The adage “amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics” resonates more profoundly than ever in an age of rapid technological advancements and global challenges. This timeless adage is highlighted by the Department of the Air Force (DAF)’s undertaking to redefine the standards of logistical support in military operations and humanitarian assistance. The DAF recently designated Rocket Cargo as the fourth Vanguard program, and this logistical initiative represents a leap in transformational capability. As part of its 2030 Science and Technology Strategy, this endeavor highlights the pursuit of cutting-edge logistics solutions.1
It also marks a significant milestone, with U.S. Space Force taking the lead on this Vanguard program, which is the Service’s first of its kind.2 The Rocket Cargo Vanguard aims to explore the viability of employing large commercial rockets for Department of Defense (DOD) global logistics. This concept promises to revolutionize the rapid delivery of resources directly to conflict zones and humanitarian disaster areas. This article delves into the operational need, legal and policy implications, and strategic risks of leveraging this commercial capability for combat and humanitarian missions, offering a comprehensive analysis of the potential to reshape logistics in the 21st century.
This article refers to the capability of Rocket Cargo delivery as TerrestrialBased Inserted Rocket Resource Delivery (T-BIRRD). The term T-BIRRD was chosen for its specificity, operational context beyond cargo delivery, and clear differentiation from existing systems using rockets to deliver resources, emphasizing the inserted characteristic. T-BIRRD emphasizes its focus on terrestrial operations and resources beyond cargo that could be delivered for crucial military and humanitarian missions. This unique naming also aids in creating a distinct identity, facilitating effective communication and ease of reference within academic and operational discussions.
The character of T-BIRRD signifies a pivotal evolution for the doctrine of military logistics and humanitarian relief. This evolution in capability aligns with strategic concepts such as Agile Combat Employment (ACE); Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI); and the need for rapid placement of humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR). T-BIRRD complements ACE concepts by facilitating rapid and versatile logistical support, enabling forces to operate more autonomously and with greater agility across dispersed locations. Similarly, it supports JRSOI by streamlining the process of deploying and integrating forces and supplies into a range of operations, enhancing the efficiency and speed of military and HADR responses. In this regard, T-BIRRD emerges as a powerful enabler, optimizing the flexibility, rapid mobility, and integration of efforts across Services and domains.
The transformative potential of T-BIRRD necessitates a thorough examination of a spectrum of legal, operational, and policy considerations. The deployment of commercial rockets for military logistics and humanitarian aid introduces intricate challenges related to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), including questions of operational control and the delineation of responsibilities between military and civilian entities. Furthermore, strategic risks are present, and the international community faces the task of ensuring that Rocket Cargo delivery aligns with existing treaties and agreements, like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), that seeks to prevent weaponizing rockets intended for benevolent use.3 This article endeavors to weave T-BIRRD’s capabilities and challenges into a coherent narrative. By exploring the multifaceted aspects of this innovative logistical approach, this article also underscores the necessity for further research, policy development, and international collaboration to fully harness T-BIRRD capabilities. By doing so, this study elevates the professional character of logistics rather than leaving it to tactical considerations.
Background and Context
The DOD logistical landscape is fraught with challenges that hinder the ability of the Armed Forces and humanitarian agencies to respond immediately to emergencies. Traditional naval and air logistical operations rely heavily on substantial infrastructure, such as runways and ports, vulnerable to enemy actions or natural disasters. The vulnerability of cargo aircraft to antiair defenses and the limitations imposed by the need for secure and expansive landing zones are significant obstacles to operational agility. Prepositioning supplies raises several challenges, including the need to deploy forces abroad to secure the assets, constructing storage infrastructure, and the risk of placing resources near adversary territories, which makes the supplies more vulnerable to enemy actions. Additionally, current resupply methods, including airdrops, are limited by the type, weight, and quantity of materials that could be delivered and pose fall hazards. For example, the maximum single platform weight for air-droppable supplies is 60,000 pounds from both the C-17 and C-5 aircraft.4
The development and potential deployment of T-BIRRD offer an opportunity to transcend these limitations. The SpaceX Starship is capable of hauling 55,000 pounds into orbit, meaning that suborbital cargo deliveries allow for greater weights to be carried.5 By employing large commercial rockets like the Starship, T-BIRRD could enable the delivery of resources in a fraction of the time required by traditional methods. The DAF proposal is to transport up to 100 tons to any location on the planet within a tactical timeline.6 This allows for a 233 percent increase in vertically inserted payload compared to the maximum single platform weight for dropped air supplies from any Air Force aircraft. This is still shy of the C-5’s maximum payload of 281,000 pounds, but delivering that load requires vast infrastructure and many personnel to land the aircraft safely.7
Depending on the dimensions of each maximum 60,000-pound single load, which is likely long and wide, the C-5 would max out on available space, depleting the overall number of pallet positions. This reduces the overall aircraft payload, yielding substantially less than the 281,000-pound maximum load capacity. The T-BIRDD capability to insert massive payloads with minimal infrastructure and support personnel aligns with the strategic concepts of ACE and JRSOI and enhances the capacity for rapid HADR operations. Such agility and precision in logistics could drastically reduce the time to respond to emergencies, potentially saving lives and mitigating the impacts of conflicts and disasters.
