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Japanese soldiers in Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 (Sueddeutsche Zeitung/Alamy)

Political objectives are the key element of a grand or national/ coalition security strategy. Political leadership has the primary responsibility for determining realistic and achievable political objectives. However, political leaders should make sure that the highest military leaders are included in the process. Their professional advice should be sought and fully considered in determining political objectives. Ideally, this process should be relatively fast and orderly. But the harsh reality is that it can be complicated and time-consuming because of the need to reconcile several contradictory requirements. Another problem is the leaders’ lack of understanding and knowledge of the process.

A political objective can be described as one whose accomplishment would secure important national or alliance/ coalition interests in a certain part of a theater. When aimed at achieving national interests, a political objective is strategic in scale. The accomplishment of a political strategic objective would have a drastic effect on the course and outcome of a war. In his seminal work On War, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote that “no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses does so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”¹ He observed that “the political object—the original motive for the war— will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”²

The value of the political objective directly affects the duration of a war, the means used, and the cost. Clausewitz wrote that “since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and in duration. Once the expenditure of the effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”³ He also observed that “the smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified.”⁴

The value of political objectives is the highest if the country’s survival is at stake—for example, Ukraine’s existence as a nation in its defense against Russia’s invasion in 2022. Then the support of the public and willingness to pay any price are high. A large state might be willing to pay a heavy price for a political objective aimed to preserve or ensure its rise as a great power. In the Russo- Japanese War of 1904–1905, the value of the political objective for the Japanese was extremely high. They were willing to take the enormous risk of fighting the Russian empire—to mobilize every possible man, mortgage the state, and fight as hard as possible for as long as they could.⁵

Role of Civilian and Military Leaders

Politicians are responsible for determining policy and grand or national security strategy, managing alliances/coalitions, and allocating resources. They are ultimately responsible for determining and articulating political objectives in times of peace and for war. They also decide the acceptable risks, shape operational choices, and reconstruct military organizations.⁶ The chief responsibilities of the military leaders are preparing for, planning, and conducting operations. However, the political leaders should rely heavily on professional advice of the military leaders in developing strategy.⁷ This is particularly important in determining political objectives.

In a democracy, subordination of the military to civilian control is accepted and undisputed. Yet the civil-military relationship is in essence a conflictual collaboration because of major differences in the civilian and military cultures and experiences. The military often regards politicians as inconsistent, unreliable, and keen to be in the limelight.⁸ Military values, such as loyalty, sacrifice, altruism, and courage, are not widely present in civilian society. Political leaders often make decisions slowly. They also want to have as much freedom as possible to adjust, modify, or even abandon a certain course of action. In contrast, military leaders prefer quick and clear decisions to maximize effectiveness. A delayed decision could result in an unnecessary waste of lives and treasure. Both sides have competing expectations and use language sometimes incomprehensible to the other side. All this makes for a difficult relationship.⁹ Political leaders often refuse to commit ideas to paper because of their concern that if things go wrong, their political opponents can use it against them.¹⁰ This problem is often exacerbated by bad personal relationships between political and military leaders.

The use of military power must always be based on clear and achievable political objectives; otherwise, military leaders cannot provide viable military options. In the Korean War, President Harry Truman failed to give a clear political objective to General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U.S. and United Nations forces, in the wake of the Chinese intervention on October 25, 1950. MacArthur said that he was not willing to order men to their deaths by the thousands in such a complete “vacuum” of policy decisions. Not only the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) but also the State Department lacked a clear political objective.¹¹ Both the joint chiefs and MacArthur protested that political objectives had to be known before they could provide a military course of action.¹²

In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to provide military options. However, Powell correctly insisted that he had to know political objectives before developing military options.¹³

Prerequisites

Determination of an achievable political objective essentially hinges on the sound understanding of the pending war, sufficient economic and military strength, excellent strategic intelligence, and realistic political assumptions. Clausewitz wrote that “the first, supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander must make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first strategic question and the most comprehensive.”¹⁴

