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Jeffrey A. Larsen is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and President of Larsen Consulting Group. He is co-editor of Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise? (Lynne Rienner, 2024). James J. Wirtz is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is co-author of War, Peace, and International Relations, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2024).
Each new Presidential administration develops a national security strategy early in its tenure. Sometimes the President chooses to continue the strategy of his predecessor, but more commonly the new team will revise or completely rewrite the strategy to accommodate changes in the international system and to reflect the goals of the new President. In the case of the second Donald J. Trump administration, part of that calculation will be whether to retain the concept that the Joseph R. Biden administration called “integrated deterrence,” an idea that addressed a series of national security concerns that began to set off alarms during President Trump’s first term in office.
Integrated deterrence was introduced in three key documents published by the Biden administration in 2022: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review.1 The idea behind this concept is simple enough: In a more complex world of multiple adversaries, emerging technologies, new domains of warfare, and globalized economic ties, the United States needs a broader ap- proach to the traditional military mission of deterrence. The new concept addresses these developments by calling for a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance strategy that uses both nonkinetic and kinetic deterrent threats.
The Biden initiative is an innovative approach to an old requirement—the need to synchronize capabilities and ac- tions in a deliberate manner to maximize the effectiveness of deterrent and coercive threats. It accurately reflects a more complex world with new warfare domains, new and emerging technologies, highly sophisticated weaponry, and multiple regional and global actors, including two peer nuclear competitors to the United States. It also responds to a growing realization that Cold War capabilities and ideas are no longer sufficient as the basis of a deterrent strategy for the West. The concept builds on the first Trump administration’s understanding of the military requirements for renewed Great Power competition, expanding those ideas into a national responsibility. Integrated deterrence, if successfully applied, could resolve many issues by its combination of cross-domain capabilities, a whole-of-government approach, and alliance-wide efforts to allay the multilayered deterrence challenge facing the United States, its allies, and its friends and partners today.
Nevertheless, the concept remains vague. What is integrated deterrence, and who is responsible for it? Is it strictly a military mission? Is it solely a U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) mission? Should it be treated as a broader Department of Defense (DOD) effort that assumes greater coordination across all military commands and Services? Or does it demand a whole-of-government emphasis that requires input from multiple agencies and other Cabinet departments? If the latter, who is the lead integrator for those requirements?2
These questions reflect a lack of clarity over who is leading the national effort to integrate deterrence. Many individuals and agencies believe that the concept of integrated deterrence is solely the responsibility of DOD, or the military Services, or perhaps USSTRATCOM as the Nation’s nuclear striking force. Yet integrated deterrence is also mentioned in the National Security Strategy as a mission meant to be supported by the entire government.3 One of the primary challenges to ensuring the success of integrating deterrence, therefore, is the identification of a key facilitator—a central office or individual whose responsibility it is to move the concept beyond the purview of DOD and embed it in the mindset of all relevant government agencies. By the end of the Biden administration, no one had identified or designated the person, office, or agency that was ultimately responsible for integrating deterrence.
There are other obstacles to integrating deterrence: conceptual ambiguity, institutional ambivalence, lack of understanding by both elites and the public, uncertainly about the role of allies, the rapid pace of technological change, and the challenge of creating a societal commitment to the strategy. It is also unclear whether the second Trump administration will pick up where the first one left off by pursuing a whole-of-government effort to synchronize deterrence across warfare domains, government agencies, the joint force, and allies and friends. Given the Trump administration’s early interest in seeking efficiencies, synchronizing the efforts of many agencies in the quest to strengthen deterrence is a plausible way to get more bang for fewer bucks. The remainder of this article considers these issues.
Lack of Central Guidance
In the March 2023 Strategic Command Posture Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, USSTRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton reminded the Members that integrated deterrence, and the requirements necessary to ensure its success, have expanded beyond DOD to include a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance perspective.
