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Joint Force Quarterly 96 (1st Quarter, January 2020)
By | Feb. 10, 2020

Joint Force Quarterly 96
Joint Force Quarterly 96
Joint Force Quarterly 96
Photo By: NDU Press
VIRIN: 200210-D-BD104-008

One of the great efforts undertaken every year is the mission of joint professional military education (JPME) faculty members to advance the critical and creative thinking skills of their students. Why and how do they do this? For the why, I turn to one of the greatest minds we have known, Albert Einstein, who in 1955 stated to Life, “The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existing. One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little of this mystery every day.” It seems that a key to genius is in constantly seeking out answers even to questions that we may already know the answers to.

In my JPME teaching experience, I believe many students matriculate thinking they are already successful thinkers. But what happens over that year tends to surprise them and, to the satisfaction of their faculty, is the real secret to joint force sustainment. Students are challenged at every turn by the readings as well as their faculty and classmates, whether they openly admit so or not. The seminar discussions, problem-solving, paper writing, presentations, travel to familiar and new places, and interacting with senior leaders all work together to slowly and irreversibly place each eventual graduate on a different and perhaps higher intellectual plane.

What happens in the classrooms is often quite remarkable and difficult to explain to an outsider, but essentially the faculty asks students to question everything in order to better understand the world they live in. Some might ask, “Aren’t military personnel just supposed to accept the orders of their superiors and do as they are told?” The answer to such a question—“It depends”—is exactly why we need such educational experiences. American history is replete with examples of leaders deciding to go against their training and mission brief when circumstances demand a less-than-obvious approach to solving a problem.

Such is the fundamental separation between what has happened that can be documented and what may happen that has not. Successful fighting forces in the past have learned to adapt and overcome, and PME classrooms are one of the key places where that ability is developed for those who are headed to our highest positions of responsibility in uniform. The best are expert thinkers who can also express their thoughts in such a way as to convince others to follow as needed, adapt when necessary, but always value the process of learning to become a better thinker. It starts when one questions everything with the end of learning how to fight the next war better than the last. This issue of Joint Force Quarterly, the first of 2020, will certainly require you to ask questions as the authors try to provide insights to the future in the decade ahead.

Leading the Forum, one of the Australian Army’s leading thinkers, Mick Ryan, discusses efforts to advance intellectual development within the ranks to meet what he describes as a new industrial revolution. The problem of modeling warfare in all its forms has been an equally challenging problem, so when an author such as KC Reid offers a way to develop a unified model of warfare, we take notice. While reports of decreased funding for research and development have made news lately, the directors of the U.S. military’s laboratories, William Cooley, David Hahn, and John George, provide a valuable update on what advances we can expect from their work and what they recommend other national research efforts can do to keep the United States out front technologically. As advancements in technology arrive in the battlespace, arguing against going too far down the mission command road, Trent Lythgoe suggests that fighting forces need to become less hyper-decentralized in terms of command relationships.

In JPME Today, we offer two articles that are both classic parts of the JPME experience, strategic thinking and the nature of war, but suggest cutting-edge ideas on how we approach the work. U.S. Army War College professors Andrew Hill and Stephen Gerras offer their approach on how strategic leaders should ask questions. As long as there have been staff and war colleges, Carl von Clausewitz’s writings have been a part of the mix of military and political science theory, which of late has added systems and systems theory as a focus of research and planning approaches. From the Marine Corps War College, Brian Cole takes us once again to the Baron’s Trinity to understand war as a complex adaptive system.

Our Commentary authors address two different subjects, both with important strategic implications. Steven Hendrickson and Riley Post have developed a simple answer on how best to apply operations analysis to special operations. Ryan Tice tells us that we should get serious about the growing likelihood of Great Power competition in the Bering Strait, as he lays out the case for a permanent joint task force in the area.

Features contains a diverse set of discussions about the role of chaplains on the modern battlefield, the revival of al Qaeda, the Vietnam air war, and land force projection across the shore. Seeing chaplains as valuable in a range of tasks beyond the individual spiritual needs of the military, David Leonard describes how commanders can place them where regular troops lack the skill set to succeed particularly in interagency humanitarian operations. At the other end of the conflict spectrum, Robert Angevine takes us to the skies over Vietnam 50 years ago to offer a lesson in adaptation during war. As today’s conflicts have evolved since 9/11, Jami Forbes writes that al Qaeda is regaining areas of influence in places we have already fought them and gaining ground in new places we have not, at least not yet. As I have often said to my students over the years, war is a physics problem when it comes to force projection. Brian Molloy agrees, and he discusses how the U.S. Army needs to approach logistics in the antiaccess/area-denial problem set in the Pacific.

As is always the case with our Recall articles, the past has informative experiences for the present-day warrior to know and understand. Ben Ho takes us to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in the South West Pacific Area to discuss how gaining maritime superiority was a game of antiaccess/area-denial long before it became a modern catch phrase. In addition, we have recently shifted our book review editor responsibilities to one of National Defense University’s brightest rising research associates, Brett Swaney, who has selected three reviews of important books. Along with our Joint Doctrine Update, we bring three articles on how the joint force, joint functions, and doctrine will be adapted to deal with megacities, artificial intelligence, and interagency operations. Looking at a hole in our joint doctrine in dealing with failed megacities, Matthew Metzel, Todd McCubbin, Heidi Fouty, Ken Morris, John Gutierrez, and John Lorenzen suggest changes to Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, as well as other areas for future joint doctrine focus. Brian Ray, Jeanne Forgey, and Benjamin Mathias help us work out the range of likely impacts of artificial intelligence on joint warfighting. And one of our most prolific joint doctrine authors, George Katsos, returns with an interesting view on interagency operations.

As you can now see, critical and creative thinking leads to writing and discussions on a wide range of issues confronting the joint force and its partners. Remember to pose questions as Einstein suggested. Then write down what you think will make the joint journey more interesting and ultimately successful. When you do, we will be here for your best questions.

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NDU Press produces Joint Force Quarterly in concert with ongoing education and research at National Defense University in support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman's joint military and security studies journal designed to inform and educate national security professionals on joint and integrated operations; whole of government contributions to national security policy and strategy; homeland security; and developments in training and joint military education to better equip America's military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow's challenges while protecting freedom today.


Joint Doctrine Update
By The Joint Staff | Feb. 10, 2020

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Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

JP 1-0, Personnel Support

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence

JP 3-05, Special Operations

JP 3-26, Combating Terrorism

JP 5-0, Joint Planning

JP X-XX, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations

JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Vol. 1

JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations

JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations

JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations

JP 3-40, Countering WMD

JP 6-0, Joint Communications System


The Future of Interagency Doctrine
By George E. Katsos | Feb. 10, 2020

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Colonel George Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is a Program Manager on the Joint Staff.

Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter assigned to B Company, 1st
Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, California Army National Guard, assisted by Inyo County Search and Rescue, hovers while hoisting injured hiker at 13,800 feet on Mount Whitney, Inyo County, California, August 25, 2019 (Courtesy Inyo County Search and Rescue)
Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter assigned to B Company, 1st Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, California Army National Guard, assisted by Inyo County Search and Rescue, hovers while hoisting injured hiker at 13,800 feet on Mount Whitney, Inyo County, California, August 25, 2019 (Courtesy Inyo County Search and Rescue)
Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter assigned to B Company, 1st
Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, California Army National Guard, assisted by Inyo County Search and Rescue, hovers while hoisting injured hiker at 13,800 feet on Mount Whitney, Inyo County, California, August 25, 2019 (Courtesy Inyo County Search and Rescue)
Whitney Rescue
Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter assigned to B Company, 1st Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, California Army National Guard, assisted by Inyo County Search and Rescue, hovers while hoisting injured hiker at 13,800 feet on Mount Whitney, Inyo County, California, August 25, 2019 (Courtesy Inyo County Search and Rescue)
Photo By: Courtesy of Inyo County Search and Rescue
VIRIN: 190825-Z-A3568-1001Y

Agencies and Departments must deliberately and jointly invest in civil-military strategy, doctrine, training, and operations to meet the tests of this era.1

—General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.

Interagency capability synchronization continues to challenge whole-of-government approaches to national security. In 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey addressed the issue in the context of reform by directing the U.S. Armed Forces to expand the envelope of interagency cooperation.2 This strategic direction inspired an abundance of literature cataloging horizontal and vertical unity challenges among and between military and civilian workforces. Subsequently, the Joint Staff convened Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD (interagency and other civilian stakeholders) personnel to brainstorm on how to improve workforce interoperability within the context of joint doctrine—the purpose being to identify and work with those who get things done. The following accomplishments bring to light the potential of future interagency doctrine development.

U.S. military workforces plan and train with guidance material called doctrine. Joint doctrine, which is managed by the CJCS, is a body of institutional knowledge that provides fundamental principles and offers official advice to guide the employment of joint military forces in support of achieving national policy objectives. While recent national security system reform pursuits often describe U.S. Government civil-military cooperation emphasis as diminishing over time, joint doctrine was identified as one of two military efforts that still maintains a focus on promoting whole-of-government issues.3

Joint doctrine’s influence is vast. In a broader context for interagency personnel, joint doctrine and its standardization of terminology reduce organizational uncertainty, focus on strategic and operational perspectives, and provide transparency of best practices for organizational leaders, individual members, and society at large.4 In the realm of national interests, while national policies provide direction, joint doctrine in comparison offers official advice on how to enhance joint force effectiveness. While strategy describes national power synchronization, joint doctrine offers official advice on how to make strategy more effective on what to attain and with which military capabilities. Furthermore, as plans enumerate steps in the pursuit of mission objectives, joint doctrine offers official advice on how those objectives can be achieved. Under joint force development, lessons captured in operations and exercises enhance joint doctrine as well as expose unproven conceptual ideas that identify doctrinal gaps. Training, exercises, and education are also developed and implemented in accordance with joint doctrine.

Workforce doctrine and standardized terminology outside of DOD are scarce. Most organizations can be categorized as policy- or rules-based rather than doctrine-based workforces that capture and revalidate frameworks, common language, and best practices. Other than DOD, the Department of Homeland Security is the only U.S. Government entity with formal doctrine and terminology development processes. With present-day socialization of existing doctrine and terminology frameworks with interagency personnel, these participants continue to develop a basic understanding and appreciation for joint doctrine as well as a sincere desire to participate in joint doctrine development and to foster a dialogue that is leaning toward something similar for their own organizations.

