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Colonel D. Matthew Neuenswander, USAF (Ret.), is Director of the Joint Integration Directorate at the U.S. Air Force Curtis E. LeMay Center and serves as the Air Force’s Senior Doctrine Representative to both U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The Theater Air Control System (TACS)/Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) has been a staple of joint air-ground doctrine since May 1966, when General William Westmoreland, commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, integrated the air and ground systems into the first joint air-ground operations system.1 The TACS/AAGS was formalized between the Army and Air Force in 1973 and first depicted in Field Manual (FM) 100-26, The Air-Ground Operations System, published in March 1973.2 Despite significant changes, it is still in effect in 2023. Both Services provide trained liaisons at specified TACS/AAGS echelons based on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff (see figure 1).3
The TACS/AAGS identifies the command and control (C2) structure that the Army and Air Force employ to conduct joint fires (including close air support and air interdiction inside a land area of operations), airspace control, joint intelligence, suppression of enemy air defenses, tactical airlift, and a host of other missions. In 2023, after-action reports from the Joint Staff J6, Joint Fires Integration Division, suggested joint fires training between the Army and Air Force TACS/AAGS elements had atrophied based on decades of a counterinsurgency fight.4 This article provides a history of the TACS/AAGS and discusses current capabilities and challenges for both Services as they strive to meet the 2022 National Military Strategy and transition to large-scale combat operations. Last, the article provides a potential way ahead to enable an updated TACS/AAGS to maintain its relevancy in the future.
History of TACS/AAGS
Since its inception in Vietnam, TACS/ AAGS naming conventions, organizations, and echelons evolved to keep up with shifts in U.S. doctrine based on budgets, force structure, and national military strategy.
From 1973 to 1976, the Army transitioned from Vietnam-era doctrine to a doctrine of active defense. In 1981, the Army transitioned yet again to the doctrine of AirLand Battle with a focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its defense of the Soviet threat on the central front.5 Over time, the TACS/AAGS has continued to evolve. In 1973, the Army’s Field Army went away as a tactical echelon.6 By 1984, U.S. Army Field Circular 100-26 showed the TACS/AAGS with the Field Army Tactical Operations Center moving to an operational role as a land component commander headquarters. The 1984 publication placed the Air Force Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at the corps level with control of the subordinate tactical air control parties (TACPs) at the corps, division, brigade, and battalion command posts.7 During the next 10 years, this “ASOC at corps” relationship was codified in multi-Service doctrine. Paraphrasing from the Air Land Sea Applications (ALSA) Center’s 1998 Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System publication, the ASOC is directly subordinate to the air operations center and plans, coordinates, and directs air support for land forces, normally at corps level and below.8
The 1973, 1984, and 1998 versions of the TACS/AAGS all have an Army liaison from the land component commander at the air operations center (battlefield coordination detachment); however, there was no corresponding air component air liaison at the land component headquarters. Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were both conducted following the ASOC-at-corps model. However, U.S. attacks in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 did not include an ASOC because the senior Army head- quarters was the 10th Mountain Division.9
The 2003 Army–Air Force Liaison MOA stated, “The USAF will provide a combat ready ASOC in Direct Support to Army corps, or senior Army tactical command echelon in the absence of a corps, as the focal point for supporting air operations.”10 Also in 2003, the Air Force made a significant change to the TACS/ AAGS and Army–Air Force Liaison MOA with the addition of an air component coordination element (ACCE). The ACCE was located at the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC)’s head- quarters to act as a liaison between the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and JFLCC for Operation Iraqi Freedom.11 It is important to note that the ACCE is not organized, trained, or equipped to perform C2 and does not have authority over any air forces. This ACCE is now depicted as a joint air com- ponent coordination element (JACCE) in the 2019 version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Joint Air Operations, with the following duties:
The JFACC may establish one or more joint air component coordination elements with other commanders’ headquarters to better integrate joint air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a component-level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. The JACCE does not perform any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command authority over any air forces. The JACCE is established by the JFACC to better integrate with other component’s senior deployed headquarters.12
Figure 2 Theater Air Control System
During initial Operation Iraqi Freedom maneuvers, the ACCE (as it was originally called) operated at the JFLCC headquarters (3rd Army performed that role). The JFLCC organized all the land component’s long-range fires under V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force and did not retain long-range fires, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, at echelons above corps/Marine expeditionary force.13 These long-range fires systems were generally preplanned with the Joint Air Operations Center, and the missiles were given their own airspace and integrated/deconflicted with airborne assets. Based on the success of fires integration in Operation Iraqi Freedom circa 2003, the Air Force carried forward the concept of “long-range fires” at the senior tactical echelon in Service and joint doctrine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including all the ALSA TTPs dealing with fires, airspace control, and targeting.