A country should have sufficient overall economic and military strength, strong public support, and the will to fight to achieve its stated political objectives. This is especially important for the side that plans to initiate hostilities. Yet this is not necessarily always the case. Imperial Japan made the decision to start hostilities against Russia in 1904 and the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in December 1941 from a position of inferiority. In 1904, the Japanese economy was heavily dependent on loans and credit from abroad. This was also one of the main reasons that Japan sought to end hostilities in 1905.¹⁵ In December 1941, the combined strength of the United States and the British Empire was much superior to Japan in terms of population (2.7 to 1), and territory (7.5 to 1).¹⁶ In 1941, Japan imported some 90 percent of its oil; about 75 to 80 percent of it came from the United States (which then produced 63 percent of the world’s oil).¹⁷ The Japanese economy was fully mobilized, but it was only about one-tenth the size of the American economy.¹⁸ This disparity was bound to increase to Japan’s detriment once the U.S. economy was fully on a war footing. As it turned out, the United States had to commit only 15 percent of its total war effort to defeat Japan.¹⁹

Experience shows the critical importance of having accurate, timely, and relevant strategic intelligence. This requires a sound intelligence organization and the highest level of professionalism and moral integrity of intelligence officials. In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Japanese intelligence was excellent in its estimate of the Russian political objectives. The Japanese had agents in the Russian capital of Saint Petersburg and in Europe in addition to Korean and Chinese agents in the Far East. The Japanese even penetrated the Russian defense ministry.²⁰

The common mistakes in determining political objectives are overestimating or underestimating the enemy’s capabilities, politicizing intelligence, and making false political assumptions. Many of these problems are related to the quality of intelligence. However, a lack of knowledge of the enemy’s culture and society by the political and military leaders, a sense of cultural and/or racial superiority, poor judgment, misperceptions, and sheer ignorance can play major roles in a decision to go to war.

Overestimating the enemy’s capabilities prior to a war can lead to overreacting during a crisis. It also results in major credibility problems in the aftermath of the war and thereby limits domestic and international support in the future.²¹ More often, political and military leaders, and even populations, underestimate the enemy’s capabilities or willingness to go to war. Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, most Russian government officials and people expected an easy victory over the Japanese because of their feelings of racial superiority.²² In preparing to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German leadership grossly underestimated the Soviet ability to produce huge quantities of weapons, equipment, and ammunition. They also underestimated the true state of Soviet science and technology. A major reason for all this was the Soviets’ exceptional secrecy. The Germans greatly overestimated the fragility of the Soviet political system and underestimated Russian resilience. They were ignorant of the fact that when faced with external aggression, the Russians closed ranks, putting aside their disagreements.²³ Adolf Hitler reportedly told his generals, “We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten Russian edifice will come tumbling down.”²⁴ Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian intelligence was surprisingly very poor. It not only misjudged the strength of popular and military resistance, but also misread geography and terrain.²⁵

A major problem is interference by policymakers who, by either overt or subtle pressure, want to receive an intelligence product that supports a strategic decision that has been made or is to be made. Politicization of intelligence occurs when an intelligence product is unacceptable because it runs counter to a certain policy or is too critical of higher officials or friendly foreign leaders. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community came under heavy political pressure to rely on and accept information provided by the Iraqi opposition. This happened even though the Iraqi opposition’s credibility was suspect and in some cases had a track record of actively falsifying information to either exaggerate its own importance or push the United States toward war with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The worst consequence of the politicization of U.S. intelligence was that policymakers accepted certain information for justifying the war as a fact rather than a possibility.²⁶

In developing strategy, the many unknowns might outnumber known factors. A strategic situation is often complex, volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous. This is particularly true in the case of the enemy’s intentions. Hence, in the process of defining objectives, political leadership must make some political assumptions.²⁷ An uncanny ability to think from the enemy’s perspective is one of the key prerequisites in making realistic political assumptions. Full knowledge of the enemy’s history, society, traditions, and culture could be extremely useful to understand the enemy’s motivations and intentions and anticipate his reactions. In deciding to open hostilities against the United States in December 1941, the Japanese leaders were fully aware of Japan’s economic inferiority. Yet they believed that because of their strong national will, discipline, and warfighting prowess, the Japanese people could defeat the stronger but “soft” Americans. The Japanese regarded America as a decadent nation in which pacifism and isolation- ism practically ruled the government’s policy.²⁸ For the Japanese, all Westerners were “too selfish and egoistic, and incapable of mobilizing for a long fight in a distant place.”²⁹

