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Winners of the 2018 Essay Competition
By NDU Press | Nov. 8, 2018

NDU Press Congratulates the Winners of the 2018 Essay Competitions

NDU Press is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and JFQ George C. Maerz essay competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 17–18, 2018, during which 29 faculty judges from 15 participating professional military education institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages.

Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition

The 12th annual competition is intended to stimulate new approaches to coordinated civilian and military action from a broad spectrum of civilian and military students. Essays address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the core competencies of our national security institution.

First Place
Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian Navy
U.S. Naval War College
“Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas: China’s Strategy and Potential U.S. Options”

Second Place
Major Craig W. Thomas II, USMC
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
“The Casualty of Truth”

Third Place
Lieutenant Colonel Cory Brown, USAF
Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy
“Strategic Optionality for Defense Acquisition: An Alternative Management Approach for Major Defense Acquisition Programs”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition

This annual competition, in its 37th year in 2018, challenges students at the Nation’s joint professional military education institutions to write research papers or articles about significant aspects of national security strategy to stimulate strategic thinking, promote well-written research, and contribute to a broader security debate among professionals.

Strategic Research Paper

First Place
Sergeant First Class Daniel P. McGarrah, USA
College of International Security Affairs
“Military Medicine: The Gender Gap in Trauma Training”

Second Place
Colonel Robert Ellison Croft, USA
U.S. Army War College
“Understanding Uncertainty: Incorporating the Unknown into Military Estimates”

Third Place
Lieutenant Colonel Jason Glynn, USAF
U.S. Naval War College
“Is the Arctic a Blind Spot in U.S. Strategy?”

Strategy Article

First Place (Tie)
Major Edwin Y. Chua, Singapore Army
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
“Political Warfare with Other Means: 2017 Cyber Attacks on Qatar”

First Place (Tie)
Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Wagner, USA
U.S. Army War College
“Peacekeepers in the Donbas”

Second Place
Matt Butram
College of International Security Affairs
“The NotPetya Attack as a Harbinger: How Cyber Attacks Create Risk to Strategic Mobility”

Third Place
Colonel Sean C. McMahon, USA
U.S. Army War College
“The Constitutional Divide between Covert Action and Traditional Military Activity”

Joint Force Quarterly Maerz Awards

In its third year, the JFQ George C. Maerz Awards, chosen by the staff of NDU Press, recognize the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues. Five outstanding articles were chosen for the Maerz Awards, named in honor of Mr. George C. Maerz, former writer-editor of NDU Press.

Forum
James M. Davitch
“Open Sources for the Information Age: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Unclassified Data,”
JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017)

JPME Today
Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin Kelley
“Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military Education,”
JFQ
84 (1st Quarter 2017)

Commentary
Darryl Williams
“Forensic Vulnerability Analysis: Putting the ‘Art’ into the Art of War,”
JFQ 85 (2nd Quarter 2017)

Features
Gregory C. McCarthy
“Are There Too Many General Officers for Today’s Military?”
JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017)

Recall
Phillip S. Meilinger

“Time in War,”
JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017)

Distinguished Judges

Twenty-nine senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition.

Twenty-nine senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition.
Distinguished Judges
Twenty-nine senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition.
Photo By: NDU
VIRIN: 181108-D-BD104-001

Front row, left to right: Mr. Robert Orr, National War College; Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone, U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Richard DiNardo, Marine Corps Staff College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Kenneth Johnson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Trevor Albertson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Margaret Sankey, Air War College; Ms. Bonnie Calabria, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Kathryn Fisher, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College. Back row, left to right: Ms. Andrea Connell, NDU Press; Ms. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Commander Jeffrey Stebbins, USN; Captain Bill Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief, Joint Force Quarterly; Dr. Brian McNeil, Air War College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. James Kiras, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Naunihal Singh, U.S. Naval War College; Mr. Jeffrey Turner, Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Jim Chen, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, NDU Press; Dr. Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College.

Not pictured: Dr. Robert Baumann, Command and General Staff College; Mr. Ray Damm, Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Mr. Jay Hatton, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Carl “CJ” Horn, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Wray Johnson, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting; Dr. Sorin Lungu, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Stephen Mariano, National War College; Dr. Nicholas Sarantakes, U.S. Naval War College.


Joint Doctrine Update
By The Joint Staff | Nov. 5, 2018
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Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations

JP 3-05, Special Operations

JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations

JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations

JP 3-11, Operations in CBRN Environments

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense

JP 3-28, Defense Support to Civil Authorities

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting

JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations

JP 4-0, Joint Logistics

JP 4-04, Contingency Basing

JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations

JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations

JP 3-14, Space Operations

JP 3-15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device Operations

JP 3-26, Counterterrorism

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Joint Staff Doctrine
Sponsor Signature)

JP 4-09, Distribution Operations

Joint Doctrine Note 1-17, Strategy


Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics
By Andrew Keene | Nov. 5, 2018
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Lieutenant Andrew Keene, Navy Supply Corps, USN, is Assistant to the Strategy and Readiness Division Chief, Joint Staff J4.

Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016, Naval Magazine Indian Island, Washington, June 13, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kenneth W. Norman)
Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016, Naval Magazine Indian Island, Washington, June 13, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kenneth W. Norman)
Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016, Naval Magazine Indian Island, Washington, June 13, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kenneth W. Norman)
Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016
Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016, Naval Magazine Indian Island, Washington, June 13, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kenneth W. Norman)
Photo By: Staff Sgt. Kenneth Norman
VIRIN: 160613-F-QX786-1330

The Joint Staff Director, Logistics Directorate (J4), approved the revision of Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Joint Logistics. The publication, signed by the Director of Joint Force Development (J7), is the latest keystone document of the joint doctrine logistics series since 1995. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the first official version of JP 4-0 in 1995. Since then, the joint doctrine development community has revised JP 4-0 in 2000, 2008, and 2013. In 2000, JP 4-0 introduced the concept of focused logistics and sustainment for effective combat power. In 2008, the JP 4-0 update shifted emphasis by introducing the joint logistics environment and joint logistics imperatives. The 2013 revision introduced the concept of the joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) while providing guidance on coordinating and synchronizing joint logistics.

JP 4-0 was developed to provide the doctrinal foundation for logistics planning, execution, and assessment in support of joint operations. It focuses on the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts while leveraging the global JLEnt to affect the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to sustain a joint force commander’s concept of operations. Additionally, it provides guidance for joint logistics, describes core logistics functions essential to success, and offers a framework for combatant commanders and subordinate commanders to integrate capabilities from national, multinational, Services, and combat support agencies to provide forces properly equipped and trained, when and where required.

