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The subject of military history as taught in the U.S. Army’s school system is much in the air of late.” So the editors of Parameters chose in 1981 to reintroduce Michael Howard’s timeless article on military education writ large.¹ Such an introduction could serve just as well some 40 years later, when the state of joint professional military education (JPME) remains a heated source of debate. Howard—a combat veteran of the Italian Campaign in 1943 to 1945, in addition to being an esteemed military historian—urged that the military professional needed to study history in width, depth, and context, in that order.

Dr. Kevin Pollpeter, Director of Research for the China Aerospace Studies Institute, and Professor David T. Burbach, Ph.D., Director of the Naval War College Space Studies Group, answer questions during Naval War College’s Future Warfighting Symposium onboard Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island, August 7, 2025 (U.S. Navy/Connor Burns)

Even as JPME considers new issues such as how to integrate new technology—for example, artificial intelligence chatbots—the central issue remains how best to study war in width, depth, and context. With this being the case, this article provides some insights into the evolving curriculum of the Air War College to consider how balanced its approach has been amid some critique that JPME has sacrificed depth for breadth, with some contending that “war” has been removed from the war college.² This criticism comes amid the implementation of the new emphasis on outcomes-based education, which calls for ensuring that each student achieves the program-defined learning outcomes across professional military education (PME) and which will more frequently assess whether schools meet these outcomes by measuring how well graduates were prepared for their next assignments. These new standards mandate little in the way of specific curriculum content. Rather, they provide sound overarching guidance, such as the need to provide students with “diverse and often conflicting perspectives” to arrive at “evidence-based conclusion(s).”³

An appropriate focus on war in the context of JPME should include instruction on war theory, national security, planning, and the various capabilities and limitations of each domain to foster greater joint-mindedness. Grounded in a sound study of history, JPME institutions should also help students consider emerging challenges from a host of perspectives, including technological, economic, political, changing threats, and the like. War consists of military operations, but those maneuvers cannot be isolated from the larger context in which wars are fought. There should also be a central focus on instilling critical thinking into students that reflects General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s vision for the National War College. As he explained, one of that college’s roles “should be to develop doctrine rather than to accept and follow prescribed doctrine. . . . The War College approach to any problem should not be bound by any rules or accepted teaching. If this is not done, the War College loses one of its most valuable and essential assets.”⁴ War-gaming and other simulations are also essential parts of any PME curriculum, but these should be balanced with instruction to allow students to apply the knowledge they have acquired during their school years.⁵

Approaching the study of war and strategy from several perspectives instills breadth into the system. Depth, however, comes from the multilayered JPME system that considers the staff colleges maintained by each of the Services and focused more explicitly on the operational level of war. Although not every officer who attends a staff college is guaranteed to be selected to attend a war college, this is immaterial as staff and war colleges should be viewed holistically. This is not a new approach; at least as far back as the report of the Knox–King–Pye Board of 1920, intermediate- and senior-level programs have been viewed as distinct stops on a career of learning for well-rounded officers.⁶

The Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the need for a broad study of warfare. Despite a tendency for casual commenters to fixate on drones destroying tanks, the “war” ranges widely off the traditional battlefield to involve every facet of society. The Black Sea front, for example, has seen economic warfare as Russia sought to stymie Ukrainian wheat exports. Similarly, the appreciation for logistics and the industrial base that underpins it has thankfully soared once the war turned into a highly attritional conflict. Furthermore, there is no aspect of Russian or Ukrainian society that has not been affected in some way by this war. Perhaps more than ever as the reach of both kinetic and nonkinetic weapons increases, the traditional battlefield morphs and expands. For JPME to take an approach focused primarily on the military does not properly prepare officers for the broad range of challenges they must account for in successfully planning and waging warfare.

The danger is that a poor understanding of how military education works may be used to design narrow curricula built excessively around planning and doctrine that could miss many of the critical lessons from the conflict in Ukraine and elsewhere. The notion that war is somehow not studied at U.S. staff and war colleges has gained traction since the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), for example, commissioned a study on naval warfighting culture in 2021. Among its eight main recommendations, the study suggested removing “all political and sociological topics from professional military education and replacing them with essential warfighting courseware.”⁷ An article by Thomas Bruscino and Mitchell Klingenberg with a similar argument added fuel to this fire.⁸ In December 2021, Cotton cited Bruscino and Klingenberg’s piece during the confirmation hearings for Admiral Christopher W. Grady to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting that he follow up on their claims that implementation of the May 2020 guidance issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been “lost in a maze of bureaucracy.”⁹

Given that the Military Education Coordination Council, a body that advises the director of joint force development, continues to meet and receive directions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these criticisms may ripple across the entirety of officer military education. In this vein, it is important to note that war colleges do, in fact, teach war and warfighting and have not strayed from their mandate. This can be seen most clearly by tracing the history of curriculum at Air War College. The composition and content of courses has changed over time, but the study of war has been the core of PME.

The single most important contribution that military education can make to ensure that it serves as a force multiplier is, as MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray have argued, to help officers “make correct decisions at the political and strategic level.” They further explain that “mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but strategic mistakes live forever.”¹⁰ A wide range of opinions on PME exists, but we believe that graduates of staff and war colleges must be both creative problem-solvers while always remaining conscious of how to link operational objectives to strategic and policy goals. Balancing those objectives helps to explain how military education has evolved, and narrowing curricula to focus even more on warfighting could have dire consequences.

How, then, to build depth into the system? It has already been designed that way in a building-block approach. For example, Air Force students attend a 6-week course at the Squadron Officer School as captains, to which those selected for intermediate-level resident education build on with a yearlong course followed by another yearlong course of senior-level resident education, sometimes further supplemented by online education.

The Basics of JPME

It is useful to understand the ranks at which various levels of PME operate. Senior-level education takes place at war colleges and involves lieutenant colonels (or the equivalent), who generally have about 20 years of military service. By contrast, intermediate-level education takes place at command and staff colleges and targets majors (and the equivalent), who typically have about 13 years of military service. Currently, there are 5 intermediate and 11 senior programs in addition to the Space Force intermediate and senior programs operated in conjunction with John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.¹¹

The greatest difference between the senior and intermediate level of military education is that the former focuses primarily on the strategic level of war, whereas the latter concentrates on the operational level of war, best understood as the waging of military campaigns. This point importantly reflects the fact that education at a war college will be more political in scope by its very nature or focusing first and foremost on how military force can help achieve one’s desired political objectives.

Students from Air War College participate in war game designed around Pacific conflict, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, December 21, 2023 (U.S. Air Force/Billy Blankenship)

Misfired Rounds

Regarding arguments alleging that PME is to blame for America’s many failures in Afghanistan, the most significant logical flaw should be obvious: one simply cannot provide causal evidence to link the two. Rarely do monocausal explanations have explanatory value, especially in such complex cases. Likewise, the contention that a greater concentration on warfighting might have turned the tide in Afghanistan is impossible to establish.

That military education has been singled out as a causal factor is not surprising, however. Dating back to the founding of the Naval War College in 1884 and the birth of PME in the United States, there has been no shortage of opinions on what this education should look like, who should teach it, and who should receive it.¹²

Others debate its value to previous conflicts. Some historical studies argue that PME made a measurable contribution to American victory in World War II by instilling the “applicatory system” and decisionmaking processes through the heavy use of war games.¹³ Others have taken a dim view of interwar military education, arguing that it produced doctrinaire ideas and “school solutions” and rehashed the battles of the past without looking to the future.¹⁴ The divergence of opinions from learned scholars on JPME’s effect in past wars demonstrates that its effect on military performance is not easily measured.

New Guidance

Measuring the “outcomes” of PME is part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 2020 and 2022 guidance^.15 The tenor of some scathing critiques might suggest that this guidance has dictated sweeping reforms in addition to the new assessment methodology.¹⁶ But the 2020 document’s “Summary of Changes” highlights practical aspects of assessment, talent management, and other related matters rather than mandating significant curriculum reform. Indeed, the sole directive regarding academic curriculum requires programs to use the Joint Staff’s continually updated Joint Learning Areas—hardly a new development—yet leaves the door open for initiative on the part of individual institutions, explaining that programs should use the document’s guidance to “develop mission-unique program learning objectives.”¹⁷ In other words, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 2020 guidance encourages jointness while eschewing a cookie-cutter curriculum. The 2022 guidance follows in the same vein, only expanding to 142 pages to provide educational administration with the necessary guidance on procedures to demonstrate outcomes-based learning.

The 2020 document exhorts PME to produce “historically informed, strategically minded, skilled joint warfighters.” How to interpret this wording is the subject of some debate. Bruscino and Klingenberg take a narrow interpretation of this guidance. In this case, it is useful to consider the six joint learning areas that govern PME.¹⁸ These strike a balance between developing an officer’s “advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought” with an understanding of warfare in the past and present, the global security environment, and the formation and execution of strategic and operational plans. If there is not enough “war” in our war colleges, then the issue lies with the standards set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have embraced a broad understanding of what should be taught to officers yet prescribe areas that still focus on how to wage war.

Change and Continuity

The curricula of war and staff colleges typically focus on four main areas: military history and theory, international relations, leadership and command studies, and joint planning. The balance among these elements differs somewhat depending on the level of education of the individual school. At the intermediate level, for instance, the Army’s Command and General Staff College primarily focuses on developing the operational planning process with history providing context for decisionmaking, with only a smattering of international relations.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Air Command and Staff College devotes about five-eighths of its required curriculum to war, with the remaining three-eighths of the curriculum focused on leadership and international studies.²⁰ It added a 5-day war game to the curriculum for the 2023 academic year as well as a 10-day joint air operations planning course. A greater proportion of the College of Naval Command and Staff curriculum—approximately one-quarter—focuses on international relations through the Theater Security Decision Making course, although a new Perspectives on Modern War course began during the 2024–25 academic year.²¹

The curriculum at the senior programs likewise provides little evidence that the core curricula has devolved into a postmodern pastiche that instills in military officers the notion that “[p]rofessional military education prepare[s] graduates to avoid armed conflict, not prevail in it” as Bruscino and Klingenberg assert. The standards for these schools call for education in national security strategy; theater strategy and campaigning; joint planning processes and systems; and joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.²² As with the variations noted among the intermediate schools, the senior schools accomplish these goals in similar ways, albeit with some noticeable differences. The four legacy Service schools are all built around the four core curriculum elements outlined above, often including capstone exercises that allow students to apply all the elements learned in the core curriculum. Some schools, such as the Army and Air War Colleges, also include core courses on regional and cultural studies intended to foster knowledge and connections with partner countries.²³ The Army War College also offers a course on economics and defense management to give officers a greater understanding of war’s fiscal and organizational underpinnings.²⁴ Even with these variations, the overwhelming majority of graduates of senior-level programs will have gone through curricula where a majority of the content focuses explicitly on military history, theory, and military planning—that is, the study of war.

Army Colonel Phillip Cuccia, Army War College academic engagement director, highlights opening actions of Battle of Gettysburg to Air Force field grade officers at Gettysburg National Military Park, Pennsylvania, April 18, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Michael B. Keller)

A Historical Snapshot of the Air War College Curriculum

Critically, a longitudinal analysis of curricula can help practitioners understand how these institutions have evolved. Some institutions are wary of sharing curriculum information, but the Air War College has valuable data dating back to its founding. The Air War College’s first curriculum, from around 1952, included a core course in international relations. Indeed, international relations and global strategy constituted one-half of the course work, with air warfare the other half. By the late 1960s, the Air War College curriculum placed a greater emphasis on warfighting as demonstrated by the increased instruction on military capabilities. Still, it is important to note that the Air Force temporarily began sending fewer of its students to the college because of the Vietnam War.²⁵ This reality helps point out that a deep understanding of PME’s trajectory cannot be reduced to a formulaic accounting of curriculum.

During the 1970s, independent study came to dominate the curriculum, albeit still undergirded by an emphasis on military strategy and capabilities. Interestingly, this approach aligns with the French model, which one expert has described as very creative and advanced.²⁶ Still, one commission found that the curriculum contained too much management. As a result, the 1975 Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in Education advocated devoting 33 percent of the Air War College curriculum to aerospace warfare. But, just as Bruscino and Klingenberg cannot establish any causal linkage between PME and the loss of Afghanistan, it would be equally difficult to demonstrate that the increased study of airpower necessarily resulted in the United States winning its only major war since World War II: the Gulf War, in 1991.

