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Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University.
In April 2024, Xi Jinping announced a new military restructuring focused on improving the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve information dominance and conduct integrated joint operations in wartime. Continuing a process of reform that Xi initiated nearly a decade ago,1 the latest reform included three parts: eliminating the Strategic Support Force (SSF), establishing a new Information Support Force (ISF) responsible for network defense and communications support, and placing the ISF and three other support forces under Xi’s direct control.2 This reform constituted the most significant structural overhaul of the PLA in the last 5 years, and the first since Russia’s failed attempt to topple the government in Ukraine signaled to Xi and other Chinese leaders the difficulties of offensive warfare, especially as Russian troops struggled to dominate the information environment and fight effectively as a joint force.3
Xi’s reorganization seeks to continue to improve the PLA so that it can succeed where Russia stalled. A new round of structural improvements has been regarded internally as a positive step in the PLA’s ability to meet its 2027 modernization timeline, which reportedly has a focus on preparations for a Taiwan contingency.4 This article traces the origins of Xi’s latest reform, analyzing each of the three major components in turn. It then discusses the implications for the PLA’s operational effectiveness and the challenges that remain. The conclusion is that the reforms could improve the Chinese leadership’s confidence in the PLA’s combat potential and thus shape leadership views on the costs and risks of aggression. Refinements to the U.S. Joint Warfighting Concept should take this revised institutional context into account.
The Demise of the SSF
The latest restructuring is part of a process of military reforms stretching back to the early years of Xi’s tenure as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the PLA’s high command. There were three general purposes for reform. First was to better posture the PLA to conduct joint operations by removing the service headquarters from the operational chain of command and empowering joint commanders in five newly created theater commands to carry out joint planning, conduct joint training, and transition more efficiently to a wartime footing. Second was improving the PLA’s internal management by breaking up corruption-prone power centers, especially the four Cold War–era general departments; replacing them with smaller, easier-to-manage CMC departments, commissions, and offices; and providing greater autonomy to internal supervisors such as auditors and anticorruption inspectors. Third was better integrating the PLA with civilian resources through acquisition, mobilization, and logistics system reforms.5 All three reasons were integral to Xi’s call for the PLA to be better prepared to “fight and win wars.”
One of the early structural innovations in Xi’s tenure was the creation of the SSF in December 2015.6 This force brought together information warfare capabilities that were previously distributed across the PLA. The SSF had two components: the Aerospace Force, which included space and counterspace capabilities, and the Cyberspace Force, which conducted cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.7 At the SSF’s inauguration, Xi hailed it as a “new type of combat force that safeguards national security and is an important support for our military’s joint combat system.”8 Retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, a frequent commentator on PLA affairs, described it as crucial for victory in “local wars under informatized conditions” through reconnaissance, early warning, communications, navigation, and battlefield support “for the joint operations of multiple services and branches.”9
Further adjustments to the SSF took place in a “below-the-neck” mini-reorganization between 2017 and 2019. This change involved the transfer of the PLA’s Information Communication Base from the Joint Staff Department to the SSF. The former organization was responsible for managing joint communications networks (including fiber optic cables), providing cyber defense, and overseeing communications brigades based in the theaters.10 At the PLA’s 70th anniversary parade in 2017, a new “SSF information support team,” led by a major general, was unveiled, which PLA media described as a “new-type combat force to safeguard national security.”11 By 2024, the SSF had established an Information Technology Force, coexisting alongside the aerospace and cyberspace forces.12 Adding these capabilities to the SSF cemented its role as the primary provider of information services to joint warfighters.
