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Air Force crew chiefs marshal A-10C Thunderbolt II during Agile Combat Employment exercise in austere location within U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, December 11, 2024 (U.S. Air Force)

The Agile Combat Employment (ACE) operational scheme of maneuver was developed by the Air Force to address anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) threats. ACE deemphasizes the use of permanent air bases and instead uses dispersed operating locations for short periods. This approach complicates adversary targeting, increases survivability of air forces, and imposes dilemmas within adversary decisionmaking by exploiting maneuver and surprise.¹ But rapid maneuver of air forces from base to base only partially addresses survivability concerns against a peer adversary. Adversary long-range fires, or even small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS), may still present a viable threat to aircraft, personnel, and equipment on the ground. The Air Force must find a way to effectively integrate highly mobile and flexible air defense capabilities into the ACE concept.

Air Force doctrine discusses protection as a core element of ACE.² However, application of the protection joint function in the ACE concept remains broad, focusing on a defensive counterair (DCA) concept as the primary method to protect a forward-operating site from airborne threats and restraining discussion on the particulars of integrating joint air and missile defense capabilities.³ While the ACE concept is clearly devoted to solving the problem of adversary long-range strike through maneuver, it dedicates a significant amount of its analysis of the protection function toward more traditional counterintelligence and law enforcement force protection activities that are better suited toward protecting the static, sanctuary air bases of the preceding 20 years.⁴

The Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces within the House Armed Services Committee specifically highlighted insufficient air defenses to protect critical airbases and assets as a major concern in the markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2024, requesting additional details on how the Air Force intends to address this shortfall. In the draft NDAA, the subcommittee directed the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to Congress detailing how the Service intends to defend these remote sites.⁵ In the ensuing year, senior defense leaders debated which Service, or combination of Services, should address this problem, but with time of the essence in developing ACE in the Indo-Pacific region, rapid action is needed to integrate viable solutions into experimentation and training events today.⁶

The Threat to ACE

The People’s Liberation Army is pre- pared to employ hundreds of cruise missiles, thousands of ballistic mis- siles, and approximately 1,200 fighter aircraft to prevent foreign intrusion into the Indo-Pacific region if crisis escalates to conflict. Antiair and missile defense may be the deciding factor in whether an air task force (ATF)’s sorties get off the runway in such an environment, especially before enemy combat power has been sufficiently degraded. A flexible and layered approach is necessary to protect combat capability at an ACE site.⁷ Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment, which introduces the ACE concept, acknowledges the requirement to reevaluate counter-SUAS and air and missile defense integration.⁸ However, the Air Force has extremely limited organic capacity to execute such tasks in a dispersed environment against advanced enemy threats. Furthermore, Air Force counterair doctrine acknowledges that DCA operations rely heavily on both passive and active integrated air and missile defenses, not only air patrols by fighter aircraft, to defeat the wide array of airborne threats in today’s operating environment.⁹ Historically, decisions about implementing such integrated air defense structures were held at the theater level by the area air defense commander (often also the joint forces air component commander or JFACC).¹⁰ Thus, the current gap in doctrine and organizational structure is one of particulars. Given that ACE operating sites and their associated ATFs may be isolated, both geographically and digitally, from their command node, how does the joint force commander ensure ATF commanders are allocated appropriate assets to protect themselves long enough to successfully execute their assigned tasks before moving to a new location?¹¹

The joint force will experience significant impacts if ground-based air defenses are not included in the planning and execution of the ACE concept. The air component would likely experience delays in establishing even localized air superiority during a large-scale combat operation, as many of its offensive resources would be committed to conducting defensive sorties over dispersed airfields. Worse, these resources may be damaged or destroyed on the ground by adversary long-range fires. Such a delay would inhibit converging penetrations of adversary A2/AD bubbles, causing the joint force to lose initiative and ultimately culminating prior to achieving critical objectives.

Possible Solutions

The Air Force remains in the relatively early stages of implementing ACE. But the earlier the Service can integrate layered solutions, the better opportunity the joint force has at deterring conflict in the near term. Of course, the Air Force could sustain the current Service-centric approach, relying on movement and maneuver plus defensive counterair sorties to mitigate risk. This would require a significant paradigm shift in training to ensure that air forces are able to establish at an austere location, execute operations (including rearming and refueling combat aircraft), and depart within the targeting timelines of our most capable adversaries. This approach may also require materiel and personnel solutions to guarantee the correct balance of aviation capacity in an ATF (for example, providing enough fighters, aircrew, and maintainers to sustain DCA over a site while still providing necessary forces to mass offensive fires against enemy vulnerabilities). A second course of action involves providing the Air Force with a more robust unilateral land-based air defense capability. There is some limited prece- dent for doing so, with Air Force security forces taking increasing responsibility for defending air bases from SUAS.¹² However, to protect Air Force assets from a peer adversary would require a much more comprehensive and layered capability than man-portable counter-UAS equipment. Thus, a significant materiel, organizational, and training solution would be necessary to either identify and implement new technology or transplant existing Army kinetic and nonkinetic air defense equipment into Air Force units.

