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Lieutenant Colonel Shiraz Khan, USAF, is a Senior Intelligence Officer for Strategic Competition.
Defense and service departments are temporary constructs, reflecting national choices that are therefore worthy of continual examination as they often lose sight of their beginnings.1
The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly calls to “deter cyberattacks from state and nonstate actors and will respond decisively with all appropriate tools of national power to hostile acts in cyberspace, including those that disrupt or degrade vital national functions or critical infrastructure.”2 The ensuing 2023 National Cyber Security Strategy deems that “Cybersecurity is essential to the basic functioning of our economy, the operation of our critical infrastructure, the strength of our democracy and democratic institutions, the privacy of our data and communications, and our national defense.”3 As concerns of nefarious activities in cyberspace grow and adversaries recognize the low-cost and high-return nature of having cyber-based capabilities, the U.S. Senate added a provision to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ordering the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a study to evaluate the need to stand up a seventh Service, one that would focus exclusively on enhancing U.S. capability in the cyber domain. While Congress stripped that provision at the last minute before passing the 2024 NDAA, the question of an independent U.S. Cyber Force continues to generate conversation among national security professionals. This article does not aim to analyze the current level of cyber capabilities and determine whether they are adequate to meet U.S. cyber needs. Rather, it focuses on the question of an independent Cyber Force through the lens of the two most recent historical examples of a defense capability outgrowing the Service that it was originally housed under. An understanding of the historical conditions surrounding the Air Force and Space Force prior to their breaking away from their parent organizations offers senior policymakers a perspective to view the Cyber Force question through a precedent-based lens of new defense force creation.
Research Methodology
To determine if the conditions exist to support the establishment of a separate Cyber Force, this article uses the framework of Bruno Dyck and Frederick Starke’s process model, which studied the conditions that lead to the formation of breakaway organizations.4 Because Dyck and Starke created this model after assessing nonprofit and faith-based organizations breaking away from parent organizations, the model is first tested for its applicability to the creation of a military organization. Testing Dyck and Starke’s model on the formation of the Air Force and the Space Force demonstrates its applicability to gauge the conditions for standing up a Cyber Force. From there, the criteria are applied to the current conditions surrounding the discussion on an independent Cyber Force. While organizations in the military cannot break away from their parent organization the same way that the organizations that Dyck and Starke studied, their stages and triggers still provide a useful framework to study how the Air Force and Space Force were formed.
Figure. Bruno Dyck and Frederick Starke’s The Formation of Breakaway Organizations
In The Formation of Breakaway Organizations: Observations and a Process Model, Dyck and Starke identify six stages in the progression of organizations eventually breaking away:
- relative harmony
- idea development
- change
- resistance
- intense conflict
- exit.
These six stages include five
“trigger events”:
- introduction of conflicting ideas
- legitimizing event
- alarm
- polarization of views
- justification.5
An additionally important note is that Dyck and Starke did not explicitly state that all the stages and triggers had to occur sequentially, or if they could happen in parallel.
Air Force Case Study
The Air Force began as a division within the U.S. Army in 1907 and became its own force in 1947 after decades of internal discussions focused on recognizing the air as a defense domain and the belief that the application of airpower had limits being housed under the Army.
(Stage) Relative harmony. From its inception in 1907 under the U.S. Army Signal Corps when the Air Service was in “charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects”6 to the successful demonstration of airpower in World War II, airpower advocates experienced constant friction while continuously pushing the limits of independence, arguing that the ability to optimize airpower was being lost by aero squadrons being placed under disparate Army organizations.7 Although Airmen coexisted with Soldiers, they recognized the unmet potential of airpower and consistently advocated for more resources.
(Trigger event) Introduction of conflicting ideas. By 1920, shortly after the conclusion of aerial demonstrations in World War I, Congress recognized the need for expansion of the aviation capability and directed the Army Reorganization Act that led to an Air Service, commanded by a major general who would oversee air training, aerial depots, and three groups.8 However, all aerial units were still subordinate to Army corps commanders and primarily seen as support units for ground operations.