It was therefore surprising when the SSF suddenly disappeared in April 2024. This was the first and only case of a Xi-era military reform being overturned. PLA sources did not provide an explanation, leaving foreign analysts to speculate about the reasons. John Costello and Joe McReynolds contend that the SSF may never have been intended as a permanent fixture; its main purpose could have been nurturing nascent cyber and space forces, which after 8 years were ready to manage themselves. They also propose that the SSF’s demise might have been accelerated by corruption. They note that former Defense Minister Li Shangfu, whom Xi fired in 2023, had been an SSF deputy commander in 2016–2017 and that the SSF’s last commander, Ju Qiansheng, had disappeared for a time amid rumors of graft.13
However, these arguments might not be correct. There is no precedent for the PLA to establish a major headquarters purely as a transitional arrangement: Xi’s comments to the SSF at its inception indicated a hope that it would thrive in the long term. It is also unclear why the PLA would have created an incubator for space and cyber forces, but not for logistics forces, which had been merged into the Joint Logistic Support Force in 2016 but did not need a parent organization like the SSF to ensure their success.14 The political argument is also tenuous. Li Shangfu’s offenses were related to his tenure as head of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department, and not to his earlier SSF position.15 SSF commander Ju Qiansheng disappeared in mid-2023 but later resurfaced and was not charged with corruption or removed from the PLA. Moreover, the PLA has many existing power centers at the same bureaucratic level as the SSF, including the corruption-plagued Rocket Force, that were not shut down.
Rather, the SSF was probably dissolved because it had become a bureaucratic nuisance. Reformers might have envisioned it promoting greater synergies across different information warfare disciplines, which PLA doctrine considers essential for success on the future battlefield,16 but as Chinese sources note, most modern militaries have separate space and cyber forces17—after all, they exist for different reasons and harness different technologies. This was no less true in the PLA, where space and cyber forces remained largely within their own bureaucratic silos—the same people conducting the same missions from the same locations, without much SSF-led coordination between them. As an excess management layer, the SSF also reduced the PLA senior leadership’s (and Xi’s) insight into sensitive programs. Costello and McReynolds reasonably speculate that the SSF might have been blamed for embarrassing Xi when, in February 2023, a Chinese spy balloon traveled over—and was ultimately shot down over—the United States. SSF leaders might have failed to transmit vital information related to this program to the top.18 As he has done in other parts of the reform, Xi appears to have concluded that the best solution was to abandon a bureaucratic structure that was not producing the desired effect—and to replace it with something better.
Rise of the Information Support Force
Coinciding with the dissolution of the SSF, the PLA confirmed that its main internal components would become independent forces. The Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force now report directly to the CMC, with a similar status as the Joint Logistic Support Force. At the same time, the creation of the Information Support Force was announced. The initial commander was Lieutenant General Bi Yi, who previously served as an SSF deputy commander and was earlier a deputy head of the CMC Training and Administration Department.19 At the force’s inaugural flag-raising ceremony, Xi called it a “key support for coordinating the construction and application of network information systems” [网络信息系统].20
The ISF’s structure was likely inher- ited from earlier SSF information forces. Costello and McReynolds assess that it handles military networks, cyber defense, and electromagnetic spectrum allocation and management, as well as meteorology, navigation, mapping, and other battle- field support functions.21 It may therefore have responsibility for communications and navigation satellites, though this has not been confirmed.22 In comparative terms, the ISF would centralize a number of information functions that are handled in different parts of the U.S. Department of Defense. Its role in network manage- ment and spectrum allocation mirrors that of the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency, which provides informa- tion technology and communications support to combatant commanders and the military Services. The ISF’s network defense function appears similar to that of U.S. Cyber Command (with the PLA Cyberspace Force handling offensive cyber and electronic warfare missions). The creation of the ISF is consistent with PLA concepts of “system destruc- tion warfare,” referring to the idea that the side that is best able to preserve its own systems while destroying the enemy’s systems is most likely to prevail in modern combat.23 The protection and effective management of one’s “in- formation support system” [信息保障 体系] play a critical role in this respect. This system consists of information and communications networks, navigational and positional data (including Beidou satellites), and information assurance measures such as data encryption.24 Based on its assessed internal compo- nents, the ISF is a more complete and bureaucratically higher level embodiment of the information support system than its predecessors. It was no surprise that a PLA Daily commentary discussing its creation noted that “modern war is a confrontation between systems and a contest between systems. Whoever has the advantage of information will have the initiative in war.”25