The 2018 version of JP 4-0 is not a radical departure from the previous version. The majority of changes ensure the publication now contains the most current figures, terms, definitions, and references based on changes to other JPs in the joint doctrine library since approval of the 2013 JP 4-0 version. Most notably, the 2018 version contains five joint logistics focus areas: warfighter readiness, competition below armed conflict, global integration, innovation, and strengthening alliance and partner networks. These will guide joint logisticians in the performance of the integrating functions needed for successful joint operations.

The joint community’s recommendations resulted in the consolidation of JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs, into the JP 4-0 revision. The revision also incorporates updated information regarding health services from the 2017 release of JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. It updates the description of the directive authority for logistics and includes amplified information regarding the roles of U.S. Transportation Command and combat support agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency within the JLEnt. The latest revision more adequately describes technology and how it can enable the joint force commander to effectively control logistics within the operational area, if leveraged effectively.

The technology section describes how new technologies, in the form of information systems, decision support tools, and evolving communications capabilities, can improve visibility of logistics processes, resources, and requirements and provide the information necessary to make effective decisions. Additionally, the revision includes clarifying information for base operating support integrator and lead Service support.

Because of the interrelationship between logistics and all phases of operations, JP 4-0 was developed in close collaboration with other recent versions of joint publications, ensuring continuity between keystone JPs to address strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Logistics support will continue to evolve. As the JLEnt develops updated processes in the new logistics environment, the joint doctrine development community will capture those best practices and integrate them into JP 4-0 through the adaptive doctrine process.

In an effort to reflect adaptive doctrine, this keystone now contains appendices for each subsequent JP within the JP 4-0 series. The appendices provide horizontal and vertical linkages to the keystone and within the joint doctrine publication hierarchy to best support joint operations (JP 3-0) and the foundation for joint doctrine publication hierarchy reset considerations that elaborate on or improve joint doctrine efficiencies.

The updated JP 4-0 is a big step in aligning logistics joint doctrine with the processes used by logisticians in the combatant commands and the guidance in the National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. This version provides joint force commanders and their component commanders with processes that allow for that flexibility and the ability to provide streamlined logistics support in an uncertain and challenging environment. JFQ


Building Joint Personnel Recovery Through Multinational Collaboration
By David Gayvert | Nov. 5, 2018
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David Gayvert is a Multinational Engagement Analyst at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.

Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shipiro)
Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shipiro)
Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shipiro)
Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shipiro)
Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shipiro)
Photo By: Tech. Sgt. Brandon Shapiro
VIRIN: 181106-D-BD104-020

In Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter 2018), an article titled “Born Multinational: Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations” introduced the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC), a Joint Staff J7 multinational force development initiative focused on collaboratively developing and assessing concepts and capabilities to address the challenges associated with conducting coalition and multinational operations.1 This article provides additional information about how the MCDC enables effective collaboration among like-minded partner nations (PN) in the vital mission area of personnel recovery (PR).

The Integrated Coalition Personnel Recovery Capability (ICPRC) is one of nine projects undertaken during the current 2017–2018 MCDC program cycle, the theme of which is Rapid Aggregation of Coalition and Partner Forces. Personnel recovery is included within this theme as a high-interest subject area. Joint Publication 3-50 defines personnel recovery as the “sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.”2

Several studies have assessed that multinational forces and operations are at risk due to a lack of an effective and enduring global PR network, using a common lexicon, and cooperation and synchronization mechanisms to optimally employ nations’ capabilities across the full PR spectrum—diplomatic, military, and civil domains. This hampers the ability of commanders and other decisionmakers to prevent or respond effectively to isolating events.

The ICPRC project aims to address this problem by creating an international guidebook that will provide nations and governmental or nongovernmental organizations a tool to assess and address gaps in PR capability and interoperability, as well as to educate senior leaders about the importance and basic elements of personnel recovery. Doing so will enable more efficient preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions of personnel recovery among allies and partners, providing common principles, terms and definitions, capability standards, best practices, and processes. The guidebook will be a descriptive rather than prescriptive product and is not intended to be a doctrinal manual; its recommendations are not binding on any nation.

As with all MCDC projects, the ICPRC seeks to implement the guidance contained in key policy documents, from the National Defense Strategy to Chairman of the Joint Chief (CJCS) issuances, joint publications, and derivative Service doctrine, all of which echo the Department of Defense (DOD) emphasis on multinational cooperation. As noted in CJCS Instruction 2700.01F, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Activities, for example, leveraging the capabilities, capacities, and shared interests of partner nations is a key force multiplier for U.S. military planners and commanders.3 Furthermore, strengthening our allies and forging new multinational partnerships is among Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s top priorities.4 Reinforcing this emphasis, General Joseph Dunford recently affirmed that “allies and partners are our strategic center of gravity.”5

Clearly, the volatile global security environment will continue to require—more than ever before—a comprehensive approach to effectively counter collective threats, one that must include political, diplomatic, military, civil, and nongovernmental activities conducted via partnered coalitions of like-minded nations and organizations. Yet in many mission areas—and personnel recovery is certainly one of these—the lack of compatible, interoperable policies and doctrine; education and training; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); capability standards; and strong, functional relationships inhibits optimal partnering with our allies and partner nations.

In regions like Africa and the Pacific, where the United States has only limited PR-capable assets available, this situation can create significant risks to DOD and other U.S. and PN personnel operating in those areas. In short, the United States simply does not have the capacity to handle all current and potential future PR requirements. Therefore, PN support is essential to reduce risk and ensure sustained PR coverage for U.S. and coalition missions, as well as guarantee adequate response to future operational threats that may require military response. Thus, growing the PR capability and capacity of willing partners and improving interoperability through shared doctrine, training, and TTP are certainly in the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.

Why is this so important? Aside from reducing the direct risk to our people, past experience illustrates that when personnel are held captive, or otherwise isolated in hostile areas or conditions, the lack of a timely and effective recovery operation—or an adversary’s exploitation of isolated personnel through public media—can prompt changes in policies that place collective strategic aims at risk and may even threaten the stability of coalitions. Still burned into our minds, the images of U.S. personnel being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, directly led to the U.S. decision not to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.6 The more recent press photographs showing the horrific fate of the Jordanian pilot executed by terrorists in Syria similarly had massive impacts on public opinion and subsequent political decisions made.7

Accordingly, to address this gap in PR capability and interoperability and provide multinational force commanders with an improved capability to quickly and effectively plan, synchronize, execute, and assess joint and combined PR operations, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) teamed with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to co-lead the ICPRC project. The project provides a means for both organizations to achieve several key strategic objectives and has already produced value for project partners who are using parts of the guidebook (published in October 2018) to educate leaders within their nations about personnel recovery, as well as influence the curriculum of their PR education and training programs.