Non-DOD joint publication participation continues to grow over time. Evidence includes non-DOD requests increasing twofold since General Dempsey’s departure. General Dunford added to his direction for non-DOD organizations to invest in military doctrine.5 The Joint Staff subsequently broadened opportunities for non-DOD entities via the Annual Call Memorandum to Executive Secretariats, creating a pathway for working group participation and other revision opportunities. One significant opportunity for change occurred in 2016 when the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and other governmental and nongovernmental organization personnel became involved during the revision of Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.6 Their input influenced military perceptions that steered current practices away from calling non-DOD organizations “force multipliers and partners” to being known as “stakeholders” within an operational environment. Initially, the “so what” for non-DOD involvement was whether joint doctrine content was important enough to monitor and the development process worth the time and effort to inject organizational perspectives. After results of the aforementioned and other interactions, the question changed from whether to be involved to how these organizations could become more involved in joint doctrine development. Subject matter of continued interest focused on interorganizational cooperation, protection of civilians, defense support to civil authorities, joint planning and intelligence activities, special operations, counterdrug operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and combating terrorism.7

Non-DOD involvement in joint doctrine development positively affects the enterprise. Recently, the Joint Staff assembled more than 30 authors from 18 organizations to develop a series of 3 articles on interorganizational cooperation.8 This series addressed the importance of a shared purpose, shared process, and working thoughtfully with people who follow through. Authors also examined organizational interpretation of higher-level guidance, area of responsibility distribution, time horizons, decisionmaking, and work methods. Furthermore, the group examined attitude and mutual respect as well as touchpoints on understanding principles, mandates, and organizational interests. This interaction and process led the way to understanding the importance of and need for a common set of terms and definitions to close the knowledge gap among U.S. Government workforces.9 Based on the fact that successful doctrine is normally built on a well socialized, understood, and agreed language, multiple interagency personnel banded together in 2017 and created the U.S. Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms. This first edition included domestic- and foreign-themed sections to assist stakeholders in understanding counterpart language usage during steady state cooperation and force employment. Members of specific communities that found utility in this product included DOD special operations forces and academia.10

The remaining question is whether the time is ripe to formally develop interagency doctrine. In current joint doctrine, non-DOD contributions continue to improve content to include what joint force commanders should know about other potential workforces to be encountered during force employment.11 This U.S. Government interoperability information can be productive for use by National Security Council and Executive Branch department and agency personnel. The vehicle for this momentum is the new Joint Guide for Interagency Doctrine. Released in October 2019 and available at the Joint Electronic Library, this inaugural document contains U.S. Government structures, frameworks, relevant coordination mechanisms, force employment observations, organizational areas of responsibility regions, and notional framework and terminology mapping constructs. Moreover, the guide expands on current knowledge and can assist in the strategic art of navigating the U.S. Government bureaucracy to make workforces work more efficiently together in achieving national policy objectives. CJCS General Mark Milley has touched upon this issue, indicating that listening to entities such as those that make up the interagency is important to building an adaptive and agile force.12 In the end, the Joint Staff–driven gathering held 5 years ago not only shined a light on improving U.S. Government workforce interoperability but also brought the future of interagency doctrine to fruition. JFQ

Notes

1 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Advance Questions for General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” July 9, 2015, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdf>.

2 Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic Direction for the Force: Strengthening Our Relationship of Trust with the Nation (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 6, 2012), 5; George J. Flynn, Decade of War, vol. 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, VA: The Joint Staff, June 15, 2012), 25.

3 Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2015), 10.

4 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016); Barry R. Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (2016), 159–173, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115042>.

5 Dunford, “Advance Questions for General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.”

6 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 12, 2016).

7 Ibid.; George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Health Security: Focus on Medical Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter 2017), 66–75; “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Food Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017), 112–121; “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 130–139; “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 90 (3rd Quarter 2018), 106–112; and “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 91 (4th Quarter 2019), 97–104; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 31, 2013); JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 16, 2017); JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 2013); JP 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 16, 2014); JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Activities (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 5, 2019); JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 31, 2014); JP 3-26, Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 24, 2014).

8 James C. McArthur et al., “Interorganizational Cooperation, I of III: The Interagency Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (4th Quarter 2015), 106–112; “Interorganizational Cooperation, II of III: The Humanitarian Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016), 145–152; and “Interorganizational Cooperation, III of III: The Joint Force Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter 2016), 129–139.

9 George E. Katsos, “Department of Defense Terminology Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter 2018), 124–127.

10 George E. Katsos, “Command Relationships,” Joint Force Quarterly 63 (4th Quarter 2011), 153–155; “Multinational Command Relationships,” Joint Force Quarterly 65 (2nd Quarter 2011), 102–104; and “The United Nations and Intergovernmental Organization Command Relationships,” Joint Force Quarterly 66 (3rd Quarter 2012), 97–99.

11 Feedback from onsite doctrinal briefing at Special Operations Command, April 2018; feedback at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government National and International Security Program for Senior Executives, August 2019.

12 Mark A. Milley, “39th Chief of Staff Initial Message to the Army,” September 1, 2015, available at <www.army.mil/article/154803/39th_chief_of_staff_initial_message_to_the_army>.


Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions
By Brian David Ray, Jeanne F. Forgey, and Benjamin N. Mathias | Feb. 10, 2020

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Colonel Brian David Ray, USAR, is the Senior Army Reserve Advisor for the Transformation Initiative at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. Colonel Jeanne F. Forgey, USAR, is the Assistant Chief of Staff G8/Comptroller for the 335th Signal Command (Theater). Major Benjamin N. Mathias, West Virginia Air National Guard, is a C-17 Mobility Pilot at the 167th Airlift Squadron.

Infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, clears bunker September 25, 2019,
during platoon live-fire training, Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Scott Kuhn)
Infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, clears bunker September 25, 2019, during platoon live-fire training, Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Scott Kuhn)
Infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, clears bunker September 25, 2019,
during platoon live-fire training, Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Scott Kuhn)
190924-A-IN006-035
Infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, clears bunker September 25, 2019, during platoon live-fire training, Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Scott Kuhn)
Photo By: Capt. Scott Kuhn
VIRIN: 190924-A-IN006-035

Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes technological innovation as well as the way it will change the overall character of war, the joint force is not adequately positioned to share best practices and lessons learned among key players in the artificial intelligence/autonomous systems (AI/AS) space.1 To address this shortcoming, joint manning documents across the force should add an AI/AS cell made up of officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers in order to effectively incorporate technological best practices across the seven joint functions. This increase of specialized staffing is similar to the approach that the Army took in 2003 at the brigade level with the creation of knowledge management as a distinct discipline and staff function.2 With knowledge management, the Army sought to “help commanders drive the operations process through enhanced understanding and visualization . . . thereby enabling them to envision a set of desired future conditions that represent the operation’s end state.”3

Embracing similar new approaches and techniques in the AI/AS space is in keeping with advice offered by Rear Admiral Andrew Loiselle, the deputy director for Future Joint Force Development on the Joint Staff J7, who stated, the joint force “cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons and equipment. Neither is modernization defined solely by hardware. It requires changes in the way we organize and employ forces.”4

This article explores the most likely impacts of AI/AS on each of seven joint functions: command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. These functions represent groups of related activities that provide commanders and staff with the ability to synchronize and execute military operations.5 Each of the functions, which is aligned with the Joint Capability Areas and Functional Capability Boards, allows for effective assessment and investment decisions by policymakers.6

The Use of AI/AS in the Joint Force

The joint force is accustomed to fighting by effectively synchronizing the unique set of land, sea, and air capabilities inherent in each of the Services. In the protracted engagements of the past two decades, the joint force has fought via a set of “interconnected human-inhabited platforms that pass surveillance and targeting data across great distances.”7 However, over the next 20 years, the pace of technological change will significantly impact how the joint force plans and executes the full spectrum of its missions.8 Rapid technological developments in five key areas (info, neuro, quantum, nano, and bio) will be primary drivers in various areas of AI and AS.9 As the Brookings Institution’s John Allen and Darrell West note, “AI will significantly impact the world’s economy and workforce, the finance and health-care systems, national security, criminal justice, transportation, and how cities operate. All of this change is likely to redistribute and concentrate wealth, challenge political systems, and generate new cyber threats and defenses.”10

Future kinetic conflicts, especially those that include near peers such as China or Russia, will likely be replete with AI/AS architectures and methods that will include engagements best characterized as a “swarm” of lethality with unprecedented “coordination, intelligence, and speed.”11 In a March 2016 budget hearing before Congress, General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated future conflicts will likely have “an increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional nature. . . . [F]uture conflicts will spread quickly across multiple Combatant Command geographic boundaries, functions, and domains.”12 U.S. near peers clearly understand the importance that AI/AS will have in future conflicts.

Airman participates in Security Forces Sustainment training at Baumholder, Germany, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Deven Schultz)
Airman participates in Security Forces Sustainment training at Baumholder, Germany, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Deven Schultz)
Airman participates in Security Forces Sustainment training at Baumholder, Germany, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Deven Schultz)
191010-F-AU874-0231
Airman participates in Security Forces Sustainment training at Baumholder, Germany, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Deven Schultz)
Photo By: Senior Airman Deven Schultz
VIRIN: 191010-F-AU874-0231

By way of example, in 2017 the Chinese government released a document titled “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” with the stated ambition of leading the world in AI by 2030. This plan calls for a “civil-military” fusion of AI to leverage dual-use advances for applications in national defense, including support of command decisionmaking, military deduction, and defense equipment.13 The Chinese also have an approach in this domain that is best described as “systems confrontation and system destruction warfare.”14 Seeing the strategic importance of AI, Vladimir Putin stated, “Whoever becomes the leader in AI will be the ruler of the world.”15 The United Kingdom also clearly demonstrated the importance of AI/AS with its May 2018 publication of a joint doctrine document titled Human-Machine Teaming. The document describes the stakes that are involved in exploring and integrating AI/AS:

Robots and artificial intelligence offer the potential for an inflection point in delivering military transformation and advantage. Developing the right blend of human-machine teams (i.e., the effective integration of humans and machines into our warfighting systems) is the key . . . and we should not forget that we are in a race with our adversaries to unlock this advantage. The clock is ticking as new technology capabilities accelerate. This joint concept document should be read by everyone who needs to understand how AI, robotics, and data can change the future character of conflict for us and our adversaries.16

The military application of autonomous systems has an array of protection and lethality possibilities (for example, unmanned vehicles and swarming weapons systems) as well as the potential to provide commanders with the ability to make decisions much more quickly and efficiently than a team of humans in a headquarters ever could. Even though AI/AS is at the forefront of thought leadership in a variety of disciplines, the Department of Defense (DOD) has neither taken a proactive approach in developing policies to govern such technology, nor has it effectively infused it into the formal acquisition process. This lack of policy guidance and adequate funding has had a limiting effect on the full military potential of AI/AS.17 This lack of joint/synchronized exploration of AI/AS possibilities should be a significant concern. As of summer 2018, each Service still seemed to be going it alone, with the Air Force, for example, having more than 600 projects incorporating various facets of AI across multiple mission sets.18