The curriculum has continued to evolve since the Cold War’s end. After 9/11, the college added a global security core course to assess how changes in the international system affect national security. Most recently, the college has shifted toward an intensified focus on warfighting to support Great Power competition. However, that warfighting emphasis has been characterized by stressing the “intellectual weapons of critical, creative, and strategic thinking over merely regurgitating an argument envisioned by an author or the professor.” Meanwhile, the current curriculum has a broad range of areas of interest, including the school’s culminating event, the Global Challenge war game, which requires students to “prioritiz[e] threats, develo[p] a comprehensive global strategy, and desig[n] an operational approach that responds to a military threat.”²⁷ This wargame speaks to the broad nature of preparing for future warfare, as highlighted by multiple authors including Sean McFate, who cautions that we cannot expect the neat battlefields of the past.²⁸

Change Is Constant

Like every complex structure, PME is the product of a series of tradeoffs. Setting aside many of the other hotbutton issues that surround it, what is taught and how it is taught at these schools requires constant give and take. Would it make officers more effective leaders to focus more on warfighting at the expense of the leadership and management courses that have become more common in military education in recent decades? Would limiting curricula’s coverage of international relations and regional studies—both of which allow officers to better understand geopolitics and the U.S. roles and responsibilities in various regions—detract from American and allied security? Wargaming from the interwar period may be showered with praise today, but this conclusion assumes that one is designing the right war games to solve the right problems.²⁹

Furthermore, no less a luminary warfighter than Admiral Raymond Spruance, who had taught at the Naval War College during the interwar period and assumed the presidency of the Naval War College in 1946, broadened the curriculum to consider the increasing uncertainty of the Navy’s place in the postwar period. Critically, Spruance wanted officers who could fight but also were “strategical types” and creative thinkers. As he described the goal of the college, “If imagination, tempered and guided by common sense and reason is the scarce and valuable quality which I believe it to be, it behooves us to recognize the individuals who possess this disciplined imagination and make full use of them.”³⁰

Over four decades ago, a former officer who had survived 2 years of grueling warfare enjoined JPME to first study in width, then in depth, then in context. The study of war in its entirety is alive and well at the Nation’s staff and war colleges, and the Joint Chief of Staff’s most recent guidance allows the Services largely to develop curriculum as they see fit, within the confines of broadly focused joint learning objectives. One need only look at the war in Ukraine to see how an interconnected and informationalized world can significantly enhance and even add to the capabilities beyond those traditionally employed on a battlefield. War college students have spent most of their careers employing military capabilities at the operational and tactical levels of war, which is precisely why war colleges concentrate the fulcrum of their efforts at the point where military strategy intersects with political objectives. Tasking PME to double down on teaching “warfighting” that already constitutes the bulk of curricula is likely only to increase the disconnect between using the means to meet the important ends our students may need to apply in the toughest classroom of all: war. JFQ

Notes

¹ Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” RUSI [Royal United Services Institute] Journal, no. 107 (February 1962), reprinted in Parameters 11, no. 1 (1981), 9 and 14, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/ parameters/vol11/iss1/16/.

² Jessica Edwards, “Argument Over ‘Woke-Ism’ in the Military Erupts in House Hearing,” Military Times, April 5, 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/04/05/argument-over-woke-ism-in-the-military-erupts-in-house-hearing/.

³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 1810.01, Outcomes-Based Military Education Procedures for Officer Professional Military Education (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 1, 2022), appendix E, enclosure B, 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/ CJCSM%201810.01.pdf.

⁴ Alfred Dupont Chandler, ed., Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945, vol. 6 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 801.

⁵ Carrie Lee and Bill Lewis, “Wargaming Has a Place, But Is No Panacea for Professional Military Education,” War on the Rocks, August 5, 2019, https://warontherocks. com/2019/08/wargaming-has-a-place-but-isno-panacea-for-professional-military-education/.

⁶ “Report and Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding the Instruction and Training of Line Officers,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 46, no. 8 (August 1920), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1920/august/report-and-recommendations-board-appointed-bureau-navigation.

⁷ Robert E. Schmidle and Mark Montgomery, A Report on the Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, July 12, 2021), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/navy_report.pdf.

⁸ Thomas Bruscino and Mitchell G. Klingenberg, “Putting the ‘War’ Back in War Colleges,” City Journal, September 2, 2021, https://www.city-journal.org/article/putting-the-war-back-in-war-colleges.

⁹ “Senator Cotton Q&A During a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing,” December 8, 2021, Senator Tom Cotton, video, 6:56,

¹⁰ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, “Conclusion: The Future Behind Us,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050, eds. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 180.

¹¹ Joint Force 2030 OPT—Enclosure A: Professional Military Education Policy (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 4, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/education/jf2030/enclosure_a_dod_inst_outcomes.pdf; Charles Rivezzo, “USSF, Johns Hopkins University Debut New Era of Officer PME,” United States Space Force, July 28, 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3476316/.

¹² Harun Dogo, “10 Things I Don’t Get About PME,” Foreign Policy, January 31, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/31/10-things-i-dont-get-about-pme/; Adam Lowther and Brooke Mitchell, “Professional Military Education Needs More Creativity, Not More History,” War on the Rocks, May 28, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/professional-military-education-needs-more-creativity-not-more-history/; Mie Augier et al., “Sustaining an Intellectual Overmatch: Management Education for Our Naval Warfighters,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), October 9, 2020, https://cimsec.org/sustaining-an-intellectual-overmatch-management-education-for-our-naval-warfighters/; John R. Schindler and Joan Johnson-Freese, “‘Civilian’ Faculty in Professional Military Education: Just What Does That Mean?” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/03/civilian-faculty-in-professional-military-education-just-what-does-that-mean/; Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 2 (February 2010), https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2010/february/too-busy-learn.

¹³ Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010); Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018); Norman Friedman, Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2018), https://www.history.navy.mil/ content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/ publication-508-pdf/NHHC_Winning%20 a%20Future%20War_508b.pdf; John M. Lillard, Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2016).

¹⁴ Tami Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jörg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2013); and Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980), https://digital-commons.usnwc. edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/4/.

¹⁵ For the best article on how to incorporate this guidance, see Kristin Mulready-Stone, “A New Form of Accountability in JPME: The Shift to Outcomes-Based Military Education,” Joint Force Quarterly (1st Quarter, 2024), 30–38, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/ News/News-Article-View/Article/3678739/a-new-form-of-accountability-in-jpme-theshift- to-outcomes-based-military-educa/. The 2020 guidance is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01F, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 15, 2020), http://web.archive.org/web/20240216154840/https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800_01f.pdf. The 2022 guidance is CJCSM 1810.01. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy has since been updated. See CJCSI 1800.01G, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 15, 2024), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800.01g.pdf.

¹⁶ James Lacey, “Finally Getting Serious About Professional Military Education,” War on the Rocks, May 18, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/finally-getting-serious-about-professional-military-education/.

¹⁷ CJCSI 1800.01F.

¹⁸ CJCSI 1800.01F.

¹⁹ CGSC Circular 350-1: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Catalog, 2020–2021, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, https://armyuniversity.edu/cgsc/files/cgsc_circular_350-1_college_catalog_%282020-2021%29.pdf.

²⁰ “Academics: Curriculum,” Air University, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ACSC/Academics/.

²¹ “JPME Phase I and Master’s Degree,” U.S. Naval War College, n.d., https://usnwc.edu/college-of-naval-command-and-staff/JPME-Phase-I-and-Masters-Degree.

²² Joint Force 2030 OPT—Enclosure A.

²³ “MEL-1 Resident Education Program,” Army War College, accessed April 1, 2023, https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/rep.htm; “AWC Curriculum,” Air University, 2024, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AWC/Curriculum/.

²⁴ Academic Programs Guide: Academic Year 2025 (Carlisle, PA: U.S Army War College, 2025), https://www.armywarcollege.edu/documents/Academic%20Program%20Guide.pdf.

²⁵ Richard L. Davis and Frank P. Donnini, Professional Military Education for Air Force Officers: Comments and Criticisms (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1981), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA421950.pdf.

²⁶ Emilie Cleret, interview by Peter Roberts, host, The Western Way of War, podcast, episode 77, “So What Did We Learn, If Anything?,” RUSI, December 23, 2021, https://rusi.org/ podcasts/western-way-of-war/episode-77-sowhat- did-we-learn-if-anything.

²⁷ Lee and Lewis, “Wargaming Has a Place, But Is No Panacea for Professional Military Education.”

²⁸ Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder (New York: William Morrow, 2019), 185. See also Heather Pace Venable, “The Future of War,” review of The New Rules of War and Limiting Risk in America’s Wars, by Sean McFate and Phillip S. Meilinger, respectively, The Field Grade Leader blog, October 6, 2019, http://fieldgradeleader.themilitaryleader.com/the-future-of-war-the-new-rules-of-warlimiting-risk-in-americas-wars/.

²⁹ Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

³⁰ John B. Hattendorf et al., Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), https://archive.org/details/ sailorsscholarsc00hatt/mode/2up. See also “U.S. Naval War College Program Classes of June 1947,” Box 23, Entry 55 (General Correspondence, 1942–1948), Record Group 337 (Headquarters, Army Field Forces), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

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Kori Schake’s The State and the Soldier is an engaging, compact, and comprehensive examination of U.S. civil-military relations history. The book recounts the defining moments in the relationship between civilian political leadership and the military from the perspective of a scholar and think-tanker who is well-known for her commentary on a wide range of defense policy-related topics. The State and the Soldier is an important and timely resource—amidst increasing public discourse regarding the current state of norms in civil-military relations, Schake provides much-needed historical perspective on what constitutes a civil-military crisis, and how worried we should be.

Throughout the nearly 250-year history of the United States, the military has been a bulwark of democracy, despite the Founding Fathers’ original fears about a standing army. The U.S. military has consistently passed Schake’s two essential tests of healthy civil-military relations: can the president fire military leaders with impunity, and will the military carry out policies with which it does not agree? Even so, current public discourse suggests that we are at a perilous point for civil-military relations. Schake provides context for general readers as well as military professionals who seek to better understand what is at stake and how to navigate the tricky relationship between military and civilian leadership.

Most military professionals’ understanding of civil-military relations is based on Samuel Huntington’s 1957 The Soldier and the State. Professional military education still relies heavily on Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control, which posits that civil-military relations are best maintained when there is strict separation between military and civilian spheres. In the Huntingtonian formulation, military leadership should remain technically expert, providing “best military advice” to civilian leadership, but otherwise refrain from politics and civilian decisionmaking. Yet any military professional who has served in the National Capital Region knows that military leaders are frequently asked to engage in political-level decisions.

Navigating civil-military relations today requires more than a reading of The Soldier and the State. Schake weaves the scholarship of prominent voices in civil-military relations into her historical retrospective, highlighting the works of Peter Feaver, Risa Brooks, and Eliot Cohen, among others. The strong theoretical work—providing a new perspective on Huntington and his contemporary rival, Morris Janowitz—is left for the epilogue. There, Schake notes the impracticality of both Huntington’s strict separation and Janowitz’s desire for complete integration. Informed by history, she concludes that both are “extreme models at variance with what has actually worked, and worked well, in American history.”

Schake advocates for a more practical and modern conceptualization of healthy civil-military relations. The key to military subservience to civilian authority and the integrity of the profession in the United States begins with General and President George Washington, who set numerous important precedents that today’s military carries forward as norms of civil-military relations. Schake recounts Washington’s scrupulousness in honoring Congress’s role in both strategy and managing the purse strings, even when he disagreed with its decisions or lamented the slowness with which it operated. Washington’s willingness to step away from his leadership roles was also remarkable at the time, impressing onlookers including King George III.

Schake’s admiration for Washington is based on his political acumen, not his apoliticism. Understanding the politics of the moment (and perhaps the future), Washington made deliberate decisions to strengthen certain institutions over others, clarifying the subordination of the military to civilian authority and signaling to the public the importance of adherence to the Constitution. It was Washington, not Huntington, who laid out the tenets of American military professionalism.

Though the foundation for the stability of the U.S. civil-military relationship originated with Washington, it took time for these norms to take root. Here, The State and the Soldier makes a significant contribution by exploring the numerous often-overlooked instances of general officers challenging elected political authority within the first 100 years of U.S. history, including insubordination from future Presidents such as Ulysses S. Grant and Zachary Taylor. Even so, the staying power of the norms established during Washington’s tenure carried through the tough early years to serve as the better example from early U.S. history.

The most dangerous event in U.S. civil-military history might have been the failed conspiracy of former Vice President Aaron Burr and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, James Wilkinson. However, Schake believes the most trying moment was when Congress compelled General Ulysses Grant to testify against the President and the Secretary of War. In December 1867, the House was considering President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment, posing tough questions to Grant about the President’s policies. Although Grant had a checkered history regarding civil-military relations, in this critical moment he followed in Washington’s footsteps by siding with Congress in its Constitutional oversight role, regardless of the effect on the military and commander-in-chief.

According to Schake, two major efforts contributed to a transformation in civil-military relations: the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 and the professionalization of the military around the turn of the century, following the example of the Prussian school. The result was a military that invested in its own technical competence and ethos, designed for employment primarily overseas. Schake is just as meticulous about retelling the history of civil-military relations in the United States after these first 100 years, through the modern era and until today, including an entire chapter devoted to the past decade, but notes that these events pale in comparison to the potential threats posed in the early years.

Despite the professionalization of the military that inculcated many of the norms Washington pioneered, the civil-military relationship today is far from perfect. Using historical cases, Schake performs some course-correction on prevailing narratives regarding more recent events in civil-military relations. She provides examples of general officers staying above the political fray and mistakes that general officers have made in attempting to constructively engage in inherently political conversations. Ultimately, it is the civilian leadership’s responsibility to make and own strategic decisions. For example, while H.R. McMaster wrote that military officers were derelict in their duty to push back on bad civilian strategy during the Vietnam War, Schake questions whether his preferred approach would be appropriate as civil-military relations advice. 

Instead of outright defiance, the civil-military relationship in the modern era has been mostly characterized by Feaver’s concept of “shirking”—that is, military leadership’s placing bureaucratic obstacles in the way of implementation of civilian political decisions. While military professionals are taught to remain “apolitical,” adept bureaucratic maneuvering is often lauded as an important skill set for senior officers. Military leaders are often called on to navigate political worlds, requiring a more sophisticated understanding of the history and context in which military professionals are operating today. The State and the Soldier is essential reading for any military professional who anticipates an assignment in the National Capital Region or other strategic-level commands requiring engagement with senior civilian leadership. JFQ

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Coast Guard Cutters Munro and Alex Haley steam alongside while patrolling Gulf of Alaska, July 5, 2025 (U.S. Coast Guard/Samika Lewis)

Maritime activity has been a constant feature of the world’s oceans since the development of seafaring capabilities. Whether at peace or at war, nations use the oceans to achieve their national strategic objectives and expand their power projection to the world. The United States is no different, and in the years following World War II, America and its allies enjoyed and continue to enjoy unparalleled access to the maritime domain. Maritime vessels transport millions of tons of cargo daily across the world, bolstering the global economy and commercial trade. This unprecedented access results not from international harmony but from sustained maritime security efforts. In a world of competition, global maritime security oversees this vital aspect of the world’s trade. The maritime domain differs from the other domains in that aspect—the land, air, and space domains remain relatively dormant until activated by conflict and do not require the security needs that the maritime domain does to continue unimpeded activity.

