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In a moving speech to the Finnish parliament last summer, Speaker Matti Vanhanen warned that Russia will continue using “brutal military power on a large scale to pursue its own illusory goals.” Vanhanen, moreover, acknowledged “fundamental changes” in the European security environment.¹ Moscow’s assertiveness in the Arctic and the Baltics and its invasion of Ukraine convinced Helsinki that joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a strategic necessity. As Europe gathers strength and surges support to Kyiv, however, its western borderlands remain vulnerable. Critical undersea infrastructure that connects Europe with North America is susceptible to sabotage in Irish waters. Russian bombers and battleships regularly threaten Dublin’s sea lines and air corridors. The Irish, too, must recognize the fundamental changes in European security. To secure Europe’s western flank, Ireland must join NATO.

“Ireland is too much part of the West to stand apart from it,” declared Fintan O’Toole, a leading liberal intellectual.² Ireland plays an active role in the international order and benefits tremendously from it. It supports United Nations humanitarian, medical, and peacekeeping missions and climate initiatives. It values freedom of the press and free markets. Its cities enjoy global prestige as havens for multinational corporations like Amazon and Google.³ But the Irish balk at taking an active security role in the system that incubates its economic power, diplomatic clout, and cultural prestige. The security and prosperity of this system now hinge on Irish membership in the Alliance.

The Irish must work to deter Russian aggression and safeguard key infrastructure powering the Atlantic and global commons. Ireland’s unique geographical positioning places it at a “critical juncture of [the] global network.”⁴ Russian activity along its shores and skies threatens this strategic confluence. Integrating Ireland supports NATO’s objective of securing Europe’s critical subsea infrastructure, western air and sea lines, and maritime routes with North America.

Historically, NATO membership has been a political nonstarter for Ireland. In 1914, the Irish Neutrality League pithily summed up Dublin’s foreign policy: “We serve neither king nor Kaiser.”⁵ In the early days of Irish statehood, Sinn Fein’s political dominance set Dublin on a course of nonalignment. For the nascent republic, this became a potent way of “expressing sovereignty on the world stage” and bestowed Dublin with a unique status as a “diplomatic superpower.”⁶ The Irish stood apart from the formidable array of pacts and alliances glaring at each other across the minefields of the continent. Dublin would achieve prominence as a peace broker. Detachment would also spare the Irish from disastrous overseas adventures. Nonalignment “never led to Irish soldiers occupying Afghanistan, or bombing Libya, or training Malian soldiers who led a coup.” Ireland sought “moral authority” over military might.⁷

Finland, too, held itself up as a global conflict arbiter, a “peacemaker and bridge-builder.” In the 80 years since World War II, Finns strived for a utopian “peaceful coexistence of states.” Conventional international security norms were viewed as dangerous competition and strictly for Great Powers. Like the Irish, the Finns reasoned that a “small country in a geostrategic important position should not be dragged” into either the Russian or NATO orbits. Foreign policy “restraint was the highest maxim.”⁸

Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, however, embodied by a hot war in Ukraine, militarized economy, and Atlantic belligerence, presents an ominous security situation. Russia is neither “an economic partner with autocratic power aspirations” nor a political outlier in a coexistence of convenience.⁹ Russia’s regional ambitions have become militarized. Sharing an 832-mile border with Russia, the Finns, sensitive to the shifting security climate, hitched their wagon to NATO.¹⁰ And yet current Russian doctrine indicates that Moscow will avoid a frontal assault across Alliance territory. Instead, Russia will seek strategic vulnerabilities on the periphery.¹¹

With this in mind, Ireland remains the weak link in Atlantic security. Moscow can (and does) leverage security gaps in Irish skies and waters to threaten Europe, regardless of Ireland’s nonalignment. Dublin is faced with two choices to address this vulnerability: join NATO or enter into a major non-NATO ally agreement with Washington.

The Risks to Europe’s Western Flank

Transatlantic Cables. If NATO is the backbone of the West, the undersea cables crisscrossing the Atlantic sea- floor are its nervous system. Dozens of cables that stretch from North America to Europe connect the globe’s largest economic hubs. Every day, $10 trillion move between the continents. Ninety-seven percent of all intercontinental data flows through them. The network supports both diplomatic and classified military correspondence.¹² Private and government institutions depend on their bandwidth. Damage to the “arteries on which our modern world depends” would be catastrophic. Communication outages would shock global markets. Internet services would cease indefinitely.¹³ Coordination between Allies would be impaired, if not severed outright. The limited capacity of corporate and defense satellites would hardly serve as a reliable redundancy.¹⁴ All of these outcomes factor into the Russian strategic calculus.