The application of AI/AS in a military context has significant potential. Some researchers envision future AI/AS fights with “autonomous and uninhabited systems” that will be networked and have the ability to coordinate actions in response to events on the ground.19 For example, swarming/coordinated action will enable synchronized attacks or defense, more efficient allocation of assets over an area, self-healing networks that respond to enemy actions, and widely distributed assets that cooperate for sensing, deception, and attack. As then–Secretary of the Army Mark Esper stated, “This technology [AI/AS] could very well change the character of warfare as we know it.”20

In the U.S. Army War College publication Key Strategic Issues List 2018–2020, AI and AS are mentioned multiple times as keys areas for future research and investment.21 Our allies in the United Kingdom also see the benefits of AI/AS for each of the joint warfighting functions with the following stated goals: “increase situational awareness, lighter physical and cognitive loads, sustainment with increased anticipation and efficiency, increased force protection, and ultimately superior maneuver options in and across all domains.”22 However, one difficulty that the United States and others will have in adopting AI/AS across any of the seven joint functions primarily concerns the challenges associated with testing and validation. In short, how can leaders be confident that a system will do what it is intended to do and nothing else beyond that, which might be detrimental to the mission? As then–Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva stated, “In the DOD, we test things until they break. You can’t do that with artificial intelligence. We’re going to have to figure out how to get the software to tell us what it has learned.”23 Beyond this necessary step of analyzing what the software has learned, the more critical aspects of assessment also include deciding how to employ AI/AS within all of the generally accepted ethical, legal, and moral frameworks.24

Regarding the use of AI/AS in the joint force, there are currently four Joint Capability Areas envisioned for unmanned systems: battlespace awareness, force application, protection, and logistics.25 For example, the use of robots would mean that fewer troops would be needed to defend a certain piece of terrain. This is an advantage given increasing DOD personnel costs.26 Robots also have the capability to operate for longer periods of time without the human need for rest.27 Moreover, unmanned systems can operate in harsh and deadly environments (for example, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) with less degradation in capabilities. These and other examples provide an economy-of-force advantage that would allow joint force commanders the flexibility to allocate personnel to particular aspects of a battle plan (for example, interpretive or conceptual work) that are not conducive to or appropriate for unmanned systems.28 An economy-of-force advantage from AI/AS would help address one of General Dunford’s stated concerns, namely that the joint force currently lacks sufficient capacity to meet all the combatant commands’ requirements for forces.29

The Definition of Autonomous in Military Settings

When incorporating any form of autonomy in a military context, it is important to acknowledge that such a move also increases unpredictability.30 Autonomy in the context of the human/machine interaction dynamic has three dimensions: the human-machine C2 relationship, the complexity of the decisions made by the machine, and the functions of the system that are made autonomous. DOD frequently defines autonomy in terms of human involvement in the execution of a machine’s tasks. Systems that are marked by full human control over all the machine’s core tasks are considered “human-in-the-loop” systems. Systems that have the ability to operate independently but still require humans to review decisions and intervene in the case of a malfunction are often called “on-the-loop” or “human-supervised” systems. A system that can carry out its tasks with total independence, leaving no opportunity for a human to intervene, is referred to as a “human-out-of-the-loop” system.31 However, there are many different points of view regarding the terms used throughout the military (for example, automation vs. autonomy, semi-autonomy, supervised autonomy, on-the-loop vs. in-the-loop, and mixed initiative). This diversity of AI/AS phrases led to such confusion that a recent report suggested that “DOD should abandon the debate over definitions of levels of autonomy” and instead focus on developing a “method of analysis of trade-offs over multiple stakeholders and objectives.”32

Figure 1. Exponential Convergence
Figure 1. Exponential Convergence
Figure 1. Exponential Convergence
Photo By: NDU Press
VIRIN: 200210-D-BD104-002

Currently, DOD has an established “spectrum of activity” for describing autonomy. Variables within the spectrum include differentiating between machines that think and machines that think and act. Figure 1 offers a visualization regarding the important distinctions between what can best be described as manual or “physical tasks” (firing a weapon, for example) vis-à-vis mental or “cognitive tasks” (for example, deciding if the target is friendly, neutral, or hostile). As one can imagine, the spectrum between the two is quite wide. Therein lies the difficulty for DOD, and by association the joint force, in deciding which scenarios and environments are conducive to the advantages of autonomous systems and which require human discernment and interaction with machines in order to accomplish the mission.33

Command and Control

As Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, states, joint functions should reinforce and complement one another.34 Integration across the other six joint functions is imperative if joint task forces are to effectively and efficiently accomplish their mission. Of the seven joint functions, C2 is the most complex and most important. For example, JP 3-0 lists 12 tasks that are part of the joint C2 warfighting function. Examples include managing risk, communicating and maintaining the status of information among and across subordinate units, assessing progress toward accomplishing mission-related tasks, and coordinating/controlling the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Given these important tasks, it is clear that AI/AS could play a significant role in creating efficiencies in a variety of C2 decisionmaking processes.35 As noted by Samuel White, “Winning in the decision space is winning in the battle space.”36 Similarly, a more robust capability for commanders to effectively “understand the operating environment” was one of the 11 strategic themes of the Decade of War study that looked at key lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

An example of how AI/AS could prove beneficial in this area includes more timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence that results in a more robust common operating picture across the joint force, something that would provide a staff with the opportunity to keep commanders better apprised of developments in the battlespace.38 Another example of improved C2 via AI/AS is the automated analysis of more than 90,000 daily Facebook posts by the so-called Islamic State and its sympathizers, looking for actionable intelligence that even the most robust team of humans could not possibly generate in a similarly efficient manner.39 General Dunford has described these types of scenarios as the ability of commanders to “make decisions at the speed of relevance.”40

Figure 2. Tasks and Trust
Figure 2. Tasks and Trust
Figure 2. Tasks and Trust
Photo By: NDU Press
VIRIN: 200210-D-BD104-003

Andrew Massie suggests why AI/AS, and its implications for C2, are not easily reconciled:

The challenge of C2 Mission Command involves communicating intent as well as appreciation for why a task has been set but does not determine how it must be conducted; competent subordinates will exercise their best judgment dependent upon the circumstances. However, when delegating authority, we set bounds on the activity our subordinates undertake. Approaching one of these boundaries invokes the need to report up the chain for clarification or further guidance. Therefore, supervision is inherent in any command relationship, and will vary with circumstance and task complexity.41

The difficult balance is determining how to harness the speed of AI/AS in the C2 protocol without losing the ability to incorporate new or revised command guidance as circumstances dictate or as new opportunities present themselves on the battlefield.

Paratrooper assigned to 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, navigates wire obstacle during Blood on the Water competition at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, September 7, 2018 (U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado)
Paratrooper assigned to 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, navigates wire obstacle during Blood on the Water competition at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, September 7, 2018 (U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado)
Paratrooper assigned to 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, navigates wire obstacle during Blood on the Water competition at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, September 7, 2018 (U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado)
180907-A-FC879-003
Paratrooper assigned to 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, navigates wire obstacle during Blood on the Water competition at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, September 7, 2018 (U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado)
Photo By: U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado
VIRIN: 180907-A-FC879-003

AI can also assist commanders in making decisions about distinction (that is, proper identification of friend, enemy, or noncombatant) as well as decisions that deal with the appropriate proportionality of a retaliatory strike.42 The Air Force is currently developing the fastest jet computer processor in avionics, the Advanced Display Core Processor, that will have the ability to process 87 billion instructions per second. The result will be faster and more reliable mission data processing.43 Another area where AI/AS could prove advantageous is military operations in complex environments such as mega-cities and subterranean operations.44 IBM, with its Watson AI initiative, foresees AI/AS technology soon being adapted to develop tactical military plans as well as design a set of courses of action (COAs) for commanders to consider.45

C2 enhancements that utilize AI/AS have the following advantages: endless and faultless memory, lack of emotional investment, and potentially unbiased analyses.46 However, autonomous systems are not capable of reasoning in the human sense.47 Systems of this nature develop COAs (that is, reason) using a probabilities approach.48 Accordingly, DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, from May 2017 provides clear guidance on the C2 function with regard to the use of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems: “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”49 In a military engagement where lethal force is directed or applied, there is a clear chain of accountability from the trigger puller to the commander who directs that the target be engaged. For autonomous weapons systems, the locus of responsibility is not so clear-cut. How to determine who “ordered” the attack and who or which entities should be held accountable beyond the traditional chain of command present significant challenges.50

With these types of concerns in mind, the key position that the United States has taken in many international settings (for example, the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) is that lethal force can only be committed to a target when “appropriate levels of human judgment” by an individual have been taken into account. In other words, a person, not a machine, has the ultimate decisionmaking authority. Interestingly, it was clarified at the same meeting that the U.S. position was not that a human had to make every firing decision. Instead, the U.S. position is that a weapons system has to act in a manner consistent with “reasoned human decisionmaking.” Specifically, the U.S. position paper argues that international humanitarian law “does not require that a weapon determine whether the target is a military objective, but rather that the weapon be capable of being employed consistent with the principle of distinction by a human operator.”51

Combat medic assigned to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Regional Health Command–Europe secures simulated casualty during simulated attack asapart of 21st Theater Sustainment Command Best Medic Competition, Baumholder, Germany, August 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jesse Pilgrim)
Combat medic assigned to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Regional Health Command–Europe secures simulated casualty during simulated attack asapart of 21st Theater Sustainment Command Best Medic Competition, Baumholder, Germany, August 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jesse Pilgrim)
Combat medic assigned to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Regional Health Command–Europe secures simulated casualty during simulated attack asapart of 21st Theater Sustainment Command Best Medic Competition, Baumholder, Germany, August 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jesse Pilgrim)
190822-A-IC955-0098
Combat medic assigned to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Regional Health Command–Europe secures simulated casualty during simulated attack asapart of 21st Theater Sustainment Command Best Medic Competition, Baumholder, Germany, August 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jesse Pilgrim)
Photo By: Sgt. Jesse R Pilgrim
VIRIN: 190822-A-IC955-0098

Intelligence

The joint intelligence process encompasses six categories of intelligence operations: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.52 If correctly established and thoroughly vetted by subject matter experts from all Services and intelligence disciplines, AI/AS tools offer a variety of opportunities and provide the potential for mitigating cognitive analyst biases (for example, availability heuristic or bandwagon effect).