In late 2023, the Red Sea became a focal point in global maritime security, with Houthi forces attacking shipping lanes in the area. The United States produced a swift response; the U.S. Navy launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, bringing together several nations to provide maritime security under Task Force 153’s leadership.¹ The coalition demonstrated sustained effectiveness throughout its control of the operation, with numerous adversary drones, missiles, and small boats destroyed, establishing protective coverage for commercial traffic to continue maritime commerce.² The operation’s success depended significantly on established allied infrastructure in the region. Despite the distance from the United States, the U.S. Navy not only supported but also led the operation to secure continued freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This article argues that establishing a deep-draft port at Nome, Alaska, is now a strategic necessity for U.S. power projection and crisis response in the Arctic and therefore merits immediate joint action by the Department of War (DOW), the Department of Homeland Security, and Congress.

As Arctic sea ice continues to diminish, increased access will likely result in more presence and activity throughout the Arctic region.³ Such circumstances require proportionate operational capabilities to help manage numerous expected challenges, including emergency situations, disaster response, search and rescue, law enforcement issues, resupply and maintenance needs, and many others. The ability to engage with such issues in the maritime environment depends greatly on—if not outright requires—proximity to infrastructure support, as the Red Sea crisis clearly shows. Presence, and the ability to be present quickly, in the maritime domain often determines operational success. Whether in port or steaming into an area of operation, distance matters, even more so in difficult maritime environments. For the Arctic, distances and current U.S. operational maritime surface capabilities continue to be a problem in proportion to increasing activity in the region.

The distance from Anchorage to Nome is 1,334 nautical miles, which translates to about 4 days of travel at 14 knots.⁴ The distance from Seattle to Anchorage is 1,428 nautical miles, about 4.25 days of travel at 14 knots. The distance from Seattle to Nome is 2,500 nautical miles, or about 7.5 days of travel at 14 knots.⁵ And Nome itself remains approximately 150 nautical miles south of the Arctic Circle. Anchorage as a sea line of communication (SLOC) remains a challenge given significant daily tidal change, which requires effective timing, often extending delays to operational presence. While a deepwater port at Nome cannot replace the infrastructure role of homeports, its presence could change the ability to facilitate operational maritime presence. For U.S. Arctic-related national security interests, a deepwater port in Nome would change the Arctic maritime operational calculus by becoming an established SLOC.

Figure 1. Map of Sail Distances and Times

Source: Authors modified from Google Maps

Sea Lines of Communication

Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that a nation’s ability to project power and safeguard commerce ultimately hinges on assured access to SLOCs—whoever “holds the sea” can decide both the tempo and geography of conflict.⁶ Julian Corbett refined this insight, noting that maritime control is rarely absolute and therefore concentrates on focal areas—narrow passages and logistic nodes where fleeting command can yield decisive advantage.⁷ In the 21st-century Arctic, the Bering Strait and the chokepoint at 75° N along the Northern Sea Route constitute precisely such focal areas: each funnels traffic through a corridor less than 55 nautical miles wide, easing both interdiction and rapid reinforcement. As seasonal ice recedes and Russian “bastion” patrols increase, sustaining American and allied freedom of movement will depend less on nominal blue-water superiority and more on the timely establishment of forward-support nodes that mitigate Arctic time-distance constraints. Taken together, Mahan’s call for sustained SLOC access and Corbett’s focus on focal-area control underscore that a deep-draft port in the Bering Region is indispensable to closing the Arctic response gap.

Geopolitically, SLOCs play a significant role in the success of nations through trade and freedom of the seas. In peacetime, SLOCs function as the main mode of transporting commerce, with 90 percent of trade moved by sea.⁸ Nicholas Spykman’s America’s Strategy in World Politics discusses the importance of SLOCs at length in the perspective of the United States. Written in 1942, the seminal work recognizes that one of the greatest U.S. aspirations in becoming a global superpower was securing control of all oceanic coastal routes and interior lines of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific.⁹ Achieving this control, the United States and its allies enjoyed significant freedom of navigation through major sea lanes, both commercial and military, in the 20th and 21st centuries, bolstering the global economy and ensuring the continued success of marine transportation. Now, with the Arctic opening, a new sea lane emerges. Changes in transportation routes, and the contests for them, can greatly shift both political and economic power. America now bears a responsibility to protect its new highway emerging in the Bering Strait.

America’s History With SLOCs

American naval supremacy emerged definitively during World War II. The United States successfully operationalized Mahanian and Corbettian theories in the Pacific theater, demonstrating their strategic validity. Both the United States and Japan recognized the importance of SLOCs to achieve their strategic goals. Japan needed to sustain its war effort of Pacific expansion, while the United States sought to limit Japan's capability to do so.¹⁰ While major naval battles took place at the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, and Leyte Gulf, the United States used its Pacific submarine fleet to effectively blockade Japan. With the relentless American attacks on mainland Japan and its commercial traffic, and the Japanese navy’s overextension of its own SLOCs, the Japanese found themselves systematically isolated from their new resources in southeast Asia and with progressively diminishing operational capability to fight the war.¹¹ The sub- marine campaign is credited with the sinking of 1,178 merchant vessels and 214 naval vessels, leading to over 5.6 million tons of sunk Japanese resources.¹² Japan’s goal of a short war was thwarted, and its inability to maintain its overextended SLOCs led to eventual defeat. Thus, the importance of protecting SLOCs became increasingly clear to the United States as well as other countries for future maritime superiority.

The Cold War proved an opportunity for the United States to defend its own SLOCs and attempt to deter the Soviet Union’s use of its own. The Cold War’s strategic mission on sea control appeared simple in this context—the United States needed to move its own military as well as humanitarian and economic supplies through its respective SLOCs while denying such access to the Soviet Union.¹³ How the Navy saw this happening changed from start to finish. The United States initially and incorrectly assumed the Soviet Union wanted a third Battle of the Atlantic and to attack America’s SLOCs; however, the Soviet Navy instead chose to defend its homeland and its capabilities rather than pursue the offensive.¹⁴ While the Soviet Union willingly chose not to attack American SLOCs and to play the defensive, the United States nevertheless bolstered its own SLOC defense in the North Atlantic with the Navy’s 2nd Fleet on patrol to deal with any anti-SLOC risk from the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Fleet effectiveness metrics remain contested as the 2nd Fleet never saw action against its SLOC defense and the Cold War remained mostly cold until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nevertheless, the powerful U.S. Navy, and its presence in the region, defended America’s SLOCs to Europe and guaranteed the safety of allied maritime transit.

Today, SLOCs remain ever critical for the United States and its allies as a major factor in U.S. Navy and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy. The mission of NATO’s Joint Force Command–Norfolk explicitly states that the command will “defend the Strategic Lines of Communications across all domains between Europe and North America.”¹⁶ The 2nd Fleet was initially disbanded in 2011 but then recommissioned in 2018 following concerns about Russia’s resurgence. Partially due to the 2nd Fleet’s presence, the North Atlantic SLOCs remain comfortably secure. The 2nd Fleet can easily access its SLOC nodes and receive maintenance, supplies, and additional support as required for its operations, with major allied ports across its area of operations. The same cannot be said of the North Pacific and Arctic oceans, which until recently were not SLOCs worthy of significant consideration. Now, however, is the time to focus on these oceans, which show significant Russian and Chinese presence and in- creased maritime traffic but do not retain a U.S. Navy or Coast Guard fleet.

Expanded Purpose of SLOCs

To defend a SLOC, as previously mentioned, requires points to provide relief for operators in its area and providing its defense. Both the military and commercial operators seek reprieve in heavy or unexpected weather, in emergencies, and in the face of aggression from adversaries. Furthermore, these points serve an expanded purpose—the support through various other services, such as air support and seabasing assistance, and supporting other national security objectives—and allow greater SLOC defense.

East Coast–based Naval Special Warfare Operator and Norwegian naval special operations commandos test ice thickness next to Los Angeles–class attack submarine USS Hampton to establish landing zone for MH-47G Chinook helicopter assigned to 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) during integration exercise, March 9, 2024, as part of Arctic Edge 24, Arctic Ocean (U.S. Navy/Jeff Atherton)

Expeditionary operations require the creation of forward-operating bases to forward-deploy military units via land, sea, or air. Over the last century, American military success has depended on the ability to send and support expeditionary forces in the defense of security and economic interests.¹⁷ This is vital to the success of an objective in antiaccess warfare, such as SLOC defense. A force that can maneuver over long distances, transition to offense, and fight in difficult conditions gains a significant tactical advantage over adversaries. To do requires a “jumping-off point” from which to coordinate its defense. Nearby SLOC nodes provide perfect locations for forward-operating bases, given their infrastructure and logistical support network. This includes the capacity for increased air forces for both manned and unmanned aircraft if an airfield is available. As a joint network, expeditionary operations support will be successful de- pending on coordinated and reinforced land, air, and sea forces.¹⁸ This is most easily completed through sea control and SLOC defense.

Seabasing follows a similar route of success with the creation of a nearby SLOC node. Seabasing can be defined as the ability of the United States to use the maritime domain in a similar way as other U.S. forces use overseas land bases, which include deterrence, cooperative security, allied support, forward operations, and power projection.¹⁹ Seabasing also requires sea control, which then requires successful SLOC defense. Seabasing thus further extends sea control into the actual maritime domain and becomes crucial in remote environments such as the Arctic Region. Seabasing creates a forward presence and produces a deterrent effect that cannot be achieved from other domains.²⁰ The closest SLOC node, then, becomes the point from which maintenance, supplies, and other forces will support the seabase from shore.

The importance of other nonmilitary factors due to enhanced SLOCs and SLOC nodes in austere environments is also worth consideration. For commercial activities, such as maritime trade or tourism, safe harbors provide welcome shelter from storms; maintenance and repair opportunities; and resupply. For vessels sailing the Transpolar Sea Route or Northwest Passage, no major noncontinental U.S. port exists on the North Pacific side of North America other than Seattle or Anchorage. On the other side of the continent, there is Nuuk, Greenland, or Nanisivik, Canada— which, at present, remains incomplete and technically only for use by the Royal Canadian Navy. This great distance between ports is critical not only for repair purposes but also for search-and-rescue and environmental response capabilities. The Northern Sea Route invites closer ports in the Arctic Ocean, but under the auspices of the Russian Federation. A NATO-aligned Arctic Ocean SLOC node, either supported jointly by Canada and the United States or separately by either nation and shared by allies, would provide a strong safety net for vessels transiting the Arctic Ocean by improving proximity and capability.

The Current State of Arctic SLOC Defense

Analysis of Arctic requirements and the chokepoints requiring SLOC defense demonstrates that the “points” Mahan covered remain fundamental. Mahan specifically notes that distant regions require secure ports for vessels, both commercial and military, to secure the line of communication.²¹ As noted, Alaska does maintain deepwater ports used as SLOC nodes for the North Pacific and Arctic regions. These include Anchorage, Dutch Harbor, and Kodiak. Depending on the size and capabilities of ships, even Seattle is a key SLOC point for the Bering Strait. These facilities contribute to regional operations and help establish a line of communication to the Arctic. The critical deficiency involves SLOC support for operations in the Arctic Ocean itself. The closest American deepwater port to the Arctic Ocean is the Port of Dutch Harbor, over 700 nautical miles south of Nome. For a situation requiring immediate action in the North Bering or Chukchi seas, deployment and response from further south risks operational failure.

The Don Young Port of Alaska in Anchorage is Alaska’s largest port. Owned by the Municipality of Anchorage, the port handles approximately half of all Alaska-inbound freight and enjoys a strong intermodal transit network connecting Alaska’s primary road, rail, pipeline, marine, and air systems.²² Additionally, the port maintains Commercial Strategic Seaport status from the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, making Anchorage 1 of only 18 port cities in the United States designed for force deployment during contingencies and national defense emergencies. The secure port operates year-round and maintains seven berths dredged to 35 feet, supporting commercial and military ships.²³ The port positions itself as America’s premier facility for supporting Arctic shipping routes—a claim that, while currently accurate, obscures significant operational limitations.²⁴ This assertion requires qualification, given the port’s location approximately 1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle.

Another significant concern is the tidal range for Anchorage. The average tidal range in Anchorage is among the most extreme in the United States, with a mean tidal range of over 26 feet.25 This significant tidal variation is mostly due to the shape of Cook Inlet, which intensifies tidal movements as water flows into the narrower portions near Anchorage. The highest tides can exceed 35 feet at peak times, and the lowest ebb tides can drop to just a few feet below base level. This wide range is extremely important for vessels transiting into and out of the port, requiring careful scheduling and adaptation to the tidal cycle. In cases of emergency, hours could easily be lost waiting on the tide to allow vessel movement.

Coast Guard Cutter Stratton transits Glacier Bay, Alaska, August 1, 2024 (U.S. Coast Guard)

As Alaska’s main port of operations, the port cannot always directly provide ready-service fuel for vessels. This includes an instance in which an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer needed its fuel requirement to be met via fuel trucks rather than through the port’s pipeline. A struggle to get marine-grade diesel also added to delays to the destroyer’s operational schedule. Anchorage re- mains an unequivocally strong port for the Gulf of Alaska and remains a key component of the U.S. North Pacific SLOC, but the port is too far away to support the region as the primary port for Arctic SLOC defense.