The ICPRC Project Team and Objectives

Currently, 20 nations and multinational organizations from around the globe are participating in the project in some capacity.8 In addition to specific information explaining how to effectively prepare, plan, and execute personnel recovery, the ICPRC project promotes several key concepts:

  • PR capability, whether material (platforms, equipment) or nonmaterial (policy, doctrine, education, training), cannot be produced overnight; it must be developed, acquired, and maintained well in advance of the operational need.
  • Personnel recovery is truly a whole-of-nation responsibility requiring involvement of political, diplomatic, civil, and military leadership and capabilities; as such, it is an inherently joint mission area.
  • The need for interoperability—both internationally and among national components—in joint PR (JPR) capabilities is paramount and should be factored into all force development decisions.
  • Mutual trust and working relationships among allies and partner nations must be developed and intensified over time through training, exercises, and other collaboration at all levels.
  • Preparing, planning, and effectively executing personnel recovery is a responsibility for all nations and leaders.
  • Personnel recovery is a moral obligation that will only provide reassurance to and trust among at-risk personnel if leaders adequately prepare and plan to ensure adequate and available capabilities when required.
  • Every nation can contribute something to PR.

This last message is in fact key: leaders—within both DOD and our international partners—must have a common understanding of the wide range of activities and expertise that comprise personnel recovery and be prepared to contribute something—whether it be equipment, recovery platforms, or simply well-trained personnel—to the collective mission. Political, diplomatic, civilian, and military leaders alike must continuously collaborate to effectively prepare, plan, and execute personnel recovery so as to be able to locate, support, recover, and reintegrate isolated personnel. They must recognize that requisite capabilities cannot be established overnight, or in the immediate aftermath of a PR event. The tendency to postpone commitment of time and resources to this critical mission “until we need it” must be avoided. Preparation and planning for isolating events must be done well in advance of need; history proves that virtually all nations will experience a PR event sooner or later.

The guidebook emphasizes that among the most important activities is development of national and organizational policies for PR/JPR that establish priorities for capability, capacity, and interoperability development, along with ways and means to achieve them.

The good news is that nations have a wide range of ways in which they may contribute to and improve the effectiveness of combined PR activities. In addition to developing and implementing formal policies that articulate the desired endstate (and that specify ways and means for the conduct of personnel recovery both unilaterally and within coalitions of allies and partners), other associated activities include but are not limited to providing key mission enablers such as intelligence, public affairs, strategic communications, and medical support.

The guidebook urges that relationships, communications networks, and written agreements among partners be established early, then maintained and strengthened throughout the preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation phases of personnel recovery, whether as part of a coalition, military operation, or within a diplomatic or other nonmilitary context. It calls attention to the fact that the sensitivities surrounding a particular isolating event may require the lead for recovery decisionmaking, planning, and execution to shift among military, diplomatic, and civil teams, depending on the political environment at the scene, assets available, and leaders’ need to coordinate and offer guidance, planning, and information support across the domains.

Throughout the planning and project execution (February 2017 to present), the ICPRC team has consistently contributed time and expertise to create a practical, compact reference, focused on the core components and activities of the PR system, providing enough information to understand how personnel recovery works—and how essential it is to national interests—without drowning the reader in detail.

Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction
Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction
Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
Photo By: Tech. Sgt. Gregory Brook
VIRIN: 180222-F-OH871-1241

ICPRC Working Session 2, Almagro, Spain

Envisioned users of the guidebook include not only partner nations that wish to build or improve their PR capability, capacity, and interoperability but also security assistance/cooperation and force development program officers and planners developing PR concepts, doctrine, and training strategies.

Measures of effectiveness for the project include:

  • Increase in (commitment to) user-nation PR capabilities: Guidebook provides a useful roadmap for PR/JPR capability and interoperability evaluation, preparation, planning, and development.
  • Improvement in PN PR participation: Every nation can (and does) contribute some capability.
  • Improvement in coalition interoperability: Partner nations ready to contribute value to PR mission on day one (plug and play capability).
  • Demand signal for the guidebook: Have the right users asked for it and what is their feedback?

The fact that some of the project team nations are already using the current draft guidebook to convey key aspects of personnel recovery to senior commanders as well as to influence the curriculum of their PR education and training programs is an early indicator that the ICPRC will produce a valuable tool for the global PR community. Particularly among developing nations, the guidebook will provide ready access to the cumulative expertise and relevant operational experience resident within NATO, European Union, JPRA, and other ICPRC project partners.

However, publication of the guidebook aside, the most important long-term outcome of the ICPRC project will certainly be the expansion and strengthening of many key bilateral and multilateral relationships. For example, through collaboration on the ICPRC, JPRA has significantly increased its understanding of and support to complementary capability development activities under way in other nations, as well as key organizations like the European Personnel Recovery Centre and European Defence Agency Project Team Personnel Recovery. This increase in shared understanding constitutes real progress toward the ultimate goal of a truly global PR federation of capable, willing, and active partners.

ICPRC Supports JPRA Multinational Outreach Objectives

The JPRA mission is to lead DOD personnel recovery, providing strategic direction, oversight, operational support, analysis, capability integration, and education and training to improve PR interoperability and enable DOD, multinational partners, and the interagency community to prevent, prepare for, and respond to isolating events.

As a CJCS-controlled activity and the DOD office of primary responsibility for personnel recovery (less policy), building and sustaining an international network of willing and capable partners is a major objective and mission-essential task for JPRA, as the agency pursues its strategic vision of achieving seamless, full-spectrum personnel recovery through enduring global integration and interoperability.9

The JPRA charter includes three separate references that give it specified authority and responsibility in the area of multinational engagement.10 The charter:

  • directs JPRA to “provide a team of recognized experts to support DOD, interagency [community], and allied efforts to identify and meet current and future PR challenges”
  • directs JPRA to “maintain direct liaison with DOD components, the interagency [community], and multinational partners
  • authorizes JPRA the “appointment of allied personnel to serve in JPRA” (after coordination with Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services).

In addition to the charter, DOD Directive 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, further establishes that JPRA shall:

  • “assist other U.S. Government departments and agencies, partner nations, and others, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense with PR-related education and training programs”
  • “[d]evelop and manage a capability to share appropriate lessons learned with interagency [community] and partner nations
  • “ssist in developing and coordinating NATO doctrine and other NATO operational publications to distribute personnel recovery guidance and encourage synchronization with U.S. personnel recovery doctrine.”11

To carry out these important specified tasks, JPRA has developed an international engagement strategy that is outcome-oriented, enabling the targeting of resources in a way that ensures force multiplication without duplication of effort and maintains a clear path toward the development of an enduring global PR community.