(S) Idea development. In 1921, William “Billy” Mitchell, who was then a colonel in the Army Air Service, released the seminal work Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense, where he made the case for a separate air force. In the first sentence of the foreword, Mitchell provocatively states that the “purpose of this book is to bring before the American people an idea of what an efficient organization of our aeronautical resources means to our country,” followed by “Suitable and adequate preparation of the air arm, and the personnel required to man the aircraft, manufacture the equipment, and supply such a force cannot be furnished by the Army or Navy, or by the two combined, as has been the experience in all countries in the recent War.”9 Mitchell’s aggressiveness became a catalyst to advance the idea of a separate service. His unwavering advocacy for a separate air service would lead to his court-martial for insubordination.
(T) Legitimizing event. While there was no singular legitimizing event leading to the creation of a separate air force, airpower demonstrated its value to warfighting from its earliest days. From providing reconnaissance and target identification to strategic bombing campaigns in World Wars I and II that neutralized adversaries on land, sea, and in the air, the acceptance of the need for aerial capabilities grew by the decade. The Air Corps Act of 1926, which changed the Air Service to the Air Corps and established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, signaled that the United States recognized the growing role of airpower and the need for investment in expanded aerial capabilities.10 From there, investments in airpower personnel, training, and equipment continued to steadily increase over the ensuing decades.
(S) Change. Because of the legitimization by the Air Corps Act of 1926 and Billy Mitchell’s “crusader’s energy,”11 change agents saw room to advance airpower principles, albeit under Army control. Change agents saw a major victory with the operational stand-up of General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF) in 1935, with GHQAF assuming command and control over Air Corps units.12 Air Force historian Herman Wolk described GHQAF: “The GHQ Air Force could be seen as a compromise between the advocates of air independence and the officers of the War Department General Staff, who persisted in the view that the major air mission was the support of the Army ground forces.”13 While the stand-up of GHQAF was not enough to fully satisfy airpower zealots like Major James “Jimmy” Doolittle, other luminaries such as Brigadier General Henry “Hap” Arnold saw this as a milestone in a long road.14 Arnold in particular would go on to shape the future force, not only with ground focused doubters externally but also with air theorists internally, who battled over the values of pushing for precision bombing versus the more desired strategic bombing potential.15
(T) Alarm. By 1937, Major General Oscar Westover, who was appointed as the new Air Corps chief, warned that the “GHQ Air Force is part of the Army, and it is our interest and duty to keep that fact constantly in mind.”16 Westover made clear that he was against an independent service. However, Westover would die in a plane crash the following year, and the conversation for an independent force once again proliferated.
(S) Resistance. As institutional resistance to the idea of an independent Air Force grew in the Army, airpower advocates faced a setback in the goal of an independent Air Force. In 1940, GHQAF was once again placed under the control of Army field forces. During this period, airpower zealots were not able to demonstrate fully their value to a conflict.17
(T) Polarization of views. Due to Arnold’s patience and relationships, he was able to continue to advocate quietly for more independence from the Army, and by June of 1941, Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall established the Army Air Forces (AAF) to provide command and control over both the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command (formerly GHQAF).18 With the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, American sentiment for an independent Air Force grew, and Congress introduced two bills to create one.19 However, both Marshall and Arnold agreed to wait until after the war to revisit the issue of an independent service, but the AAF did get additional funding to strengthen its position.20
(S) Intense conflict. With World War II underway and the AAF heavily tasked, discussion of an independent Air Force was shelved, and there was not a continuance of the debate during wartime, avoiding what may have otherwise led to an intense conflict.
(T) Justification. Air Force historian Herman Wolk referred to the aviation performance of the Army’s airmen during World War II as “a culminating point in the long struggle of the airmen to establish an independent Air Force. The impressive contribution to allied victory made by the AAF provided a decisive impetus to the drive to create a United States Air Force.”21 Airpower advocates had a tangible demonstration of what resources and independence would mean to the Nation’s defense.
(S) Exit. Following the conclusion of World War II, from 1945 to 1947 and trends moving toward the creation of an independent air service, bitter fights broke out regarding military Service roles, budgets, and policies, but ultimately those fights were won by airpower zealots, leading to the creation of an independent service.22 After 40 years under the Army, the Harry Truman administration’s National Security Act of 1947 led to the establishment of an independent Air Force.
