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Air Force intelligence analysts from 9th Intelligence Squadron analyze geographical data at Beale Air Force Base, California, February 19, 2025 (U.S. Air Force/Frederick A. Brown)

In a 2015 Joint Force Quarterly article, several analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) proposed a vision for how the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) would lead analytic transformation into what we now call “strategic competition.” While primarily focused on the need for better big data integration, a key recommendation included a way ahead for training to meet new challenges:

To build the levels of professional trust and skills needed for this degree of sophisticated collaboration, DIA is making strategic investments in training, education, and professional development. We will establish and measure critical analytic skills for the [DIE] through the analyst professional certification program. The program will assess analyst knowledge and performance of critical skills and emphasize continuous analytic proficiency through lifelong learning. These shared skill standards will ensure analysts in the [DIE] are synchronized in their use of analytic tradecraft.¹

Two joint intelligence current operations analysts work on providing updates to mock scheme of maneuver during command post exercise portion of African Lion 2024, Agadir, Morocco, May 23, 2024 (U.S. Army/Ed McBride)

It all sounds great, but what if we are not using the right standards? And why are we not?

The standards are found in the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3115.17, Management and Oversight of DOD All-Source Analysis, which provides Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy guidance to the DIE for defense analysis and assigns responsibilities for the management and oversight of DOD all-source analysis to an analysis functional manager, now called Defense Intelligence Enterprise Managers (DIEM).² The DODI states up front that the policy is “Consistent with the Principles of Joint Intelligence in Joint Publication [JP] 2-0 [Joint Intelligence] ([DODI] Reference (j)) and the Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards, including Analytic Tradecraft Standards, in Intelligence Community Directive [ICD] 203 ([DODI] Reference (k)) and as appropriate to the level and type of analysis being performed.”³

Under the DIE Analytic Functional Manager responsibilities, it adds that they “[advise] the [Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD I&S)]; the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]; and the Director, DIA, on the development and implementation of training, education, and certification programs for Defense Intelligence all source analysts in accordance with Joint and IC standards pursuant to References (j) and (k).”⁴

These two key references—JP 2-0 and ICD 203—provide a balance in what defense analysis delivers and the analytic skills applied to specify timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence to decisionmakers. Yet support to the joint force—the warfighting decisionmakers—has degraded over 20 years, as training has focused more on the skills (Reference k) as opposed to the outputs of defense analysis (Reference j). As a result, many intelligence analysts no longer speak the same language as the joint force, instead adhering exclusively to analytic tradecraft and processes developed independent from joint doctrine warfighter support requirements. It is as if a baseball coach brought a set of training programs to a team that focused on weightlifting, nutrition, mental health, and team building but did not bother to practice hitting and fielding. The team undoubtedly would be stronger, healthier, and maybe even happier, but that does not mean that they could throw strikes, hit homeruns, or win games. The basic rules of the game—the principles of joint intelligence—are deficient in the analytic tradecraft—and because of this, the warfighter is losing.

Hyperbole? Perhaps, but the joint intelligence planning community—which consists of more than 300 intelligence officers at DIA headquarters, the Joint Staff J2, and combatant command (CCMD) J2s—has noted a steady decrease in defense intelligence officer’s ability to understand how the analytic function supports planning and operations. Examples include:

• Product lines that prevent maintenance of running assessments of the operational environment due to production at CCMDs and policymakers being driven by requests for information and tasking. As a result, products are often limited to static formats versus the running estimates that the Joint Concept for Competition and campaigning decisions require.
• Shift at CCMDs from Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) development for commander decisions to key intelligence question methodology, which is an intelligence analyst–driven construct. The decoupling of PIRs from decisions results in a disconnect between indicators in the warning framework and indicators in PIRs as a disconnect in vernacular between the analysts and operators on warning.
• Lack of training on adversary situation and decision templates to support enemy course of action (ECOA) development and COA war-gaming and analysis, which further exacerbate the lack in understanding of how decision support templates drive warning and PIRs.
• Friction between analytic lines and the exploratory analyses that are necessary to support planning assumptions and ECOA development. This is in large part driven by a lack of understanding of how intelligence is integrated into planning and operations through the joint planning processes rather than providing intelligence as a separate and definitive product line.
• Lack of training on operational assessments necessary to support global and CCMD campaign assessments and inform the Chairman and commanders on the effectiveness of the military approach.
• Divergence in tradecraft among deterrence assessments, perception analysis, and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) instruction on analyzing the cognitive domain and information operations.