This certainly presents an opportunity cost issue, as Airmen would be pulled from other technical specialties to operate these systems. If the Air Force took greater responsibility for ground-based air and missile defenses over significant portions of the operational area, doctrinal changes would need to address unity of effort, as the land component typically provides the predominance of land-based air defenses across a theater.¹³ The Air Force has not traditionally employed ground-based air defenses. To generate its own organic ground-based air defense capabilities, the Air Force would be heavily reliant on Army training, doctrine, and materiel and would need to radically transform its priorities in the current budgeting cycle for any chance to meet this decade’s readiness requirements.

A third option is to implement training and doctrine changes to build greater integration between Army air defense and Air Force expeditionary ele- ments. An Army model already exists in the form of the maneuver short-range air defense (M-SHORAD) battalions, which are attached to multidomain task forces (MDTFs).¹⁴ M-SHORAD units are equipped with air defense systems mounted on Stryker armored fighting vehicles. The program is intended to be modular and continues to add new capabilities, including directed energy, to the existing kinetic munitions on current models. Much like the ATF’s associated maintenance, fuel, and support equipment, M-SHORAD Strykers are transportable by C-17 aircraft, allowing them to rapidly arrive at an ACE site and establish air defense protection.¹⁵

ATFs and Army MDTF M-SHORAD platoons would be especially suited for integration because of the overlapping nature of their missions. MDTF planners will be well versed in concepts of strategic attack and convergence, including a baseline understanding of how the air component operates, airspace control measures, and operational-level plans against near-peer adversaries. MDTF elements will understand the theater of operation in a multidomain context. MDTFs are designed to be highly tailorable and achieve operational-to-theater strategic effects, a mission that closely matches the purpose of an ATF element conducting strategic attack and offensive counterair operations early in a conflict.¹⁶

The MDTF Advantage

This article recommends flexible employment of Army MDTF M-SHO- RAD units to provide ground-based air defense protection to distributed ACE sites and/or MDTF strategic fires assets. The Army is already developing cutting-edge technology to protect against modern threats and is desig- nated by the Department of Defense as the executive agent for counter-SUAS.¹⁷ Employing the M-SHORAD elements from the MDTFs would best ease training and integration burdens, as the mission sets of the MDTFs and ACE elements are similar.

The Army’s existing doctrine and training prepare these forces for more than just point defense of air bases, making them a flexible and versatile resource for the joint force. However, SHORAD doctrine would require adjustment to incorporate modern ACE concepts. Current SHORAD doctrine provides limited guidance on protecting an airfield, including considerations for defending “control towers, aircraft hangars, and base operations centers.”¹⁸ Such critical facilities may not even exist at most austere ACE dispersal sites. Fortunately, Field Manual 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations, already addresses mix and mobility as principles of air and missile defense.¹⁹ These principles will remain relevant when supporting the ACE concept, but additional context may be required to identify what the best mix of capabilities is to defend air assets that are intensely vulnerable on the ground but may exercise outstanding capability to defeat advanced air threats once airborne.

Regarding the principle of mobility, M-SHORAD units typically maneuver with their assigned ground forces, but in ACE they may undertake phases of protecting aircraft, then dispersing to survivability positions while aircraft are executing offensive operations. Once aircraft have completed their missions or returned to a major hub location for re- supply and maintenance, SHORAD must deconflict the return of these aircraft to their ACE site and reassume a protective posture. Alternatively, they may rapidly roll on to a C-17 under cover of darkness and deploy to a new ACE site to begin the process over again.

By combining M-SHORAD and ACE elements, the joint force commander may flexibly employ Air Force capabilities across a wider range of operational environments. The JFACC may direct combat air forces to stand in an A2/AD bubble for longer periods at lower risk. Furthermore, air assets would be available for additional offensive operations if they are not as heavily prioritized to DCA sorties to defend isolated bases against air and missile threats. Finally, the M-SHORAD/ATF team could effectively execute mission command if cut off from the typical command and control (C2) structure as the M-SHORAD provides mobile protection for Air Force assets while they continue to execute the commander’s intent.