Approximately 1,000 nautical miles to the southwest of Anchorage, the Amaxnaxˆ Island (also known as Amaknak) is home to the closest U.S. deepwater port to the Arctic Ocean, Dutch Harbor, which is a vital port and SLOC point, hosting major vessels on the Unangam Tanangin (Aleutian Islands). A U.S. Coast Guard favorite for vessels operating in the Bering Sea and beyond, the port hosts six docks ranging in depth from 19 to 50 feet.²⁶ Time-distance calculations, however, reveal Dutch Harbor’s limitations as an Arctic SLOC node. Dutch Harbor lies approximately 700 nautical miles south of Nome and an additional 150 nautical miles south of the Arctic Circle, making the trip a 2-day transit at 15 knots to the northern Bering and Chukchi seas. Additionally, while Dutch Harbor remains the closest deepwater port, as an island the port does not possess the capacity to expand its multimodal functions, locked into marine and air modes of transit.

Both Anchorage and Dutch Harbor are vital to the chain of SLOC defense, but in the case of the capacity to respond effectively and quickly to emergencies in the Arctic Ocean, distance and capabilities—and, in the case of Anchorage, its environment—limit support. Pointedly, there is a significant need for an Arctic deepwater port as a SLOC node. The American Society of Civil Engineers’ most recent Alaska Infrastructure Report Card includes a lengthy discussion of the need for a deepwater Arctic port to accommodate Arctic and sub-Arctic shipping and resource extraction. The report states that an Arctic deepwater port would provide economic development opportunities; decrease the cost of goods; offer safe harbor and protection for vessels in the area; provide vessel repair and maintenance support as well as emergency response facilities; and most important, provide logistical support to vessels operating in the Arctic while raising awareness of the United States as an Arctic nation.²⁷

Although the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, released in 2022, does not outright mention SLOCs, it seems to agree on the need for additional presence and SLOC defense in the region. The first pillar, “Security: Develop Capabilities for Expanded Arctic Activity,” noted as the highest priority, discusses the need to enhance and expand civilian and military capabilities in the Arctic to deter threats and respond to human-made and natural emergencies.²⁸ This includes the strategic objective to advance American military presence in the region, specifically in support of “homeland defense . . . power projection, and deterrence goals.”²⁹ Perhaps most significant, the strategy specifically states that the White House would “support development of a deep draft harbor in Nome” to assist in emergency response times and recovery.³⁰ As previously stated, the current lack of a deepwater port and coastal infrastructure in the region limits the U.S. ability to sustain power projection and support forward-deployed sea and air assets.³¹ The evidence is clear: the United States requires a SLOC node in the Arctic Region.

The Next Arctic SLOC Node: Nome, Alaska

The city of Nome (also known as Sitŋasuaq) on the southern tip of the Seward Peninsula is home to approximately 4,000 Alaskans. Once the most populated city in Alaska, Nome is famous for the 1898 gold rush as well as the annual Iditarod Trail Sled Dog Race. Nome represents America’s most viable option for establishing an Arctic SLOC node. The Port of Nome has seen remarkable growth in the last decade, with increased numbers of private and commercial vessels transiting the Bering Strait using Nome as a resupply port.³²

The port accommodates significant cruise ship traffic, supports 450 regional seafood harvesters, and averaged 7.5 million gallons of petroleum products a year over the past decade.³³ The port’s current depth is around 22 feet in the outer basin, safely accommodating vessels with a draft of 18 feet or less due to tidal variations.³⁴ This significantly inhibits major commercial and military traffic, with larger vessels forced to anchor in the harbor or ignore the port entirely and make way for Dutch Harbor. Nome maintains a regional airport and a significant surrounding road network, but the roads do not access major Alaska road systems.³⁵ The city, its people, and its leadership, which includes the Bering Straits Native Corporation and Sitnasuak Native Corporation, maintain an effective regional logistics center supporting approximately 50 communities in western and northern Alaska. Port expansion would fundamentally transform America’s Arctic SLOC defense capabilities.

The Water Resources Development Act of 2007 authorized a feasibility study into a project to modify the depth of Nome Harbor.³⁶ The final report, released in 2020, recommended a plan to improve navigation access to the port, which included, among other suggestions, a new deepwater basin to a depth of approximately 40 feet at Mean Lower Low Water.³⁷ The report found the expanded port could “improve the viability of numerous Alaska native communities, strengthen the resiliency of the region, and serve as a critical outpost for national security.”³⁸ Since the Army Corps’ report, the expansion discussion has been a controversial topic, with many recognizing the economic, national strategic, and resiliency positives, while also acknowledging the massive alteration to the lives of the people of Nome should the project be completed. Nevertheless, significant positive changes would result from port development. Primarily, larger vessels such as the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreakers and U.S. Navy destroyers and submarines could moor at the outer basin pier, providing a significant, albeit limited logistics hub in an austere and remote environment. The deep-draft port would enable sustained logistical support to these vessels and provide shore-based maintenance, logistics, and training required for SLOC defense and Arctic operations.³⁹ As shown throughout the report, a vessel departing from Nome at standard transit speed of 14 knots could be in the Chukchi Sea in less than half a day to respond to emergencies or defense operations in the Arctic Region. Given Nome’s proximity to the Bering Strait, an infrastructure hub supporting these major assets greatly enhances timely response to national security, environmental, and marine traffic crises.

Additional roles Nome could play are as a forward-deploying base for alternative forces aside from the maritime domain to support SLOC defense—among them, manned and unmanned air support and expeditionary forces—and as a jumping-off point for seabasing farther north into the Arctic Ocean. Infrastructure investments would need to go well beyond expanding the port depth to make Nome a successful SLOC node. Having coastal infrastructure in a remote area of operations enhances multidomain capabilities in the region. To do this would require full Federal, state, tribal, and local government support to transform the city of just under 4,000 into a logistical hub for not only the U.S. military’s increased presence but also an increased commercial presence. This would also likely require further road infrastructure to connect Nome and its surrounding communities to Alaska’s major highways. The Nome community has split opinions on the port expansion, with some advocating for the economic benefit and national strategic importance of the port and the infrastructure buildup, while others believe concerns with chronic social problems in the region, such as housing shortages and substance abuse, take priority and prefer the port to stay as it is.⁴⁰ To make the national strategic objective of Nome as a permanent SLOC node a lasting success, the U.S. Government will need to work closely with stakeholders during the buildup and into its operational period to ensure its longevity.

Seaman Sarah Treacy stands watch on navigation bridge of Coast Guard Cutter Healy as cutter transits Chukchi Sea, June 30, 2025 (U.S. Coast Guard/Steve Strohmaier)

Counterarguments and Comparative Analysis

While the strategic imperative for Arctic infrastructure is clear, legitimate concerns about environmental impact, economic feasibility, and alternative sites merit serious consideration. A rigorous assessment strengthens rather than weakens the case for Nome as America’s Arctic SLOC node.

The Port of Nome expansion project has been stalled by a fundamental mismatch between government cost estimates and actual contractor bids, with the Army Corps of Engineers forced to cancel the initial $662 million solicitation in October 2024 when pricing exceeded statutory procurement limits,⁴¹ leading to a scaled-down Phase 1A approach that reduces scope from 3,500 to 1,200 feet of causeway extension and armor stone from 22 to 18 tons.⁴² The core problem stems from underestimating the true costs of Arctic construction logistics, weather delays, and material transport to remote Alaska locations, compounded by rigid Federal acquisition regulations that prohibit accepting bids more than 25 percent above government estimates, creating a cycle where realistic project costs cannot be legally awarded despite secured funding of $425 million from Federal and state sources.

Environmental assessments identify potential impacts on the Bering Strait region, which hosts critical habitats for sea birds and marine mammals.⁴³ Increased vessel traffic could disrupt subsistence hunting patterns, while dredging operations risk disturbing contaminated sediments from gold rush–era mining. However, the environmental risks of inaction may exceed those of controlled development. Without adequate port infrastructure, vessels anchor offshore in unprotected waters, increasing pollution risk.

Costs continue to cause concern for the project, which is not uncommon for U.S. Arctic infrastructure debates. However, comparative analysis strengthens the economic case for an improved port in Nome. Canada’s Port of Churchill generates $100 million annually despite serving a smaller population.⁴⁴ Iceland’s Akureyri added a new pier in 2019, which continues to help bolster economic opportunities.⁴⁵ Similar effects at Nome would generate significant jobs and revenue, eventually producing positive returns within 8 to 10 years. Notably, Kotzebue and Utqiaġvik (formerly Barrow) advocate leveraging their proximity to Arctic waters as well. However, cost comparisons demonstrate Nome’s decisive advantages. Kotzebue would require $1.2 billion in dredging costs—double Nome’s requirements—plus massive breakwater construction. Utqiaġvik faces 300-percent higher construction costs and ice conditions, limiting navigation to 60 to 90 days annually versus Nome’s 150-plus days. Nome’s existing jet-capable airport, fuel storage, and regional networks provide irreplaceable advantages. Rail extension to Nome would cost $2.1 billion compared to $3.8 billion for Kotzebue. While Utqiaġvik remains economically unfeasible, Kotzebue feasibility studies were discontinued because of coastal erosion rates alone.⁴⁶

The greatest risk lies in continued inaction. Each year allows Russia to consolidate Northern Sea Route control while China maps underwater terrain through “research” voyages. Arctic contingencies without infrastructure upgrades could force disadvantages involving territorial disputes or navigation restrictions. The above analysis suggests that controlled development at Nome could reduce environmental risk while generating positive economic returns. Moreover, alternative sites face insurmountable obstacles that make them unsuitable for timely SLOC development. Most critical, the strategic risks of inaction far exceed manageable development risks. The question is not whether America needs Arctic infrastructure—but whether it will act before competitors make that choice irrelevant.

Policy Recommendations

The October 2024 joint Chinese- Russian patrol in U.S. Arctic waters indicated intent to demonstrate presence where the United States is lacking, representing objectives that facilitate and enable operational capabilities and further strategic competition. The following recommendations provide urgent actions required within 24 months to establish Nome as a critical maritime infrastructure hub.

DOW must designate Nome as a Strategic Arctic Port under the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), unlocking priority funding streams for military specifications.⁴⁷ This notion may initially seem implausible, but based on Maritime Administration NPRN criteria, Nome presents a compelling case for designation as a Strategic Port, particularly given evolving Arctic threats and the DOW’s explicit identification of the Arctic as a strategic priority region. To be sure, the multitude of NPRN criteria–related requirements presents challenges, some demonstrated in this article, and warrants comprehensive analysis. Additionally, DOW can effectively improve presence capabilities through quarterly destroyer visits during ice-free months, while showing allies and adversaries that America can project power into Arctic waters. At a minimum, critical infrastructure substantial capital requirements must include shore power for Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, 15-million-gallon fuel storage, and emergency repair capabilities for Polar Security Cutters.

Coast Guard aviation must deploy to Nome seasonally, and for extended periods of time, reducing Bering Sea and Chukchi Sea rescue response. In 2024, Coast Guard aviation maintained a forward presence in Kotzebue for only 3 weeks, entirely unsatisfactory for the traffic in the neighboring waters. An Arctic Maritime Operations Center is essential to coordinate the 150-plus daily vessel transits now occurring through an essentially unmonitored Bering Strait. Prepositioned spill response equipment and ice-capable rescue vessels would help prevent another disaster on the scale of MV Selendang Ayu in waters where backup is days away.⁴⁸

An additional policy consideration is an executive order establishing an Arctic Infrastructure Task Force, co-chaired by the deputy secretaries of War and Homeland Security, which would break traditional stovepipes that have paralyzed Arctic policy for decades. Such a task force could potentially include representative advisors from the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Canadian Coast Guard. A $50 million Community Impact Fund, managed with Alaska Native Corporations, would address legitimate local concerns about housing, health services, and cultural preservation. Finally, support for public-private partnerships could generate annual funding from cruise ships and transpolar shipping for the purposes of creating sustainable operations funding.

Conclusion

In October 2024, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers canceled the solicitation for the Port of Nome Modification Project’s first phase of construction, citing costs well above statutory cost limits and exceeding allocated funds made available by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.⁴⁹ Only one company placed a bid on the project.⁵⁰ Although the project has not formally been canceled, the project delays frustrate Arctic policy experts who recognize the region’s escalating geopolitical significance. As countries such as China and Russia continue to expand their presence in the region, the United States once again finds itself lagging in the Arctic. Protecting the “great highways” that Rear Admiral Mahan articulated over 100 years ago proved the basis for American success at sea since World War II. SLOC defense ensured success during the Cold War and continues to deter adversaries across the globe today.

Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter crew lowers hoisting cable to crew members on flight deck of Coast Guard Cutter Alex Haley while underway in Bering Sea, April 8, 2024 (U.S. Coast Guard/John Hightower)

In regions where commercial and military maritime activity increases at an expeditious rate, the United States especially must maintain the capability to control the newfound SLOCs, sustain freedom of navigation, and deter adversaries from harming U.S. national strategic interests. As the new North Pacific and Arctic SLOCs open, evidence suggests the current U.S. SLOC nodes in Alaska and elsewhere cannot support the sustained presence, proximity, or capability required to successfully react to emergencies in the High North, be they environmental, lifesaving, or security- based in nature. Expanding the Port of Nome for U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and commercial use would significantly enhance America’s ability to protect the region as a key SLOC hub. The ability to eliminate days’ worth of travel to respond to events and the capability to use different domains suddenly made available through an increased infrastructure presence would show the United States is serious about its role as an Arctic nation.

The October 2024 solicitation failure should serve as a catalyst for renewed urgency rather than resignation. Congressional appropriators, defense planners, and Arctic stakeholders must recognize that the cost of inaction—measured in permanent loss of Arctic access and freedom of navigation—justifies the infrastructure investment required. The strategic arithmetic is straightforward: an investment today prevents far more expensive strategic disadvantages tomorrow. Through coordinated action among the city of Nome, its corresponding Alaska Native Corporations, and the State of Alaska, the U.S. Government can create a new SLOC node in Nome that will support the national strategic objectives within America’s Arctic maritime domain. JFQ

Notes

¹ Joseph Clark, “U.S., Partners Committed to Defensive Operations in Red Sea,” DOD News, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3631623/us-partners-committed-to-defensive-operations-in-red-sea/.

