Download PDF
Lauren Edson is a Research Assistant in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs in INSS.
Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has been an important priority for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) due to the strategic importance of airpower in modern military campaigns. As part of a 2007 edited volume assessing future PLA force structure,1 Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam examined PLAAF modernization and presented a framework to analyze Beijing’s choices in building its air force of the future.2 They identified five perspectives on the “right size” of the PLAAF that might shape Chinese decisions on its future force structure.3 The authors argued that “perceptions of the international threat environment (to include assessments of the likelihood of a crisis over Taiwan or a conflict with the United States) and budget concerns will have significant influence on the overall size of the future PLA and the speed of modernization.”4
Saunders and Quam did not produce a point estimate of future PLAAF force structure but argued that four key tradeoffs would shape decisions about the future PLAAF. Their analytic framework focused on:
• potential changes in PLAAF roles and missions
• domestic vs. foreign procurement
• low-tech vs. high-tech systems
• combat vs. support aircraft.
They suggested that decisions in these four areas could serve as a predictive and interpretative guide for Chinese decisions about the right size of the future air force.
This article examines how PLAAF force structure has changed since the Saunders-Quam chapter was published in 2007. After a brief review of the quantitative changes in force structure since 2007, the article analyzes these changes through the lens of the four trade-offs, examining the choices the PLAAF made in each area and the resulting impact on force structure. It then assesses the analytic value of their interpretative framework, with a focus on where it is helpful and what it missed. The article concludes with a discussion of how the framework might be modified to predict future PLAAF force development and to analyze other cases.5
PLAAF 2007 vs. PLAAF 2025
Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance reports for 2007 and 2025, PLAAF force size has changed from around 400,000 personnel and 2,675 fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft in 2007 to 403,000 personnel and 2,284 combat aircraft in 2025.6 These end points mask a significant decline in personnel and combat aircraft in the years in between, especially from 2010 to 2012. We include data for 2012, which shows that the PLAAF force size dipped to about 330,000 personnel and 1,507 combat aircraft. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show that the PLAAF aircraft fleet of 2025 has decreased only slightly in quantity, contrasting with the air forces of other countries that shrank significantly with modernization.
According to IISS data, the total number of PLAAF fighters, multirole fighters, and ground-attack aircraft shrank from 2,453 in 2007 to 2,065 in 2025. This decline is a common phenomenon, as air forces move from less expensive second- and third-generation fighters to much more expensive but more capable fourth-generation aircraft.7 Table 1 and the figure show that almost all the PLAAF’s second- (J-6, Q-5) and third- (J-7 and J-8) generation aircraft have been retired from the force. This transition between generations produced an even greater decline in PLAAF fighter strength in the early 2010s, when secondgeneration fighters were retiring, and fourth-generation (Su-27/J-11 and J-10) aircraft were only available in limited quantities. China did not engage in major military conflicts in the 2010s, allowing the PLAAF to tolerate a decline in strength while waiting for more capable aircraft to become available.8 Although the 2025 PLAAF has fewer fighters than the 2007 PLAAF, the aircraft it operates are mostly fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. The result is a somewhat smaller but much more capable force.
A similar story is evident in examining PLAAF bomber development. Table 2 shows that PLAAF bomber numbers in 2025 (219) are slightly smaller than in 2007 (222), but the 2024 PLAAF bomber force is much more capable. The PLAAF retired its H-5 medium bombers (based on the Soviet Il-28 Beagle) and most of its early production H-6 bombers (based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger). The current PLAAF bomber force consists of newer production H-6 airframes that incorporate a variety of improvements, including higher-performance turbofan engines and aerial refueling capability.9 Although based on a late-1950 Soviet design, these aircraft serve primarily as long-range missile carriers, with the H-6N expected to carry nuclear and conven- tional versions of an air-launched ballistic missile based on the DF-21.10 The PLAAF is awaiting development and deployment of the H-20 strategic bomber, which will incorporate stealth features and will likely have a nuclear delivery role.11
The PLAAF has increased both the overall numbers and the capability of its support aircraft fleet (see table 3). The 2007 PLAAF operated a limited number of air refuellable fighters and bombers, which were supported by about 10 HY-6 tankers and a planned purchase of 8 to 10 Il-78 tankers. Russia proved unable to produce new airframes, but Ukraine ultimately sold China three used Il-78 tankers.12 China’s HY-6 tankers only worked with its J-10 aircraft, while the Il-78 could only refuel aircraft derived from Soviet designs (such as the Su-30 and Su-35).13 The 2025 PLAAF has a larger tanker fleet, with newly built YY-20A tankers expected to eventually replace the HY-6 tankers.14 The PLAAF added nine new YY-20A tankers in 2024. PLAAF tankers routinely operate with PLAAF bombers on long-range missions.15
The 2007 PLAAF operated several Chinese-built short- and medium-range transports but only a few long-range Il-76MD strategic transports purchased from Russia. Although the PLAAF contracted to buy additional Il-76 aircraft, Ilyushin was unable to produce aircraft at its factory in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to fulfill the contract.16 The 2025 PLAAF has retired many of its small Y-5 transports but continues to operate indigenously produced Y-8 and Y-9 medium transports. The PLAAF also now flies about 55 Y-20 indigenously produced heavy transport aircraft and is procuring additional aircraft from the Chinese manufacturer. The PLAAF added five new Y-20s in 2024. Although the total number of transports is roughly the same, older aircraft with shorter ranges and less lift capacity have been replaced by longer-range, heavier lift models.