The strategic landscape is also evolving, with the creation of entities like the Chinese Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF). Established in 2016, the JLSF aims to be the core of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) logistics, enhancing the Chinese military’s joint operations capability through streamlined supply operations and the integration of civilian logistics resources.8 JLSF efforts to modernize and strengthen logistics by integrating military and civilian elements underscore China’s focus on building a responsive and efficient military logistics system for modern warfare.9 The development of T-BIRRD represents a critical opportunity for the United States to advance its logistical capabilities and ensure it remains at the forefront of military and humanitarian operations.
The transition to rocket-based delivery systems, however, is not without its challenges and implications. Questions about the cost-benefit analysis of such a system compared to traditional airdrops, the ability to secure rocket cargo from enemy detection and interception, and the environmental impacts of increased rocket launches are critical to assessing the viability of T-BIRRD. Additionally, reliance on commercial industry to develop and operate these delivery systems raises concerns about the security of the supply chain and the potential for technological espionage or rocket housing proliferation. As DOD explores the possibility of T-BIRRD, it must navigate a complex array of operational, legal, and policy considerations.
Operational Need, Advantages, and Case Study
The DAF shift toward runway-independent platforms drives a transformation in military logistics. This is necessary for strategic alignment with broader defense strategies that emphasize agility with the capacity for rapid deployment to theaters of war and humanitarian relief zones. This evolution is advanced by the development of T-BIRRD for resource needs and seeks to mitigate the vulnerabilities inherent in traditional logistics systems that rely on fixed infrastructure such as naval ports and airfields. Research and development initiatives by organizations such as RAND and the Stimson Center hig light the necessity of affordable runwayindependent unmanned aerial vehicles (ARIUAV) that operate with minimal reliance on runways for DOD operations in the 21st century.10
This evolution aims to divorce the joint force from the hindrance of conventional joint logistics. The joint force has historically relied on well-established or in-place support systems, including civil engineer Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources, fuel operational readiness capability equipment, and extensive asphalt or concrete runways.11 These systems, designed for operations on traditional airbases, have not seamlessly transitioned to the support of expeditionary, runwayindependent operations that ARIUAV and similar technologies envision. This adaptation requires a revisioning of logistical support to accommodate the operational flexibility and rapid deployment characteristics of next-generation unmanned systems, underscoring the need for innovative logistical solutions that can operate beyond the constraints of fixed infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Speed and Runway Independent Technologies (SPRINT) project seeks to evolve air mobility by developing the next generation of tiltrotor military aircraft.12 Characterized by runway independence and in collaboration with the U.S. Special Operations Command, the SPRINT program focuses on creating an aircraft with profound implications for mobility, logistics operations, personnel recovery, and medical transport.13 This initiative is another testament to the ongoing efforts to overcome the limitations of traditional aircraft relying on airfields. DOD needs an operational edge through the capability to deploy resources directly to areas in need without relying on extensive and vulnerable infrastructure. Against the backdrop of China’s logistical advancements, notably the establishment of the JLSF, the imperative for the United States to pursue innovative technologies like T-BIRRD becomes increasingly apparent. The JLSF aim to foster an efficient logistics system underscores the strategic imperative for the United States to maintain its logistical superiority and adaptability.14
The following two-part hypothetical scenario explores the use of T-BIRRD in both a remote conflict zone and a disaster relief setting. Although these scenarios are fictional, they demonstrate how the system could streamline effects and expedite response times.
In the context of escalating tensions in the South China Sea, the United States initiates ACE operations, employing the strategy of island hopping to enhance its strategic positioning and resupply forward-deployed forces rapidly. Given China’s antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and limited runway infrastructure on small islands, resupply using traditional aircraft, including airdrop, is not feasible. The T-BIRRD system is activated to deliver critical munitions, surveillance equipment, and rations to a series of small, strategically vital islands. The operation requires precise coordination and swift action. Payloads are meticulously prepared, with special packaging to protect sensitive equipment from the stress of rocket launch and reentry, ensuring operational integrity on delivery. T-BIRRD rockets are launched within allotted critical timeframes, bypassing Chinese A2/AD capabilities due to insertion speed, delivering supplies directly to awaiting forces. This operation showcases T-BIRRD’s ability to support dispersed forces efficiently, reinforcing the U.S. military’s agility and operational unpredictability under the ACE doctrine.
Simultaneously, a devastating earthquake strikes Haiti, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis initiated by civil unrest. With the country’s infrastructure severely damaged, including the two international airports and traditional aid routes compromised, the rapid deployment capabilities of T-BIRRD are leveraged for a humanitarian mission. The system delivers emergency medical and shelter supplies, food, and water to isolated areas. Given the urgent need for aid and the complexities of delivering supplies in a volatile security environment, the payloads are carefully arranged to ensure that lifesaving materials are accessible for immediate use at arrival.
The successful deployment of T-BIRRD in this two-part scenario illustrates its versatility across military and humanitarian operations and its potential to save lives by significantly reducing the response time in disaster relief efforts.
Legal and Policy Considerations
Integrating commercial entities into military logistics through initiatives like T-BIRRD, where SpaceX would be a provider, intersects with numerous aspects of law and international treaties. The complexities surrounding the involvement of commercial space entities in armed conflict or HADR stress the balance between state neutrality and combatant status. When commercial actors under a neutral state’s jurisdiction provide military assistance, such as telecommunications, navigational services, or aid to people under an unstable government, this could potentially implicate the neutral state, challenging its neutral status.15 This raises critical questions about the implementation of T-BIRDD in relation to the LOAC and Law of War (LoW), MTCR, delineation of operational control authority, and the broader employment of commercial space companies in response to international scenarios. The introduction of T-BIRRD mandates the development of legal and policy frameworks that govern such activities, especially considering the dual-use nature of space technologies and the dual-use capabilities for war and humanitarian relief.
First, using commercial space platforms for military logistics has implications under the LOAC and LoW, particularly regarding the differentiation between civilian and combatant assets. Specific LOAC guidelines on conduct during conflict will focus on T-BIRRD’s ability to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and limit environmental damage.16 Meanwhile, broader LoW principles guide the strategic and ethical deployment of T-BIRRD, emphasizing the necessity and proportionality of its use. Proportionality, in relation to T-BIRRD, in the LoW assesses whether the military advantage gained from an action outweighs the potential for collateral damage. For T-BIRRD, this involves evaluating whether its logistical support justifies potential risks or damages, such as environmental impact from rocket launches or unintended disruptions to civilian areas. This consideration ensures that the use of T-BIRRD is measured and justified, aligning with ethical military practices.
Additionally, in the LoW, the principle of necessity concerns the requirement that military actions must be essential for achieving a legitimate military objective. For T-BIRRD, the necessity would be demonstrated by its critical role in supporting military operations where traditional logistics methods are impractical or too risky. This could include scenarios in which T-BIRRD delivers essential supplies to forward-operating bases in hostile territories where other forms of resupply would compromise the safety of transport crews.
As T-BIRRD capabilities become integral to strategic military operations, the imperative to establish clear protocols and agreements that delineate the responsibilities and liabilities grows. This differentiation is crucial to safeguarding noncombatant entities and ensuring compliance with international humanitarian laws. To ensure T-BIRRD operations align with the LOAC and the LoW, Space Force must take a comprehensive and forward-looking approach to solutions. This involves adhering to existing principles and anticipating the evolving military logistics and technology landscape.
The T-BIRRD deployment strategy should incorporate proactive communication with international bodies and potentially affected nations, especially for humanitarian efforts, to prevent misinterpretation and potential diplomatic tensions. This will require Space Force integration into the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and Department of State for access and overflight clearance. Adhering to international law will ensure that T-BIRRD’s integration into military logistics remains within legal standards, leverages commercial partnerships effectively, and respects humanitarian principles. In this context, a case study worth examining is the MQ-9 aircraft contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) operations, which shed light on the civilian-military relationship within combat operations.
COCO operations offer commercial partnerships that support military objectives while adhering to the LOAC and the LoW. These aircraft can bear commercial markings but cannot fire weapons at targets without a military controller taking over. If Space Force organically acquires or establishes a contract with the commercial industry for T-BIRDD, similar provisions should be made to delineate between military-owned and contractor-owned platforms. Beyond the paint scheme, the delineation of ownership will determine who has operational control authority (discussed in the next section).
Second, a clear operational distinction is necessary for T-BIRRD operations. Combat missions should exclusively fall under the purview of Space Force controllers, ensuring DOD oversight and alignment with military overflight standards, the LOAC, and the LoW principles. In contrast, humanitarian missions can permit operational control to commercial partners, highlighting the noncombatant intention. Such differentiation necessitates unique mission markings and the use of specific radio frequencies to unequivocally identify the nature of each mission, improving transparency and reducing the potential for misinterpretation.
Furthermore, given the legal considerations of integrating commercial platforms into military and humanitarian logistics, a proactive stance involves delineating operational control authority for combat operations. Again, operational control for combat resupply missions must unequivocally reside with Space Force operators, ensuring logistical decisions are made within military ethics and legal standards. Even with an established contract, like the MQ-9 COCO intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights mentioned, operational control and decisions must remain with DOD for all combat resource supply missions. This stance will ensure that DOD takes known risks to launching and landing a rocket in a combat environment, given the potential of misinterpretation with a missile attack. For a combat mission with T-BIRRD, the paint scheme, electronic transponder codes, FAA registration, and navigational strobes must all be appropriately aligned for this mission type.
For organically owned and operated T-BIRRD assets, the operational control should permanently reside with Space Force or designated military command structures. It should not be expected that Space Force maintains, services, and repairs its T-BIRRD assets, so there will always be a connection to the commercial industry. That service could be accomplished via maintenance contracts awarded to the original commercial space provider. DOD officials should maintain the authority to launch and insert these organic assets to ensure the inclusion of checks and balances, such as review processes or oversight mechanisms, to monitor adherence to international law.
For HADR missions, contractors can maintain operational control. Still, Space Force should establish a supervisory mechanism to ensure these missions remain in the noncombatant realm, with clearly defined objectives and operational parameters. Distinct markings and specific radio frequencies (squawking) must be established to differentiate these missions. Space Force must ensure transparent communication with the FAA, ICAO, or the State Department, as notifying affected nations is crucial to mitigating misunderstandings or perceived aggression. This will foster a cooperative international environment for the peaceful use of space technologies.