Chinese sources provide indications of three priorities for the ISF. First is improving interoperability in communications systems across the PLA, as suggested in Xi’s reference to the ISF as a “key support” for “network information systems.” The latter phrase dates to the 2017 Science of Military Strategy, a key PLA doctrinal teaching volume, which states that “joint operations based on network information systems” have become “the basic form of operations.”26 Xi’s 19th Party Congress work report later that year encouraged the PLA to “increase joint combat capabilities based on network information systems.”27 His 20th Party Congress work report in 2022 repeated this goal, after which CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang described “network information systems” as the “basic support” for “smooth and efficient joint operations.”28 However, previous reforms were apparently lacking. A PLA senior colonel argues that the ISF should address enduring communications problems, including software and hardware incompatibility among PLA units and poor information-sharing. He writes that the ISF will “build a solid line of defense in this area and ensure information superiority.”29
A second goal is increasing the efficiency of decisionmaking. For the PLA, network information systems connote not only interoperability but also faster and more precise decision processes. One article, for instance, claims that such systems can aid commanders through data analysis, trend predictions, combat plans evaluation, and other tools.30 The PLA senior colonel quoted above also noted that in previous wars, commanders spent 85 percent of their time processing information, but only 15 percent considering operational issues. However, “after the combat command information system receives network integration,” those ratios would be reversed, “greatly improving command efficiency.”31 It would be logical to assume that one purpose for ISF systems updates would be to upgrade command, control, communications, and computers to make greater use of computer-aided decisionmaking automation, including the use of artificial intelligence tools to aid commanders. PLA sources have long associated such improvements with an ability to compete in the “intelligentized” wars of the future.32
A third goal is defending information systems from adversary attack. Speculatively, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine might have drawn greater Chinese leadership attention to communications vulnerabilities in wartime. One Chinese defense industry article suggested that communications has long been a Russian weakness, stretching back to World War II when Soviet tank crews lacked communications equipment and were easily targeted by German antitank batteries.33 The article noted that in Ukraine, Russia did not destroy Ukraine’s civil communications infrastructure because it needed it to coordinate its own forces—and therefore could not achieve “information dominance.” Moreover, poor communications meant that Russian generals had to operate near the front lines, making them targets for defenders. The ISF supports the “information assurance” role of the “information support system” by defending against adversaries, which would be a critical task in any major conflict.
Building a “Military Force System”
Xi’s latest reform was larger than improving China’s ability to build an effective “information support system”; it supported the more ambitious goal of building a “modern military force system” [现代军事力量体系]. Xi’s address to the ISF in April 2024 stated that its creation represented “a strategic measure to build a new service and arms institutional layout and improve the modern military force system with Chinese characteristics.”34 The Defense Ministry spokesman added that the revised system would consist of the four services—the army, navy, air force, and Rocket Force—and four support forces, including the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistic Support Force (which some foreign analysts have referred to as the “4+4” system).35 He added that as the situation evolves, “we will continue to improve the military force system with Chinese characteristics.”36
The unfolding of the new 4+4 system was part of a long-term process of clarifying the relations among the services, operational commanders, and support forces. The term stretches back to 2013 with discussions of a “lean, flexible, versatile, and efficient” system where “leadership decisionmaking and management efficiency is relatively high, and the mechanisms for joint command, training, and support are relatively sound.”37 As noted, the initial steps were taken in 2015 and 2016 with the creation of a modern joint command system led by the CMC (which manages the Joint Staff Department and the national Joint Operations Command Center) and the five joint theater commands, and the reversion of the service headquarters to a “man, train, equip” function. Along with the establishment of the SSF and Joint Logistic Support Force, joint commanders could not only draw on service-provided forces based within their geographic regions but also be augmented by information and logistics services normally held at the national level during major contingencies. Determining how these actors would relate to each other in wartime would be of critical importance for combat effectiveness.38