USSTRATCOM’s role . . . is not limited to nuclear plans and operations. USSTRATCOM’s mission is to deter strategic attack—not just nuclear attack —against our nation and allies. . . . Correspondingly, our new concepts and plans must account for nuclear, long-range conventional, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and cyberspace capabilities. Crucially, DOD’s plan must integrate all capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.4
This implies that in General Cotton’s view, integrated deterrence is first and foremost a DOD responsibility, and USSTRATCOM may be the lead integrator. Nevertheless, this version of integrated deterrence is not universally shared. Then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, for example, publicly stated that deterrence must be different than it was in the past. In 2021, he explained that for integrated deterrence to be successful, “we need . . . the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is so credible, flexible, and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause.”5 This definition downplayed the whole-of-government aspects of integrated deterrence.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy carried forward the theme that integrated deterrence may be a military mission—but not exclusively so. It states, “Meeting the challenge requires a holistic response: integrated deterrence.”6 It continues, “DOD will pursue asymmetric approaches that focus on denial of an adversary’s objectives, building resilience (within defense realms), and deterring an adversary through direct and collective cost imposition.” In this last category, we find the first mention of non-DOD players, specifically “our allies and partners who rely on U.S. extended deterrence.”7
Although these statements seem to diminish the idea that integrated deterrence should be a whole-of-government activity, other government leaders see integrated deterrence in a broader light. Discussions with senior leaders and staff members at USSTRATCOM and in the Pentagon, for example, have made it clear to these authors that many in the military think of integrated deterrence in a more holistic way than the official documents imply. In this view, the definition of integrated deterrence, and the requirements necessary to ensure its success, have expanded beyond DOD to include a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance perspective.
Those who see integrated deterrence in a broader light point to the current National Security Strategy for confirmation of this view. That document clearly states that U.S. security strategy relies on integrated deterrence, defined as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.”8 This entails the integration of deterrence across domains, across regions, across the spectrum of conflict, and, most tellingly, “across the U.S. Government to leverage the full array of American advantages, from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions.”9 It also requires integration with allies and partners. The National Security Strategy thus provides a much broader definition than that found in other documents or in speeches by senior defense leaders.
There is considerable uncertainty within government departments and across DOD commands as to which of these perspectives is correct. No one seems certain whether this really is a whole-of-government approach or if it is a DOD responsibility. And some government agencies suspect DOD of trying to “hijack” the concept for its own bureaucratic purposes.10
These varying definitions reflect the lack of consensus on what integrated deterrence is, how it is defined, who is responsible for leading the effort, and why it is a necessary approach to dealing with the challenges facing the United States and its allies. From a broad perspective, deterrence today is anything but integrated. There is no grand strategy that tells the multiple government agencies what is to be deterred or how we might use our collective resources to deter it. Nor is there a strategy for integrating deterrence as a whole-of-government approach to national defense. And the United States lacks a dedicated lead integrator to motivate and coordinate that effort.
Institutional Resistance
Some agencies and departments of the U.S. Government believe integrated deterrence is a DOD initiative that involves only the military. In some cases, there is suspicion by nondefense agencies about the DOD lead in this effort—or about USSTRATCOM’s interest in the subject beyond its traditional nuclear deterrence mission. Some agencies respond negatively to the “mission creep” inherent in the concept, which would give DOD a more direct role in the political aspects of U.S. defense strategy. To overcome these suspicions, integrating deterrence within DOD would benefit from the creation of a joint interagency task force that is responsible for working on deterrence from both a policy point of view and regarding operational requirements. Nevertheless, questions remain about where to locate such a group within the executive branch.
There also is an unwillingness by other government agencies to accept responsibility for their role in a whole- of-government approach to integrated deterrence. This is made more challenging by the absence of a central integrating agent. At present, there is no office that can act as a proponent for a whole-of-government approach to deterrence within the executive branch, with Congress, and with the American public. The right place for such an advocate is the White House, most likely within the National Security Council. Creating a senior director for integrating deterrence would validate the importance of the project and place it next to the decisionmaking center for nearly all strategic issues that arise these days: the Presidency.11
One also might ask whether the Biden administration’s reach exceeded its grasp when it called for a whole-of- government approach to deterrence. The lack of any central push from the White House after the concept was included in key 2022 national security documents implies that it may have been more of a buzzword than a firm commitment to a new approach, even though the concept offers a useful way to address the emerging strategic setting. Or perhaps, unlikely as it would seem, the integrated deterrence concept may have really been a DOD initiative, without higher-level backing, that somehow made an appearance on one page of the National Security Strategy. Logic would imply, however, that integrated deterrence is in fact a concept approved at the highest levels that was meant to be a whole-of-government effort, with military support but not necessarily military-led.