In 2007, the PLAAF was experimenting with prototypes of several models of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, but they were not yet operationally deployed. The 2025 PLAAF operates about 54 AEW aircraft of various designs, which are routinely used to support air defense and bomber operations.17 In terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) assets, the PLAAF continues to operate the Tu-154 long-range ELINT (electronic intel- ligence) aircraft it purchased from Russia but has retired its older tactical ISR/EW platforms based on the J-6 fighter and now employs a variety of dedicated systems based on the J-8 and J-16 fighters and the Y-8 and Y-9 transports.
The 2007 article focused exclusively on manned systems, although the PLAAF was already beginning to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 2025, uncrewed systems are widely deployed throughout the PLA, including in the army, navy, and special forces.18 The PLAAF operates unmanned aircraft systems of various sizes, ranges, and missions. According to the China Aerospace Studies Institute:
PLAAF-operated systems include high-altitude long-endurance systems like the WZ-7 and WZ-10; medium-altitude long-endurance systems like the BZK-005, GJ-1, and GJ-2; and some longer-range systems. UAS are used for surveillance and reconnaissance, testing and training, targeting and battle damage assessment, logistics, data relay and communications support, and information operations, including suppression of enemy air defenses.19 The PLAAF has also begun to field combat UAVs capable of strike missions and is experimenting with manned-unmanned teaming.20
The 2007 PLAAF was organized around seven military region air forces, all of which reported to PLAAF headquarters. The 2015–2016 PLA reforms reorganized PLAAF tactical aviation assets into theater command air forces, which report to five joint theater commands, narrowing the scope of PLAAF headquarters to a force-building function.21 PLAAF headquarters retains operational command of national-level assets such as bomber and transport forces and six brigades of airborne troops. The PLAAF lost its bid to gain responsibility for space operations but became fully responsible for coastal air defense and acquired PLA Navy (PLAN) pilots and aircraft as part of the mission transfer.22
Evaluating the Framework’s Proposed Indicators of Force Structure
The Saunders-Quam framework proposed four areas as indicators for future PLAAF force structure: potential YY-20A releases flares during demonstration at 2023 Changchun Air Show, Changchun, Jilin Province, July 24, 2023 (Courtesy N509FZ) 14 Forum / Rightsizing the PLA Air Force JFQ 118, 3rd Quarter 2025 changes in PLAAF roles and missions, domestic vs. foreign procurement, low- tech vs. high-tech systems, and combat vs. support aircraft. The framework sug- gests these four focus areas could serve as an interpretive and predictive guide to Chinese force structure decisions.
Potential Changes in PLAAF Roles and Missions. The PLA experienced a major reorganization at the end of 2015 that reallocated forces and missions across the military, including air force roles and missions.23 Although “integration of air and space” was a PLAAF strategic priority, and former PLAAF commander Xu Qiliang had been a strong advocate for the view that space was inherently an air force mission, the air force did not win control of the space mission set in the reforms. Instead, responsibility for space shifted from the general departments to the aerospace force within the newly established PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF).24 The aerospace force later became an independent force when the SSF was dissolved in 2024.25 However, the PLAAF maintains some space assets and space-based equipment largely for information and intelligence support.26 If the PLAAF had succeeded in gaining the space mission, it would have acquired significant new personnel and equipment, which would have directly altered its force structure. Adding space missions might also have shifted the focus of PLAAF leadership and constrained modernization efforts in other areas
The drive for jointness across the PLA, evident in the 2016 reorganization, changed the command relationship of the PLAAF and its constituent forces. The new organization changed the role of PLAAF headquarters from an operator to a force provider, with tactical aviation assets and command responsibilities transferring to five theater command air forces based in Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Beijing. PLAAF headquarters retained command responsibility for H-6N bombers with a nuclear mission, one transport division and transport brigade, some special mission aviation units, and the PLAAF Airborne Corps.27 These aircraft and airborne forces are mobile national-level assets that could cross theater boundaries as needed to perform their missions. While this reorganization did not directly change PLAAF force structure, it did change command relationships and how PLAAF forces operate.