U.S. leaders were perhaps even more ignorant of Japan’s national character and culture. In the months preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many high officials in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration believed that no sensible Japanese leader could rationally contemplate war with the United States. They were clearly blind to the consequences of the U.S. decision to impose an almost-total embargo of Japanese trade in the summer of 1941. That decision cut off some 80 percent of the Japanese oil requirements. The Japanese had only two options: submit to U.S. demands or resume their economic dependence on the United States. In the 1930s, many Americans believed that Japan was “virtually bankrupt; short of raw materials; hopelessly bogged down in China; it lagged 100 years behind the times, and in case of a major conflict, its wheel-barrow economy would shatter like a teacup hurled against the brick wall.”³⁰ At the imperial conference held on September 6, 1941, the Japanese military leadership presented a paper on the pending war with Great Britain and the United States. They anticipated that Japanese forces would achieve “remarkable successes in the south [Southeast Asia] or pending surrender of Great Britain, the American public might change in favor of ending the war.” They believed that Japan should be able to establish an invincible position: by building a strategically advantageous position through the occupation of important areas in the South; by creating an economy that  will be self-sufficient in the long run through the development of rich resources in the Southern regions, as well as through the use of the economic power of the East Asian continent [mainland China]; and by linking Asia and Europe in destroying the Anglo-American coalition through our cooperation with Germany and Italy.³¹

False assumptions by the highest political leaders on whether the enemy’s leadership would defend its friends or allies can have very negative, or even fatal, effects on deciding to go to war. Hitler (falsely) believed that although France and Britain offered help to Poland, it was out of the question that British statesmen would risk war because of the precarious world situation.³² Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made false assumptions about Hitler’s intentions toward the Soviet Union, saying that “Hitler would not have the strength to fight on two fronts, and Hitler would not attempt such a risky adventure.”³³

Sometimes sheer ignorance about the true state of the enemy’s economic and/or military strength and a lack of knowledge and understanding of his culture can lead to false assumptions about the out- come of a war. The German military was misinformed or ignorant about the state of the Soviet military and economy. They believed that the Russians were inferior, had contempt for the Soviet officers, and underestimated Soviet industrial capacity. Like Hitler, they also believed that the Soviets would just collapse.³⁴

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his inner circle had incorrect political assumptions prior to the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. They claimed that the Ukrainian government consisted of drug addicts and neo-Nazis, and that Ukraine was little more than an aberration that could not stand up to Russian power.³⁵

The Process

The first and most important step in determining political strategic objectives is conducting a strategic estimate.  Any strategic situation consists of many military and nonmilitary elements ranging from purely political, diplomatic, ideological, geopolitical, military, economic to social, demographic, ethnic, religious, and others (see figure 1). They can be tangible (measurable) or intangible (hard or impossible to measure) in their content. They pertain to friendly, enemy, and neutrals. In conducting the estimate, the Cartesian method of reducing the complexities of a situation to the sum of its simpler constituent parts should be applied.³⁶ The aim is to identify the essential elements of the situation. After- ward, holistic (comprehensive) methods should be used to link essential elements together (“connecting the dots”), identify strategic patterns, and then discern trends in a strategic situation.

Potential political objectives identified during the strategic estimate should be listed first. Afterward, national interests— those fundamental and enduring interests that a nation intends to pursue—should be identified. At the same time, the severity of the enemy’s challenge in securing national interests must be assessed.³⁷

Defining national interests is often very complicated. Not all national interests are equally important. Arbitrarily, a distinction can be made among vital, major, and peripheral national interests, respectively. To qualify as a vital national interest means that failure to defend it would cause serious or even fatal effects on a nation. It might even become a matter of the nation’s survival. Normally, a state would use military force in defense of vital national interests.³⁸ Traditionally, vital national interests are preserving national territorial integrity and sovereignty, preserving/restoring regional stability, ensuring safety of one’s citizens at home/abroad, preserving economic well-being and prosperity, and preserving the national way of life.³⁹ A major national interest is the one that would cause serious harm to a nation unless strong actions and measures, including use of military forces, are taken. The examples of major national interests are acquitting or defending a dominant position in a certain geopolitically or economically important area, preventing the rise of a major hostile power, securing freedom of the seas, ensuring the viability and stability of global political and/or economic order, ensuring the stability of global trade and financial systems, guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of oil/gas, among others. Peripheral national interests are those that have an impact on a nation’s overall interests but do not really pose a threat to the nation.⁴⁰ They can be geopolitical, economic, religious, ethnic, or humanitarian in their character. They are also usually located far from a nation’s borders.

The number of potential political objectives should be pared down to those considered the most critical. The larger the number of political objectives, the greater the sources of power, time, and effort that must be exerted to achieve them. In practice, the line between vital and major national interests can be blurred, making it more complicated to determine the need for military and nonmilitary sources of power for their accomplishment. The political leadership should also determine the sequence in which political objectives should be accomplished.