In 2005, the Army began a significant force structure shift as part of the transition to a modular force. Within this reorganization, the Army restructured three echelons (theater army, corps, and division) into two echelons capable of directing brigade combat teams in major operations.14 This change created a dilemma for the Air Force. Which was the senior tactical echelon, and where would the ASOC go in that structure? More important, who would control the joint air request network and at what echelon?
To resolve these questions, Air Combat Command’s Joint Air-Ground Office established a tiger team in 2005 to develop courses of action to transform the TACS to meet Army requirements. In meetings at Fort Leavenworth, the Joint Air-Ground Office team worked with the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and subordinate units including the Army Fires Center’s Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, the Combined Arms Center’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, and the Air Force’s Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Education and Development. The tiger team looked at restructuring the Air Force ASOCs from six 150-person centers supporting four corps to 10 nonaligned centers with approximately 50 personnel each supporting 18 divisions and three corps (these numbers include active and guard Army units and were a net increase of 150 ASOC personnel across the USAF).15 The ASOCs would conduct the same procedural airspace C2 of air component assets in support of the Army. However, in most cases the Army had shifted from the corps to the division as the senior tactical echelon. These studies assumed the Army divisions would have a main and tactical command post (CP) and the ASOC would be located at the main CP.
As the Air Combat Command Joint Air-Ground Office team and TRADOC worked this major TACS/AAGS reorganization, in 2007 events in Iraq led the commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq, to issue a joint urgent operational needs statement requesting assistance with airspace control: “The joint community and the U.S. Army are not equipped to manage or adequately deconflict airspace of high-traffic density.”16 This statement included the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems by Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, special operations forces, and coalition partners in Iraq. Both Air Combat Command and the LeMay Center recommended the support of Army Transformation and the airspace control issue be part of the next Army– Air Force Warfighter Talks that were eventually held in February 2009. During these talks, the two chiefs of staff directed Air Combat Command and TRADOC (specifically the Army Fires Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma) to develop a concept titled Joint Air-Ground Integration Cell. After 4 years of experimentation between the two Services, the Army and Air Force published a two-Service TTP known as the Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) in 2014.17
The new JAGIC TTP complied with the Army’s intent to have a division act as the senior tactical echelon and resulted in other joint doctrine changes for the Army–Air Force team. The four main types of JAGIC operations included fires integration, close air support, air interdiction, and airspace control. ASOCs would now be at the division main CP. If a JAGIC was formed, the airspace control authority could delegate a volume of airspace to the division to conduct procedural airspace control. The concept of “division assigned airspace” was formalized in the initial JAGIC TTP and made its way into other joint and Service publications, such as JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and JP 3-52, Airspace Control. As a result of the JAGIC TTP, the Air Force modified the TACS and removed the Army Corps from the TACS diagrams in Service and joint doctrine/ TTPs. The TACS diagram from the 2014 ALSA Theater Air-Ground System manual (figure 2) shows the division re- porting directly to the JFLCC (normally an Army corps) with no intermediate headquarters.