Russian doctrine “calls for rapid destruction of critical infrastructure in the early stages of a conflict.”¹⁵ These methods aim to disintegrate command and control, disable allied cooperation, and induce panic among noncombatants. Short of a ground war with NATO, “Russia’s ability to target critical infra- structure . . . and impose economic costs to deter external intervention in regional conflicts is an important component to Moscow’s doctrine.”¹⁶ This approach would fragment communication with the United States and sow operational confusion throughout Europe.

The origin and terminus of the cables run through waters of the world’s most capable navies. Few adversaries con- template attacking the network without attracting the attention of the Americans or British. The density of maritime traffic, naval patrols, coastal sensors, and ubiq- uitous satellite coverage would quickly alert either power to maritime intrusions. On the approaches to southwest Ireland, however, 75 percent of all transatlantic cables emerge from the Western Atlantic Basin and onto the Celtic Sea’s continental shelf.¹⁷ There, at depths of 90 meters and within Ireland’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), they are susceptible to interference.¹⁸

Moscow has resourced the means to destroy or compromise the network there. Experts estimate that the Northern Fleet deploys up to 50 vessels in North Atlantic waters for “mapping allied critical infrastructure . . . on the seabed,” as part of the Kremlin’s “underwater reconnaissance program.”¹⁹ Damaging cables is not complicated. They are “feeble in many ways,” warns Eoin McNamara of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. “It only takes a couple of rusty ships with ship repair equipment to cut,” he continues.²⁰ Within its flotilla of rusty ships, Moscow maintains a small fleet of unmanned submersibles. Experts believe these can destroy or “record, copy, or steal data,” facilitating corporate and military espionage. Moscow is also developing techniques to hack into the cable network management systems. From there, its saboteurs could execute a “kill click” and disrupt networks at chosen times.²¹ Throughout 2023, Russian- flagged vessels, armed with cable-cutting equipment, were observed patrolling above known cable locations several miles west of the Irish coast.²²

The Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap. The Northern Fleet’s periodic patrols were a combination of “research” vessels and conventional battleships and submarines.²³ This presents the second security concern: Russian naval activity is not confined to a motley assortment of decaying ships trawling the Atlantic seabed. In February 2022, Moscow initiated full-scale fleet war games within Ireland’s EEZ.²⁴ Only the intervention of Cork fishing boats near the fleet embarrassed Moscow into suspending the exercise. The few frigates of the Irish Defence Forces struggle to secure the coastline, much less large stretches of the North Atlantic.

Russia has an interest in exploiting the 500-mile stretch of ocean between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom known as the GIUK gap. Superiority within the passage is a strategic imperative for NATO. It remains the “transatlantic bridge” of the Alliance. However, a smaller, nimbler navy could develop its depth. Vessels could loiter away from the prying eyes of allied sensors near the Irish coast. The Northern Fleet could check, disrupt, or destroy critical American sealift racing across the Atlantic at the outset of a conflict. Western ground targets would also be susceptible to attacks from the rear. Ships equipped with Kalibr land-attack missiles, for example, could “strike a wide range of targets in Northern and Western Europe from the sanctuary of waters” near Ireland.²⁵ In fact, the Admiral Grigorovich was observed passing through Irish waters a month before firing the opening Kalibr salvos at Kyiv.²⁶

In addition, the Russian air force regularly violates Irish sovereign and controlled airspace. In a conflict with NATO, permissive corridors would enable Russia to attack allied shipping or port facilities in the United Kingdom. Strategic Tu-95 Bear bombers, surveillance aircraft, and an assortment of other tactical aircraft continue provocative sorties.²⁷ Without military radar or adequate means to intercept, the Dáil (Irish parliament) relies on a flimsy, decades-old security treaty with London to secure its airspace. The aggressors test Royal Air Force (RAF) response times and generally do so with transponders turned off, threatening crowded airways above Ireland. About 90 percent of transatlantic flight traffic transits Dublin’s airspace.²⁸ At times, civilian airliners have either been grounded or rerouted to avoid collisions. British fighter pilots sometimes receive limited Irish civilian radar feeds to vector them to intercept. Interdictions are discernibly sluggish and predictable.²⁹

Figure. Subsea Cables Near Ireland

Irish Security Shortfalls

Russian forces operate with impunity through Dublin’s sovereign zones, and flagrant incursions illustrate Irish inadequacies in these domains. Four small frigates constitute Ireland’s naval inventory. All four remained in port for most of 2023. Only two frigates are slated to be operational through 2024.³⁰ On a recent visit to the Atlantic Council, Dublin’s minister of defense, Micheál Martin, doubted if Ireland would ever be able to thoroughly defend its coastal waters.³¹

