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The geostrategic challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Western Pacific is a contest that the United States must counter with the collective implementation of the instruments of national power in pursuit of improved operational access for the U.S. joint force. The U.S. whole-of-government integrated effort holds the potential to preserve the international order and promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific for decades in the face of PRC regional aggression.¹ The commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, described the necessity for directing the power of the U.S. Government toward the challenges in the Western Pacific at the Pacific Forum in January 2024, remarking, “We have to address the security challenges, and we need to understand that for the United States. . . it’s going to take all forms of power of our government. It can’t be military alone. . . . [The military] allows the other forms of national power to operate from a position of strength.”² An integrated strategy requires applying the instruments of national power to ensure the operational access of the U.S. joint force.

The United States must acknowledge the formidable basing and access challenges west of the International Date Line (IDL) and within the Second Island Chain.³ It is imperative to formulate comprehensive strategies and intergovernmental approaches that amplify joint force operational access. Effective solutions demand a strategic blend of diplomatic initiatives, coordinated information efforts, and targeted economic approaches to bolster operational access, aligning with achieving integrated deterrence. As the United States reaffirms its role as an Indo-Pacific power, operational access should emerge as a linchpin for upholding regional security, bolstering partnerships, and ensuring the successful execution of an integrated deterrence strategy. Exploring the historical and present-day dimensions of operational access and recognizing its pivotal role in shaping the future posture of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is critical to generating the whole-of-government efforts to improve military posture west of the IDL.

Figure 1. U.S. Defense Sites West of the International Date Line

Current Posture and Gaps

The existing U.S. force posture in the Western Pacific, rooted in historical basing and rotational force agreements stemming from the post–Pacific War security landscape, necessitates recapitalization and evolution to sustain operational access for the joint force. The concentrated presence of forces in Northeast Asia, coupled with the constraints that this density imposes on the operational reach of the joint force, requires careful strategic considerations^.4 The current military posture of U.S. forces west of the IDL relies heavily on basing and access agreements that have their infancy in the Cold War.⁵ In this context, military posture refers to the combination of forces, positions (such as large bases and prepositioned stocks), and political agreements that dictate the actions permitted for these forces under specific conditions.⁶ This includes overflight access provisions for U.S. aircraft and authorizations for cooperative logistical operations.⁷ Military posture signals intent to adversaries, and in the Western Pacific, it is critical to enable the joint force to overcome the tyranny of distance for credible power projection from the continental United States in support of a crisis.⁸ Figure 1 depicts the current joint force posture west of the IDL and shows the concentration of forces in Northeast Asia, specifically in Guam, Japan, and South Korea.⁹ Of note in figure 1 is the increase of rotational forces in the South Pacific, arraying from Australia north into the First Island Chain through the Philippines. The central geostrategic position of the PRC presents a dilemma to the joint force, which may need to improve its ability to maneuver effectively in the Western Pacific and support U.S. national strategic objectives by addressing the current shortfalls in regional access and basing agreements.

While the U.S. posture in the Western Pacific may currently preserve operational reach for the joint force to access potential flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula in a permissive environment, the absence of multiple operational axes of maneuver or sea approaches restricts the force flow options available to the USINDOPACOM commander. Persistent basing in Northeast Asia simplifies operational problems for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a targeting and intelligence-gathering perspective, just as the joint force would begin maneuvering in a crisis.¹⁰ Admiral Aquilino notes the importance of a distributed force in his 2023 posture statement to Congress, commenting that a “distributed force posture west of the IDL . . . increases survivability, reduces risk, and sustains the force with a network of stores, munitions, and fuel to support operations in a contested environment.”¹¹ The current concentration of forces inhibits maneuver on multiple axes through the southern approaches of South China and East China seas to conduct unified action to support a crisis or conflict.¹² While maritime forces may experience unrestricted movement on the high seas, establishing forward air bases for Air Force assets and ports of debarkation for Army forces demands a strategically distributed access footprint across a prospective theater of operations.¹³ Distributed operational access enables survivability and provides operational maneuver options for the joint force while presenting the PLA with intelligence and targeting dilemmas.