This article aims to identify and outline structural reasons behind key gaps in intelligence analytic support to the joint force and to recommend changes to how joint military intelligence officers rebalance IC tradecraft and joint force standards.

From 9/11 and IRTPA to ICD 203: Creating Analytic Tradecraft Standards

For most of the thousands of intelligence officers hired after September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA), signed in December 2004, has governed the organizational construct and provided guidance for IC operations and improved integration (see textbox for 18 IC members). IRTPA was a response to the lack of intelligence-sharing and tradecraft that contributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and faulty assertions of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

One of the ways the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) implemented the mandates from IRTPA was by developing and publishing ICD 203, first published in 2007 and last updated in 2022. ICD 203 established the IC’s “Analytic Standards that govern production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices; and delineates the role of the [ODNI] Analytic Ombuds.”⁵ It further states that the “IC Analytic Standards serve as a common IC foundation for developing education and training in analytic skills. The results of analytic product evaluations will be used to improve materials and programs for education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft.”⁶

ICD 203 includes five analytic standards and nine tradecraft standards, which drive analytic tradecraft, review, and publication criteria. These include:

• objective
• independent of political consideration
• timely
• based on all available sources of intelligence information
• implements and exhibits analytic tradecraft standards.

ICD 203 and implementation of a DIE-wide training standard to the principles in it have unquestionably improved how analysis is presented to decisionmakers, but it does not capture the standards or tradecraft for what analysis is required by the joint force. To address those gaps, defense intelligence must look toward joint doctrine, Reference J.

Joint Intelligence Principles and the Missing Standards

What is Reference J, Joint Intelligence? Intelligence is one of the seven joint functions identified as central to all joint operations and joint operational planning in both JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning. JP 3-0 states:

Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. The intelligence function informs joint force commanders about adversary intentions, capabilities, centers of gravity, critical factors, vulnerabilities, and future courses of action. . . . Using the continuous JIPOE analysis process, properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance the operating environment (OE) understanding and enable the Joint Force Commander to act quickly and effectively.⁷

JP 5-0 cites JIPOE 44 times with pages dedicated to outlining for nonintelligence officers the joint intelligence deliverables and products expected throughout all seven steps of the joint planning process, operations, as well as multiple steps of the assessment process.⁸ JP 5-0 also argues for running estimates, and not static product lines, to facilitate the transition to crisis planning: “This is why CCMD JIPOE efforts should be continuous; these efforts maintain the intelligence portions of the CCDR’s strategic estimate. Keeping the strategic estimate up to date greatly facilitates planning in a crisis, as well as the transition of contingency plans to execution in crisis situations.”⁹ JP 2-0 further defines the roles and responsibilities of joint intelligence, which include:

• Support the planning of operations

– describe the OE
– provide estimates of adversary intentions, capabilities, and COAs
– analyze target systems and identify
their vulnerabilities
– identify, define, and nominate objectives

• Support the execution of operations

– monitor the OE
– provide warning
– enable physical and nonphysical engagements against designated targets

• Assess the effectiveness of operations

– perform battle damage assessment
– measure changes to adversary capabilities, system behavior, and the OE.¹⁰