The strategy is organized into five major multinational lines of effort (LOE), all derived from the agency’s authorities; essential, specified, and implied tasks; and aligned with the priorities of the Joint Staff J7 Director’s Campaign Plan for Joint Force Development:

  • LOE1: Strategy and Planning
  • LOE2: Bilateral Engagement
  • LOE3: Multilateral Engagement
  • LOE4: Strategic Communication
  • LOE5: Education and Training.

The MCDC program is a major LOE3 activity and helps JPRA advance its organizational goals in significant ways. By providing a structured and proven forum to collaboratively develop and introduce new nonmaterial capabilities, the program is an ideal venue through which JPRA can execute its directed responsibilities in the multinational arena. Among the foremost of these is ensuring that senior leaders—military, diplomatic, and civil—recognize the importance of the PR mission area and appropriately prepare and plan accordingly. The ICPRC guidebook does just that.

Finally, while there are established MCDC planning, approval, and reporting processes, project teams are able to plan, develop, and complete their work largely unfettered by the bureaucratic requirements that often characterize government-sponsored activities. The ICPRC project will be completed in November 2018, closing out the MCDC 2017–2018 cycle. Concept development for additional PR-related projects are currently under way for the 2019–2020 cycle.

Another critical element of this strategy under Bilateral Engagement (LOE2) is the nascent JPRA Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) program, which aims at further strengthening key bilateral relationships by posting allied PR specialists as FLOs at JPRA headquarters. This would enable them to share their nations’ PR experiences, expertise, and perspective while simultaneously developing expertise in the U.S. PR system. These exchanges serve to better align bilateral and multilateral approaches to improving capability, capacity, and interoperability and in the process, strengthen the global JPR community.

Lieutenant Colonel Georg Stauch of the German army arrived at JPRA in January 2018 and is JPRA’s first FLO. On May 8, 2018, this valuable relationship was formally recognized with a ceremonial posting of the Federal Republic of Germany’s flag at JPRA headquarters. JPRA looks forward to welcoming additional allied FLOs from the United Kingdom and Poland in mid–fiscal year 2019.

ICPRC Supports NATO Commitment to JPR

In 2015, NATO ACT, through its Capability Development Division, initiated efforts to establish JPR as a key developmental focus, to be pursued through a number of interrelated activities. These included analysis of whether JPR should become a defined discipline within the Alliance as a means to better establish standards of training and professionalize execution of this essential mission area. In February 2016, NATO formally promulgated Allied Joint Publication 3-7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment. In March 2017, it submitted the Action Plan for Joint Personnel Recovery in a Hostile Environment to NATO headquarters for military committee approval, and in October 2017, submitted a draft JPR policy for NATO for North Atlantic Council review. Over the past 3 years, NATO has also developed and ratified a number of JPR-related standardization agreements within the Alliance. These address survival, evasion, resistance, and extraction training standards, PR staff education, and PR TTP.

These are major milestones in the effort to improve JPR capability, capacity, and interoperability within the Alliance, as well as its operational partners. The action plan in particular is significant, as it describes the path to achieve a long-term vision of an integrated JPR capability in NATO. It contains 30 action items organized under 4 strategic objectives (SO) and related LOE:

  • SO1/LOE1 Doctrine: Agreed Policy, Doctrine, Plans, and Documentation
  • SO2/LOE2 Training: Trained and Qualified Forces, Trained Command and Control Structure
  • SO3/LOE3 Organization: Integrated Command and Control Structure
  • SO4/LOE4 Material: Force Structure Fielded and Operational.

The ICPRC project is completely complementary to the action plan and will help it accomplish many of its objectives, particularly in the doctrine and training SO/LOE.

NATO also co-leads three other projects within the MCDC 2017–2018 cycle. The Federated Mission Networking/Mission Partner Environment addresses capability development requirements for civil-military information-sharing. The International Cyberspace Operations Planning Curricula will create interoperable educational planning curricula that will effectively build courses to train cyberspace planners to conduct operations as an integral component of multinational force operations and exercises. And the Medical Modular Approaches project is developing a concept for modular, interoperable medical capabilities that provides a flexible, agile, and mission-tailored configuration and enhancement of an end-to-end multinational medical support system. Clearly, the MCDC program provides NATO with a vehicle through which it may address a wide range of capability development challenges.

Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway)
Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway)
Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway)
Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway)
Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway)
Photo By: Christopher Callaway
VIRIN: 130410-F-TJ158-442

Conclusion

The ICPRC project will enable greater standardization and harmonization of JPR TTP, doctrine, and policy, and shared understanding among project partners of the JPR capabilities and capacity of coalition partner nations. It will provide a useful tool for other nations and organizations that wish to create, develop, or simply improve their JPR program and interoperable capabilities. Most important, it will underscore the importance of effective personnel recovery to all nations and the necessity that senior decisionmakers factor PR considerations into all operational preparations and planning.

Ultimately, the project aims to increase operational participation and burden-sharing among allies and partner nations as a means to sustain combined JPR capability and improved personnel and equipment interoperability. An ambitious goal to be sure, but one that is within reach because of programs like MCDC that harness the creativity, experience, and hard work of multinational partners to collaboratively, quickly, and affordably identify, analyze, and solve common problems. JFQ

Notes

1 Charles W. Robinson, “Born Multinational: Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter 2018), 128–132.

2 Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 20, 2011).

3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2700.01F, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Activities (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 18, 2015).

4 James Mattis, “Memorandum for All Department of Defense Personnel,” October 5, 2017, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/GUIDANCE-FROM-SECRETARY-JIM-MATTIS.pdf>.

5 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017), 4–5.

6 Steve Baldauf, “Why the U.S. Didn’t Intervene in the Rwandan Genocide,” Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 2009, available at <www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/0407/p06s14-woaf.html>.

7 Adam Chandler, “‘I Expect the Jordanian Government to Seek Revenge,’” The Atlantic, February 4, 2015, available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/jordan-pilot-ISIS-execution-unity-Mouath-al-Kasaesbeh-King-Abdullah-revenge/385147>.

8 Australia, Austria, Denmark, European Personnel Recovery Centre, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

9 CJCSI 3270.01B, Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 23, 2015).

10 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Realignment of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Under the Department of the Air Force, with Attachment,” November 25, 2011. Emphases added.

11 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: DOD, April 16, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, April 4, 2013). Emphases added.


The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security: Focus on Campaign Activities
By George E. Katsos | Nov. 5, 2018
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Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is the Department of Defense Terminology Program Manager and a Joint Doctrine Strategist.

USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department)
USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department)
USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department)
USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department)
USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department)
Photo By: State Department
VIRIN: 181106-D-BD104-013

In an effort to cross-reference U.S. Government policies, practices, and joint doctrine with human security,1 this article completes the discussion2 on its most relevant dimensions—health, food, environmental, and economic security—with a combatant commander campaign activity focus on civilian security (personal, community, political).3

Protection from violence is crucial for people, especially vulnerable populations. The inability to establish and maintain safe and secure environments through effective governance may result in population dislocation or displacement.4 These conditions can overwhelm institutional capacities and disturb regional norms, resulting in assistance or intervention from security providers such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the U.S. Government. For civilians who remain in place, the pursuit of desperate or questionable measures to steady a favorable environment or attain a better standard of living may also result in counterproductive stabilization practices and weaken the foundation of civilian security and society as a whole. Therefore, viable security institutions and their active role in providing civilian security are central to U.S. national security interests.

Definitions and Descriptions

Both governmental and nongovernmental documentation provide insight through definitions and descriptions on current protection practices in order to present a better understanding of civilian security as an element of effective governance. For the U.S. Government, the White House defines protection as capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters.5 Within the executive branch, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines protection as actions or measures taken to cover or shield from exposure, injury, or destruction including those needed to ensure protective reactions that do not unnecessarily interfere with citizen’s freedoms and liberties.6 The Department of Defense (DOD) adds another definition of protection: to preserve the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.7 DOD policies further discuss protection as peacekeeping forces that employ active and passive measures to protect themselves against adversaries, accidents, diseases, and other threats to mission success.8

Outside of the government, international organizations such as the UN use the terms protection and protection of civilians when addressing issues related to civilian security. Based on mandate language in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), descriptions focus on preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians by the host government. Other definitions in UN workforce documentation include protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and also acknowledge state obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and refugee law.9 Regional organizations such as NATO define protecting civilians as activities conducted with the intent to safeguard noncombatants from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure and stable environment for civilians over the long term.10 This approach informs the understanding of operational environments including efforts that alleviate harm, facilitate access to basic needs, and contribute to safe and secure environments.11 Additionally, NATO descriptions include avoiding, minimizing, and mitigating negative effects that might arise from military operations, conflict-related physical violence, or threats of physical violence by other actors.12 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines protection as all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, while the concept as a whole ensures authorities and other constituted groups comply with their obligations under IHL, IHRL, and refugee law.13

For purposes here, civilian security includes supporting law and order, the rule of law, and establishing security through effective governance (for example, viable police, justice, and defense systems). These measures contribute to addressing policy issues on sheltering civilians from physical and systematic violence (personal security), providing family and culture protection from identity-based tensions (community security), and protecting from oppressive governing practices such as repression and human rights abuses (political security).14

Legislative and Judicial Actions

U.S. legislative and judicial efforts address civilian security concerns within the boundaries of the Constitution. Per legislative action, Congress develops Federal laws in support of issues such as national defense and protection from oppressive domestic governing. For the latter, the Constitution contains provisions that protect civilians from unlawful imprisonment or detention, punishment for conduct not illegal at the time performed, punishment focused on individuals or groups, states favoring their own citizens over others, and unreasonable searches per the Bill of Rights. Constitutional amendments passed after the Civil War acknowledge citizenship rights, legal and equal protections under the law, and voting rights. Congress can also limit the Federal Government and executive power such as preventing Federal military personnel from enforcing domestic policies at home.15 More recently, Congress authorized the use of military force against nations, organizations, or persons that plan, authorize, commit, or aid in terrorist attacks in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.16

Regarding governmental functions, Congress can create, eliminate, or restructure executive branch entities and agencies. In the first year of George Washington’s Presidency, Congress created the position of Attorney General that now leads the Department of Justice. After World War II, Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DHS.17 For significant judicial decisions, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of legal issues to be resolved under Federal law. After the Civil War, some rights codified in constitutional amendments were not observed, as subsequent Supreme Court decisions undermined civilian security protections that could have extended under state law.18 However, by the mid-20th century these rights were eventually enforced by subsequent court decisions and new legislation.19

International Engagement

For over a century, the United States has been involved in protecting civilians outside national borders. After World War I, the United States joined the League of Nations to mitigate future conflict between nations. By the end of World War II, the UN replaced the league and broadened its purpose over time to protect civilians beyond the effects of conflict. In 1949, the United States became a signatory to a set of international treaties and protocols known as the Geneva Conventions to protect civilian victims during armed conflict and internal violence. Building on the Geneva Conventions, the Nation ratified the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. In the years following World War II, a body of law was created around IHL (also known as the Law of Armed Conflict) to limit the effects of perpetrator actions against stability and further codify noncombatant legal protection. More recently, IHRL developed as a broader body of law where nations are determined to have a collective duty to protect their own civilian populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

In the spirit of IHRL, UNSCR mandates contain modern “responsibility to protect” language that holds individual national authorities accountable for civilian protection violations.20 In support of both IHL and IHRL, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement supports civilian security through its components: the ICRC (humanitarian protection and assistance in armed conflict and violent situations), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (coordinates efforts of national societies to provide humanitarian assistance primarily in disaster relief and public health), and National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (auxiliary entities to national governments).

U.S. Army captain, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises Afghan National Army major about security in Logar Province, Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, August 7, 2018 (NATO/U.S. Navy/Aubrey Page)
U.S. Army captain, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises Afghan National Army major about security in Logar Province, Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, August 7, 2018 (NATO/U.S. Navy/Aubrey Page)
U.S. Army captain, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises Afghan National Army major about security in Logar Province, Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, August 7, 2018 (NATO/U.S. Navy/Aubrey Page)
U.S. Army captain advises Afghan National Army major about security
U.S. Army captain, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises Afghan National Army major about security in Logar Province, Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, August 7, 2018 (NATO/U.S. Navy/Aubrey Page)
Photo By: Lt. Aubrey Page
VIRIN: 180807-N-QJ088-1005

The Executive Branch

Civilian security fosters confidence in effective governance. Under Article II of the Constitution, the President is granted authority to cultivate that confidence through executive power to protect the people from internal and external threats. As such, the President approves the National Security Strategy to articulate strategic policy goals and national power direction on matters related to civilian security. Subsequently, executive branch departments produce organizational strategies and plans in support of the President’s strategy. In furtherance of setting a political agenda, the President can issue multipurpose policy direction through executive orders to the executive branch on topics such as combating the trafficking of persons and minimizing civilian casualties when applying military force.21 Executive orders issued specifically for national security purposes are called Presidential directives. Relevant directives include combatting terrorism, counternarcotic activities, and mass atrocity prevention. The following overview captures governmental civilian security efforts within the executive branch in three cascading categories: significant, additional, and remaining.