The M-SHORAD/ATF team should be flexible and scalable. MDTF M-SHORAD battalions, companies, and platoons will certainly be required to protect both long-range fires assets and ACE elements and would likely need to flow back and forth between the two mission sets seamlessly depending on phase of campaign, weight of effort, and characteristics of the operational environment. The current M-SHORAD capability and its near-future directed energy evolutions would provide protection of critical assets from cruise missile, fighter, UAS, rocket, artillery, and mortar threats to the joint force commander’s priority long-range fires assets regardless of whether those assets are aircraft or ground-based fires platforms.²⁰

As addressed, this approach will certainly require doctrinal and training changes to ensure the two elements are fully interoperable. At the operational level, the key decision will be to prioritize whether ground- or air-based fires assets require M-SHORAD. Fortunately, joint doctrine already suggests a locus of control for that decision. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, specifies that the joint force commander “may designate the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic attack” and “normally designates the JFACC as the area air defense commander and airspace control authority.”²¹ This doctrinal unity of command at the operational level of all relevant tasks to this operational construct makes the integration of ACE and M-SHORAD a simpler process to implement.

Implementation

While this approach would be primarily a doctrine and training change, its implementation would require a review of Army organization (including personnel and equipment allocations). Such a review may reveal that MDTFs are inappropriately structured and resourced to support the ACE concept. Alternatively, integration between an MDTF and Air Force tactical elements may lead to significant synergistic opportunities. For example, one can envision a degraded C2 environment in future conflicts. In such an environment, greater integration between Air Force strategic attack forces and Army MDTFs could result in mobile, regional firebases that combine land-based long-range fires and aviation assets in a joint command node executing the combatant commander’s intent without moment-to-moment targeting guidance. Though this expands beyond the primary problem addressed in this recommendation, such integration would require regular reviews of training, doctrine, and even policy to ensure appropriate supported/supporting relationships are established in such operating environments.

The first step in implementing this change is to develop opportunities for experimentation and training between MDTF M-SHORAD platoons within Air Force ACE exercises. These exercises should iterate on potential doctrinal changes and test organizational structures that may be required. This experimentation and training may highlight organizational growth requirements for MDTFs to meet demand (that is, additional M-SHORAD platoons or companies) or potentially even the development of a joint manning document to fully align forces under a joint task.

M-SHORAD battalions would continue to train and prepare for deployment within the MDTF construct; however, programming additional training time with Air Force units would be critical. While this may initially seem like a burden on MDTFs, additional interoperability with the joint force—especially the Air Force that shares a heavy responsibility for strategic attack functions—would certainly be a positive development for the M-SHORAD units and the MDTF.

If organizational and manpower growth is needed, the initial effort to experiment, train, and develop new doctrine prior to the growth arriving would tax existing MDTF structures. This would require commanders in both the Air Force and Army to manage and mitigate risk during near-term readiness cycles.

When considering readiness, a critical concern is the alignment of Air Force and Army deployment cycles. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) consists of three phases of 8 months each: a modernization phase, a training phase, and a mission phase.²² The Air Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN) model, on the other hand, has four 6-month phases: reset, prepare, certify, and avail- able to commit.²³ The Air Force is still in the early stages of implementing this model, and it may evolve over time.

The Air Force’s certify phase presents the best opportunity for complex training with joint partners, but smaller scale training to exercise deconfliction and interoperability would certainly also provide advantage in the prepare phase. Ultimately, these are both 2-year cycles, and alignment of training opportunities should simply come down to communication between staff planners. The recently announced Air Force ATF structure will also ease training integration, as each ATF will have a dedicated command element and air staff directorates throughout the AFFORGEN process who are responsible for training and certifying their team, unlike previous force-generation models that piecemealed expeditionary units together from across the Service.²⁴ Combatant commanders with responsibility for operations plans requiring combat operations against peer adversaries may also mandate training and certification requirements prior to deployment in these theaters.

As doctrinal, training, and possibly organizational or materiel solutions to address the ACE concept’s gap in air defense progress through joint and Service force management processes, there are several potential interim solutions. As noted, Air Force security forces Airmen are already fielding man-portable counter-SUAS systems to defend airfields both inside the United States and abroad. The logical next step would be to explore implementation of man-portable air defense systems for these same troops, though this would impose a greater training burden on these forces, draw resources away from their more traditional force-protection roles, and would not address a broad cross-section of adversary long-range strike capability.

Another avenue to explore would be leveraging allies’ and partners’ existing air defenses (both static and mobile) to protect ACE locations. This may require adjusting planning factors to prioritize dispersal locations that fall under ally or partner air-defense umbrellas. It would also likely necessitate more comprehensive interoperability training efforts to avoid fratricide.