Planning and direction will likely continue to be a human-driven operation, although AI/AS can provide recommendations using historical data, cultural knowledge, previous operational design, and results. As with many applications of AI/AS, the likelihood of success with the employment of these technologies is largely dependent on the quality and volume of the data available for analysis. Critical to the success of AI/AS efforts in joint intelligence will be the normalization of legacy stovepipe data segregation.

While joint collection activities could be enabled or supplemented by cognitive AI/AS systems, it is likely to take time for commanders to become comfortable with the idea of having a machine prioritize their intelligence requirements for collection and develop a supportive collection strategy. In reality, AI/AS tools have the potential to be well suited to perform as a collection manager in accordance with the four key tenets of this particular role: early identification of requirements, prioritization of requirements, taking a multidisciplinary approach, and the tasking of available collection assets.53 The Navy has invested heavily in AI-enabled sensors in both sea (for example, OPNAV N96 initiatives) and air (for example, sixth-generation fighter) platforms.54

Processing and exploitation present perhaps the most promising use of AI/AS systems in the intelligence domain. For example, during the past 10 years within the geospatial intelligence discipline, academicians and technology professionals have participated in an annual contest known as ImageNet to detect and identify certain objects within images.55 Teams from around the world collaborate and compete to build the best exploitation programs by leveraging traditional programmatic coding, detailed algorithms, and AI/AS tools. The resulting open-source repository now contains over 14 million URLs that can be used to train image recognition AI tools, many of which have achieved a 97.3 percent accuracy rate, far surpassing average human capabilities.56 Signals intelligence—including communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signal intelligence—is another discipline that presents a significant opportunity for AI/AS usage in the analysis of collected electronic signals. The use of AI/AS tools in conjunction with other disciplines, such as human intelligence, will be slower to implement.

Analysis and production are also good candidates for the integration of AI/AS tools. Currently, the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army is developing algorithms that enable data fusion, enhance intelligence analysis, and support command decisionmaking.”57 Today’s intelligence teams are faced with an increasing flow of information and data through a variety of sensors and sources. Technological advances have continued to accelerate that flow, but human analysts have not been able to keep pace with these increases. There is undeniable risk associated with the integration of AI/AS tools into analytical processes. As with any cognitive or machine-learning solution, it will take time as well as a variety of learning situations to hone analytical capabilities and build a sufficient level of confidence with AI/AS-developed products. Processes must be put in place to vet analytical data, especially those created prior to achieving an acceptable level of confidence with joint products. In the end, though, if the joint force does not find a way to streamline and automate a portion of the intelligence analysis function, commanders will continue to be deprived of volumes of potentially actionable intelligence.

Within the dissemination and integration function, AI/AS will enable the former, but the latter is required to enable AI/AS usage. Standard dissemination is one of the most straightforward intelligence functions to automate, while ad hoc disseminations will likely continue to involve human effort. As previously cited, integration with large, consistent, normalized datasets will require successful AI/AS intelligence integration. That said, there are also security implications associated with collapsing a variety of data sources or networking a greater number of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Since every sensor within an automated system has the potential to be exploited in a variety of ways (for example, jamming, intercepting, hacking, or spoofing), integrating these tools into a more comprehensive network has the potential of increasing vulnerability.58

While AI/AS tools have the ability to objectively evaluate and provide feedback regarding the quality and effectiveness of intelligence reports and products, the more critical and impactful evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of intelligence is likely to come from the human engaged in conflict. If commanders do not trust and act on intelligence products produced with the assistance of AI/AS tools, it will not matter how efficient the processes have become.

Fires

JP 3-0 lists eight key considerations when employing fires: targeting, joint fire support, countering air and missile threats, interdiction, strategic attack, global strike, limiting collateral damage, and nonlethal capabilities.59 As AI/AS are developed, it is important for the programmers to work closely with commanders to ensure this breadth of employment options is taken into account. In 2005, as the AI/AS sector was gaining traction, a senior leader at U.S. Joint Forces Command commented on the significant benefits of automated weapons systems: “They don’t get hungry. They’re not afraid. They don’t forget orders. They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job than humans? Yes.”60 In 2019 and beyond, the implications of AI/AS in the fires domain are even higher, with Bruce Jette, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, offering the following observations:

There are a number of public organizations that have gotten together and said, “We don’t want to have AI tied to weapons.” But time is a weapon. If I can’t get AI involved with being able to properly manage weapons systems and firing sequences then, in the long run, I lose (in the time domain). Let’s say you fire a bunch of artillery at me, and I can shoot those rounds down, and you require a man in the loop for every one of the shots. There are not enough men to put in the loop to get them done fast enough.61

While those statements are true in most respects, they are observations that only look at AI/AS technology as an asset. The liabilities of technology must also be considered. Commanders and the U.S. Government must still be held accountable for actions taken by AI/AS. DOD Instruction 3000.09 directs that autonomous weapons must be able to “complete an engagement in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the engagement.”62

Given this directive, the crafting of rules of engagement for multiple scenarios, as well as establishing the appropriate boundaries for how DOD will utilize AI/AS technologies, will be quite challenging. For example, when programming an autonomous weapons system (AWS) for a multitude of scenarios, at some point the weapon will only be effective and/or safe to employ in a small number of instances, calling into question its benefits vis-à-vis its costs. If an AWS cannot be programmed to meet the “reasonable commander standard” (that is, properly weighing the likely collateral damage vis-à-vis the potential military advantage), it is highly unlikely that a senior military leader will conclude that the potential advantages of an AWS are worth the risk.63

Four unmanned remotely operated high-speed maneuvering surface targets move to blocking positions on James River during Office of Naval Research–
sponsored demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology, Newport News, Virginia, August 13, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara)
Four unmanned remotely operated high-speed maneuvering surface targets move to blocking positions on James River during Office of Naval Research– sponsored demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology, Newport News, Virginia, August 13, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara)
Four unmanned remotely operated high-speed maneuvering surface targets move to blocking positions on James River during Office of Naval Research–
sponsored demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology, Newport News, Virginia, August 13, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara)
140813-N-RZ218-007
Four unmanned remotely operated high-speed maneuvering surface targets move to blocking positions on James River during Office of Naval Research– sponsored demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology, Newport News, Virginia, August 13, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara)
Photo By: U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara
VIRIN: 140813-N-RZ218-007

Movement and Maneuver

JP 3-0 states that the objective of movement and maneuver is to gain positional advantage to accomplish both operational and strategic goals. This is done primarily through five key tasks: deploying forces within the operational area (OA), maneuvering to achieve the advantage, providing constant ability to mobilize over terrain or obstacles without delay, delaying or stopping the enemy, and controlling significant areas in the OA.64

In the area of movement and maneuver, an autonomous system such as a robot has certain advantages over a human. For example, a robot has no instinctual need for self-protection that could slow an advance. A robot does not have the emotions that could otherwise distract/impair a warfighter’s judgment (for example, frustration, fear, revenge, or rage). Conversely, robots have no innate appreciation for the sanctity of human life or feelings such as compassion or mercy.65 One example of new AI/AS technology in the movement and maneuver domain is the Navy’s new unmanned underwater vehicle, which is capable of operating for 5 months at a time without maintenance or refueling.66 The space domain has also seen similar use of unmanned vehicles with the Phantom Express and X-37B platforms, both of which provide enhanced and efficient maneuver capability.67

Even with these promising examples, there is still an open question on the best way that AI/AS can be utilized within the joint function of movement and maneuver. Unmanned aircraft and ground platforms are already utilized in the Middle East for resupply missions. The Army recently accelerated its Automated Ground Resupply program and plans to have 70 self-driving supply trucks operational by 2020.68 The future challenge is finding ways to enable these systems to “autonomously predict, plan, track, and optimize resupply demands from military users.”69 This idea of interconnected autonomy will allow troops to focus more on the mission instead of using precious time planning how they will maneuver from one place to another across the battlespace.

Protection

JP 3-0 describes protection as a function that encompasses traditional force protection and protection of health and other activities that preserve/conserve the force. Of the seven joint functions, protection is one of the more complex. For example, JP 3-0 lists 15 tasks/components that are part of the protection warfighting function. Examples include providing air/space/missile defense; protecting U.S. civilians and contractors authorized to accompany the force; conducting operations security, cyber defense, and cyber security; providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; establishing capabilities and measures to prevent friendly fire incidents; and securing and protecting combat and logistics forces, bases, joint security areas, and lines of communication. And while those components of force protection seem on the surface straightforward and appropriate, JP 3-0 also includes additional aspects of force protection that are broader in nature and not easily or narrowly defined, such as health protection.70 To ensure overmatch against near peers, force protection is one of five key lines of effort envisioned by the Army Training and Doctrine Command for integrating new technologies into future organizations, the other four being increasing situational awareness, lightening Soldiers’ workloads, sustaining the force, and facilitating movement and maneuver.71

JP 3-0 provides a taxonomy of four broad areas that provide a useful approach for analyzing the methods by which the joint force could effectively utilize AI/AS to enhance force protection: active defensive measures, passive defense measures, the application of technology to reduce fratricide, and a more robust and rapid response to various types of emergencies (for example, accidents or natural disasters).72 In the area of active defensive measures, the key focus is on protecting information, military installations/assets, and lines of communication from enemy destruction and/or disruption. There has been significant progress in the use of unmanned automated systems to execute resupply missions. The benefits of letting machines do the “dull, dirty, and dangerous” work of resupply so troops can focus on more complex aspects of the mission have been pointed out.73 Commenting on a Marine amphibious exercise, Colonel Daniel Sullivan stated, “Going forward, the first one in the room should never be an air breather. It should be a robot with a lethal capability.”74 In congressional hearings, Senator Gary Peters (D-MI) offered the following telling observation: “In the Iraq War we lost more Soldiers in logistics operations than we did in combat.” To mitigate loss of life, especially in resupply and logistics, one promising AI/AS concept is “leader/follower.” This solution envisions personnel in a lead vehicle with multiple unmanned trail vehicles moving along the same general route based on the electronic signal from the lead vehicle.75

In the area of passive defensive measures, JP 3-0 stresses the importance of taking proactive/precautionary steps to make it more difficult for a hostile force to locate and engage personnel, assets/facilities, and various systems (such as communications). One could imagine the use of deep learning systems (machines that are programmed to discern when certain types of attacks are likely/imminent) conducting analysis quicker than could be expected by human monitoring and/or reaction.76 Other examples where deep learning systems could prove beneficial include cyber defense and electronic warfare attacks. Autonomous systems also provide an advantage in defensive postures to “select and engage incoming enemy” indirect fires (for example, mortars, artillery shells, and rockets). An autonomous system designed to provide a rapid and robust “counter-battery” response against the origin of an attack provides commanders with additional time to focus on second- and third-order decisions given that the initial response to the attack was “automatically initiated” with speed and accuracy. Israel uses this type of force protection approach with its Iron Dome defenses.77

In the area of applying technology to reduce fratricide, AI/AS technologies have tremendous potential for the joint force as well as potential hazards. It is possible to envision scenarios in which AI/AS can provide much more effective early identification in protecting civilians as well as combatants from friendly fire incidents (for example, more precise targeting or minimizing collateral damage).78 In the area of developing a more robust and rapid response to emergency scenarios, the key for the joint force will be adopting AI/AS technology and applying it to respond with COAs that enhance survivability as well as isolating the negative impacts that result from accidents, biological hazards, and natural disasters.79

Marines with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, provide security for convoy during Samurai 2-20 on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, December
10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kallahan Morris)
Marines with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, provide security for convoy during Samurai 2-20 on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, December 10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kallahan Morris)
Marines with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, provide security for convoy during Samurai 2-20 on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, December
10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kallahan Morris)
191211-M-KM064-009
Marines with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, provide security for convoy during Samurai 2-20 on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, December 10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kallahan Morris)
Photo By: Cpl. Kallahan Morris
VIRIN: 191211-M-KM064-009

Sustainment

JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, defines sustainment as “the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations.” The logistics portion of sustainment includes the core functions of deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistical services, operational contract support, engineering, and health services.80 Among the seven joint functions, sustainment operations present some of the most likely quick wins for employment of AI/AS technologies.