Ireland is nearly as helpless in the air. The modest Air Corps lacks a “recognized air picture”: an aggregate readout of all aircraft in each space, pulled from outlying radar stations. Irish airspace is six times the size of its landmass.³² Without military radar, Air Corps pilots are limited to civilian feeds like their British counterparts. Tactically, they are hardly equipped to contend with fourth-generation fighters. Ireland’s interdiction capability comprises a squadron of 12 Pilatus PC-9s. The propeller-driven PC-9s are limited to “pre-planned” interdiction of “slow moving aircraft such as a Cessna or a helicopter traveling at slow speeds and at low altitudes.”³³

Neither the Dáil nor the electorate are blind to these shortfalls. In a recent survey, 59 percent of Irish polled supported increasing defense spending.³⁴ In a consultative forum launched in response to the war in Ukraine, the Dáil committed to a 50-percent increase (€1.6 billion) through 2028. The forum energized Irish policymakers to implement “substantial reforms” across the armed forces.³⁵ 

While the Irish scramble to rehabilitate their defenses, Russian aggression has brought to light the aforementioned Anglo-Irish military cooperation. To maintain the veneer of nonalignment and the appearance of keeping London at arm’s length, Dublin negotiated a series of covert defense agreements with the British. Unfortunately, they are ill-defined and executed on a case-by-case basis. RAF responsiveness is challenged by limited
radar and pursuit through swarming civilian flight paths.³⁶ Maritime responses are equally murky given Dublin’s naval deficits. Still, calls for London’s support have gotten desperate with Russian ships and bombers looming in and over the Celtic Sea. Collective defense under NATO
would ultimately provide better capabilities and prove more palatable to the Irish than secretive compacts with London.

Domestically, Irish support for NATO has surged. Following the invasion of Ukraine, nearly half of respondents in national polls voiced support for membership.³⁷ Irish academic and political leaders are increasingly dynamic in a “drift towards NATO,” with Dublin’s foreign policy now under continuous debate and review.³⁸ Opposition to these currents springs mainly from the right. Challenged militarily by Moscow and culturally through “Europeanization,” however, “Catholic nationalism and residual anti-imperialism,” the drivers behind Irish reclusiveness, are steadily in decline.³⁹ Even Sinn Féin supported sending funds to Ukraine in the aftermath of the invasion.⁴⁰ 

Some have argued that Irish neutrality is, in fact, an illusion. As former Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald intimated, “our ‘traditional neutrality’” was part of “fostered myths.”⁴¹ Historically, the Irish have proved their mettle in confronting threats to Europe. Dublin’s participation in World War II proves that the Irish people were deeply supportive of combating those dangers. Forty thousand Irish citizens enlisted to fight in the British armed forces in Europe.⁴² Irish airfields, ports, and training grounds hosted and staged allied armies and air forces. As one historian noted, Ireland was “benevolently neutral.”⁴³

The current sentiment suggests that the Irish could not stomach the blame and responsibility of a devastating attack on transatlantic infrastructure, civilian flight, or European territory. Ireland’s status as an economic, democratic, and cultural hub would be tarnished if it turned a blind eye to Moscow. Ultimately, NATO membership is the most productive way of avoiding that eventuality.

NATO Integration

Joining the Alliance would truly enable Ireland to deter Russian aggression through its porous air and sea lines. Effective deterrence reduces “the prospect of a successful attack” through “punishment credible response options.” Analyst Sean Monaghan sees two components of this: detection and physical presence.⁴⁴ With NATO support, Ireland could execute three key countermeasures to deter Russian aggression: an integrated radar system that reduces Russia’s ability to project power through the eastern GIUK gap, swift and overwhelming fighter interdiction of Russian overflights, and naval patrols in zones near transatlantic cables.

The Icelandic model is a good starting point for Irish inclusion in NATO. Iceland has “punched above its weight" on Europe’s northwestern flank.⁴⁵ It has no active-duty military. Through NATO, however, Iceland successfully deters Russian activity across the western GIUK gap and Arctic air corridors. Reykjavik commits 0.06 percent on defense given its lean security signature.⁴⁶ Integrating does not demand an immediate levy of 2 percent of gross domestic product, and Ireland could improve its proverbial foxhole without committing to wholesale mobilization or overwhelming its modest industrial base. Iceland’s four radar stations, for example, amount to around $20 million—well within Dublin’s fiscal wheelhouse for the next 4 years.⁴⁷

Integrated Air Defense System. Reykjavik fields four overlapping radar air surveillance sites, an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Each monitors 250 miles across its airspace, furnishing a complete recognized air picture. This feeds NATO’s comprehensive Integrated Air and Missile Defense and its Combined Air Operations Center. Together, these nodes provide command and control to Allied fighter, bomber, and missile operations across the Atlantic. A small cadre of 12 Icelandic Coast Guard members operates the IADS, integrating Iceland into the full air and missile defense of the Alliance.⁴⁸ Without an air force, Iceland can track enemy launches, direct missile targeting, and guide a fighter interdiction. Radar coverage discourages air incursions, and an IADS offers a suite of capabilities the Irish could use without committing to costly signature air platforms. An informed recognized air picture also adds a layer of safety to civilian air travel, tracking bombers that could suddenly veer into civilian flight paths.

