A seemingly incomprehensible set of events is occurring as I write this column: the People’s Republic of China is asserting its desire to extend an air defense zone in the Pacific, the Syrian crisis continues unabated, violence in nations transitioning from one form of government to another is the norm from Iraq to Egypt to Libya, Iran seems to be yielding to international pressure to control its nuclear ambitions, Venezuela seems poised for an economic collapse, bombings and other violence in Pakistan continue, and the Russian Federation has annexed Crimea triggering a possible response from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This particular situation seems to have been taken from a script of an early post–Cold War NATO exercise.

Cyberspace can be leveraged by first, finding a theory to express and teach the constantly changing vagaries of that domain, including a suitable lexicon, and second, overcoming assorted turf wars and adequately resourcing the study, manning, equipping, and training of the cyberspace force so it can integrate with other domains.

Cyberspace considerations are irreversibly proliferating, and five core ideas will help commanders fight a perpetual cyberwar: education and training, a clear chain of custody, explicit processes and procedures and guidance, advanced methods of controlling access to networks and information, and a formal cyberspace mishap investigation process throughout the Defense Department.

The Combined Effects Power (CEP) construct does not eliminate the combined arms warfare (CAW) concept, but CEP seeks to overcome CAW’s anomalies by accommodating the behavior of both cyber domain and soft power participants from the natural domains to offset the dangers springing from the information revolution.

The Obama administration’s Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21 are a beginning, but establishing public-private information sharing requires matching cyber security legislation to fill in the gaps found in the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, address a multitude of contentious issues, and achieve a unified cyberspace focus.

National Defense University (NDU) will adhere to the Chairman's vision by reordering priorities to focus on students and increasing its ability to share its faculty across various NDU elements. Much must still be done by the university as a team to provide an enriched educational experience by academic year 2015.

Interagency/Navy efforts to develop and test biofuels to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign sources and protect the military from energy price shocks have been disappointing, and research into military application and feasibility suggests that biofuels will be neither cost competitive nor available in sufficient quantities to enhance energy security.

The military’s ability to shape the security environment can be substantially improved by adopting multiple simultaneous stimulants, most prominently the national security strategy shift from deterrence and containment to cooperation and engagement. These capabilities must be sufficiently resourced so Washington’s interests can be pursued short of armed conflict where possible.

Joint doctrine, where it inadequately addresses incorporating Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) organizations into the military planning process, must be revised to give JIIM engagement its due. Moreover, greater cross-organizational exposure among partners should increase understanding and trust and get partners more fully synchronized in both planning and execution.

The Five Rings theory may not provide quick wins against large countries with modern air defense systems, but an escalatory strategic interdiction strategy relying on capable air and navel forces to affect the most critical and vulnerable elements would apply to many crises with its nonlethal and reversible options.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War cuts both ways. Its tenets work against enemies but can also strike against China. Using the general’s maxims, we can uncover inconsistencies in the grandly moral stance assumed by Chinese leaders. For instance, claims made for public consumption can be juxtaposed with demonstrable fact.

Geography impacts global mobility, and USTRANSCOM works with the components, the Defense Logistics Agency, and commercial partners to overcome vast distances and to subdue the burdens of time and cost. Crises evolve rapidly and the United States must maintain its unique ability to project power anywhere, any time.

Committed people accounted for the success of Operation Unified Protector in Libya. NATO and partner participants in the air-heavy campaign arrived in haste and had to find fast solutions to endless challenges and shifting capabilities requirements. Skillful leadership enabled unity to survive as the center of gravity.

The Army’s G-3/5/7 represents Army air and missile defense (AMD) interests and understands that threats that have evolved in capability, complexity, and capacity; a defense strategy and policy that rely on an enduring deterrence capability; and an increasing need to maintain joint operational access to distant regions ensure its importance.

Washington should pass its domestic emergency response capability along to improve the governance and economics of African nations. The “National Response Platform” (NRP) and “National Response Force” (NRF) concepts will encourage a more impactful whole-of-nation approach, helping African states become contributors to stability and economic growth and maintaining U.S. leadership.

Redundancies in the training of junior logisticians could be eliminated without sacrificing the different ranks, tasks, and courses each Service utilizes. A cross-Service study suggests the need for a comprehensive and unified approach to training from entry level on through the Junior Joint Logistics Officer Training program.

The 1942 raid on Dieppe remains enshrouded in questions yet is a treasure of information to the astute student of warfare who can penetrate the ten charges most often leveled at its failure and the overall blaming frenzy, providing insight into the Western mindset and the perpetual facts of war.

Any U.S. military officer or civil servant yearning to earn the sobriquet “grand strategist” must understand the ethos of the countries of Latin America. While many bodies of water are of great interest to the people of the United States and its government, the Rio Grande River is a vital interest. A worthy way to expand one’s knowledge of the states south of that long river is to read Marie Arana’s sound and solid biography Bolívar: American Liberator.

Ever since the rise of Hitler and the Second World War, international events and circumstances have led to periodic revivals of interest in the ideas and concepts of classical geopolitical theorists. As the Wehrmacht surged into the vast expanses of Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan sought to carve out a greater East Asia and Pacific empire, Western strategists and even popular media outlets such as Time magazine “discovered” the “Heartland” theory first propounded by British geographer Halford Mackinder in his 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History,” revised and expanded in his 1919 masterpiece Democratic Ideals and Reality, and further revised and updated in a 1943 Foreign Affairs article, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.”

In this companion piece to the authors’ 2010 work, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, Wayne Hall and Gary Citrenbaum have brought forth a superior forum by which to consider the challenges associated with intelligence collection in complex environments. Each author brings with him a lengthy résumé of credible service in the intelligence field. Hall is a retired U.S. Army officer with over 30 years of intelligence experience, and he has remained active within the intelligence field by participating in numerous seminars on intelligence training and intelligence transformation. Citrenbaum is actively involved in issues associated with intelligence transformation. Accordingly, both speak with authority on the issues they raise.

Modern technology has vastly increased available capabilities, which are rarely controlled exclusively by any single Service or nation-state. Keeping the U.S. advantage in cross-domain synergy calls for enhanced understanding of jointness and a shift from Service centrism to holism that expands ownership of capabilities.