The heightened prominence of counter-intervention as the PLA increasingly focused on deterring and defeating U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency has also had implications for PLAAF force structure. One aspect is a higher priority for long-range strike capabilities that could attack U.S. air bases and aircraft carriers as part of PLA antiaccess/ area-denial efforts. The PLAAF’s part of this mission prioritizes H-6 (and eventually H-20) bombers that can carry long-range antiship cruise missiles and land-attack cruise missiles to hold U.S. carriers and bases at risk.28 Another aspect involves developing the capability to attack key enablers of U.S. airstrikes, such as tankers; standoff jammers, such as the EC-130 Compass Call; and air-borne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft. The PLAAF’s J-20 fighters are optimized for this mission with their stealth capability and long-range air-to-air missiles and would likely be supported by PLAAF AEW aircraft to identify tar- gets and coordinate attacks.29
Another change involved responsibilities for coastal air defense and maritime strike missions. The PLAAF and PLAN Naval Aviation had divided air defense responsibilities, with the PLAN operating its own fighters, fighter-bomber/ground attack, and bomber aircraft. Naval Aviation units were responsible for defense of China’s coasts, near-shore waters, and the concomitant airspace, while air force units focused primarily on territorial air defense and conducted offensive counterair missions. As China’s maritime territorial disputes assumed more prominence as a national security concern after 2008, the PLAAF began to pay more attention to maritime missions, flying more regularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea and conducting long-range bomber flights over water.30
A 2023 reorganization transferred most PLAN land-based aviation units (including fighters, bombers, radars, airfields, and air defense units) to the PLAAF, consolidating maritime strike and air defense capabilities within one service.31 Gaining full responsibility for the coastal air defense and maritime strike missions (and control of the PLAN personnel and equipment associated with those missions) expanded PLAAF personnel and force structure. This change also limited the need for cross-service cooperation at the tactical level, which posed difficult command and control challenges. At the same time, it embraced jointness at the operational level by forcing the PLA Navy to rely on the PLA Air Force to execute critical maritime strike missions.
Domestic vs. Foreign Procurement. Saunders and Quam suggested that the chosen mix of domestic and foreign aircraft would have a large impact on PLAAF force structure. They noted PLA concerns about dependence on foreign suppliers, especially since political developments had cut off access to Soviet arms and military technology in 1960 and access to Western military technology in 1989 as a result of Western sanctions imposed following the suppres- sion of protestors in Tiananmen Square.32 Saunders and Quam described a trade-off between more capable aircraft purchased from Russia (which would increase dependence on foreign suppliers) and less capable aircraft produced by PRC aviation companies (which would entail a performance penalty).
As table 4 demonstrates, the PLA has largely focused on domestic procurement, with only limited purchases of high-end Russian multirole fighters such as the Su-30MKK and the Su-35. These aircraft incorporate advanced avionics and other high-tech features that Chinese manufacturers could not produce on their own. Purchasing relatively small quantities of these aircraft gave the PLAAF higher-end operational capabilities and gave Chinese aircraft companies samples that could be studied and reverse engineered. Nevertheless, the bulk of PLAAF tactical aviation aircraft are domestically produced, limiting PLA dependence on foreign suppliers and vulnerability to a potential cutoff of spare parts.
Chinese manufacturers successfully produced fourth-generation fighters of their own design (the J-10 series) and transitioned from coproducing the J-11 (based on the Su-27) with Russian assistance to indigenous production of a reverse engineered version, the J-11B.33 They also produced a fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, which was reportedly informed by access to U.S. design information acquired through cyber- espionage.34 However, these hard-won successes did not eliminate dependence on foreign suppliers. The PLAAF has continued to rely heavily on Russian aircraft engines due to the inability of domestic suppliers to produce advanced turbojet engines with high thrust-to-weight ratios and sufficiently long service lives. In recent years, advances in China’s defense enterprises have finally begun to over- come this key limitation.35
The PLAAF followed a similar path with its surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Chinese manufacturers learned to reverse engineer the Russian S-300 SAM and to produce a highly-capable indigenous version, the HQ-9, in large quantities. The bulk of the PLAAF long-range SAM force now consists of Chinese systems, but the PLAAF has also acquired advanced Russian S-400 systems with longer ranges and more advanced missile-defense capabilities. As of 2025, the PLAAF operates 248 long-range Russian SAMs. The rest (422+) of its long-range SAMs and all its short- and medium- range SAMs are domestically produced.