Allied Fighter Protection.To answer airspace intrusions, fighter engagement remains a strong deterrent for NATO. In recent years, Russian bombers have been quickly shuttled out of allied air corridors on intercept.⁴⁹ But Ireland has pitiful means of combating conventional fighter aircraft or attacking high-altitude bombers. Iceland, too, has little to achieve these missions singularly but remains shielded by NATO’s air-policing missions. Within minutes of a detection, aircraft from select nations rotate through “first responder” interdiction.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway combined their collective 250 combat aircraft into an “integrated management structure for planning and executing air operations” over the North Atlantic.⁵¹ Likely, Dublin’s skies would swiftly fall within formidable multinational fighter coverage. This would lighten regional tactical demands on the RAF, establish a tried-and-true security architecture in Irish airspace, and avoid political blowback from surreptitious deals with London.

Standing NATO Maritime Group and Critical Undersea Infrastructure Cell. NATO entry would also secure Ireland’s vulnerable waters under a
Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG). SNMG Group One conducts routine patrols of Atlantic sea lines. This group acts as “a central tool that the Alliance use[s] to demonstrate resolve for collective defense.”⁵² The United States, France, United Kingdom, and Spain perform surface patrols and P-8 overflights to discourage Russian incursions into Allied waters. NATO task forces like Group One would enjoy the freedom of maneuver in vulnerable Irish zones. The group carries exquisite capabilities of detecting subsea sabotage uniquely valuable to this challenge. A multirole ocean surveillance ship was recently developed to counter subsea threats and furnish a complement of technologies critical to the Irish EEZ: “The ship will be dedicated to safeguarding seabed telecommunications cables and oil and gas pipelines . . . will act as a ‘mother ship,’ operating remote and autonomous off-board systems for underwater surveillance and seabed warfare.”⁵³

NATO is also developing comprehensive ways for maritime nations to counter subsea threats. The Critical Undersea Infrastructure Cell (CUIC) is a case in point. Established in February 2023, the CUIC’s mission is “to coordinate allied activity, bring military and civilian stakeholders together by facilitating engagement with private industry . . . and better protect CUI through jointly detecting and responding.” The cell also explores a range of options for system resiliency.⁵⁴ Within the CUIC, Ireland would have a direct conduit for its industry, government, and security leaders to cooperate with partners to secure the region’s economic and military lifelines. They could also drive deterrence by influencing improved and resilient subsea architecture.

Major Non-NATO Ally Option

Some argue that joining NATO is a bridge too far for Ireland. Irish conservatives, while supportive of Ukraine, have not yet softened their stance on membership.⁵⁵ Ireland could still act as a bulwark in Europe’s vulnerable borderlands without committing to Article 5 entanglements. As a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) of the United States, Ireland could exercise deterrence in its home skies and waters without compromising nonalignment.

Through MNNA status, Dublin would have the freedom to dictate its own terms of the security relationship. Partners enter a memorandum of understanding or “other formal agreement” outlining the parameters of cooperation. Depending on those terms, Dublin could calibrate its own deterrence. The MNNA designation is a “powerful symbol” but does not “entail any security commitments.”⁵⁶ In this way, Ireland could arm and operate outside the political volatility of the Alliance. Dublin would exercise “strategic autonomy” by improving its own defense with American expertise while rebuffing deployments to distant lands and spurning large-scale training exercises.⁵⁷

Ireland could direct its funds to procure, maintain, and operate low-cost, high-payoff sensory platforms like internal IADS and unmanned aerial and submersible vehicles. A sensor-based architecture would suit the Defence Forces well given recruitment woes and historical aversion to conventional security. MNNA status would make Dublin eligible for loans of materials, supplies, equipment, and cooperative research from the United States.⁵⁸ With a national defense prioritizing light, mobile, and digitally enabled sensors, the Irish could “deter by detection.”⁵⁹ Among many, at least, there is little appetite to integrate Irish forces into NATO. Instead, Ireland could continue to address security concerns independently.

As an MNNA, Morocco offers a fitting template for an Irish-American partnership. Straddling Europe’s “southern flank,” Morocco has a strategic importance larger than its land area would suggest.⁶⁰ Bordering Gibraltar and Algeria, Morocco is a critical Western partner in securing maritime routes and combating international terrorism.⁶¹ Morocco is a parliamentary monarchy with economic, agricultural, and energy sectors modeled on Western systems. However, inclusion into a permanent European alliance is politically acceptable to neither Moroccans nor its Maghreb neighbors. This does not prevent Morocco from taking full advantage of security agreements, exercises, and partnerships with the Allies. Dublin could exercise the same political flexibility while maximizing capabilities on Europe’s periphery.