Despite these early reforms, PLA sources continued to reference the need for improvements to the “military force system.” A 2018 PLA Daily commentary called for further upgrades, including in the coordinated construction of the theaters and services, integration of combat and support forces, and integration up and down the leadership chain. Modernizing “network information systems” was a key step in producing a more cohesive system by promoting information-sharing and interoperability.39 Chinese sources also suggested that the system should become leaner and more efficient. A 2022 article suggests that a system that has too many layers “not only responds slowly, but is also relatively conservative and solid, and cannot adapt to a readily changing environment.”40 Previewing the 2024 reforms, the article goes on to state that:
The future innovation of the military force structure should maximize the synergy of new and old combat forces by adjusting the structure and optimizing the formation, extending the new combat force level downward, accelerating the combination of [new] combat forces in the fields of network, space, and information with traditional combat forces of land, sea, and air at the tactical level, and allocating new combat force units at the battle level, and dispersing them as appropriate to be assigned downward and ready to be accessed at any time according to the needs of the battle.41
Along these lines, the 4+4 system appears designed to reduce bottlenecks in the provision of support capabilities to joint warfighters. It does this by placing the four support forces at the same bureaucratic level—in the PLA’s byzantine organizational structure, they are all now one level below the theaters—and can thus follow similar procedures for the transfer and utilization of their subordinate units.42 Costello and McReynolds liken them to a set of “functional combatant commands,” which are each designed as providers of specialized services to the theaters (the PLA’s version of geographic combatant commands) and national authorities.43 This appears as a good analogy, with the addition that the PLA also requires its version of a “global integrator” (a role played by the U.S. Joint Staff) to align national assets with theater needs. In the PLA system, this role would probably be played by the CMC Joint Staff Department and the Joint Operations Command Center, which sit above both the theaters and support force. Overall, this represents an improvement over the previous system, in which the SSF was on the same level as the theaters, which rendered coordination more difficult.
Implications and Challenges
The latest reform, if successful, could better position the PLA to achieve information dominance and operate as a cohesive joint force, although some problems remain. PLA commentary has referred to the changes as an “important increment in increasing the PLA’s combat effectiveness” and claimed that they would “definitely help” achieve the PLA’s 2027 centennial goal “on schedule.”44 Chinese officials have generally referred to 2027 as an important date for military modernization, alongside later targets in 2035 and 2049.45 U.S. officials have disclosed that Xi has also specifically instructed the PLA to be better prepared for combat operations against Taiwan by that date.46 There is consequently a general sense in which the creation of the ISF and improvements to the “military force system” will improve the PLA’s combat capabilities.
In the information domain, the reform is most apparent in promoting more resilient and efficient “network information systems.” With a commander at a higher bureaucratic grade than his predecessors, the ISF can more effectively lobby for funding and authority to improve network defenses, encourage communications interoperability among the different services and branches, and push for the broader integration of artificial intelligence–assisted data processing and decisionmaking. Greater information support could be vital for the PLA to continue to operate in the face of adversary cyber, electronic warfare, and kinetic attacks on critical information systems in wartime and to enable commanders across all echelons to make quicker and more accurate decisions. These benefits would advance the PLA’s ability to achieve “information dominance”—one of the doctrinal “three dominances” (information, air, and sea)—as part of the opening phases of a war with Taiwan and the United States.47
The reform could also produce a PLA with a stronger ability to plan, train for, and conduct joint operations. With four support forces at the same grade, the PLA could develop standard methods for transferring capabilities from their parent organizations to joint commanders at the theater level or below. Eliminating SSF headquarters could be valuable in that it would remove a bureaucratically senior organization that might have its own views on where and how resources should be allocated. It is probable that the PLA’s joint doctrine—which began to be overhauled with the CMC’s release of a new outline for joint operations in late 202048—will specify the standard relations between services, support forces, and theaters; those processes will have to be integrated into large-scale PLA exercises in the next several years to ensure that transitions to wartime are as smooth as possible.