The integration of AI/AS analytical tools provides a significant advantage for dealing with large datasets and complicated algorithms. The Air Force already uses the Automatic Logistics Information System, which has automated the transmission of logistics data (for example, fuel consumption and engine diagnostics) to free up pilot attention for a greater focus on combat.81 Since planning for deployment and distribution relies heavily on large volumes of data and algorithms, AI/AS implementation could provide a tangible improvement for the joint force. By leveraging automated solutions to track information such as unit basic load status, supply orders, warehousing stock, distribution channels, and transportation schedules, a joint logistics command would be well positioned to service both peacetime and wartime requirements.

Highly automated vehicles (HAVs) are currently in use, with many experts suggesting that the adoption of autonomous vehicles will soon become commonplace in military as well as civilian settings. One of the primary challenges associated with the widespread adoption of HAVs in sustainment and logistics operations is the ethical issues associated with “training” vehicles—how to teach the AI/AS technology to effectively evaluate potential accidents. The Army recently invested nearly $50 million in the Autonomous Ground Resupply Program to leverage AI/AS with the goal of saving lives as well as economy of force.82 The joint force may want to build on this initial implementation of HAV technology in relatively self-contained environments (for example, moving materials on and off ships and aircraft) before implementing a more robust program. In this rollout, the joint force could partner with civilian freight agencies that are already moving forward with test programs. The legalities of leveraging HAVs in an international environment, and the related liabilities, would have to be fully researched by the Judge Advocate Corps before this option is rolled out in various countries.

The network-based nature of private sector logistics provides a natural framework for implementing and scaling AI for complex military supply chains.83 In June 2018, the Army awarded a predictive maintenance contract to Uptake, a company that analyzes millions of hours of data from diesel engines and other major components to predict imminent equipment failures. The goal of this trial program is to identify ways to streamline logistics and help untether the warfighter from traditional supply lines.84

While the most common AI/AS-enabled personnel services and processes relate to recruitment, hiring, onboarding, and financial management, there are a multitude of rules-based, repetitive human resources tasks that can be automated to provide more time for value-added functions.85 For example, AI/AS tools have the potential of assisting joint force leaders with talent and succession planning programs in an unbiased manner. Automation techniques could also be used to offer a preliminary evaluation of promotion packets and offer suggestions on personnel management, such as setting the optimal rate for retention bonuses.

The Services have each undertaken efforts to more effectively attract, manage, and retain talent. “Cultivating workforce talent” is highlighted in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, along with the clarification that it will require the inclusion of new capabilities and an openness to updating practices, not just the addition of new technology.86 Following the Air Force’s September 2017 Workforce Summit, Michael Parker stated, “Talent management information technology must transform to function in today’s digitally connected world.”87 Simultaneously, the Navy’s Sailor 2025 initiative as well as the Army’s Talent Management Task Force seek to “improve and modernize personnel management.”88

In another sustainment initiative, the Army is poised to implement the Integrated Personnel and Pay System–Army, which will allow the tracking of individual Soldier and civilian skillsets across all three components: Active, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.89 Personnel management has the unique ability to be both an enabler of the future of AI/AS within the joint force—through focused recruitment and talent management programs—and a consumer of AI/AS capabilities. While each of the Services is becoming more analytical and objective regarding evaluations and promotions, having positioned themselves to use AI/AS functions in a Service-specific manner, if DOD would merge these sources of talent data, the joint force would have a robust source of the information from which to staff future teams.

The healthcare component of sustainment has already seen success with AI/AS and stands poised for even more. Recovery Engagement and Coordination for Health, a Veterans Administration (VA) program that uses AI to analyze veteran health record data, had proactively identified nearly 7,000 veterans at risk of suicide as of March 2018, thereby allowing for quick and effective intervention.90 IBM is partnering with the VA—and with myriad civilian medical research entities—in the area of cancer treatment.91 With the number of new cancer diagnoses between one million and two million annually, medical assessments are a tremendous area of opportunity for expanded AI/AS usage, particularly in remote and/or deployed environments where it is not always possible for a full range of specialists to be on location.

Whether the focus is logistics, personnel management, or healthcare services, the sustainment function is primed for incremental AI/AS enhancements. Additionally, this is a key integration area where the joint force could and should partner with civilian and interagency organizations for the more robust and effective systems.

F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Stingers of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron 113 launches from flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 5, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts)
F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Stingers of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron 113 launches from flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 5, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts)
F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Stingers of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron 113 launches from flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 5, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts)
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) Deployment FY 2018
F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Stingers of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron 113 launches from flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 5, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts)
Photo By: Petty Officer 3rd Class Rebecca Winberry
VIRIN: 180205-N-MJ135-1086

Information

With the 2017 release of JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, information was added as the seventh joint function, the first addition of a joint warfighting function in 20 years.92 JP 1 defines the information joint function as follows:

The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides [joint force commanders] the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.93

Brigadier General Alexus Grynkewich, who served on the Joint Staff as the J39 Director of Global Operations, stated, regarding the addition of this seventh joint function, “The elevation of information in joint doctrine . . . underscores the [DOD] focus on how to adapt in order to more effectively use the military instrument of national power in a changing strategic environment.”94 Building on this idea, the DOD publication Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment states that information could possibly be the decisive factor in successful future military operations.95 Secretary Mattis likewise understood the importance of this newly designated joint function when, as a commanding general, he stating, “Capturing perception is the new high ground in today’s conflicts.”96 General John Hyten, then commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated, “The military that figures out how to control information will be the most powerful military on the planet.”97 The importance of information as a joint function was also highlighted in Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World. This document includes the following prediction: “Advanced information technologies will lead to new and faster ways to form, build, and maintain cohesion and common purpose among members of a group. Consequently, it will become easier to mobilize and expand groups and ideas, irrespective of geographic proximity.”98 In support of this prediction, the most recent National Security Strategy, as well as the 2018 National Defense Strategy, frequently cite myriad threats to national security that are likely to stem from the use of information as a weapon by U.S. adversaries.99

Artificial intelligence and automated systems hold tremendous promise for improvements across each of the seven joint functions. As Andrew Massie noted, “At its core, our ability to harness autonomy is a test of our ability to trust machines, and therefore delegate authority for decision making and action.”100 DOD took action with the June 2018 directive establishing the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center.101 The joint community would be wise to build on this new initiative and timely directive by adding AI/AS planning and integration cells on joint manning documents to ensure that the benefits of lessons learned, both within and outside the military, are fully leveraged across the joint force. But this is just a part of what should be a much bolder approach to AI/AS investment across DOD and the joint force. Time is of the essence. In recent congressional testimony, DOD officials reported that China spent $12 billion in 2017 on AI and plans to spend at least $70 billion by 2020.102 By comparison, current U.S. expenditures are one-tenth of those planned by the Chinese. By taking a bold and integrative approach in the AI/AS space, DOD and the joint community will put themselves in position to take advantage of the advice offered by Paul Schare, author of Robotics on the Battlefield: “The winner of this revolution will not be who develops these technologies first, or even who has the best technologies, but who figures out how to best use them.”103 JFQ

Notes

1 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], January 19, 2018), 3, available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

2 Field Manual (FM) 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 16, 2012), iv, available at <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm6-01-1.pdf>.

3 Ibid., I-8.

4 Andrew Loiselle, “Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight: Joint Concepts and Future Readiness,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 119, available at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-89/jfq-89.pdf?ver=2018-04-19-153711-177>.

5 Alexus Grynkewich, “Introducing Information as a Joint Function,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 7.

6 Gregory Radabaugh, “The Practical Implications of Information as a Joint Function,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 17.

7 Jeffrey L. Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Brief Survey of Developmental, Operational, Legal, and Ethical Issues, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, December 2015), 27, available at <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2378.pdf>.

8 Howard R. Simkin, “Technological Fluency 2035–2050,” Small Wars Journal, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technological-fluency-2035-2050>.

9 Ibid.

10 Jim Baker, “Artificial Intelligence—A Counter Intelligence Perspective: Part I,” Lawfare, August 15, 2018, available at <www.lawfareblog.com/artificial-intelligence-counterintelligence-perspective-part-1>.

11 Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems, 80.

12 Posture Statement of General Joseph Dunford, Jr., USMC, 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 114th Congress Senate Arms Services Committee Budget Hearing, March 17, 2016, 4, 65, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_03-17-16%20.pdf>.

13 Elisa Kania, “Great Power Competition and the AI Revolution: A Range of Risks to Military and Strategic Stability,” Lawfare, September 19, 2017, 2, available at <www.lawfareblog.com/great-power-competition-and-ai-revolution-range-risks-military-and-strategic-stability>.

14 Jeffrey Egstrom, Systems Confrontation and Systems Destruction Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), iii.

15 Kania, “Great Power Competition and the AI Revolution,” 5.

16 Joint Concept Note 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming (London: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, May 2018), iii, available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/709359/20180517-concepts_uk_human_machine_teaming_jcn_1_18.pdf>.