² Clark, “U.S., Partners Committed to Defensive Operations in Red Sea.”

³ Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Arctic Interests,” n.d., https://www.gao.gov/u.s.-arctic-interests.

⁴ Distances Between United States Ports, 2025 (14th) ed. (Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2025), https://nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/publications/docs/distances.pdf.

⁵ “Sea Route from Port of Nome, United States, to Port of Seattle, United States,” Ports, n.d., http://ports.com/sea-route/port-of- nome,united-states/port-of-seattle,united- states/#/?a=0&b=0&c=Port%20of%20 Nome,%20United%20States&d=Port%20of%20Seattle,%20United%20States.

⁶ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Company, 1892), 25.

⁷ Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longsman, Green, and Co., 1911), 91.

⁸ Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 8.

⁹ Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1942), 79.

¹⁰ G.H. Pearsall, The Effects of The World War II Submarine Campaigns of Germany and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA283407.pdf.

¹¹ Daniel E. Benere, A Critical Examination of the U.S. Navy’s Use of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in the Pacific Theater During WWII (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA253241.pdf.

¹² Benere, A Critical Examination of the U.S. Navy’s Use of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in the Pacific Theater During WWII.

¹³ John H. Noer, Maritime Economic Interests & the Sea Lines of Communication Through the South China Sea: The Value of Trade in Southeast Asia, with David Gregory (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA362458.pdf.

¹⁴ Bradford Dismukes, “The Return of Great-Power Competition: Cold War Lessons About Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 3 (Summer 2020), 33–58, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48739548.

¹⁵ Dismukes, “The Return of Great-Power Competition,” 42.

¹⁶ Joint Force Command–Norfolk, n.d., “About Us,” https://jfcnorfolk.nato.int/about-us.

¹⁷ Trent J. Lythgoe, “An Army Overseas Expeditionary Maneuver Through the Maritime Domain,” Military Review (March– April 2018), 72–80, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2018/Lythgoe-Maneuver-through-Maritime/.

¹⁸ Lythgoe, “An Army Overseas Expeditionary Maneuver Through the Maritime Domain.”

¹⁹ Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Basing—Concept, Issues, and Recommendations,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), 28–41, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/5.

²⁰ Tangredi, “Sea Basing,” 32.

²¹ Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783, 514.

²² “Port of Alaska,” Don Young Port of Alaska, 2020, https://www.portofalaska.com/wp-content/uploads/PortOfAlaska_fact_sheet_ Sept2020.pdf.

²³ “Port of Alaska.”

²⁴ “About Port of Alaska,” Don Young Port of Alaska, 2023, https://www.portofalaska.com/about-us/.

²⁵ “Tides & Currents,” NOAA, n.d., https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/stationhome.html?id=9455920.

²⁶ “Facilities & Services,” City of Unalaska, Alaska, n.d., https://www.ci.unalaska.ak.us/portsandharbors/page/facilities-services.

²⁷ Report Card for Alaska’s Infrastructure 2021 (Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2021), https://infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2021-Alaska-Report-Card_Final.pdf.

²⁸ National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf.

²⁹ National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

³⁰ National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

³¹ Troy J. Bouffard and Edward M. Soto, “U.S. Arctic Deepwater Port: Value-Added Capabilities in Support of National Security,” in On Thin Ice?: Perspectives on Arctic Security, ed. Duncan Depledge and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Peterborough, Ontario: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2021), 109, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Depledge-Lackenbauer-On-Thin-Ice-final-upload.pdf.

³² “Nome: The Nation’s Arctic Port,” City of Nome, Alaska, https://www.nomealaska.org/sites/default/files/fileattachments/port_of_nome/page/1981/pon_brochure_-_2025_ revised_1.pdf.

³³ “Nome.”

³⁴ “Port of Nome Modification Project,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, n.d., https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Library/Reports-and-Studies/Port-of-Nome-Modification-Project/.

³⁵ “Port of Nome Modification Project.”

³⁶ Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–114, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 8, 2007, 22, https://www.congress.gov/110/ plaws/publ114/PLAW-110publ114.pdf.

³⁷ Memorandum by Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Port of Nome Modifications, Nome, Alaska,” May 29, 2020, https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/publicreview/portofnome/ SIGNEDChiefsReportPortofNome20200529.pdf?ver=2020-06-02-190412-287.

³⁸ Memorandum by Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite, 2.

³⁹ Bouffard and Soto, “U.S. Arctic Deepwater Port,” 110.

⁴⁰ Emily Schwing, “‘Like a Highway Going Right Past Us’: Nome Grapples With Its Future as Arctic Shipping Traffic Increases,” Alaska Public Media, October 24, 2023, https://alaskapublic.org/2023/02/23/like-a-highway-going-right-past-us-nome-grapples-with-its-future-as-arctic-shipping-traffic-increases/.

⁴¹ Diana Haecker, “Port of Nome Project on Ice as Corps Cancels Call for Contractor Bids, Nome Nugget, October 17, 2024, https://www.nomenugget.com/news/port-nome-expansion-project-ice-corps-cancels-call-contractor-bids.

⁴² Tim Newcomb, “Port of Nome Modification Project Returns With Scaled Down Phasing,” ENRWest, March 17, 2025, https://web.archive.org/ web/20250725200231/https://www.enr.com/articles/60466-port-of-nome-modification-project-returns-with-scaled-down-phasing.

⁴³ Kathy J. Kuletz et al., “Seasonal Spatial Patterns in Seabird and Marine Mammal Distribution in the Eastern Chukchi and Western Beaufort Seas: Identifying Biologically Important Pelagic Areas,” Progress in Oceanography 136 (August 2015), 175–200, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. pocean.2015.05.012.

⁴⁴ Dave Baxter, “Port of Churchill Expanding and Expecting Business to Boom,” The Winnipeg Sun, March 3, 2025, https://winnipegsun.com/news/provincial/port-of-churchill-expanding-and-expecting-business-to-boom.

⁴⁵ “Akureyri,” World Ports Directory, n.d., https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/akureyri.

⁴⁶ “Termination Letter Report—Kotzebue Harbor Feasibility Study, Navigation Improvements at Cape Blossom, Kotzebue, Alaska (0130789),” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers–Alaska District, February 11, 2020, https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/publicreview/kotzebueharbor/KotzebueTerminationLetterReportFeb2020.pdf.

⁴⁷ National Port Readiness Network, U.S. Department of Transportation–Maritime Administration, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/national-port-readiness-network-nprn.

⁴⁸ David Rosen, “AST3 Bean and the Selendang Ayu Disaster 20 Years Ago!” National Coast Guard Museum, January 15, 2025, https://nationalcoastguardmuseum.org/articles/selendang-ayu/.

⁴⁹ Alex DeMarban, “$663M Arctic Port Delayed, Frustrating Nome Officials and Alaska Congressional Delegation,” Anchorage Daily News, October 29, 2024, https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2024/10/29/663m-arctic-port-delayed-frustrating-nome-officials-and-alaska-congressional-delegation/.

⁵⁰ DeMarban, “$663M Arctic Port Delayed, Frustrating Nome Officials and Alaska Congressional Delegation.”

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Army UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter crew chiefs with Charlie Company, Detachment 2, 1-171st General Support Aviation Battalion, 57th Troop Command, New Jersey Army National Guard, conduct medical evacuation training with combat medics with 1st Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment, 44th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, New Jersey Army National Guard, at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, November 7, 2023 (New Jersey National Guard/Mark C. Olsen)

An update and integration of our military medical strategy is needed before the next large conflict. In the current lull between major conflicts, much discussion has been generated regarding the next fight, which is postulated to be quite different than the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This predicted large-scale large numbers of expected casualties not seen since the mid-20th century.¹ It is expected that the next LSCO will generate thousands of casualties in the opening days and stress the U.S. combat operation (LSCO) battle will health-care system. Casualty evacuation will present new challenges. The scope and scale of the conflict will require a greater level of coordination between military and civilian healthcare systems to aid the large numbers of expected casualties. Old lessons can be revamped, however, and innovation is needed. Recognition of our healthcare system as a national security asset is required.

The historical “rear area” of past conflicts may not exist in the predicted modern conflict.² Long-range munitions and multidomain operations (satellites, long-range reconnaissance) will expand the combat zone where the enemy can be targeted. Casualties will need to be evacuated quickly and for longer distances until they are in a safe zone and definitive care can be rendered. Sustainment (under which medical support falls), logistics, and resupply have always been recognized as vitally important in winning a war.³ With this being the case, the foe will target these key features if it can. Medical assets may not enjoy the protection they have had in past conflicts.

Casualty evacuation is largely a logistical problem and thus depends on logistic supply lines. If a Servicemember is injured in a conflict at the front line, ideally, he or she would immediately be removed from the line of fire, be triaged, and receive first aid from a medic or corpsman. Casualty collection points right off the front line will be established where more triage, treatment, and casualty movement to higher levels of care will occur—within minutes if possible. If immediate movement is not possible or is constrained, medics will need to provide prolonged care in the field until evacuation is possible. Moreover, recognizing that uncontested air space might not exist during a LSCO fight, “prolonged field care” is being taught and encouraged. This training assumes that a medic will need to take care of a casualty or casualties for potentially days before they are able to be evacuated to a role of care such as a battalion aid station (Role I) or equivalent with more medical and lifesaving capability. However, medics will need to resist the urge to consolidate and congregate with other medics’ casualty collection points to avoid being targeted.⁴

Current numbers of dedicated military casualty evacuation platforms are likely inadequate and would be overwhelmed by the number of casualties in a LSCO conflict.⁵ Other means of casualty evacuation will be employed. Necessity will dictate that anything that rolls, floats, drives, or flies will be considered and utilized. Casualties will become an important priority of movement for logistical resupply operations. Supplies will go forward, and casualties will come back. Whether it is an Air Force Air Mobility Command aircraft, Navy Military Sealift Command ship, or Army 5-ton truck, cargo will go out and patients will come in. Any platform used for logistics may be pressed into casualty evacuation service. Medical planners will need to become intimately familiar with an area of operation’s main supply routes, alternate supply routes’ resupply, and retrograde timetables. They will need to know the number and types of vehicles used in the supply convoy.

Medical planners within a fighting unit will estimate the number of expected casualties from a pending battle. They will calculate how many casualties can be evacuated and at what times from preplanned resupply packages and rank them within the priority-of-movement system. Casualties will be loaded on to trucks, flatbeds, and other vehicles coming back from a battle after they drop off their supplies. Casualties will be put on ships, planes, trains, or any other means of transportation being used by logistics. Using these preplanned logistical resupply schedules, medical officers can predict how many casualties could potentially be evacuated from a given area. This medical information gives commanders the ability to compare how many casualties could potentially be evacuated with the estimated casualty numbers from pending battles and help inform decisions on where to attack.

Nonstandard casualty evacuation platforms will be utilized and should be included in our current military exercise scenarios. All civilian modes of transportation should be considered. If a contested area has a robust rail network, medical planners should know how many casualties could potentially be evacuated using trains and coordinate their use if needed. If a contested area has a system of domestic ferries to move people and supplies in peacetime, medical planners should calculate how many casualties could be moved using these platforms. If there is an extensive network of canals or rivers (for example, in Europe), the number of potential casualties using these evacuation routes should be calculated.

Civilian passenger jets have the potential to be retrofitted to transport casualties as well.⁶ The current military medical casualty evacuation system—field ambulances or medical helicopters to a C-17 or C-130 transport aircraft, to a medical ship, or to a fixed medical facility—will be quickly overwhelmed and prove inadequate during a LSCO fight. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a Department of Transportation and Department of War (DOW) program in which U.S. civilian airlines volunteer their aircraft during a national defense crisis.⁷ It has been activated three times since it was established in 1951 and was last used in 2021 to evacuate U.S. citizens and personnel, Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and other at-risk individuals from Afghanistan.⁸

In regions like the Indo-Pacific, watercraft casualty evacuation may become the primary mode in contested airspace. Navy and Army transport vessels will be pressed into service for casualty evacuation and ad hoc treatment platforms. The Navy, in anticipation of this scenario, is purchasing fast ferries and retrofitting them into medical treatment and transport platforms.⁹ These will expand and diversify military medical capabilities as well as increase survivability via speed and agility. The current hospital ships, USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, are large, slow, and vulnerable.

Dispersion is key to survival on the battlefields of the future. Any congregations of personnel or equipment will be under threat if they are larger than the enemy’s targeting threshold and stationary long enough for fires against them to be calculated and executed. This expanded area of conflict resulting from the introduction of long-range precision munitions will mean that all casualty care will need to be mobile, which means smaller and more mobile than current doctrine dictates.¹⁰

Army Specialist Jazmyne Wanger, combat medic specialist with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Pennsylvania National Guard, tends to simulated wounded soldier while HH-60 Black Hawk helicopter draws near pickup site during air medevac exercise at Grafenwoehr Training Area, October 11, 2024 (U.S. Army National Guard/Leanne Demboski)

Role I aid stations, the most far-forward medical capability, will need to be exceptionally mobile and move frequently to avoid being targeted. The larger Role II aid stations will also need to be mo- bile and frequently moved if they are to provide far-forward medical and surgical capabilities without being targeted.¹¹ Many of our current Role I and Role II combat medical aid stations are not designed to be agile or mobile. As such, they will need to be set up far outside the much larger combat zones of the future to avoid being targeted. In turn, these stations will become less relevant to their mission of providing intermediate care and salvage surgery en route to the next tier (Role III) medical care facility as they encroach on the safe spaces this next tier occupies as well. During our more recent conflicts, casualties frequently bypassed Role II forward surgical capabilities and were taken to Role III facilities for more definitive surgery when casualty evacuation was expeditious.¹² Highly agile medical assets will increase survivability and give commanders more options as they perform risk analysis for medical coverage within combat zones. If the appropriate threshold for survivability of precious surgical/medical assets cannot be obtained within the future combat zone, rapid casualty evacuation becomes even more critical.

