Space Warfare

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The second edition of Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy, John Klein’s landmark work on spacepower, is a substantial expansion and update to the original. The book is a comprehensive primer on spacepower, intentional in its reliance on analogy to other domains (especially the maritime domain) but mindful of the limits of analysis by analogy. Klein emphasizes common characteristics of the maritime and space domains, such as expansive lines of communication, distant hubs of activity, movement of people and commerce, strategic positions, and interaction with activities on land. In the revised, updated, and expanded second edition, he adds depth and nuance to his analogies to maritime strategy and updates the book to reflect many developments in military space operations over the past two decades.

Klein is a senior fellow and strategist at Falcon Research, Inc.; an adjunct professor at The George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute; and a prolific author on space strategy. Space Warfare, originally published in 2006, was first of his several influential books on space power. Well versed in maritime strategy from his years as a naval officer, Klein’s approach to spacepower is often summarized as “Corbett on orbit” for his application to space of Sir Julian Corbett’s views on naval power.

The second edition has been updated throughout to reflect the establishment of U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Space Force, to address recent events in space, and to reference new and revised sources of space policy and doctrine. The second edition also offers much more robust consideration of legal issues applied to space operations in competition and conflict.

The new edition, like the first, is organized into three major parts. Part I introduces the space domain and major principles of military strategy relevant to the topic. A notable new passage is the author’s confession of error in the first edition’s comparative assessment of naval strategists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Corbett. Mahan is often associated with seeking decisive battle, while Corbett is understood to emphasize preserving access to sea lines of communication. Each generalized proposition obscures the depth of their ideas. Klein notes that Mahan’s best-known statements are excerpts from his early writings. Mahan further developed his ideas throughout his lengthy professional career, and Corbett had the benefit of beginning where Mahan left off. Klein urges strategists to see Mahan and Corbett as “two sides of the maritime strategy coin” and ultimately defends his reliance on Corbett as the later and more fulsome culmination of both strategists’ thought.

Also new in part I is a brief but important discussion of Chinese views on “cultural security,” the extent of a population’s acceptance of a distinct cultural identity, political structures, and information norms. Space capabilities such as satellite communications can bypass firewalls and other national information controls deployed in the name of cultural security. Such considerations can be significant for how authoritarian regimes like the Chinese Community Party approach space.

Part II is the heart of Klein’s application of naval strategy to space warfare, and most of Klein’s core analysis from the first edition endures in here. However, some passages have been substantially expanded. One example is chapter 11, “Limited Space Warfare, Asymmetric Advantage, and Coercion” (titled “Space as a Barrier” in the first edition). This new title suggests its relevance to the joint force: space operations have qualities analogous to special operations and irregular warfare, arguably better understood across the joint force following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than the first edition’s more counterintuitive approach to “space as a barrier.”

Another newly expanded discussion concerns a “disposal space force,” a nod to Corbett’s “disposal force” for conducting operations “as a method of disturbing our enemy’s plans and strengthening . . . our own positions.” Klein also discusses the concept of a “space force in being,” after Corbett’s admonition to avoid “decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favor.” Each of these ideas is developed even more fully in Klein’s Fight for the Final Frontier: Irregular Warfare in Space (Naval Institute Press, 2023). However, their inclusion in Space Warfare adds coherence to the latter’s more expansive approach to spacepower.

Entirely new in the second edition is chapter 13, “Guardian Angels and Celestial Demons.” Klein makes the technical, operational, and doctrinal case for spacecraft optimized for defense and attack. Guardian Angels are “autonomous, cooperative, co-orbital spacecraft operating in proximity to the defended target to provide characterization, awareness, and evaluation of the local region . . . (and) possess(ing) the capabilities necessary to protect and defend the target.” “Celestial Demons” are their offensive opposite number: spacecraft for surveillance, characterization, and interdiction of adversary satellites. Klein again borrows from the naval tradition in analogizing these spacecraft to hukker (“hunter-killer”) antisubmarine task forces.

Also in chapter 13, Klein foresees the eventual need for “constabulary” space forces for rescue, law enforcement, and grey-zone operations, particularly as commercial utilization of lunar resources becomes feasible. He posits a force analogous to the U.S. Coast Guard for space—specifically authorized for law enforcement functions—though concedes the political will for such a reorganization of U.S. space forces is probably decades away.

In part III, Klein concludes his defense of maritime strategic thought as an intellectual baseline for understanding spacepower. He also makes policy recommendations about the U.S. approach to space warfare. New to the second edition is a recommendation to establish a Space National Guard. Klein notes the value of part-time citizen Guardians to space missions, the utility of space for disaster response such as overhead infrared sensing for countering wildfires, and National Guard support to domestic crisis response.

Space Warfare does not address recent legislation establishing a “single component” Space Force, which already provides a legal authority for Space Force Guardians to serve on a full-time or part-time basis. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why National Guard–specific authorities would be necessary to bring satellites—inherently deployed beyond the political or legal jurisdiction of any state or territorial governor—to bear on domestic problems. Currently, no National Guard space mission units operate systems capable of “monitor(ing) large gatherings of people engaged in civil unrest” (one of the missions Klein suggests for a Space National Guard). His recommendation may envision a future National Guard equipped for such missions. In any event, Klein’s digression on a Space National Guard is a brief detour in his analysis.

Space Warfare is a bright star in the constellation of spacepower literature. Klein’s core ideas, first articulated two decades ago in the first edition, remain relevant and insightful. The second edition builds on that strong foundation, much as Corbett’s ideas built on Mahan’s, and will prove immensely valuable to future generations of space warfighters. JFQ