The 2014 version of the TACS with “division assigned airspace” remained the model until the Army decided to reorganize again and brought the corps back as a tactical echelon in the 2017 version of FM 3-0, Operations. FM 3-0 proposed to leave the Air Force ASOCs at division headquarters while retaining the JAGIC TTP capability and division assigned airspace. The diagram in figure 1 was agreed on in 2024 and generally depicts the current joint and Service doctrine on the TACS/AAGS. This figure also sup- ports the current Army–Air Force Liaison MOA signed in February 2022 with the ASOC at division under a superior corps tactical echelon.18
As of 2023, the joint definition of TACP in JP 3-09.3 is as “a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.” Currently, TACPs reside at each Army echelon from battalion through corps regardless of where the ASOC is placed. The ASOC is also defined in JP 3-09.3 as “the principal air control agency of the theater air control system responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground combat element.” Utilizing the procedural method of airspace control, the ASOC functions as an extension of the JFACC’s Joint Air Operations Center.
Based on the most recent Army–Air Force Liaison MOA, the ASOC is located at the headquarters of the Army echelon above brigade that is most capable of integrating fires and effects and procedural airspace control. The MOA further states that the ASOC’s location will be approved by the Commander, Air Force Forces, and will not be above or below echelon of another ASOC (that is, “stacked”).19
Challenges
As the current Army–Air Force Liaison MOA was going through staffing, Service requirements to meet the 2022 National Military Strategy were changing. The MOA is authoritative doctrinal guidance for both Services and serves as a baseline for the TACS/AAGS and units involved in fires, airspace, and air-ground operations. As of October 2023, both Services were attempting to determine if the current TACS/AAGS, as defined in the MOA, is adequate for the future.
Army. Although the Army agreed to leave the ASOC at the division to maintain a JAGIC capability, it has frequently looked for an alternative to the former ASOC at the corps to provide the corps commander the ability to shape in front of the subordinate divisions. At the July 2020 Army–Air Force Integration Forum General Officers Steering Committee, TRADOC proposed Air Combat Command and TRADOC develop a “Joint Targeting and Execution Capability” TTP. Senior Army leaders saw this capability as a TACS/AAGS requirement based on the loss of the ASOC at corps.20 To date, placing an ASOC at corps remains an unresolved discussion item, especially in the European theater and with NATO allies.
In 2020, FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations, introduced the theater fires command (TFC), theater fires element (TFE), and multidomain task force (MDTF).21 These organizations are aligned at echelons above corps and will potentially support the theater Army, JFLCC, or joint task force. Although several of these new units have already been fielded, the Service and joint doctrine for TFC, TFE, and MDTF is still under development, resulting in the units being depicted without connection to any headquarters in the 2024 TACS/ AAGS diagram (figure 1). The Army desires an Air Force airspace control capability at the MDTF; however, as previously discussed, the JFACC’s JACCE supporting a JFLCC or JTF where the MDTF is located does not have an air-space control capability.
To deal with a peer adversary with long-range fires capability, the 2022 FM 3-0, Operations, states, “Army forces must ensure their command posts are difficult to detect, dispersed to prevent a single strike from destroying more than one node, and rapidly displaceable.” Unlike the JAGIC TTP model where a division has a main and a tactical CP with a large Army–Air Force team in the main, the new focus is on smaller command post nodes that use existing structures. In accordance with the current JAGIC TTP, the ASOC is subordinate to the Joint Air Operations Center and is responsible for the coordination and control of air component missions in division assigned airspace.22 It is the ASOC that enables the airspace control authority to allow airspace control over the division. Under the current doctrine, CPs that are too small for a JAGIC (including personnel and requisite equipment) would result in the loss of division assigned airspace. In other words, dispersing CPs, an appropri- ate response to the threat of long-range fires, may result in losing the ability to control airspace.