Ideally, the final list of potential political objectives should not reflect the subjective view of a single leader or group of influential political leaders. Yet sometimes the highest political-military leader would determine political objectives that reflect his or her personal interests, ideological views, or biases. This is especially the case in a dictatorship. Hitler’s war aims against Soviet Russia were based on his interpretation of German history since the end of the 19th century, lessons from military defeat in 1918, the German revolutionary events in 1918–1919, and the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Hitler held social Darwinist beliefs that struggle is in not only the life of individuals, but also the life principle of the people. He wanted to abandon prewar Germany’s colonial and trade policy and shift to “soil policy” (Bodenpolitik) in the future. This meant conquest of Russia and its subjected peripheral states to gain “living space” (Lebensraum) for Germany.⁴¹

Political objectives can range from purely political, ideological, geographic, or geopolitical to economic, financial, social, ethnic, and religious. The examples of purely political objectives are preserving/restoring national territorial integrity and political sovereignty, preserving one’s alliances or breaking up the opposing alliance/coalition, preserving/gaining political dominance in a certain area, change the enemy’s political system, among others. In 1904, the Japanese firmly believed that the Russian influence in Manchuria and Korea had to end or else Japan’s status as a rising power would be forever gone. The Russians considered Manchuria as a base of operations of incomparable value for political penetration into China. Korea was not considered a threat to Russia’s interests.⁴²

The Japanese political objectives at the beginning of war in December 1941 were favorable settlement in China and establishing Japanese dominance of the Far East. These objectives reflected the Japanese understanding of honor and national pride, prestige, and standing as a great power. Otherwise, Japan would lose its great power status and be permanently subordinated to America.⁴³

Prior to 1904, the Japanese reasons to go to war with Russia were essentially geopolitical. Foreign minister Komura Jutaroˉ noted on June 23, 1903, “Korea is like a dagger pointing at Japan’s heart and she could never endure its possession by a foreign power. Russia’s activities in Manchuria and Korea are leading eventually to her domination over Korea. . . .In order to ensure Korean security, Japan should limit Russia’s activities in Manchuria to those permitted under existing treaties.”⁴⁴ At the same time, the Korean Peninsula was considered a foothold for Japan’s continental expansion. The Japanese objectives were simple and long established: ensuring control over Korea and eliminating the Russian presence in Manchuria.⁴⁵

Very often, political objectives were a combination of geopolitical and demo- graphic, as the case of Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 shows.⁴⁶ After the successful invasion of Poland, western Polish provinces were incorporated into the Third Reich and were earmarked for immediate German colonization. The remaining part of Poland was officially designated Generalgouvernement (General Government) and was where the “undesirable” Polish population would be settled.⁴⁷ At a meeting with the high military leaders on August 22, 1939, Hitler said that one reason for invading Poland was to test the Wehrmacht’s capabilities in a limited war before a general war with the victorious powers of World War I (Britain and France).⁴⁸ This was a novel way of explaining the reasons for invading a sovereign country. In July 1940, Hitler decided that the political objectives in the planned invasion of Soviet Russia were the destruction of the Russian state and its breakup into several parts. New buffer states—Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia—would be created; Romania, “Generalgouvernement,” and Finland would be enlarged. Hitler and his political advisors did not want any independent state to be created on the occupied territories.⁴⁹

Purely political objectives are often combined with economic ones. In March 1941, Hitler told Japanese foreign minister Yoˉsuke Matsuoka that Germany’s war aims in Europe were to break British hegemony, exclude British influence in Europe, and prevent any American attempt to interfere in Europe.⁵⁰ The most effective way for preventing this interference was to paralyze the English economy.⁵¹ The economic objectives played a major role in Hitler’s decision to invade Soviet Russia. Nazi Germany heavily relied on imports of rubber, tungsten, copper, platinum, zinc, asbestos, and jute before the physical link with the Far East could be established. The areas south of the Volga and Don estuaries, including the Caucasus, were necessary as the objectives for the pending invasion of Soviet Russia. The oil produced in the Caucasus area would be essential for the exploitation of any territory occupied in Russia. By capturing European Russia, Germany would control some 75 percent of the total Soviet armament potential and almost 100 percent of the precision-tool and optical industries.⁵² German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop told German diplomats overseas (except those in Japan) on August 26, 1941, that the conquest of Ukraine would resolve problems of food for Germany forever; control of important raw materials in southern Russia would greatly improve the situation for the German war industries.⁵³ The Japanese economic objectives in December 1941 were to make Japan self-sufficient by obtaining permanent control of the sources of raw material—in the Southern Resources Area (Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies and Timor)—considered essential to the Japanese economy.⁵⁴