In recent comments to the media regarding air defense, General David Allvin, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, commented directly on this issue, stating, “I would feel more confident if we had a more robust, active base defense, quite frankly. And that’s one of those [areas] where we’ve been working with the Army, and that’s something that the department has taken on as a joint requirement—that we need to improve our base defenses. . . . If we can’t have [air defenses] at every space, we want to be able to decide where to place them.”²⁵ Indeed, now is the right time to consider creative ways to apply Service strengths to maximize the dilemmas the joint force may impose on its adversaries. The flexible employment of the MDTF’s M-SHORAD capabilities to protect both Army and Air Force long-range precision strike capabilities within a theater is one such option. JFQ

Notes

¹ Air Force Doctrine Note (AFDN) 1-21, Agile Combat Employment (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, August 23, 2022), https://www.doctrine. af.mil/portals/61/documents/afdn_1-21/ afdn%201-21%20ace.pdf.

² AFDN 1-21, 6.

³ AFDN 1-21, 10.

⁴ AFDN 1-21, 10.

⁵ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, House Armed Services, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Markup, HR 2670, 117th Cong., April 18, 2023, 6, https://www.congress.gov/ bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text.

⁶ Michael Marrow, “‘Everybody’s Going to Have to Figure This Out’: Army, Air Force Debate Base Defense amid New Threats,” Breaking Defense, November 25, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/11/ everybodys-going-to-have-to-figure-this-out- army-air-force-debate-base-defense-amid-new- threats/.

⁷ Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 12, 2021, https:// missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/; “People’s Liberation Army Air Force (2025) Aircraft Inventory,” World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft, last updated January 1, 2025, https://www.wdmma.org/peoples- liberation-army-air-force-china.php.

⁸ AFDN 1-21.

⁹ Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, Counterair Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, June 15, 2023), 5, https://www.doctrine. af.mil/portals/61/documents/afdp_3-01/3- 01-afdp-counterair.pdf.

¹⁰ Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Defense Threats (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 21, 2017), II-11.

¹¹ Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “SecAF Announces Air Task Force Model,” Department of the Air Force, September 18, 2023, https://www.af.mil/News/Article- Display/Article/3529139/secaf-announces-air- task-force-model/.

¹² Nathan Strout, “U.S. Air Force Issues $90M Contract for Counter-Drone Systems and Support,” C4ISRNET, August 25, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/ unmanned/2020/08/25/air-force-issues-90- million-contract-for-counter-drone-systems- and-support/.

¹³ JP 3-01, II-4.

¹⁴ Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense Force Structure and Selected Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, R46463 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 23, 2020), 3, https:// crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/ R46463/2.

¹⁵ Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), U.S. Army Acquisition Program Portfolio 2023–2024: The Army of Today, The Technology of the Future (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2023), 51, https:// api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/11/20/ 0f0da2ca/2023-u-s-army-acquisition-portfolio. pdf.

¹⁶ Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, March 16, 2021), 12, https://api.army. mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/23/ eeac3d01/20210319-csa-paper-1-signed-print- version.pdf.

¹⁷ Department of Defense Directive 3800.01E, DOD Executive Agent for Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Unmanned Aircraft Groups 1, 2 and 3 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 21, 2020).

¹⁸ Field Manual (FM) 3-01.44, Short-Range Air Defense Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 2022), 4-10.

¹⁹ FM 3-01.44, 1-3.

²⁰ Feickert, U.S. Army Short-Range Air Defense Force Structure and Selected Programs, 20

²¹ JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 18, 2022), III-7.

²² Kurt J. Ryan and Jin H. Pak, “Operationalizing ReARMM: A Sustainment Perspective,” Army Sustainment (July– September 2021), 47, https://alu.army.mil/ alog/archive/pb7002103full.pdf.

²³ Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Airmen to See Changes in Deployment Cycles with AFFORGEN,” Department of the Air Force, June 27, 2023, https://www.af.mil/ News/Article-Display/Article/3440970/ airmen-to-see-changes-in-deployment-cycles- with-afforgen/.

²⁴ Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “USAF Units of Action: Air Task Forces Defined, First Locations Announced,” Headquarters Department of the Air Force, June 15, 2024, https://www.af.mil/News/ Article-Display/Article/3776461/usaf-units- of-action-air-task-forces-defined-first-locations- announced/.

²⁵ Michael Marrow, “Air Force Needs ‘More Robust, Active Base Defense’ Amid New Threats: Allvin,” Breaking Defense, August 22, 2024, https://breakingdefense. com/2024/08/air-force-needs-more-robust- active-base-defense-amid-new-threats-allvin/