Third, incorporating adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime into the framework of T-BIRRD ensures compliance with international export controls and nonproliferation treaties. The MTCR, an international agreement aimed at preventing the proliferation of missile technology, mainly those capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, plays a crucial role in guiding the acquisition of T-BIRRD for both combat and humanitarian aid missions.17 Establishing rigorous export control mechanisms is paramount to ensuring compliance and aligning T-BIRRD operations with MTCR’s strict missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems guidelines. This includes a comprehensive application of controls on category I and II items. Category I items are subject to the most stringent restrictions due to their capacity to deliver larger payloads over longer distances.18 T-BIRRD would be considered a category I asset in the MTCR because of its dual-use capability. While the recent U.S. reinterpretation of MTCR guidelines, treating specific UAV systems as category II items to facilitate exports, offers flexibility, it demands a diplomatic approach.19 This amendment aims to balance technological advancements and strategic needs with the imperative of nonproliferation. Adhering to these strategies ensures that T-BIRRD contributes positively to global security and humanitarian efforts, harmonizing the innovative use of space technologies with the international community’s nonproliferation goals and legal standards. Strategic Risks Integrating T-BIRRD into military logistics and HADR operations raises critical considerations about the international security landscape. This prompts an examination of these operations compared to traditional resupply methods, specifically with the potential for stealth missions, misinterpretation of rocket launches, implications for operational security, and the landscape of air traffic management. First, the visibility and detectability of rocket launches pose significant challenges in maintaining operational stealth. Unlike aircraft that can leverage stealth technology to minimize radar signatures, rockets are inherently more visible and detectable on launch.20 Rockets, including those used for T-BIRRD, emit substantial thermal plumes and signatures as they ascend or descend through the atmosphere. These signatures are detectable by infrared and optical sensors, both ground-based and space-based, such as the Defense Support Program satellites operated by Space Force, designed to identify missile launches worldwide.21 Operationally, exploring launch windows, trajectories, and locations that minimize visibility to adversarial sensors could further reduce the likelihood of detection. Additionally, the size and trajectory of rockets contribute to their radar crosssection, making them visible to radar systems over long distances. The development of stealth technology for rockets should include materials, coatings, and designs that reduce thermal emissions from the thrusters and overall radar signatures. Such advancements could significantly alter the ability to detect T-BIRRD assets, although this would require substantial research and development efforts as the SpaceX Starship is not primarily concerned with concealment.
Second, the risk of rocket launches being mistaken for hostile activities, particularly intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, poses significant challenges, especially in regions marked by heightened geopolitical tensions. Misinterpretation is not a new problem as there are analogous issues with countries such as Iran, with their Ghased platform, and North Korea, with their Unha-3 platform, which could use space launch vehicles as mediums to incorporate nuclear explosive technologies.22 Such misinterpretations could potentially trigger rapid military responses based on false alarms. To mitigate these risks, it is imperative to implement enhanced communication protocols, specifically for short-notice HADR missions. These should involve detailed pre-launch notifications to international space monitoring agencies and global defense entities, clearly outlining the civilian or nonaggressive nature of the launch. Furthermore, maintaining transparency about launch purposes with international communities like the ICAO and openly sharing flight trajectories and payloads could help reduce suspicions. Ensuring these strategies are in place would significantly diminish the potential for dangerous misunderstandings and promote more stable international relations.
Additionally, the risk of misinterpretation must be analyzed in relation to previously discussed stealth technologies for T-BIRRD use during combat operations. In combat scenarios where stealth and secrecy are crucial, the United States faces the challenge of ensuring that its T-BIRRD operations are not mistaken for ICBM launches. To manage this risk, the United States could employ controlled transparency, selectively sharing limited launch information under strict confidentiality with third-party international monitoring bodies to verify the nonaggressive nature of these operations. Rapid response communication teams could engage swiftly with international counterparts or directly with adversaries using LOAC and LoW justifications to provide clarifications and prevent escalatory responses. Additionally, the United States should promote international legal frameworks that address the use of T-BIRRD technologies in combat scenarios to help set global norms,23 reinforcing the taboo of nuclear weapons use in combat.24 This would reduce potential misinterpretations and ensure that T-BIRRD operations are seen within the framework of their intended use, thus maintaining global peace and stability while securing U.S. defense objectives.
Third, T-BIRDD missions introduce operational security (OPSEC) challenges, particularly regarding data integrity and safeguarding communication channels. In this context, OPSEC concerns stem from protecting the data that guides and controls T-BIRRD missions from cyber threats of interception or manipulation. Data integrity is paramount for T-BIRRD operations as the precision required for rocket delivery mandates that navigation, payload information, and launch commands are accurate and secure from tampering.25 The rocket’s telemetry must remain accurate throughout all mission phases to ensure correct trajectories and velocities at different stages. The operational technology (OT) that underpins T-BIRRD systems is susceptible to cyber threats like any other computing system. Cybersecurity measures tailored to OT environments, often distinct from traditional IT security practices, are crucial. This includes network segmentation, real-time threat detection systems, and rigorous access controls to prevent unauthorized access to mission critical systems.26
Furthermore, implementing a layered cyber defense strategy is pivotal for safeguarding the T-BIRRD system against a spectrum of cyber threats. This approach combines perimeter defenses, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, with comprehensive security measures, including entry point protection and network monitoring.27 Complementing this defense-in-depth strategy, regular security audits and penetration testing are essential. These practices analyze the cyber infrastructure of the T-BIRRD system to discover any vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit, ensuring that potential security gaps are identified and remedied promptly. Moreover, active collaboration with national and international cybersecurity agencies enhances the system’s security posture. By engaging with these agencies, the operating system maintainer, whether the commercial seller or Space Force Guardians, will be able to patch the OT and IT systems effectively. This would allow T-BIRRD to remain at the forefront of cybersecurity developments, integrating emerging threats into its defensive strategies to fortify its operations against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.
