Joint Force Quarterly 88

Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter, January 2018)

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Executive Summary

By William T. Eliason

War exacts a toll over time unlike any other human experience. And meeting the demands of combat takes more than one individual’s effort, budget, and ideas to succeed. The joint force has to adapt, adjust, acquire, repurpose, retrain, recruit, and perform a whole range of other functions to continue to meet the mission of protecting our Nation, allies, and partners around the world.

The Future Is Plural: Multiple Futures for Tomorrow's Joint Force

By F.G. Hoffman

Multidimensional challenges cannot rely on dartboards or algorithms fed by Big Data. The central question for senior leaders in defense is improving their assessment of risk in ambiguous contexts.

Multidomain Battle: Time for a Campaign of Joint Experimentation

By Kevin M. Woods and Thomas C. Greenwood

Concepts on the scale of multidomain battle (MDB) require a campaign of experimentation that provides compelling evidence for the concept by fleshing out its operational and institutional contexts.

The Power of Partnership: Security Cooperation and Globally Integrated Logistics

By Thomas Warren Ross

Logistics ought to be substantially integrated into security cooperation efforts, and security cooperation ought to be thoughtfully integrated into the discipline of logistics. While this premise may seem obvious, it is too often overlooked or misunderstood.

Surfing the Chaos: Warfighting in a Contested Cyberspace Environment

By William D. Bryant

To win in the new cyber-contested battles of the future, a combatant must still command, but let go of control and surf the chaos.

JPME Today

The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process

By Milan Vego

Is risk management overemphasized in the decisionmaking process? Is caution more valued than boldness in action?

Women, Regardless: Understanding Gender Bias in U.S. Military Integration

By Elizabeth M. Trobaugh

Regardless of whether society thinks women should be in combat, the reality is they already have been in the fight. Yet the current combat arms culture has been slow to adjust.


Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts Toward a Joint Solution

By David G. Perkins and James M. Holmes

As advancements in cyber continue to accelerate and proliferate across multiple domains, and as our potential adversaries adjust their strategies by utilizing these advancements asymmetrically in order to counter our strengths, we can no longer develop domain-specific solutions that require time and effort to synchronize and federate.

A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America

By Steve F. Kime

We need to start thinking about a military doctrine that is appropriate to the realities the United States faces in the 21st century. Despite the growing awareness that our current military posture is out of sync with the times, no politician and no military officer could successfully confront the powerful array of vested interests in the status quo and suggest the kind of military revolution that reality requires.

The Need for an Innovative Joint Psychological Warfare Force Structure

By Richard B. Davenport

There has never been a greater historical need and better opportunity to create a strategic joint influence organization and subsequent total joint influence force structure. A unified joint influence force would be able to support and defend the Nation’s strategic interests against all propaganda efforts coming from the likes of adversarial states and nonstate actors well into the foreseeable future.


Geographic Component Network Analysis: A Methodology for Deliberately Targeting a Hybrid Adversary

By Chance A. Smith and Steve W. Rust

As the nature of the adversaries the U.S. military engages on the battlefield changes, so must our thinking on how to systematically analyze and degrade their centers of gravity. Geographic component network analysis (GCNA) enables more rapid analysis of a hybrid enemy in a focused, systematic manner to degrade the adversary’s capability to effectively govern and project combat power from defined territorial strongholds.

Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Simplifying an Increasingly Complex Problem

By Gabriel Almodovar, Daniel P. Allmacher, Morgan P. Ames III, and Chad Davies

As the complexity of air, cruise, and ballistic missile threats quickly evolves over the next 10 to 20 years, DOD must find a less complicated way to rapidly develop and integrate the Services’ integrated air and missile defense capabilities and employ them across the combatant commands boundaries.

Achieving Secrecy and Surprise in a Ubiquitous ISR Environment

By Adam G. Lenfestey, Nathan Rowan, James E. Fagan, and Corey H. Ruckdeschel

As foreign and commercial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities proliferate, our ability to leverage secrecy and surprise for battlefield advantage is in danger of being severely degraded or lost altogether. We must take prudent near-term steps to address this concern.

Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation: Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. Africa Command’s Efforts

By Andrus W. Chaney

U.S. Africa Command’s lack of operationalization of its security cooperation processes, combined with the sheer size of its area of responsibility and the significant changes with the new NDAA, create unique challenges. This article outlines four main areas where USAFRICOM can improve its efforts to operationalize and synchronize its security cooperation efforts.


Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War: Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis

By Kenneth T. "Max" Klima, Peter Mazzella, and Patrick B. McLaughlin

Scipio Africanus’s European and African campaigns during the Second Punic War serve as timeless lessons for joint force planners on how to conduct center of gravity (COG) analysis in support of theater and national military planning.

Book Reviews

Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014

By Carter Malkasian

For years, the British enjoyed a reputation of counterinsurgency excellence. Their campaigns—Malaya, Kenya, Oman, Northern Ireland—were hailed as successes in this difficult form of war. Afghanistan, however, turned out to be painful for the British. They committed a peak of over 9,500 troops, eventually drawing down to a few hundred by the end of 2014. They faced numerous battlefield reverses. Eventual successes were overshadowed by the arrival of 20,000 U.S. Marines. Britain’s counterinsurgency reputation came out of the campaign tarnished.

Elite Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the World

By Bruce McClintock

Special operations forces (SOF) have existed in some form and played roles in warfare since the advent of conventional military operations. For example, in biblical times, King David had a special forces platoon. World War II brought growth, greater recognition, and prestige for special forces like the British Commandos, Special Air Service, and the American Office of Strategic Services. The last two decades have witnessed explosive growth in various forms of unconventional or SOF.

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan

By Brian R. Price

The gap between academia and the military has existed at least since the early 1960s, when Project Camelot crystallized political opposition to the American military/security apparatus by activist academicians. As a result, the military/security community established its own think tanks, designed to replicate social and hard science capabilities, reducing the political noise and fallout inherent in the engagement with a potentially hostile academic community. On the other side of the divide, many academics reacted with anger to social scientists engaged in military activity, political beliefs fusing with concerns of academic freedom and fanned with the flames of opposition to the Vietnam War in what they saw as colonialism and rampant militarization of American society.

Joint Doctrine

A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles

By Jacob Barfoed

While current U.S. doctrine makes the center of gravity (COG) concept the centerpiece in operational planning, there is a broad call for either revising or killing the concept. However, if the COG concept is to remain the centerpiece in military planning, it must not only help link actions, effects, and objectives but also link the JFC level of command with the national strategic level of command.

Department of Defense Terminology Program

By George E. Katsos

The Department of Defense (DOD) Terminology Program was formalized in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and falls under the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).1 The program is overseen by the director of Joint Force Development (DJ7) to improve communications and mutual understanding through the standardization of military and associated terminology within DOD, with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and between the United States and international partners. It includes U.S. participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology development as well as other terminology forums.

Born Multinational: Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations

By Charles W. Robinson

U.S. military operations are conducted in a multinational environment. Given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s emphasis on working with allies and other international partners, there are many advantages to certain capabilities being born multinational. A multinational development team offers the benefits of both inherent interoperability and a broad set of perspectives, insights, and knowledge sources.

Joint Doctrine Update

By The Joint Staff

Joint Doctrine Update.