In its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Iraqi political objectives were primarily economic combined with enhancing its maritime strategic position. Annexation of Kuwait would immediately resolve Iraq’s economic problems, specifically, nullification of direct debt plus obtaining powerful foreign capital of the emirate. Iraq would obtain control of one-fifth of the global oil reserves. It would also result in a decisive improvement of the Iraqi maritime strategic position in the Persian Gulf. Iraq at the time controlled only a small, narrow strip of the coast and did not have a deep- water port.⁵⁵

In the modern era, political objectives often were largely ideological. In 1937, the Japanese government claimed that its war was against China but for China, aimed to “cure from the Chinese body politic the cancer left by Western penetration. . . . China must be purged . . . of all traces of liberalism, democracy, socialism, communism, the variant evil fruits of the vine of Western materialism.”⁵⁶ In the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the ideological objectives were not specifically spelled out. However, the German Army leadership was aware of Hitler’s private statements and comments by high leaders about the link between Bolshevism and Judaism. The aim was destruction of the communist leadership and Jews in occupied Soviet territories.⁵⁷

In rare cases, political objectives could be quite unconventional. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s political objective in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War in October 1973 was not to recover territories lost to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967, but to create a political crisis that would shock the regional security and open the way for negotiations.⁵⁸

Purpose and Scope

A political objective can be offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two. An offensive political objective aims to gain or take away something from the other side. It is often expressed in terms of dominance, regime change, conquest, absorption, break-up, fragmentation, or containment, among others. In contrast, a defensive political strategic objective aims to deny something to the other side. It is often expressed in terms of deterring, defending, preserving, preventing, or delaying. All aggressive wars have inherently offensive political objectives—as examples, Nazi Germany’s invasions of Poland (September 1939), Norway and Denmark (April 1940), the former Yugoslavia (April 1941), and the Soviet Union (June 1941). A war with defensive political objectives is fought by a country invaded by a superior enemy. It is also conducted by a major power forced strategically on the defensive, as was the case of Great Britain in 1939–1942, the United States in the Pacific in 1941–1942, Imperial Japan in 1942–1945, and Nazi Germany in 1943–1945.

The duration of hostilities largely depends on whether the scope of a political objective is limited or unlimited, or a combination of these two. A limited political objective is the one that would require low to modest use of military power, effort, and time. It would result in a limited war. A war with limited objectives involves deliberate restraint. Both sides in such a war would not exert the utmost efforts. They would be willing to reach a negotiated settlement.⁵⁹ Clausewitz observed the “more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified.”⁶⁰ The British theoretician B.H. Liddell Hart wrote that if the government realizes that the enemy has military superiority either in general or in a specific theater, it would be wise to select a limited political objective.⁶¹ Or a government might wait until the balance of forces can be changed by the intervention of allies or by referring forces from another theater, or it might limit its military effort permanently while naval or economic action decides the issue.⁶² A limited political objective can vary from the threat of using force to a change in the enemy’s behavior or policy on a certain issue, acquiring a dominant (political, economic) position in a certain geopolitical area or preserving/restoring territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country.

In all three wars of German unification, Prussia pursued limited political and military strategic objectives, respectively.⁶³ In the war against Denmark in 1864 (the Second Schleswig War), Prussia was allied with Austria. By the terms of the Treaty of Vienna on October 30, Prussia and Austria gained joint control of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Saxe-Lauenberg.⁶⁴ The Prussian War against Austria in 1866 (June 14–July 22) was fought for who would dominate Germany. Prussia was allied with several states of the German Confederation plus Italy. Soon after the end of war with Denmark, there were growing frictions between Prussia and Austria over their joint control of Schleswig and Saxe-Lauenberg. The Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck moved to gain control of these two duchies and solidify Prussia’s dominant position in north Germany.⁶⁵ Bismarck’s war aims of gaining a free hand for Prussia in northern Germany, the dissolution of the German Confederation, and the removal of the Austrian hegemony in central Europe had been achieved. However, Bismarck faced strong opposition from King William I and high military leaders (including chief of the general staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, Sr.) in seeking limited objectives during negotiations to end war with Austria. He reportedly said that “my greatest difficulty was first to get the king into Bohemia and then to get him out again.”⁶⁶ Bismarck was opposed to treating Austria harshly. For him, the most important thing was to end the war quickly and thereby prevent the intervention of third powers. A prolongation of hostilities would have a highly uncertain outcome.⁶⁷ Bismarck believed that “a triumphant entry of the Prussian army in the hostile capital [Vienna] would naturally have been a gratifying recollection for our soldiers, but it was not necessary to our policy. It would have left behind it . . . a wound to the pride of Austria . . . and would have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of our future mutual relations.”⁶⁸ Because of possible French interference, he advised King William I to make peace with Austria by preserving its territorial integrity and imposing moderate conditions.⁶⁹ Bismarck’s intent was to avoid wounding Austria too severely and thereby causing “bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge,” but rather to “reserve the possibility of becoming friends again.”⁷⁰ The war with Austria ended with the Treaty of Prague on August 23, 1866. Austria was forced to surrender its authority in Germany. Prussia abolished the 39-state German Confederation established in 1815 and annexed six of its northern members (Schleswig, Holstein, Hannover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt-am-Main), while four duchies (Saxony, Hessia-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg, and Thuringia) and three free cities (Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen) were organized into a North German Confederation.⁷¹ The southern German states would remain independent and were allowed to form their own confederation.⁷²