Space Force Case Study
Much like the Air Force under the Army, the Space Force also began its existence under another Service and eventually broke away after widespread recognition that the United States was not able to meet its security needs fully under the existing construct. The Space Force can tie its origins to the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954 and became its own force in 2019.23
(S) Relative harmony. While the Army disagreed with CONAD falling under the newly formed Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed and allowed CONAD to remain under the Air Force. CONAD remained a direct part of the Air Force portfolio until 1975, when it was reshaped as Aerospace Defense Command and was moved under the larger North American Aerospace Defense Command in partnership with Canada to ensure air sovereignty and air defense for North America.24
(T) Introduction of conflicting ideas. As the Cold War proceeded into the 1980s, the Ronald Reagan administration became increasingly concerned with the prospect of Soviet space-based laser capability. A group of Government Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) officials began advocating for an Aerospace Force or Space Force that would be responsible for creating offensive laser weapons and defending against Soviet laser advancements.25 A national space policy document was issued in 1982, increasing awareness of the space domain.
(S) Idea development. By 1985, U.S. Space Command was created as a unified combatant command, falling directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While many of the space assets would still belong to the Air Force, U.S. Space Command would be the means to centralize operations and maximize space capabilities indigenous to the Army and Navy as well.26 This would not, however, synchronize multiple program management efforts found across DOD.
(T) Legitimizing event. While the theoretical value of space-based operations had been discussed throughout the decades since the 1950s, the Persian Gulf War in 1990 was a legitimizing event that shaped the model for what future conflicts would look like. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General McPeak declared the Persian Gulf war as “our first space war,”27 as the value of space was demonstrated through satellite communication, advanced reconnaissance, up-to-the-minute weather updates, Scud warnings, and navigation.28
(S) Change, (T) Alarm. The overall success of space applications during the Persian Gulf War led Air Force leaders to believe they were the leaders in the space community.29 However, by the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the Air Force performance in the space domain increasingly came under scrutiny. Author and historian Priscilla Dale Jones offered:
The Department of Defense, but particularly the Air Force, had long come under particular and bipartisan scrutiny by major congressional overseers. Defense space issues, notably the organization and management of space acquisitions and oversight and the evolving nature of space, were an abiding interest and growing source of concern for Congress. Some Senate and House members criticized what they believed were “managerial deficits” in space acquisition.30
In November 1998, Senator Robert Smith (R-NH) gave a speech at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy advocating for a substantial shift of resources to space-based endeavors and even proposed the possibility of a Space Force.31 These ideas would later be used as the basis of a 2001 Space Commission report and NDAA for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, which would ultimately establish the Space Force. Senator Smith did not believe the Air Force was an independent advocate for space-based capabilities, arguing Air Force leaders would prioritize air needs first.32 The Iraq and Afghanistan wars would distract from recommendations of the 2001 Space Commission report to establish space as a top national security and pushing for better space synchronization. The findings would encounter regular resistance from Air Force leaders.
(S) Resistance. Senior Air Force leaders were not only caught in a defensive position, recognizing that prioritizing space would come at a cost to air-based competencies, but they also did not want to lose the overall portfolio.33 They used similar arguments that the Air Force faced from the Army in seeking their own independence half-century earlier. Air Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters offered:
At the risk of confirming that I am a Luddite when it comes to space, let me say that I really do not understand what the big problem is that justifies a national commission. The Air Force, I think, is doing a pretty darn good job of space stewardship within the constraints of the budget that we have been given. We spent 85 percent of the national defense space budget and have roughly the same number of men and women engaged in the trenches of national defense space.34
Similar to how Army leaders argued about the Air Force, Peters would go on making the argument about Space Force through the lens of added bureaucracy, training, recruiting, and operating costs. He argued instead that Congress should give the Air Force more funding, and then the space portfolio could grow to meet congressional needs while not sacrificing the air portfolio.35 Additionally, critics offered that while the Air Force earned independence after successful display of air doctrine implementation during World War II, the Space Force had not had the chance to show an independent utility of space doctrine.
(T) Polarization of views, (S) Intense conflict. While there was no singular polarizing event in the late 2010s, after decades of conversation on the topic, and the Air Force was still actively fighting in conflict across the globe, the discussion for an independent service picked up steam during the first Donald Trump administration.