Operational Access to Enable the Joint Force

Strengthening Integrated Deterrence. The joint force requires increased operational access to enable an effective integrated deterrence strategy in the Western Pacific. In the 2022 National Security Strategy, the United States reaffirmed its role as an Indo-Pacific power, emphasizing the imperative to uphold regional connectivity, bolster security measures, and enhance resilience for long-term stability.¹⁴ The 2022 National Defense Strategy describes integrated deterrence as how the United States will advance its security priorities, noting that “integrated deterrence is enabled by combat credible forces prepared to fight and win.”¹⁵ The joint force is the critical factor in enabling security in the region by being credibly positioned to counter malign actions by the PLA.

Enhancing access is paramount for facilitating an integrated deterrence strategy, as it empowers the United States to deny crucial political, military, and geographic key terrain from the PRC. Simultaneously, it allows the United States to bolster its presence, empowering regional partners and fortifying resilience.¹⁶ The balance of forces in the Western Pacific is one of many factors for creating a deterrent effect against the PRC. Still, it is a critical piece of an overall strategy of integrated deterrence.¹⁷ In the case of enabling access for forward-deployed forces to the Indo-Pacific region, deterrence-by-denial can be achieved by convincing the PRC that escalatory aggressive action is unlikely to succeed based on the local balance of forces.¹⁸ A method of exploiting current operational access is through rotational forces, which can significantly affect the local balance of forces and enable a deterrent effect.

Figure 2. U.S. Ground Forces Indo-Pacific Region

Although the Western Pacific is commonly perceived as a maritime-dominated region, deploying forward-positioned or rotational ground and land-based forces can be a highly credible strategy to establish a reliable deterrent against malign actions by the PLA. Figure 2 depicts permanent and rotational bases employed by ground elements of the joint force west of the IDL.19 A 2020 RAND study on the impact of ground forces on deterrence found that heavy ground forces reduced the likelihood of low-intensity militarized disputes between a partner or allied nation and an adversary.²⁰ This form of extended deterrence is critical to opening pathways for increased operational access between the United States and regional partners.²¹ The study also found that crisis deployments of ground troops can prevent escalation but require considerable forward posture, infrastructure, and logistical support to enable ground forces to rapidly flow into a theater of operations to have an effect.22 Rotational ground forces can provide a low-impact footprint to establish operational access and can lead to increased investment for infrastructure to support other Services’ operations.²³ Access and infrastructure are critical for air forces, requiring specialized operations and maintenance facilities.24 While the joint force retains the ability to conduct power projection with maritime forces in times of crisis, it requires developed physical infrastructure and mature access agreements to enable operational access for the joint forces, notably the Army and Air Force.

Assuring Partners and Allies. Operational access is crucial to ensure regional security and to reassure partners and allies of the unwavering U.S. commitment to the theater. Regular operational access during strategic competition is essential to laying the groundwork for future access requests in times of crisis or conflict. A RAND study on conflict access in the Indo-Pacific region found that increasing peacetime access requests could increase the likelihood of their approval by a partner during conflict.²⁵ Routine exercises, training events, arms sales, and public messaging are associated with increased operational access. These measures can reassure partners and allies of the U.S. commitment to mutual defense and regional security.²⁶

In his posture statement to Congress, Admiral Aquilino highlighted the importance of forward-deployed forces, stating, “Forward-based and rotational joint forces armed with lethal capabilities demonstrate resolve, support the security of our allies and partners, and provide the Secretary and President with multiple options if required.”²⁷ When a crisis occurs, operational access is critical to providing options for the U.S. Government by calling on the network of partners and allies in the region for support and basing. However, a network of allies and partners in the Western Pacific is insufficient to guarantee operational access for the joint force in reaction to PLA aggression.