Air Force. As the U.S. military shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific theater, the Air Force recently announced it would be cutting up to 44 percent of its TACP liaisons assigned to Army units. Currently, about 3,700 Air Force officers, enlisted, and civilians are serving on Army posts. This number will fall to a little more than 2,000 personnel and may require the Air Force to consolidate forces in just a few stateside locations.23 This consolidation could break the alignment called for in the 2022 Army–Air Force Liaison MOA, and despite ongoing discussions between the Army and Air Force, the issue remains unresolved.
The placement of ASOCs within an Army structure has been an issue for Air Force leadership since the 2009 Army– Air Force Warfighter Talks directed the move from corps to division. Although the Air Force chief of staff directed the Air-Ground Operations Wings to push ASOCs from corps to division, the resourcing to make this happen never really materialized.24 Effective changes to the TACS/AAGS require a relook at ASOC current capability, placement, and responsibilities. Notably, Air Force Instruction 13-114, volume 3, Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) Operations Procedures, has not been updated since 2009.
In the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, JFACCs are looking for additional ways to leverage TACP capabilities early in a conflict in areas outside of the land component’s area of operations. In these instances, the TACP personnel may operate in direct support of the JFACC as part of an “agile combat integration team.” These teams are composed of TACP and Control Reporting Center personnel to create a seven-person mobile tactical C2 team with the capability of operating in a contested environment.25 Maintaining this capability while still providing required support to Army echelons is another area of ongoing discussions with the Army. Currently, agile combat integration teams are not included in the TACS/AAGS.
Last, with the emergence of additional Army Fires Headquarters, the Air Component would most likely desire additional Airmen to assist in joint integration tasks. Additional requirements for the Air Force Special Warfare Airmen liaisons may not be possible due to budget constraints.
Coalition.These partners also create challenges for the TACS/AAGS because few partner nations have ASOCs. As both the Air Force and the Army work with partners, they often request an ASOC or a JAGIC-like capability at echelons above division. As an example, during exercise Dacian Strike in 2023, NATO began de- veloping what it calls an ASOC/JAGIC at the coalition corps echelon.26 The current TACS/AAGS does not depict multinational liaison units/alignment; however, this is a significant consideration, particularly in Europe.
Based on the information above, it is safe to assume the current 2022 liaison MOA must change as the Nation transitions to a peer pacing threat.
- The Army would like an additional Air Force capability at MDTF, TFE, and TFC to provide airspace management/fires integration for long- range fires. In addition, the Army would like an ASOC-like capability at the tactical corps to provide airspace management/control and fires integration, as the corps shapes at longer ranges in front of its subordinate divisions. Finally, the Army would like an additional number of smaller distributed command posts at both corps and division for survivability.
- The Air Force is downsizing the number of TACP personnel to shift resources and enable support of large-scale combat operations in the Indo-Pacific theater. Furthermore, in the opening days of a conflict, the Air Force wants to use some TACP personnel in support of the JFACC’s theater-wide roles for strategic attack, counter-air, suppression of enemy air defenses, and air interdiction outside of the land component’s area of operations. Last, some air-ground leaders in the Air Force want to reexamine the current TACP/ASOC liaison structure with a focus on emerging concepts and the pacing threat.
Recommendations
- As soon as possible, these issues should go to the Army–Air Force Warfighter Talks between the two chiefs of staff. History points to the talks as the only time there is real organizational change in the TACS/ AAGS. Only the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff have the authority and resources to make this happen.
» Recommend both Service chiefs direct a review of the TACS/AAGS
» Recommend an initial Service tiger team review of its respective portions of the TACS/AAGS
» Recommend the two Services form an Army–Air Force tiger team, much the same way the two-Service “ASOC Enabling Concept” was developed to transition Air Force ASOCs from corps to division in 2009
» If the review results in a new Army–Air Force Liaison MOA, begin the process as soon as possible.
- Once a new MOA is established, begin the process of rewriting all the Service doctrine, followed by joint publications, multinational publica- tions, TTPs, and Service instructions.