Because Russian aircraft and SAMs were significantly more capable than Chinese-produced systems in 2007, Saunders and Quam assumed that the PLAAF would have to choose between less capable Chinese systems or more capable Russian systems that involved continued dependence on foreign sup- pliers. However, improvements in the quality of weapons produced by Chinese defense industries allowed the PLAAF to evade this trade-off. Today’s PLAAF relies primarily on domestically produced aircraft and SAMs but is significantly more capable than it was in 2007. Opting for larger-scale procurement of Russian systems would have enabled the PLAAF to acquire higher-quality weapons systems more rapidly, but instead the air force chose to wait until domestic producers improved the quality of its systems, allowing the PLAAF to field a technologically advanced force while also reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.
Low-Tech vs. High-Tech Systems. Saunders and Quam suggested that budget constraints and the high cost of advanced aircraft would force the PLAAF to choose between a force with high numbers of less advanced aircraft or a force with fewer but more capable high-tech aircraft. The PLAAF made the decision to retire older, less capable fighter aircraft and replace them with relatively advanced fourth- and fifth- generation fighters. However, increases in PLAAF budgets and improvements in the domestic aviation industry allowed the service to procure large quantities of highly capable aircraft.
China’s defense spending has grown from about $89.76 billion in 2011 to $235 billion in 2024, supporting robust PLAAF procurement.36 While today’s PLAAF operates about 400 fewer fighter and ground-attack aircraft than the 2007 PLAAF, the capabilities of those aircraft are much more advanced than those the PLAAF was flying in 2007.37 The PLAAF chose the larger J-20 stealth fighter produced by Chengdu Aerospace Corporation over the J-31 prototype developed by the Shenyang Aerospace Corporation. The smaller J-31 was adapted for export and for potential use by the PLAN as a carrier-based fighter.38 Shenyang has now demonstrated the more capable J-35 variant for carrier use, which might also be of interest to the PLAAF if it seeks a cheaper alternative to the J-20.39 As more J-20 stealth fighters are deployed, the PLAAF has reportedly retired most of the Su-27s it purchased from Russia in the early 1990s.40 On December 26, 2024, a PLA sixth-generation stealth fighter was displayed flying on Chinese social media, marking an achievement for China’s defense industrial base and aviation industry.41 Once the prototype is ready for deployment, the PLAAF will face a choice about the right mix of more expensive, high-tech sixth-generation fighters and less expensive fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft.
This dynamic has been less evident in the PLAAF bomber force. As discussed earlier, the PLAAF retired all its H-5 bombers and its older H-6 aircraft. Its current bomber force is based primarily on newer H-6 variants that incorporate some advanced features such as air re- fueling and ballistic and cruise-missile carrying capabilities.42 Nevertheless, the H-6 is based on a late 1950s Soviet design that could hardly be called a high-tech system. As with U.S. B-52 bombers, the H-6 aircraft serves primarily as a missile platform, with the missiles incorporating the advanced technology necessary to penetrate modern air and missile-defense systems. The PLAAF is currently developing a more advanced H-20 bomber with stealth characteristics that may allow it to penetrate modern air defenses.43 This would be a significant technological upgrade for the PLAAF bomber force. Once the H-20 is deployed, the PLAAF will have to decide on the right mix of less expensive H-6 bombers with standoff weapons and more expensive H-20 penetrating bombers.
Combat Aircraft vs. Support Aircraft. Saunders and Quam suggested that the mix of combat aircraft and support aircraft that could increase the effectiveness of the combat force would be another key trade-off shaping future PLAAF force structure. A modern air force uses tankers to expand the range and endurance of its fighter and bomber fleet and uses AEW and AWACS to warn combat aircraft of threats and increase their effectiveness in air defense roles. Special mission aircraft provide ISR capabilities to the force, and EW platforms can help combat aircraft penetrate enemy air defenses. Strategic airlift allows an air force to drop airborne forces and provide logistics support for expeditionary operations.
Looking at the mix of combat and support aircraft through a quantitative lens, the PLAAF remains heavily focused on combat aircraft. Table 5 shows that the PLAAF has only modestly increased the percentage of support aircraft in its fleet, from about 12 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2025. This compares unfavorably to the Russian air force, where 34 percent of the aircraft are support aircraft, and the U.S. Air Force, where 31 percent of the aircraft are support aircraft.