The tactical realities of the future battlefield need to inspire strategic medical requirements now. Our current tactical battlefield medical structure will likely not survive within the future expanded combat zone without becoming more agile and mobile. Role I may need to become a single tent that can be put up and taken down in minutes, coupled with a 5-ton truck that can quickly move out if needed with everything onboard. Role II may become an expandable 20-foot surgical suite container on the back of a HEMTT (heavy expanded mobility tactical truck), unlike the current complex of several fixed tents with little organic transportation capability. A modular system, with a small mobile base unit of perhaps 10 beds that can scale up and down quickly, will be more survivable and useful than large immobile Role IIs and IIIs. All three Services have versions of expeditionary hospitalization. A LSCO will put interoperability (not necessarily interchangeability) to the test.¹³

Lines of evacuation will coincide with logistical hubs. As casualties flow back from contested theaters of operation, they will coalesce at large military treatment facilities (MTFs). Casualties from European or Middle East theaters will continue to flow to Ramstein Air Base, then to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany or to secondary medical facilities in Europe, such as RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, and then on to Walter Reed/National Capital Region, with overflow to facilities such as Naval Medical Center Portsmouth. Casualties from U.S. Southern Command will flow to San Antonio’s Brooke Army Medical Center. U.S. Indo- Pacific Command casualties will flow through air logistical hubs such as Joint Base Lewis–McChord, where Madigan Army Medical Center is located, and then on to other hubs such as Travis Air Force Base in California, where David Grant USAF Medical Center is located, or to Naval Medical Center San Diego.

Air Force 1st Lieutenant Erin Patinella and Master Sergeant Brandon Fitch, clinical nurse and medical technician, respectively, with 932nd Aeromedical Staging Squadron, treat simulated field casualty during Tactical Combat Casualty Care training for exercise Patriot Medic 25, August 10, 2025, Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana (U.S. Air Force/Noah J. Tancer)

Other lines of evacuation may include bases such as Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, where the 673rd Medical Group is based. Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii may become the logistical/casualty line of evacuation hub for those coming by sea. Casualties will be treated, triaged, and dispositioned. Some of these casualties will then be moved and dispersed to their unit’s base treatment facility or locations close to their homes of record for long-term recuperation and be under the care of their local medical facilities. Many of these medical facilities will be civilian. This system already exists on a small scale, such as Army Soldier Recovery Units, but will need to be vastly expanded and jointly applied during a LSCO fight.¹⁴ The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) will be a major player in the long-term treatment of LSCO casualties.

There will be a large shift in medical providers within the abovementioned areas with large MTFs. Active-duty medical personnel will deploy downrange. Guard and Reserve medical providers will be called up either to deploy directly to the contested theater of operation or to be assigned to backfill those Active-duty medical personnel who are deployed. This Guard and Reserve activation will have a large effect on both the civilian and VA health-care facilities within these population centers. Currently, 55 percent of the Army’s operational medical personnel are located within the Guard and Reserve.¹⁵ Their mobilization will create large gaps in these communities’ civilian health-care capabilities. This may accelerate the triage, disposition, and dispersion of casualties to their homes of record more widely distributed across the United States, better sharing the patient/casualty medical care load. Small community health-care centers will be essential to the medical war effort. Every able-bodied medical provider in even the smallest towns will thus become an important contributor to the National Military Medical Care System. National strategies to rectify impending physician shortages deserve greater emphasis within this context of national health security.¹⁶

The nature of health care as a strategic national asset was starkly revealed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It served as a wake-up call to the type of mobilization and civil-military partnering that is required to provide medical care in times of emergency. During the COVID-19 crisis, state governments mobilized their respective National Guard units to augment their overwhelmed medical systems. This did not always mean mobilized medical personnel. Nonmedical National Guardsmen were activated and deployed to rural clinics to serve as clerks or nonmedical attendants to alleviate overburdened staff.¹⁷ The USNS Comfort and a Department of Defense–manned care facility within the Javits Convention Center were mobilized in New York City. To preserve and sustain these civilian-military relationships, periodic exercises among the civilian, VA, and military health-care systems should be conducted.

Exercises should start with the large DOW MTFs. Conduct tabletop exercises with a scenario that involves the entire military, VA, civilian health care, and support-service sector in the area. What happens if most of the Active-duty medical staff are deployed overseas? What happens when the Guard and Reserve medical personnel are activated and deployed overseas or tasked to backfill for those who deployed overseas? Who is left to take care of the civilian population? What services can safely be curtailed? During the COVID-19 pandemic, health-care services were restricted to essential-only in many areas of the country. In a wartime environment where thousands of casualties are arriving at large MTFs daily, similar health service degradations may occur in the surrounding area as health-care workers tend the wounded. Having periodic exercises within these communities and war-gaming what would happen in this type of scenario could mitigate the impact of such a situation and galvanize the community better when the scenario unfolds.

A strong national health-care system is critical to our national security. DOW should take a hard look at how it can partner better with the civilian health-care system and VA to expand access and capabilities in the event of a large influx of casualties from a LSCO fight. Ensure there is a reliable chain of care from front-line medic/corpsman to hometown provider by having periodic exercises with the entire health-care system within a community. Start with the communities where large MTFs are located (for example, Puget Sound, National Capital Region, San Antonio, San Diego) and develop the collaborative VA and civilian medical center relationships and muscle memory before the hour of need arises. Additionally, DOW should inculcate rigorous casualty evacuation dilemmas within joint exercises. The use of available non-standard casualty evacuation platforms (for instance, resupply vehicles, trains, ferries, and civilian aircraft) should be encouraged and exercised. Emphasize rapid mobility, dispersion, and medical inter-Service interoperability within the scenario. Drive innovative change by studying the large-scale combat operations of the 20th century and adapting them to those in the 21st century. JFQ

Notes

¹ Mason H. Remondelli et al., “Casualty Care Implications of Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 95, no. 2 (2023), S180–4, https://doi.org/10.1097/ta.0000000000004063.

² Jessica J. Sheets, Army Medical Capacity: Ready to Meet the LSCO Challenge? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, August 20, 2021), https://web.archive.org/web/20250331201945/https://ahec.armywarcollege.edu/documents/Army_Medical_Capacity.pdf.

³ Mark Sander, “Medical Logistics Sustainment in Multidomain Operations,” Army Sustainment, Summer 2023, 30–3, https://asu.army.mil/alog/archive/pb7002303full.pdf.

⁴ Steven G. Schauer et al., “Opinion: The Risks of Prolonged Casualty Care for Conventional Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Task and Purpose, May 9, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/risks-prolonged-casualty-care-large-scale-combat-operations/.

⁵ Sheets, Army Medical Capacity; Andrew Beck and Eric Alexander, “Transition Planning in Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Infantry, Fall 2021, 22–6, https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2021/Fall/pdf/7_Beck.pdf.

⁶ Matthew Fandre, “Medical Changes Needed for Large-Scale Combat Operations: Observations From Mission Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises,” Military Review, May–June 2020, 37–45, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-20/Fandre-Medical-Changes.pdf.

⁷ “Civil Reserve Airfleet,” Department of Transportation, last updated February 23, 2024, https://www.transportation.gov/mission/administrations/intelligence-security-emergency-response/civil-reserve-airfleet-allocations.

⁸ Ian D’Costa, “This Is the Pentagon’s Not- So-Secret Civilian ‘Ghost’ Aircraft Fleet,” We Are the Mighty, March 19, 2021, https://www. wearethemighty.com/mighty-tactical/civilian-reserve-air-fleet-craf/; “Department of Defense Activates Civil Reserve Air Fleet to Assist With Afghanistan Efforts,” Department of Defense, August 22, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2741564/department-of-defense-activates-civil-reserve-air-fleet-to-assist-with-afghanis/.

⁹ Army Recovery Care Program, https://www.arcp.army.mil.

¹⁰ Fandre, “Medical Changes Needed for Large-Scale Combat Operations.”

¹¹ Howard Altman, “The Navy’s First Medical Ship in 35 Years Will Be Unlike Any Before It,” The War Zone, April 29, 2022, https://www.twz.com/the-navys-first-medical-ship-in-35-years-will-be-unlike-any-before-it.

¹² “Department of Defense Activates Civil Reserve Air Fleet to Assist With Afghanistan Efforts.”

¹³ Joseph F. Rappold, “FRSS Teams: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 133, no. 2 (2007), https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2007/february/frss-teams-good-idea-whose-time-has-passed; Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.71, Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) and Air Force Theater Hospital (AFTH) (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, August 27, 2014), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_sg/publication/afttp3-42.71/afttp3-42.71.pdf.

¹⁴ Michael F. LaBrecque and Michael Honsberger, “Army Field Hospitals and Expeditionary Hospitalization,” Army Sustainment, September–October 2018, https://alu.army.mil/alog/2018/sepoct18/pdf/210113.pdf.

¹⁵ Matthew K. Marsh and Ryan L. Hampton, “Army Medicine’s Critical Role in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Enable the Force,” Military Review, July–August 2022, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/PDF-UA-docs/Marsh-and-Hampton-UA.pdf.

¹⁶ Steven W. Ainsworth and John A. Stokes, Jr., “The Multiple Dimensions of Talent in the Army Reserve Soldier,” Army Sustainment, July–August 2018, https://alu.army.mil/alog/2018/julaug18/pdf/206867.pdf.

¹⁷ David J. Skorton, “AAMC Report Reinforces Mounting Physician Shortage,” Association of American Medical Colleges, press release, June11, 2021, https://www.aamc.org/news/press-releases/aamc-report-reinforces-mounting-physician-shortage.

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Senior Airman Chase Anderson, 168th Cyberspace Operations Squadron cyber warfare operator, Iowa Air National Guard, works on network defense during International Cyber Defense Competition, February 22, 2025, at Iowa State University in Ames, Iowa (U.S. Air National Guard/Michael J. Kelly)

In December 2020, the United States experienced one of the most sophisticated cyber espionage attacks in its history: the SolarWinds supply chain breach. Information technology (IT) management software from the company SolarWinds was compromised by the introduction of malware through its network performance monitoring platform. The attackers, identified as being from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, accessed the infrastructure of numerous organizations, including U.S. Government agencies and private-sector companies, compromising sensitive data. The prolonged infiltration of critical systems revealed notable deficiencies in existing deterrence strategies.¹

This incident parallels other historical espionage cases, such as Operation Ivy Bells during the Cold War, in which U.S. intelligence operatives covertly intercepted Soviet underwater communications cables for years without detection.² These examples illustrate a recurring challenge: both cyber and traditional intelligence special operations frequently evade conventional deterrence measures. The question that motivates this research is how the deterrent effects of cyber operations and their potential failures relate to the deterrent effects of traditional intelligence special operations.

These activities exhibit similarities both in execution and impact. Like special operations, cyber activities often rely on espionage, sabotage, and subversion to destabilize adversaries without escalating to large-scale conflict. In this article, subversion denotes a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority, integrity, and constitution of an established order, without the need for violence or overthrow, such as through propaganda and disinformation campaigns.³ Retaliatory measures in both cases are generally tacit, based on implicit understandings of acceptable behaviors and exceptionally pre-agreed or normed, which complicate the establishment of clear boundaries. This raises the question of whether current deterrence frameworks can adequately address the evolving nature of these covert threats.

From a different perspective, this article examines a key issue in security studies: the possible causes of the failures of current deterrence strategies in cyberspace, focusing on their similarity to traditional intelligence special operations that were characteristic of the Cold War but continue to exist today. These operations may occur during periods of peace, tension, or competition, where they are employed to destabilize adversaries without escalating into armed conflict, or during times of war, where these tactics are adapted to support broader military campaigns. Despite countermeasures, both cyber and covert operations persistently evade state defenses, achieving tactical objectives that often challenge traditional understandings of deterrence. This study aims to contribute to the practice of cyber deterrence and security policy by demonstrating how these historical lessons can inform contemporary strategies.

Theoretical Foundations of Deterrence

According to Thomas Schelling, the aim of deterrence is to prevent or discourage an opponent from acting through fear or doubt. It involves diverting action through the fear of consequences.⁴ For Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, deterrence is a strategic interaction where a rational actor weighs costs and benefits based on expected adversary behavior. Deterrence is effective when a potential aggressor concludes that the costs of attack outweigh the benefits, making restraint the more advantageous option.⁵

During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger argued that deterrence is a combination of power, the willingness to use it, and the aggressor’s perception of these factors. This relationship can be summarized as follows:

where D represents deterrence, Pc refers to power or the instrumental capability to retaliate, Wr is the will and resolve of the deterrer to act, and Pb is the aggressor’s perception and belief regarding the deterrer’s commitment to act. If any factor is zero, deterrence fails. Strength is ineffective without the will to apply it, and it fails if the aggressor doubts the credibility of the threat.⁶ Kissinger also suggests that retaliation should focus on not only destroying military capabilities but also affecting the adversary’s social substance.⁷

Additionally, Schelling describes how the effectiveness of threats depends on their credibility and severity. He emphasizes that responses must be severe enough to deter the adversary.⁸ He also introduces the role of “tacit agreements,” which are implicit understandings be- tween conflicting parties about acceptable behavior. These agreements establish unspoken boundaries that can prevent unnecessary escalation by clarifying expectations for conduct.⁹

The concept of tacit agreements underscores the importance of clarity and proportionality in responses, which are vital for maintaining stability. An excessively severe retaliation without a clear connection to the initial act of aggression may provoke further conflict. This reflects a central dilemma in deterrence theory: the challenge of balancing severity with credibility to ensure deterrence without triggering escalation.

The evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy—from massive retaliation, where any act of aggression would be met with an overwhelming nuclear response, to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), where both parties face annihilation in a nuclear attack—illustrates strategic shifts in deterrence. The later introduction of tailored deterrence emphasizes the need to adjust responses based on the adversary’s specific capabilities and behavior, ensuring a proportional and credible response. This highlights the critical role of proportionality in avoiding unnecessary escalation.¹⁰

Deterrence theory has evolved to ad- dress the complexities of modern hybrid threats. It combines traditional military strategies with new forms of influence, such as cyber operations, information warfare, and economic coercion, emphasizing the importance of diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, technological superiority, credible military threats, and strategic communication. This holistic approach aims to establish a robust deterrent posture, ensuring credible and effective responses to a diverse range of threats in an increasingly interconnected conflict environment.¹¹

Special Operations and Deterrence

Special operations refer to state activities that differ from both diplomacy and conventional military actions, conducted as a “third option” between inaction and direct military engagement.¹² For the United States, these covert actions aim to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad while concealing government involvement.¹³ This work specifically considers special operations as those involving espionage, sabotage, and subversion—activities that have clear parallels in cyberspace—and is typically linked to strategic or military intelligence efforts and often executed by specialized agencies. Generally, these operations, whether conducted in peacetime or during conflict, fall into two main categories: those that require covert infrastructure for secure command and control by intelligence services, and short-term tactical operations planned by special forces and coordinated through military command structures and procedures.¹⁴

Technical Sergeant Andres Coronado, Space Delta 6, Detachment 1, cyber operator, from Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado, participates in Cyber Kauai Innovative Readiness Training mission in County of Kauai’s Emergency Operations Center, May 21, 2025 (U.S. Air Force/Rachelle Morris)

Despite the significant role of special operations in conflict dynamics, academic research exploring their deterrent impact remains limited. While it is not the purpose of this article to systematically investigate the reasons behind the lack of academic interest in this question—which undoubtedly deserves deeper analysis in the future—we can speculate that this lack of attention might be due to the classified nature of these missions, which restricts data access and minimizes the publicity of results; a possible tendency to focus on diplomacy and conventional military strategies; or the secrecy and possible lack of visible impact of covert operations, as is characteristic of military actions.

However, a recent study explores how special operations can serve as forms of “strategic disruption” that fall short of open warfare to deter escalation.¹⁵ These operations, conducted within indirect or low-intensity conflicts among major powers and their proxies, are reminiscent of Cold War dynamics and suggest a promising area for future research into the deterrent capabilities of special operations.

While this article focuses primarily on the military’s role in strategic disruption, it also highlights the potential of nonmilitary instruments within national power to contribute to these efforts. The study draws on extensive analysis of historical cases of special operations conducted by diverse nation-state military and intelligence organizations, suggesting insights applicable to activities involving espionage, sabotage, and subversion, which are planned and/or conducted by strategic or military intelligence agencies. These operations are significantly important in achieving favorable strategic outcomes without escalating to war.

Disruption campaigns aim to create strategic opportunities, impeding adversaries from achieving objectives and safeguarding national interests in diplomacy, information, military, and economic realms. This aligns with integrated deterrence, where military and nonmilitary instruments work together to sustain strategic advantage in competitive contexts. It explains that these disruptive campaigns do not need to produce strategic effects in and of themselves and highlights their unique potential to frustrate adversarial competitive objectives, particularly in situations where conventional deterrence alone proves insufficient to achieve similar outcomes. Consequently, strategic disruption campaigns, whether conducted by military or nonmilitary forces, seek to obstruct adversarial strategies and decisionmaking, imposing costs, creating dilemmas, and maintaining competitive advantage without resorting to armed conflict.

Similarly, special operations involving espionage, sabotage, or subversion conducted by strategic or military intelligence agencies could create favorable conditions for strategic influence, thereby supporting traditional deterrence efforts.

Understanding the repercussions of uncovered intelligence operations and the likely responses of targeted states is crucial for assessing their deterrent effect. Historical precedents suggest that espionage rarely leads to armed conflict. Such operations can lead to diplomatic protests, expulsions, eventual executions, persona non grata declarations, and the loss or turning of assets.¹⁶ Furthermore, these situations may result in trials, detentions, or imprisonment. Likewise, declassified cases indicate that sabotage and subversion rarely escalate into full conflict.

One example is the 1982 Farewell Dossier, where a U.S. strategic intelligence operation exploited Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology. The dossier, provided by a KGB defector codenamed “Farewell,” detailed Soviet intelligence’s extensive industrial espionage activities. In response, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched a counterintelligence operation, planting flawed technology—which would eventually trigger malfunctions—within equipment that the Soviet Union sought to acquire for its infrastructure. The incident caused a catastrophic explosion on a Siberian gas pipeline. This explosion led to significant economic setbacks for the Soviet Union without triggering a direct military confrontation. This case shows how strategic sabotage, when carefully calibrated, can inflict considerable harm without escalating into outright war.¹⁷

Similarly, the Soviet Union’s Cold War “active measures” campaign sought to manipulate public opinion, influence politics, and destabilize rival states through disinformation, clandestine media operations, and forged documents. Tactics included spreading false narratives about Western leaders, inciting social tensions, and planting doubt about U.S. intentions. These measures aimed to exploit societal divisions, undermining trust in democratic institutions and weakening alliances. While they fueled political turmoil in various countries, including in the United States, these operations remained largely below the threshold of direct military engagement, illustrating how calculated subversive efforts could exert significant influence without escalating into major conflict.¹⁸

These cases suggest that sabotage and subversion were integral to broader strategic competition, illustrating their effectiveness in undermining adversaries without resorting to overt war. The limited repercussions observed may stem from tacit agreements on acceptable boundaries and reprisals, which influence state decisions regarding covert operations. As discussed, when states anticipate minimal consequences, they are less deterred from conducting such operations and may use them to complement their overall deterrence strategy. Conversely, when targeted states understand that responses will be limited by these tacit agreements, their ability to deter further operations may be restricted.

Cyber Operations and Deterrence Framework

While special operations and deterrence remain less explored, cyber deterrence has garnered substantial attention, likely due to early-21st-century fears of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.”¹⁹ This perceived threat involved catastrophic impacts on critical infrastructures, such as power grids, financial systems, and even military or social networks. Consequently, the concept of cyberwar as a unique form of warfare within cyberspace gained prominence, fueling further academic interest in cyber deterrence strategies.²⁰

This analysis defines cyber operations as including cyberattacks, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns in cyber-space. A cyberattack deliberately targets a computer system’s integrity, availability, or confidentiality through malicious software, deceptive tactics, or vulnerabilities in software, hardware, or network configurations. The aim is to gain access, damage or steal information, and/or degrade, disrupt, or block the functioning of such systems. This definition excludes electromagnetic warfare techniques, which exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, and hybrid warfare activities, which could combine cyber operations with kinetic force.²¹

Martin Libicki highlights unique challenges in cyber deterrence, particularly in attributing cyberattacks, a task that becomes more complex when proxies are involved. He suggests a combination of retaliation threats, active defense, and regulation to deter the usage of cyber weapons. The distinction is made between strategic cyberwarfare—operating solely in cyberspace, avoiding violence, and remaining sub rosa—and operational cyberwarfare, where cyberattacks support military actions. Questions such as “Do we know who did it?” “Can we hold their assets at risk?” and “Can we do it repeatedly?” illustrate the complexities of cyber deterrence. Libicki also highlights that, unlike conventional shows of force, real cyberattacks are often needed to demonstrate deterrent capacity, introducing added uncertainty.²²

More recently, Libicki highlights the uncertain effects of cyberattacks resulting from their unpredictable outcomes in comparison to traditional weapons. He states that cyberattacks aimed at espionage, sabotage, and subversion can harm adversaries but argues that cyber deterrence is most effective when integrated with other methods, such as kinetic deterrence. He notes that reliance solely on cyber operations for deterrence is limited because of their unpredictable impact.²³

Joseph Nye sees cyber deterrence as uniquely challenging compared to conventional and nuclear deterrence and emphasizes the difficulties of attribution. In addition to punishment and denial through defense to deter aggression, two political factors play a crucial role: entanglement, where economic interdependence raises potential costs for attackers, and normative taboos, which involve ethical and reputational considerations that deter aggression. Consequently, effective deterrence here depends on various factors, including the method of implementation (threats of punishment, defense, entanglement, or norms), the nature of the adversary (state or nonstate), and the type of action being deterred (for example, use of force or economic sanctions). While this multidimensional approach aligns with the broader concept of hybrid deterrence mentioned earlier, Nye’s framework remains circumscribed to cyberspace, describing how hybrid deterrence strategies can also be applied specifically within this domain.²⁴

Nye also argues that cyber weapons have thus far proved more effective for signaling or creating confusion than for causing physical destruction. He suggests that we may be looking in the wrong direction, as the real danger lies in the gray zone of hostility—conflict below the threshold of conventional war—where rapid and inexpensive digital disinformation can confuse and divide adversaries, making cyberattacks the perfect weapon for warfare below the level of armed conflict.²⁵

Additionally, the concept of strategic disruption in cyberspace should be highlighted. These capabilities are not only used to gather intelligence and influence adversary movements but also enable strategic disruption by creating opportunities for special operations forces in hostile environments. As technology rapidly advances, these cyber capabilities are expected to increasingly impact special operations forces’ ability to conduct disruption campaigns.²⁶

The initial focus on cyber deterrence was shaped by perceptions of the severe consequences of cyberattacks, drawing parallels with classical deterrence theories and emphasizing attribution issues. However, this view is shifting; the anticipated severity has not materialized, and cyber operations are increasingly regarded as effective support for kinetic operations. Moreover, cyber operations are seen as tools for espionage, sabotage, and subversion within the gray zone of hostilities. This aligns with the concept of strategic disruption, as these activities create opportunities by hindering adversaries from achieving their objectives while remaining below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Continuities Between Special and Cyber Operations

Thomas Rid notes that cyberwar—as a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code—has not happened in the past, does not take place in the present, and is unlikely to occur in the future. He argues that politically motivated cyberattacks can be considered as manifestations of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, reflecting old conflict tactics adapted to a digital domain. He concludes that despite their technical sophistication, cyberattacks pursue the same strategic objectives as traditional intelligence operations. Additionally, he suggests that while these activities can certainly support military operations and have been used for that purpose for centuries, it remains uncertain whether they will evolve into stand-alone acts of cyberwar.²⁷

Building on Rid’s framework, an additional study compares state-sponsored special operations with modern cyber counterparts from the 20th and 21st centuries. This study reveals parallels in motivations, objectives, results, impacts on foreign relations, and the role of strategic or military intelligence agencies in planning and execution. Moreover, it situates these cyber operations within the realm of cyber intelligence, positioning them as strategic intelligence activities conducted “in and from” cyberspace toward other domains, illustrating the evolution of traditional covert intelligence activities into the cyber realm.²⁸

Examples and Impacts. Notably, 20th-century state-sponsored intelligence operations in espionage, sabotage, and subversion often lacked immediate visible strategic impacts on individuals, assets, institutions, or social cohesion within targeted states. While they could yield favorable tactical results, these actions rarely resulted in significant lasting shifts in social or power structures as well as in the adversary’s global policies.

For instance, in 1957, Soviet spy Rudolf Abel was arrested in the United States while engaged in stealing atomic secrets and gathering top-secret intelligence from the United Nations and U.S. military installations. He was convicted of conspiracy and espionage and sentenced to 45 years in prison. Later, he was exchanged for an American pilot in a spy swap between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the diplomatic repercussions of this incident, Cold War activities between the two nations continued largely unchanged.

In 1960, Francis Gary Powers, a pilot of a U-2 spy plane operated by the CIA, was shot down while conducting reconnaissance over Soviet territory. This incident occurred as both nations intensified their espionage efforts. After his capture, the Soviet government portrayed Powers as a spy, leading to international controversy and a diplomatic crisis. He was tried in Moscow and sentenced to 10 years, although he served only 4 before being exchanged for Abel in 1962. Both cases sparked diplomatic tensions but ultimately did not escalate into wider conflicts, illustrating the typical or tacit consequences of revealed intelligence activities.²⁹

National Guard and Reserve cyber professionals participate in Cyber Shield 2025 at Virginia National Guard State Military Reservation in Virginia Beach, Virginia, June 6, 2025 (U.S. Air National Guard/Yonette Martin)

The Farewell Dossier exemplifies a significant act of sabotage by the United States that did not lead to immediate shifts in the Soviet Union’s power dynamics or global policies. Although it disrupted Soviet gas pipelines, affected technological logistics, and caused economic losses, its impact was not substantial enough to undermine internal social cohesion, shift political power, or alter the country’s foreign policy. Nor did it escalate into a full-scale armed conflict or change the overall dynamics of the Cold War.

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union conducted an “active measures” campaign aimed at distancing Egypt from its alliance with the United States, undermining the 1978 Camp David Accords, and escalating tensions in the Middle East. Through disinformation, propaganda, and document forgery, Soviet efforts spread rumors to discredit both Egyptian and American presidents. While these actions introduced tensions and internal pressures in Egypt, they ultimately failed to break the U.S.- Egypt alliance or undermine the Camp David agreement. As a result of these subversion campaigns, the report by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the U.S. Department of State noted that the general responses of countries that discovered Soviet active measures included well-publicized expulsions of diplomats, journalists, and others involved in these activities, with no escalations, and the Cold War continued as usual. ³⁰

During 2024, in the cyber realm, seven Chinese intelligence officers linked to China’s Ministry of State Security were indicted for hacking into the systems of U.S. companies, politicians, governmental institutions, and officials since 2010, including those in the defense industry, critical infrastructure sectors, and individual dissidents worldwide. While this led to legal actions by the U.S. Department of Justice and sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury against the individuals and companies involved, it did not prompt any escalation, reflecting the application of tacit agreements concerning discovered intelligence operations.³¹

Francis Gary Powers (right) with U-2 designer Kelly Johnson in 1966 (U.S. Air Force)

In 2015, Ukraine’s power grid suffered an attack attributed to Russian nation-state cyber actors, marking the first cyberattack to cause a large-scale blackout. This sabotage was carried out by a hacking group that used destructive malware to compromise the industrial control systems of electrical substations. The attack significantly impacted the country’s critical infrastructure, leaving 225,000 users without electricity for several hours. However, the system managed to recover, and aside from the protests, no significant escalations occurred, with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine remaining unchanged because of this incident.³²

During the 2017 French presidential election, a foreign entity linked to Russian military intelligence interfered in the voting process through a disinformation campaign against candidate Emmanuel Macron. This subversion campaign included spreading rumors on social media platforms as well as leaking of data hacked from Macron’s campaign team. Although these efforts aimed to sway public opinion among the electorate, they did not apparently produce significant changes in the electoral landscape.³³ However, following his election, Macron made public protests against Russian state–backed media outlets RT and Sputnik, accusing them of acting as “organs of influence and propaganda” during the campaign.³⁴ This reflected a deterioration in trust between the two countries, although it did not lead to a major diplomatic friction, nor did it escalate into a larger conflict between France and Russia.

