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Lieutenant Colonel Brent A. Lawniczak, USMC (Ret.), is an Associate Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Air Command and Staff College at Air University.
[C]ommanders, planners, and operators must be competent warfighters in both the operating environment and information environment.
—Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations1
To the renewed scholar Thomas Schelling, the central aspect of nuclear deterrence is being believed. It is essential that an adversary believes the threat of force is real and that the threat will be carried out. Schelling makes an extremely important observation that “saying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if true, saying so does not always make it believed.”2 Of course, Schelling was talking about the threat of force with the intent to deter, but the statement may be applied to the use of the narrative form of communication across the competition continuum in terms of information being believed by various target audiences. A narrative does not merely convey truths. One may have a truthful narrative that is not persuasive. One need only examine current political rifts to ascertain that truth does not always prevail. While the joint force must always be truthful, the truth must also be put forward in a manner that increases its persuasiveness.
This article briefly defines the narrative form of communication; highlights the influence of narratives in military operations; provides and describes 10 variables that contribute to the persuasiveness of narratives; and concludes with several recommendations for the joint force to improve the persuasiveness of its narratives.
Defining the Narrative Form of Communication
A compelling narrative guides planning, targeting, and execution, and can help prevent the “say-do” gap in which our actions and words conflict in the eyes of the audience.
—Communication Strategy and Synchronization3
Joint doctrine simply defines narrative as “a short story used to underpin operations and to provide greater understanding and context to an operation or situation.”4 Narratives create meaning and affect perceptions and subsequent actions. Joint doctrine also states that the “narrative can be thought of as a unifying story that acts as an information control measure to avoid conflicting messages and promote unity of effort.”5
The notion of using narratives to dominate the information space (or environment) is not new.6 That the battle of the narrative is central to modern military operations is widely accepted and noted throughout key joint doctrinal publications such as Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States;7 JP 3-0, Joint Operations;8 and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.9 Yet the discussion of narratives has been limited primarily to ideological wars with insurgents—as demonstrated during the long counterinsurgencies fought by the United States and its partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article takes the argument about the utility of persuasive narratives a step further. The U.S. joint force would benefit from an understanding that information, often in the form of a narrative, will be a central factor toward successful joint and combined military operations across the competition continuum, including near-peer war.
In addition to the military’s lack of a framework for analyzing and crafting narratives as part of military operations, little is mentioned in military circles regarding what makes the narrative persuasive. Fully understanding the components of a narrative together with an understanding of the factors that foster the persuasiveness of a given narrative are both essential to the effective construction and use of narratives in military operations, including armed conflict. My previous article in Joint Force Quarterly outlined the significance of the narrative and offered a framework for analyzing and deriving narratives.10
The previous article discusses the utility of using an existing framework for analyzing and creating strategic and operational narratives by the joint force as part of operational design.11 The core elements of a narrative, which can be studied both to counter enemy narratives and devise friendly narratives, consist of the setting, characters, plot, and moral.12 Because narratives are thought to be more readily accessible and accepted than nonnarrative communications, it is essential that the military planner understand what constitutes a complete narrative. In addition to the basic components of a narrative, however, it is essential to understand what makes a narrative persuasive. Only by understanding the variables that persuade people to act can we produce and counter narratives with the informational aspects of military activities.
The Influence of the Narrative Form of Communication
A narrative can connect seemingly unrelated events and provides an overarching concept that influences thought, meaning, and decision making. A good narrative will give meaning to a broader vision of how the world should and could be and why an audience should move in the direction of that vision. Effectively using narratives can shape behaviors and even transform culture.
—JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations13
JP 5-0 asks, “How does the joint force leverage the informational aspects of military activities to create relevant actor perceptions and drive relevant actors to behave in ways that support achieving the [joint force commander’s] objectives?”14 One way to leverage informational aspects of military activities is using narratives. The 2022 release of JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, goes a long way in answering the question about leveraging information in military operations.15 This article expands on some aspects highlighted in JP 3-04 and further elucidates the concept and significance specifically of the narrative form of communication and its importance in modern military operations.
In general, narratives are thought to be easier to process and remember than nonnarrative forms of communication. Narratives are also “evaluated more favorably” than nonnarrative communications and result in generally positive affective responses.16 Rather than a simple bulletized, bumper-sticker type message, it is necessary to have a cohesive, complete, and convincing narrative. The narrative must change minds and behaviors, and to do so, it must be persuasive.
Variables Affecting the Persuasiveness of a Narrative
The rhetorical persuasion that comes from narratives appears functional to creating communities and communions even where they do not actually exist.