The war against France (July 19, 1870–January 28, 1871) ended with the peace treaty of Paris in February 1871. In contrast to the terms of the war with Austria, the Prussian terms against France were harsh. France lost two important provinces (Alsace and Lorraine) and was forced to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs. France never reconciled to the loss of these provinces. However, the German terms were not as harsh as Napoleon I’s terms to Prussia in 1807. The Germans never interfered with the internal affairs of France. Bismarck left the French overseas possessions intact. Moreover, regardless of these losses, France remained a major power in Europe. The French parliament ratified the treaty on March 1, 1871.⁷³

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, both sides had limited political objectives.⁷⁴ Japan’s political objective was to obtain a dominant political and economic position in Manchuria and Korea, not to capture large parts of the Russian Far East or overthrow the tsarist regime. The Japanese considered Russia’s consolidation of the hold in Manchuria as prejudicial to their security and interests. The loss of Manchuria would constitute a threat to Korea.⁷⁵ Former Japanese prime minister Itoˉ Hirobumi stated on February 4, 1904, “If Russia is left alone, she will go on to complete possession of Manchuria, and after that, would invade Korea, and eventually threaten Japan. In these circumstances, there is no alternative, we are bound to fight, even at the price of our national existence. I say frankly that I expect no success.”⁷⁶ In the ensuing war, both sides fought with tenacity, perseverance, and incredible savagery for these limited objectives.⁷⁷

During the Falklands War in 1982, the British political objective was limited to restoring as quickly as possible “the British Administration on the Falklands and the Dependencies.”78 In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the U.S. political objectives were limited in scope—to restore Kuwait’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. An unlimited political objec- tive would shift the balance of power in the greater Middle East to Iran and that was not in the U.S. interest.

An unlimited political objective is one that seeks to achieve maximum gain in terms of political, economic, and geopolitical dominance in a given area. It would require exertion of the greatest efforts and maximum use of military power, and would be very costly. A war with unlimited political objectives against a strong enemy will be a long one. Examples of unlimited political objectives are overthrowing the enemy’s government, a radical change of the enemy’s social/political system, achieving political and/or economic dominance of a large geopolitical area, conquest of the enemy’s country, or even the extermination of the entire population of the hostile state.⁷⁹

The main political objective of the Entente and Associated Powers in World War I was to abolish ruling dynasties and weaken them militarily and economically by imposing punitive peace terms. The Western Allies and the Soviet Union in World War II sought the unconditional surrender of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and it can be contended that these objectives prolonged their resistance. At the same time, the policy of unconditional surrender strengthened public support in the United States and the United Kingdom for continuing the war until the final victory. A victor might seek to occupy the country and then impose its political system, as the Western Allies did in the aftermath of World War II in Japan and in their zone of occupation in Germany, while the Soviets imposed an oppressive Stalinist system in their occupation zone in Germany and throughout Eastern Europe where their troops were stationed.

In the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. political objectives were explicitly to overthrow the Iraqi regime.⁸⁰ The U.S. leadership believed (erroneously) that the very success of democracy in Iraq would serve as a beacon for others in the region, including U.S. allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A democratic Middle East would give the people of the region a powerful and ultimately irresistible alternative to the failed regimes of the so-called moderate states and the Islamicist totalitarian vision of the future. This was a truly radical political objective.⁸¹ In a number of cases, a war could be fought for both limited and unlimited objectives depending on the number of belligerents and their overall power. In June 1950, North Korea’s objective was unlimited—occupying all of South Korea. In contrast, South Korea’s objective was limited—preserving and restoring its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The initial objective for the United States and United Nations, which came to the aid of South Korea, was also limited. However, the United States changed the political objectives in Korea to unlimited—to eliminate the North Korean regime. The massive Chinese intervention in October 1950 radically changed the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese political objective against South Korea was unlimited—conquest of the peninsula. But the Chinese political objective against the United States was limited—forcing it out of the Korean Peninsula. Because of great confusion in the U.S. Government, the political objective did not change from unlimited to limited—seeking status quo ante—until May 1951.⁸² In the Vietnam War, the United States pursued a limited political objective—preserving South Vietnam’s independence. In contrast, North Vietnam had an unlimited political objective—overthrowing the government in South Vietnam and unifying the entire country under its leadership. North Vietnam’s political objectives toward the United States were limited—removing all U.S. forces from South Vietnam.⁸³

In the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Russia’s initial objectives were offensive and unlimited, while Ukraine had defensive and unlimited objectives. After the Russians failed to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, they changed their objectives to defensive and limited: to fully occupy Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and capture Kherson Province.⁸⁴ On May 10, 2022, the Ukrainian foreign minister declared that the new objective for Ukraine was forcing the Russian withdrawal from all occupied territories in the Donbas (Donets Basin) area.⁸⁵ In the summer of 2022, Ukraine went on the offensive with limited objectives, recapturing Kherson on November 12 and major parts of that province.

Formulating

In the process of formulating a political objective, the political leadership would consolidate the content of the political objectives, their main purpose and scope, and the amount/type of resources and anticipated time for their accomplishment. This step requires creativity, critical thinking, insights, and sound judgment.⁸⁶ The number of political objectives should be few. The temptation to pursue two or more political objectives simultaneously should be generally resisted. Whenever the conditions are drastically changed, selected political objectives should be modified, altered, changed, or even abandoned. This is the only sensible way to ensure that one’s sources of power are not used in seeking militarily unachievable political objectives.

Harmonizing Ends, Means, and Ways

One of the most difficult problems is to bring one’s ends, means, and ways into approximate harmony. If any of them is seriously out of balance, success is endangered.⁸⁷ This process is more an art than a science. Perfect matching is very difficult to achieve in practice. A lack of harmony can result in a mismatch, when one’s means are grossly inadequate to achieve stated ends. A serious imbalance between the objective and the means assigned to accomplish it will invariably lead to failure. In the American Civil War (1861–1865), the South lost primarily because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends. Hence, no amount of operational finesse could compensate for the North’s superior industrial strength and manpower. The operational skills of the Confederate Army were “rendered almost irrelevant.”⁸⁸

In World War II, Germany was defeated mainly because Hitler’s strategic ends far exceeded the country’s means to accomplish them.⁸⁹ The Japanese ends and means in 1941 were in a serious mismatch because their resources were grossly deficient to maintain adequate control of not only China’s mainland but also the newly occupied Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma. In early 1942, the Japanese expanded their control to the Bismarck Archipelago and part of the Solomons Archipelago. Likewise, mismatch between strategic ends and means caused Great Britain to suffer serious setbacks at Gallipoli in 1915, Norway in 1940, and Greece in 1941.

Disconnect occurs when a country has sufficient means to accomplish stated political strategic ends but is either unwilling or politically or psychologically too constrained to use its means, as the U.S. strategic failures in the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and Afghanistan (2001– 2021) illustrate.

A certain degree of risk is created in case of a disconnect or mismatch between one’s strategic ends and means.⁹⁰ Risk is defined in terms of both danger and the possibility that something unpleasant will occur.⁹¹ Degree of risk depends on the likelihood of its occurrence and the maximum amount of damage that would ensue if the risk became manifest.⁹² The level of risk cannot be determined with any degree of confidence; assessing it is mainly a matter of judgment. It is often forgotten that risk also provides an opportunity to achieve great success. Hence, the political leadership should sometimes take a calculated risk (but not a gamble).⁹³ A calculated risk is taking the chance of a failure whose degree of probability was estimated prior to the action taken. In contrast, a gamble is to take risks in hope of achieving a desired result. The risks can occur due to many factors, such as overrating one’s capabilities and underestimating the enemy’s capabilities. They also can be the result of willful or unintended faulty strategic assumptions. The degree of risk can be greatly reduced by scaling down one’s ends or increasing one’s means or changing the ways. The problem of mismatch can be resolved by modifying, altering, or even abandoning one’s ends. Another solution for resolving mismatch is to find a novel way of using one’s sources of military and/or nonmilitary power. One can also be successful despite a serious mismatch between ends and means by “bluffing,” as Hitler did in the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936. The problem of a serious disconnect between ends and means is relatively more difficult and time-consuming to resolve. It might require new political leadership and drastic change in the public support for a war.

Articulating

Political objectives should be articulated concisely and in clear terms. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that “if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.”⁹⁴ The Russians had very clear political objectives in their war against Japan in 1904– 1905—maintaining control over Manchuria and decisively repelling Japanese advances. Yet that was not the case with the Russian military strategic objectives.⁹⁵ Despite some claims to the contrary, the United States had clear political objectives at the beginning of its involvement in the Vietnam War. Then–Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated in March 1964, “We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam.” He noted that the United States did not seek for Vietnam to serve as a “Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security.” McNamara also believed that if that objective was not achieved, almost all Southeast Asia would probably fall under communist dominance.⁹⁶

Political objectives can be expressed in narrow or broad terms. Narrowly stated political objectives need to be accomplished in their entirety; otherwise, the political and other costs for the political leadership might well be too excessive. In a situation where vital national interests are at stake, there is usually no choice but to fight to the finish. Broadly expressed political objectives are usually applicable in a situation where vital national interests are not involved. Such objectives make it easier for the political leadership to agree to a compromise without losing domestic support or international prestige or saving face. This is all too often the case in operations short of high-intensity conventional war, such as was U.S. involvement in Somalia (1993), the Kosovo conflict (1999), and Libya (2011).

Accomplishing Political Objectives

Political leaders must decide whether they want to use the military instrument of power.⁹⁷ Political objectives of a war are generally achieved by rendering the enemy physically incapable of continuing the fight—that is, by military victory. Clausewitz firmly believed that the enemy “fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. The country must be occupied; otherwise, the enemy could raise fresh military forces.”⁹⁸ However, in the modern era, accomplishment of the political objectives requires the orchestrated employment of not only the military, but also all other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, financial, technological, informational, and others). Using one’s military power incorrectly would put a great burden on the other instruments and could make it impossible for a state to achieve its war aims.⁹⁹

Political objectives can possibly be achieved by changing the enemy’s beliefs about the probability of military victory or convincing the enemy that the cost of fighting is so high that the price begins to exceed the price the enemy is willing to pay.¹⁰⁰ In some rare cases, political objectives could be achieved by a threat of using a credible military force combined with a diplomatic, economic, financial, and informational offensive against a targeted country—that is, “winning without fighting,” as in the examples of the annexation (Anschluss) of Austria in March 1938, the bloodless occupation of Sudetenland in October 1938, and the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

The idea of “winning without fighting” originated with the Chinese general and thinker Sun Tzu. In his Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote, “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. Your aim must be to take All-under-heaven intact.”¹⁰¹ The enemy armed forces can be made useless if the aggressor threatens the use of credible military forces coordinated with a political, diplomatic, economic, financial, and informational offensive. Winning without se of one’s military power can possibly be achieved if the enemy abandons its plan to start hostilities or even changes his hostile attitude and turns hostility into friendship.¹⁰² In contrast to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz conceded a possibility of winning without having to engage in combat, but the probability of that happening is the realm of theory. Yet Sun Tzu and Clausewitz did not substantially differ on the need to resort to the use of force. Both agreed that the most rational way of conducting a war is to shorten its duration and win as decisively as possible.¹⁰³

Conclusion

The process of determining political objectives is largely an art rather than a science. This in turn requires experience, good judgment, and decisiveness on the part of the political leadership. The political and military leaders should have solid knowledge of the enemy’s history, society, culture, and traditions. The common pitfalls of overestimating one’s own and underestimating the enemy’s capabilities and making false political assumptions based on misperceptions and cultural/racial biases should be avoided. All efforts should be made to think from the enemy’s point of reference. The key parts of the process are making realistic strategic estimates, identifying critically important national interests, and formulating the political objectives. Yet the very heart of the entire process is harmonizing the strategic ends, means, and ways. The political leaders must somehow resolve the resulting problems of mismatch or disconnect. In the worst case, the political leaders must be prepared to take high but prudent risks. The political objectives should be articulated succinctly and clearly. They should not be stated together with military-strategic objectives. Normally, accomplishment of political objectives would require the use of one’s military forces. Although it is sometimes possible to win without resort to arms, such situations are rare in history. JFQ