Definitional Ambiguity
A core challenge to integrated deterrence is the lack of a clear definition of the concept. Does it strictly refer to deterrence? Or does it also include related ideas like compellence or coercion? How broad a net does this term cast? For example, does integrated deterrence include focusing on economic, diplomatic, political, and other nonmilitary efforts to cajole, persuade, dissuade, or compel an adversary to choose alternative approaches? Certainly, the National Security Strategy states that is the case, but the National Defense Strategy makes no mention of support from other government agencies.
Structurally, is integrated deterrence meant to be a strategy or an organizational construct? If a strategy, is it a national strategy along the lines of containment, or is it a lower-level strategy meant merely to help strengthen deterrence by including nonmilitary aspects of national defense? Or is it simply an aspirational approach to improving American security? In offering this strategic concept, no effort has been made to devise an organizational or command framework or a plan to implement the concept in terms of more integrated operations and procurement policies. It is hard to escape the conclusion that nothing much has been done to better integrate U.S. deterrence strategy across various agencies in the 3 years since the concept appeared in formal policy statements.
There is also uncertainty over what or whom the United States is deterring. Russian adventurism? The rise of China as a regional hegemon? Both Russia and China? Any strategic attack on the homeland? Coercion or an attack against our allies? Hybrid or gray-zone challenges? Economic and political issues as well as military actions? Anything involving an adversary’s decisionmaking? All the above?
The lack of a well-defined national strategy means there is no larger vision that underlies the concept of integrated deterrence that would give it meaning, focus, and a clear rationale. In addition, even within DOD there is considerable ambiguity as to who is responsible for what. For example, the Unified Command Plan has so many overlapping command responsibilities that it is unclear which of the unified and geographical combatant commanders would be in charge in certain scenarios.12 In a sense, the first step toward integration would be deconfliction of these overlapping responsibilities, which continue to proliferate because of the emergence of new weapons, new warfare domains, and new threat scenarios.
Lack of Public and Elite Expertise
Across today’s U.S. military and civilian leadership, one finds a widespread lack of knowledge about deterrence theory and America’s likely adversaries. This shortfall is exacerbated by a lack of experience with deterrence policies and operations. The world may be experiencing a rise in Great Power competition that has been accompanied by a similar increase in the salience of deterrence in U.S. defense strategy. We have lost much of the expertise and understanding, however, that was widely held in the military during the Cold War. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. and allied militaries have been continuously engaged in low-to high-intensity operations involving everything from peacekeeping and stabilization efforts, counterpiracy patrols, and counterproliferation airstrikes to major land campaigns. While the term deterrence was used to refer to all these operations, and a small portion of the U.S. military remained dedicated to (nuclear) deterrence on a full-time basis, the formative experience of the average Servicemember today is in the realm of actual kinetic engagements— that is, warfighting.
There is a widespread lack of understanding of deterrence as a peace preservation strategy, which contradicts the direct warfighting experience of today’s military. Nor is there much public concern, interest, or sense of urgency when it comes to studying or even acknowledging the role of deterrence in U.S. national security strategy. Added to this is a shortage of expertise in related topics such as how to integrate conventional nu- clear strategy, how best to incorporate new weapons and technologies into deterrence logic, and how to deal with new warfare domains such as outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence.13
Overcoming this strategy deficit is an area where DOD could play a significant role in the effort to realize integrated deterrence and could do so without much opposition from other government departments. To begin, defense officials should acknowledge the general lack of deterrence education available within civilian and military institutions. Many security studies programs across the country have been shuttered since the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the few that remain have not focused on Great Power competition for decades. DOD needs to find the resources to reconstitute and revitalize these programs, both in its own professional military education institutions and in public and private universities. Consideration should be given to establishing ongoing research programs that address the implications of emerging technologies, new weapons, and new warfare domains in the realm of strategy, and how these new considerations and capabilities will interact in the realm of deterrence strategy. Security studies is a particularly good program to incorporate this new initiative in deterrence theory because it is interdisciplinary and crosses multiple academic areas, including international relations, history, economics, area studies, and languages, all of which contribute to deterrence and decisionmaking, especially when one considers the growing role of information-age technologies in deterrence strategy.