(T) Justification. With direction from the Trump administration, by March 2019 DOD created a 5-year plan to establish a Space Force under the Department of the Air Force. Prominent RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth, who heavily contributed to conversations with space power advocates, noted:
Their advocates had for years believed one or more of the following to be true: first, the Air Force, “de facto custodian” of space, had not given that subject its proper due; second, improvements were needed in Air Force mechanisms for space organization and funding; third, the U.S. “military space program . . . [was] mature enough to strike out on its own toward mastering the fourth medium of warfare, either partly or completely detached from direct Air Force control.”36
From there, the Air Force accepted the inevitability of the change and proceeded to execute the task of helping to support the stand-up of an independent force.
(S) Exit. Space Force stood up in 2019 with passage of the 2020 NDAA after six decades of being recognized as a warfighting domain. The case studies of the exit of the Air Force from the Army and of the Space Force from the Air Force provide the framework to analyze the current conditions surrounding the conversation about a separate Cyber Force.
Cyber Force Analysis
Based on the application of Dyck and Starke’s process model on case studies of the Air Force and Space Force, the model is appropriate to apply its stages and triggering events to the current conditions surrounding the question of a separate Cyber Force.
While the stages and triggers in the study of the Air Force and Space Force applied linearly, retrospectively, the history of the Cyber Force discussion is still unfolding so may not have the same progression, as some events that qualify as stages and triggers may apply simultaneously. Moreover, because the Cyber Force discussion is still unfolding with no deliberate direction to change the status quo, using peer-reviewed articles, official testimony by senior cyber leaders, and positions offered by various thought leaders in the field should be useful in analyzing whether the conditions that led to breakaway military organizations in the past mirror the conversation surrounding Cyber Force today.
Like the Air Force and Space Force in their respective domains, the questions surrounding the U.S. capability to defend the cyber domain is leading to the question of the need to create a Cyber Force. Similar to the history of the other two Services, instead of creating a path for independent force creation, DOD is currently looking to meet its cyber needs through supporting a combatant command–level organization.
(S) Relative harmony. Unlike periods of relative harmony for the air domain capability under the Army or space domain capability under the Air Force, the notion of cyberspace as a domain is a nuanced one. Cyberspace extends far beyond traditional defense portfolios and includes “households, corporations, universities, governments, militaries, and all categories of critical infrastructures.”37 Because all branches of the military are affected by issues in cyberspace, all branches are committed to a degree of cyberspace capabilities. Once cyberspace became recognized as a contested space and identified as a vulnerability, relative harmony for the status quo ended.
(T) Introduction of conflicting ideas. From the beginning, with the July 1996 William Clinton administration’s President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure (PCCIP) highlighting the cyber vulnerability in the Nation’s critical infrastructure despite finding no immediate threat to it, to the George
W. Bush administration charging the newly stood up Department of Homeland Security in 2001 to protect the Nation’s critical infrastructure, U.S. institutions began to develop a desire to challenge the status quo in the rapidly expanding cybersphere.38
(S) Idea development. By 2003, the United States released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which not only emphasized the role that private industry would need to play to ensure their own cyber security but also declared that attacks in cyberspace might result in the use of cyber weapons as a response.39 The ideas developed during this period would lay the foundation for the need to defend the cybersphere while also recognizing the weaponization of this space.
(T) Legitimizing event, (S) Change. By 2004, the National Military Strategy released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared definitively that “cyberspace is a ‘domain’ of conflict alongside the air, land, sea, and space domains, and noted DOD must maintain its ability to defend against and to engage enemy actors in this new domain.”40 This move legitimized the cyberspace domain and drove institutional change leading to the establishment of task forces focusing on offensive and defensive capabilities, eventually converging, and forming U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2010. The director of the National Security Agency was also USCYBERCOM’s first commander, and the precedent of dual-hatting both responsibilities remains today.