Significant Efforts. Two departments and their agencies partake in significant civilian security efforts through varying degrees of assistance: the Department of State and Department of Justice. State manages foreign diplomatic affairs for the President while its development component (USAID) implements economic initiatives and facilitates disaster assistance abroad.22 Through diplomacy and development, State and USAID provide a competitive, forward-deployed political capability that can also facilitate security-sector assistance abroad in support of national security objectives.23 At State, many department bureaus lead efforts to develop partner capabilities and build institutional capacities of nations or other organizations that may eventually contribute troops, police, or security forces to future stabilization missions. Bureaus also advance efforts to mitigate conflict; support law and order and police force establishment, maintenance, or reforms; and provide solutions for the displaced. For development and relief purposes, USAID bureaus and offices promote human rights, democratic governance initiatives, and coordinate responses to overseas disasters.

Justice is another entity that supports civilian security. Managed by the Attorney General, Justice preserves confidence in the U.S. judicial system; administers Federal law enforcement entities; and establishes, enables, or reforms justice systems abroad through security sector assistance. Justice components such as its Federal Bureau of Investigation uphold the Constitution and protect the American people from threats. Other entities confine criminal offenders, enforce laws and regulations that bring perpetrators to justice, and consolidate operations such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and export control. To support crisis response mechanisms at home, Justice manages the National Response Framework’s Emergency Support Function #13 Public Safety and Protection that facilitates Federal public safety and security assistance to local, state, tribal, and territorial organizations overwhelmed by an actual or anticipated disaster or act of terrorism.24

Additional Efforts. Other departments make substantial contributions to civilian security. DHS identifies vulnerabilities to U.S. security and develops protective measures through coordinated responses to emergencies, Presidential direction, and critical infrastructure and key resource protection.25 Via its Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS manages Federal assistance to help populations in state, local, tribal, territorial, and organizational entities.26 Through the Coast Guard, DHS facilitates legitimate usage of waterways subject to U.S. jurisdiction.27 Moreover, its Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies monitor border crossing, immigration, and illegal entry issues.

DOD supports civilian security efforts primarily through its military workforce.28 Besides providing territorial and physical security, DOD assists governmental efforts to disrupt and prevent adversarial and competitor practices that negatively impact national interests such as stability, security, and democratic systems across the globe. Abroad, DOD defense institution-building efforts increase partner-nation abilities to meet security needs and contribute to regional and international security more effectively.29 At home, DOD leads homeland defense missions and supports civilian authorities.

Remaining Efforts. Outstanding departments also impact civilian security. Efforts include the Department of Energy’s role in nuclear safety, Labor’s enforcement of child labor laws and human-trafficking prevention, Interior’s focus on Native American safety, Treasury’s strategic threat disruption efforts to deter financial practices that threaten stability, and Health and Human Services management of refugee centers that assist in American society integration.30 As governmental entities continue to develop plans in support of national security policy objectives, the future is uncertain on how these entities will protect civilians during international systems disruption and complete collapse or from the effects of aggressive competitor measures and severe population displacement.

Military Campaign Activities

Civilians who are neither part of an armed group nor engaged in hostilities are protected under the law of war. Threats to civilian security that nations and state-like entities encounter or generate may involve a response from security institutions such as DOD. In support of governmental activities, combatant commanders and their staffs integrate force protection as well as civilian security considerations into plans, preparation, training, and missions. To socialize DOD’s role in the pursuit of civilian security, discussions and implications appear in joint doctrine, including traditional and irregular approaches that earn population support and the mitigation of civilian casualties in military operations.31 While many terms describe DOD support to civilian security efforts (investments, deployments, operations, cooperation, assistance), this discussion refers to them as campaign activities.

Campaign activities involve offense, defense, and stability components. Offensive actions can neutralize threats, defensive actions can reduce vulnerabilities, and contributions to stabilization efforts can influence political dynamics, all in support of protecting civilians.32 At the international level, DOD can provide support to peacekeeping, security-sector, and stabilization commitments through individual expertise and workforce contributions. At the regional level, DOD participates in security and stabilization efforts normally with contributions to a regional military workforce. At the national level, DOD conducts or supports activities to achieve national objectives and enable civilian authorities to build or strengthen institutional systems (police, justice, defense).

U.S. military resources used for civilian security may be independent conventional forces, conventional forces that leverage capabilities of U.S. special operations forces, or independent special operations forces. Depending on the rules of engagement and operational environment, campaign activities in support of civilian security may not always be feasible to implement due to competing operational interests that a commander must assess, such as the inherent right of self-defense and combat. For DOD, civilian security can decrease the threats that cause civilians and vulnerable populations (identity-based groups, women, children) to relocate, thus mitigating the need for future U.S. military deployment. At home, DOD leads the homeland defense mission and provides defense support to civil authorities. The following sections articulate DOD contributions to civilian security efforts by, with, and through international stakeholders and host-nation partners.

Effective Governance. DOD conducts short- and long-term campaign activities in support or in place of civilian administration. Through a range of military operations, effective governance can result in protecting civilians against physical violence, crime, terrorism, and other harm in locations where security forces occupy or operate. For security recipients, ministry or security institution development is better conducted simultaneously and not under different time horizons.33 For nations and state-like entities, institutional development and reform may be conducted either through a transitional military authority to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority, or a transitional civilian authority to establish legitimate and effective governance. Both can transition to a viable national or state-like entity authority or institution. DOD campaign activities include instituting political reform and supporting elections, restoring basic essential services, and creating effective civil administrative frameworks to protect civilians.

Police force and institution development strengthens law and order efforts and is usually conducted by the United States or by, with, and through a ministry of interior. When a central authority is weak or ceases to exist, perpetrators of violence can target civilians to pursue power. Campaign activities can ensure basic law enforcement, public order, training and education, and counter perpetrator violence. When the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent, DOD can provide transitional public security to enforce the rule of law until efforts are transitioned to competent, viable, and responsible forces and institutions. Campaign activities include persistent efforts in areas secured and held usually through intensive patrolling and checkpoints, targeted search or strike operations against adversaries, population control measures such as curfews and vehicle restrictions, biometrics collection and vetting, and integration of indigenous ex-combatants into newly formed host-nation police forces. In Iraq in 2003, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) supported international efforts to create a competent and responsible Iraqi police service that could maintain law and order, enforce the rule of law, and build confidence in the population that effective governance would protect them. DOD’s continued involvement includes training, advising, and assisting recruits and police forces in areas including integration of former fighters into the force and forensic science development.34 In 2009 in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM assumed responsibility from the State Department to train, advise, and mentor members of the Afghan National Police and, in 3 years, led 8 of 23 NATO training program sites.35

Judicial frameworks strengthen the rule of law most likely under a ministry of justice. With central authority turnover and subsequent governance challenges, perpetrators of violence can target civilians to undermine effective governance and the rule of law. Beyond providing security, DOD can protect administrators of justice such as judges and their families as well as build courts and jails. In support of building or upholding an effective judicial system, a military governing authority may operate military commissions and provost courts, establish and provide security to courts and tribunals, support investigations, and arrest war criminals.