All these cases illustrate that special operations—whether related to espionage, sabotage, or subversion, and whether conducted in traditional or cyber domains—may yield tactical or even limited strategic outcomes for the attacker. However, they often fail to achieve significant strategic impacts on the target or provoke severe or extreme retaliation. Furthermore, these retaliations tend to operate within the bounds of tacit agreements, which frequently shape the nature of the responses.

Strategic Impact. Here, strategic impact encompasses kinetic or nonkinetic effects so significant in terms of the costs imposed on the adversary—whether immediate or gradually consolidating—that they hinder a short-term return to the previous strategic situation across four main areas:

• Social cohesion: Disruptions in social stability, including displacements, humanitarian crises, unrest, or casualties, weakening government legitimacy.
• Economic impact: Disruption to critical infrastructure, destabilization of financial institutions, losses in strategic sectors of the economy, erosion of internal and external economic confidence, and loss of other sources of income, causing economic stability.
• Political structure: Significant changes within government or state institutions, including shifts in political power, leadership changes, or alterations in governance frame- works. These changes may alter domestic or foreign policy as well as the legitimacy of governing bodies, affecting defense posture and national security strategy.
• Military structure: Reductions in military capability, readiness, or effectiveness, affecting defense posture and national security strategy.

For robust deterrence, threats of retaliation should ensure not only tactical success but also substantial lasting costs and consequences for the adversary.

Deterrence Representation Model. Kissinger’s deterrence model, as previously discussed, assumed clear attribution guaranteed by kinetic aggression, with responses based on mutual retaliation, especially under the concept of MAD. During the Cold War, both the immediacy of attribution and the strategic impact of a nuclear strike were so self-evident that they required no formalization and thus were not explicitly included in the deterrence models of that era.

Building on this classical conception, we propose an adapted deterrence representation model designed to assess potential vulnerabilities in deterrent posture and evaluate its overall effectiveness. This model is conceptual and illustrative. It is meant to reflect the complexities of modern deterrence, particularly in the special operations and cyber domains, by integrating factors such as “attribution,” “tacit agreements,” and “strategic impact,” rather than to generate precise numerical predictions.

These elements can lead to failures or weakened deterrent postures while also assisting in evaluating varying degrees of efficacy. By including cyber considerations, our modern deterrence model encompasses a broader range of factors:

where D represents deterrence; Pc is the power and capability of the deterrer to retaliate; Wr represents the will and resolve of the deterrer to act; Pb is the aggressor’s perception of the deterrer’s resolve to act; At represents the capacity of the deterrer to attribute, both intellectual and material, the attack (At = 1 indicates capacity; At = 0 indicates failure of deterrence); Ta represents tacit (or explicit, if they exist) agreements (Ta = 1 indicates agreements in place, Ta = 0 indicates no agreements— these represent the unspoken or formalized understandings that the deterrer is expected to uphold when responding to an attack); and STi reflects the deterrer’s evaluation of the likely kinetic or non- kinetic effects their retaliation would have on the adversary’s political, social, economic, and military situations. Note: Values exceeding 1 are not permitted. D = 0 implies uncertainty or potential failure, not necessarily absolute nullification of deterrence.

Two approaches are proposed: Binary Representation. Here, Pc, Wr, Pb, At, and STi are limited to values of 0 or 1. If any factor equals 0, then D = 0, indicating a potential failure of deterrence. 

Estimative Representation. In this case, Pc, Wr, and Pb can take values from 0 to 1, inclusive. If any factor equals 0, deterrence could fail; values between 0 and 1 indicate the parameter’s existing level, with STi calculated as follows:

Standard representation:

where each I represents an impact—economic, military, political, or social. A value of 1 indicates presence, while 0 indicates absence. The sum is divided by 4 to ensure STi remains between 0 and 1. If STi = 0, deterrence fails; any value greater than 0 suggests a partial deter- rent effect, indicating some strategic impact contributes to deterrence.

Weighted Average: For a more quantitative threshold, weights can be assigned to each impact type to reflect its relevance:

where Ie, Im, Ip, and Is remain the impact factors, and we, wm, wp, and ws are their respective weights. As in the estimative case, here even if one impact factor is zero, others may sufficiently sustain deterrence. If all weights are equal to 0, this indicates irrelevance in the considered impact areas, necessitating the use of the standard representation of STi. In all estimative calculations, multiplying the formula by 100 will yield a percentage estimation of deterrence.

Important Considerations

This framework is a starting point. New factors and more nuanced adjustments can be added to the model as needed to capture specific scenarios. The binary representation model focuses on evaluating the potential failure or success of deterrence by assigning direct values, while the estimative models offer more flexibility by allowing subjec- tive estimations of certain parameters and accounting for different strategic impacts. The weighted STi approach allows certain impacts to have more influence on the overall assessment.

However, the subjective nature of these estimations and the challenge of quantifying impacts should be considered, along with the need to ensure transparency regarding methodology and consistency throughout this process. Additionally, the model’s reliance on rational actor behavior may not always hold, as emotions, ideologies, and misperceptions can significantly influence decisionmaking. Its use should be approached with caution, especially in complex scenarios where additional variables may emerge.

For instance, the question “Can we do it repeatedly?” could introduce an additional term: D = Do * Rp, where Do denotes the original formula and Rp represents repeatability. If Rp = 0, then D = 0, indicating possible deterrence failure. Similarly, entanglement (E), reflecting external constraints like those imposed by the international community, can be added, giving D = Do * Rp * (1 – E). If E = 1 (entanglement in place), then D = 0, indicating a weakened deterrence posture.

Conclusions

Since the emergence and intensification of state-sponsored operations in cyberspace throughout the 21st century, academic interest in the deterrent effects of this new domain of conflict has markedly increased. Initially, this interest was predicated on the assumption that cyber operations, or cyber warfare, could inflict catastrophic damage on adversaries. It was anticipated that these operations would exert an effective deterrent influence comparable to that of conventional or nuclear weapons in the past. However, it has become increasingly evident that cyber operations among states have escalated without achieving effective deterrence against such attacks.

This evolving scenario has spurred scholarly inquiry into the underlying dilemmas of deterrence failures in cyberspace, particularly as these challenges diverge from classical deterrence theories. Notably, this area has not been thoroughly examined within academia in relation to traditional special operations. This lack of attention may result from the secrecy surrounding their impacts or from the prevailing belief that such operations do not significantly alter the existing social or power dynamics of the adversary.

Drawing on a rigorous theoretical framework, academic studies, and historical examples, we have identified a clear pattern in state-sponsored intelligence special operations—encompassing both traditional and cyber domains—and demonstrating continuity in the strategies of espionage, sabotage, and subversion. While these operations may yield tactical successes, their long-term strategic impact on foreign relations, as well as on the social, economic, and power dynamics of states, appears more limited.

Moreover, emerging investigative perspectives view both special and cyber operations as continuous and integral components of strategic disruption, serving as vital complements to the overall deterrent posture of states. In this context, the significance of agreements—whether tacit or explicit—should not be underestimated. These agreements play a crucial role in moderating state responses and preventing the escalation of armed conflicts or war.

The adaptation of the classical deterrence model from the Cold War incorporates elements such as the viability of attribution, the existence of tacit agreements, and strategic impacts. As a preliminary illustrative framework, this adaptation allows us to highlight the complexity of evaluating, a priori, the potential degree of effectiveness or failure of contemporary deterrence, including cyber. This proposed dynamic and adjustable model reflects the hybrid and constantly evolving nature of modern conflicts.

The dilemma of cyber deterrence, much like that of traditional special operations, highlights the limitations of these approaches as stand-alone deterrent strategies. Instead, both serve as integral components that reinforce the broader deterrent posture of states, consistent with the principles of hybrid deterrence. Understanding the dynamics of deterrence within traditional special operations is therefore essential to comprehending the current limitations of cyber deterrence. Notably, the apparent failure of cyber deterrence is not entirely unprecedented; it reflects a historical continuity with the persistent challenges of deterring covert operations such as espionage, sabotage, and subversion. In simpler terms, both cyber and covert special operations—although often invisible or plausibly denied—are central tools through which states compete while avoiding full-scale war. Recognizing this continuity helps governments understand today’s strategic environment more clearly and design more realistic and adaptive national security strategies. JFQ

Notes

¹ 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-352a.

² Associated Press, “Experts Say Soviets Learned ‘Nothing New’ From NBC Show,” Washington Times, May 21, 1986, declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency, May 8, 2012, CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470011-1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470011-1.pdf.

³ Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2011), 22, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939.

⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), xviii.

⁵ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984), 499–500, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010184.

⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 12; R. Goychayev et al., Cyber Deterrence and Stability: Assessing Cyber Weapon Analogues Through Existing WMD Deterrence and Arms Control Regimes, PNNL-26932 (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, September 2017), https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-26932.pdf.

⁷ Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 64.

⁸ Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.

⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 53–80.

¹⁰ Rosemary Avance et al., United States Deterrence Policy: 1944–Present (Stillwater, OK: Media Ecology and Strategic Analysis Group, September 2023), https://mesagroup.okstate.edu/images/FINAL_LITERATURE_REVIEW.pdf.

¹¹ Avance et al., United States Deterrence Policy, 28–9.

¹² Mark M. Lowenthal, The Future of Intelligence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), 100.

¹³ U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2013), 72, https://web.archive.org/web/20241208034229/https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20 Overview_web.pdf.

¹⁴ Gonzalo Bravo Tejos, “Operaciones especiales: una visión amplia y actualizada del concepto” [Special operations: a broad and updated view of the concept], Revista de la marina 134, no. 958 (2017), https://revistamarina.cl/es/articulo/operaciones-especiales-una-vision-amplia-y-actualizada-del-concepto.

¹⁵ Eric Robinson et al., Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces: A Concept for Proactive Campaigning Short of Traditional War, RR-A1794-1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 5, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1794-1.html.

¹⁶ Michael Warner, “Intelligence in Cyber— and Cyber in Intelligence,” in Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies, ed. George Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 17–29, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/10/understanding-cyber-conflict-14-analogies.

¹⁷ Peter C. Oleson, “When Intelligence Made a Difference: Cold War—Farewell Dossier,” Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies 29, no. 1 (2024), 75–84, https://www.afio.com/assets/publications/excerpts/OLESON_ Farewell_Dossier_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol29_ No1_WinterSpring_2024.pdf.

¹⁸ “Soviet ‘Active Measures’: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations,” Special Report No. 88, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1981, CIA-RDP 84B00274R000100040004-8, released March 12, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP84B00274R000100040004-8.pdf.

¹⁹ See Sharon Weinberger, “Cyber Pearl Harbor: Why Hasn’t a Mega Attack Happened?,” BBC, August 19, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20130820-cyber-pearl-harbor-a-real-fear.

²⁰ See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 8–9, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG877.html.

²¹ See Arsalan Bilal, “Hybrid Warfare— New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Trust’ as the Antidote,” NATO Review, November 30, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20250326015959/https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/ hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Electromagnetic Warfare,” last updated March 22, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ topics_80906.htm.

²² Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.

²³ Martin C. Libicki, “Expectations of Cyber Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2018), 44–57, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-4/Libicki.pdf.

²⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” International Security 41, no. 3 (2016–17), 44–71, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266.

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Is Cyber the Perfect Weapon?,” Project Syndicate, July 5, 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deterring-cyber-attacks-and-information-warfare-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-07.

²⁶ Robinson et al., Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces, 59.

²⁷ Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” 5–32.

²⁸ Jorge R. Kravetz, “Operaciones especiales en el ciberespacio: espionaje, sabotaje y subversión en el siglo XXI” [Special operations in cyberspace: espionage, sabotage, and subversion in the 21st century],” Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia 3 (July–December 2023), 35–64, https://doi.org/10.58752/1PVI0VZ2.

²⁹ “Rudolf Abel and the Hollow Nickel Case,” Federal Bureau of Investigation History, n.d., https://www.fbi.gov/history/artifacts/rudolph-abel-hollow-nickel-case; “U-2 Overflights and the Capture of Francis Gary Powers, 1960,” Department of State, Office of the Historian, n.d., https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/u2-incident.

³⁰ “Soviet ‘Active Measures.’”

³¹ “Seven Hackers Associated With Chinese Government Charged With Computer Intrusions Targeting Perceived Critics of China and U.S. Businesses and Politicians,” Department of Justice, March 25, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-hackers-associated-chinese-government- charged-computer-intrusions-targeting-perceived.

³² “Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure,” CISA, July 20, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics- alerts/ir-alert-h-16-056-01.

³³ Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer et al., Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies (Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Armed Forces, August 2018), 106–16, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_ manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf.

³⁴ Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer, Russian Election Interference: Europe’s Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), 11, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21009.6.