An additional consideration that receives virtually no attention in discussions of integrated deterrence is the role of the commercial sector in any effort to adapt deterrence to a changing techno-strategic environment. Because the private sector plays a dominant role when it comes to technology-driven innovation, especially the development of new applications, strategists have to keep an eye on the Gartner Hype Cycle to identify developments that can quickly affect the character of war.14 (This cycle tracks new technologies from the peak of expectations through the trough of disillusionment to a plateau of actual performance to something truly disruptive.15) The effort to integrate deterrence will take place in a setting of techno-strategic churn that is largely beyond the influence, let alone the control, of the U.S. Government. Integrated deterrence will take place against a backdrop of uncertainty when it comes to both the longevity and the effectiveness of new capabilities and concepts of operations.
The Role of Allies
There also seems to be considerable uncertainty across government regarding the role of allies, even as there is a growing appreciation of their contribution to a collective deterrent posture. Officials often refer to the need for a whole-of-alliance deterrent posture without referencing the position of various allied capitals on the subject. It remains unclear whether Washington is prepared to incorporate allied concerns and objectives into a collective deter- rent posture, especially when these concerns can be expected to be at some variance with the view from the United States. If current trends continue and the world becomes increasingly multipolar, allies will play an increasingly important role in U.S. deterrent strategy, which makes their acceptance of the concept of integrated deterrence a key contributor to U.S. security. Nevertheless, Washington has done little to engage allies in meaningful exchanges about what integrated deterrence means to their security postures.
Some U.S. allies have a more well-developed understanding of what is strategic to them, and how a whole-of-government approach to deterring strategic threats can best serve their national security interests. In addition to the tangible contributions to multilateral defense that allies provide, such experience may be transferable to the United States as it works to establish integrated deterrence.
“Whole-of-Society” Challenges
There are no political points to be scored by championing integrated deterrence. Media attention lurches from one international crisis to another, depicting an increasingly chaotic and warlike international setting without identifying options to deal with the turmoil. By contrast, integrated deterrence appears to offer a reasonable response to both the rise of Great Power competition and the emergence of new technologies, weapons, and warfare domains. Nonetheless, no national debate is occurring to assess integrated deterrence or to suggest policy alternatives; politically, integrated deterrence is a nonissue. It is of concern only to experts rather than to the public at large.
The outcome of the 2024 Presidential election in the United States may suggest that the sun is setting on the concept of integrated deterrence. The exigencies of partisanship and electoral dynamics will lead the second Trump administration to distance itself from most Biden-era policies, resulting in a repackaging of existing ideas or the invention of new ones. Nevertheless, the concept of integrated deterrence remains valid. It addresses issues identified by the first Trump administration and corresponds to the second Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to seek government efficiencies and strengthened security. Even if the name changes, the conceptual underpinnings of integrated deterrence must be addressed by any approach to U.S. national security in the near term. Sooner or later, the Trump administration will either take integrating deterrence seriously or it will invent a more appealing name for the concept to respond to today’s techno-strategic setting.
Conclusion
Given these challenges, will it be possible to integrate deterrence as proposed? Some critics of the concept Two U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirits assigned to 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, fly Bomber Task Force mission alongside two Royal Australian Air Force F-35A Lightning IIs during exercise Koolendong 22 over Royal Australia Air Force Base Curtin, Australia, July 18, 2022 (U.S. Air Force/Dylan Nuckolls) JFQ 117, 2nd Quarter 2025 Larsen and Wirtz 21 argue that it will not be possible—that the concept is far too ambitious and exceeds the current state of the art in terms of our understanding of deterrence and the changing character of war. They also suggest that it exceeds our ability to organize many disparate efforts across many agencies and operations. Nevertheless, during the Cold War the United States developed a theory and practice of deterrence— one with bipartisan support—that approximated today’s idea of a whole-of-government integrated deterrence strategy. It was a 40-year work in progress, the product of thousands of decisions made by independent actors within the defense enterprise to turn a vision of deterrence into a strategic reality.16 It was never a perfect solution to the military threat faced by the United States and its allies. But deterrence, along with diplomacy, arms control, economic measures, and associated efforts, prevented the outbreak of general war and, most important, nuclear war. Americans agreed on the threat they were trying to deter and worked independently worldwide to support the Cold War deterrence project—all led, or at least overseen, by the U.S. Government and DOD.