During 2007 in Iraq, USCENTCOM personnel assisted Iraqi authorities to create and operate the Baghdad Rule of Law Complex that combined courts, jails, and an academy where personnel and faculties were protected from harassment and threats. Subsequent complexes were built in other cities across Iraq, sending the signal that administering the rule of law was foundational in rebuilding civil administration and providing civilian security.36 In Afghanistan from 2002, DOD assisted efforts to build or renovate courthouses and facilities and established the Rule of Law Field Force Afghanistan to improve judicial infrastructure in provinces, train on evidence-based operations for judicial actors and law enforcement, and public outreach efforts on Afghan law and trials.37

Defense or security support can strengthen a ministry of defense system and force capacity. With central authority turnover and subsequent security challenges, perpetrators of violence can challenge national sovereignty, civil administration, and governmental institutions and target civilians to undermine effective governance in pursuit of power and influence. In support of defending a nation’s sovereignty, a competent, viable, and responsible defense or security force can deny access or safe havens to individuals or groups that present a threat to civilian security. In Iraq, USCENTCOM personnel trained Iraqi Security Forces to include the Iraqi army and assisted in counterterrorism, civilian protection, and border security missions. Targeted action was brought against violent extremist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State and its ability to hold onto Iraqi territory.38 In Afghanistan, USCENTCOM leads efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan National Army, to combat threats from the Taliban and al Qaeda and continues to provide support to the NATO International Security Assistance Force in the capital region of Bagram.39 At home, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command provide support to civil authorities that can augment existing capacity and assist in the restoration of essential basic services.

Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian
Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster)
Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster)
Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian
Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster)
Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster)
Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster)
Photo By: Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster
VIRIN: 180621-A-UQ901-138

Oppressive Governing and Perpetrators of Violence. DOD campaign activities can support the coercion of uncooperative governing authorities and other entities into protecting citizens. Campaign activities include a range of military operations from armed conflict to competition that may improve conditions for populations and prevail against threats generated by a central authority, its security forces, or perpetrators of violence that operate autonomously within a country’s borders.40 Through campaign activities, U.S. forces can assist in enforcing and upholding societal norms in the face of regime repression, human rights abuses, improper detention and imprisonment, torture, mass atrocities, corruption, human-trafficking, and child labor. This includes the protection of cultural, ethnic, and religious identity; religious locations and shrines; family systems; women and children; personal values; static protection of key sites (market places or refugee camps); and human rights.

Offensive efforts to protect civilians are normally authorized by an international political body such as the UN to target a central authority or perpetrators of violence within a country’s borders. One element is regime change where a central authority is removed in order to deter or neutralize negative treatment such as mass atrocity, political or state repression, or other harm to civilians. In 2011, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) provided air strikes under UN authority that was followed up by NATO operations against an oppressive Libyan regime.41 In this action the central governing authority was removed. More recently, campaign activities with Iraqi and Afghan forces were able to counter sectarian and other forms of violence.42 Other campaign activities include safe area designations that can marginalize advisories or threats to civilians.

However, armed conflict also involves unintended consequences such as civilian casualties and key site vulnerabilities during and after military operations. Civilian deaths caused by U.S. military operations often fuel narratives that support resistance to U.S. influence and even energize the targeting of Americans. Additionally, key sites such as the National Museum of Baghdad, libraries, or religious properties make “no target” lists, but the buildings’ security may not be immediately provided to prevent looting. Nevertheless, recent emphasis on civilian casualty mitigation and key site vulnerability practices confirm the importance of civilian security to the chain of command from the top down.43

Other defensive and stabilization efforts support civilian security and can increase confidence in a state’s ability to protect daily life. Campaign activities include a variety of human security elements captured in this five-part series (health, food, environmental, economic, civilian) that protect individuals and populations from negative treatment such as torture, ill treatment, unlawful detention and imprisonment, human rights abuses, and free election disruption. International security providers can establish a safe area to provide direct protection to civilians within a nation’s borders in a temporary and designated geographic area. Normally authorized through UNSCRs, safe areas involve safe zones (large areas that physically protect civilians where they normally live) and safe havens (protecting displaced or dislocated civilians in specific places) where civilians are protected by denying belligerents access through the threat or use of military force. In safe areas, organizations such as the UN and nongovernmental organizations usually authorize no-fly zones, build and administer camps, and provide basic assistance and services.

Recent campaign activities include USCENTCOM’s support of northern and southern Iraq no-fly zones and USAFRICOM’s no-fly zone efforts in Libya. DOD built and administered camps in northern Iraq to feed ethnic Kurds and in Albania to protect Kosovar refugees in the 1990s.44 Today, campaign activities support displaced civilians through the transportation of supplies from one stop to another en route to a final camp destination.45 Safe havens are also ungoverned, undergoverned, or ill-governed physical and virtual areas where U.S. adversaries believe they can operate without harassment. Whether most recently in southeastern Afghanistan or northern Iraq and eastern Syria, extremist organization safe havens are used to terrorize civilian populations into submission but can be removed with active offensive measures. At home, DOD can support civilian authorities through an Active-duty base commander’s immediate response authority or command over federalized National Guard forces for emergency response. Presently, federalized National Guard forces are deployed to the southern borders for defensive purposes;46 however, Federal military personnel are prevented from enforcing domestic policies at home per the Posse Comitatus Act.

Campaign activities can enhance efforts to improve conditions for effective governance, alleviate population concerns that cause displacement or counterproductive activity, and prevent the need for future or extended employment of U.S. forces. Still, aggressive competitors and perpetrators of violence find opportunities to impose their own version of civilian security when confidence in governance erodes or disappears. Therefore, it is critical to keep viable security institution establishment and reinforcement central to government efforts in the pursuit of productive civilian stabilization practices and civilian security. JFQ

Notes

1 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 66th Session, “Follow-Up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” (A/RES/66/290), October 25, 2012; UNGA, 66th Session, “Follow-Up to General Assembly Resolution 64/291 on Human Security” (A/66/763), April 5, 2012; Human Security: Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/701 (New York: United Nations [UN], March 8, 2010).

2 George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Health Security: Focus on Medical Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter 2017), 66–75; George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Food Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017), 112–121; George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018), 130–139; and George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Economic Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 90 (3rd Quarter 2018), 106–112.