At sea, Morocco supports NATO’s Maritime Group Two, which oversees Mediterranean security. NATO and Moroccan navies conduct personnel exchanges and execute NATO Response Force exercises like Brilliant Mariner and counterterrorism interdiction like Active Endeavor.⁶² Morocco also participates in Operation Sea Guardian with eight NATO navies. The training exercise builds interoperability in observing “maritime traffic along major sea lines of communication, collecting data on patterns-of-life” and air interdiction—both applicable to Western Atlantic security.⁶³ Ireland could support Atlantic SNMGs without committing to Alliance membership or full training integration and invite SNMG activity at times of its choosing.

To counter Russian overflights, MNNA agreements enable host nations to support strategic U.S. military assets. The 82nd Airborne’s immediate response force is one of NATO’s key strategic formations. As a result of the Wagner Group’s presence in the Sahel, American paratroopers conducted joint forcible entry operations in a series of Moroccan-hosted exercises known as African Lion.⁶⁴ A similar but less invasive arrangement may be suitable for Dublin. Before NATO membership, several Nordic nations hosted American B-2 Spirit overflights to deter Russian airspace incursions.⁶⁵ With unmatched nuclear and stealth capabilities, the B-2 sends an unmistakable message to hostile actors. Meanwhile, the two-crewed aircraft offers a small tactical signature on Irish airfields (certainly less than an airborne brigade and accompanying air wing). Recurring port visits from Seawolf-class attack submarines are another option for deterring unwanted Russian submarine patrols without attracting attention for minimal political backlash.

Politically, MNNA membership provides Morocco with American security sponsorship, maximum political latitude, and minimal obligation. In fact, NATO troops simultaneously train, stage, and cooperate with Moroccan forces while Rabat maintains bilateral cooperation with Moscow. In a December 2023 Saint Petersburg summit, Russia pledged to reduce wheat prices to offset the effects of North African droughts. The two nations continue to cooperate diplomatically and economically.⁶⁶ For Dublin, an Irish-American bilateral agreement opens the door to NATO interoperability and the maintenance of its diplomatic bona fides.

Conclusion

MNNA status has its benefits. Namely, Ireland could leverage U.S. loans to rehabilitate its rusted-out frigates, grow its defense industry, or mature its sea and air sensors. American industry experts could nurture an Irish defense base that builds capabilities to secure Europe’s flank. Ireland could exercise deterrence with episodic visits from U.S. strategic assets. Stealth bombers and nuclear submarines not only send a strong message to Moscow but also are perhaps more amenable than pleading for British help. The presence of singular American aircraft and ships also advances U.S. support without large logistical footprints. Participation in NATO’s standing maritime exercises is also an attractive way of signaling dissatisfaction with Moscow without compromising nonalignment. Altogether, the MNNA option keeps the door open for allied intervention in Irish waters without intimating belligerence to Moscow.

Despite these benefits, NATO membership offers the most effective way of securing the Western Atlantic. First, the current threat environment reflects a “matter of urgency” for this region.⁶⁷ Russia is less likely to risk another ground invasion, especially if that incursion is met with the collective might of allied armies. Given the tactical balance in Ukraine and Russia’s checkered offensive history (for example, the Finnish War of 1939), Moscow would likely strike at susceptible and high-payoff targets on the flank.

Europe cannot wait for Dublin to methodically build the air and sea security architecture necessary to safeguard the Western Atlantic. Even the most generous American loans would not spur Irish industry to deliver fighters, radars, and vessels immediately. Joining NATO would fold Irish airspace and sea lines into Alliance responsibility overnight. Ultimately, this could be more of a political boon than imagined. A surge in national debt and a spike in large-scale defense would be more of a societal jolt than the invisible hand of NATO squadrons sweeping through Irish airspace miles out to sea.

Second, the Irish could calibrate their response to air and sea incursions without politically explosive backroom deals with London. Ireland stands to benefit from collective European security. This serves to bolster the Dàil internationally as a government that is truly capable of managing its own security. Meanwhile, any capabilities that Ireland builds would be augmented through integration into NATO. While IADS is an attractive concept, the radars are only as effective as the fighters and missiles that can be brought to bear against tracked targets.