Nevertheless, PLAAF support aircraft systems and platforms have matured and are now routinely deployed for operations and exercises. In 2007, the PLAAF was experimenting with prototypes of several airborne early warning and control systems, one of which crashed, killing both the aircrew and members of the design team.44 The PLAAF now operates 28 AEW aircraft (KJ-2000, KJ-200, KJ-500). The third-generation KJ-500 was deployed in 2015 and is the PLAAF’s most advanced operational AEW system.45 These aircraft are used rou- tinely to support air defense and bomber operations, including participation in China-Russia joint bomber patrols.46
PLAAF tanker and transport aircraft numbers are lower than what is expected for a modern air force. The small size of these fleets is shaped by the distance required by the PLA mission set, which has largely been regionally focused, and the limited number of refuelable PLAAF fighters and bombers. However, the PLAAF also chose not to procure large quantities of H-6U tankers, waiting until the more capable YY-20A tanker was available to buy significant numbers of tankers. The PLAAF currently has eight YY-20A tankers, but this number is expected to grow over time.47
The PLAAF has also invested in ISR and EW aircraft to support its combat force. The number of dedicated PLAAF ISR/EW aircraft increased from 53 in 2007 to 92 in 2025, with the PLAAF retiring older aircraft based on the short-range F-6 and adding aircraft based on more modern, longer-range platforms. The PLA in general has begun to rely more heavily on space-based and land-based assets to meet its ISR needs.48 EW is an area of continued investment, demonstrated by the increase in dedicated aircraft as opposed to EW systems installed onto aircraft. The Y-8 series has increased in numbers and new Y-9 variants (Y-9G, Y-9XZ) have entered the force.49 J-16D electronic jamming platforms have become fully operational and have been seen in exercises around Taiwan.50 In this area, the PLAAF has seen a modest increase in aircraft numbers and a larger increase in capability, increasing its ability to fight informationized wars. The PLAAF also uses uncrewed platforms for ISR purposes, but open-source information is insufficient to assess the number of these systems currently deployed.
Assessing the Framework
Saunders and Quam argued that “perceptions of the international threat environment (to include assessments of the likelihood of a crisis over Taiwan or a conflict with the United States) and budget concerns will have significant influence on the overall size of the future PLA and the speed of modernization.”51 A Taiwan contingency involving U.S. intervention continues as the principal PLA planning and force development scenario. The PLA has focused on deterring Taiwan independence while methodically building the capabilities necessary to provide military options to Chinese civilian leaders.52 The authors’ judgment that Taiwan would be a major driver of PLAAF modernization appears correct, but their view that PLAAF modernization would be significantly constrained by budget concerns underestimated the willingness of CCP civilian leaders to provide sufficient resources to allow the air force to procure large quantities of expensive, high-tech systems.
The framework’s focus on four key trade-offs is a useful lens for interpreting PLAAF modernization. The first factor, “changes to PLAAF roles and missions,” is a strong indicator for future force structure, especially considering the numerous reforms and reorganizations the PLA has undergone. The second factor, “domestic vs foreign procurement,” was useful in gauging force disposition and makeup, with implications for the sustainability and effectiveness of the air force over time. However, significant improvements in the PRC aircraft industry allowed the PLAAF to evade the implicit assumption of the dynamic between foreign/domestic and advanced/less advanced capabilities.
The PLAAF has been able to build a highly capable modern air force that mainly flies aircraft produced in China. The third factor, “high-tech versus low-tech” highlights the dynamic between budget, force capability, and force size. The PLAAF challenged the framework’s implicit assumption that budget constraints would result in a significant decrease in force size. Budget increases allowed the PLAAF to opt for high-tech systems while maintaining force size, making this factor less useful for predicting future force structure. However, it is worth noting that the size of the PLAAF did decrease significantly from 2007 to 2012, as the PLA retired older, capable aircraft while waiting patiently for more capable indigenous replacements to become available. The fourth category, “combat versus support aircraft,” has some value as an indicator for future force structure, since support aircraft that serve as force multipliers can increase the effectiveness of combat aircraft (and thus decrease the number necessary for missions and campaigns). The PLAAF saw a modest increase in numbers of dedicated ISR/EW aircraft and a somewhat larger increase in their capability. The relatively low number of support aircraft in the PLAAF compared to the Russian air force and U.S. Air Force might be constrained by technology limitations that delayed the availability of more capable long-range transports, advanced tankers, and other support aircraft. This picture might change over time now that the Y-20 and YY-20A are in production.