Fourth, the FAA and the ICAO are critical to overseeing and regulating air traffic to ensure safety and efficiency in the skies. The deployment of T-BIRRD necessitates close coordination with the FAA in the United States and compliance with ICAO standards globally. The FAA would ensure that T-BIRRD operators have flight path deconfliction and altitude regulations and certify that rocket launches do not interfere with commercial air traffic.28 Similarly, the ICAO would be instrumental in setting international standards and recommended practices for T-BIRRD operations crossing into international airspace. Coordination with ICAO would help harmonize regulations and ensure that T-BIRRD operations are recognized and accommodated within global air traffic management frameworks.
Integrating T-BIRRD into the existing air traffic management framework requires thorough planning and swift execution to meet DAF’s tactical timelines. This necessitates pre-launch coordination with the FAA to promptly deconflict rocket launch schedules, providing detailed information on the intended flight path, expected altitudes, and timing. Given the necessity for emergency use of T-BIRRD, this coordination enables the FAA to make necessary adjustments to commercial flight paths to prevent conflicts. Flight deconfliction emphasizes the importance of choosing launch site locations that minimize disturbance to heavily trafficked airways. The launch sites for T-BIRRD should therefore be placed in coastal regions to avoid major cities’ flight paths.
Additionally, implementing real-time monitoring systems ensures continuous oversight of T-BIRRD flights, allowing immediate communication with air traffic controllers should deviations occur. Also, developing comprehensive emergency response plans would outline precise procedures for addressing malfunctions or unexpected scenarios during T-BIRRD operations. Together these measures underscore the imperative of integrating T-BIRRD operations seamlessly into national and international airspace systems. The goal is to facilitate quick-launch capabilities while ensuring minimal impact on ongoing air traffic and upholding the highest safety and regulatory compliance standards.
Conclusion
The dawn of Terrestrial-Based Inserted Rocket Resource Delivery should mark a significant milestone in the evolution of military logistics and humanitarian aid, offering an unprecedented capability to deliver resources swiftly and directly to the most remote and challenging environments. Powered by the potential of commercial rocket technology, T-BIRRD embodies the agility required in modern conflict and disaster response scenarios and reflects a pivotal shift in logistical strategies. As part of its 2030 Science and Technology Strategy, the DAF initiative seeks to harness this transformative potential.29 The adoption of T-BIRRD promises to significantly enhance the logistical capabilities of the U.S. military and humanitarian agencies, offering a rapid response mechanism that overcomes traditional barriers of geography and infrastructure. As these capabilities become integral to strategic operations, the necessity for ongoing research and development is apparent. Innovations in stealth technology, enhanced communication protocols, and integration into global air traffic control systems represent just the beginning of what could be a broader revolution in logistics and delivery methodologies.
To this end, a strong call to action is required. Stakeholders across the U.S. military and international organizations must come together to explore the full implications of T-BIRRD systems. This collaboration should aim to establish clear guidelines and treaties that address the unique challenges posed by T-BIRRD implementation, particularly in terms of security, escalation due to misinterpretation, and regulatory compliance. By forging ahead with these initiatives, the United States could ensure that equally innovative approaches to governance match the revolutionary capabilities of T-BIRRD. This is a logistical opportunity professionals need to discuss and an initiative for maintaining strategic combat superiority and humanitarian responsiveness in the coming decades. JFQ
Notes
1 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Department of the Air Force Announces Fourth Vanguard Program,” June 4, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/ Article/2646703/department-of-the-air-forceannounces-fourth-vanguard-program/.
2 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs.