NATO membership includes a permanence required in the Western Atlantic. Although maritime groups have unquestionable tactical and strategic merits, they patrol Irish waters only at Dublin’s invitation. By joining NATO, the Irish would immediately access a suite of around-the-clock capabilities needed to detect irregular subsea threats and strategic bombers over the British Isles. If Irish hardliners hesitate about falling in with NATO, they cannot deny the value of preventing Russian bombers from barreling through crowded civilian flight paths. Given the binary security environment, the glaring weakness of Irish security, and the vulnerabilities it presents to a regional and powerful aggressor, NATO membership is the most politically and fiscally responsible means of securing Europe. JFQ

Notes

¹ Sebastian Glassner and Annalena Fuchshuber, “Between NATO and Non-Alignment: How to Understand the ‘U-Turn’ in Finnish Foreign Policy,” Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2023), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/content/between-nato-and-non-alignment-how-under- stand-u-turn-finnish-foreign-policy.

² Colin Gannon, “Ireland Should Resist the Pressure to Join the Western Military Bloc,” Jacobin, July 19, 2023, https://jacobin.com/2023/07/ireland-nonalignment-neutrality-nato-us-european-union-war-foreign-policy.

³ Andrew Cottey, “Why Ireland Matters for European Security,” Strategic Europe, November 7, 2023, https://carnegieendowment. org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/11/why-ireland-matters-for-european-security?lang=en.

⁴ George Allison, “Ireland Must Be Responsible for Its Own Maritime Security,” UK Defence Journal, December 23, 2023, https:// ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ireland-must-be-responsible-for-its-own-maritime-security/.

⁵ Gannon, “Ireland Should Resist the Pres- sure to Join the Western Military Bloc.”

⁶ Tom Clonan, “Joining NATO Doesn’t Benefit Ireland, but That Doesn’t Excuse Poor Defence Spending,” The Journal, June 19, 2023, https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/ ireland-military-neutral-6095042-Jun2023/.

⁷ Gannon, “Ireland Should Resist the Pres- sure to Join the Western Military Bloc.”

⁸ Glassner and Fuchshuber, “Between NATO and Non-Alignment.” Finland believes Moscow cared little for its cherished “treaty-based cooperation or even human dignity.” In Matti Vanhanen’s eyes, joining NATO was the most productive way of defending Finnish sovereignty and supporting Finland’s like-minded neighbors. Like Ireland, Finland viewed the European Union as the “main frame of reference, channel, and security.” Given the salience of Ukraine in the public mind, however, Finns acknowledged that only NATO provided “real security guarantees,” resourcing, armament, and the overwhelming firepower of the United States.

⁹ Glassner and Fuchshuber.

¹⁰ Kostya Manenkov and Sergei Grits, “Newest NATO Member Finland Starts Build- ing Fence on Russian Border,” PBS News, April 15, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ world/newest-nato-member-finland-starts-building-fence-on-russian-border.

¹¹ Lee Willett, “NATO Steps Up Response to ‘Clear and Present’ Undersea Infrastructure Risk,” Naval News, May 16, 2023, https:// www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/05/ nato-steps-up-response-to-clear-and-present- undersea-infrastructure-risk/.

¹² Colin Wall and Pierre Morcos, “Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 11, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.

¹³ James Griffiths, “The Global Internet Is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable,” CNN, July 26, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk/index.html. Though several of the cables are owned and maintained by state actors (for example, the U.S. Department of Defense), most are claimed by a group of regional and global corporations. Google (16 cables), Facebook (12), Microsoft (5), and Amazon (5), for example, all have stakes in transoceanic communications.

¹⁴ Lane Burdette, “2034 and the Threat of Russian Submarine Cable Sabotage,” Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Texas A&M University, May 2021, https://bush.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Burdette-CGS-FINAL.pdf.

¹⁵ Willett, “NATO Steps Up Response to ‘Clear and Present’ Undersea Infrastructure Risk.” Look no further than Russian attacks on Ukrainian Internet and power in February 2022 as proof of concept.

¹⁶ Sean Monaghan et al., NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure, CSIS Briefs (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2023), https://csis- website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-12/231219_Monaghan_NATO_CUI.pdf?VersionId=6Usacn9I0OlKjF6t4s4XhehMIVROp74W. The strength of Western defense architecture is not attritional war. NATO doctrine calls for delaying attack from the East until the United States can bring its preponderance of combat power to bear on the continent. Russian air and naval activity suggests that it seeks to disrupt the allied connection to the United States.

¹⁷ Eoin Drea, “Ireland Is Europe’s Weak- est Link,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/ireland-military-neutrality-russia-ocean-communication-energy-infrastructure-sabotage/.

¹⁸ “Simply Blue Energy Launches Offshore Ireland Wind Farm Project,” Offshore Magazine, July 6, 2020, https://www.offshore-mag. com/field-development/article/14178971/simply-blue-energy-launches-offshore-ireland- floating-wind-farm-project.

¹⁹ “Russia ‘Actively Mapping’ West’s Criti- cal Undersea System, NATO Warns,” Irish Times, May 3, 2023, https://www.irishtimes. com/world/2023/05/03/nato-warns-russia-is-actively-mapping-wests-critical-undersea- systems/.