3 Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24–25, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf>.

4 Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 3, 2014), IV-20.

5 Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness (Washington, DC: The White House, March 30, 2011), 6.

6 United States Government Glossary of Interagency and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], July 2017), 750.

7 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2018), GL-14; George E. Katsos, “Department of Defense Terminology Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter 2018), 124–127.

8 JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 1, 2018), xi.

9 Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support Policy, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2015.07 (New York: UN, June 1, 2017), 5; IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters (New York: UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, January 2011), 58; Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (New York: UN, 2003), 21.

10 See “NATOTerm,” online database, available at <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc>.

11 Sarah Williamson et al., “Overcoming Protection of Civilian Failures: The Case for an Evolutionary Approach within NATO,” OPEN Publication 1, no. 4 (Spring 2017).

12 “NATO Policy for Protection of Civilians,” fact sheet, July 2016, available at <www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160705_1607-protection-civilians-en.pdf>.

13 Protection of the Civilian Population: 29-10-2010 Overview,” International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/protecting-civilians/overview-protection-civilian-population.htm>; and Urban Reichhold and Andrea Binder, Scoping Study: What Works in Protection and How Do We Know? (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, March 2013), available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPPi_2013_DFID_scoping-study-protection.pdf>.

14 Human Development Report 1994, 30–33.

15 The Posse Comitatus Act, Pub. L. 45-2363, 18 U.S. Code § 1385, original at 20 Stat. 152, 45th Cong., 2nd sess., June 18, 1878. This does not apply to the Army National Guard or Air National Guard acting under state authority in a law enforcement capacity. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 107th Cong. 2nd sess., November 25, 2002.

16 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), § 2(a); The Homeland Security Act of 2002.

17 Jonathan Masters, “U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at <www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president>; The Homeland Security Act of 2002.

18 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), which prevented rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause from being extended to rights under state law; and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which originated the phrase “separate but equal” and gave Federal approval to Jim Crow laws.

19 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and laws such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., July 2, 1964; and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 89th Cong., 1st sess., August 6, 1965.

20 UNGA, 6498th Meeting, “Resolution 1973 (2011),” March 17, 2011; UNGA, 6942nd Meeting, “Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) [on Women, Peace, and Security],” October 31, 2000; UNGA, 4037th Session, “Resolution 1261 (1999),” August 30, 1999; UNGA, 5235th Meeting, “Resolution 1612 (2005),” July 26, 2005; UNGA, 4046th Session, “Resolution 1265 (1999),” September 17, 1999; UNGA, 5430th Meeting, “Resolution 1674 (2006),” April 28, 2006; UNGA, 6903rd Meeting, “Resolution 2086 (2013),” January 21, 2013.

21 See Executive Order (EO) 13257, President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (Washington, DC: The White House, February 13, 2002); and EO 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1, 2016).

22 Pub. L. 105-277, div. G, subdiv. A, title XV, § 1522, October 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-794), 22 U.S. Code § 6592, “Administrator of AID Reporting to Secretary of State.”

23 FY 2018–2022 Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2018), 11, 23, 35, 40; and FY 2014–2017 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2014).

24 “Emergency Support Function #13: Public Safety and Security Annex,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, available at <www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1470149136419-d6dc70a586f4b0bc8f0c689008974f44/ESF_13_Public_Safety_and_Security_20160705_508.pdf>.

25 United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 2018), 706, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/dictionary/repository/interagency_associated_terms.pdf?ver=2018-01-02-104007-367>; National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013).

26 Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 13, 21, 22; Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2012–2016 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 19; and “Emergency Support Function #13.”

27 Maritime Law Enforcement Program, U.S. Coast Guard, available at <www.overview.uscg.mil/Missions/Maritime_Law/>; Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 7, 8, 13, 14, 20, 28.

28 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, 2018); National Military Strategy (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2016).

29 DOD Directive 5205.82, Defense Institution Building (Washington, DC: DOD, May 4, 2017), 3.

30 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014), 34; U.S. Department of Energy Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2014), 1, 3, 13, 15, 16; U.S. Department of Labor Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Labor, 2014), 28, 29; U.S. Department of the Interior Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 2014), 26, 42; Department of the Treasury FY 2014–2017 Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, 2014), 28, 33; Treasury Strategic Plan 2018–2022 (Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, 2018), 24–27.

31 DOD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: DOD, August 28, 2014), 1.

32 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2017), V-15.

33 Seth G. Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 3.

34 Ibid., 105; Dustin Roberts, “DDR Continues to Educate Iraqi Workers, Army.mil, July 31, 2009, available at <www.army.mil/article/25322/ddr_continues_to_educate_iraqi_workers>; “Troops Train Iraqis in Forensic Techniques,” American Forces Press Service, April 16, 2009, available at <www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883827/troops-train-iraqis-in-forensic-techniques/>.

35 Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, GAO-12-293R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2011), 3, 6.

36 Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 212–213.

37 Rule of Law in Afghanistan: U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than $1 Billion, SIGAR 15-68-AR/Rule of Law (Washington DC: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 2015).

38 Cheryl Pellerin, “Centcom Commander to Focus on Partnerships, Complexities During AOR Visit,” Defense.gov, May 18, 2016, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/775841/centcom-commander-to-focus-on-partnerships-complexities-during-aor-visit/>; and Jeff Schogol, “The Pentagon Is Shifting U.S. Combat Power from Iraq to Afghanistan, Task & Purpose blog, February 5, 2018, available at <https://taskandpurpose.com/us-combat-power-iraq-afghanistan/>.

39 Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined, GAO-11-66 (Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2011); and Nick Simeone, “U.S. Military Begins Training Iraqi Forces to Take on ISIL,” Defense.gov, January 5, 2015, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49867>.

40 Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 13, 21, 22; Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2012–2016, 19; “Emergency Support Function #13.”

41 Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006), RAND Counterinsurgency Study, vol. 2 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), xv, 2, 22.

42 Hugh Breakey, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur, “Protecting Civilians: How It Works,” Pass Blue, December 10, 2012, available at <www.passblue.com/2012/12/10/how-the-two-main-principles-for-protecting-civilians-actually-work>.

43 David Hodge, “Soldiers Secure Piece of Iraqi Religious History,” Defense.gov, May 14, 2008, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49867>; and Matthew D. Thurlow, “Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International Law,” Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 8, no. 1 (February 2014), available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=yhrdlj>.

44 Air Force Handbook 10-222, vol. 22, Camp Planning for Displaced Persons (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, April 20, 2011), 16.

45 JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, IV-20.

46 David S. Cloud and Joseph Tanfani, “Mattis Authorizes Up to 4,000 National Guard Troops for U.S. Border with Mexico, Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2018, available at <www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-troops-20180406-story.html>.