For over 50 years, the TACS/AAGS has provided guidance and stability to Army and Air Force inter-Service relationships and to those officers and enlisted personnel who are liaisons to the other Service. Although some may say the systems are inflexible and hard to change, there have been massive changes based on the threat, resources, and emerging doctrine. It is time for yet another senior-level review to see what must change to meet the threats of 2024 and beyond. JFQ
Notes
1 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 433.
2 Field Manual (FM) 100-26, The Air- Ground Operations System (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1973), 4–5.
3 General James C. McConville and General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., Memorandum of Agree- ment Between the United States Army and the United States Air Force for Army–Air Force Liaison Support, February 22, 2022.
4 Brian L. Brock, chief, Joint Fires–Joint Close Air Support Branch, Joint Staff J6, telephone interview with the author, October 17, 2023.
5 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984), 71, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/From-Active- Defense-to-AirLand-Battle.pdf.\
6 Harold R. Winton, “Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield,” Parameters, Spring 1996, 100–119, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1770&contex t=parameters.
7 Field Circular 100-26, Air-Ground Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Com- mand and Staff College, July 31, 1984), B-1.
8 Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.17, Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, 1998), III-15.
9 D. Matthew Neuenswander, “JCAS in Operation Anaconda—It’s Not All Bad News,” Field Artillery Journal (May–June 2003), 2–4, https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin- archive/2003/may_jun_2003/may_jun_2003_ full_edition.pdf.
10 General John M. Keane and General John P. Jumper, Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Army and the United States Air Force for Army–Air Force Liaison Support, June 16, 2003.
11 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 39–40.
12 Joint Publication 3-30, Joint Air Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 25, 2019, Validated on September 17, 2021), II-16, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
13 Colonel Kevin Benson, USA (Ret.), via telephone interview with the author, August 28, 2023.
14 Association of the United States Army (AUSA), The U.S. Army: A Modular Force for the 21st Century, Torchbearer National Security Report (Arlington, VA: AUSA, March 2005), 25, https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/ TBNSR-2005-The-US-Army-A-Modular-Force-for-the-21st-Century.pdf.
15 Curtis Neal and James Felton, “ASOC/ TACP Transformation & Modernization,” JAGO ASOC Tiger Team presentation,Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 24, 2005.
16 Headquarters Multi-National Corps–Iraq, “Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) Statement for Area-Coverage, Low Level, Consolidated Air Picture with Combat Identification (U),” Baghdad, Iraq, August 13, 2007.
17 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-91.1, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2014).
18 McConville and Brown, Memorandum of Agreement, 4.
19 McConville and Brown.
20 Army–Air Force Integration Forum Council of Colonels, “CORPS Joint Targeting and Execution Capability,” Army Capabilities Manager-Echelons Above Brigade presentation, Combined Arms Center, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, July 21, 2020.
21 FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2020).
22 ATP 3-91.1, The Joint Air-Ground Integration Center, v.
23 Rachel S. Cohen, “Air Force Looks to Cut Nearly 50% of Tactical Air Control Party Jobs,” Air Force Times, April 14, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2023/04/14/air-force-looks-to-cut- nearly-50-of-tactical-air-control-party-jobs/.
24 Seth D. Spidahl, “The Once and Future Air Support Operations Center: A Critical Reflection on Developments in Air-to-Ground Command and Control” (master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2016), vii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ Doctrine/Education/jpme_papers/spidahl_s.pdf?ver=2017-12-29-142157-207.
25 Zachary Jakel, “Aviano AB and Ramstein AB Conduct Joint Agile Control Integration Team Training,” Aviano Air Base, August 9, 2023, https://www.aviano.af.mil/News/ Display/Article/3487852/aviano-ab-and-ramstein-ab-conduct-joint-agile-control-integration-team-training/.
26 Troy Darr, “NATO Implements Exercise Dacian Strike 2023,” U.S. Army, June 22, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/267792/ nato_implements_exercise_dacian_strike_2023.