²⁰ The Upfront Team, “Why Are Subsea Cables off Ireland Causing Continental Concerns?” RTE, November 10, 2023.

²¹ Wall and Morcos, “Invisible and Vital.”

²² “Russia ‘Has Plan to Sabotage North Sea Windfarms, Cables,’” Irish Times, April 19, 2023, https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2023/04/19/russia-has-plan-to-sabotage-north-sea-windfarms-cables/.

²³ “Russia ‘Has Plan to Sabotage North Sea Windfarms, Cables.’” In April 2023, two Russian-flagged ships, the Umka and Bakhtemir (both equipped with cable cutters), were observed executing “unusual maneuvers” miles off the Galway coast. They were drifting above a newly opened subsea cable. Several Irish vessels meandered out to track the intruders, who quickly turned south toward their originally chartered destination—Equatorial Guinea. As the Irish ships returned to station, the Russians about-faced and continued their foray through Ireland’s seas. Weeks later, four Russian ships—one armed with Kalibr cruise missiles—were observed in Irish waters along cable routes. In December 2023, a “nominally” Russian surface vessel was spotted 12 nautical miles off the coast of Cork. Irish Defence Forces promptly requested British support. Upon interdiction, British air and sea assets discovered that the ship was escorting a Russian submarine.

²⁴ “Report: Russian Sub Probes Ireland’s Defenses, Loiters off Cork Harbor,” The Maritime Executive, December 12, 2023, https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-russian-sub-probes-ireland-s-defenses-loiters-off-cork-harbor.

²⁵ Nick Childs, Gauging the Gap: The Green- land–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap—A Strategic Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2022), https://www.iiss.org/sv/research-paper/2022/05/ gauging-the-gap-the-greenland-iceland-united- kingdom-gap-a-strategic-assessment/.

²⁶ Sophie Boulter, “Will Ireland’s Neutrality Survive Putin’s Aggression?” Center for European Policy Analysis, November 10, 2023, https://cepa.org/article/will-irelands-neutrality-survive-putins-aggression/.

²⁷ Edward Burke, “What Are Russian Bombers Doing in Irish Airspace?” Irish Times, March 10, 2020, https://www.irishtimes.com/ opinion/what-are-russian-bombers-doing-in-irish-airspace-1.4197785.

²⁸ Niall O’Connor, “Ireland’s Air Policing Security Failure and How the British System Keeps Their Skies Safe,” The Journal, May 13, 2023, https://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-air-policing-irish-air-corps-raf-royal-air-force- 6064833-May2023/.

²⁹ Burke, “What Are Russian Bombers Doing in Irish Airspace?”

³⁰ “Only Two Irish Ships Available to Go to Sea,” BBC, August 24, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cprwlpdv04lo.

³¹ Tim Martin, “Ireland Will ‘Never Be in a Position to Engage’ in Antisubmarine Warfare: Defense Minister,” Breaking Defense, February 9, 2023, https://breakingdefense. com/2023/02/ireland-will-never-be-in-a-position-to-engage-in-antisubmarine-warfare- defense-minister/.

³² O’Connor, “Ireland’s Air Policing Security Failure and How the British System Keeps Their Skies Safe.”

³³ O’Connor.

³⁴ Olafimihan Oshin, “Russia-Ukraine War Shifts Irish Opinion on NATO Membership: Poll,” The Hill, March 27, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/599943-russia-ukraine-war-shifts-irish-opinion-on-nato-membership-poll/.

³⁵ Cottey, “Why Ireland Matters for European Security.”

³⁶ Ray O’Hanlon, “RAF Forced to Inter- cept as Russian Bomber Planes Enter Irish Controlled Airspace,” Irish Central, February 9, 2017, https://www.irishcentral.com/news/raf-forced-to-intercept-as-russian-bomber-planes-enter-irish-airspace.

³⁷ Shawn Pogatchink, “Poll: More Irish Want to Join NATO in Wake of Ukraine Invasion,” Politico, March 27, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-more-irish-want-to-join-nato/.

³⁸ Barry Whyte, “Michael D. Higgins Exclusive: Ireland Is ‘Playing with Fire’ in ‘Dangerous Drift’ Towards NATO,” Business Post, June 17, 2023.

³⁹ Gannon, “Ireland Should Resist the Pres- sure to Join the Western Military Bloc.”

⁴⁰ Connor Gallagher, “Is Sinn Féin Softening on Neutrality?” Irish Times, June 10, 2023, https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/2023/06/10/is-sinn-fein-softening-on-neutrality-mary-lou-mcdonald-would-reject- such-an-assertion-but/.

⁴¹ Gallagher, “Is Sinn Féin Softening on Neutrality?”