(T) Alarm, (S) Resistance. The initial stand-up of USCYBERCOM did not cause alarm as each Service still maintained its own cyber capability, even as USCYBERCOM elevated from subunified command to a unified command. Air Force Cyber, Army Cyber, Navy Cyber, and Marine Cyber each had roles for their Services and in support of USCYBERCOM.41 However, calls for a separate Cyber Force continued to grow louder. Retired senior cyber leaders penned a memorandum in 2023 via the Military Cyber Professional Association. These leaders included the signatures of the first USCYBERCOM commander, General Keith Alexander, and the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, General Michael Hayden. In the memo, the authors argued that “Only a service, with all its trappings, can provide the level of focus needed to achieve optimal results in their given domain. Cyberspace, being highly contested and increasingly so, is the only domain of conflict without an aligned service. How much longer will our citizenry endure this unnecessary risk?”42
Critics of establishing a separate Cyber Force pushed back vehemently. Air Force Colonel Corey M. Ramsby, former director of staff for the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, offered:
It is premature to call for a separate cyberspace armed service, independent of the other services and agencies, to project power and protect vital U.S. national security and economic vitality interests. There are four key prerequisites before achieving this goal: 1) a unique, strategic military capability unachievable by any of the other services and agencies; 2) corresponding technological advances; 3) an unrestricted battlespace; and 4) political champions to maneuver the bureaucracy and pass legislation.43
While Ramsby was not alone in arguing that the criteria to establish a separate service had not been met, several senior military leaders and politicians disagreed.
(T) Polarization of views. There is an increasing recognition that greater institutional partnership with private industry will be critical to advance cyber capabilities and that the current military construct lacks the mechanisms to do that. For the 2024 NDAA, the Senate included a provision that charged the Secretary of Defense with preparing a study comparing how current organizing, training, and equipping cyber requirements are being met with an evaluation of how a separate Cyber Force could meet those requirements. The provision was eventually stricken from the NDAA, as Congress did not trust in the ability of DOD to conduct these assessments while evaluating the performance of USCYBERCOM with beefed up NDAA support.44
(S) Intense conflict. While the conflict between Cyber Force advocates and detractors is not as intense as those within the organizations Dyck and Starke studied or what the Air Force faced during stand up, there will be heavy evaluation of USCYBERCOM’s performance moving forward. FY24 will be the first year that USCYBERCOM will have Enhanced Budgetary Control over its own funding, allowing for U.S. Special Operations Command–like acquisition capability.45 This Service-like funding will allow USCYBERCOM a viable acquisition vehicle to meet the Nation’s defense needs or further push the conversation on a separate force. Additionally, cyber forces within each Service will be maturing in their capabilities to meet internal Service needs in addition to supporting USCYBERCOM and will be part of the evaluation on whether the Nation needs a separate Cyber Force.
(T) Justifying event. While USCYBERCOM’s failing to meet the Nation’s cyber defense needs would give more momentum to the Cyber Force conversation, external factors will also influence the conversation. Key strategic competitor China is reorganizing its forces to better integrate cyber capabilities.46 Just as the United States did with Space Force, Cyber Force advocates argue that China is moving ahead of it in the cybersphere, and the United States must react with a force resourced and dedicated to winning in the cyber domain.47 As advances in artificial intelligence continue at a rapid pace and cyberattacks against the United States continue to rise, the calls for more optimized, unified cyber responses will only further fuel the Cyber Force conversation.
(S) Exit. Currently, despite growing calls to stand-up a cyber force and the conditions surrounding the evolution of the cybersphere conversation mirroring those of the Air Force and Space Force, there have not been tangible steps taken to create a breakaway service.
Conclusion
Comparing the stages and triggering events in the formation of the Air Force and Space Force for new warfighting organizations supports the case for an independent Cyber Force and posits further datapoints for policymakers to consider when assessing this issue from a historical precedent perspective.
All elements of Dyck and Starke’s process model’s stages and trigger conditions were evident in the breakaway of the Air Force and the Space Force leading to the creation of their independent Services. The same holds true in the analysis of the current conditions surrounding the conversation of a potential Cyber Force. However, a key difference is that although the prospect of an independent Air Force enjoyed significant political support from the Truman administration, and the independence of Space Force garnered significant support from the Trump administration, the Cyber Force does not currently enjoy the same level of support from the White House. Additionally, although the Air Force was formed after successful demonstration of airpower as a major factor in World War II, a potential Cyber Force is in the same place as Space Force in that it has not demonstrated large-scale combat impacts of its doctrine and has still been in a supporting role despite growing tactical successes and its role as a deterrence factor.
