Over the past two decades, the strategic landscape has changed dramatically. While the fundamental nature of war has not changed, the pace of change and modern technology, coupled with shifts in the nature of geopolitical competition, have altered the character of war in the 21st century. To keep pace with the changing character of war, we must globally integrate the way we plan, employ the force, and design the force of the future.

What kind of force does the United States need in order to meet its mission of protecting the Nation? How do we preserve our working relationships with allies and partners? What about the ongoing issue of readiness needs versus force modernization? No matter how the future turns out, the United States and the joint force will continue to be central elements of how the world is shaped.

In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a change to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, introducing information as a new and seventh joint function. This issuance portends significant changes in how the joint force will plan and execute transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional operations. As such, it represents an opportunity to reimagine what “combined arms” means in 21st-century warfare.

The need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges. During a recent effort by the Joint Staff to update Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, leaders recognized that the joint force was already attempting to use information as a function and that the time to institutionalize information as a function was therefore overdue.

The integration of the Information as a Joint Function (IJF) with the other six joint functions offers new opportunities for developing and conducting operational art and design. IJF will result in the development of executable plans to deal with future conflicts that are TMM in nature. The ultimate result will be that joint force commanders are able to dominate the informational aspect of their operating environment (the IE) the same way they dominate land, sea, air space, and cyberspace.

The limitations in the Globally Integrated Exercise construct should not dissuade its utilization. Like any new concept, it requires the necessary time, space, and iterations to meet the Chairman’s intent. There is no shortage of recommendations for tackling the globally integrated operations challenges.

In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of the Intel Corporation, made his now famous prediction that the “number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately double every 24 months.” More than 50 years later, his prediction has not only held true, but also the implications of what is now called Moore’s Law define the combat environment for the joint force. The continual miniaturization, mass production, proliferation, and improvement of integrated circuits and microprocessors have introduced powerful computing technology into every aspect of modern life.

Understanding how adversaries use threat networks globally to compete with us below the threshold of traditional armed conflict is a critical first step to identifying opportunities to exploit, disrupt, or degrade threat networks. However, the increasing convergence of legitimate and illicit networks complicates our ability to gain the level of understanding required to do this effectively.

The way that I think of by, with, and through is another way to talk about ends, ways, and means. I look at this idea as a way to approach some of this. That’s where we arrive at the discussion of by, with, and through as an operational approach. We apply it on a broad scale now, and I do think that it merits becoming doctrine.

The U.S. military must organize, resource, and train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments requires common understanding and the development of joint force doctrine.

Land forces in U.S. Central Command have adopted an operational approach of “by, with, and through” (BWT) to achieve this endstate. This article provides the USARCENT perspective on how it accomplishes its mission with BWT as the operational approach and demonstrates the need for the joint force to come to a common understanding of what executing operations within a BWT operational approach, and all associated terms, means.

In January 2017, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, deployed to bolster the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the campaign to annihilate the so-called Islamic State. How we advised ISF commanders was as important as what we advised them to do in order to win.

Speed and tactical efficiency do not win civil conflict; host-nation legitimacy combined with eventual tactical victory does. These facts necessitate a conditions-based approach.

Logistics interoperability is critical to the future success of global operations responding to transregional threats, but it requires dedicated efforts in logistics security cooperation to build the foundation for a strategic BWT approach.

The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 provides that the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will depend substantially on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries. Consistent with the law, implementation guidance over the years has been clear, and increasingly more urgent.

Despite George Santayana’s warning—“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it”—we continue to forget what we have learned and fall into bad habits. Although we have already determined better ways to make decisions and solve problems, we tend to forget them.

The importance of gathering, developing, and disseminating joint lessons learned cannot be overemphasized. Today, we need real-world lessons learned by the deployed young officer who is experiencing what works, what does not, and what could—if certain changes were made. This is mission of the Joint Staff Joint Force Development Directorate’s Joint Lessons Learned Division (JLLD).

Two global trends that present monumental new challenges for civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises are urbanization—the growth of cities across the world—and climate change. The following article explains how these two trends and their interactive effects will increasingly complicate and test civil-military coordination in humanitarian crises.

The lessons learned during nearly a decade of concept development must be translated into a joint force structure capable of defeating antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and preserving America’s power projection advantage. However, such a force structure will only be effective if it is pursued through a joint approach to acquisitions.

In the coming years, each Service will likely pursue a human capital data analytics solution set that best meets its needs. Regardless of each Service’s chosen path, the paramount requirement before us all is to create systems that balance the data analytic needs of leaders while strengthening the bond of trust with our Servicemembers.

In Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (Columbia University Press, 2006), Kimberly Zisk Marten recounts the dismal record of Western military interventions that could achieve temporary stability but not foster any lasting political change. Her solution is to lower expectations while extending presence; outsiders cannot shape the course of internal political change but can maintain security for the lengthy period required for equilibrium to be restored after a society is disrupted.

John Kiszely had an outstanding career in the British army. As a major, he won the Military Cross while leading his company of Scots Guards in the attack on Tumbledown Mountain in the last days of the Falklands War. During his career, he served in the bureaucracy in Whitehall as the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff and served stints in British operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Iraq, finally retiring as a lieutenant general. He has seen war at both ends: the hard, sharp end of combat and the making and coordinating of policy and operations.

This trim book explains the full course of the U.S. Navy’s General Board, its institutional forum for innovation, during the period from 1900 to 1950. To remedy challenges identified during the Spanish-American War, Navy Secretary John D. Long established the board as an experiment. The Secretary realized he needed military advice, so he chose a mix of up-and-coming Navy officers, the head of the Bureau of Navigation that managed careers, and one Marine officer, all led by the redoubtable Admiral George Dewey, to offer it.

Military forces that quickly adapt to change usually prevail. It is difficult to adapt in the near term, more so when there is an extended time horizon, but not adapting can exact a heavy toll in blood and treasure. The high cost of not adjusting to new situations underlies the stereotypical conservatism of military organizations, and it is borne in their propensity to lean heavily on the lessons of the last war and eschew radical change. But those who do not try to anticipate change risk surrendering the initiative on the future battlefield.

As we move past the plan of the day, proceed outside of the budget cycle, and venture beyond the 10-year horizon of strategic planning efforts, significant ongoing changes in the security environment will alter the character of warfare beyond recognition.

The future operating environment will feature broad changes in the character of warfare. Driven by the rise of competent and competitive states; economic, social, and environmental challenges; and rapidly evolving technologies, these changes will necessitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DOD). Innovation must develop and employ new capabilities, organizational constructs, and approaches to warfighting to maintain competitive advantage over a broad range of potential adversaries.

This article continues the discussion on human security’s1 seven relevant dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.2 Complementing previous Joint Force Quarterly installments on health and food security,3 the following describes the U.S. Government’s approach to environmental security with a focus on combatant commander campaign activities.

Joint Doctrine Updates.