Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous Hackers
By Andy Greenberg
Anchor Books, 2020
368 pp. $18.00
Reviewed by Janine Lafortune
Major Janine Lafortune, USA, is a Space Operations Officer (FA40) serving in the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center at the Pentagon.
Sandworm reads like a fiction crime thriller but raises the alarm about a looming nonfiction threat: unrestricted cyber war. Andy Greenberg, the author and a senior writer for Wired, cautions readers that the world is in the midst of a global cyber arms race. He forewarns that civilian critical infrastructure remains highly vulnerable to cyber attacks by aggressive state and nonstate actors. He identifies malicious cyber attacks, as part of a new tit-for-tat, with escalation mirroring that of the Cold War, with increasingly sophisticated cyber attack methods and capabilities constituting a new, modern arms race. He concludes with an ominous message: that the next cyber doomsday is not a matter of if but when.
The main narrative follows the aggressive and unrelenting cyber attacks that have been bombarding Ukraine since 2015. For 5 years, Ukraine served as a petri dish for cyber operations by Russian state and nonstate actors, who were testing the limits of deniability, attribution, proportionality, and discrimination. Each time they conducted an attack—BlackEnergy in 2015, Industroyer in 2016, NotPetya and Bad Rabbit in 2017—these cyber hackers walked away unscathed and free to strike again. Intertwined with this narrative is a second one, detailing Greenberg’s quest to find and oust the masterminds behind many of these attacks, accompanied by civilian cyber security professionals. Together, the two accounts illuminate the new and evolving world of cyber conflict.
Greenberg traces the history of state-sponsored cyber attacks and offers a critique of U.S. cyber activities. Once Stuxnet, the computer worm identified in 2010, was compromised, it opened a Pandora’s box. Cyber gurus, aggressors, and defenders have been playing an escalating game of cat and mouse ever since. Greenberg warns that this is no game, however, and that it comes with real consequences—millions of dollars in economic losses, physical damage to property, and potential loss of life. He points to NotPetya as the perfect case study. The malware spread to more than 65 countries and caused an estimated $10 billion in damages, demonstrating unprecedented scope. Greenberg argues that malicious cyber attacks are becoming more dangerous, and indiscriminate attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, spreading beyond traditional notions of state sovereignty, should serve as a warning to the global order.
Greenberg’s ability to present complex and dry technical jargon with fluidity and accessibility aids readers in navigating the more challenging elements of his argument. However, at times, Sandworm jerks the reader around in its six sections. Greenberg interrupts his main narratives with branch narratives, biographies, and fascinating but superfluous history. For instance, instead of presenting mysterious cyber hackers such as Fancy Bear, FSociety, and Shadow Brokers in “Part V: Identity,” he introduces the former two in “Part III: Evolution” and the last in “Part IV: Apotheosis.” Similarly, he presents a new cyber attack called Bad Rabbit/Olympic Destroyer, followed by a chapter on false attribution, all in “Section V: Identity.” These interruptions create confusion and tangents that detract from his fundamental question: Who is Sandworm? Nevertheless, Greenberg’s research, analysis, and impressive sources provide credibility, and a sense of urgency and mystery, making it an exciting read.
Sandworm makes a convincing case about the threats of unrestricted cyber war and the vulnerability of civilian critical infrastructure. The book is thorough, with rich accounts from cyber security specialists and cyber attack victims adding weight and perspective to the main argument. Greenberg’s focus on Ukraine as the test bed for Russian malicious cyber activities provides the greatest example of cyber conflict’s complexity. Offensive cyber attacks to support tactical military operations, as seen in Ukraine, are just a tiny facet of the cyber influence that strategic competitors leverage to obtain combat advantage. There is also a psychological component to cyber war, manifesting as harassment, extortion, and even destruction—all aimed at eroding civilians’ trust in their governments and their ability to protect its people.
Although Greenberg is careful to question U.S. cyber security policy in the wake of NotPetya, his efforts in this regard fall short. Despite interviewing top cyber security officials from the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, Greenberg never critically examines U.S. cyber security policy, U.S. Federal cyber security operations teams (national roles, authorities, and responsibilities), or the ways international humanitarian law applies to cyber activities. He fails to address the U.S. creation and alignment of responsible cyber security organizations, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the policies that govern their activities—a notable omission. The Department of Defense’s official policy states that the law of war will apply to cyberspace operations; however, Sandworm chronicles malicious activity that occupies the gray zone—below the threshold of armed conflict. In a missed opportunity, Sandworm pirouettes around the most significant issue the United States faces in the wake of the Ukrainian case study: How does the Nation conduct cyber operations consistent with domestic law, applicable international law, and rules of engagement, when the same rules do not constrict our competitors and adversaries?
Despite failing to address some of the most significant legal considerations the United States faces to cyber operations, Sandworm is one of the most comprehensive chronicles of cyber warfare available over open-source platforms. The book forces self-reflection—which at times triggers vulnerability—and challenges our underlying assumptions of U.S. cyber security policy, methods, and capabilities, as well as those belonging to actors within the strategic environment. Its warnings and insights on cyber’s “gray areas” make it a formidable resource for those in the joint force and the national security community charged with the preservation and the defense of U.S. military advantage and U.S. interests. JFQ