—Giuseppe Caforio, “Rhetorical Persuasion and Storytelling in the Military”17
JP 3-04 uses the term narrative no fewer than 297 times.18 Additionally, JP 3-04 lists the narrative as 1 of the 10 “drivers of human behavior.”19 However, the publication addresses the “Joint Force Use of Narrative” in a few short paragraphs that do not address how a narrative can or should be persuasive.20 It uses some form of the word persuade a total of six times—persuade (4), persuasion (1), and persuasive (1). Appendix A of the same publication does provide a list of factors thought to be important in creating effective narratives, stating that an effective narrative:
- provides coherence to military actions and activities
- is easily understood and remembered by intended audiences
- describes the context of the organization (that is, why it does what it does, and ideally something about what it does)
- makes clear and removes the ambiguity of U.S. values and interests
- provides a more compelling and believable alternative for the future than the adversary is attempting to portray
- offers a better and just future regarding the contested interest (this future should appeal to emotions and demonstrate an awareness of the audiences’ values and social norms)
- is logical, meaning that it falls within the belief system of the intended audience
- supports the development of a common identity and a desired image of the force that is necessary to integrate words and deeds, thus creating desired effects in the information environment
- is easily communicated through credible sources.<21
This list provides important aspects for creating effective narratives, and no doctrinal publication can provide deep insight into every factor of human psychology and cognition. However, it is important for all planners, not just “information” professionals, to understand some of the complexities and nuances of persuasion via the joint force’s use of narratives. The remainder of this article highlights the 10 variables that affect the persuasiveness of a narrative and elaborates a bit on some of the factors noted in the previous list from JP 3-04.
What Makes a Narrative Persuasive
Emotion or Affect. Emile Simpson asserts that “ny strategic narrative, to be persuasive, must have emotional as well as rational purchase on an audience.”22 A “narrative construction [is] a powerful tool that can shape people’s realities and emotions,” hence, their behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs.23 Affect provides a strong impulse to action for many; thus, it is argued that a truthful and persuasive narrative will be most effective in affecting “human decisionmaking and cognitive processes.”24 While policymakers and planners may desire to frame narratives from a factual, rational standpoint, they must carefully consider and intentionally incorporate the emotional aspects of a given narrative.25
Ease of Understanding/Simplicity. It is also argued that “processing fluency” affects the “subjective feelings of ease or difficulty” with which an individual processes new information.26 A target audience that experiences difficulty in receiving and understanding new information will often have a negative affective response, while a target that is able to easily process information will respond positively.27 Additionally, narratives that are easier for target audiences to process lead to greater acceptance levels of a conveyor’s policy goals.28 P.W. Singer and Emerson Brooking argue: “Human minds are wired to seek and create narrative.”29 That is why movies and books remain in peoples’ minds. Singer and Brooking continue: “By simplifying complex realities, good narratives can slot into other people’s preexisting comprehension.”30 Therefore, simplicity in the narrative is essential, as individual attention spans shrink, and the complexity of the world seems to be inestimable.31 Singer and Brooking state: “Rational theories are for well-ordered worlds and for leaders set within that world. Today, however, we have a chaotic world, with leaders who are ill-prepared for its complexities. Narratives are even more important for ordering the chaos.”32
Consistency. JP 3-04 notes that “humans perceive narratives as credible if they build on their understanding of the world and their social environment to connect new information to the information they already have.”33 Thus, the narrative must be consistent with the target’s culture and “macrobeliefs” or worldviews.34
Canon. Part of this cultural consistency includes the use of “canonical language,” which has been shown to add to the persuasiveness of narratives.35 An individual’s or group’s understanding and acceptance of a narrative can be affected by invoking the terminology of a profession, culture, religion, or other aspects of life to which they are particularly devoted. Using a language, or canon, that is readily familiar to and accepted by the culture or institution can make narratives more appealing and persuasive. Simply put, matching the words of the narrative to the vocabulary of the audience—which includes those who will execute military plans and those whom the plans intend to influence—makes the narrative more persuasive.36
Identification. The use of canonical language may be logically linked to what another group of researchers describes as “identification”—that narrative persuasion is affected by the target’s ability to “adopt the perspective of the character” of the story, making narrative persuasion more likely.37 The phenomenon of identification can be fostered by “portraying a character in a positive light . . . [using the] first-person perspective, and emphasizing similarities between the target of communications and a character in the narrative.”38
Narrative Transportation and Trust. Another closely related aspect that is hypothesized as important in making narratives persuasive is that of “narrative transportation.”39 This characteristic of some narratives allows the reader or tar- get of a narrative to imagine or picture a story, resulting in an increasingly positive view of the story and acceptance of the proposed policies or solutions.40 Closely associated with this is narrator trust. If the target audience of a narrative trusts the narrator, then it will more often increase the target audience’s preferences for the policies or outcomes argued in the narrative.41 Identification, narrative transportation, and trust will likely rely heavily on knowing what one’s audiences care about—what they hold dear and what they find credible.42 Both the source and the content of the narrative are influential variables regarding persuasion.
Resonance. All the preceding factors increase the resonance of the narrative. When a narrative resonates with an audience, the narrative will “fit neatly” into an audience’s “preexisting story lines” and foster solidarity or identification with the actors in the story.43
Coherence. Likewise, military planners must ensure that narratives are coherent. The core facets of the narrative must make sense. They must nest with higher level objectives and the narratives—national, strategic mission, operational, and tactical—used to attain those objectives.44 Additionally, the narrative must be coherent across audiences. Audience perceptions, fundamental beliefs, and cultures may vary within a region and a specific country. It is necessary to simultaneously adjust narratives to suit multiple audiences without losing the coherence of the overarching narrative.45 A critical aspect of coherence, then, is congruence. For a narrative to be coherent to an audience, and across audiences, it must have congruence with the audiences’ deeply held belief systems, culture, religion, and the like. Planners “must find narratives that appeal to multiple audiences with differing interests and learn what makes those narratives convincing.”46 Military planners must devise coherent narratives across the levels of warfare and be adept at “publicly expos[ing] the inconsistencies across their opponents’ narrative levels.”47
Convincing. The narrative story must align with actions. This is something commonly understood but not always practiced by the military planning community. Knowing that this should be done and seeing that it is carried out in tactical- and operational-level activities is something else entirely. As Carl von Clausewitz sagely noted, in war the simplest task becomes very difficult.48 The use of a narrative form of communication will make aligning actions with words easier to carry out at all levels. Stories are easier to understand and remember not only by the target audience but also by members of the joint force who will convey the narrative in words and by action. Providing a Soldier, Marine, Sailor, Airman, or Guardian with a story to remember and tell through words and action will more likely lead to the U.S. military, overall, conveying a complete and coherent narrative to the target audience. This will foster keeping the kinetic or “purely military” activities aligned with the moral—the desired outcome—of the story.
State History and Identity.
Emile Simpson states, “History matters. Strategic narrative, which effectively provides the interpretive structure that seeks to give a particular meaning to tactical actions, must take this into account.”49 He continues, “History is a powerful spring of emotion” and the construction of narratives that “tap into that well [gains] access to its power.”50 That the history of a state forms the foundation of its enduring identity, which determines the appropriateness of certain behaviors, is documented in a large body of international relations literature. State identity, often more than specific security concerns, or even the more nebulous notion of culture, has been shown to be a strong force in determining foreign policy decisions.51 The strategic and military operational planner would be wise to study state identities as much or more than some elusive conception of the “culture” of a state.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Narratives are always in existence, whether we purposefully create them or not.
—JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations 52
Rather than the narrative fitting joint force actions, the military operation itself should be planned to fit within the desired (persuasive) narrative.53 Instead of tactical actions driving or at best fitting the narrative, the narrative should drive the tactical- and operational-level activities of the joint force. This is consistent with recent doctrinal developments, which note that a compelling narrative, particularly at the operational level, “guides planning, targeting, and execution” and that courses of action should “align planned actions with strategic and operational mission narratives.” Furthermore, joint doctrine notes that joint force “activities support the narrative.”54 All three of these doctrinal statements indicate that the narrative should precede, rather than follow, the other activities that the joint force will execute. Following this pattern will enable a greater alignment between the words of the joint force and its actions.
Another recommendation is to focus the narrative on elite actors, particularly foreign policymakers, and to closely examine how these individuals process and convey narratives to their constituent groups.55 This method will aid in simplifying target audience analysis to some extent. Rather than planners being forced to examine numerous individuals or several groups in a region or country, focusing on a smaller set of elite policymakers as primary influencers and decisionmakers will help to focus narrative analysis. Instead of offering narrative messages directly to target audiences, elite decisionmakers offer a proxy or relay that will likely be more adept and in tune with how the populace or key groups receive information and find it persuasive. This will more likely result in transmission from the elite to the mass audience with the nuances appropriate to state identity. Additionally, a focus on elites will likely increase the ability of target audiences to identify, empathize, and agree with these elite influencers in a community, country, or region.
The joint force should consider increasing its understanding of state identity and its impact on making and justifying foreign policy decisions. The joint force has focused on examining the cultures of various peoples during long engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although understanding the history, language, and broader culture is an important aspect of understanding the strategic and operational environments, such understanding may not lead to the formation of persuasive narratives. The cultural aspects of the environment are often imprecise and misunderstood.
A better framework for understanding target audiences in foreign countries, both friendly and adversary, is to analyze and understand state identity. State identity is also rooted in national history, but unlike culture, it provides insight into what unifies a body of people. State identity has been theorized and shown to shape state practices in the international arena.56 Additionally, state identity can be a strong source of elite policymakers’ justification for foreign policy decisions.57 Although ascertaining which state identity will manifest in each situation is difficult, state identity and the appropriate behavior that conforms to a given identity offer a more tangible aspect for analysis than culture. Analyzing state or nonstate actors’ identity offers a path for devising influential and persuasive narratives.
The incorporation of the competition continuum into joint doctrine has reemphasized the role of the military in supporting diplomacy and deterrence as well as responding to national security threats and other crises with armed force during combat.58 Persuasion—by and through the joint force—will assume a greater role across this continuum. The military, during cooperation and competition below armed conflict, will often need to persuade or convince other parties that certain actions or decisions (favoring U.S. interests) are in their best interests. The use of narratives provides a powerful tool for the joint force to leverage information across all types of military operations and to do so with cohesive narratives that will fit across the competition continuum simultaneously. A solid understanding of the factors that make a narrative persuasive is the responsibility of every planner and commander. Together, an increased understanding of the components of a narrative, the variables that contribute to narrative persuasiveness, a focus on elite policymakers, and the analysis of state identity will enhance the effectiveness of joint force narratives across the competition continuum. JFQ
Notes
1 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 18, 2022), IV-42.
2 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 35 (emphasis added).
3 Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7, Communication Strategy and Synchronization (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 2016), 1, https://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/ documents/doctrine/fp/comm_strategy_and_ sync_fp.pdf.
4 JP 3-61, Public Affairs (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 17, 2015, Incorporating Change 1, August 19, 2016), I-11.
5 JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 14, 2022), V-3.
6 See, for example, Thomas Elkjer Nis- sen, “Narrative Led Operations: Put the Narrative First,” Small Wars Journal, Oc- tober 17, 2012, https://web.archive.org/ web/20231205142620/https://smallwars-journal.com/jrnl/art/narrative-led-operations- put-the-narrative-first.
7 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017).
8 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2017, Incor- porating Change 1, October 22, 2018).
9 JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 1, 2020).
10 Brent A. Lawniczak, “The Narrative Policy Framework in Military Planning,” Joint Force Quarterly 108 (1st Quarter 2023), Dandeker (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 89–99, https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91409-1_6. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/media/news/news- article-view/article/3264564/the-narrative- policy-framework-in-military-planning/.
11 Lawniczak, “The Narrative Policy Frame- work in Military Planning.”
12 Elizabeth A. Shanahan et al., “The Narra- tive Policy Framework,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2018), 175–176.
13 JP 3-04, I-8.
14 JP 5-0, III-37.
15 JP 3-04.
16 Olivia M. Bullock, Hillary C. Shulman, and Richard Huskey, “Narratives Are Persua- sive Because They Are Easier to Understand: Examining Processing Fluency as a Mechanism of Narrative Persuasion,” Frontiers in Com- munication 6 (September 2021), https:// www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/ fcomm.2021.719615.
17 Giuseppe Caforio, “Rhetorical Persuasion and Storytelling in the Military,” in Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations: Es- says in Honor of Jürgen Kuhlmann, ed. Gerhard Kümmel, Giuseppe Caforio, and Christopher
18 JP 3-04.
19 JP 3-04, I-7, figure I-2.
20 JP 3-04, ix, II-5–II-6.
21 JP 3-04, A-1–A-2. The list in this article has been abbreviated from the list provided in JP 3-04.
22 Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 179.
23 Shanahan et al., “The Narrative Policy Framework,” 175–176; Bullock, Shulman, and Huskey, “Narratives Are Persuasive Because They Are Easier to Understand.”
24 Shanahan et al., “The Narrative Policy Framework,” 180.
25 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 192–193.
26 Bullock, Shulman, and Huskey, “Narra- tives Are Persuasive Because They Are Easier to Understand.”
27 Bullock, Shulman, and Huskey.
28 Bullock, Shulman, and Huskey.
29 P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 157.
30 Singer and Brooking, 157.
31 Singer and Brooking, 158.
32 Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power,” Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April 2014), 74, https:// doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696.
33 JP 3-04, I-8.
34 Shanahan et al., “The Narrative Policy Framework,” 183, 185.
35 Shanahan et al., 185.