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Lieutenant Colonel James H. Gifford, USA, is an Instructor in the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy at the National Defense University. He was previously Chief of Nuclear Wargaming at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
For the past 30-plus years since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has been able to operate with no real threat of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Due to that lack of threat and getting rid of our own tactical nuclear arsenal, U.S. strategy and policy have basically forgotten about nonstrategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons. Nearly every Active-duty member of the joint force began military service after the Cold War, and almost none have ever even heard of a tactical nuclear weapon. But a quick Internet search of “Russia” and “nuclear weapons” will result in multiple articles in the past few months about Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling or threats to employ so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
This is not just a Russia problem, either. The United States currently has multiple adversaries with nuclear arsenals that could be employed in a future conflict. If an adversary has such an arsenal, why would it not use it, particularly if backed into a corner or threatened with imminent defeat? The United States and its allies must take these threats seriously and start considering how to respond to an adversary’s limited use of nonstrategic nuclear strikes. As we as a nation begin to relearn and rethink the policy and doctrine on how to operate on a nuclear battlefield, it is vital that the effects and implications of an adversary’s limited nuclear use are properly considered across all levels of war to formulate an appropriate political and military response.
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons come in many shapes and sizes, and it is important to under- stand their differences. However, the only official distinction among nuclear weapons is between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The difference between the two is whether the weapon is governed by an arms control treaty, such as the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Weapons governed by this treaty are considered “strategic nuclear weapons.” This term does not define the specific warhead or yield of the weapon, but only the delivery system or how the warhead gets to the target.
The “strategic” delivery systems from the treaty are nuclear ballistic missile sub- marines, nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear bombers.1 Any nuclear warhead being delivered by one of those three systems is a strategic weapon. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons are any nuclear weapons not delivered by one of the three types of strategic systems. This includes things such as artillery, cruise missiles, short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, air-dropped weapons, atomic demolition munitions, atomic landmines, and myriad other ways to get a nuclear warhead to a target.
In the late 1980s, just before the end of the Cold War, it was estimated that the United States and the Soviet Union had over 60,000 nuclear weapons combined, with most being nonstrategic nuclear weapons.2 Again, this distinction between strategic and nonstrategic applies only to the delivery system, not the yield or size of the warhead. Strategic does not equal high yield, and nonstrategic does not denote low yield. It is possible to have nonstrategic weapons with higher yields than some strategic weapons and vice versa. This is an important point to understand when reading news reports or stories about adversary nuclear arsenals and threats.
There are a few other terms related to nuclear weapons—even if they are not part of the official distinction—such as tacti- cal nuclear weapons, battlefield nuclear weapons, or low-yield nuclear weapons. These three terms are often used inter- changeably with “nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” and for the most part mean the same thing. However, as mentioned, it is possible to have a lower yield weapon delivered by strategic means, so low yield is not always synonymous with nonstrategic. Additionally, where is the line drawn between “low yield” and “high yield?” Is it 1 kiloton (kT), 10kT, 100kT? There are differing opinions, but often low yield is described as anything less than 100kT and high yield above that. Not having a common vernacular when discussing adversary nuclear weapons can lead to miscommuni- cations or misunderstandings when trying to develop plans and policy regarding nuclear response.
Once a shared understanding of the types and characteristics of different nuclear weapons exists among those making nuclear response decisions, it is also essential to understand the difference between reality and fiction when it comes to nuclear detonations. Nuclear weapons can be terribly destructive and are horrible weapons of war that we hope will never be used again in aggression. Nuclear weapons also produce unique environments not found with conventional explosives, such as thermal radiation; neutron and gamma radiation; and delayed radiation (or fallout).3 However, depending on the size, the actual effects of a tactical nuclear detonation are likely much less than what most people envision when they imagine a mushroom cloud from a strategic nuclear weapon. Nearly every Hollywood movie, TV show, or video game involving a nuclear detonation drastically overdramatizes the effects of the explosion, leading to a civilian population—and even much of the military—that has a correspondingly distorted view of what would happen. This exaggerated understanding often leads to an erroneous interpretation of the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the effects such use would have on a combat force.