Figure. Four-Step JIPOE Process

The key joint intelligence tasks in the definition (above in italics) from Operations (Joint Staff J3), Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), and Intelligence (J2) doctrine are the four steps of JIPOE, which are cited by both JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 as the methodology behind the joint intelligence function (see figure). JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, is solely dedicated to the process, templates, and step-by-step instructions for defense intelligence analysts. In addition to JP 2-01.3, JP 5-0 devotes five pages to explaining the significance of the JIPOE process to planning and assessments, emphasizing the importance of these intelligence tasks to joint planning and operations. Every joint officer (military and civilian) who is trained in professional military education has studied JP 3-0 and JP 5-0. They expect the expert intelligence analysts on the planning teams to conduct JIPOE and deliver an ECOA.

While doctrine identifies the standards for what joint intelligence produces, the Chairman’s Readiness System and associated CJCS instructions governing it provide the authorities for joint commanders and the Joint Staff to demand they are upheld. In CJCS Instruction 3500.02C, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Program, the Chairman states that the UJTL is the “authoritative menu (or library) of all approved joint tasks required for planning, readiness reporting, training, and exercises, lessons learned processing, and requirements.”¹¹ The UJTL provides the standardization for all warfighting functions from the strategic to the tactical levels, from which 1 million Servicemembers in the joint force speak, plan, train to, exercise, and assess the ability to perform joint operations. Intelligence does not get a pass. The warfighter we support expects intelligence analysts to perform these tasks to these standards in these terms. The intelligence tasks in the UJTL mirror the intelligence cycle:

• planning and direction (2.1)
• collection (2.2)
• exploitation (2.3)
• analysis (2.4)
• dissemination (2.5)
• evaluation (2.6).

For the thousands of defense intelligence analysts at DIA and in the CCMDs, the most relevant tasks to drive analytic standards, training, and resources are the strategic national (SN) and strategic theater (ST) tasks:

• SN 2.4, Produce Strategic Intelligence
• SN 2.4.1.1, Identify Issues and/or Threats Priority
• SN 2.4.1.2, Determine Adversary Capabilities
• ST 2.4, Develop Intelligence
• ST 2.4.1, Conduct JIPOE
• ST 2.4.3, Provide Theater Intelligence Products.¹²

Army Major Taihei Hongo, Washington National Guard, attends Operational Intelligence Preparation of the Environment brief during exercise Cobra Gold on Camp Red Horse, Utapao, Rayong Province, Kingdom of Thailand, March 1, 2023 (U.S. Army National Guard/Adeline Witherspoon)

Though the UJTL titles appear generic, the description of each connects directly to the doctrinal definition, citing JP 2-01.3 as the foundational source for each.¹³ Moreover, each analytic task in the UJTL returns to the italicized text in the joint intelligence function that cites the key intelligence outputs of JIPOE, center of gravity (COG), and ECOAs, which are necessary to inform operational and planning decisions. Finally, each Universal Joint Task includes standards for assessment and training. It is wonderfully logical and yet so woefully overlooked.

Most analysts in support of the CCMDs or the Joint Staff do not have formal training in JIPOE or the core responsibilities listed for joint intelligence. Nor does the joint intelligence function consistently report the ability to perform these tasks through the Defense Readiness and Reporting System required by the Chairman’s Readiness System. Instead, the OUSDI&S and the DIEM for analysis employ different frameworks and different standards for analytic readiness assessments. At a minimum, these parallel processes are inefficient. At worst, they impede commanders’ ability to fully assesses risk to their mission.

Recommendations

Change must first start with redesign and reeducation of DIE analytic training to capture the key analytic tasks expected from joint intelligence and then must continue through the structural realignment of how managers of the defense analysis enterprise assess the DIE’s ability to conduct defense analysis at the theater and national levels. Practical change includes:

• Relink IC analytic standards to SN and ST 2.4 series tasks and update the measures and standards to include ICD 203 standards. That way assessments under the DIEM construct and joint force constructs are realigned and support both the CJCS and OUSD I&S.
• Re-baseline analytic training Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) (used to identify training objectives at the DIA Joint Military Intelligence Training Center) to the UJTL SN and ST 2.4 series and include training courses or modules on:

– PIR development and relationship to warning and assessments
– JIPOE
– ECOA development, to include situational templates and matrices
– COG analysis
– Operational assessments to include updates on intelligence requirements on monitoring the environment and assessing adversary perceptions as described in the Joint Concept for Competition and Joint Warfighting Concept.