Nevertheless, the reform also highlights several continuing weaknesses for the PLA. First is the center’s difficult task of managing the bureaucracy. Xi himself is only a part-time CMC chairman, with most of his time spent on political, diplomatic, and economic affairs. It is doubtful that within Xi’s military portfolio, he can spend significant time on information warfare, or that he has the expertise to guide the development of the ISF and other support forces. The CMC also lacks other members with high-tech expertise, raising questions about its ability to supervise these forces.49 Replacing the SSF with a set of three independent forces will, if anything, increase the “span of control” problem facing the CMC. How well the CMC can handle these additional tasks will probably depend on management and expertise by the Joint Staff Department, which functions as the PLA’s highest-level joint command. In the absence of effective central management, the ISF, the Cyberspace Force, the Aerospace Force, and the Joint Logistic Support Force could evolve into bureaucratic fiefdoms like the SSF, but on a smaller scale, with their leaders still hesitant to share sensitive or embarrassing information with the top; autonomy, especially in a post-Xi era, could also breed corruption.
Second, the PLA will continue to face challenges in the allocation of national assets to the theaters, including those held by the support forces. The Eastern Theater commander, who is responsible for cross-Strait operations, does not “own” space, cyber, information, or joint logistics forces. These forces are centralized because they are scarce and must be available to support operations across a range of scenarios, including domestic emergencies that may happen anywhere(similar to the 2020 pandemic), escalating tensions with India, Japan, or the Philippines, or, in a worst-case scenario, simultaneous crises in the main and secondary theaters—which PLA theorists refer to as “chain reaction warfare.”50
Centralizing these assets encourages flexible use but reduces any specific theater’s ability to integrate them in peacetime. It also means that the CMC and its Joint Staff Department will face challenges during wartime in deciding which resources to allocate to the Eastern Theater and what to distribute elsewhere to preserve general readiness. Those challenges could be exacerbated if commanders in secondary theaters lobby for the allocation of national assets to strengthen deterrence.
Third, the new “military force system” does not support a larger global role for the PLA. The intent of the system is to promote more cohesive joint operations, but the focus remains on domestic and regional crises. There is no joint command and control structure available to lead the integration of combat and support forces beyond China’s periphery.51 PLA logistics forces have not increased their global footprint (such as large munitions stockpiles), and there are no large permanent overseas deployments.52 If the ISF takes control of communications and navigation satellites, it would play an important role in supporting limited PLA deployments that currently take place, such as naval antipiracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden, but this is not equivalent to the construction of a “system of systems” capable of executing high-end combat operations abroad. Such changes, if they occur, will be contingent on a more fundamental shift in China’s military strategy to require the PLA “fight and win wars” outside Asia.
Deterring Chinese adventurism across the Taiwan Strait requires undermining Chinese leadership’s confidence in China’s ability to prevail at an acceptable cost. Continued reforms to the PLA’s structure that promote greater “combat effectiveness” make that task more difficult. The elimination of the SSF as a bureaucratic obstacle, construction of a force dedicated to improving information support, and stronger alignment of support and combat forces will increase the PLA’s confidence that it can operate cohesively and provide resilient and effective information support to commanders in wartime. Still, the PLA faces serious problems, including limited oversight from the top, resource allocation tradeoffs, and limited global combat potential—all of which are aggravated by the Chinese leadership’s concerns that their forces remain untested. For the United States, the Joint Warfighting Concept and Service doctrines, in this context, should continue to seek ways to exploit those vulnerabilities to ensure that the PLA remains doubtful that its battlefield objectives can be achieved.53 JFQ