Figure. Operational and Tactical Considerations After 10kT Strike
Why is understanding this overestimation important when thinking about nuclear use in combat? Because that overestimation may lead planners, strategists, and decisionmakers to treat nuclear weapons as “silver bullets” that can wipe whole units and cities off the map, opera- tionally ending the mission and causing strategic overreactions that could lead to escalation and a broader nuclear conflict. Taking the view of “Game over, man!” after the detonation can lead to policy miscalculations that could potentially lead to World War III. It is vitally important for leaders at all levels of the military and government, policymakers included, to understand the realities of a nuclear detonation to be able to react appropriately and respond to an adversary’s nuclear use on the battlefield.
Nuclear Weapons Use on the Battlefield
If an adversary uses a nuclear weapon on the battlefield, it is not possible to understand the full consequences without examining its use and impact at each level of warfare: the tactical effects on the units near ground zero, the operational impacts to the mission, and the strategic implications for national response and future strategy for the war. U.S. policy and nuclear response decisionmakers must understand and con- sider all the effects rather than jumping right to an automatic response.
Tactical Level. The tactical level is where the actual effects to personnel and equipment are determined. Unless a megaton-size weapon is used, in most combat operations a limited nuclear strike will likely affect only a single brigade or less. The number of vehicles damaged and destroyed, the number of casualties (both injured and fatalities), the types of injuries, and the medical requirements all have types of information that cannot be captured without assessing at the tactical level.
Evaluating a nuclear strike at the operational or strategic level does not offer the perspective needed to determine the detailed effects to the unit(s) hit by the detonation. The figure depicts a 10kT strike (yellow triangle) on a motorized infantry brigade from various operational and tactical perspectives, with the green circle showing the maximum lethal radius for personnel inside an armored personnel carrier. In the operational-level depiction (1A, brigade level), it looks like the detonation was a complete miss, with no effect at all. However, the brigade symbol depicts the center of what are, at the tactical level, battalions (composed of companies and platoons) spread over several square kilometers. Lowering into the tactical levels provides the detail needed to determine how detrimental the strike was to the brigade and its lower level tactical assets. The battalion level (1B) shows one battalion inside the lethal ring. However, if we zoom in again to the company level (1C), only two companies from that battalion are in the lethal area, not the entire battalion. At the platoon level (1D), it is confirmed that a total of two companies from this brigade are combat ineffective, with casualties that must be dealt with. This one example demonstrates that looking only at an operational-level depiction of field assets will not provide adequate information about the actual effects to personnel and equipment. Truly understanding the casualties and effects of the nuclear detonation requires looking at the tactical level.
Operational Level. So why not look at every nuclear strike/interaction at only the tactical level? While the effects may be tactical, the impacts of the nuclear detonation are not appreciated until seen at a higher operational level. In the figure, the brigade lost 2 out of 15 combat arms companies. Tactically, the battalion that was hit is at 33-percent strength and combat ineffective, but operationally the whole brigade is at 85 percent and could likely still be able to accomplish its mission. Stepping up from the tactical perspective allows for better understanding of the impact to the whole operational mission and not just the tactical battle. We have all heard the phrase “You may have won the battle, but I’ll win the war.” At the operational level, this would likely hold true if only a limited number of tactical-level units are hit with a low-yield nuclear strike.
Another apparent effect when examining the operational level is grasping the number of casualties produced by the detonation and what that means for combat operations. The figure shows six motorized infantry platoons as red (severe casualty or fatality), one as yellow (degraded), and one medical platoon as red (severe casualty or fatality). With roughly 30 Soldiers per platoon, that would be over 200 severe casualties. The green circle around the nuclear triangle depicts the potential lethal radiation dose to Soldiers in an armored personnel carrier, so most of those 200-plus casualties are due to radiation and would not be immediately dead but instead would require specialized medical treatment. Treating radiation exposure requires special medical equipment, not something that can be accomplished onsite by a company medic. Those tactical company commanders who just received a high dose of radiation are not going to be able to coordinate the casualty evacuation for themselves and the other 200 casualties— that is going to take outside help. And that help is going to come from outside of the tactical sphere, from the higher operational level.