• Align training in intelligence planning, analysis, collection, and targeting courses to understand tasks associated with requirements planning aligned to SN 2.1.2, Determine Strategic Intelligence Requirements. Differentiate between the ICD 203 tradecraft in developing key intelligence questions for policymakers and the process for developing PIR for commanders.
• Develop dual-approved joint tradecraft notes between the analytic career field and intelligence planning functional managers for JIPOE, ECOA development, COG analysis, and operational assessments; expand to dual tradecraft notes between other mission management career fields such as targeting and collection management and analysis enterprise managers to enable common lexicon and training.
• Align analysis training with intelligence planning instruction so that both the analyst and intelligence planning communities train to the same standards. Joint Staff J2’s steps toward reimagining warning will help realign planning decisions to warning problems.
• Evaluate additional joint military intelligence training courses’ TLOs and relationship to UJTs and develop intelligence support to planning and operations modules into analysis, targeting, partner engagement, foreign disclosure, collection, and warning courses to enable cross training. Each of these intelligence functions are members of an intelligence planning team and are expected to contribute to planning and develop appendices to the annex Bs for Campaign and Contingency Plans.
• Realign readiness and risk reporting under DIEMs to the reference assessments within joint and agency Mission Essential Task Lists for SN 2.4 and ST 2.4 series.
• Update deterrence and perceptions tradecraft notes to align with doctrine on operational assessments and potentially joint targeting methodology for assessing battlefield damage in the cognitive domain.
• Develop a joint military intelligence officer course and/or certification program for intelligence officers assigned to CCMD J2s. Add language to define support to joint planning, operations, or combat assessments into performance objective language for analysts at CCMDs. Nonspecific language in performance objectives has not succeeded in helping analysts understand their part in the JIPOE and joint intelligence support.
• Revisit the delineation of 11 career fields, particularly the ones aligned to intelligence operations/intelligence cycle, and identify ways to mandate cross training so that the intelligence cycle is a cycle and not cylinders

We in the DIE can no longer focus exclusively on training intelligence analytic tradecraft at the expense of training analysts to support the joint force. The regression of the joint military intelligence officer away from joint doctrine has been 20 years in the making. It is time to reevaluate intelligence analytic training standards. If IRTPA and the reforms from 2004 to 2008 overcorrected deficiencies in military intelligence support, we do not need to wait another 20 years to rebalance and make clear that when we say we support the warfighter, we know what that means. JFQ

Notes

¹ Catherine Johnston et al., “Transforming Defense Analysis,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (4th Quarter 2015), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/621117/transforming-defense-analysis/. Emphasis added.

² Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3115.17, Management and Oversight of DOD All-Source Analysis (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 21, 2020), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/311517p.pdf.

³ DODI 3115.17, 2.

⁴ DODI 3115.17, 8.

⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 (McLean, VA: ODNI, December 21, 2022), 2.

⁶ ODNI, ICD 203. Emphasis added.

⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 18, 2022), I-13, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. Emphasis added.

⁸ JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 1, 2020), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf.

⁹ JP 5-0, II-27. Emphasis added.

¹⁰ JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 22, 2013), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2_0.pdf.

¹¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.02C, Universal Joint Task List Program (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 19, 2022), 1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203500.02C.pdf. Emphasis added.

¹² See “Universal Joint Task List,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, last updated May 15, 2025, 76, 78, 80, 617, 619, 623, https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL/.

¹³ JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 21, 2014), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2-01-3.pdf.