⁴² Brian Girvin, “The Forgotten Volunteers of World War II,” History Ireland, 2024, https://historyireland.com/the-forgotten- volunteers-of-world-war-ii/.

⁴³ Gannon, “Ireland Should Resist the Pres- sure to Join the Western Military Bloc.”

⁴⁴ Monaghan et al., NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure.

⁴⁵ Megan Eckstein, “Iceland Embracing Its Strategic Location by Supporting NATO Air Defense,” USNI News, October 24, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/10/24/iceland-embracing-its-strategic-location-though-supporting-nato-air-defense-hosting-us-planes.

⁴⁶ “Funding NATO,” NATO, Last Updated July 26, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm. The 2-percent pledge is chiefly a “pledge” among allies as a reflection of their “will.”

⁴⁷ Cottey, “Why Ireland Matters for European Security.”

⁴⁸ “Iceland’s Role in NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense System,” Allied Air Command, 2016, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2016/icelands-role-in-nato-integrated-air-and-missile-defence-system.

⁴⁹ “Danish Air Force Intercepts Russian Bombers Headed to Dutch NATO Airspace,” Reuters, August 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-air-force-intercepts-russian-bombers-headed-dutch-nato-airspace-2023-08-14/.

⁵⁰ Vivienne Machi, “German Air Force Rushes to Iceland in ‘Rapid Viking’ Drill,” Defense News, July 28, 2023. During Rapid Viking exercises in July 2023, Germany showcased its ability to scramble a Eurofighter squadron over Iceland within hours.

⁵¹ Gerard O’Dwyer, “Nordic Nations Move to Link Air Forces Into 250-Strong Aircraft Fleet,” Defense News, March 24, 2023.

⁵² Joshua Tallis, “NATO’s Maritime Vigi- lance: Optimizing the Standing Naval Force for the Future,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/natos-maritime-vigilance-optimizing-the-standing-naval-force-for-the-future/.

⁵³ Joe Saballa, “British Navy Receives First Undersea Surveillance Ship,” The Defense Post, January 20, 2023, https://thedefensepost.com/2023/01/20/british-navy-surveillance-ship/.

⁵⁴ Monaghan et al., NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure.

⁵⁵ Pat Leahy, “Sinn Féin Drops Pledges to Withdraw from EU and NATO Defence Arrangements,” Irish Times, May 13, 2023.

⁵⁶ “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2021, https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/.

⁵⁷ Matthias Bauer, The Impacts of EU Strat- egy Autonomy Policies—A Primer for Member States (Brussels: European Centre for International Political Economy, September 2022), https://ecipe.org/publications/eu-strategy- autonomy-policies-impact/.

⁵⁸ “Major Non-NATO Ally Status.”

⁵⁹ Monaghan et al., NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure.

⁶⁰ Federico Borsari, “Ignore NATO’s Southern Flank at Your Peril,” Center for European Policy Analysis, August 11, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/ignore-natos-southern-flank-at-your-peril/.

⁶¹ R. Clarke Cooper, “As Qatar Becomes a Non-NATO Ally, Greater Responsibility Conveys With the Status,” Atlantic Council, March 3, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/menasource/as-qatar-becomes-a-non-nato-ally-greater-responsibility-coveys-with-the-status/.

⁶² Philip Breedlove, “NATO’s Naval Forces Conducting Important Missions Every Day,” Atlantic Council, October 3, 2013.

⁶³ Tom Dunlop, “NATO Conducts Maritime Patrols Near the Strait of Gibraltar,” UK Defence Journal, January 1, 2024, https:// ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-conducts-maritime-patrols-near-the-strait-of-gibraltar/. Morocco is also the beneficiary of NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program, which “fosters defense capacity and institution building” and “tailored practical support” to nonaligned democratic nations.

⁶⁴ David Vergun, “U.S. Uses Holistic Approach in Africa Relations, General Says,” Department of Defense, March 2, 2023, https:// www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/ Article/Article/3316721/us-uses-holistic-approach-in-africa-relations-general-says/.

⁶⁵ Astri Evardsen, “Increased Allied Military Presence in Iceland,” High North News, September 6, 2023. During rotations to the Middle East, the U.S. Army offloaded thousands of Soldiers at Shannon International Airport during refueling. Despite the political and operational distance from the war on terror, the sight of U.S. troops was unacceptable to the public.

⁶⁶ Abdellah Erraji, “Morocco, Russia Seek to Boost Bilateral Relations,” Morocco World News, December 1, 2023, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/12/359267/morocco-russia-seek-to-boost-bilateral-relations.

⁶⁷ Clonan, “Joining NATO Doesn’t Benefit Ireland, But That Doesn’t Excuse Poor Defence Spending.”