During the war on terror, an event considered to be mass casualty usually involved 5 to 10 Soldiers. The U.S. military has not fought an enemy able to inflict hundreds of casualties in one strike in a long time—that many casualties is an operational challenge, not a tactical one. The United States needs to rethink its doctrine and policies for dealing with an extremely high number of casualties; although unseen during the counter- insurgency years, this is an imminent reality in the face of adversary nuclear employment.
A third operational effect to consider from a nuclear detonation lies outside of the combat forces attacked by the nuclear detonation. There will likely be some proportion of the civilian population in proximity to the detonation who see the bright flash of light. Like most everyone, they are going to overestimate the effects and think they have been irradiated and are going to die (which is very unlikely unless they were in the midst of the combat forces). The local battlefield, and likely the whole operational area, is now going to be congested with civilians trying to flee the area in fear of the next nuclear detonation(s). How does the civilian population limit movement and/ or require medical assistance? How are the 200-plus military casualties evacuated with traffic jams on every road in the area? This operational impact would be a real friction point on the limited nuclear use battlefield, but again, our current doctrine and policy do not necessarily tackle this.
Strategic Level. The tactical level is necessary to understand the effects of a nuclear detonation on unit personnel and equipment, and the operational level is necessary to understand the effects of a nuclear detonation on the overall mission. Why is the strategic level necessary to understand adversary use of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon? On a map of Europe, the green circle of death from the figure would be a tiny dot. What value is added by looking at the strategic level when a tactical nuclear weapon is so small? The broader implications of nuclear use manifest at the strategic level.
Nuclear weapons always have strategic implications, with even the smallest yield nonstrategic nuclear weapon potentially causing huge strategic ripples up to the highest levels of government. Imagine two nuclear-armed adversaries in conflict. It is possible to escalate from a single nu- clear strike to a limited nuclear exchange to all-out nuclear war in a matter of days if one or both sides overreact. This runaway escalation can be prevented through deterrence and escalation management: both strategic-level challenges in the realm of national decision authority and in the highest levels of military command. Those strategic leaders must consider many factors in their decisionmaking and recommendations on how to respond to that single nuclear use on the battlefield. Is nuclear retaliation appropriate (perhaps not to appear weak), or is a nonnuclear response appropriate to continue the mission and not escalate the conflict? The strategic messaging accompanying a response to nuclear use is almost as important as the response itself. It is possible that an adversary uses a nuclear weapon because it is at risk of losing the conventional fight and it is a last-ditch effort to end the conflict before total defeat (“escalate to deescalate”). In that case, there may be no need for a nuclear response. Instead, continue the conventional fight for as long as it remains effective and deters further adversary nuclear use. If the U.S. response is just to continue winning the conventional fight, it must still be accompanied by strategic messaging to the adversary, even if no strategic nuclear weapons are used.
Conclusion
While most of the world thinks of city-destroying nuclear weapons, the figure shows that adversary use of a 10kT weapon would have a limited effect on the featured brigade and its operational mission. Strategic leaders could determine that retaliation need not be nuclear—that increasing the intensity of conventional attacks may be an appropriate response to a limited nuclear strike like the one shown in the figure. If a nuclear response is deemed necessary, the decision and authority to use a nuclear weapon rest solely with the President, who must consider a host of issues in the decision, including the status of the whole war, national strategic goals, the need to demonstrate resolve, an attempt to “escalate to deescalate” the conflict, and many others.
This strategic-level decision, however, relies on first understanding the tactical-level effects, how they influence the operational mission, and whether a “strategic” (nuclear) response is called for. Those in senior leadership roles likely have no experience thinking through a limited nuclear battlefield. It is important that the response policy is clearly thought through and rehearsed/wargamed with those leaders, so they understand the potential tactical, operational, and strategic consequences on adversary nuclear use. Leaders in the United States must think harder about the types of strategic policy decisions that they might face and prepare how to respond. Waiting for the first mushroom cloud would be too late. JFQ