Perhaps what is needed today is the educational equivalent of the science and technology push of the late 1950s and early 1960s that followed the Sputnik surprise and the dramatic realization that the Soviet Union posed an existential threat to Western society. The people of the United States need to be made aware of the significant threats facing them today: not just potential military challenges from two peer nuclear powers, but the entire landscape of new and emerging technologies across multiple domains that could threaten our way of life. This is not to advocate solely for a military response. On the contrary, integrated deterrence is intentionally meant to en- compass all aspects of society, beginning with a whole-of-government approach to the challenge that must begin with an understanding and acceptance of what that entails. Some of America’s allies, especially those in close geographical proximity to the other major powers, are aware of that threat. It is time for the United States to also recognize the world for what it is. We no longer live in the relatively benign post–Cold War world of American hegemony; the unipolar moment is fast disappearing.
Such an educational effort is obviously well beyond the ability of DOD, let alone U.S. Strategic Command, to lead. But it must be done, and DOD can become more proactive in its efforts to support it. The key will be the requirement to develop societal consensus on what is necessary to integrate deterrence.
Integrated deterrence is a constructive approach to dealing with a more complex international security environment. The obstacles that face the implementation of this concept are significant but not insurmountable. Success will require development of a national strategy that embeds deterrence among its tools; the establishment of a senior advocate and coordinator; a commitment to the concept by all government departments and agencies; the recognition of allied contributions; and a public education program to explain the necessity for integrating deterrence across the whole of government and society. After a generation of post–Cold War neglect regarding strategic challenges, however, the integration of deterrence will be well worth the effort. JFQ
Notes
1 See National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, October 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf; 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-national-defense-strategy-npr-mdr.pdf.
2 Jeffrey A. Larsen and James J. Wirtz, “The Meaning of ‘Strategic’ in U.S. National Security Policy,” Survival 65, no. 5 (October 2023), 95–116, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261249; James Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Who Does Deterrence? The Politics and Strategy of Integrated Deterrence,” RUSI Journal 168, no. 6 (2023), 14–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2288133; James J. Wirtz, “Wanted: A Strategy to Integrate Deterrence,” Defense & Security Analysis 40, no. 3 (2024), 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943; and Emily Meierding et al., “What Is Strategic? The Who, What, Where, When, and Why of Strategy,” Military Strategy Magazine 9, no. 4 (Summer 2024), https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/what-is-strategic-the-who-what-when-where-and-why-of-strategy/.
3 National Security Strategy.
4 “Statement of Anthony J. Cotton, Commander, United States Strategic Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces,” March 8, 2023, https://www.stratcom.mil/portals/8/documents/2023%20usstratcom%20congressional%20posture%20statement.pdf.
5 Lloyd Austin, quoted in C. Todd Lopez, “Defense Secretary Says ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense,” DOD News, April 30, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2592149/defense-secretary-says-integrated-deterrence-is-cornerstone-of-us-defense/.
6 National Defense Strategy, 8.
7 National Defense Strategy, 9.
8 National Security Strategy, 22.
9 National Security Strategy, 22.
10 Author interviews with interagency staff members, 2022–24.
11 See Wirtz and Larsen, “Wanted”; Larsen and Wirtz, “Who Does Deterrence?”
12 The White House, “Unified Command Plan,” January 13, 2021. For more on these plans, see Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, R42077 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf.
13 For a review of emerging challenges, see chapters on each of these topics in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Shane Smith, Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2024).
14 James J. Wirtz, “A Strategist’s Guide to Disruptive Innovation,” Military Strategy Magazine 8, no. 4 (2023), 4–10, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/a-strategists-guide-to-disruptive-innovation/.
15 See George Strawn, “Open Science and the Hype Cycle,” Data Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 2021), 88–94, https://doi.org/10.1162/dint_a_00081.
16 James J. Wirtz, “Nuclear Politics: The Political Decision to Acquire, Sustain, or Discard a Nuclear Arsenal,” in Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, ed. Michael Rauchhaus et al. (London: Routledge, 2011), 138–54.