Factors Missing From the Framework. The 2007 framework did not focus explicitly on doctrine and thus did not elaborate on the increasing PLAAF emphasis on offensive missions, an important change between the old and new PLAAF. To some degree this shift was captured under changing roles and missions. The air force originally had the defensive missions of territorial air defense and provided ground force support for the army. By 2012, the PLAAF was more focused on offensive missions, as reflected in its bomber strike operations.53
At a more strategic level, the increased willingness of Chinese leaders to use military power as a coercive tool made some PLAAF assets such as bombers and maritime-strike aircraft more relevant as tools of statecraft.
The 2007 framework also did not discuss counterintervention, which became an increasing priority as the PLA focused on deterring or defeating U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency. There was also a major air force shift toward operating over oceans (though this partly reflected a successful PLAAF effort to compete with PLAN Naval Aviation for the maritime strike mission, a consideration included in the framework). The PLA’s establishment of a military logistics base in Djibouti in 2017 indicates a shift away from China’s original policy of no overseas bases. This base marked a new strategic focus on projecting military power abroad, serving as an impetus for the PLAAF to increase its power projec- tion capabilities to meet the demands of expeditionary missions.54
The framework also did not address manned vs. unmanned systems, an increasingly important factor in analyzing PLAAF force structure. The development and use of unmanned systems has long been a priority for the PLA, and the PLA Army, PLA Navy, and PLA Special Forces have all begun to employ UAVs in their operations.55 The extent of UAV integration in the PLAAF is less clear. The PLAAF has deployed several tactical and strategic UAVs, but reconnaissance missions appear to be more common than strike missions.56 The integration of unmanned systems in the PLAAF remains underdeveloped, but this is likely to change over time as the PLA fully adapts to lessons learned from the Ukraine war.57
Analytic Lessons Learned. A few analytic lessons can be learned from assessing the framework’s performance in explaining changes in PLAAF force structure between 2007 and 2025:
• Rising defense budgets were one of the most influential drivers of force structure by offsetting higher procurement, operations, and maintenance costs of advanced aircraft.
• The progress of China’s defense industry emerged as an extremely significant factor that eased common force modernization trade-offs, allowing the PLAAF to forge a new path of a high-tech and domestically produced air force.
• The PLAAF has significantly reduced, but not eliminated, its dependence on foreign suppliers.
The PLAAF avoided some difficult trade-offs by choosing to wait for the domestic aviation industry to overcome technology constraints and catch up with foreign producers.
The PRC’s grand strategy of avoiding conflict allowed the PLAAF to exercise patience in its force modernization decisions instead of having to procure expensive foreign systems or large quantities of available but less capable domestic systems.
Conclusion: Predicting Future Changes
The Saunders-Quam framework demonstrated considerable value in analyzing and explaining past PLAAF force structure decisions and some value as a predictive tool to anticipate key decisions that will shape the future force structure of the PLAAF. The framework undervalued the role of advances in the PRC aviation industry and defense budget increases that allowed the air force to avoid trade-offs between domestic and foreign procurement and between expensive high-tech systems and more affordable low-tech systems. However, China’s slowing economic growth may constrain future defense budget increases and force the PLA to make difficult trade-offs in the future, making the framework’s focus on trade-offs even more important.
This article suggests that China’s relatively benign security environment allowed the PLAAF to adopt a patient approach to modernization. This patience may be more difficult to maintain as U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies and the balance of regional military capabilities becomes more important.58 The four areas discussed in this article will remain useful in evaluating future air force modernization choices, but heightened U.S.-China strategic competition may force the PLAAF to focus more on near-term capability development as the risk of U.S.-China military conflict increases.
The framework’s ability to serve as a predictive tool of future developments in force modernization for the PLA and other militaries might be enhanced by adding three additional focus areas to complement the four trade-offs identified in the framework. The authors argued that perceptions of the international threat environment and budget constraints would have a significant impact on PLAAF modernization and future force structure but did not explicitly include those factors as variables. The analysis in this article also highlights improvements in the PRC defense industrial base as an important factor reducing the degree to which the foreign-domestic production tradeoff was a binding constraint. The Saunders- Quam framework might be modified to include perceptions of the likeliness of conflict, changes in defense budgets, and advances in the defense industrial base as explicit variables that shape the four trade-offs they analyzed. This modification would allow analysts to see the full picture surrounding force structure decisionmaking and better predict future force modernization.