17 Caitlin Thorn, “Drop Zone: The Third Offset and Implications for the Operating Environment,” Over the Horizon: Multi-Domain Operations & Strategy, January 19, 2018, 2, available at <https://othjournal.com/2018/01/19/drop-zone-the-third-offset-and-implications-for-the-future-operating-environment/>.

18 Kris Osborn, “Air Force Brings AI to Major Air-Warfare Combat Platforms: B-2, F-35, & F-15,” Warrior Maven, July 30, 2018, 1, available at <https://defensemaven.io/warriormaven/air/air-force-brings-ai-to-major-air-warfare-combat-platforms-b-2-f-35-f-15-TAugbSjpqEqaGJfTrPj1RA/>.

19 Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems, 27.

20 Ian Thibodeau, “Driverless Vehicles May Reshape the Future of Warfare,” Detroit News, May 14, 2018, 2, available at <www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2018/05/14/army-transforming-warfare-self-driving-vehicles-tanks-tardec/34880891/>.

21 Key Strategic Initiatives List (KSIL) 2018–2020 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, August 14, 2018), 7, available at <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1393.pdf>.

22 Joint Concept Note 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming, iii.

23 Andrew Clevenger, “The Terminator Conundrum: Pentagon Weighs Ethics of Pairing Deadly Force and AI,” Defense News, January 23, 2016, 3, available at <www.defensenews.com/2016/01/23/the-terminator-conundrum-pentagon-weighs-ethics-of-pairing-deadly-force-ai/>.

24 Paul Lester et al., “Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 113.

25 Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems, 14.

26 Lou Kratz, Bradd A. Buckingham, and Tzyh-Chyang Chang, “Enabling National Security Through Dual-Use Technology,” Proceedings of the 11th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, vol. 2 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 1, available at <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a624728.pdf>.

27 Jarna Petman, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: “Out of the Loop?” (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2017), 21.

28 Osborn, “Air Force Brings AI to Major Air-Warfare Combat Platforms”; Ronald Arkin, Perspectives on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Roboticist’s Perspective on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, UNODA Occasional Paper no. 30 (New York: United Nations, November 2017), 37, available at <www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/unoda-occasional-papers-no-30-november-2017/>.

29 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 2.

30 Andrew Massie, “Autonomy and the Future Force,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 2016), 139, available at <www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=793199>.

31 Michael Carl Haas and Sophie-Charlotte Fischer, “The Evolution of Targeted Killing Practices: Autonomous Weapons, Future Conflict, and the International Order,” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 2 (2017), 285, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1336407>.

32 Arkin, Perspectives on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 36.

33 Massie, “Autonomy and the Future Force,” 135, 138.

34 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2017), III-3.

35 Charles Trumball, “U.S. Opening Statement at CCW Meeting Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems,” Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, November 15, 2017, 1, available at <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/11/15/u-s-opening-statement-at-ccw-meeting-of-group-of-governmental-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/>.

36 Samuel White, Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, October 2017), 74.

37 Gwendolyn DeFilippi, Stephen Nowak, and Bradford Baylor, “The Impact of Lessons Learned in Joint Force Development,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018.

38 Haley Evans, “Too Early for Ban: The U.S. and UK Positions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Lawfare, April 13, 2018, 5, available at <www.lawfareblog.com/too-early-ban-us-and-uk-positions-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems>.

39 Katie Lange, “3rd Offset Strategy 101: What It Is, What the Tech Focuses Are,” DOD Live, March 20, 2016, 2, available at <www.dodlive.mil/2016/03/30/3rd-offset-strategy-101-what-it-is-what-the-tech-focuses-are/>.

40 Dunford, “The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed,” 3.

41 Massie, “Autonomy and the Future Force,” 137.

42 Trumball, “U.S. Opening Statement at CCW Meeting Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.”

43 Osborn, “Air Force Brings AI to Major Air-Warfare Combat Platforms.”

44 Elisa D. Harris, James M. Acton, and Herbert Lin, Governance and Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, April 2016), 3, available at <www.amacad.org/publication/governance-dual-use-technologies-theory-and-practice>; Matthew Cox, “Army Is Spending Half a Billion to Train Soldiers to Fight Underground,” Military.com, June 24, 2018, 1, available at <www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/24/army-spending-half-billion-train-troops-fight-underground.html>.

45 Ted W. Schroeder, “Policies on the Employment of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems in Future Conflicts,” December 2016, 55, available at <www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/Documents/2017/07/LAWS_Essay.pdf>.

46 White, Closer Than You Think, 74.

47 G. Lage Dyndal, Tor Arne Berntsen, and Sigrid Redse-Johansen, “Autonomous Military Drones: No Longer Science Fiction,” NATO Review Magazine, July 28, 2017, 4, available at <www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/EN/index.htm>.

48 Haas and Fischer, “The Evolution of Targeted Killing Practices,” 286.

49 DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems (Washington, DC: DOD, May 8, 2017), 2, available at <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf>.

50 Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Military Review (May–June 2017), 75, available at <www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/>.

51 John Cherry, “U.S. Statement at the CCW GGE Meeting: Intervention on Appropriate Levels of Human Judgment Over the Use of Force,” Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, November 15, 2017, available at <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/11/16/u-s-statement-at-ccw-gge-meeting-intervention-on-appropriate-levels-of-human-judgment-over-the-use-of-force/>.

52 JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 22, 2013), I-5, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf>.

53 Ibid., III-15.

54 David B. Larter, “U.S. Navy Moves Toward Unleashing Killer Robot Ships on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News, January 15, 2019, available at <www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/01/15/the-us-navy-moves-toward-unleashing-killer-robot-ships-on-the-worlds-oceans>; Kris Osborn, “Navy Sees Stealthy, AI-Enabled 6th-Gen Fighter to Come after F-35,” Warrior Maven, January 14, 2019, available at <https://defensemaven.io/warriormaven/cyber/navy-sees-stealthy-ai-enabled-6th-gen-fighter-to-come-after-f-35-W2dZvsLTIkOPJXRFD72HDg/>.

55 John Markoff, “A Learning Advance in Artificial Intelligence Rivals Human Abilities,” New York Times, December 10, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/science/an-advance-in-artificial-intelligence-rivals-human-vision-abilities.html>.

56 Artificial Intelligence in Logistics: A Collaborative Report by DHL and IBM on Implications and Use Cases for the Logistics Industry (Troisdorf, Germany: DHL Customer Solutions & Innovation, 2018), 11, available at <www.logistics.dhl/content/dam/dhl/global/core/documents/pdf/glo-core-trend-report-artificial-intelligence.pdf>.

57 Kania, “Great Power Competition and the AI Revolution,” 3.

58 Jeff Becker, “How to Beat Russia and China on the Battlefield: Military Robots,” Real Clear Defense, March 19, 2018, 5, available at <www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/19/how_to_beat_russia_and_china_on_the_battlefield_military_robots_113222.html>.

59 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-27.

60 Petman, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law,” 21.

61 Matthew Cox, “Army Looking at AI-Controlled Weapons to Counter Enemy Fire,” Military.com, January 10, 2019, available at <www.military.com/defensetech/2019/01/10/army-looking-ai-controlled-weapons-counter-enemy-fire.html>.

62 DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, 2.

63 Petman, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law,” 47, 54.

64 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-33.

65 Petman, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law,” 7.

66 Kevin McCaney, “Boeing’s New Autonomous UUV Can Run for Months at a Time,” Defense Systems, March 14, 2016, 1, available at <https://defensesystems.com/en/articles/2016/03/14/boeing-echo-voyager-uuv>.

67 “Autonomous Systems,” Boeing Web site, available at <www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/index.page>.

68 Sydney J. Freeberg, Jr., “Army Wants 70 Self-Driving Supply Trucks by 2020,” Breaking Defense, August 20, 2018, available at <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-wants-70-self-driving-supply-trucks-by-2020/>.

69 “Using Autonomy to Supply the Last Mile,” Army Technology, June 25, 2017, available at <www.army-technology.com/features/featureusing-autonomy-to-supply-the-last-mile-5852408/>.

70 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-35, III-36.

71 Etzioni and Etzioni, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 78.

72 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-35.

73 “Using Autonomy to Supply the Last Mile,” 2.

74 Daniel Cebul, “The Future of Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Domain-Specific Analysis,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 14 (Fall 2017), 44, available at <www.csis.org/npfp/future-autonomous-weapons-systems-domain-specific-analysis>.

75 Thibodeau, “Driverless Vehicles May Reshape the Future of Warfare,” 1–2.

76 Lange, “3rd Offset Strategy 101,” 3.

77 Michael J. Armstrong, “As Missiles Fly: A Look at Israel’s Iron Dome Interceptor,” The Conversation, April 15, 2018, 1, available at <https://theconversation.com/as-missiles-fly-a-look-at-israels-iron-dome-interceptor-94959>.

78 Caton, “Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 58.

79 Kratz, Buckingham, and Chang, “Enabling National Security Through Dual-Use Technology,” 1.

80 JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 16, 2013), I-1–I-2, available at <www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp4_0%2813%29.pdf>.

81 Osborn, “Air Force Brings AI to Major Air-Warfare Combat Platforms.”

82 Matthew Cox, “Army Spends $50 Million to Build Autonomous Supply Convoys,” Military.com, June 12, 2018, 2, available at <www.military.com/defensetech/2018/06/12/army-spends-50-million-build-autonomous-supply-convoys.html>.

83 Artificial Intelligence in Logistics, 14.

84 Sydney J Freedberg, Jr., “Joint Artificial Intelligence Center Created Under DOD CIO,” Breaking Defense, June 29, 2018, 1, available at <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/joint-artificial-intelligence-center-created-under-dod-cio/>.

85 Artificial Intelligence in Logistics, 23.

86 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 7.

87 Brooke Brzozowski, “AF Concludes Workforce Summit, Focuses on Being Employer of Choice,” Air Force Personnel Center, September 1, 2017, available at <www.afpc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1298077/af-concludes-workforce-summit-focuses-on-being-employer-of-choice/>.

88 “Sailor 2025,” U.S. Navy Personnel Command, available at <www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/career/talentmanagement/Pages/default2.aspx>; “Army Talent Management Task Force,” Army.mil, August 8, 2016, available at <www.army.mil/standto/2016-08-11>.

89 Brian Hamilton, “Talent Management Enhances Total Force Readiness,” Army.mil, April 6, 2018, available at <www.army.mil/article/203537/talent_management_enhances_total_force_readiness>.

90 Sara Friedman, “DHA Looks to Machine Learning for Military Health Data,” Defense Systems, April 24, 2018, available at <https://defensesystems.com/articles/2018/04/25/military-health-data.aspx>.

91 Sarah Wells, “IBM Watson Health and the VA Extends Partnership in Cancer Research,” Tech Crunch, July 19, 2018, available at <https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/19/ibm-watson-health-and-the-va-extends-partnership-in-cancer-research/>.

92 Grynkewich, “Introducing Information as a Joint Function,” 7.

93 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 12, 2017), I-19, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf>.

94 Grynkewich, “Introducing Information as a Joint Function,” 7.

95 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (Washington, DC: DOD, June 2016), 15, available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf>.

96 Scott Thompson and Christopher Paul, “Paradigm Change: Operational Art and the Information Joint Function,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 14.

97 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, 11.

98 Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 14, 2016), 12, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917>.

99 Thompson and Paul, “Paradigm Change,” 9.

100 Massie, “Autonomy and the Future Force,” 135.

101 Paul McLeary, “Pentagon, Intel Agencies Set Up New AI Joint Office,” Breaking Defense, April 13, 2018, 1, available at <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/pentagon-intel-agencies-set-up-new-ai-joint-office/>.

102 Tom Ramstack, “Pentagon Says U.S. Military Losing Its Advantage with Artificial Intelligence,” The Gazette (Colorado Springs), December 16, 2018, available at <www.gazette.com/military/pentagon-says-u-s-military-losing-its-advantage-with-artificial/article_b225e198-ffb4-11e8-9d38-3716e8a47e98.html>.

103 Joint Concept Note 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming, iii.


Failed Megacities and the Joint Force
By Matthew N. Metzel, Todd J. McCubbin, Heidi B. Fouty, Ken G. Morris, John J. Gutierrez, and John Lorenzen | Feb. 10, 2020

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Colonel Matthew N. Metzel, USAR, is Director of Army Reserve Affairs at Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan, Camp Zama. Major General Todd J. McCubbin, USAF, is the Mobilization Assistant to the Commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. Colonel Heidi B. Fouty, USAR, is in the 416th Theater Engineer Command. Major Ken G. Morris, USAR, is in the U.S. Army Reserve–Civil Affairs, Human Resource Command. Major John J. Gutierrez, USMCR, is in the 4th Marine Division of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Mr. John Lorenzen, USA, is an Instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III)
U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III)
U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III)
U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III)
U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III)
Photo By: DOD/Fred W. Baker III
VIRIN: 200207-D-BD104-016

In what might become one of the greatest international challenges of the 21st century, sociologists have documented a dramatic shift in population centers termed megacities.1 These densely populated urban areas are of such size and scale that they create new challenges requiring careful consideration by both civilian and military planners. The problems the joint force could face when operating in a megacity would stretch the limits of U.S. military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Although joint doctrine addresses the subject of traditional urban terrain, it neglects to address the highly complex challenges associated with megacities. Given the potential crisis of a failed megacity, the probability for military support, and the risk associated with inadequate doctrine, the Department of Defense (DOD) must develop joint doctrine that adequately addresses the challenges posed by operations in a failed megacity.

There are several key points that underscore the need to develop joint force doctrine to address failed megacities. First, megacities should be categorized differently than other urban terrain due to the size and scale of those affected by either natural or man-made disasters.2 Second, existing joint doctrine does not adequately address the problem of conducting operations within an urban environment with a population of 10 million or more people.3 Third, megacities will become more commonplace in developing nations and, due to the weight of economic and humanitarian needs, cause an increase in social destabilization.4 Fourth, unstable nation-states will exploit potential migration crises from failed megacities in an effort to receive political favors and financial aid from the international community.5 Fifth, violent extremist and criminal organizations will persist in and leverage ungoverned spaces in megacities to achieve their political and economic objectives.6 Sixth, these organizations will leverage migration activity from megacities by embedding themselves within and recruiting from displaced civilian populations in order to breach established security measures.7 Finally, given these key points, U.S. leaders will likely need to quickly employ joint force capabilities to support humanitarian assistance operations for failed megacities to protect U.S. interests abroad.

Megacities: Definition and Problem

General Mark Milley stated that the joint force is insufficiently prepared for operational activity in megacities.8 His words of caution signal the need for military leaders to develop joint doctrine that adequately addresses operations within this highly complex terrain. Megacities are defined as areas of continuous urban development that contain over 10 million people.9 These large and densely populated areas create new challenges that require careful consideration for best practices by both civilian and military planners.

For the first time in recorded history, more than half of the world’s population lives in an urban environment, with over 8 percent of mankind now living in one of the world’s 37 megacities.10 The 10 largest megacities are:

  • Tokyo-Yokohama (38 million)
  • Jakarta (32 million)
  • Delhi (27 million)
  • Manila (25 million)
  • Seoul-Incheon (24 million)
  • Shanghai (24 million)
  • Mumbai (23 million)
  • New York City (22 million)
  • Beijing (21 million)
  • Sao Paulo (21 million).11

In 1990, New York ranked as the second largest city in the world, with Los Angeles ranking eighth. By 2018, New York dropped to the eighth largest, while Los Angeles slipped to seventeenth.12 These statistics show that the developing world is outpacing Western population growth in dramatic fashion. For example, China now holds the largest number of megacities (four), with an additional eight cities on the cusp of megacity status.13

The reason megacities matter to the joint force is tied to the scope and scale of these large and potentially ungoverned spaces. The enormous challenges that military leaders faced during humanitarian assistance efforts following the 2010 earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti, would pale by comparison if a similar earthquake struck a megacity. Port-au-Prince ranks as a relatively small urban population of just over 2.8 million (globally, Port-au-Prince ranks 176th in population).14 A natural disaster disrupting a megacity, such as Lagos, Nigeria, with a population of 13.9 million people, or Seoul-Incheon, with 24 million inhabitants, would lead to exponentially more damage.15 Military capabilities would be consumed relatively quickly under the sheer size and scale of any such response operation.

Given the gaps in current joint doctrine in addressing the significant challenges of a potential failed megacity such as Lagos, leaders should prioritize the development of relevant doctrine to the threat of failed megacities. The urbanization of populations across the globe and the resulting concentration of threats to millions of people in relatively confined areas pose a problem that military leaders have traditionally tried to avoid because of the associated risks. A natural or man-made disaster in a megacity such as Lagos would prove to be a complex disaster in an unknown or, more likely, hostile operational environment.

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory executed Dense Urban Operations limited operational experiment 2019 called Project Metropolis II, with Marines assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; squad-size element from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment; and British Royal Marines assigned to 8 Troop
Charlie Company, at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana, August 20, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matt Lyman)
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory executed Dense Urban Operations limited operational experiment 2019 called Project Metropolis II, with Marines assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; squad-size element from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment; and British Royal Marines assigned to 8 Troop Charlie Company, at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana, August 20, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matt Lyman)
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory executed Dense Urban Operations limited operational experiment 2019 called Project Metropolis II, with Marines assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; squad-size element from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment; and British Royal Marines assigned to 8 Troop
Charlie Company, at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana, August 20, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matt Lyman)
Out of the Smoke
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory executed Dense Urban Operations limited operational experiment 2019 called Project Metropolis II, with Marines assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; squad-size element from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment; and British Royal Marines assigned to 8 Troop Charlie Company, at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana, August 20, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matt Lyman)
Photo By: Matt Lyman
VIRIN: 190820-M-NQ873-0492

Joint Urban Operations Doctrine and Megacities

In 2013, former Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno directed the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to study the problem of megacities as part of a comprehensive review of urban operations.16 Since then, General Milley and, before his retirement in July 2019, Marine Corps Commandant General Robert Neller openly stated their shared goal to improve urban operations doctrine in order to address the challenges of military operations in megacities.17

Joint urban operations (JUO) doctrine is largely silent on the subject of megacities and provides only a general overview of items to consider when conducting military operations, primarily combat operations, in an urban setting. Joint doctrine does discuss the challenges of what it describes as the “urban triad,” which consists of three significant challenges for military operations in an urban environment. The triad includes man-made physical terrain—the buildings and layout of the urban area; population size and density—the magnitude of the population size, and the density/layout of the population; and infrastructure that the area/city depends on for basic operations—utilities that include sewer, power, and communications.18 The triad is not only significant for planning urban operations, but it is also exponentially more critical in a megacity environment. Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, uses the term megacities to warn that criminal groups operating within this type of urban terrain have the potential to gain significantly more power over the population in a short amount of time than those who operate within rural settings.19 The triad would serve as fundamental to criminal groups gaining control, but be difficult for joint forces to wrest from them.

In addition, JP 3-06 highlights a few critical points that could apply to both urban and megacity operations. For example, it discusses the critical nature of understanding the operational environment and the joint intelligence preparation of this environment.20 It also emphasizes that urban operations should be a coordinated effort with all political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information elements and across all instruments of national power.21 Understanding the operational environment and the collaboration of intelligence are critical components, but doctrine should better address the significant differences between operating in megacities and operating in traditional urban centers.

In 2017, a RAND report addressed the concern of military operations in megacities by looking at five recent conflicts in urban environments.22 The report stated, the “Army is not ready to fight in urban combat. Its doctrine, tactics, and training have not absorbed the lessons these case studies [the five recent conflicts] teach. In part, this is because urban combat is messy and destructive and seen as something to be avoided.”23 However, two common mitigation themes emerged from RAND’s research into urban operational requirements that can aid in preparing for future urban conflict, and both may apply to urban HA/DR operations. First, maintaining a mobile protected firepower capability when conducting urban operations is a necessity for combat operations and force protection.24 Second, forces need to be creative and adaptive and exploit intelligence to gain the desired operational effect.25 This recent research suggests that current JUO doctrine and the Army’s Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, are largely inadequate to address complex military operations involved in response to a failed megacity.26

In a 2015 article from Parameters, the authors point out that a megacity “can be best described as systems of systems, comparable to a living organism. They are dynamic environments that change not only block by block, but day to day.”27 The authors discuss five complex challenges presented by megacities that are either not adequately addressed or not addressed at all in current JUO doctrine. These five challenges include:

  • regional and international interconnectedness and centers of gravity (not addressed)
  • extended urban infrastructures supporting dense, diverse populations (partially addressed in joint doctrine)
  • formal and informal sources of power (not addressed)
  • congested and constraining terrain (partially addressed in joint doctrine)
  • interconnected, embedded threats across super-surface, surface, sub-surface, and cyber/space (not addressed).28

These five areas highlight the fact that each megacity is unique and that the challenges faced will be multilayered issues for joint military and civilian leadership to address. A review of JP 3-06, recent research findings, and assessments from General Milley and General Neller all indicate that the joint force is not prepared, nor does current joint doctrine adequately address military combat or humanitarian operations in a megacity environment.