Figure 3. Agreements, Treaties, and Partnerships

Seeking access through diplomatic channels can enhance security collaboration and improve mutual comprehension of the status of forces and related agreements, mitigating potential tensions during crises. The United States actively deepened its partnerships and alliances in the Western Pacific through increased engagement over the past decade since the “pivot to Asia” under President Barack Obama.28 Figure 3 shows the current state of U.S. and China’s mutual defense treaties, status of forces agreements (SOFA), cooperative logistics supply support (CLSS), and the PRC comprehensive strategic partnerships.²⁹ While mutual defense treaties provide the most robust cooperation, coordination, and access for the United States, SOFAs provide critical value during strategic competition that enables the joint force by laying the groundwork to allow for the maneuver of the joint force on an ally’s territory, in its airspace, or through its territorial waters.³⁰ CLSS enables interoperability; provides opportunities for training, cooperation, and engagement during competition; and enables the development of critical infrastructure to support U.S. military assets.³¹ The joint force must start with requirements that enable actions in crisis or conflict to drive operational access approaches. Operational access efforts based on the requirements the joint force may require from a specific partner or ally are vital to having the best possible posture in case of a crisis.

Distributed Warfighting Concepts. Operational access enables the physical distribution of forces across a theater, enabling flexibility in responding to crises or escalation. All U.S. Armed Forces have coalesced around warfighting concepts that stress agility, distribution, advanced basing, and operations across warfighting domains.³² From the Army’s multidomain operations, the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment, and the Navy’s distributed maritime operations, these warfighting concepts are built on the foundation of an assumed U.S. ability to distribute forces and exercise access within a theater of operations.³³ This assumption is only valid if the diplomatic conditions enable the joint force operational access across a distributed footprint.34 The joint force requires operational access during strategic competition to bring its unique warfighting concepts to bear in times of crisis and conflict.

Whole-of-Government Approach to Operational Access

Using the nonmilitary instruments of national power, the U.S. Government should conduct integrated campaigning to enhance operational access west of the IDL. This strategy entails cultivating diplomatic consensus, operationalizing the information environment, and directing regional economic initiatives. The ultimate objective is to achieve integrated deterrence by advancing the posture of the joint force west of the IDL. While USINDOPACOM is conducting campaigning daily to improve operational access, integrated deterrence requires a whole-of-government approach to achieve strategic objectives. Integrated campaigning must include a whole-of-government approach to be effective and sequence operations, activities, and investments. Achieving a unified purpose through alignment is crucial, and the U.S. Government must coordinate endeavors among the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and USINDOPACOM. This collaboration aims to facilitate joint force access during strategic competition to support integrated deterrence. Additionally, it enables the joint force’s capability during crises and conflicts, working toward restoring relations to a state of strategic competition.

The United States requires a whole-of-government approach to enable access during the competition, enhance deterrence, and provide levers to increase operational access in the Western Pacific. The following are three recommendations across the diplomatic, informational, and economic levers of national power to enable operational access for the joint force west of the IDL.

Recommendation 1: Generate Diplomatic Consensus. The State Department should lead in developing regional consensus against specific unacceptable acts by the PRC, focused explicitly on states without current access or basing agreements for military forces. Developing regional consensus outside the current defense and logistical agreements could improve understanding of the benefits of collective action against PRC aggression and regional hostility.³⁵ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one such venue to develop this regional consensus, with 10 nations conducting military security drills in September 2023.³⁶ The cross-section of ASEAN participants concerned with possible PRC aggression in the region represents states with robust military and security cooperation agreements with the United States, states with no established agreements (Laos and Vietnam), and states with well-established mutual defense treaties (Philippines and Thailand). Discussions with the ASEAN states on mutual consensus could contribute to regional deterrence and provide avenues for additional access during strategic competition.

Increasing engagement through the ASEAN forum provides opportunities to transition unilateral relationships in the region to multilateral cooperation and defense agreements, strengthening integrated deterrence efforts and providing additional levers to obtain operational access in competition. The State Department can set the conditions for operational access by stewarding bilateral alliances into issue- and interest-based multilateral agreements.³⁷ Deepening relationships with current partners provides opportunities to clarify and engage on issues that may arise, allowing states to express concerns and reservations about U.S. forces having operational access on their shores. The assumption that current agreements will remain in effect at the outbreak of crisis or conflict is a poor one, and the State Department should look for opportunities to assure allies and deepen partner relationships to ensure operational access for the joint force. Approaching relationships with states in the region to conduct security assistance or counter transnational criminal or terrorist threats may provide opportunities for deepening relationships.³⁸

Recommendation 2: Improve the Odds of Cooperation in Crisis With Information. Access for the joint force is about more than enabling maneuvers during conflict; it also provides opportunities for the U.S. Government to assist states in upholding democratic norms and enabling resilience in crises. One tool that the U.S. Government used extensively to advance these objectives was the multiagency approach to enable the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative (IPTI). Through the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the IPTI efforts to improve quality governance, democratic norms, and free and open economic policy demonstrated an excellent model to grow future U.S. policy and efforts in shaping the information environment through improved access in the Indo-Pacific region.³⁹ USAID and State Department efforts and engagement to compete in the governance, information space, and human rights demonstrated a critical capability that could improve and help drive states toward greater democratic values and provide a more welcoming atmosphere for U.S. access in times of crisis.⁴⁰ Programming efforts through IPTI sought input and collaboration with civil society actors and organizations to enhance transparency.⁴¹ This involved tapping into the resources of civil society organizations to bolster their democratic strategies. Since the divestiture of resources from USAID, the U.S. Government must develop a strategy to wield the instruments of national power through the interagency community to achieve these objectives and continue momentum on improving resilience in partners and allies in the region. These strategies are a way the U.S. Government can aim to improve deterrence through resilience in partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific and set the conditions for operational access.

The United States should seize opportunities to operationalize significant themes and messages to enable more effective whole-of-government operations in the information environment that support and influence partners, allies, and adversaries to facilitate access for the joint force. Some regional partners and states may harbor concerns about the PRC’s retaliation against them if seen officially supporting operational access for U.S. forces. With its increase in military equipment purchases, for example, Thailand may be concerned about running afoul of the PRC with public joint statements or high-profile military training operations with U.S. forces.⁴² The Department of Defense (DOD) and its partners in the interagency community should analyze each state in the region from an information environment perspective and develop a messaging campaign to improve the likelihood of gaining operational access on different timelines. For example, the political changes in the Philippines have brought different levels of support from the Philippines government regarding U.S. troops and the number and location of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites.⁴³ Changing political situations require calibrated approaches to the information environment and should be included in integrated country strategies to synchronize efforts between State and DOD in the information environment. Operations in the information environment can shape perspectives and beliefs about the U.S. commitment to regional and state security and are necessary to ensuring access for the joint force.

Recommendation 3: Enhance Operational Access With Economic Levers. Finally, the United States should leverage the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) to address opportunities for increasing supply chain resilience and infrastructure projects that enable access for the joint force in competition and crisis. The IPEF provides the U.S. Government an additional forum to engage with states in the Indo-Pacific region outside of the traditional regional partners and allies. The United States should update its Indo-Pacific strategy to include the IPEF as a centerpiece of its economic development line of effort. The value of the IPEF is its assertion of inclusivity and development of equitable status among the nations involved.⁴⁴ This leveling of the playing field can encourage positive sentiment toward the United States and provide opportunities for U.S. investment in developing supply chains and improving infrastructure.

Regarding infrastructure projects, DOD should use the preexisting Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) framework to drive investments and projects to non-partner and allied nations to set the conditions for operational access. The PDI is the DOD attempt to address this gap, identifying modernizing and strengthening presence in the region as the top spending priority, recommending a $2.9 billion authorization out of $9.7 billion for PDI in the Presidential Budget Request for fiscal year (FY) 2024.45 The FY24 National Defense Authorization Act increased the funding for PDI from the Presidential Budget Request of $9.7 billion to $14.7 billion, articulating the importance of funding this critical initiative. In future FYs, funding could be designated for improving infrastructure in countries without strong defense or access agreements to demonstrate U.S. commitment and improve overall sentiment for U.S. future operational access.

PRC Interpretation of Increased Operational Access

A serious argument against the pursuit of operational access is the risk of escalation and the negative perception the PRC may have of the United States increasing operational access. The PRC holds the U.S. desire to be a regional leader and Pacific power at odds with its desire for a closed or exclusive region for Chinese regional dominance.⁴⁶ Increasing overtures to states in Southeast Asia for operational access would undoubtedly be viewed by the PRC as a provocative action by the United States. Integrated deterrence is more than just ensuring access for the joint force and providing a credible threat to PRC actions; the United States must also manage perceptions and view each engagement in the region through the lens of the PRC’s beliefs and preconceptions.⁴⁷

In pursuit of operational access, it is critical that the United States actively communicates intent and goals for regional stability while reducing possibilities for misunderstanding. The United States can prevent misunderstandings with the PRC by increasing communication and articulating intent. The recent reopening of military-to-military discussions between the U.S. military and the PLA was highly publicized following the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2023.⁴⁸ Reopening military dialogue allows U.S. policymakers to channel messaging regarding routine regional operational access ventures and prevent strategic miscommunication. Any action in the Western Pacific may be viewed as escalatory to the PRC if not placed in context through strategic communication.

Addressing the strategic challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region demands a comprehensive and collaborative approach. Recognizing the significance of strategic competition in the region, the United States must prioritize enhancing operational access as a prerequisite for the joint force to navigate this dynamic landscape. As illustrated by the current theater posture, historical basing agreements are insufficient to meet the demands of the evolving security landscape. Operational access is crucial not only for integrated deterrence and crisis response but also for upholding democratic norms and fostering resilience in the Indo-Pacific. A whole-of-government approach involving diplomatic, informational, and economic levers of national power is essential to achieve these objectives. By pursuing regional consensus, deepening multilateral partnerships, shaping the information environment, and leveraging economic frameworks, the United States can enhance its access capabilities, demonstrating commitment and flexibility in the face of strategic competition. The United States can also lay the groundwork for a secure, free, and open Indo-Pacific, ensuring a robust response to the challenges posed by the PRC while promoting stability and prosperity in the region for years to come. JFQ

 

Notes

¹ A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision (Washington, DC: Department of State, November 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

² John C. Aquilino, “Command Keynote and Q&A at the Pacific Forum,” Pacific Forum, Honolulu, HI, January 24, 2024.

³ The Second Island Chain is the line of islands extending from mainland Japan through the Marshall and Caroline islands south toward Indonesia.

₄ Operational reach is defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 18, 2022), III-38, as the “distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities.”

⁵ Cheol-hee Park, The Three Enduring Legacies of the Pacific War in East Asia (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, August 2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/AP_2020-08%20Legacy%20of%20the%20Pacific%20War%20-%20Cheol-Hee%20Park_Revised.pdf.

⁶ Chris Dougherty, “Don’t Trust the Process: Moving From Words to Actions on the Indo-Pacific Posture,” War on the Rocks, February 23, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/dont-trust-the-process-moving-from-words-to-actions-on-the-indo-pacific-posture/.

⁷ Dougherty.

⁸ Billy Fabian, “Overcoming the Tyranny of Time: The Role of U.S. Forward Posture in Deterrence and Defense,” Center for a New American Security, September 21, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/overcoming-the-tyranny-of-time-the-role-of-u-s-forward-posture-in-deterrence-and-defense.

⁹ Luke A. Nicastro, U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress, R47589 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023), 13, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47589.

¹⁰ Blake Herzinger and Elee Wakim, “The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 2, 2020, https://cimsec.org/the-assumption-of-access-in-the-western-pacific/.

¹¹ Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region, 118th Cong., 1st sess., 2023.

¹² Jonathan B. Warr, “Rethinking the Approach to Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Security Nexus 24 (September 2023), 2, https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus_articles/rethinking-the-approach-to-security-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/.

¹³ Renanah M. Joyce and Brian Blankenship, “Access Denied? The Future of U.S. Basing in a Contested World,” War on the Rocks, February 1, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/access-denied-the-future-of-u-s-basing-in-a-contested-world/.

¹⁴ National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, October 2022), 37–8, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.

¹⁵ 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 8, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1183514.pdf.

¹⁶ Key terrain, as described in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 21, 2014), III-4, refers to “any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.” In this context, key terrain is extended to include partnerships, relationships, and geographical positions that the United States should attempt to enhance to gain a marked advantage over China.

¹⁷ Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE295.html.

¹⁸ Mazarr, 2.

¹⁹ Andrew Feickert, U.S. Ground Forces in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress, R47096 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 30, 2022), 12, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47096.

²⁰ Bryan Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), 139–41, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html.

²¹ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 3.

²² Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, 139–41.

²³ Andrew Feickert et al., U.S. Military Presence in Poland, IF11280 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 1–3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11280.

²⁴ Nicastro, U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, 4–5.

²⁵ Bryan Frederick et al., Greater Conflict-Phase Access to Asia: U.S. Policies for Five Indo-Pacific Countries (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, November 28, 2023) 11, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA1742-1.html.

²⁶ Frederick et al., Greater Conflict-Phase Access to Asia, 11–3.

²⁷ U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region.

²⁸ Janine Davidson, “The U.S. ‘Pivot to Asia,’” American Journal of Chinese Studies 21 (June 2014), 77–82, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44289339.

²⁹ Abby Doll et al., The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in the Indo-Pacific (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, May 5, 2023), 31, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1784-1.html.

³⁰ Doll et al., 31–3.

³¹ Doll et al., 32–3.

³² Doll et al., 25.

³³ Herzinger and Wakim, “The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific.”

³⁴ Herzinger and Wakim.

³⁵ Frederick et al., Greater Conflict-Phase Access to Asia, 10.

³⁶ Kate Mayberry, “‘Baby Steps’ for ASEAN as It Wraps Up First-Ever Joint Military Drills,” Al Jazeera, September 25, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/25/baby-steps-for-asean-as-it-wraps-up-first-ever-joint-military-drills.

³⁷ Richard C. Bush et al., An American Strategy for the Indo-Pacific in an Age of U.S.-China Competition: Enhancing Alliances, Economic Engagement, and Regional Stability, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FP_20221114_indo_pacific_strategy.pdf.

³⁸ Joint Regional Strategy: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2023), 9, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/JRS_EAP-Asia_06JAN2023_Public.pdf.

³⁹ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative (IPTI) 2021 Annual Report: Summary of Results (Washington, DC: USAID, June 2022), 10.

⁴⁰ USAID, Indo-Pacific Strategy, 8–11.

⁴¹ USAID, Indo-Pacific Strategy, 10.

⁴² Tita Sanglee, “Thailand’s Military Modernization Again in the Spotlight Following Trade Deficit Report,” The Diplomat, February 9, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/thailands-military-modernization-again-in-the-spotlight-following-trade-deficit-report/.

⁴³ Ben Dolven and William Piekos, The Philippines, IF10250 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2025), 2, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10250.

⁴⁴ Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs et al., Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), IF12373 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated July 22, 2024), 1–3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12373/9.

⁴⁵ Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2023), 5–6, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf.

⁴⁶ Joseph Cheng, “China’s Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia,” China Perspectives 2013, no. 2 (December 2013), 53–65, https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6182.

⁴⁷ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 11.

⁴⁸ Lolita C. Baldour, “Biden and Xi Agree to Restore Some Military-to-Military Communications Between the U.S. and China,” Associated Press, November 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4.