Finally, while the Air Force required over four decades from the determination of the air as a warfighting domain before gaining independence and the Space Force required six decades, a potential Cyber Force is only two decades into the conversation since the cybersphere was accepted as a warfighting domain. However, with technology evolving at a much more rapid pace and adversaries gaining parity in cyberspace much faster, cyber advocates may not have to wait as long as air and space advocates did, as the United States could cede the cyber domain to an adversary if it does not get a definitive hold of it quickly. JFQ
Notes
1 James W.E. Smith, “Space Force Creation Warrants Revisiting Defense Unification,” War on the Rocks, September 23, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/space-force-creation-warrants-revisiting-defense-unification/.
2 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, October 2022), 34, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1182639.pdf.
3 National Cybersecurity Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2023), 2, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf.
4 Bruno Dyck and Frederick A. Starke, “The Formation of Breakaway Organizations: Observations and a Process Model,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 1999), 792–822, https://doi.org/10.2307/2667056.
5 Dyck and Starke.
6 “The Birth of the United States Air Force,” Air Force Historical Research Agency, n.d., https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/433914/the-birth-of-the-united-states-air-force/.
7 “The Birth of the United States Air Force.”
8 “The Birth of the United States Air Force.”
9 William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1921), xvii.
10 “The Birth of the United States Air Force.”
11 Herman S. Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2007), 9.
12 “The Birth of the United States Air Force.”
13 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 13.
14 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 13.
15 Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2002).
16 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 14.
17 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 14.
18 “The Birth of the United States Air Force.”
19 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 17.
20 Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence, 17.
21 Herman S. Wolk, The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), v.
22 Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943–1947 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1984).
23 Robert Farley, Space Force: Ahead of Its Time or Dreadfully Premature? Policy Analysis No. 904 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep28729.pdf.
24 Farley, Space Force.
25 Priscilla Dale Jones, United States Space Force: Some Origins of the Idea “Whose Time Has Come” (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2020), https://www.afhistory.af.mil/Portals/64/Books/Titles/Space%20Force%20Origins.pdf.
26 David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: Air Force Space Command, 1998), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0063_SPIRES_BRADLEY_STURDEVANT_ECKERT_BEYOND_HORIZONS.pdf.
27 John S. Riordan, Out of the Blue and Into the Black: Creation of the United States Space Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA367209.pdf.
28 Riordan, Out of the Blue and Into the Black.
29 Spires, Beyond Horizons.
30 Jones, United States Space Force, 3.
31 Jones.
32 Jones.
33 Jones.
34 Jones, 42.
35 Jones.
36 Jones, 2.
37 Natasha Solce, “The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch—the Cyber Force,” Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 18, no. 1 (January 2008), 295, https://www.albanylawscitech.org/article/19149-the-battlefield-of-cyberspace-the-inevitable-new-military-branch-the-cyber-force.
38 Solce, “The Battlefield of Cyberspace.”
39 Solce.
40 “U.S. Cyber Command,” U.S. Cyber Command, n.d., https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/#:~:text=The%20Creation%20of%20Cyber%20Command,Command%2C%20on%2021%20May%202010.
41 “U.S. Cyber Command.”
42 Martin Matishak, “U.S. Military Needs 7th Branch Just for Cyber, Current and Former Leaders Say,” The Record, March 27, 2023, https://therecord.media/us-cyber-force-creation-proposed-mcpa.
43 Corey M. Ramsby and Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, “A Reality Check on a Cyber Force,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (2016), 116, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1015715.pdf.
44 Matishak, “U.S. Military Needs 7th Branch Just for Cyber, Current and Former Leaders Say.”
45 Matishak.
46 Christina L. Decker, “Cyber as a Service: Organizing the DOD for the Fifth Domain” (Master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2019), 39, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1177250.pdf.
47 Henry L. Sims, “Enacting the U.S. Cyber Force: The Key to Winning the Great Cyber Competition with China,” Naval War College, 2023, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1210833.pdf.