With this change, the framework would also have increased value in assessing other aspects of PLA modernization and future force structure. The three new higher-level variables are general enough to apply to other PLA services (and to other countries as well). The four trade-offs likely apply to other services but might need to be modified or augmented to reflect specific aspects of warfare in the ground and maritime domains.59 Although Saunders and Quam developed this framework to apply to the PLA Air Force, the factors they identified are not China-specific. The framework may therefore also have utility in analyzing the modernization and future force structure of the air forces of other countries. JFQ
Notes
1 Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), http://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/22.
2 Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” in Scobell and Kamphausen, Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, 377–436.
3 The five perspectives on what rightsizing might mean were 1) the external security environment, 2) changing People’s Republic of China (PRC) international interests, 3) the value of airpower for political leaders’ priorities, 4) relative return on investment in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) versus other services for PLA top-level missions, and 5) the capabilities of other modern air forces.
4 Saunders and Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” in Scobell and Kamphausen, Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, 378.
5 For an overview of how the PLA develops forces, including a discussion of the future PLAAF, see Roger Cliff, China’s Future Military Capabilities (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2023), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/960.
6 Combat aircraft are calculated based on the total number of bombers, fighters, and ground-attack aircraft in the equipment by type section
in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance. The numbers may differ from the IISS total for combat-capable aircraft,
which sometimes but not always include some trainers. The 2007 edition of Military Balance does not include trainers in its combat-capable
aircraft total, but the 2025 edition does. See “East Asia and Australasia,” The Military Balance 107, no. 1 (February 2007), 331–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220601181097; “Chapter Six: Asia,” in The Military Balance 112, no. 1 (March 2012), 205–302, https://
doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2012.663215; and “Chapter Five: Asia,” in The Military Balance 125, no. 1 (February 2025), 206, 208, 218, 230, 231, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2025.2445477.
7 While Western and Russian analysts regard the Su-27/Flanker as a fourth-generation fighter, the PLAAF refers to them as third-generation fighters. This article uses the Western usage, which regards the MiG-19/J-6 as a second-generation fighter and the MiG-21/J-7 as a third-generation fighter.
8 On China’s lack of wars allowing the PLA to focus on modernization, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy (New York: Polity Books, 2025).
9 Yefim Gordon and Dmitry Komissarov, Chinese Air Power: Current Organization and Aircraft of All Chinese Air Forces (Surrey, UK: Midland Publishing, 2010), 102–27; Gregory Barber, “The J-20’s Role in Modern Chinese Airpower,” Vortex, No. 5 (June 2023), 175–86, https://www.calameo.com/cesa/books/006940288b84632feacc2. Also see Andreas Rupprecht, Red Dragon Bombers: China’s Long-range Bomber Force Since 1956 (Vienna: Harpia Publishing, 2024).
10 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 18, 2024), 61, https://media.defense.gov/2024/dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2024.pdf. Also see Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 1 (January 2024), 49–72, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/.
11 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, 61.
12 Michael Pilger, First Modern Tanker Observed at PLAAF Air Base, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) Staff Bulletin (Washington, DC: USCC, November 18, 2014), https://www.uscc.gov/research/first-modern-tanker-observed-chinese-airbase). See also Gabriel
Collins et al., “Trends in Chinese Aerial Refueling Capacity for Maritime Purposes,” in Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, ed. Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein (Newport, RI: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 198–200.
13 “PLA Buys Il-78 Refueler to Solve Compatibility Issues With Su-30s,” Xian Binggong Keji, FBIS CPP20051123318001, October 1, 2005, 19; “Ilyushin (Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Ilmieni S.V. Ilyushina)” [Aviation Complex Named After S.V. Ilyushin], Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, July 12, 2005.
14 Bradley Perrett, “Y-20 Revolutionizes China’s Airlifter and Tanker Capacity,” Aviation Week, October 4, 2023, https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/y-20-revolutionizes-chinas-airlifter-tanker-capacity.
15 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics,” in The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military
Operations in Regional and Global Context, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2021), 199–234.
16 Piotr Butowski, “Everything You Need to Know About the Ilyushin Il-76,” Key.Aero, August 19, 2022, https://www.key.aero/article/everything-you-need-know-about-ilyushin-il-76.
17 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics.”
18 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, 50, 54–6, 82, 88, 151.
19 PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 4th ed. (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2024), 18.
20 PLA Aerospace Power.
21 Kenneth W. Allen and Cristina Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2564684/70-years-of-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-force/.
22 Rod Lee, “PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 2023, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/
Article/3475163/pla-naval-aviation-reorganization-2023/.
23 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,” Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter 2016), 68–75, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-82/jfq-82_68-75_Saunders-Wuthnow.pdf.
24 Allen and Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force, 96.
25 Joel Wuthnow, “China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges,” War on the Rocks, June 24, 2024,
https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/chinas-new-info-warriors-the-information-support-force-emerges/.