Joint publications do not address the challenges of a humanitarian and disaster relief response to the megacity environment. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, covers foreign HA/DR and lists eight short references to the complexity of operating within urban terrain.29 While JP 3-29 does cover the framework for DOD support to an HA/DR effort, and reviews the possible HA/DR missions, such as Federal disaster relief, dislocated civilians, security, and technical assistance, it does not directly address the complexities of providing these services in a megacity or urban environment. JP 3-29 also discusses “related operations,” such as humanitarian and civil assistance and security assistance (military training), foreign internal defense (JP 3-22), peace operations (JP 3-07), noncombatant evacuation operations (JP 3-68), civil-military operations (JP 3-57), and foreign consequence management (JP 3-41). A comprehensive review of these related operational areas and the corresponding joint publications reveal little guidance applicable to urban operations and none for megacity operations, which is a substantial gap in joint doctrine for a highly probable future requirement.

Joint doctrine guidance for megacity operations is currently limited to the single joint publication that directly addresses JUO. While this might suffice for current smaller urban military combat operations, it does not provide sufficient guidance for megacity combat operations or megacity HA/DR (or its related HA/DR operations). While Army and Marine Corps leaders have identified a gap in the doctrine addressing combat operations in a megacity, the requirement equally exists for HA/DR and related operations for a megacity. The gap in doctrine should be addressed as soon as feasible across the spectrum of military response requirements.

To address the complexities of megacity humanitarian relief-type operations, JP 3-29 should be updated to include discussions on megacity operations. Currently, JP 3-29 chapter 3 discusses the major areas that military operations in a HA/DR event will need to address, such as deployment, sustainment, command and control, intelligence, protection of the force, engineer operations, rules of engagement, legal considerations, liaison, communications synchronization, and public affairs.30 Lessons learned from recent urban operations should be incorporated into 3-29.31 Joint doctrine needs to expound on these topics to more adequately address the complexities of megacity operations. For example, the intelligence collection and fusion will be significantly different in a megacity environment based on scale and scope. Collection by space, air, and signal intelligence assets will be hampered in a large metropolitan area that contains large areas of ungoverned spaces. Leveraging social media, news media, and nongovernmental organization intelligence will be required in any megacity disaster relief operation, as well as sharing/synchronizing the intelligence with other civilian organizations and law enforcement agencies. In addition, HA/DR-related doctrine will need to incorporate megacity operational factors into HA/DR “related operations” mentioned above to better prepare the joint force for the complexities associated with megacity operations.

Joint Force Response to Haiti Earthquake

The humanitarian assistance provided to Haiti after the 7.0 magnitude earthquake on January 12, 2010, provides a recent example of the employment of joint force capabilities, using current doctrine, to support a large urban population. The immediate and decisive response to the disaster directly saved lives and set the stage for follow-on operations. Several key aspects of this response can be cited as examples for the use of the joint force for these nontraditional missions, despite the issues encountered.

First, the military’s planning capability provided the framework for the integration and cooperation of the rest of the international community.32 While the international community—both military and nongovernmental organizations—stood ready to provide assistance in the aftermath of the earthquake, these agencies and partners depended on the planning capabilities of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters for international coordination structure. Second, the joint force employed effective methods for liaison activities among the numerous international organizations.33 Recognizing that most assistance would not be provided by the joint force, the Operations Order 01-10 was published as an unclassified order so that partners would be able to share information.34 In addition, the JTF used numerous liaisons to ensure that there was unity of effort throughout the operation. Finally, the integration of the JTF with the functionally degraded Haitian government showed the U.S. resolve to provide the gateway for humanitarian assistance without usurping Haitian independence.

Despite these positive aspects of the operation, several issues point to the lack of a comprehensive joint doctrine that addresses all of the challenges that may be encountered. According to JP 3-29, disasters could be slow onset, rapid onset, or complex.35 In addition, the assistance may be required to be provided in one of three types of environments: permissive, uncertain, and hostile.36 Although the damage and loss of life in Haiti was a massively tragic event, the disaster could arguably be classified as neither complex nor in a hostile environment. Yet the joint force still faced several obstacles in executing the operation. First, although the U.S. Agency for International Development was established as the lead agency, the command structure on the ground was unclear.37 The agency was neither prepared nor equipped to manage the myriad U.S. and international organizations. Another problem encountered was the lack of clarity of priorities. The call for any and all types of assistance available, without the ability to accurately assess the ground situation, caused logistical and communication friction at airports, seaports, and along the limited land routes. Finally, the organization of the JTF headquarters into a functionally aligned staff postured for theater security cooperation rather than crisis response made it difficult for the staff to plan continuous operations as other partners, organizations, and supplies were flooding into Haiti.38

Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García)
Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García)
Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García)
Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García)
Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García)
Photo By: Emilio García
VIRIN: 200207-D-BD104-017

Urban City Relief Operations Compared to a Megacity

While the Haiti earthquake took an enormous toll in human lives and destruction of property and infrastructure, the failure of a megacity such as Lagos would pose infinitely more challenges to the joint force. Lagos would characterize all three challenges noted previously. First, the physical terrain would limit and impede freedom of movement for the joint force. The city of Lagos is filled with extensive infrastructure and is Africa’s major financial center. The buildings and layouts of this operational environment would further complicate any of the command and control issues that were faced in Haiti. In addition to the terrain obstacles, the population size and density of Lagos would make the operation environment extremely complex. While Haiti’s total population exceeded 10 million, this population was dispersed over more than 10,000 square miles. Lagos has a concentrated population of nearly 15 million confined to 452 square miles. Any threat posed by natural disaster, and the resulting chaos due to illness, criminal activity, and the collapse of any form of government, would be concentrated in an extremely densely populated area. Finally, the infrastructure of Lagos would further complicate any assistance operation. As seen in Haiti, the control of incoming organizations and supplies lacked any sort of prioritization or control. This problem was on an island with limited airport or seaport capability. In contrast, Lagos boasts some of Africa’s busiest airports, seaports, and highways. In addition, Lagos serves as a communication hub for Africa. Given the difficulty of controlling the limited infrastructure in Haiti, a disaster in Lagos would pose an infrastructure control and rebuilding issue of massive proportions.

Given the gaps in current joint doctrine in addressing the significant challenges of a potential failed megacity such as Lagos, leaders should prioritize the development of doctrine relevant to the threat of failed megacities. The urbanization of populations across the globe and the resulting concentration of threats to millions of people in relatively confined areas poses a problem that military leaders have traditionally tried to avoid because of the associated risks. A natural or man-made disaster in a megacity such as Lagos would prove to be a complex disaster in an unknown or, more likely, hostile operational environment.

Military leaders must seize the initiative to develop joint doctrine that adequately addresses the problem of military operations in a failed megacity environment. While some U.S. military leaders have held that humanitarian operations are a distraction from the true mission of the joint force, it is highly probable that political leaders within the United States would quickly turn to the military for an immediate HA/DR force for megacity challenges.39 Although it is a reasonable position to want to avoid the complexities of humanitarian missions, historical events highlight the value of employing joint force assets to counter crisis events, such as the destabilizing effects of forced mass migration. As the RAND study and other works have pointed out, military operations will be required in a failed megacity and the failure of a megacity is highly likely in the not-too-distant future. DOD has learned valuable lessons from recent urban operations in Haiti, Mogadishu, and Fallujah.40 Now is the time to develop DOD megacity doctrine before a disaster occurs. Updating DOD HA/DR-related doctrine will enable the future development of combatant command contingency plans to address likely security threats and challenges that will become the responsibility of future joint military leaders. JFQ

Notes

1 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Mega Cities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South (New York: Zed Books, 2009), 1, 8, 10.

2 Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong, “The Case for Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 20.

3 Ibid., 27.

4 Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox, “The World’s Fastest-Growing Megacities,” Forbes, April 8, 2013, available at <www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2013/04/08/the-worlds-fastest-growing-megacities/#3af2c7057519>; Demographia World Urban Areas, 15th ed. (Beltsville, IL: Demographia, April 2019), available at <http://demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf>. China has four cities with over 8 million people and four others with over 7 million.

5 Safak Timur and Rod Nordland, “Erdogan Threatens to Let Migrant Flood into Europe Resume,” New York Times, November 25, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/world/europe/turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan-migrants-european-union.html>.

6 Meghan Benton, Spheres of Exploitation: Thwarting Actors Who Profit from Illegal Labor, Domestic Servitude, and Sex Work (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, January 2014).

7 Brian Ross and Dragana Jovanovic, “Paris Bomber Sneaked in with Refugees, Officials Say,” ABC News, with video, 2:08, November 15, 2015, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/ International/isis-refugee-journey-terror-paris/story?id=35220868>.

8 Todd South, “The Future Battlefield: Army, Marines Prepare for ‘Massive Fight’ in Megacities,” Military Times, March 6, 2018, available at <www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/03/06/the-future-battlefield-army-marines-prepare-for-massive-fight-in-megacities/>; Gary Anderson, “Fighting in Megacities: The Army’s Next Challenge,” Small Wars Journal, April 5, 2017, available at <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fighting-in-megacities-the-army’s-next-challenge>.

9 Kotkin and Cox, “The World’s Fastest-Growing Megacities.”

10 See Demographia World Urban Areas. As of March 2018, 55.4 percent of the world’s population lives in an urban environment, and 86 cities contain a population of over 5 million.

11 Ibid., 22.

12 Kotkin and Cox, “The World’s Fastest-Growing Megacities.”

13 Ibid. See also Demographia World Urban Areas.

14 Ibid., 25.

15 Ibid., 22.

16 South, “The Future Battlefield.”

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Joint Publication (JP) 3-6, Joint Urban Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2014), II-7.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future, RR1602 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), xiii, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1602.html>.

23 Ibid., xiii.

24 Ibid., 174.

25 Ibid., xi.

26 Ibid., 160, 174–175.

27 Felix and Wong, “The Case for Megacities,” 45.

28 Ibid.

29 JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2013).

30 Ibid., chapter 5.

31 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army, chapters 3, 4.

32 David R. DiOrio, “Operation Unified Response—Haiti Earthquake 2010,” Joint Forces Staff College, November 2010, 10, available at <https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/4A_Haiti_HADR_Case_Study_revNov10.pdf>.

33 Ibid., 5.

34 Operation Order 01-10, Haiti Earthquake Foreign Disaster Relief (Miami: U.S. Southern Command, January 22, 2010).

35 JP 3-29, III-3–III-4.

36 Ibid., III-4.

37 DiOrio, Operation Unified Response—Haiti Earthquake 2010, 5.

38 Ibid., 6.

39 JP 3-29.

40 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army, chapters 3 and 4.