculty Papers for Joint Professional Military Education

In joint professional military education (JPME), there is no tool more powerful than the written word. Whether in the form of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, or course papers, students and faculty members demand high levels of intellectual rigor and reflection in both the products they read and the ones they produce.

April 1, 2015

Joint Professional Military Education: A Retrospective of the Skelton Panel

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April 1, 2015

Relying on the Kindness of Machines? The Security Threat of Artificial Agents

Modern technology is a daily part of our lives. It serves critical functions in defense, responding to natural disasters, and scientific research. Without technology, some of the most common human tasks would become laborious or, in many cases, impossible. Since we have become dependent on technology and its uses, and technology is becoming ever more capable, it is necessary that we consider the possibility of goal-driven, adaptive agents becoming an adversary instead of a tool.

April 1, 2015

Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?

Much of the future-looking discussion in national security circles today focuses on autonomous systems and cyber weapons. Largely missing from this discussion is a place for humans on the battlefield. Do today’s emerging and potentially disruptive technologies mean that humans will no longer be important in future warfare? A look at historical military operations and current technologies suggests the proper response is that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of man’s obsolescence have been exaggerated.

April 1, 2015

I Corps: U.S. Pacific Command's Newest Asset

In January 2012, the United States redefined its global security priorities with the words above. The changing global environment, signified by the rising political and economic power of Asia, necessitated an adjustment of national strategic goals. On the surface, little may appear changed in a region mostly covered with blue water. Army forces are still in Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. That surface view belies the strategic, operational, and tactical changes that have occurred as the Army’s direction has shifted to the Pacific, spearheaded operationally by I Corps.

April 1, 2015

After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia

The United States has never fought a conventional war against a nuclear-armed adversary. Yet the United States and its allies must prepare for a range of military contingencies with both North Korea and China, and avoiding nuclear escalation would be a U.S. objective in all of them. Developing strategies for managing escalation will be an essential part of U.S. efforts to extend deterrence and assure its allies in Northeast Asia.

April 1, 2015

Fighting More Fires with Less Water: Phase Zero and Modified Operational Design

Imagine that you are the fire chief for a mid-sized community. The city council informs you that it is reducing your budget this year by 30 percent. It is redirecting these funds for community outreach and fire-prevention education programs. Ironically, the council has also instructed you to organize and conduct these programs. In every previous year, you have used the entire budget to train and equip your firefighters and to respond to fire emergencies in the city. You know that outreach is important and may indeed help to lower the incidence of fires in the city—assuming, of course, that your city is not rife with arsonists. However, will you now have sufficient resources to accomplish your primary mission? Put another way, is putting out fires or preventing them a better use of your resources?

April 1, 2015

Distributed Common Ground System–Future: Moving into the 22nd Century Today

While supporting a free medical clinic in western Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces question local villagers about an increase in recent enemy activity. They learn of unusual vehicle movements and a larger number of fighters in the village over the past several weeks. After returning to base, this information is passed to the unit intelligence officer who annotates it in an initial report that is made available through a shared intelligence database. Several hours later, a known enemy signal is intercepted not far from the village and is passed by way of secure joint chat rooms and product reports. At nearly the same time, advanced imaging data from a Navy Triton unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) shows unusual disturbances in the same area. Shortly thereafter, an Army unit begins a patrol in the vicinity with a Shadow UAV performing overwatch. As the patrol reaches the area where the disturbances were noted, they are ambushed and take significant losses.

April 1, 2015

DOD Response Under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action

Hurricane Katrina revealed our nation’s lack of preparedness to respond to a complex catastrophe in a rapid, efficient, and effective manner.1 This catastrophe forced a reevaluation of how we plan for and respond to natural disasters and/or emergencies. Over the last 10 years, efforts have focused on new response frameworks and building capacity to respond to such events, but little consideration has been given to capitalizing on a process that would rapidly generate and deploy Title 10 Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities, especially the Reserve components. DOD needs to revise processes in the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) to recognize and capitalize on the inherent advantage of using Reserve forces in closest proximity to incidents. The current process is cumbersome, inefficient, and potentially leads to unnecessary loss of life and human suffering. History has illustrated over and over again that the first 72 hours of any catastrophe is the window in which we are most likely to save lives. Squandering time to run mobilization of Reserve units through the current force generation process is unacceptable.