26 Allen and Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force, 96–7.
27 Kenneth W. Allen, Current Overview of the PLA Air Force’s Organizational Structure (n.p., Center for Intelligence Research and
Analysis, 2023), 19–24, https://cira.exovera.com/news/current-overview-of-the-pla-air-forces-organizational-structure/.
28 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics.”
29 Barber, “The J-20’s Role in Modern Chinese Airpower.”
30 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics.”
31 Lee, “PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023.”
32 For a discussion, see Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman, Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies, China Strategic Perspectives 4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, December 2011), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-4.pdf.
33 Gordon and Komissarov, Chinese Air Power, 65–79; and Andreas Rupprecht, Red Dragon ‘Flankers’: China’s Prolific ‘Flanker’ Family (Vienna: Harpia Publishing, 2022).
34 Saunders and Wiseman, Buy, Build, or Steal.
35 PLA Aerospace Power.
36 “Chapter Six: Asia,” in The Military Balance (March 2012). Also see “Chapter Five: Asia,” in The Military Balance (February 2025).
37 PLA Aerospace Power.
38 Saunders and Wiseman, Buy, Build, or Steal.
39 “Shenyang Aircraft Corporation Unveils Details of New Chinese J-31B Fifth-Generation Fighter,” Global Defense News, July 3, 2024, https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2024/shenyang-aircraft-corporation-unveils-details-of-new-chinese-j-31b-fifth-generation-fighter; Gabriel Honrada, “China Redefining Air Power With Huge Stealth Fighter Rollout,” Asia Times, July 10, 2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/07/china-redefining-air-power-with-huge-stealth-fighter-rollout/; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, 61.
40 Gordon and Komissarov, Chinese Air Power, 67; “Special Report: China Inducts Additional J-20 Stealth Fighters,” Janes, June
13, 2024, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/post/special-report-china-inducts-additional-j-20-stealth-fighters; “Chapter Five: Asia,” in The Military Balance (February 2025).
41 Andrew S. Erickson, “The J-36 and Shenyang Stealth Fighters: China’s Great Aerospace Leap,” 19FortyFive, January 2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2024/12/the-j-36-and-shenyang-stealth-fighters-chinas-great-aerospace-leap/.
42 Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Air Force: Bomber Force Organization (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, May 2022), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/3016239/pla-air-force-bomber-force-organization/; Nathan Rabé and Pierre Vallée, “China’s Asserting Ambitions for Power: A Study on Bombers,” Vortex, No. 5 (June 2023), 187–200, https://www.calameo.com/cesa/books/006940288b84632feacc2.
43 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, 50, 54–6, 82, 88, 151.
44 “Kongjing-200 (KJ-200) Y-8W Club/High New 5,” Global Security, n.d., https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/kj-200.htm.
45 J. Michael Dahm, Special Mission Aircraft and Unmanned Systems (Laurel, MD: John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
October 2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1128646.pdf.
46 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics.”
47 Perrett, “Y-20 Revolutionizes China’s Airlifter and Tanker Capacity.”
48 “Chapter Six: Asia,” in The Military Balance (March 2012); “Chapter Five: Asia,” in The Military Balance (February 2025). The Chinese ISR system is more dependent on satellites, signals intelligence, radar, and UAS. See Thomas McCabe, “Chinese Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, March 8, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2528263/chinese-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-systems/.
49 “Chapter Six: Asia,” in The Military Balance (March 2012); “Chapter Five: Asia,” in The Military Balance (February 2025).
50 Guo Yuandan et al., “PLA’s J-16D Electronic Warfare Aircraft Spotted for 1st Time Near Taiwan,” Global Times (Beijing), January 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246818.shtml.
51 Saunders and Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” 378.
52 See Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War With Taiwan (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/crossing-the-strait/crossing-the-strait.pdf.
53 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Bomber Strike Packages With Chinese Characteristics.”
54 See Wuthnow et al., The PLA Beyond Borders.
55 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, 61.
56 This section benefited from conversation with China Aerospace Studies Institute research analyst Eli Turk. See also Michael S. Chase et al., Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR990.html.
57 Joel Wuthnow, Rightsizing the PLA’s Lessons From Ukraine, INSS Strategic Forum 311 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, September 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-311.pdf.
58 Phillip C. Saunders, “The Military Factor in U.S.-China Strategic Competition,” in Cold Rivals: The New Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition, ed. Evan S. Medeiros (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023), 205–32.
59 For a good illustration of the potential impact of changes in service roles and missions, see Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Impacts of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 125–70, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf.