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Lieutenant Colonel Shawn M. Cook, USA, is an Engineer Officer at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Hall, USAF, is a General Surgeon at USCENTCOM. Lieutenant Colonel Todd Spanton, USA, is a Human Resources Officer at USCENTCOM.
Human capital remains the cornerstone of an effective fighting force. Unfortunately, potential recruits’ propensity and ability to serve in the military are falling.1 The proportion of the population that physiologically and psychologically meets current recruitment standards has declined.2 This problem has culminated in a recruitment crisis for the U.S. military. In 2023, the U.S. military failed to meet recruitment goals by 41,000 recruits.
Most affected was the Army, which now has the smallest Active force since 1940.3 In addressing the Senate Armed Services subcommittee, Major General Johnny Davis stated, “This recruitment crisis certainly did not appear overnight and cannot be repaired overnight.”4 While emerging technological advances can help lessen this burden, the need for human beings to go into harm’s way and fight battles will not change in the foreseeable future.
One of the main factors hindering recruitment is the deterioration of physiological and mental fitness within the population.5 In 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) deemed 23 percent of youth eligible for military service, a fall from 29 percent in 2013 (see figure 1). The main contributor to the decline from 2013 to 2020 was a rise in disqualifying physical and mental health conditions among potential recruits. From 2020 to 2023, the number of potential recruits deemed ineligible for multiple reasons increased from 31 percent to 45 percent. These statistics indicate that the pool of potential volunteers capable of serving based on current standards is shrinking. With a smaller pool of potential candidates, either the military makeup must change or more of the shrinking pool must be recruited. Recruiting more people out of a smaller pool of potential recruits will be difficult. The drop in military recruitment can largely be attributed to declining societal opinions of the military. Between 2016 and 2021, the military achieved 100 percent of its accession goals yearly. However, in 2022, a downward trend became evident, with the military attaining only 90 percent of its recruitment objectives. This decline continued into 2023, further decreasing to 84 percent of the accession goal.
The preliminary figures for 2024 suggest a continuation of this trend, with only 81 percent of the requirements being met (see figure 2). A 2023 Gallup poll revealed a primary reason why recruitment has fallen. It found a notable decline in the American public’s confidence in the U.S. military, plummeting from a high of 78 percent in 2011 to just below 60 percent in 2023 (see figure 3). The downward trend in confidence parallels a decrease in pride in being American, with those expressing extreme or very strong pride in being American dropping from 85 percent in 2014 to less than 67 percent in 2023. The percentage of 16- to 24-year-olds who thought it likely they would join the military has fallen from over 15 percent in 2014 to under 9 percent in 2023. These statistics indicate a shrinking pool of candidates who would volunteer for military service. Such shifts in national pride and trust in the military contribute to young Americans’ declining propensity to serve.
Increasing pay to counter the declining perception of the military is not an ideal solution. Military pay as of 2020 was highly competitive in relation to civilian pay levels.6 Increasing pay further may cause more problems than benefits. While recruiting may increase with pay, there is not a proven link between productivity and pay. The military may be left with an expensive, poorly motivated workforce. Also, economic advancement is widely possible outside the military. The GI Bill, once an enticing recruitment incentive offering college tuition in exchange for military service, has been largely negated by the number of companies offering partial or full college reimbursement. Companies offering this benefit range from technology giants like Amazon and financial institutions like Wells Fargo to fast-food restaurants like Starbucks.7
The military still needs people, so it must adapt to have enough people to function. Relatively high military pay encourages recruitment and retention but is not directly modifiable by military leadership and may not be ideal.8 Services can modify recruitment and performance standards, improve the population’s physiological and mental health characteristics, or adjust the size and capabilities of the military. This article discusses three approaches to managing this problem and their potential impacts. Ultimately, the best option is likely a smaller force augmented by technological advancements.
Improve Military Recruits
It is possible to change behavior or treat behavioral problems in a population. Behavioral momentum theory describes response and resistance to desired change.9 In short, behavior is altered by overcoming resistance to change through variable levels of reinforcement. An example is how the military successfully takes untrained recruits and rapidly prepares them physically and behaviorally for military service.10 Basic training, however, is a contained, controlled, and relatively brief period. Making durable changes in an individual’s behavior and maintaining physiological changes are much more difficult. Without continual reinforcement efforts, individuals are prone to returning to previous behaviors.
The advantage of producing and maintaining a fit population is a more capable and enduring force. A clear link between a particular individual’s fitness level and broad unit performance does not exist. Poor general fitness is known to be associated with unit productivity loss.11 Maintenance of fitness standards has successfully prevented metabolic syndrome and reduced medical costs.12 Physical fitness is associated with improved individual military job performance.13 If individual fitness improves job performance and lowers costs, it can be assumed that if all unit members are fit, the unit’s job performance will be higher and medical costs will be lower. Unfortunately, while this overall assumption sounds desirable, the amount of investment required for a discrete benefit is unknown. Reinforcement efforts to maintain a healthy behavior pat- tern have costs.
Improving a population’s physiological performance is costly and takes time. Changing a less fit population to a fitter population for their entire duty period will take continuous effort. For example, diet and exercise to maintain weight loss for 1 year is reasonably attainable. Unfortunately, within a few years without continuous intervention, there is near-universal relapse to previous behavior and conditions.14 The military can and does require individuals to meet Service-specific fitness standards and periodically verifies compliance. But compliance comes with a cost. Individuals spend time training, and Services spend time assessing. If the military is depleted or its manpower needs to rapidly increase, improving and assessing recruits will consume valuable time. All the effort and cost to ensure universal compliance may not be worthwhile.15 Additionally, to ensure compliance, failure must have a consequence. Those who fail testing may be lost along with the value of their training and experience.
As with changing behavior to improve physiological performance, treating behavioral health conditions improves performance but does not eliminate the underlying problem. For mental health disorders, an individual must consistently manage the condition, and environmental changes like deployments may exacerbate the underlying issues. In the expeditionary environment, medical services and support are reduced. The expeditionary environment is also inherently stressful and degrades mental health as evidenced by the high proportion of mental health evacuations.16
Adapt to Military Recruits
Population-wide physiological and behavioral health changes have occurred within the U.S. population over the past several generations. Changing long-term behavior resulting in physiological changes is possible but costly, with a poor long-term success rate. Instead of expending effort to change the population to fit historical expectations and capabilities, a more realistic approach is to change expectations for capabilities that use the new recruits.
The advantage of adapting to the population is the opposite of improving the population. Adapting to the population allows for easy replenishment and reduced compliance costs. In a significant conflict, many personnel may be required quickly to replenish losses or bolster capabilities. Instead of improving the population to a standard, the available training time can be dedicated to job performance. The military has a history of adjusting standards to accommodate replenishment needs without apparent degradation in military capabilities.
The disadvantage of adapting to the population is a theoretically reduced military capability. The military sets physiological and mental health standards to qualify for service. The health standards exist because it is assumed those who do not meet standards will not be able to achieve, or will degrade, military functions.17 Some evidence exists that units with different breakdowns of male/ female Servicemembers—implying different physiological capabilities—perform differently.18 Despite these differences, changing the standards for different populations has been acceptable.19 In addition, physical measurements such as body mass index may predict fitness test scores, but fitness scores do not necessarily predict military task performance.20 Behavioral health challenges, though, can reasonably be expected to cause diminished unit cohesion through medical-related attrition. Behavioral health is the leading cause of disease- related evacuations in an expeditionary environment.21 A greater proportion of symptomatic behavioral health conditions within a force can be expected to increase the attrition rate.
Reduced physical fitness and mental health standards have measurable benefits and theoretical disadvantages. A numerically larger military is potentially advantageous over a smaller military. However, there is a theoretical point that physical and mental degradation in a large military is worse than having a smaller force, but it is unlikely that a military that mirrors the general population would be degraded enough at this point. The conscription model of the Israel Defense
Forces, which mandates military service for all Israeli citizens, illustrates how a country can adapt requirements to meet the limitations of its population.22 The U.S. military, however, is a world power, and the practices of small regional powers may not be directly applicable.
Shift to a Smaller, Technology-Augmented Military
A smaller, more technologically advanced military is a third option and potentially the most viable one. This option addresses medical ineligibility and the shrinking pool of willing volunteers. The result is a more efficient U.S. military that could yield cost savings while increasing pay for Servicemembers and enhancing defense capabilities. This approach focuses on quality over quantity, leveraging cutting-edge technology, streamlined operations, and strategic foresight. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of sustaining a smaller force while using technological advances to maintain a formidable military capability.
The advantage of a smaller military is cost savings in Servicemember salary and benefits. Higher quality people who meet eligibility criteria can be selected based on job requirements and tasks. Individuals can be selected in such a way that programs designed to ensure compliance with standards can be reduced or eliminated. For example, the Space Force has limited physical fitness requirements, so physical fitness tests and associated costs have been eliminated.23 Retention can be maintained. Any cost savings can be reinvested into salaries, benefits, equipment, and technology. A robust National Guard and Reserve force could also be maintained in the event a surge of manpower is required. The same societal trends affect National Guard and Reserve recruitment, but the lower service burden can result in a broader pool of willing members.
The disadvantages of a smaller and more technological force are fragility and limited force projection. The loss of any component or person is magnified if no immediate replacements exist. Technology can be valuable when it works, but it can be broken or de- graded.24 A smaller footprint limits U.S. ability to influence international affairs or participate in global peacekeeping dependent on a large force posture. The U.S. military currently has over 200,000 Active-duty Servicemembers deployed in at least 170 countries across all combat- ant commands.25 A smaller force would affect our ability to keep this operational tempo. Smaller military forces often rely heavily on international alliances and partnerships for defense. While this can foster international cooperation, it also introduces a degree of dependence.
The growth in autonomous technology makes the move to a small, technologically augmented force feasible. One example is the integration of autonomous convoy operations. A typical military convoy consists of 15 to 20 vehicles with at least 2 Servicemembers per vehicle resulting in between 30 to 40 Servicemembers required to conduct a mission. An autonomous vehicle–augmented convoy would do the same mission with fewer personnel, minimizing risk to life and freeing personnel for other tasks.26 Further successful autonomous capability integration can see across domains with unmanned aerial systems, robotic combat vehicles, unmanned undersea vehicles, and artificial intelligence in decision support. The movement toward autonomous warfare likely creates an environment in which fewer, more highly skilled Servicemembers will be required.
Personnel levels could be reduced, but new types of personnel will be required. Technical failures on complex autonomous vehicles require appropriate skill sets to repair. Adversaries will attempt to conduct cyberattacks on any vulnerabilities. Maintaining the new technologies will require a new set of skills and training programs. These personnel will mostly require knowledge and not physiological capability, making recruitment using the general population’s physiological status more tolerable. Military roles that require a high physiological and mental health standard can, therefore, be targeted in the shrinking pool of the eligible and willing population.
As the military confronts a changing recruitment landscape marked by declining national pride, confidence in military institutions, and the physiological and psychological eligibility of potential recruits, these technological improvements offer a strong manpower mitigation strategy. Technology solutions enable the military to maintain operational effectiveness and readiness, even as it navigates the complexities of modern warfare and the evolving demographic and societal trends that impact recruitment and retention.
Conclusion
The U.S. population is changing, and the military must adapt. The military can improve the available population to meet historical standards, adapt to the population and change expectations, or use a combination of the two by augmenting a smaller military. Regardless of which option the military chooses, it will have to conduct warfare with the force it has. The return on investment of universal and prolonged behavioral change is likely low. Adapting to the population and having a large but mediocre force is not palatable. The best option is a smaller and technologically augmented military that adapts or improves the population depending on the required task.
A smaller and technologically augmented military is the recommended approach. A smaller military allows a high recruitment standard amid a shrinking pool of people who can meet the standards and are willing to serve. A smaller military prioritizing specialization, rapid deployment capabilities, and technological superiority can offer flexibility and cost effectiveness. Fragility with a low-force posture is a problem. This will have to be mitigated with partnerships and a healthy Reserve. This hybrid model ensures a robust defense mechanism and aligns with broader societal goals, fostering a sustainable and resilient military force capable of addressing contemporary and future challenges. JFQ
Notes
1 Office of People Analytics, Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies, Department of Defense, “Spring 2022 Propensity Update,” April 2022, https://jamrs.defense.gov/portals/20/documents/yp52spring2022publicreleasepropensityupdate.pdf.
2 Hui Zheng and Paola Echave, “Are Recent Cohorts Getting Worse? Trends in U.S. Adult Physiological Status, Mental Health, and Health Behaviors Across a Century of Birth Cohorts,” American Journal of Epidemiology 190, no. 11 (2021), 2242–55, https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwab076.
3 Davis Winkie, “Army Numbers Smallest Since WWII—What Units Face Cuts in 2024?” Army Times, December 28, 2023, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/12/28/army-numbers-smallest-since-wwii-what-units-face-cuts-in-2024/.
4 Jim Garamore, “Chiefs Discuss Military Recruiting Challenges at Committee Hearing,” DOD News, December 7, 2023, https://www.
defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3610846/chiefs-discuss-military-recruiting-challenges-at-committee-hearing/.
5 Thomas Novelly, “New Study Finds Even More Young Americans Are Unfit to Serve,” Military Officers Association of America, September 30, 2022, https://www.moaa.org/content/publications-and-media/news-articles/2022-news-articles/new-study-finds-even-more-young-americans-are-unfit-to-serve.
6 Troy D. Smith et al., An Updated Look at Military and Civilian Pay Levels and Recruit Quality (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3200/RR3254/RAND_RR3254.pdf.
7 Jennifer Calonia, “10 Employers That Pay for College Tuition,” Forbes, August 4, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/student-loans/jobs-that-pay-for-college/.
8 Beth J. Asch et al., Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG950.pdf.
9 John A. Nevin and Timothy A. Shahan, “Behavioral Momentum Theory: Equations and Applications,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 44, no. 4 (2011), 877–95, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3251288/.
10 Harris R. Lieberman et al., “Positive Effects of Basic Training on Cognitive Performance and Mood of Adult Females,” Human Factors 56,
no. 6 (2014), 1113–23, https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720813519472; Jace R. Drain et al., “The Effectiveness of Basic Military Training to Improve Functional Lifting Strength in New Recruits,” The Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research 29 (2015), 173–7, https://doi.org/10.1519/
jsc.0000000000001072.
11 Heikki Kyröläinen et al., “Physical Fitness, BMI, and Sickness Absence in Male Military Personnel,” Occupational Medicine 58, no. 4 (2008), 251–6, https://doi.org/10.1093/occmed/kqn010.
12 Marcus M. Cranston et al., “When Military Fitness Standards No Longer Apply: The High Prevalence of Metabolic Syndrome in Recent Air Force Retirees,” Military Medicine 182, no. 7 (2017), e1780–6, https://doi.org/10.7205/milmed-d-16-00253.
13 Tommi Ojanen et al., “Effects of Task-Specific and Strength Training on Simulated Military Task Performance in Soldiers,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21 (2020), 8000, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17218000.
14 Wayne C. Miller, “How Effective Are Traditional Dietary and Exercise Interventions for Weight Loss?” Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 31 (1999), 1129–34, https://doi.org/10.1097/00005768-199908000-00008.
15 Laura A. Talbot et al., “Cost Effectiveness of Two Army Physical Fitness Programs,” Military Medicine 178, no. 12 (2013), 1353–7, https://doi.org/10.7205/ milmed-d-13-00118; Brandon L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell, “Testing Compliance,” Law and Contemporary Problems 83 (2020),
47, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4975&context=lcp.
16 Andrew Hall et al., “Relative Risk of All-Cause Medical Evacuation for Behavioral Health Conditions in U.S. Central Command,” Military Medicine 189, nos. 1–2 (2024), e279–84, https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usad306.
17 Paul R. Sackett and Anne S. Mavor, eds., Assessing Fitness for Military Enlistment (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2006), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11511/.
18 Center for Military Readiness, Marine Corps Force Integration Plan—Summary, https://cmrlink.org/data/sites/85/CMRDocuments/
USMCSept.10fourPGSummaryWISRR.pdf.
19 Ellen Mitchell, “Army Approves Reduced Physical Fitness Standards for Women, Older Soldiers,” The Hill, March 23, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/599459-army-approves-reduced-physical-fitness-standards-for-women-older-soldiers/.
20 Joseph R. Pierce et al., “Body Mass Index Predicts Selected Physical Fitness Attributes But Is Not Associated With Performance on Military Relevant Tasks in U.S. Army Soldiers,” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport 20 (2017), S79–84, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsams.2017.08.021.
21 Andrew Hall et al., “Differences in Disease Non-Battle Injury Between Combatant Commands,” Military Medicine 188, nos. 7–8 (2023), e2414–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usac413.
22 Stuart A. Cohen, “The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a ‘People’s Army’ to a ‘Professional Military’—Causes and Implications,” Armed Forces and Society 21, no. 2 (1995), 237–54, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502100205.
23 Rachel S. Cohen, “Here’s the Space Force’s Plan to Ditch Annual Fitness Testing,” Air Force Times, March 18, 2022, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/03/18/heres-the-space-forces-plan-to-ditch-annual-fitness-testing/.
24 Tegg Westbrook, “The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 2 (2019), 1–16, https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1720&context=jss.
25 Niall McCarthy, “All the Countries Worldwide With a U.S Military Presence,” Forbes, March 28, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/03/28/all-the-countries-worldwide-with-a-u-s-military-presence-infographic/.
26 Rajesh Uppal, “Militaries Thrust on Autonomous Convoys or Vehicle Swarm Technology for Building Autonomy-Enabled Future Force,” International Defense Security and Technology, July 5, 2022, https://idstch.com/geopolitics/united-states-army-and-lockheed-martin-demonstrate-autonomous-convoy/.