3 “Missile Technology Control Regime,” n.d., https://www.mtcr.info/en/.
4 Army Field Manual 4-20.116/ Technical Order No. 13C7-1-13, Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment: Reference Data for Airdrop Platform Loads (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army/ Headquarters Department of the Air Force, August 2001), https://www.marines.mil/ Portals/1/MCRP%204-11.3L%20Airdrop%20 of%20Supplies%20and%20Equipment%20 Reference%20Data%20for%20Airdrop%20 Platform%20Loads%201.pdf.
5 Jackie Wattles, “SpaceX’s Explosive Test Flight Achieved Key Milestones. But There Is Still a Long Way to Go,” CNN, January 11, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/21/ world/spacex-nasa-starship-artemis-moonlander-scn/index.html.
6 Air Force Research Laboratory, “Rocket Cargo for Agile Global Logistics,” n.d., https:// afresearchlab.com/technology/successstories/ rocket-cargo-for-agile-global-logistics/.
7 U.S. Air Force, “C-5M Super Galaxy,” n.d., https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/ Display/Article/104492/c-5m-super-galaxy/.
8 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/ Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DODCHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORTFINAL.PDF.
9 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
10 James A. Leftwich et al., Supporting Combat Power Projection Away From Fixed Infrastructure (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 26, 2022), https://www.rand.org/ pubs/research_reports/RRA596-1.html; Kelly A. Grieco et al., Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to U.S. Air Bases in the IndoPacific (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2024), 48, https://www.stimson.org/wpcontent/uploads/2024/12/Cratering-EffectsReport_Dec-6_WEB.pdf.
11 Leftwich et al., Supporting Combat Power Projection Away From Fixed Infrastructure.
12 Rojoef Manuel, “DARPA Taps Four Firms to Produce VTOL Aircraft Faster Than Osprey,” The Defense Post, December 28, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost. com/2023/12/28/darpa-vtol-faster-osprey/.
13 Manuel.
14 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
15 Guoyu Wang, “The Complex Neutrality of Commercial Space Actors in Armed Conflict,” Humanitarian Law & Policy, November 16, 2023, https://blogs.icrc.org/ law-and-policy/2023/11/16/the-complexneutrality-of-commercial-space-actors-inarmed-conflict/.
16 John Goehring, “The Legality of Intermingling Military and Civilian Capabilities in Space,” Articles of War, October 17, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legalityintermingling-military-civilian-capabilities-space/.
17 “Fact Sheet: Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, updated February 2023, https://armscontrolcenter.org/missiletechnology-control-regime-mtcr-2/.
18 “Fact Sheet.”
19 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Change to the License Review Policy for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to Reflect Revised United States Policy,” Federal Register, January 12, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2021/01/12/2020-27983/ change-to-the-license-review-policy-forunmanned-aerial-systems-uas-to-reflect-revisedunited-states.
20 U.S. Space Force, “Defense Support Program Satellites,” October 2020, https:// www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/ Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2197774/defensesupport-program-satellites/.
21 U.S. Space Force, “Defense Support Program Satellites.”
22 2022 Challenges to Security in Space: Space Resilience in an Era of Competition and Expansion (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, March 2022), https:// www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/ Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_ Security_Space_2022.pdf.
23 Joel B. Mozer et al., The Future of Space 2060 and Implications for U.S. Strategy: Report on the Space Futures Workshop (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: Air Force Space Command, September 5, 2019), https://apps.dtic.mil/ sti/pdfs/AD1095527.pdf.
24 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945,” Brown Political Science, December 20, 2007, https://polisci.brown. edu/publication/nuclear-taboo.
25 Office of the Chief Engineer, NASA Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook, NASA/ SP-202300002470, Rev. 1 (Washington, DC: NASA, February 2023), https://nodis3.gsfc. nasa.gov/OCE_docs/OCE_51.pdf.
26 Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity (Washington, DC: The White House, May 12, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2021/05/17/2021-10460/ improving-the-nations-cybersecurity.
27 Matt Monte, Network Attacks and Exploitation: A Framework (Indianapolis: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), 49.
28 Federal Aviation Administration, “ICAO and International Training,” last updated January 31, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/ about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/ international_affairs/global_issues.
29 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Department of the Air Force Announces Fourth Vanguard Program.”