The Political Thought of Xi Jinping

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Not long after Xi Jinping assumed the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012, a debate among China-watchers emerged over the nature of Xi’s leadership. How ambitious was he? Would he try to change the norms of institutionalization that had existed since Mao Zedong’s death in 1976? What bureaucratic constraints would he face, and could he overcome them?

Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London, join this debate in their book The Political Thought of Xi Jinping. This book possesses elements of political science, international relations, and biography—a logical mix, considering that Xi Jinping Thought (as presented by the authors) encompasses domestic and international policies in China’s security, economic, and even societal spheres. To develop their findings, the authors analyze Xi’s speeches and writings as well as secondary sources in English and Chinese. Both authors are Chinese leadership specialists at SOAS’s China Institute and possess strong publication records regarding high-level Chinese politics. This makes them especially qualified to assert conclusions on this controversial topic.

Xi Jinping Thought was incorporated into the CCP constitution in October 2017. The use of “Thought” as opposed to “theory” placed Xi on the level of Mao in terms of political and symbolic significance. Xi wants to move beyond a post–Tiananmen Square Massacre social contract of economic livelihood in ex- change for political compliance. He wants a populace that loves its mother country. The authors’ characterization of Xi Jinping Thought—which has essentially become state ideology—could be called Leninism with Chinese Characteristics, or perhaps Make Chinese Leninism Great Again. Xi Jinping Thought envisions a China led by a central party with absolute power, which in turn is topped by a strongman. The country that this party leads is a major power filled with patriots, devoid of corruption, and respected, admired, and even a little feared by other nations.

Those who are not ethnic Han Chinese—notably, Uyghurs and Tibetans—and dissidents such as Hong Kong protestors must be reeducated to achieve this CCP-centric nationalism. Reeducation means learning, knowing, and living Xi Jinping Thought. This is done through formal education, workplace study sessions, and a dedicated app named Xuexi Qiangguo (literally, “study the powerful country”). Rooting out corruption is a major feature of Xi Jinping Thought, with a Party rectification campaign being the tool of that feature. Xi Jinping Thought also seeks more than economic growth for its own sake—Xi’s China emphasizes investment and growth in future technologies that will propel China to surpass the West. Xi is transformational, not manage- rial, according to the authors.

Tsang and Cheung deftly connect Xi’s writings and speeches to policies of Xi Jinping Thought in the book’s first three chapters. The first two chapters examine the intellectual foundations of Xi Jinping Thought and Party rectification and anti- corruption; the third is titled “The Party Leads Everything.” However, the connection between Xi Jinping Thought and actual policy practice is less solid in the chapters focusing on antipoverty campaigns and development of the socialist market economy. Consequently, the book also might benefit from a reorganization.

An organizing theme—as opposed to a list of policy arenas where Xi Jinping Thought exists—might make the research more penetrating. The book might also benefit from more historical development of Xi in terms of his own views and the policies and views of his immediate predecessors (Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin) to provide a greater sense of contrast and evolution. There is some background to Xi’s policy development in the book, but it is a bit truncated.

One of the book’s most disconcerting takeaways that affects the joint force is how the concept of tianxia (“all under heaven”) guides the foreign policy of Xi Jinping Thought. The goal is to achieve a “national rejuvenation” by 2050, restoring China to its lost imperial grandeur. This process entails incorporating Taiwan and other “lost territories” into the fold. Xi also targets the Global South as an audience for support, at the West’s expense. The authors make clear that tianxia does not imply that Xi Jinping Thought means that China seeks to fully displace the United States as the global hegemon; China does not want to shoulder the alliance commitments that derive from that status. It does, however, mean transforming the United Nations system and other international organizations. The result is an international order that is Sino-centric as opposed to Western-centric. This suggests that a China seeking a new global order—one that is tianxia—is a threat to the United States and the West in general. Xi’s policy is “making China second to none in terms of its ‘comprehensive national strength,’” and for it to be “universally recognized as the world’s ‘first power’ on its own terms” by 2050. Only then will China have realized the dream of national rejuvenation and reclaimed its rightful place in the world. Read on its face, this does not bode well for conflict avoidance or even tension reduction between China and the United States.

Xi’s acts have no doubt made domestic enemies, and his supreme power and status raise concerns about succession, leadership voids, and stability—a major concern for the joint force. The authors assert that since 1989, the regime has never made a policy decision that would destabilize the People’s Republic of China system or threaten CCP rule. Yet the zero-COVID policy was skirting that edge. That said, the authors do not see a viable threat to Xi’s power, despite protests against the zero-COVID policy.

Those across the national security enterprise who are concerned with China’s future trajectory under Xi should read this book. Moreover, people who are interested in the debates over the nature of China under Xi’s rule, the future aspirations of a rising China, and the potentiality of Sino-U.S. conflict should add The Political Thought of Xi Jinping to their reading lists. JFQ