Conflict may be defined as “a serious disagreement or argument, typically a protracted one.” In practice, the Oxford Dictionary defines the word as “incompatible or at variance; clash.” David Stevenson, in his book Cataclysm,1 used his opening chapter to define conflict as “the destruction of peace.” The study of conflict over time sees chaos, or a move toward chaos and away from order, become more apparent.
In conflict and subsequent warfare, there is a desire to provide order and potential structure to the conduct of war to better understand, prepare for, and subsequently dominate the adversary to achieve political gains. Carl von Clausewitz wrote Principles of War in 1812 as a prepared essay that he left for the 16-year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm IV to study before Clausewitz left to join the Russian army. This essay was an attempt to provide order, through principles, to defensive and offensive warfare. It also identified a need to understand tactics in support of the strategy. Operational-level commanders must understand more than tactics; they must understand theoretical concepts for warfare.2
Clausewitz understood that certain military “functions” were essential enablers of war. He saw that these critical activities—exercising command, protecting friendly troops, supplying the force, maneuvering soldiers to set conditions for a counterattack or surprise assault, massing fires in the offense and defense to destroy the main column of the enemy, and so on—reflected lessons learned across centuries. These lessons were principles that, once organized, provided structure to chaos. Lessons on protecting, moving, shooting, and supplying, all while having some understanding of the enemy and their efforts, are codified in today’s joint functions.
One of the tools that current military leaders, planners, and executors use are the seven functions from Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations:
• command and control (C2)
• information
• intelligence
• fires
• movement and maneuver
• protection
• sustainment.
Thomas Crosbie states that “today’s joint functions are built around a core of four kinetic principles (leadership or C2, maneuver, firepower, and protection), to which subsequent revisions have attempted to add a range of ‘softer’ military fields (intelligence, information, sustainment, and civilmilitary cooperation), sometimes successfully, sometimes not.”3
In discussing theoretical, practical, and doctrinal implications of the joint functions, should we take a current doctrinal review of the functions as the answer to most military problems, or as the starting point to use in conjunction with practical expertise or knowledge to identify the solution? There is tension between military theory and doctrine. There is greater tension among theory, doctrine, and practice. Doctrine is the agreement on what should have been done yesterday, and practice is what is done today; hence, theory is the study of yesterday and today to address what can happen tomorrow. By looking deeper into the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical application of the joint functions, we might better understand their importance as well as the responsibility of the operational commander to understand the theory that drives the doctrine. In our present state of Great Power competition, this understanding is more critical than ever. Operational and joint commanders must know both the theory of joint functions and how they can be leveraged in practice to achieve time, space, and force advantage in today’s complex, contested operational environment.
Joint Functions: What Are They? What Is Their Role?
Joint functions are a critical framework that provides order to the chaos of tactical and operational warfare. They provide a common understanding across all levels of war and of command. JP 3-0 notes that the levels of “warfare [help] commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives to campaigns and major operations and link their objectives to tactical operations. These levels help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands.”4 Thus, these joint functions represent a common agreement across the joint force—Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, U.S. Cyber Command, and U.S. Special Operations—on consistent vernacular to describe the framework used in planning and execution of joint operations.
This common vernacular represents what Herbert Simon calls “satisficing.” He sees people—in this case, the joint force—settle with a solution to a problem that is “good enough.” According to Simon, people do not seek the best possible solutions to problems but operate within what he calls “bounded rationality.”5 The joint functions are important enough to merit doctrine defining their structure to support organizations in the chaos that results from conflict. Culture within the U.S. military differs by Service; each sees the fight within its domain (land, sea, air, space, cyber) as unique.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was intended to curtail this parochialism and enhance joint operations by reducing inter-Service rivalry. It also addressed the differences in the joint force language. It mandated joint professional military education, established peacetime training requirements, and provided guidance on how the joint force would communicate and synchronize operations during conflict. As one outcome of these efforts, the joint functions provided a framework for the joint force to speak the same language. As Simon demonstrates, joint doctrine and the framework of the joint functions are “satisficing” through and through. There is an agreement of vernacular and concepts across tactical levels that should, but does not always, translate to shared understanding across the operational levels of warfare.
Some History on the Theory and Doctrine of Functions
Organizing a force to fight is as old as warfare itself. On land and at sea, recruiting a fighting force, conducting reconnaissance, establishing supplies, and commanding the fight have always been part of successful warfighting. Organizing a military staff along these functional requirements has also been part of the success. Paul Thiébault developed the French staff system from the Ancien Régime to the French Revolution into the early 19th century along with a functionality that is still seen in current military staffs.6 The existing J1 personnel staff section, J3 operations staff section, and J4 logistics staff section owe their roles to this antiquated functional organization. The concept of functional requirements across a military force and staff is not new. The concept of joint functions is recent in doctrinal practice, if not in concept.
In 1993, JP 3-0 addressed aspects of the joint functions, with emphasis on C2, intelligence, and logistics. But as recently as the JP 3-0 published in 2001, no specific joint functions were listed, nor were there discussions of battlefield operating systems, the functions precursor. JP 3-0 of 2006 established six joint functions—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. In 2008, the Army published Field Manual 3-0, Operations, to transition from a Cold War–focused force to one capable of operating in a complex, multidomain operating environment. The warfighting functions replaced the battlefield operation system of the Army, aligning with the joint and tactical functions and parallel to the Marines Corps’ warfighting functions.7 These battlefield operating systems, or battlefield functional areas, were originally replaced with six warfighting functions. The warfighting functions, when combined with a seventh element, leadership, are the elements of combat power. The warfighting functions were movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, C2, and protection. In July 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a special out-of-cycle revision to joint doctrine, adding information to the joint functions. The theoretical nature of functional requirements to conduct warfare will continue to evolve. The theoretical aspects of operational functions in Milan Vego’s Joint Operational Warfare provide additional perspectives worth reviewing.
Why a Theoretical, Doctrinal, and Practical Look at Joint Functions?
Sun Tzu wrote, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.”8 Many theorists such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Baron AntoineHenri Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sylvanus Thayer have influenced our view on the conduct of warfare. Doctrine is the capturing of theory and practice and formalizing it based on the imperfect understanding of what a military should do to fight and win with its current operational environment, capability, and potential adversaries. A popular definition of military doctrine by Harald Høiback is “authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgment in application.”9 Practice is the term used to capture the experience gained in training or combat by militaries and their leaders. The tension between the theoretical and doctrinal view of joint functions is reflected in their use in practice, in preparation for and execution of military operations. Domains and the Impact on Practice (and Hence Theory and Doctrine) Military art addresses three components: strategy, tactics, and operational art. Operational art is the study of the theory and practice of operational warfare.10 Milan Vego began to study and collate the historical aspects and vignettes of operational art in the late 1990s. Looking to history to provide lessons on operational warfare allows the practices of the past to influence the theories of the present and future.
Often, practice and theory influence military doctrine. The practical application of force within the land and sea domains provides many centuries of observable practice to study and on which to base theory and military doctrine. Efforts in the air domain concerning the application of force are about a century old. The U.S. military is still struggling with theory and doctrine concerning the air domain—rightly so, based on relatively limited practice within it.
A key aspect of operational art, how military forces balance functions to synchronize their forces in time and space, is worth a relook through the theory, doctrine, and practice lens. Vego’s Joint Operational Warfare addresses the theoretical operational functions that are worthy of discussion. The impacts of command organization at the operational level are different from the joint C2 perspective. The effects of C2 warfare provide a perspective on the joint function of information that needs to be addressed at the operational level, and a later discussion of operational fires provides a focus to operational commanders that joint fires are not in the doctrine.11 Reviewing these perspectives through an operational lens may provide joint force commanders and their staffs with a stronger application of joint doctrine in the practice of warfare.
Joint Functions at the Operational Level
In his 1981 article “The Character of Modern War,” Colonel Wallace P. Franz discussed the importance of Napoleon’s grand tactical level and why it rightly was added to our understanding of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military action.12 In 1926, MajorGeneral J.F.C. Fuller observed in The Foundations of the Science of War that at the grand tactical level, operational units are maneuvered and concentrated. At the tactical level, fire is moved and concentrated.13 In today’s joint professional military education, practitioners (that is, military individuals with tactical expertise and experience) are often struck with the disconnect identified between military theory and military doctrine. Often the very practice these experts have experienced is disconnected from both theory and doctrine. The best way to see the interplay and relationship across theory, doctrine, and practice is a perspective that considers each facet as well as how each facet (theory, doctrine, and practice) influences the others.
Theory vs. Doctrine: What We Can Learn From Vego
What joint function is considered most important? The functions of C2 and sustainment, for example, would seem preeminent, but do all joint functions have the same priority and emphasis at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels? Functions such as intelligence have entire governmental agencies aligned to address the strategic and operational requirements of the Nation. Some of the functions, such as information, are represented in the Constitution as inalienable rights to each citizen and are often represented by private industry. Of course, practice has informed the doctrine of joint functions in some capacity. Vego’s theory of operational functions has also informed some of the practice and doctrine.
Operational functions, as with all good theory, are based on the study of historical operations and their impacts on functions. A deeper look at Vego’s approach to the functions of C2 versus operational command organization, joint fires versus operational fires, information versus C2 warfare, and information warfare provides perspective on the importance of comparing theory to doctrine and practice. Practitioners’ experiences in the conduct of operations and combat ensure that we are all prisoners of our own history. We also can be rigid in our understanding of and adherence to doctrine. There may be lessons to learn from the collection of theory that Vego published in 2007.
C2 vs. Operational Command Organization
Vego sees the joint functions of C2 and movement and maneuver as wasted efforts. Is it imprudent to think we can fight without C2 and movement and maneuver? As we read the theoretical discussion, Vego states that thinking about how we use C2 is inherent in what we currently understand as mission command.14 JP 3-0 states, “Mission command empowers subordinate military commanders at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative, act aggressively, and independently strive to accomplish the mission.”15 Many who have studied and used joint functions have identified C2 as first among equals. Without a clear understanding of who commands and who controls, operations struggle to succeed. Vego’s definition of operational command organization states that the “theaterwide or operational command organization (or structure) is the principal means by which an operational commander sequences and synchronizes joint force activities in peacetime and orchestrates the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish assigned strategic objectives in time of war.”16 Perhaps either providing the distinction that C2 is the first among equals or seeing it as above the other functions would aid the joint force in continuing to struggle with this aspect of operational warfighting.
JP 3-0 states that “Command is the authority a commander in the armed forces exercises lawfully over subordinates by rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions.”17 The joint function of C2 encompasses the exercise of control or authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The joint force commander provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force that includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources lawfully to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. JP 3-0 sees C2 as a responsibility, consistent across tactical, operational, and strategic commands. Identifying the difference with operational command coupled with understanding the impacts of joint and combined operations will provide a stronger understanding of the importance of C2.
Does the discussion on command organization from an operational perspective make more sense than just reiterating what C2 is at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels? Most military after-action reviews discuss the failed C2 structure (personality, Service culture, international relations) as a reason for operational frictions. Identifying and formalizing the supporting/supported command organization versus just defining C2 would better support operational-level planning and execution. A command structure should be created to deal with an operational problem or objective versus placing an existing command structure onto a problem. By defining the concept of joint command as the “responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces,”18 we understand what the concept should do versus Vego’s operational command organization on what the concept should be.19
The second aspect is how Vego sees (or does not see) movement and maneuver. Vego states that telling a force at the operational level how to move and maneuver disenfranchises the tactical experts. Maneuver is not an operational or joint function, but a key element of a major operation or campaign, discussed in the concept of operations scheme of maneuver.20 Telling operators how to operate is a waste of time; inherently tactical action is conducted by tactical commanders. In JP 3-0, the joint function of movement and maneuver lays out two different things: “Movement to Extend and Maintain Operational Reach,” and “Maneuver,” the employment of forces to gain a position of advantage concerning the enemy.21 How does the theory influence the operational and joint functions and their effect on the tactical fight? For theory’s sake, perhaps removing C2 and movement and maneuver from the joint function, or elevating them as 1a and 1b in the hierarchy of the joint functions, would simplify the balancing of functions in operational planning. The strength of C2 and movement and maneuver is seen clearly at the tactical level. At the operational level, when organizations micromanage through C2 and movement and maneuver, they struggle to succeed even with overwhelming fires, intelligence, and logistics capabilities.
Finally, Vego argues that operational command organization is perhaps one of the most critical of all operational functions. It is a framework that integrates all other theater-wide functions. It is the principal means by which the operational commander sequences and synchronizes the actions and activities of both military and nonmilitary sources of national power in each theater. It should allow the application of the principles of objective and mass when needed. The responsibilities of each command echelon should be established and delineated. There is no greater error for a higher commander than unduly interfering with the actions and decisions of a subordinate commander.22 Perhaps we should value operational C2 much greater as a function, given its impact on all the functions and direction it provides to tactical movement and maneuver.
Information vs. C2 Warfare/Information Warfare
If C2, the first among equals, is theoretically above the other functions, the joint force must ensure its importance in doctrine. More than 20 years ago, Vego explored operational C2 warfare.23 Aspects of how the joint force should address C2 warfare are now found in the information function, which was officially added in 2017 and is currently the second listed function in JP 3-0. It has been recognized as something the joint force must identify and dominate, especially in view of how large a role information has played in the Ukraine and Israel/Gaza conflicts. But at the operational level, how does the command best influence the operational environment and attack the enemy? The information domain, often transmitted through the cyber domain, affects decisionmakers. Vego’s exploration of historical aspects of C2 warfare addresses these theoretical aspects, but are they applicable today? As noted in JP 3-0, the information function addresses some of this discussion, later in its description: “The elevation of information as a joint function impacts all operations and signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within today’s complex [operating environment].”24 Perhaps defining what information is may be important for a common understanding of the joint force, though it may seem redundant. Describing what the joint force should do in the competition space, with emphasis on C2 warfare, may be more applicable to our current campaigning requirements.
C2 Warfare and the Art of Deception
Vego states that:
Deception is as old as warfare. It is a creative art, not an exact science. The chances of success in a campaign or major operation can be considerably enhanced if a sound, elaborate deception plan is prepared and skillfully executed. Deception should be conducted in peacetime as well as in times of crisis, conflict, or war. . . . Deception can be conducted at any level of war. Yet nowhere is its value as critical as at the strategic and operational levels.25
How should the operational commander target the adversary’s C2? Is deception the primary aspect of influencing decisionmakers? How do operational commanders influence and attack rival C2? As Vego notes, “Deception is one of the most important components of command-and-control warfare. It should not be arbitrarily grouped with information operations.”26 Tactical deception is protective in nature but can force enemy tactical decisionmakers to rush. Operational-level deception takes more time and should always be a consideration of the commander. According to Vego, “In contrast to other components of information operations, deception is a part of the commander’s estimate process and the basic operation plan. Hence, it is one of the main elements of any sound operational idea [scheme].”27 For example, C2 warfare, which is a military application of information warfare, is not commonly considered an operational function. According to current joint doctrine, military deception should “mislead enemy decision makers and commanders and cause them to take or not take specific actions. The intent is to cause enemy commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their intelligence collection assets; and fail to employ their combat or support units effectively.”28 As with most joint doctrines, these recommendations seem reactionary and do not focus on targeting adversary C2.
Vego’s 2007 discussion of C2 warfare in conjunction with information warfare writing and doctrine should be readdressed at the operational level. The theory and practice identified the requirement to address C2 warfare, yet our current information joint function is focused significantly on messaging while burying the operational commander’s responsibility to attack the adversary’s C2 with deception and exploitation of information. A subset of the information joint function should address C2 warfare through the information function.
Joint Fires vs. Operational Fires
Vego discusses the importance of operational fires as a main prerequisite for the success of the initial phase of a campaign or major operation. Joint fires are defined as the use of weapons systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target or objects of influence in accordance with U.S. and international law.29 They are additionally described as being delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. The joint definition can be seen at the tactical level with Army and Marine ground forces being supported by Air Force close air support or Navy strike support.
How do operational commanders consider fires at the operational level without seeing them all as tactical fires? Vego’s argument that operational fires must achieve operational-level effects is a worthy discussion for joint task force commanders. Should operational-level commanders not leave tactical fire support to tactical commanders, providing resources, capabilities, and intent? Focusing on what an operational fire is, just like an operational decision, will allow for a more focused course of action and simplify the operational plan. Once the C2 structure is established, and supported/supporting roles are recognized, provide fires to those that require it. Focus operational fires in a way to support the subordinate commands:
Operational fires can be described as the application of one’s lethal and/or nonlethal firepower for generating a decisive impact on the course and outcome of a campaign or major operation. In contrast to tactical fires, operational fires are planned to accomplish an operational objective. Sometimes the aim is to force the enemy commander to react operationally—for example, forcing him to commit his operational reserves earlier than planned or deceiving him as to the point of one’s forces’ main attack.30
Defining joint fires into a tactical and an operational framework is possible; joint doctrine does address strategic attacks (nuclear and nonnuclear).31 Providing the operational commander with doctrine addressing the use of operational fires, with emphasis on joint fires capabilities in this role, may address this shortfall. As seen in JP 3-0, the function fires encompasses the fires associated with several tasks, missions, and processes, including:
1. Conduct Joint Targeting
2. Provide Joint Fire Support
3. Counter Air and Missile Threats
4. Interdict Hostile Capabilities
5. Conduct Strategic Attack
6. Assess the Results of Employing Fires.32
For a function as important as fires, the description of and types of fires are tactical in nature. Can we have functions that lack specificity for responsibility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels? Are tactical fires all we need? When operational commanders are bound by joint doctrine, they often fail to focus joint fires in any other capacity than supporting the tactical fight. If joint commanders stop being prisoners to their own experiences and pull themselves up to the operational level, perhaps they can focus efforts on operational fires to support the operational objective. We are generally experienced and effective at tactical fires and want to execute our strengths. Until operational commanders plan and fight at the operational level, with particular emphasis on fires, we will struggle to achieve operational success.
Why Theory, Doctrine, and Practice Matter
The joint functions are an incredibly important construct to assist a joint force commander in organizing, planning, and executing joint operations. These joint functions provide a consistent framework for context to operate on the joint level. The discussion of whether these functions are complete or accurately portray the elements required to synchronize a joint task force is up for debate. With information added as a joint function owing to its impact on the joint operational environment, we see elements of the framework change. With the use of operational law as something outside the current framework of the joint functions but utilized by our nation’s competitors to influence the operation environment, perhaps it will be added in the future. By studying history and theory, and by applying common sense from practical application, doctrine and the joint functions should be scrutinized.
The study of the theory and practice of joint functions through the lens of operational warfare allows practitioners of violence and peace to recognize the influence history has on current doctrine and practice. Additionally, education and practice of a profession come with a better understanding of the historical successes and failures of that profession. John Keegan wrote, “History lessons remind us that the states in which we live, their institutions, even their laws, have come to us through conflict, often of the most bloodthirsty sort.”33 The practice of historical warfare is a worthwhile study when addressing the impacts it has on theory and doctrine. These historical and theoretical perspectives are what developed our understanding of functions and joint doctrine. Today’s practitioners must also understand how they support the joint fight with their expertise.
Strategy and tactics are often central to historical case studies. Vego once stated that without a deep understanding of history and theory, those who practice warfare and write doctrine will lack the ability to adequately critique their choices. The operational functions from Vego provide a small glimpse into the (potential) impact of theory’s influence on doctrine and practice and allow us an appreciation of the strengths and shortcomings of joint functions. Command organization, C2 warfare, and operational fires frameworks are all areas we assume operational commanders understand. With study through this operational lens, joint force commanders and their staffs may apply joint doctrine to the practice of warfare and protect our most important asset: the lives of Servicemembers. As the old maxim goes, “If you want a new idea, read an old book.”34 Perhaps military practitioners should see doctrine through the lens of history and theory and read military theorists’ works. JFQ
Notes
1 David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
2 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, ed. and trans. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, September 1942), https://clausewitzstudies.org/ mobile/principlesofwar.htm.
3 Thomas Crosbie, “Getting the Joint Functions Right,” Joint Force Quarterly 94 (3rd Quarter 2019), 96–100.
4 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 18, 2022), xi.
5 Herbert A. Simon, “Decision Making: Rational, Nonrational, and Irrational,” Educational Administration Quarterly 29, no. 3 (August 1993).
6 Eman M. Vovsi, “Paul Thiébault and the Development of the French Staff System From Ancien Régime to the Revolution,” The Napoleon Series, March 2011, https://www. napoleon-series.org/military-info/organization/France/Miscellaneous/c_Staff.html.
7 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008).
8 Sun Tzu, The Art of War: The Essential Translation of the Classic Book of Life, ed. John Minford (New York: Penguin Classics, 2009).
9 Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (New York: Routledge, 2013).
10 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2007).
11 Vego.
12 Wallace P. Franz, The Character of Modern War: Theory-Doctrine-Practice at the Operational Level (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1981), https://apps.dtic. mil/sti/pdfs/ADA108990.pdf.
13 Franz.
14 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, X-28.
15 JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, III-5.
16 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, VIII-7.
17JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, II-1.
18 JP 3-0, II-1.
19 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, VIII-7.
20 Vego, VIII-5n1.
21 JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, III-38.
22 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, VIII-20.
23 Vego, VIII-45.
24 JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, III-15.
25 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, VIII14.
26 Vego.
27 Vego.
28 JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, III-19.
29 JP 3-0, III-30.
30 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, VIII59–60.
31 JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, III-34.
32 JP 3-0, III-30–31.
33 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1994).
34 Attributed to Ivan Pavlov, Russian experimental neurologist (among others).